Introduce app_data_file_type attribute.
This gives us an easy way for the policy to refer to all existing or
future types used for app private data files in type= assignments in
seapp_contexts.
Apply the label to all the existing types, then refactor rules to use
the new attribute.
This is intended as a pure refactoring, except that:
- Some neverallow rules are extended to cover types they previous
omitted;
- We allow iorap_inode2filename limited access to shell_data_file and
nfc_data_file;
- We allow zygote limited access to system_app_data_file.
This mostly reverts the revert in commit
b01e1d97bf1320d54c8641cfff687f13f32013bf, restoring commit
27e0c740f1894e9a390b7105255eb29401d25c35. Changes to check_seapp to
enforce use of app_data_file_type is omitted, to be included in a
following CL.
Test: Presubmits
Bug: 171795911
Change-Id: I02b31e7b3d5634c94763387284b5a154fe5b71b4
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 139165f..a60c327 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -520,16 +520,7 @@
allow system_server staging_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Walk /data/data subdirectories.
-# Types extracted from seapp_contexts type= fields.
-allow system_server {
- system_app_data_file
- bluetooth_data_file
- nfc_data_file
- radio_data_file
- shell_data_file
- app_data_file
- privapp_data_file
-}:dir { getattr read search };
+allow system_server app_data_file_type:dir { getattr read search };
# Also permit for unlabeled /data/data subdirectories and
# for unlabeled asec containers on upgrades from 4.2.
@@ -542,16 +533,7 @@
allow system_server system_app_data_file:file create_file_perms;
# Receive and use open app data files passed over binder IPC.
-# Types extracted from seapp_contexts type= fields.
-allow system_server {
- system_app_data_file
- bluetooth_data_file
- nfc_data_file
- radio_data_file
- shell_data_file
- app_data_file
- privapp_data_file
-}:file { getattr read write append map };
+allow system_server app_data_file_type:file { getattr read write append map };
# Access to /data/media for measuring disk usage.
allow system_server media_rw_data_file:dir { search getattr open read };
@@ -1042,14 +1024,11 @@
# system server should never be operating on zygote spawned app data
# files directly. Rather, they should always be passed via a
# file descriptor.
-# Types extracted from seapp_contexts type= fields, excluding
-# those types that system_server needs to open directly.
+# Exclude those types that system_server needs to open directly.
neverallow system_server {
- bluetooth_data_file
- nfc_data_file
- shell_data_file
- app_data_file
- privapp_data_file
+ app_data_file_type
+ -system_app_data_file
+ -radio_data_file
}:file { open create unlink link };
# Forking and execing is inherently dangerous and racy. See, for