private/incidentd.te

typeattribute incidentd coredomain;
typeattribute incidentd mlstrustedsubject;

init_daemon_domain(incidentd)
type incidentd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
binder_use(incidentd)
wakelock_use(incidentd)

# Allow incidentd to scan through /proc/pid for all processes
r_dir_file(incidentd, domain)

# Allow incidentd to kill incident_helper when timeout
allow incidentd incident_helper:process sigkill;

# Allow executing files on system, such as:
#   /system/bin/toolbox
#   /system/bin/logcat
#   /system/bin/dumpsys
allow incidentd system_file:file execute_no_trans;
allow incidentd toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;

# section id 2001, allow reading /proc/pagetypeinfo
allow incidentd proc_pagetypeinfo:file r_file_perms;

# section id 2002, allow reading /d/wakeup_sources
allow incidentd debugfs_wakeup_sources:file r_file_perms;

# section id 2003, allow executing top
allow incidentd proc_meminfo:file { open read };

# section id 2004, allow reading /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpufreq/all_time_in_state
allow incidentd sysfs_devices_system_cpu:file r_file_perms;

# section id 2005, allow reading ps dump in full
allow incidentd domain:process getattr;

# section id 2006, allow reading /sys/class/power_supply/bms/battery_type
allow incidentd sysfs_batteryinfo:dir { search };
allow incidentd sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms;

# Create and write into /data/misc/incidents
allow incidentd incident_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow incidentd incident_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Get process attributes
# TODO allow incidentd domain:process getattr;

# Read files in /proc
allow incidentd {
  proc_stat
}:file r_file_perms;

# Signal java processes to dump their stack and get the results
# TODO allow incidentd { appdomain ephemeral_app system_server }:process signal;
# TODO allow incidentd anr_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
# TODO allow incidentd anr_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Signal native processes to dump their stack.
# This list comes from native_processes_to_dump in incidentd/utils.c
allow incidentd {
  audioserver
  cameraserver
  drmserver
  inputflinger
  mediacodec
  mediadrmserver
  mediaextractor
  mediaserver
  sdcardd
  surfaceflinger
}:process signal;

# Allow incidentd to make binder calls to any binder service
binder_call(incidentd, system_server)
binder_call(incidentd, appdomain)

# Reading /proc/PID/maps of other processes
# TODO allow incidentd self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;

# Run a shell.
allow incidentd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;

# logd access - work to be done is a PII safe log (possibly an event log?)
userdebug_or_eng(`read_logd(incidentd)')
# TODO control_logd(incidentd)

# Allow incidentd to find these standard groups of services.
# Others can be whitelisted individually.
allow incidentd {
  system_server_service
  app_api_service
  system_api_service
}:service_manager find;

# Only incidentd can publish the binder service
add_service(incidentd, incident_service)

# Allow pipes from (and only from) incident
allow incidentd incident:fd use;
allow incidentd incident:fifo_file write;

# Allow incident to call back to incident with status updates.
binder_call(incidentd, incident)

###
### neverallow rules
###

# only system_server, system_app and incident command can find the incident service
neverallow {
  domain
  -incident
  -incidentd
  -statsd
  -system_app
  -system_server
} incident_service:service_manager find;

# only incidentd and the other root services in limited circumstances
# can get to the files in /data/misc/incidents
#
# write, execute, append are forbidden almost everywhere
neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold } incident_data_file:file {
  w_file_perms
  x_file_perms
  create
  rename
  setattr
  unlink
  append
};
# read is also allowed by system_server, for when the file is handed to dropbox
neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold -system_server } incident_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# limited access to the directory itself
neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold } incident_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;