blob: 8543cac6aa5e231db8a4de93fd0dc198485a0ae3 [file] [log] [blame]
Steven Moreland7baf7252018-05-25 16:23:37 -07001# applies all permissions to hal_omx NOT hal_omx_server
2# since OMX must always be in its own process.
3
Steven Moreland7baf7252018-05-25 16:23:37 -07004
5# can route /dev/binder traffic to /dev/vndbinder
6vndbinder_use(hal_omx_server)
7
8binder_call(hal_omx_server, binderservicedomain)
9binder_call(hal_omx_server, { appdomain -isolated_app })
10
11# Allow hal_omx_server access to composer sync fences
12allow hal_omx_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
13
14allow hal_omx_server gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
15allow hal_omx_server video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
16allow hal_omx_server video_device:dir search;
17allow hal_omx_server ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
18allow hal_omx_server hal_camera:fd use;
19
20crash_dump_fallback(hal_omx_server)
21
22# Recieve gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd. Note that hal_omx_server never
23# directly connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge
24# between those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd
25# via PDX. Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro.
26allow hal_omx_server bufferhubd:fd use;
27
Steven Moreland8fc79812018-05-30 16:43:17 -070028hal_attribute_hwservice_client(hal_omx, hal_omx_hwservice)
29hal_attribute_hwservice_client(hal_omx, hal_codec2_hwservice)
30
Steven Moreland7baf7252018-05-25 16:23:37 -070031allow hal_omx_client hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
32
33binder_call(hal_omx_client, hal_omx_server)
Steven Moreland8fc79812018-05-30 16:43:17 -070034binder_call(hal_omx_server, hal_omx_client)
Steven Moreland7baf7252018-05-25 16:23:37 -070035
36###
37### neverallow rules
38###
39
40# hal_omx_server should never execute any executable without a
41# domain transition
42neverallow hal_omx_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
43
44# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
45# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
46# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
47# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
48# hardware/content. Etc.
49#
50# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
51# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
52# Lengthier explanation here:
53# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
54neverallow hal_omx_server domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;