private/sdk_sandbox_all.te

###
### sdk_sandbox_all
###
### This file defines the rules shared by all sdk_sandbox_all domains.
### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
### directory).  The sdk_sandbox_all_all attribute is assigned to all default
### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between FIRST_SDK_SANDBOX_UID (20000)
### and LAST_SDK_SANDBOX_UID (29999) if the app has no specific seinfo
### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.

allow sdk_sandbox_all system_linker_exec:file execute_no_trans;

# Required to read CTS tests data from the shell_data_file location.
allow sdk_sandbox_all shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow sdk_sandbox_all shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;

# allow sdk sandbox to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
# modify them other than to connect
allow sdk_sandbox_all system_server:udp_socket {
        connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write getopt setopt };

# allow sandbox to search in sdk system server directory
# additionally, for webview to work, getattr has been permitted
allow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { getattr search };
# allow sandbox to create files and dirs in sdk data directory
allow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# allow apps to pass open fds to the sdk sandbox
allow sdk_sandbox_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { getattr read };

###
### neverallow rules
###

neverallow sdk_sandbox_all app_data_file_type:file { execute execute_no_trans };

# Receive or send uevent messages.
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;

# Receive or send generic netlink messages
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all domain:netlink_socket *;

# Too much leaky information in debugfs. It's a security
# best practice to ensure these files aren't readable.
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all debugfs_type:file read;

# execute gpu_device
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all gpu_device:chr_file execute;

# access files in /sys with the default sysfs label
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all sysfs:file *;

# Avoid reads from generically labeled /proc files
# Create a more specific label if needed
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all proc:file { no_rw_file_perms no_x_file_perms };

# Directly access external storage
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file {open create};
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:dir search;

# Avoid reads to proc_net, it contains too much device wide information about
# ongoing connections.
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all proc_net:file no_rw_file_perms;

# SDK sandbox processes have their own storage not related to app_data_file or privapp_data_file
# TODO(b/280514080): shell_data_file shouldn't be allowed here
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { app_data_file_type -sdk_sandbox_data_file -shell_data_file -radio_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { app_data_file_type -sdk_sandbox_data_file -shell_data_file -radio_data_file }:file ~{ getattr read };

# SDK sandbox processes don't  have any access to external storage
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { media_rw_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { media_rw_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms;

neverallow { sdk_sandbox_all } tmpfs:dir no_rw_file_perms;

neverallow sdk_sandbox_all hal_drm_service:service_manager find;

# Only certain system components should have access to sdk_sandbox_system_data_file
# sdk_sandbox only needs search. Restricted in follow up neverallow rule.
neverallow {
    domain
    -init
    -installd
    -system_server
    -vold_prepare_subdirs
} sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { relabelfrom };

neverallow {
    domain
    -init
    -installd
    -sdk_sandbox_all
    -system_server
    -vold_prepare_subdirs
    -zygote
} sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };

# Only certain system components should have access to sdk_sandbox_all_system_data_file
# sdk_sandbox_all only needs search. Restricted in follow up neverallow rule.
neverallow {
    domain
    -init
    -installd
    -system_server
    -vold_prepare_subdirs
} sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { relabelfrom };

neverallow {
    domain
    -init
    -installd
    -sdk_sandbox_all
    -system_server
    -vold_prepare_subdirs
    -zygote
} sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };

# sdk_sandbox_all only needs to traverse through the sdk_sandbox_all_system_data_file
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:dir ~{ getattr search };

# Only dirs should be created at sdk_sandbox_all_system_data_file level
neverallow { domain -init } sdk_sandbox_system_data_file:file *;

# Restrict unix stream sockets for IPC.
neverallow sdk_sandbox_all {
    domain
    -sdk_sandbox_all
    -netd
    -logd
    -adbd
    userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
    # needed for profiling
    -traced
    -traced_perf
    -heapprofd
    # fallback crash handling for processes that can't exec crash_dump.
    -tombstoned
    # needed to connect to PRNG seeder daemon.
    -prng_seeder
}:unix_stream_socket connectto;
neverallow {
    domain
    -adbd
    -sdk_sandbox_all
} sdk_sandbox_all:unix_stream_socket connectto;