private/incidentd.te

typeattribute incidentd coredomain;
typeattribute incidentd mlstrustedsubject;

init_daemon_domain(incidentd)
type incidentd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
binder_use(incidentd)
wakelock_use(incidentd)

# Allow incidentd to scan through /proc/pid for all processes
r_dir_file(incidentd, domain)

# Allow incidentd to kill incident_helper when timeout
allow incidentd incident_helper:process sigkill;

# Allow executing files on system, such as:
#   /system/bin/toolbox
#   /system/bin/logcat
#   /system/bin/dumpsys
allow incidentd system_file:file execute_no_trans;
allow incidentd toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;

# section id 1002, allow reading kernel version /proc/version
allow incidentd proc_version:file r_file_perms;

# section id 2001, allow reading /proc/pagetypeinfo
allow incidentd proc_pagetypeinfo:file r_file_perms;

# section id 2002, allow reading /d/wakeup_sources
allow incidentd debugfs_wakeup_sources:file r_file_perms;

# section id 2003, allow executing top
allow incidentd proc_meminfo:file { open read };

# section id 2004, allow reading /sys/devices/system/cpu/cpufreq/all_time_in_state
allow incidentd sysfs_devices_system_cpu:file r_file_perms;

# section id 2005, allow reading ps dump in full
allow incidentd domain:process getattr;

# section id 2006, allow reading /sys/class/power_supply/bms/battery_type
allow incidentd sysfs_batteryinfo:dir { search };
allow incidentd sysfs_batteryinfo:file r_file_perms;

# section id 2007, allow reading LAST_KMSG /sys/fs/pstore/console-ramoops
userdebug_or_eng(`allow incidentd pstorefs:dir search');
userdebug_or_eng(`allow incidentd pstorefs:file r_file_perms');

# section id 3023, allow obtaining stats report
allow incidentd stats_service:service_manager find;
binder_call(incidentd, statsd)

# section id 3026, allow reading /data/misc/perfetto-traces.
allow incidentd perfetto_traces_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow incidentd perfetto_traces_data_file:file r_file_perms;

# section id 3052, allow accessing nfc_service
allow incidentd nfc_service:service_manager find;

# Create and write into /data/misc/incidents
allow incidentd incident_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow incidentd incident_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Enable incidentd to get stack traces.
binder_use(incidentd)
hwbinder_use(incidentd)
allow incidentd hwservicemanager:hwservice_manager { list };
get_prop(incidentd, hwservicemanager_prop)
allow incidentd hidl_manager_hwservice:hwservice_manager { find };

# Read files in /proc
allow incidentd {
  proc_cmdline
  proc_pid_max
  proc_pipe_conf
  proc_stat
}:file r_file_perms;

# Signal java processes to dump their stack and get the results
allow incidentd { appdomain ephemeral_app system_server }:process signal;

# Signal native processes to dump their stack.
# This list comes from native_processes_to_dump in incidentd/utils.c
allow incidentd {
  # This list comes from native_processes_to_dump in dumputils/dump_utils.cpp
  audioserver
  cameraserver
  drmserver
  inputflinger
  mediadrmserver
  mediaextractor
  mediametrics
  mediaserver
  sdcardd
  statsd
  surfaceflinger

  # This list comes from hal_interfaces_to_dump in dumputils/dump_utils.cpp
  hal_audio_server
  hal_bluetooth_server
  hal_camera_server
  hal_codec2_server
  hal_face_server
  hal_graphics_allocator_server
  hal_graphics_composer_server
  hal_health_server
  hal_omx_server
  hal_sensors_server
  hal_vr_server
}:process signal;

# Allow incidentd to make binder calls to any binder service
binder_call(incidentd, system_server)
binder_call(incidentd, appdomain)

# Reading /proc/PID/maps of other processes
userdebug_or_eng(`allow incidentd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace }');
# incidentd has capability sys_ptrace, but should only use that capability for
# accessing sensitive /proc/PID files, never for using ptrace attach.
neverallow incidentd *:process ptrace;

allow incidentd self:global_capability_class_set {
    # Send signals to processes
    kill
};

# Connect to tombstoned to intercept dumps.
unix_socket_connect(incidentd, tombstoned_intercept, tombstoned)

# Run a shell.
allow incidentd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;

# For running am, incident-helper-cmd and similar framework commands.
# Run /system/bin/app_process.
allow incidentd zygote_exec:file { rx_file_perms };
# Access the runtime feature flag properties.
get_prop(incidentd, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
get_prop(incidentd, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
# ART locks profile files.
allow incidentd system_file:file lock;
# Incidentd should never exec from the memory (e.g. JIT cache). These denials are expected.
dontaudit incidentd dalvikcache_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
dontaudit incidentd apex_module_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
dontaudit incidentd apex_art_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
dontaudit incidentd tmpfs:file rwx_file_perms;

# logd access - work to be done is a PII safe log (possibly an event log?)
userdebug_or_eng(`read_logd(incidentd)')
# TODO control_logd(incidentd)

# Access /data/misc/logd
r_dir_file(incidentd, misc_logd_file)

# Allow incidentd to find these standard groups of services.
# Others can be allowlisted individually.
allow incidentd {
  system_server_service
  app_api_service
  system_api_service
}:service_manager find;

# Only incidentd can publish the binder service
add_service(incidentd, incident_service)

# Allow pipes only from dumpstate and incident
allow incidentd { dumpstate incident }:fd use;
allow incidentd { dumpstate incident }:fifo_file write;

# Allow incident to call back to incident with status updates.
binder_call(incidentd, incident)

# Read device serial number from system properties
# This is used to track reports from lab testing devices
userdebug_or_eng(`
  get_prop(incidentd, serialno_prop)
')

# Read ro.boot.bootreason, persist.sys.boot.bootreason
# This is used to track reports from lab testing devices
userdebug_or_eng(`
  get_prop(incidentd, bootloader_boot_reason_prop);
  get_prop(incidentd, system_boot_reason_prop);
  get_prop(incidentd, last_boot_reason_prop);
')

###
### neverallow rules
###
# only incidentd and the other root services in limited circumstances
# can get to the files in /data/misc/incidents
#
# write, execute, append are forbidden almost everywhere
neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold } incident_data_file:file {
  w_file_perms
  x_file_perms
  create
  rename
  setattr
  unlink
  append
};
# read is also allowed by system_server, for when the file is handed to dropbox
neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold -system_server } incident_data_file:file r_file_perms;
# limited access to the directory itself
neverallow { domain -incidentd -init -vold } incident_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;