private/app.te

# /proc/net access.
# TODO(b/9496886) Audit access for removal.
# proc_net access for the negated domains below is granted (or not) in their
# individual .te files.
r_dir_file({
  appdomain
  -ephemeral_app
  -isolated_app_all
  -network_stack
  -platform_app
  -priv_app
  -shell
  -sdk_sandbox_all
  -system_app
  -untrusted_app_all
}, proc_net_type)
# audit access for all these non-core app domains.
userdebug_or_eng(`
  auditallow {
    appdomain
    -ephemeral_app
    -isolated_app_all
    -network_stack
    -platform_app
    -priv_app
    -shell
    -su
    -sdk_sandbox_all
    -system_app
    -untrusted_app_all
  } proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
')

# Allow apps to read the Test Harness Mode property. This property is used in
# the implementation of ActivityManager.isDeviceInTestHarnessMode()
get_prop(appdomain, test_harness_prop)

get_prop(appdomain, boot_status_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, dalvik_config_prop_type)
get_prop(appdomain, media_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, packagemanager_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, radio_control_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, surfaceflinger_color_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, systemsound_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, telephony_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, userspace_reboot_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, vold_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, adbd_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, dck_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, persist_wm_debug_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, persist_sysui_builder_extras_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, persist_sysui_ranking_update_prop)

# Allow the heap dump ART plugin to the count of sessions waiting for OOME
get_prop(appdomain, traced_oome_heap_session_count_prop)

# Allow to read ro.vendor.camera.extensions.enabled
get_prop(appdomain, camera2_extensions_prop)

# Allow to ro.camerax.extensions.enabled
get_prop(appdomain, camerax_extensions_prop)

# Prevent apps from causing presubmit failures.
# Apps can cause selinux denials by accessing CE storage
# and/or external storage. In either case, the selinux denial is
# not the cause of the failure, but just a symptom that
# storage isn't ready. Many apps handle the failure appropriately.
#
# Apps cannot access external storage before it becomes available.
dontaudit appdomain storage_stub_file:dir getattr;
# Attempts to write to system_data_file is generally a sign
# that apps are attempting to access encrypted storage before
# the ACTION_USER_UNLOCKED intent is delivered. Apps are not
# allowed to write to CE storage before it's available.
# Attempting to do so will be blocked by both selinux and unix
# permissions.
dontaudit appdomain system_data_file:dir write;
# Apps should not be reading vendor-defined properties.
dontaudit appdomain vendor_default_prop:file read;

# Access to /mnt/media_rw/<vol> (limited by DAC to apps with external_storage gid)
allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox_all } mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;

# allow apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
# modify them other than to connect
allow appdomain system_server:udp_socket {
        connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };

# Allow to read sendbug.preferred.domain
get_prop(appdomain, sendbug_config_prop)

# Allow to read graphics related properties.
get_prop(appdomain, graphics_config_prop)

# Allow to read persist.config.calibration_fac
get_prop(appdomain, camera_calibration_prop)

# Allow to read db.log.detailed, db.log.slow_query_threshold*
get_prop(appdomain, sqlite_log_prop)

# Allow to read system_user_mode_emulation_prop, which is used by UserManager.java
userdebug_or_eng(`get_prop(appdomain, system_user_mode_emulation_prop)')

# Allow font file read by apps.
allow appdomain font_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow appdomain font_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;

# Enter /data/misc/apexdata/
allow appdomain apex_module_data_file:dir search;
# Read /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art, execute signed AOT artifacts.
allow appdomain apex_art_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain apex_art_data_file:file rx_file_perms;

# Allow access to tombstones if an fd to one is given to you.
# An app cannot open the tombstone itself because it lacks `open`.
allow appdomain tombstone_data_file:file { getattr read };

# Execute the shell or other system executables.
allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')

# Allow apps access to /vendor/app except for privileged
# apps which cannot be in /vendor.
r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, vendor_app_file)
allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } vendor_app_file:file execute;

# Allow apps to read microdroid related files in vendor partition for CTS purpose.
r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, vendor_microdroid_file)

# Perform binder IPC to sdk sandbox.
binder_call(appdomain, sdk_sandbox_all)

# Allow apps to communicate via binder with virtual camera service.
binder_call(appdomain, virtual_camera)

# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;

# Read/write visible storage
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
# accesses to the underlying FS.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
#
# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };

#logd access
control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all })

# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info grant rebind update };

allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;

use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all })

use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all })

allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } persistent_data_block_service:service_manager find;

# For app fuse.
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, display_client)
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, display_manager)
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, display_vsync)
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, performance_client)
# Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all }, bufferhub_client)

# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app_all -ephemeral_app -sdk_sandbox_all } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;


# WebView and other application-specific JIT compilers
allow appdomain self:process execmem;

allow appdomain { ashmem_device ashmem_libcutils_device }:chr_file execute;

# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from zygote.
allow appdomain zygote:fd use;

# Receive and use open file descriptors inherited from app zygote.
allow appdomain app_zygote:fd use;

# gdbserver for ndk-gdb reads the zygote.
# valgrind needs mmap exec for zygote
allow appdomain zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;

# Notify zygote of death;
allow appdomain zygote:process sigchld;

# Read /data/dalvik-cache.
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:dir { search getattr };
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file r_file_perms;

# Read the /sdcard and /mnt/sdcard symlinks
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox_all } rootfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox_all } tmpfs:lnk_file r_file_perms;

# Search /storage/emulated tmpfs mount.
allow { appdomain -sdk_sandbox_all } tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;

# Notify zygote of the wrapped process PID when using --invoke-with.
allow appdomain zygote:fifo_file write;

userdebug_or_eng(`
  # Allow apps to create and write method traces in /data/misc/trace.
  allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
  allow appdomain method_trace_data_file:file { create w_file_perms };
')

# Notify shell and adbd of death when spawned via runas for ndk-gdb.
allow appdomain shell:process sigchld;
allow appdomain adbd:process sigchld;

# child shell or gdbserver pty access for runas.
allow appdomain devpts:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };

# Use pipes and sockets provided by system_server via binder or local socket.
allow appdomain system_server:fd use;
allow appdomain system_server:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow appdomain system_server:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
allow appdomain system_server:tcp_socket { read write getattr getopt shutdown };

# For AppFuse.
allow appdomain vold:fd use;

# Communication with other apps via fifos
allow appdomain appdomain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

# Communicate with surfaceflinger.
allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };

# App sandbox file accesses.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox_all } {
  app_data_file
  privapp_data_file
  is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_UNLOCKED_STORAGE_API, `storage_area_content_file')
}:dir create_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox_all } {
  app_data_file
  privapp_data_file
  is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_UNLOCKED_STORAGE_API, `storage_area_content_file')
}:file create_file_perms;

is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_UNLOCKED_STORAGE_API, `
  # an app can read but cannot write to its own directory of storage areas
  allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox_all } storage_area_app_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
  # an app can write to its storage areas
  allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox_all } storage_area_dir:dir rw_dir_perms;
')

allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app_all -mlstrustedsubject -sdk_sandbox_all } {
  app_data_file
  privapp_data_file
  is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_UNLOCKED_STORAGE_API, `storage_area_content_file')
}:file ioctl FS_IOC_MEASURE_VERITY;

# Access via already open fds is ok even for mlstrustedsubject.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox_all } {
  app_data_file
  privapp_data_file
  system_app_data_file
  is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_UNLOCKED_STORAGE_API, `storage_area_content_file')
}:file { getattr map read write };

# Access open fds from SDK sandbox
allow appdomain sdk_sandbox_data_file:file { getattr read };

# Traverse into expanded storage
allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;

# Keychain and user-trusted credentials
r_dir_file(appdomain, keychain_data_file)
allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain misc_user_data_file:file r_file_perms;

# TextClassifier
r_dir_file({ appdomain -isolated_app_all }, textclassifier_data_file)

# Access to OEM provided data and apps
allow appdomain oemfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain oemfs:file rx_file_perms;

allow appdomain system_file:file x_file_perms;

# Renderscript needs the ability to read directories on /system
allow appdomain system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain system_file:lnk_file { getattr open read };
# Renderscript specific permissions to open /system/vendor/lib64.
not_full_treble(`
    allow appdomain vendor_file_type:dir r_dir_perms;
    allow appdomain vendor_file_type:lnk_file { getattr open read };
')

full_treble_only(`
    # For looking up Renderscript vendor drivers
    allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } vendor_file:dir { open read };
')

# Allow apps access to /vendor/overlay
r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_overlay_file)

# Allow apps access to /vendor/framework
# for vendor provided libraries.
r_dir_file(appdomain, vendor_framework_file)

# Allow apps read / execute access to vendor public libraries.
allow appdomain {vendor_public_framework_file vendor_public_lib_file}:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain {vendor_public_framework_file vendor_public_lib_file}:file { execute read open getattr map };

# Read/write wallpaper file (opened by system).
allow appdomain wallpaper_file:file { getattr read write map };

# Read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
allow appdomain ringtone_file:file { getattr read write map };

# Read ShortcutManager icon files (opened by system).
allow appdomain shortcut_manager_icons:file { getattr read map };

# Read icon file (opened by system).
allow appdomain icon_file:file { getattr read map };

# Old stack dumping scheme : append to a global trace file (/data/anr/traces.txt).
#
# TODO: All of these permissions except for anr_data_file:file append can be
# withdrawn once we've switched to the new stack dumping mechanism, see b/32064548
# and the rules below.
allow appdomain anr_data_file:dir search;
allow appdomain anr_data_file:file { open append };

# New stack dumping scheme : request an output FD from tombstoned via a unix
# domain socket.
#
# Allow apps to connect and write to the tombstoned java trace socket in
# order to dump their traces. Also allow them to append traces to pipes
# created by dumptrace. (Also see the rules below where they are given
# additional permissions to dumpstate pipes for other aspects of bug report
# creation).
unix_socket_connect(appdomain, tombstoned_java_trace, tombstoned)
allow appdomain tombstoned:fd use;
allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file append;
allow appdomain incidentd:fifo_file append;

# Allow apps to send dump information to dumpstate
allow appdomain dumpstate:fd use;
allow appdomain dumpstate:unix_stream_socket { read write getopt getattr shutdown };
allow appdomain dumpstate:fifo_file { write getattr };
allow appdomain shell_data_file:file { write getattr };

# Allow apps to send dump information to incidentd
allow appdomain incidentd:fd use;
allow appdomain incidentd:fifo_file { write getattr };

# Allow apps to send information to statsd socket.
unix_socket_send(appdomain, statsdw, statsd)

# Write profiles /data/misc/profiles
allow appdomain user_profile_root_file:dir search;
allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Allow writing performance tracing data into the perfetto traced daemon.
# Needed for java heap graph ART plugin (perfetto_hprof).
# The perfetto profiling daemon will check for the specific application's
# opt-in/opt-out.
perfetto_producer(appdomain)

# Send heap dumps to system_server via an already open file descriptor
# % adb shell am set-watch-heap com.android.systemui 1048576
# % adb shell dumpsys procstats --start-testing
# debuggable builds only.
userdebug_or_eng(`
  allow appdomain heapdump_data_file:file append;
')

# Grant GPU access to all processes started by Zygote.
# They need that to render the standard UI.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } gpu_device:dir r_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } sysfs_gpu:file r_file_perms;


# Use the Binder.
binder_use(appdomain)
# Perform binder IPC to binder services.
binder_call(appdomain, binderservicedomain)
# Perform binder IPC to other apps.
binder_call(appdomain, appdomain)
# Perform binder IPC to ephemeral apps.
binder_call(appdomain, ephemeral_app)
# Perform binder IPC to gpuservice.
binder_call({ appdomain -isolated_app_all }, gpuservice)

# Talk with graphics composer fences
allow appdomain hal_graphics_composer:fd use;

# Already connected, unnamed sockets being passed over some other IPC
# hence no sock_file or connectto permission. This appears to be how
# Chrome works, may need to be updated as more apps using isolated services
# are examined.
allow appdomain appdomain:unix_stream_socket { getopt getattr read write shutdown };

# Backup ability for every app. BMS opens and passes the fd
# to any app that has backup ability. Hence, no open permissions here.
allow appdomain backup_data_file:file { read write getattr map };
allow appdomain cache_backup_file:file { read write getattr map };
allow appdomain cache_backup_file:dir getattr;
# Backup ability using 'adb backup'
allow appdomain system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow appdomain system_data_file:file { getattr read map };

# Allow read/stat of /data/media files passed by Binder or local socket IPC.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox_all } media_rw_data_file:file { read getattr };

# Read and write /data/data/com.android.providers.telephony files passed over Binder.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } radio_data_file:file { read write getattr };

# For art.
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:file execute;
allow appdomain dalvikcache_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;

# Allow any app to read shared RELRO files.
allow appdomain shared_relro_file:dir search;
allow appdomain shared_relro_file:file r_file_perms;

# Allow apps to read/execute installed binaries
allow appdomain apk_data_file:dir { open getattr read search ioctl lock };
allow appdomain apk_data_file:file { getattr open read ioctl lock map x_file_perms };

# /data/resource-cache
allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow appdomain resourcecache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;

# logd access
read_logd(appdomain)

allow appdomain zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;

allow appdomain console_device:chr_file { read write };

# only allow unprivileged socket ioctl commands
allowxperm { appdomain -bluetooth } self:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
  ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };

allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } ion_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } dmabuf_system_secure_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;

# Allow AAudio apps to use shared memory file descriptors from the HAL
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_audio:fd use;

# Allow app to access shared memory created by camera HAL1
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_camera:fd use;

# Allow apps to access shared memory file descriptor from the tuner HAL
allow {appdomain -isolated_app_all} hal_tv_tuner_server:fd use;

# Allow app to access shared memory created by PowerHAL for FMQ use
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_power_server:fd use;

# RenderScript always-passthrough HAL
allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all } hal_renderscript_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
allow appdomain same_process_hal_file:file { execute read open getattr map };

# TODO: switch to meminfo service
allow appdomain proc_meminfo:file r_file_perms;

# For app fuse.
allow appdomain app_fuse_file:file { getattr read append write map };

###
### CTS-specific rules
###

# For cts/tests/tests/permission/src/android/permission/cts/FileSystemPermissionTest.java.
# testRunAsHasCorrectCapabilities
allow appdomain runas_exec:file getattr;
# Others are either allowed elsewhere or not desired.

get_prop(appdomain, high_barometer_quality_prop)

# Connect to adbd and use a socket transferred from it.
# This is used for e.g. adb backup/restore.
allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow appdomain adbd:fd use;
allow appdomain adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };

allow appdomain cache_file:dir getattr;

# Allow apps to run with asanwrapper.
with_asan(`allow appdomain asanwrapper_exec:file rx_file_perms;')

# Read access to FDs from the DropboxManagerService.
allow appdomain dropbox_data_file:file { getattr read };

# Read tmpfs types from these processes.
allow appdomain audioserver_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
allow appdomain system_server_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file { map read };

###
### Neverallow rules
###
### These are things that Android apps should NEVER be able to do
###

# Superuser capabilities.
# bluetooth requires net_admin and wake_alarm. network stack app requires net_admin.
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -network_stack } self:capability_class_set *;

# Block device access.
neverallow appdomain dev_type:blk_file { read write };

# Note: Try expanding list of app domains in the future.
neverallow { untrusted_app isolated_app shell } graphics_device:chr_file { read write };

neverallow { appdomain -nfc } nfc_device:chr_file
    { read write };
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth } hci_attach_dev:chr_file
    { read write };
neverallow appdomain tee_device:chr_file { read write };

# Privileged netlink socket interfaces.
neverallow { appdomain -network_stack }
    domain:{
        netlink_tcpdiag_socket
        netlink_nflog_socket
        netlink_xfrm_socket
        netlink_audit_socket
        netlink_dnrt_socket
    } *;

# These messages are broadcast messages from the kernel to userspace.
# Do not allow the writing of netlink messages, which has been a source
# of rooting vulns in the past.
neverallow { appdomain -network_stack }
    domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket { write append };

# Sockets under /dev/socket that are not specifically typed.
neverallow appdomain socket_device:sock_file write;

# Unix domain sockets.
neverallow appdomain adbd_socket:sock_file write;
neverallow { appdomain -radio } rild_socket:sock_file write;

# ptrace access to non-app domains.
neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:process ptrace;

# The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
# of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components
# to apps. Crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
# produce stack traces.  llkd is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
# inspect stack traces for live lock conditions.

neverallow {
  domain
  -appdomain
  -crash_dump
  userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd')
} appdomain:process ptrace;

# Read or write access to /proc/pid entries for any non-app domain.
# A different form of hidepid=2 like protections
neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain }:file no_w_file_perms;
neverallow { appdomain -shell } { domain -appdomain }:file no_rw_file_perms;

# signal access to non-app domains.
# sigchld allowed for parent death notification.
# signull allowed for kill(pid, 0) existence test.
# All others prohibited.
# -perfetto is to allow shell (which is an appdomain) to kill perfetto
# (see private/shell.te).
neverallow appdomain { domain -appdomain -perfetto }:process
    { sigkill sigstop signal };

# Write to rootfs.
neverallow appdomain rootfs:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

# Write to /system.
neverallow appdomain system_file_type:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

# Write to entrypoint executables.
neverallow appdomain exec_type:file
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

# Write to system-owned parts of /data.
# This is the default type for anything under /data not otherwise
# specified in file_contexts.  Define a different type for portions
# that should be writable by apps.
neverallow appdomain system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

# Write to various other parts of /data.
neverallow appdomain mediadrm_system_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow appdomain drm_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
    apk_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
    apk_private_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
    apk_private_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -shell }
    shell_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth }
    bluetooth_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow { domain -credstore -init } credstore_data_file:dir_file_class_set *;
neverallow appdomain
    keystore_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow appdomain
    systemkeys_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow appdomain
    wifi_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };
neverallow appdomain
    dhcp_data_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

# access tmp apk files
neverallow { appdomain -platform_app }
    apk_tmp_file:dir_file_class_set
    { create write setattr relabelfrom relabelto append unlink link rename };

# Access to factory files.
neverallow appdomain efs_file:dir_file_class_set write;
neverallow { appdomain -shell } efs_file:dir_file_class_set read;

# Write to various pseudo file systems.
neverallow { appdomain -bluetooth -nfc }
    sysfs:dir_file_class_set write;
neverallow appdomain
    proc:dir_file_class_set write;

# Access to syslog(2) or /proc/kmsg.
neverallow { appdomain -system_app -shell -platform_app -priv_app }
    kernel:system { syslog_read syslog_mod syslog_console };

# SELinux is not an API for apps to use
neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:security { compute_av check_context };
neverallow { appdomain -shell } *:netlink_selinux_socket *;

# Ability to perform any filesystem operation other than statfs(2).
# i.e. no mount(2), unmount(2), etc.
neverallow appdomain fs_type:filesystem ~getattr;

# prevent creation/manipulation of globally readable symlinks
neverallow appdomain {
  apk_data_file
  cache_file
  cache_recovery_file
  dev_type
  rootfs
  system_file
  tmpfs
}:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;

# Applications should use the activity model for receiving events
neverallow {
  appdomain
  -shell # bugreport
} input_device:chr_file ~getattr;

# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties except for a few allowed domains.
# neverallow rules for access to Bluetooth-related data files are above.
neverallow {
  appdomain
  -bluetooth
  -system_app
} { bluetooth_audio_hal_prop bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop bluetooth_prop exported_bluetooth_prop }:file create_file_perms;

# allow system_app to access Nfc-related system properties.
set_prop(system_app, nfc_prop)

# allow system_app to access radio_config system properties.
set_prop(system_app, radio_control_prop)

# Apps cannot access proc_uid_time_in_state
neverallow appdomain proc_uid_time_in_state:file *;

# Apps cannot access proc_uid_concurrent_active_time
neverallow appdomain proc_uid_concurrent_active_time:file *;

# Apps cannot access proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time
neverallow appdomain proc_uid_concurrent_policy_time:file *;

# Apps cannot access proc_uid_cpupower
neverallow appdomain proc_uid_cpupower:file *;

# Apps may not read /proc/net/{tcp,tcp6,udp,udp6}. These files leak information across the
# application boundary. VPN apps may use the ConnectivityManager.getConnectionOwnerUid() API to
# perform UID lookups.
neverallow { appdomain -shell } proc_net_tcp_udp:file *;

# Apps cannot access bootstrap files. The bootstrap files are only for
# extremely early processes (like init, etc.) which are started before
# the runtime APEX is activated and Bionic libs are provided from there.
# If app process accesses (or even load/execute) the bootstrap files,
# it might cause problems such as ODR violation, etc.
neverallow appdomain system_bootstrap_lib_file:file
    { open read write append execute execute_no_trans map };
neverallow appdomain system_bootstrap_lib_file:dir
    { open read getattr search };

# Sensitive app domains are not allowed to execute from /data
# to prevent persistence attacks and ensure all code is executed
# from read-only locations.
neverallow {
  bluetooth
  isolated_app_all
  nfc
  radio
  shared_relro
  sdk_sandbox_all
  system_app
} {
  data_file_type
  -apex_art_data_file
  -dalvikcache_data_file
  -system_data_file # shared libs in apks
  -apk_data_file
}:file no_x_file_perms;

# Don't allow apps access to any of the following character devices.
neverallow appdomain {
    audio_device
    camera_device
    dm_device
    radio_device
    rpmsg_device
}:chr_file { read write };

# Block video device access for all apps except the DeviceAsWebcam Service which
# needs access to /dev/video* for interfacing with the host
neverallow {
    appdomain
    -device_as_webcam
} video_device:chr_file { read write };

# Prevent calling inotify on APKs. This can be used as a side channel
# to observer app launches, so it must be disallowed. b/231587164
# Gate by targetSdkVersion to avoid breaking existing apps.
neverallow {
  appdomain
  -untrusted_app_25
  -untrusted_app_27
  -untrusted_app_29
  -untrusted_app_30
  -untrusted_app_32
} apk_data_file:dir { watch watch_reads };
neverallow {
  appdomain
  -untrusted_app_25
  -untrusted_app_27
  -untrusted_app_29
  -untrusted_app_30
  -untrusted_app_32
} apk_data_file:file { watch watch_reads };

neverallow appdomain system_server:udp_socket {
        accept append bind create ioctl listen lock name_bind
        relabelfrom relabelto setattr shutdown };

# Transition to a non-app domain.
# Exception for the shell and su domains, can transition to runas, etc.
# Exception for crash_dump to allow for app crash reporting.
# Exception for renderscript binaries (/system/bin/bcc, /system/bin/ld.mc)
# to allow renderscript to create privileged executable files.
# Exception for virtualizationmanager to allow running VMs as child processes.
neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }
    { domain -appdomain -crash_dump -rs -virtualizationmanager }:process { transition };
neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }
    { domain -appdomain }:process { dyntransition };

# Don't allow regular apps access to storage configuration properties.
neverallow { appdomain -mediaprovider_app } storage_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;

# Don't allow apps reading /system/etc/font_fallback.xml
dontaudit appdomain system_font_fallback_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
neverallow appdomain system_font_fallback_file:file no_rw_file_perms;

neverallow { appdomain -shell } tombstone_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };
is_flag_enabled(RELEASE_UNLOCKED_STORAGE_API, `
  # Files and directories that apps write to their storage areas
  # should have type storage_area_content_file
  type_transition {
    appdomain
    -isolated_app_all
    -ephemeral_app
    -sdk_sandbox_all
  } storage_area_dir:{ notdevfile_class_set dir } storage_area_content_file;
')