Joel Galenson | ca0efb1 | 2020-10-01 14:32:30 -0700 | [diff] [blame^] | 1 | /* |
| 2 | * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| 5 | * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| 6 | * You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| 7 | * |
| 8 | * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| 9 | * |
| 10 | * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| 11 | * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| 12 | * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| 13 | * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| 14 | * limitations under the License. |
| 15 | */ |
| 16 | |
| 17 | #define LOG_TAG "keystore2" |
| 18 | |
| 19 | #include "crypto.hpp" |
| 20 | |
| 21 | #include <log/log.h> |
| 22 | #include <openssl/aes.h> |
| 23 | #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| 24 | |
| 25 | #include <vector> |
| 26 | |
| 27 | // Copied from system/security/keystore/blob.h. |
| 28 | |
| 29 | constexpr size_t kGcmTagLength = 128 / 8; |
| 30 | constexpr size_t kAes128KeySizeBytes = 128 / 8; |
| 31 | |
| 32 | // Copied from system/security/keystore/blob.cpp. |
| 33 | |
| 34 | #if defined(__clang__) |
| 35 | #define OPTNONE __attribute__((optnone)) |
| 36 | #elif defined(__GNUC__) |
| 37 | #define OPTNONE __attribute__((optimize("O0"))) |
| 38 | #else |
| 39 | #error Need a definition for OPTNONE |
| 40 | #endif |
| 41 | |
| 42 | class ArrayEraser { |
| 43 | public: |
| 44 | ArrayEraser(uint8_t* arr, size_t size) : mArr(arr), mSize(size) {} |
| 45 | OPTNONE ~ArrayEraser() { std::fill(mArr, mArr + mSize, 0); } |
| 46 | |
| 47 | private: |
| 48 | volatile uint8_t* mArr; |
| 49 | size_t mSize; |
| 50 | }; |
| 51 | |
| 52 | /** |
| 53 | * Returns a EVP_CIPHER appropriate for the given key size. |
| 54 | */ |
| 55 | const EVP_CIPHER* getAesCipherForKey(size_t key_size) { |
| 56 | const EVP_CIPHER* cipher = EVP_aes_256_gcm(); |
| 57 | if (key_size == kAes128KeySizeBytes) { |
| 58 | cipher = EVP_aes_128_gcm(); |
| 59 | } |
| 60 | return cipher; |
| 61 | } |
| 62 | |
| 63 | /* |
| 64 | * Encrypt 'len' data at 'in' with AES-GCM, using 128-bit or 256-bit key at 'key', 96-bit IV at |
| 65 | * 'iv' and write output to 'out' (which may be the same location as 'in') and 128-bit tag to |
| 66 | * 'tag'. |
| 67 | */ |
| 68 | bool AES_gcm_encrypt(const uint8_t* in, uint8_t* out, size_t len, const uint8_t* key, |
| 69 | size_t key_size, const uint8_t* iv, uint8_t* tag) { |
| 70 | |
| 71 | // There can be 128-bit and 256-bit keys |
| 72 | const EVP_CIPHER* cipher = getAesCipherForKey(key_size); |
| 73 | |
| 74 | bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()); |
| 75 | |
| 76 | EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), cipher, nullptr /* engine */, key, iv); |
| 77 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx.get(), 0 /* no padding needed with GCM */); |
| 78 | |
| 79 | std::vector<uint8_t> out_tmp(len); |
| 80 | uint8_t* out_pos = out_tmp.data(); |
| 81 | int out_len; |
| 82 | |
| 83 | EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx.get(), out_pos, &out_len, in, len); |
| 84 | out_pos += out_len; |
| 85 | EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(), out_pos, &out_len); |
| 86 | out_pos += out_len; |
| 87 | if (out_pos - out_tmp.data() != static_cast<ssize_t>(len)) { |
| 88 | ALOGD("Encrypted ciphertext is the wrong size, expected %zu, got %zd", len, |
| 89 | out_pos - out_tmp.data()); |
| 90 | return false; |
| 91 | } |
| 92 | |
| 93 | std::copy(out_tmp.data(), out_pos, out); |
| 94 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, kGcmTagLength, tag); |
| 95 | |
| 96 | return true; |
| 97 | } |
| 98 | |
| 99 | /* |
| 100 | * Decrypt 'len' data at 'in' with AES-GCM, using 128-bit or 256-bit key at 'key', 96-bit IV at |
| 101 | * 'iv', checking 128-bit tag at 'tag' and writing plaintext to 'out'(which may be the same |
| 102 | * location as 'in'). |
| 103 | */ |
| 104 | bool AES_gcm_decrypt(const uint8_t* in, uint8_t* out, size_t len, const uint8_t* key, |
| 105 | size_t key_size, const uint8_t* iv, const uint8_t* tag) { |
| 106 | |
| 107 | // There can be 128-bit and 256-bit keys |
| 108 | const EVP_CIPHER* cipher = getAesCipherForKey(key_size); |
| 109 | |
| 110 | bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()); |
| 111 | |
| 112 | EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx.get(), cipher, nullptr /* engine */, key, iv); |
| 113 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(ctx.get(), 0 /* no padding needed with GCM */); |
| 114 | EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx.get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, kGcmTagLength, const_cast<uint8_t*>(tag)); |
| 115 | |
| 116 | std::vector<uint8_t> out_tmp(len); |
| 117 | ArrayEraser out_eraser(out_tmp.data(), len); |
| 118 | uint8_t* out_pos = out_tmp.data(); |
| 119 | int out_len; |
| 120 | |
| 121 | EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx.get(), out_pos, &out_len, in, len); |
| 122 | out_pos += out_len; |
| 123 | if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx.get(), out_pos, &out_len)) { |
| 124 | ALOGE("Failed to decrypt blob; ciphertext or tag is likely corrupted"); |
| 125 | return false; |
| 126 | } |
| 127 | out_pos += out_len; |
| 128 | if (out_pos - out_tmp.data() != static_cast<ssize_t>(len)) { |
| 129 | ALOGE("Encrypted plaintext is the wrong size, expected %zu, got %zd", len, |
| 130 | out_pos - out_tmp.data()); |
| 131 | return false; |
| 132 | } |
| 133 | |
| 134 | std::copy(out_tmp.data(), out_pos, out); |
| 135 | |
| 136 | return true; |
| 137 | } |
| 138 | |
| 139 | // Copied from system/security/keystore/keymaster_enforcement.cpp. |
| 140 | |
| 141 | class EvpMdCtx { |
| 142 | public: |
| 143 | EvpMdCtx() { EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_); } |
| 144 | ~EvpMdCtx() { EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_); } |
| 145 | |
| 146 | EVP_MD_CTX* get() { return &ctx_; } |
| 147 | |
| 148 | private: |
| 149 | EVP_MD_CTX ctx_; |
| 150 | }; |
| 151 | |
| 152 | bool CreateKeyId(const uint8_t* key_blob, size_t len, km_id_t* out_id) { |
| 153 | EvpMdCtx ctx; |
| 154 | |
| 155 | uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| 156 | unsigned int hash_len; |
| 157 | if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_sha256(), nullptr /* ENGINE */) && |
| 158 | EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx.get(), key_blob, len) && |
| 159 | EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx.get(), hash, &hash_len)) { |
| 160 | assert(hash_len >= sizeof(*out_id)); |
| 161 | memcpy(out_id, hash, sizeof(*out_id)); |
| 162 | return true; |
| 163 | } |
| 164 | |
| 165 | return false; |
| 166 | } |
| 167 | |
| 168 | // Copied from system/security/keystore/user_state.h |
| 169 | |
| 170 | static constexpr size_t SALT_SIZE = 16; |
| 171 | |
| 172 | // Copied from system/security/keystore/user_state.cpp. |
| 173 | |
| 174 | void generateKeyFromPassword(uint8_t* key, size_t key_len, const char* pw, size_t pw_len, |
| 175 | uint8_t* salt) { |
| 176 | size_t saltSize; |
| 177 | if (salt != nullptr) { |
| 178 | saltSize = SALT_SIZE; |
| 179 | } else { |
| 180 | // Pre-gingerbread used this hardwired salt, readMasterKey will rewrite these when found |
| 181 | salt = (uint8_t*)"keystore"; |
| 182 | // sizeof = 9, not strlen = 8 |
| 183 | saltSize = sizeof("keystore"); |
| 184 | } |
| 185 | |
| 186 | const EVP_MD* digest = EVP_sha256(); |
| 187 | |
| 188 | // SHA1 was used prior to increasing the key size |
| 189 | if (key_len == kAes128KeySizeBytes) { |
| 190 | digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| 191 | } |
| 192 | |
| 193 | PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pw, pw_len, salt, saltSize, 8192, digest, key_len, key); |
| 194 | } |