private/system_server.te

#
# System Server aka system_server spawned by zygote.
# Most of the framework services run in this process.
#

typeattribute system_server coredomain;
typeattribute system_server mlstrustedsubject;
typeattribute system_server scheduler_service_server;
typeattribute system_server sensor_service_server;
typeattribute system_server stats_service_server;

# Define a type for tmpfs-backed ashmem regions.
tmpfs_domain(system_server)

# Create a socket for connections from crash_dump.
type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_ndebug_socket "ndebugsocket";

# Create a socket for connections from zygotes.
type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_unsolzygote_socket "unsolzygotesocket";

allow system_server zygote_tmpfs:file read;
allow system_server appdomain_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };

# For Incremental Service to check if incfs is available
allow system_server proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;

# Access the IncFS list of features
r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_fs_incfs_features);

# To create files, get permission to fill blocks, and configure Incremental File System
allow system_server incremental_control_file:file { ioctl r_file_perms };
allowxperm system_server incremental_control_file:file ioctl {
  INCFS_IOCTL_CREATE_FILE
  INCFS_IOCTL_CREATE_MAPPED_FILE
  INCFS_IOCTL_PERMIT_FILL
  INCFS_IOCTL_GET_READ_TIMEOUTS
  INCFS_IOCTL_SET_READ_TIMEOUTS
};

# To get signature of an APK installed on Incremental File System, and fill in data
# blocks and get the filesystem state
allowxperm system_server apk_data_file:file ioctl {
  INCFS_IOCTL_READ_SIGNATURE
  INCFS_IOCTL_FILL_BLOCKS
  INCFS_IOCTL_GET_FILLED_BLOCKS
  INCFS_IOCTL_GET_BLOCK_COUNT
};

# For art.
allow system_server { apex_art_data_file dalvikcache_data_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server { apex_art_data_file dalvikcache_data_file }:file r_file_perms;

# When running system server under --invoke-with, we'll try to load the boot image under the
# system server domain, following links to the system partition.
with_asan(`allow system_server dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;')

# /data/resource-cache
allow system_server resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow system_server resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;

# ptrace to processes in the same domain for debugging crashes.
allow system_server self:process ptrace;

# Child of the zygote.
allow system_server zygote:fd use;
allow system_server zygote:process sigchld;

# May kill zygote on crashes.
allow system_server {
  app_zygote
  crash_dump
  webview_zygote
  zygote
}:process { sigkill signull };

# Read /system/bin/app_process.
allow system_server zygote_exec:file r_file_perms;

# Needed to close the zygote socket, which involves getopt / getattr
allow system_server zygote:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr };

# system server gets network and bluetooth permissions.
net_domain(system_server)
# in addition to ioctls allowlisted for all domains, also allow system_server
# to use privileged ioctls commands. Needed to set up VPNs.
allowxperm system_server self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
bluetooth_domain(system_server)

# Allow setup of tcp keepalive offload. This gives system_server the permission to
# call ioctl on app domains' tcp sockets. Additional ioctl commands still need to
# be granted individually, except for a small set of safe values allowlisted in
# public/domain.te.
allow system_server appdomain:tcp_socket ioctl;

# These are the capabilities assigned by the zygote to the
# system server.
allow system_server self:global_capability_class_set {
    ipc_lock
    kill
    net_admin
    net_bind_service
    net_broadcast
    net_raw
    sys_boot
    sys_nice
    sys_ptrace
    sys_time
    sys_tty_config
};

# Trigger module auto-load.
allow system_server kernel:system module_request;

# Allow alarmtimers to be set
allow system_server self:global_capability2_class_set wake_alarm;

# Create and share netlink_netfilter_sockets for tetheroffload.
allow system_server self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;

# Create/use netlink_tcpdiag_socket for looking up connection UIDs for VPN apps.
allow system_server self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { create_socket_perms_no_ioctl nlmsg_read };

# Use netlink uevent sockets.
allow system_server self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;

# Use generic netlink sockets.
allow system_server self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
allow system_server self:netlink_generic_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;

# libvintf reads the kernel config to verify vendor interface compatibility.
allow system_server config_gz:file { read open };

# Use generic "sockets" where the address family is not known
# to the kernel. The ioctl permission is specifically omitted here, but may
# be added to device specific policy along with the ioctl commands to be
# allowlisted.
allow system_server self:socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;

# Set and get routes directly via netlink.
allow system_server self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_write;

# Kill apps.
allow system_server appdomain:process { getpgid sigkill signal };
# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
allow system_server appdomain:process { signull };

# Set scheduling info for apps.
allow system_server appdomain:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server audioserver:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_audio:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_bluetooth:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_codec2_server:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_omx_server:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server mediaswcodec:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server cameraserver:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server hal_camera:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server mediaserver:process { getsched setsched };
allow system_server bootanim:process { getsched setsched };

# Set scheduling info for psi monitor thread.
# TODO: delete this line b/131761776
allow system_server kernel:process { getsched setsched };

# Allow system_server to write to /proc/<pid>/*
allow system_server domain:file w_file_perms;

# Read /proc/pid data for all domains. This is used by ProcessCpuTracker
# within system_server to keep track of memory and CPU usage for
# all processes on the device. In addition, /proc/pid files access is needed
# for dumping stack traces of native processes.
r_dir_file(system_server, domain)

# Write /proc/uid_cputime/remove_uid_range.
allow system_server proc_uid_cputime_removeuid:file { w_file_perms getattr };

# Write /proc/uid_procstat/set.
allow system_server proc_uid_procstat_set:file { w_file_perms getattr };

# Write to /proc/sysrq-trigger.
allow system_server proc_sysrq:file rw_file_perms;

# Delete /data/misc/stats-data/ and /data/misc/stats-service/ directories.
allow system_server stats_data_file:dir { open read remove_name search write };
allow system_server stats_data_file:file unlink;

# Read /sys/kernel/debug/wakeup_sources.
allow system_server debugfs_wakeup_sources:file r_file_perms;

# Read /sys/kernel/ion/*.
allow system_server sysfs_ion:file r_file_perms;

# The DhcpClient and WifiWatchdog use packet_sockets
allow system_server self:packet_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;

# 3rd party VPN clients require a tun_socket to be created
allow system_server self:tun_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;

# Talk to init and various daemons via sockets.
unix_socket_connect(system_server, lmkd, lmkd)
unix_socket_connect(system_server, mtpd, mtp)
unix_socket_connect(system_server, zygote, zygote)
unix_socket_connect(system_server, racoon, racoon)
unix_socket_connect(system_server, uncrypt, uncrypt)

# Allow system_server to write to statsd.
unix_socket_send(system_server, statsdw, statsd)

# Communicate over a socket created by surfaceflinger.
allow system_server surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt };

allow system_server gpuservice:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt };

# Communicate over a socket created by webview_zygote.
allow system_server webview_zygote:unix_stream_socket { read write connectto setopt };

# Communicate over a socket created by app_zygote.
allow system_server app_zygote:unix_stream_socket { read write connectto setopt };

# Perform Binder IPC.
binder_use(system_server)
binder_call(system_server, appdomain)
binder_call(system_server, binderservicedomain)
binder_call(system_server, dumpstate)
binder_call(system_server, fingerprintd)
binder_call(system_server, gatekeeperd)
binder_call(system_server, gpuservice)
binder_call(system_server, idmap)
binder_call(system_server, installd)
binder_call(system_server, incidentd)
binder_call(system_server, iorapd)
binder_call(system_server, netd)
binder_call(system_server, notify_traceur)
userdebug_or_eng(`binder_call(system_server, profcollectd)')
binder_call(system_server, statsd)
binder_call(system_server, storaged)
binder_call(system_server, update_engine)
binder_call(system_server, vold)
binder_call(system_server, wificond)
binder_call(system_server, wpantund)
binder_service(system_server)

# Use HALs
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_allocator)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_audio)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_authsecret)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_broadcastradio)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_codec2)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_configstore)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_contexthub)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_face)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_fingerprint)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_gnss)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_graphics_allocator)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_health)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_input_classifier)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_ir)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_light)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_memtrack)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_neuralnetworks)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_oemlock)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_omx)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_power)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_power_stats)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_rebootescrow)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_sensors)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_tetheroffload)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_thermal)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_tv_cec)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_tv_input)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_usb)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_usb_gadget)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_vibrator)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_vr)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_weaver)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_wifi)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_wifi_hostapd)
hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_wifi_supplicant)
# The bootctl is a pass through HAL mode under recovery mode. So we skip the
# permission for recovery in order not to give system server the access to
# the low level block devices.
not_recovery(`hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_bootctl)')

# Talk with graphics composer fences
allow system_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;

# Use RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
allow system_server hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
allow system_server same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };

# Talk to tombstoned to get ANR traces.
unix_socket_connect(system_server, tombstoned_intercept, tombstoned)

# List HAL interfaces to get ANR traces.
allow system_server hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager list;

# Send signals to trigger ANR traces.
allow system_server {
  # This is derived from the list that system server defines as interesting native processes
  # to dump during ANRs or watchdog aborts, defined in NATIVE_STACKS_OF_INTEREST in
  # frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/Watchdog.java.
  audioserver
  cameraserver
  drmserver
  gpuservice
  inputflinger
  mediadrmserver
  mediaextractor
  mediametrics
  mediaserver
  mediaswcodec
  mediatranscoding
  mediatuner
  netd
  sdcardd
  statsd
  surfaceflinger
  vold

  # This list comes from HAL_INTERFACES_OF_INTEREST in
  # frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/Watchdog.java.
  hal_audio_server
  hal_bluetooth_server
  hal_camera_server
  hal_codec2_server
  hal_face_server
  hal_fingerprint_server
  hal_gnss_server
  hal_graphics_allocator_server
  hal_graphics_composer_server
  hal_health_server
  hal_light_server
  hal_neuralnetworks_server
  hal_omx_server
  hal_power_stats_server
  hal_sensors_server
  hal_vr_server
  system_suspend_server
}:process { signal };

# Use sockets received over binder from various services.
allow system_server audioserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
allow system_server audioserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
allow system_server mediaserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
allow system_server mediaserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;

# Use sockets received over binder from various services.
allow system_server mediadrmserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
allow system_server mediadrmserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;

userdebug_or_eng(`perfetto_producer({ system_server })')

# Get file context
allow system_server file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
# access for mac_permissions
allow system_server mac_perms_file: file r_file_perms;
# Check SELinux permissions.
selinux_check_access(system_server)

allow system_server sysfs_type:dir search;

r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_android_usb)
allow system_server sysfs_android_usb:file w_file_perms;

allow system_server sysfs_extcon:dir r_dir_perms;

r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_ipv4)
allow system_server sysfs_ipv4:file w_file_perms;

r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_rtc)
r_dir_file(system_server, sysfs_switch)

allow system_server sysfs_nfc_power_writable:file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server sysfs_power:dir search;
allow system_server sysfs_power:file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server sysfs_thermal:dir search;
allow system_server sysfs_thermal:file r_file_perms;
allow system_server sysfs_uhid:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server sysfs_uhid:file rw_file_perms;

# TODO: Remove when HALs are forced into separate processes
allow system_server sysfs_vibrator:file { write append };

# TODO: added to match above sysfs rule. Remove me?
allow system_server sysfs_usb:file w_file_perms;

# Access devices.
allow system_server device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server mdns_socket:sock_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server input_device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server input_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server tty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server usbaccessory_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server video_device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server adbd_socket:sock_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server rtc_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server audio_device:dir r_dir_perms;

# write access to ALSA interfaces (/dev/snd/*) needed for MIDI
allow system_server audio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;

# tun device used for 3rd party vpn apps
allow system_server tun_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allowxperm system_server tun_device:chr_file ioctl { TUNGETIFF TUNSETIFF };

# Manage data/ota_package
allow system_server ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow system_server ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage system data files.
allow system_server system_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server system_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
allow system_server packages_list_file:file create_file_perms;
allow system_server keychain_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server keychain_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow system_server keychain_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;

# Manage /data/app.
allow system_server apk_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server apk_data_file:{ file lnk_file } { create_file_perms link };
allow system_server apk_tmp_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server apk_tmp_file:file create_file_perms;

# Access input configuration files in the /vendor directory
r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_keylayout_file)
r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_keychars_file)
r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_idc_file)

# Access /vendor/{app,framework,overlay}
r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_app_file)
r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_framework_file)
r_dir_file(system_server, vendor_overlay_file)

# Manage /data/app-private.
allow system_server apk_private_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server apk_private_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow system_server apk_private_tmp_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server apk_private_tmp_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage files within asec containers.
allow system_server asec_apk_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server asec_apk_file:file create_file_perms;
allow system_server asec_public_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage /data/anr.
#
# TODO: Some of these permissions can be withdrawn once we've switched to the
# new stack dumping mechanism, see b/32064548 and the rules below. In particular,
# the system_server should never need to create a new anr_data_file:file or write
# to one, but it will still need to read and append to existing files.
allow system_server anr_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server anr_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# New stack dumping scheme : request an output FD from tombstoned via a unix
# domain socket.
#
# Allow system_server to connect and write to the tombstoned java trace socket in
# order to dump its traces. Also allow the system server to write its traces to
# dumpstate during bugreport capture and incidentd during incident collection.
unix_socket_connect(system_server, tombstoned_java_trace, tombstoned)
allow system_server tombstoned:fd use;
allow system_server dumpstate:fifo_file append;
allow system_server incidentd:fifo_file append;
# Write to a pipe created from `adb shell` (for debuggerd -j `pidof system_server`)
userdebug_or_eng(`
  allow system_server su:fifo_file append;
')

# Allow system_server to read pipes from incidentd (used to deliver incident reports
# to dropbox)
allow system_server incidentd:fifo_file read;

# Read /data/misc/incidents - only read. The fd will be sent over binder,
# with no DAC access to it, for dropbox to read.
allow system_server incident_data_file:file read;

# Manage /data/misc/prereboot.
allow system_server prereboot_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow system_server prereboot_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Allow dropbox to read /data/misc/perfetto-traces. Only the fd is sent over
# binder.
allow system_server perfetto_traces_data_file:file read;
allow system_server perfetto:fd use;

# Manage /data/backup.
allow system_server backup_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server backup_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Write to /data/system/dropbox
allow system_server dropbox_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server dropbox_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Write to /data/system/heapdump
allow system_server heapdump_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow system_server heapdump_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage /data/misc/adb.
allow system_server adb_keys_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server adb_keys_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage /data/misc/appcompat.
allow system_server appcompat_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow system_server appcompat_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage /data/misc/emergencynumberdb
allow system_server emergency_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server emergency_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage /data/misc/network_watchlist
allow system_server network_watchlist_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server network_watchlist_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage /data/misc/sms.
# TODO:  Split into a separate type?
allow system_server radio_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server radio_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage /data/misc/systemkeys.
allow system_server systemkeys_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server systemkeys_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage /data/misc/textclassifier.
allow system_server textclassifier_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server textclassifier_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Access /data/tombstones.
allow system_server tombstone_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server tombstone_data_file:file r_file_perms;

# Allow write access to be able to truncate tombstones.
allow system_server tombstone_data_file:file write;

# Manage /data/misc/vpn.
allow system_server vpn_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server vpn_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage /data/misc/wifi.
allow system_server wifi_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server wifi_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage /data/misc/zoneinfo.
allow system_server zoneinfo_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server zoneinfo_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage /data/app-staging.
allow system_server staging_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server staging_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Manage /data/rollback.
allow system_server staging_data_file:{ file lnk_file } { create_file_perms link };

# Walk /data/data subdirectories.
allow system_server app_data_file_type:dir { getattr read search };

# Also permit for unlabeled /data/data subdirectories and
# for unlabeled asec containers on upgrades from 4.2.
allow system_server unlabeled:dir r_dir_perms;
# Read pkg.apk file before it has been relabeled by vold.
allow system_server unlabeled:file r_file_perms;

# Populate com.android.providers.settings/databases/settings.db.
allow system_server system_app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server system_app_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Receive and use open app data files passed over binder IPC.
allow system_server app_data_file_type:file { getattr read write append map };

# Access to /data/media for measuring disk usage.
allow system_server media_rw_data_file:dir { search getattr open read };

# Receive and use open /data/media files passed over binder IPC.
# Also used for measuring disk usage.
allow system_server media_rw_data_file:file { getattr read write append };

# System server needs to setfscreate to packages_list_file when writing
# /data/system/packages.list
allow system_server system_server:process setfscreate;

# Relabel apk files.
allow system_server { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:{ dir file } { relabelfrom relabelto };
allow system_server { apk_data_file apk_private_data_file }:{ dir file } { relabelfrom relabelto };
# Allow PackageManager to:
# 1. rename file from /data/app-staging folder to /data/app
# 2. relabel files (linked to /data/rollback) under /data/app-staging
# during staged apk/apex install.
allow system_server { staging_data_file }:{ dir file } { relabelfrom relabelto };

# Relabel wallpaper.
allow system_server system_data_file:file relabelfrom;
allow system_server wallpaper_file:file relabelto;
allow system_server wallpaper_file:file { rw_file_perms rename unlink };

# Backup of wallpaper imagery uses temporary hard links to avoid data churn
allow system_server { system_data_file wallpaper_file }:file link;

# ShortcutManager icons
allow system_server system_data_file:dir relabelfrom;
allow system_server shortcut_manager_icons:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
allow system_server shortcut_manager_icons:file create_file_perms;

# Manage ringtones.
allow system_server ringtone_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
allow system_server ringtone_file:file create_file_perms;

# Relabel icon file.
allow system_server icon_file:file relabelto;
allow system_server icon_file:file { rw_file_perms unlink };

# FingerprintService.java does a restorecon of the directory /data/system/users/[0-9]+/fpdata(/.*)?
allow system_server system_data_file:dir relabelfrom;

# server_configurable_flags_data_file is used for storing server configurable flags which
# have been reset during current booting. system_server needs to read the data to perform related
# disaster recovery actions.
allow system_server server_configurable_flags_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server server_configurable_flags_data_file:file r_file_perms;

# Property Service write
set_prop(system_server, system_prop)
set_prop(system_server, exported_system_prop)
set_prop(system_server, exported3_system_prop)
set_prop(system_server, safemode_prop)
set_prop(system_server, theme_prop)
set_prop(system_server, dhcp_prop)
set_prop(system_server, net_radio_prop)
set_prop(system_server, net_dns_prop)
set_prop(system_server, usb_control_prop)
set_prop(system_server, usb_prop)
set_prop(system_server, debug_prop)
set_prop(system_server, powerctl_prop)
set_prop(system_server, fingerprint_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_logging_prop)
set_prop(system_server, dumpstate_options_prop)
set_prop(system_server, overlay_prop)
set_prop(system_server, exported_overlay_prop)
set_prop(system_server, pm_prop)
set_prop(system_server, exported_pm_prop)
set_prop(system_server, socket_hook_prop)
set_prop(system_server, audio_prop)
set_prop(system_server, boot_status_prop)
set_prop(system_server, surfaceflinger_color_prop)
set_prop(system_server, provisioned_prop)
set_prop(system_server, retaildemo_prop)
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(system_server, wifi_log_prop)')

# ctl interface
set_prop(system_server, ctl_default_prop)
set_prop(system_server, ctl_bugreport_prop)
set_prop(system_server, ctl_gsid_prop)

# cppreopt property
set_prop(system_server, cppreopt_prop)

# server configurable flags properties
set_prop(system_server, device_config_input_native_boot_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_netd_native_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_activity_manager_native_boot_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_media_native_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_profcollect_native_boot_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_statsd_native_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_statsd_native_boot_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_storage_native_boot_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_sys_traced_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop)
set_prop(system_server, device_config_configuration_prop)

# BootReceiver to read ro.boot.bootreason
get_prop(system_server, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
# PowerManager to read sys.boot.reason
get_prop(system_server, system_boot_reason_prop)

# Collect metrics on boot time created by init
get_prop(system_server, boottime_prop)

# Read device's serial number from system properties
get_prop(system_server, serialno_prop)

# Read/write the property which keeps track of whether this is the first start of system_server
set_prop(system_server, firstboot_prop)

# Audio service in system server can read audio config properties,
# such as camera shutter enforcement
get_prop(system_server, audio_config_prop)

# system server reads this property to keep track of whether server configurable flags have been
# reset during current boot.
get_prop(system_server, device_config_reset_performed_prop)

# Read/write the property that enables Test Harness Mode
set_prop(system_server, test_harness_prop)

# Read gsid.image_running.
get_prop(system_server, gsid_prop)

# Read the property that mocks an OTA
get_prop(system_server, mock_ota_prop)

# Read the property as feature flag for protecting apks with fs-verity.
get_prop(system_server, apk_verity_prop)

# Read wifi.interface
get_prop(system_server, wifi_prop)

# Read the vendor property that indicates if Incremental features is enabled
get_prop(system_server, incremental_prop)

# Read ro.zram. properties
get_prop(system_server, zram_config_prop)

# Read/write persist.sys.zram_enabled
set_prop(system_server, zram_control_prop)

# Read/write persist.sys.dalvik.vm.lib.2
set_prop(system_server, dalvik_runtime_prop)

# Read ro.control_privapp_permissions and ro.cp_system_other_odex
get_prop(system_server, packagemanager_config_prop)

# Create a socket for connections from debuggerd.
allow system_server system_ndebug_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;

# Create a socket for connections from zygotes.
allow system_server system_unsolzygote_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;

# Manage cache files.
allow system_server cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir { relabelfrom create_dir_perms };
allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file { relabelfrom create_file_perms };
allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:fifo_file create_file_perms;

allow system_server system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server system_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;

# ART locks profile files.
allow system_server system_file:file lock;

# LocationManager(e.g, GPS) needs to read and write
# to uart driver and ctrl proc entry
allow system_server gps_control:file rw_file_perms;

# Allow system_server to use app-created sockets and pipes.
allow system_server appdomain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } { getattr getopt setopt read write shutdown };
allow system_server appdomain:{ fifo_file unix_stream_socket } { getattr read write };

# BackupManagerService needs to manipulate backup data files
allow system_server cache_backup_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow system_server cache_backup_file:file create_file_perms;
# LocalTransport works inside /cache/backup
allow system_server cache_private_backup_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server cache_private_backup_file:file create_file_perms;

# Allow system to talk to usb device
allow system_server usb_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow system_server usb_device:dir r_dir_perms;

# Read from HW RNG (needed by EntropyMixer).
allow system_server hw_random_device:chr_file r_file_perms;

# Read and delete files under /dev/fscklogs.
r_dir_file(system_server, fscklogs)
allow system_server fscklogs:dir { write remove_name };
allow system_server fscklogs:file unlink;

# logd access, system_server inherit logd write socket
# (urge is to deprecate this long term)
allow system_server zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;

# Read from log daemon.
read_logd(system_server)
read_runtime_log_tags(system_server)

# Be consistent with DAC permissions. Allow system_server to write to
# /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/parameters/adj
# /sys/module/lowmemorykiller/parameters/minfree
allow system_server sysfs_lowmemorykiller:file { getattr w_file_perms };

# Read /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
# Don't worry about overly broad permissions for now, as there's
# only one file in /sys/fs/pstore
allow system_server pstorefs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server pstorefs:file r_file_perms;

# /sys access
allow system_server sysfs_zram:dir search;
allow system_server sysfs_zram:file rw_file_perms;

add_service(system_server, system_server_service);
allow system_server audioserver_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server authorization_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server batteryproperties_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server cameraserver_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server dataloader_manager_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server dnsresolver_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server drmserver_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server dumpstate_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server fingerprintd_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server gatekeeper_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server gpu_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server gsi_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server idmap_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server incident_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server incremental_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server installd_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server iorapd_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server keystore_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server mediametrics_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server mediaextractor_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server mediadrmserver_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server mediatuner_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server netd_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server nfc_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server radio_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server stats_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server storaged_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server update_engine_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server vold_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server wifinl80211_service:service_manager find;
userdebug_or_eng(`
  allow system_server profcollectd_service:service_manager find;
')

add_service(system_server, batteryproperties_service)

allow system_server keystore:keystore_key {
	get_state
	get
	insert
	delete
	exist
	list
	reset
	password
	lock
	unlock
	is_empty
	sign
	verify
	grant
	duplicate
	clear_uid
	add_auth
	user_changed
};

allow system_server keystore:keystore2 {
	add_auth
	clear_ns
	get_state
	lock
	reset
	unlock
};

allow system_server keystore:keystore2_key {
	delete
	use_dev_id
	grant
	get_info
	rebind
	update
	use
};

# Allow system server to search and write to the persistent factory reset
# protection partition. This block device does not get wiped in a factory reset.
allow system_server block_device:dir search;
allow system_server frp_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allowxperm system_server frp_block_device:blk_file ioctl { BLKSECDISCARD BLKDISCARD };

# Clean up old cgroups
allow system_server cgroup:dir { remove_name rmdir };
allow system_server cgroup_v2:dir { remove_name rmdir };

# /oem access
r_dir_file(system_server, oemfs)

# Allow resolving per-user storage symlinks
allow system_server { mnt_user_file storage_file }:dir { getattr search };
allow system_server { mnt_user_file storage_file }:lnk_file { getattr read };

# Allow statfs() on storage devices, which happens fast enough that
# we shouldn't be killed during unsafe removal
allow system_server sdcard_type:dir { getattr search };

# Traverse into expanded storage
allow system_server mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;

# Allow system process to relabel the fingerprint directory after mkdir
# and delete the directory and files when no longer needed
allow system_server fingerprintd_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms remove_name rmdir relabelto write };
allow system_server fingerprintd_data_file:file { getattr unlink };

userdebug_or_eng(`
  # Allow system server to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
  allow system_server method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
  allow system_server method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };

  # Allow system server to read dmesg
  allow system_server kernel:system syslog_read;

  # Allow writing and removing window traces in /data/misc/wmtrace.
  allow system_server wm_trace_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
  allow system_server wm_trace_data_file:file { getattr setattr create unlink w_file_perms };
')

# For AppFuse.
allow system_server vold:fd use;
allow system_server fuse_device:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
allow system_server app_fuse_file:file { read write getattr };

# For configuring sdcardfs
allow system_server configfs:dir { create_dir_perms };
allow system_server configfs:file { getattr open create unlink write };

# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
# Used for e.g. jdwp.
allow system_server adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow system_server adbd:fd use;
allow system_server adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };

# Read service.adb.tls.port, persist.adb.wifi. properties
get_prop(system_server, adbd_prop)

# Set persist.adb.tls_server.enable property
set_prop(system_server, system_adbd_prop)

# Allow invoking tools like "timeout"
allow system_server toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;

# Allow system process to setup and measure fs-verity
allowxperm system_server apk_data_file:file ioctl {
  FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY
};

# Postinstall
#
# For OTA dexopt, allow calls coming from postinstall.
binder_call(system_server, postinstall)

allow system_server postinstall:fifo_file write;
allow system_server update_engine:fd use;
allow system_server update_engine:fifo_file write;

# Access to /data/preloads
allow system_server preloads_data_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
allow system_server preloads_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms write remove_name rmdir };
allow system_server preloads_media_file:file { r_file_perms unlink };
allow system_server preloads_media_file:dir { r_dir_perms write remove_name rmdir };

r_dir_file(system_server, cgroup)
r_dir_file(system_server, cgroup_v2)
allow system_server ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;

# Access to /dev/dma_heap/system
allow system_server dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
# Access to /dev/dma_heap/system-secure
allow system_server dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;

r_dir_file(system_server, proc_asound)
r_dir_file(system_server, proc_net_type)
r_dir_file(system_server, proc_qtaguid_stat)
allow system_server {
  proc_cmdline
  proc_loadavg
  proc_locks
  proc_meminfo
  proc_pagetypeinfo
  proc_pipe_conf
  proc_stat
  proc_uid_cputime_showstat
  proc_uid_io_stats
  proc_uid_time_in_state
  proc_uid_concurrent_active_time
  proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time
  proc_version
  proc_vmallocinfo
}:file r_file_perms;

allow system_server proc_uid_time_in_state:dir r_dir_perms;
allow system_server proc_uid_cpupower:file r_file_perms;

r_dir_file(system_server, rootfs)

# Allow WifiService to start, stop, and read wifi-specific trace events.
allow system_server debugfs_tracing_instances:dir search;
allow system_server debugfs_wifi_tracing:dir search;
allow system_server debugfs_wifi_tracing:file rw_file_perms;

# Allow system_server to read tracepoint ids in order to attach BPF programs to them.
allow system_server debugfs_tracing:file r_file_perms;

# allow system_server to exec shell, asanwrapper & zygote(app_process) on ASAN builds. Needed to run
# asanwrapper.
with_asan(`
  allow system_server shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
  allow system_server asanwrapper_exec:file rx_file_perms;
  allow system_server zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
')

# allow system_server to read the eBPF maps that stores the traffic stats information and update
# the map after snapshot is recorded, and to read, update and run the maps and programs used for
# time in state accounting
allow system_server fs_bpf:dir search;
allow system_server fs_bpf:file { read write };
allow system_server bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write prog_run };

# ART Profiles.
# Allow system_server to open profile snapshots for read.
# System server never reads the actual content. It passes the descriptor to
# to privileged apps which acquire the permissions to inspect the profiles.
allow system_server { user_profile_root_file user_profile_data_file}:dir { getattr search };
allow system_server user_profile_data_file:file { getattr open read };

# System server may dump profile data for debuggable apps in the /data/misc/profman.
# As such it needs to be able create files but it should never read from them.
allow system_server profman_dump_data_file:file { create getattr setattr w_file_perms};
allow system_server profman_dump_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;

# On userdebug build we may profile system server. Allow it to write and create its own profile.
userdebug_or_eng(`
  allow system_server user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
')
# Allow system server to load JVMTI agents under control of a property.
get_prop(system_server,system_jvmti_agent_prop)

# UsbDeviceManager uses /dev/usb-ffs
allow system_server functionfs:dir search;
allow system_server functionfs:file rw_file_perms;

# system_server contains time / time zone detection logic so reads the associated properties.
get_prop(system_server, time_prop)

# system_server reads this property to know it should expect the lmkd sends notification to it
# on low memory kills.
get_prop(system_server, system_lmk_prop)

get_prop(system_server, wifi_config_prop)

# Only system server can access BINDER_FREEZE and BINDER_GET_FROZEN_INFO
allowxperm system_server binder_device:chr_file ioctl { BINDER_FREEZE BINDER_GET_FROZEN_INFO };

# Watchdog prints debugging log to /dev/kmsg_debug.
userdebug_or_eng(`
  allow system_server kmsg_debug_device:chr_file { open append getattr };
')
# Watchdog reads sysprops framework_watchdog.fatal_* to handle watchdog timeout loop.
get_prop(system_server, framework_watchdog_config_prop)


# Font files are written by system server
allow system_server font_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow system_server font_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
# Allow system process to setup fs-verity for font files
allowxperm system_server font_data_file:file ioctl FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY;

###
### Neverallow rules
###
### system_server should NEVER do any of this

# Do not allow opening files from external storage as unsafe ejection
# could cause the kernel to kill the system_server.
neverallow system_server sdcard_type:dir { open read write };
neverallow system_server sdcard_type:file rw_file_perms;

# system server should never be operating on zygote spawned app data
# files directly. Rather, they should always be passed via a
# file descriptor.
# Exclude those types that system_server needs to open directly.
neverallow system_server {
  app_data_file_type
  -system_app_data_file
  -radio_data_file
}:file { open create unlink link };

# Forking and execing is inherently dangerous and racy. See, for
# example, https://www.linuxprogrammingblog.com/threads-and-fork-think-twice-before-using-them
# Prevent the addition of new file execs to stop the problem from
# getting worse. b/28035297
neverallow system_server {
  file_type
  -toolbox_exec
  -logcat_exec
  with_asan(`-shell_exec -asanwrapper_exec -zygote_exec')
}:file execute_no_trans;

# Ensure that system_server doesn't perform any domain transitions other than
# transitioning to the crash_dump domain when a crash occurs.
neverallow system_server { domain -crash_dump }:process transition;
neverallow system_server *:process dyntransition;

# Only allow crash_dump to connect to system_ndebug_socket.
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -crash_dump } system_ndebug_socket:sock_file { open write };

# Only allow zygotes to connect to system_unsolzygote_socket.
neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  -system_server
  -zygote
  -app_zygote
  -webview_zygote
} system_unsolzygote_socket:sock_file { open write };

# Only allow init, system_server, flags_health_check to set properties for server configurable flags
neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  -system_server
  -flags_health_check
} {
  device_config_activity_manager_native_boot_prop
  device_config_input_native_boot_prop
  device_config_netd_native_prop
  device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop
  device_config_runtime_native_prop
  device_config_media_native_prop
  device_config_storage_native_boot_prop
  device_config_sys_traced_prop
  device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop
}:property_service set;

# system_server should never be executing dex2oat. This is either
# a bug (for example, bug 16317188), or represents an attempt by
# system server to dynamically load a dex file, something we do not
# want to allow.
neverallow system_server dex2oat_exec:file no_x_file_perms;

# system_server should never execute or load executable shared libraries
# in /data. Executable files in /data are a persistence vector.
# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=955 for example.
neverallow system_server data_file_type:file no_x_file_perms;

# The only block device system_server should be accessing is
# the frp_block_device. This helps avoid a system_server to root
# escalation by writing to raw block devices.
neverallow system_server { dev_type -frp_block_device }:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;

# system_server should never use JIT functionality
# See https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/2016/12/bitunmap-attacking-android-ashmem.html
# in the section titled "A Short ROP Chain" for why.
# However, in emulator builds without OpenGL passthrough, we use software
# rendering via SwiftShader, which requires JIT support. These builds are
# never shipped to users.
ifelse(target_requires_insecure_execmem_for_swiftshader, `true',
  `allow system_server self:process execmem;',
  `neverallow system_server self:process execmem;')
neverallow system_server { ashmem_device ashmem_libcutils_device }:chr_file execute;

# TODO: deal with tmpfs_domain pub/priv split properly
neverallow system_server system_server_tmpfs:file execute;

# Resources handed off by system_server_startup
allow system_server system_server_startup:fd use;
allow system_server system_server_startup_tmpfs:file { read write map };
allow system_server system_server_startup:unix_dgram_socket write;

# Allow system server to communicate to apexd
allow system_server apex_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server apexd:binder call;

# Allow system server to scan /apex for flattened APEXes
allow system_server apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;

# Allow system server to read /apex/apex-info-list.xml
allow system_server apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;

# Allow system server to communicate to system-suspend's control interface
allow system_server system_suspend_control_internal_service:service_manager find;
allow system_server system_suspend_control_service:service_manager find;
binder_call(system_server, system_suspend)
binder_call(system_suspend, system_server)

# Allow system server to communicate to system-suspend's wakelock interface
wakelock_use(system_server)

# Allow the system server to read files under /data/apex. The system_server
# needs these privileges to compare file signatures while processing installs.
#
# Only apexd is allowed to create new entries or write to any file under /data/apex.
allow system_server apex_data_file:dir { getattr search };
allow system_server apex_data_file:file r_file_perms;

# Allow the system server to read files under /vendor/apex. This is where
# vendor APEX packages might be installed and system_server needs to parse
# these packages to inspect the signatures and other metadata.
allow system_server vendor_apex_file:dir { getattr search };
allow system_server vendor_apex_file:file r_file_perms;

# Allow the system server to manage relevant apex module data files.
allow system_server apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
allow system_server apex_permission_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server apex_permission_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow system_server apex_wifi_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server apex_wifi_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Allow PasswordSlotManager rw access to /metadata/password_slots, so GSIs and the host image can
# communicate which slots are available for use.
allow system_server metadata_file:dir search;
allow system_server password_slot_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow system_server password_slot_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;

allow system_server userspace_reboot_metadata_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server userspace_reboot_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;

# Allow system server rw access to files in /metadata/staged-install folder
allow system_server staged_install_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow system_server staged_install_file:file create_file_perms;

allow system_server watchdog_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow system_server watchdog_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;

# Allow system server r access to /system/bin/surfaceflinger for PinnerService.
allow system_server surfaceflinger_exec:file r_file_perms;

# Allow init to set sysprop used to compute stats about userspace reboot.
set_prop(system_server, userspace_reboot_log_prop)

# JVMTI agent settings are only readable from the system server.
neverallow {
  domain
  -system_server
  -dumpstate
  -init
  -vendor_init
} {
  system_jvmti_agent_prop
}:file no_rw_file_perms;

# Read/Write /proc/pressure/memory
allow system_server proc_pressure_mem:file rw_file_perms;

# TODO Remove this property when Keystore 2.0 migration is complete b/171563717
get_prop(system_server, keystore2_enable_prop)

# dexoptanalyzer is currently used only for secondary dex files which
# system_server should never access.
neverallow system_server dexoptanalyzer_exec:file no_x_file_perms;

# No ptracing others
neverallow system_server { domain -system_server }:process ptrace;

# CAP_SYS_RESOURCE was traditionally needed for sensitive /proc/PID
# file read access. However, that is now unnecessary (b/34951864)
neverallow system_server system_server:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;

# Only system_server/init should access /metadata/password_slots.
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } password_slot_metadata_file:dir *;
neverallow {
  domain
  -init
  -system_server
} password_slot_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } password_slot_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set *;

# Only system_server/init should access /metadata/userspacereboot.
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } userspace_reboot_metadata_file:dir *;
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } userspace_reboot_metadata_file:file no_rw_file_perms;

# Allow systemserver to read/write the invalidation property
set_prop(system_server, binder_cache_system_server_prop)
neverallow { domain -system_server -init }
    binder_cache_system_server_prop:property_service set;

# Allow system server to attach BPF programs to tracepoints. Deny read permission so that
# system_server cannot use this access to read perf event data like process stacks.
allow system_server self:perf_event { open write cpu kernel };
neverallow system_server self:perf_event ~{ open write cpu kernel };

# Do not allow any domain other than init or system server to set the property
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } socket_hook_prop:property_service set;

neverallow { domain -init -system_server } boot_status_prop:property_service set;

neverallow {
  -init
  -vendor_init
  -dumpstate
  -system_server
} wifi_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;

# Only allow system server to write uhid sysfs files
neverallow {
    domain
    -init
    -system_server
    -ueventd
    -vendor_init
} sysfs_uhid:file no_w_file_perms;

# BINDER_FREEZE is used to block ipc transactions to frozen processes, so it
# can be accessed by system_server only (b/143717177)
# BINDER_GET_FROZEN_INFO is used by system_server to determine the state of a frozen binder
# interface
neverallowxperm { domain -system_server } binder_device:chr_file ioctl { BINDER_FREEZE BINDER_GET_FROZEN_INFO };

# Only system server can write the font files.
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } font_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } font_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;