blob: 375f386c3550a3ec945ebdd1d8362568ca7f96a0 [file] [log] [blame]
Steven Moreland7baf7252018-05-25 16:23:37 -07001# applies all permissions to hal_omx NOT hal_omx_server
2# since OMX must always be in its own process.
3
4add_hwservice(hal_omx_server, hal_codec2_hwservice)
5add_hwservice(hal_omx_server, hal_omx_hwservice)
6
7# can route /dev/binder traffic to /dev/vndbinder
8vndbinder_use(hal_omx_server)
9
10binder_call(hal_omx_server, binderservicedomain)
11binder_call(hal_omx_server, { appdomain -isolated_app })
12
13# Allow hal_omx_server access to composer sync fences
14allow hal_omx_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
15
16allow hal_omx_server gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
17allow hal_omx_server video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
18allow hal_omx_server video_device:dir search;
19allow hal_omx_server ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
20allow hal_omx_server hal_camera:fd use;
21
22crash_dump_fallback(hal_omx_server)
23
24# Recieve gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd. Note that hal_omx_server never
25# directly connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge
26# between those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd
27# via PDX. Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro.
28allow hal_omx_server bufferhubd:fd use;
29
Steven Moreland8fc79812018-05-30 16:43:17 -070030hal_attribute_hwservice_client(hal_omx, hal_omx_hwservice)
31hal_attribute_hwservice_client(hal_omx, hal_codec2_hwservice)
32
Steven Moreland7baf7252018-05-25 16:23:37 -070033allow hal_omx_client hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
34
35binder_call(hal_omx_client, hal_omx_server)
Steven Moreland8fc79812018-05-30 16:43:17 -070036binder_call(hal_omx_server, hal_omx_client)
Steven Moreland7baf7252018-05-25 16:23:37 -070037
38###
39### neverallow rules
40###
41
42# hal_omx_server should never execute any executable without a
43# domain transition
44neverallow hal_omx_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
45
46# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
47# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
48# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
49# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
50# hardware/content. Etc.
51#
52# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
53# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
54# Lengthier explanation here:
55# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
56neverallow hal_omx_server domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;