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Jeff Vander Stoepf9be7652017-03-13 13:32:51 -07001# only HALs responsible for network hardware should have privileged
2# network capabilities
3neverallow {
4 halserverdomain
5 -hal_bluetooth_server
6 -hal_wifi_server
Roshan Piusd7b34a42017-12-22 15:03:15 -08007 -hal_wifi_hostapd_server
Jeff Vander Stoepf9be7652017-03-13 13:32:51 -07008 -hal_wifi_supplicant_server
Amit Mahajan30073442018-03-12 17:12:09 +00009 -hal_telephony_server
Benjamin Gordon9b2e0cb2017-11-09 15:51:26 -070010} self:global_capability_class_set { net_admin net_raw };
Jeff Vander Stoepf9be7652017-03-13 13:32:51 -070011
Jeff Vander Stoepd75a2c02017-06-21 12:46:21 -070012# Unless a HAL's job is to communicate over the network, or control network
13# hardware, it should not be using network sockets.
Jeff Vander Stoepf9be7652017-03-13 13:32:51 -070014neverallow {
15 halserverdomain
Jeff Vander Stoepd75a2c02017-06-21 12:46:21 -070016 -hal_tetheroffload_server
Jeff Vander Stoepf9be7652017-03-13 13:32:51 -070017 -hal_wifi_server
Roshan Piusd7b34a42017-12-22 15:03:15 -080018 -hal_wifi_hostapd_server
Jeff Vander Stoepf9be7652017-03-13 13:32:51 -070019 -hal_wifi_supplicant_server
Amit Mahajan30073442018-03-12 17:12:09 +000020 -hal_telephony_server
Jeff Vander Stoepf9be7652017-03-13 13:32:51 -070021} domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
Jeff Vander Stoep84b96a62017-03-20 14:52:58 -070022
23###
24# HALs are defined as an attribute and so a given domain could hypothetically
25# have multiple HALs in it (or even all of them) with the subsequent policy of
26# the domain comprised of the union of all the HALs.
27#
28# This is a problem because
29# 1) Security sensitive components should only be accessed by specific HALs.
30# 2) hwbinder_call and the restrictions it provides cannot be reasoned about in
31# the platform.
32# 3) The platform cannot reason about defense in depth if there are
33# monolithic domains etc.
34#
35# As an example, hal_keymaster and hal_gatekeeper can access the TEE and while
36# its OK for them to share a process its not OK with them to share processes
37# with other hals.
38#
39# The following neverallow rules, in conjuntion with CTS tests, assert that
40# these security principles are adhered to.
41#
42# Do not allow a hal to exec another process without a domain transition.
43# TODO remove exemptions.
44neverallow {
45 halserverdomain
46 -hal_dumpstate_server
Amit Mahajan30073442018-03-12 17:12:09 +000047 -hal_telephony_server
Jeff Vander Stoep84b96a62017-03-20 14:52:58 -070048} { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
49# Do not allow a process other than init to transition into a HAL domain.
50neverallow { domain -init } halserverdomain:process transition;
51# Only allow transitioning to a domain by running its executable. Do not
52# allow transitioning into a HAL domain by use of seclabel in an
53# init.*.rc script.
54neverallow * halserverdomain:process dyntransition;