private/app.te

# /proc/net access.
# TODO(b/9496886) Audit access for removal.
# proc_net access for the negated domains below is granted (or not) in their
# individual .te files.
r_dir_file({
  appdomain
  -ephemeral_app
  -isolated_app
  -platform_app
  -priv_app
  -shell
  -supplemental_process
  -system_app
  -untrusted_app_all
}, proc_net_type)
# audit access for all these non-core app domains.
userdebug_or_eng(`
  auditallow {
    appdomain
    -ephemeral_app
    -isolated_app
    -platform_app
    -priv_app
    -shell
    -su
    -supplemental_process
    -system_app
    -untrusted_app_all
  } proc_net_type:{ dir file lnk_file } { getattr open read };
')

# Allow apps to read the Test Harness Mode property. This property is used in
# the implementation of ActivityManager.isDeviceInTestHarnessMode()
get_prop(appdomain, test_harness_prop)

get_prop(appdomain, boot_status_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, dalvik_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, media_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, packagemanager_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, radio_control_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, surfaceflinger_color_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, systemsound_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, telephony_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, userspace_reboot_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, vold_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, adbd_config_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, dck_prop)

# Allow ART to be configurable via device_config properties
# (ART "runs" inside the app process)
get_prop(appdomain, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
get_prop(appdomain, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)

userdebug_or_eng(`perfetto_producer({ appdomain })')

# Prevent apps from causing presubmit failures.
# Apps can cause selinux denials by accessing CE storage
# and/or external storage. In either case, the selinux denial is
# not the cause of the failure, but just a symptom that
# storage isn't ready. Many apps handle the failure appropriately.
#
# Apps cannot access external storage before it becomes available.
dontaudit appdomain storage_stub_file:dir getattr;
# Attempts to write to system_data_file is generally a sign
# that apps are attempting to access encrypted storage before
# the ACTION_USER_UNLOCKED intent is delivered. Apps are not
# allowed to write to CE storage before it's available.
# Attempting to do so will be blocked by both selinux and unix
# permissions.
dontaudit appdomain system_data_file:dir write;
# Apps should not be reading vendor-defined properties.
dontaudit appdomain vendor_default_prop:file read;

# Access to /mnt/media_rw/<vol> (limited by DAC to apps with external_storage gid)
allow appdomain mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;

neverallow appdomain system_server:udp_socket {
        accept append bind create ioctl listen lock name_bind
        relabelfrom relabelto setattr shutdown };

# Transition to a non-app domain.
# Exception for the shell and su domains, can transition to runas, etc.
# Exception for crash_dump to allow for app crash reporting.
# Exception for renderscript binaries (/system/bin/bcc, /system/bin/ld.mc)
# to allow renderscript to create privileged executable files.
neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }
    { domain -appdomain -crash_dump -rs }:process { transition };
neverallow { appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }
    { domain -appdomain }:process { dyntransition };

# Don't allow regular apps access to storage configuration properties.
neverallow { appdomain -mediaprovider_app } storage_config_prop:file no_rw_file_perms;

# Allow to read sendbug.preferred.domain
get_prop(appdomain, sendbug_config_prop)

# Allow to read graphics related properties.
get_prop(appdomain, graphics_config_prop)

# Allow to read persist.config.calibration_fac
get_prop(appdomain, camera_calibration_prop)

# Allow to read db.log.detailed, db.log.slow_query_threshold*
get_prop(appdomain, sqlite_log_prop)

# Allow font file read by apps.
allow appdomain font_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow appdomain font_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;

# Enter /data/misc/apexdata/
allow appdomain apex_module_data_file:dir search;
# Read /data/misc/apexdata/com.android.art, execute signed AOT artifacts.
allow appdomain apex_art_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow appdomain apex_art_data_file:file rx_file_perms;

# Allow access to tombstones if an fd to one is given to you.
# This is restricted by unix permissions, so an app must go through system_server to get one.
allow appdomain tombstone_data_file:file { getattr read };
neverallow appdomain tombstone_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };

# Execute the shell or other system executables.
allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
not_full_treble(`allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } vendor_file:file x_file_perms;')

# Allow apps access to /vendor/app except for privileged
# apps which cannot be in /vendor.
r_dir_file({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process }, vendor_app_file)
allow { appdomain -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } vendor_app_file:file execute;

# Perform binder IPC to supplemental process.
binder_call(appdomain, supplemental_process)

# Allow access to external storage; we have several visible mount points under /storage
# and symlinks to primary storage at places like /storage/sdcard0 and /mnt/user/0/primary
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } storage_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } storage_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } mnt_user_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } mnt_user_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;

# Read/write visible storage
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } { sdcard_type fuse }:dir create_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } { sdcard_type fuse }:file create_file_perms;
# This should be removed if sdcardfs is modified to alter the secontext for its
# accesses to the underlying FS.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Allow apps to use the USB Accessory interface.
# http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/connectivity/usb/accessory.html
#
# USB devices are first opened by the system server (USBDeviceManagerService)
# and the file descriptor is passed to the right Activity via binder.
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } usb_device:chr_file { read write getattr ioctl };
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } usbaccessory_device:chr_file { read write getattr };

#logd access
control_logd({ appdomain -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process })

# application inherit logd write socket (urge is to deprecate this long term)
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } keystore:keystore_key { get_state get insert delete exist list sign verify };
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } keystore:keystore2_key { delete use get_info rebind update };

allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } keystore_maintenance_service:service_manager find;
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } keystore:keystore2 get_state;

use_keystore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process })

use_credstore({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process })

# For app fuse.
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process }, display_client)
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process }, display_manager)
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process }, display_vsync)
pdx_client({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process }, performance_client)
# Apps do not directly open the IPC socket for bufferhubd.
pdx_use({ appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process }, bufferhub_client)

# Apps receive an open tun fd from the framework for
# device traffic. Do not allow untrusted app to directly open tun_device
allow { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } tun_device:chr_file { read write getattr append ioctl };
allowxperm { appdomain -isolated_app -ephemeral_app -supplemental_process } tun_device:chr_file ioctl TUNGETIFF;

# Sensitive app domains are not allowed to execute from /data
# to prevent persistence attacks and ensure all code is executed
# from read-only locations.
neverallow {
  bluetooth
  isolated_app
  nfc
  radio
  shared_relro
  system_app
} {
  data_file_type
  -apex_art_data_file
  -dalvikcache_data_file
  -system_data_file # shared libs in apks
  -apk_data_file
}:file no_x_file_perms;

# For now, don't allow apps other than gmscore to access /data/misc_ce/<userid>/checkin
neverallow { appdomain -gmscore_app } checkin_data_file:dir *;
neverallow { appdomain -gmscore_app } checkin_data_file:file *;