| // Copyright 2020, The Android Open Source Project |
| // |
| // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| // You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| // |
| // http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| // |
| // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| // limitations under the License. |
| |
| #![allow(dead_code)] |
| |
| use crate::{ |
| database::BlobMetaData, database::BlobMetaEntry, database::EncryptedBy, database::KeyEntry, |
| database::KeyType, database::KeystoreDB, enforcements::Enforcements, error::Error, |
| error::ResponseCode, key_parameter::KeyParameter, legacy_blob::LegacyBlobLoader, |
| legacy_migrator::LegacyMigrator, |
| }; |
| use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::Domain::Domain; |
| use anyhow::{Context, Result}; |
| use keystore2_crypto::{ |
| aes_gcm_decrypt, aes_gcm_encrypt, generate_aes256_key, generate_salt, Password, ZVec, |
| AES_256_KEY_LENGTH, |
| }; |
| use std::ops::Deref; |
| use std::{ |
| collections::HashMap, |
| sync::Arc, |
| sync::{Mutex, Weak}, |
| }; |
| |
| type UserId = u32; |
| |
| #[derive(Default)] |
| struct UserSuperKeys { |
| /// The per boot key is used for LSKF binding of authentication bound keys. There is one |
| /// key per android user. The key is stored on flash encrypted with a key derived from a |
| /// secret, that is itself derived from the user's lock screen knowledge factor (LSKF). |
| /// When the user unlocks the device for the first time, this key is unlocked, i.e., decrypted, |
| /// and stays memory resident until the device reboots. |
| per_boot: Option<SuperKey>, |
| /// The screen lock key works like the per boot key with the distinction that it is cleared |
| /// from memory when the screen lock is engaged. |
| /// TODO the life cycle is not fully implemented at this time. |
| screen_lock: Option<Arc<ZVec>>, |
| } |
| |
| #[derive(Default, Clone)] |
| pub struct SuperKey { |
| key: Arc<ZVec>, |
| // id of the super key in the database. |
| id: i64, |
| } |
| |
| impl SuperKey { |
| pub fn get_key(&self) -> &Arc<ZVec> { |
| &self.key |
| } |
| |
| pub fn get_id(&self) -> i64 { |
| self.id |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #[derive(Default)] |
| struct SkmState { |
| user_keys: HashMap<UserId, UserSuperKeys>, |
| key_index: HashMap<i64, Weak<ZVec>>, |
| } |
| |
| #[derive(Default)] |
| pub struct SuperKeyManager { |
| data: Mutex<SkmState>, |
| } |
| |
| impl SuperKeyManager { |
| pub fn new() -> Self { |
| Self { data: Mutex::new(Default::default()) } |
| } |
| |
| pub fn forget_screen_lock_key_for_user(&self, user: UserId) { |
| let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap(); |
| if let Some(usk) = data.user_keys.get_mut(&user) { |
| usk.screen_lock = None; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| pub fn forget_screen_lock_keys(&self) { |
| let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap(); |
| for (_, usk) in data.user_keys.iter_mut() { |
| usk.screen_lock = None; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| pub fn forget_all_keys_for_user(&self, user: UserId) { |
| let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap(); |
| data.user_keys.remove(&user); |
| } |
| |
| pub fn forget_all_keys(&self) { |
| let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap(); |
| data.user_keys.clear(); |
| data.key_index.clear(); |
| } |
| |
| fn install_per_boot_key_for_user(&self, user: UserId, super_key: SuperKey) { |
| let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap(); |
| data.key_index.insert(super_key.id, Arc::downgrade(&(super_key.key))); |
| data.user_keys.entry(user).or_default().per_boot = Some(super_key); |
| } |
| |
| fn get_key(&self, key_id: &i64) -> Option<Arc<ZVec>> { |
| self.data.lock().unwrap().key_index.get(key_id).and_then(|k| k.upgrade()) |
| } |
| |
| pub fn get_per_boot_key_by_user_id(&self, user_id: u32) -> Option<SuperKey> { |
| let data = self.data.lock().unwrap(); |
| data.user_keys.get(&user_id).map(|e| e.per_boot.clone()).flatten() |
| } |
| |
| /// This function unlocks the super keys for a given user. |
| /// This means the key is loaded from the database, decrypted and placed in the |
| /// super key cache. If there is no such key a new key is created, encrypted with |
| /// a key derived from the given password and stored in the database. |
| pub fn unlock_user_key( |
| &self, |
| db: &mut KeystoreDB, |
| user: UserId, |
| pw: &Password, |
| legacy_blob_loader: &LegacyBlobLoader, |
| ) -> Result<()> { |
| let (_, entry) = db |
| .get_or_create_key_with( |
| Domain::APP, |
| user as u64 as i64, |
| KeystoreDB::USER_SUPER_KEY_ALIAS, |
| crate::database::KEYSTORE_UUID, |
| || { |
| // For backward compatibility we need to check if there is a super key present. |
| let super_key = legacy_blob_loader |
| .load_super_key(user, pw) |
| .context("In create_new_key: Failed to load legacy key blob.")?; |
| let super_key = match super_key { |
| None => { |
| // No legacy file was found. So we generate a new key. |
| generate_aes256_key() |
| .context("In create_new_key: Failed to generate AES 256 key.")? |
| } |
| Some(key) => key, |
| }; |
| // Regardless of whether we loaded an old AES128 key or generated a new AES256 |
| // key as the super key, we derive a AES256 key from the password and re-encrypt |
| // the super key before we insert it in the database. The length of the key is |
| // preserved by the encryption so we don't need any extra flags to inform us |
| // which algorithm to use it with. |
| Self::encrypt_with_password(&super_key, pw).context("In create_new_key.") |
| }, |
| ) |
| .context("In unlock_user_key: Failed to get key id.")?; |
| |
| self.populate_cache_from_super_key_blob(user, entry, pw).context("In unlock_user_key.")?; |
| Ok(()) |
| } |
| |
| /// Unwraps an encrypted key blob given metadata identifying the encryption key. |
| /// The function queries `metadata.encrypted_by()` to determine the encryption key. |
| /// It then check if the required key is memory resident, and if so decrypts the |
| /// blob. |
| pub fn unwrap_key<'a>(&self, blob: &'a [u8], metadata: &BlobMetaData) -> Result<KeyBlob<'a>> { |
| match metadata.encrypted_by() { |
| Some(EncryptedBy::KeyId(key_id)) => match self.get_key(key_id) { |
| Some(key) => Ok(KeyBlob::Sensitive( |
| Self::unwrap_key_with_key(blob, metadata, &key).context("In unwrap_key.")?, |
| SuperKey { key: key.clone(), id: *key_id }, |
| )), |
| None => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::LOCKED)) |
| .context("In unwrap_key: Key is not usable until the user entered their LSKF."), |
| }, |
| _ => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)) |
| .context("In unwrap_key: Cannot determined wrapping key."), |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// Unwraps an encrypted key blob given an encryption key. |
| fn unwrap_key_with_key(blob: &[u8], metadata: &BlobMetaData, key: &[u8]) -> Result<ZVec> { |
| match (metadata.iv(), metadata.aead_tag()) { |
| (Some(iv), Some(tag)) => aes_gcm_decrypt(blob, iv, tag, key) |
| .context("In unwrap_key_with_key: Failed to decrypt the key blob."), |
| (iv, tag) => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)).context(format!( |
| concat!( |
| "In unwrap_key_with_key: Key has incomplete metadata.", |
| "Present: iv: {}, aead_tag: {}." |
| ), |
| iv.is_some(), |
| tag.is_some(), |
| )), |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// Checks if user has setup LSKF, even when super key cache is empty for the user. |
| pub fn super_key_exists_in_db_for_user( |
| db: &mut KeystoreDB, |
| legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator, |
| user_id: u32, |
| ) -> Result<bool> { |
| let key_in_db = db |
| .key_exists( |
| Domain::APP, |
| user_id as u64 as i64, |
| KeystoreDB::USER_SUPER_KEY_ALIAS, |
| KeyType::Super, |
| ) |
| .context("In super_key_exists_in_db_for_user.")?; |
| |
| if key_in_db { |
| Ok(key_in_db) |
| } else { |
| legacy_migrator |
| .has_super_key(user_id) |
| .context("In super_key_exists_in_db_for_user: Trying to query legacy db.") |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// Checks if user has already setup LSKF (i.e. a super key is persisted in the database or the |
| /// legacy database). If not, return Uninitialized state. |
| /// Otherwise, decrypt the super key from the password and return LskfUnlocked state. |
| pub fn check_and_unlock_super_key( |
| &self, |
| db: &mut KeystoreDB, |
| legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator, |
| user_id: u32, |
| pw: &Password, |
| ) -> Result<UserState> { |
| let result = legacy_migrator |
| .with_try_migrate_super_key(user_id, pw, || db.load_super_key(user_id)) |
| .context("In check_and_unlock_super_key. Failed to load super key")?; |
| |
| match result { |
| Some((_, entry)) => { |
| let super_key = self |
| .populate_cache_from_super_key_blob(user_id, entry, pw) |
| .context("In check_and_unlock_super_key.")?; |
| Ok(UserState::LskfUnlocked(super_key)) |
| } |
| None => Ok(UserState::Uninitialized), |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// Checks if user has already setup LSKF (i.e. a super key is persisted in the database or the |
| /// legacy database). If so, return LskfLocked state. |
| /// If the password is provided, generate a new super key, encrypt with the password, |
| /// store in the database and populate the super key cache for the new user |
| /// and return LskfUnlocked state. |
| /// If the password is not provided, return Uninitialized state. |
| pub fn check_and_initialize_super_key( |
| &self, |
| db: &mut KeystoreDB, |
| legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator, |
| user_id: u32, |
| pw: Option<&Password>, |
| ) -> Result<UserState> { |
| let super_key_exists_in_db = |
| Self::super_key_exists_in_db_for_user(db, legacy_migrator, user_id).context( |
| "In check_and_initialize_super_key. Failed to check if super key exists.", |
| )?; |
| if super_key_exists_in_db { |
| Ok(UserState::LskfLocked) |
| } else if let Some(pw) = pw { |
| //generate a new super key. |
| let super_key = generate_aes256_key() |
| .context("In check_and_initialize_super_key: Failed to generate AES 256 key.")?; |
| //derive an AES256 key from the password and re-encrypt the super key |
| //before we insert it in the database. |
| let (encrypted_super_key, blob_metadata) = Self::encrypt_with_password(&super_key, pw) |
| .context("In check_and_initialize_super_key.")?; |
| |
| let key_entry = db |
| .store_super_key(user_id, &(&encrypted_super_key, &blob_metadata)) |
| .context("In check_and_initialize_super_key. Failed to store super key.")?; |
| |
| let super_key = self |
| .populate_cache_from_super_key_blob(user_id, key_entry, pw) |
| .context("In check_and_initialize_super_key.")?; |
| Ok(UserState::LskfUnlocked(super_key)) |
| } else { |
| Ok(UserState::Uninitialized) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| //helper function to populate super key cache from the super key blob loaded from the database |
| fn populate_cache_from_super_key_blob( |
| &self, |
| user_id: u32, |
| entry: KeyEntry, |
| pw: &Password, |
| ) -> Result<SuperKey> { |
| let super_key = Self::extract_super_key_from_key_entry(entry, pw).context( |
| "In populate_cache_from_super_key_blob. Failed to extract super key from key entry", |
| )?; |
| self.install_per_boot_key_for_user(user_id, super_key.clone()); |
| Ok(super_key) |
| } |
| |
| /// Extracts super key from the entry loaded from the database |
| pub fn extract_super_key_from_key_entry(entry: KeyEntry, pw: &Password) -> Result<SuperKey> { |
| if let Some((blob, metadata)) = entry.key_blob_info() { |
| let key = match ( |
| metadata.encrypted_by(), |
| metadata.salt(), |
| metadata.iv(), |
| metadata.aead_tag(), |
| ) { |
| (Some(&EncryptedBy::Password), Some(salt), Some(iv), Some(tag)) => { |
| let key = pw.derive_key(Some(salt), AES_256_KEY_LENGTH).context( |
| "In extract_super_key_from_key_entry: Failed to generate key from password.", |
| )?; |
| |
| aes_gcm_decrypt(blob, iv, tag, &key).context( |
| "In extract_super_key_from_key_entry: Failed to decrypt key blob.", |
| )? |
| } |
| (enc_by, salt, iv, tag) => { |
| return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)).context(format!( |
| concat!( |
| "In extract_super_key_from_key_entry: Super key has incomplete metadata.", |
| "Present: encrypted_by: {}, salt: {}, iv: {}, aead_tag: {}." |
| ), |
| enc_by.is_some(), |
| salt.is_some(), |
| iv.is_some(), |
| tag.is_some() |
| )); |
| } |
| }; |
| Ok(SuperKey { key: Arc::new(key), id: entry.id() }) |
| } else { |
| Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)) |
| .context("In extract_super_key_from_key_entry: No key blob info.") |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// Encrypts the super key from a key derived from the password, before storing in the database. |
| pub fn encrypt_with_password( |
| super_key: &[u8], |
| pw: &Password, |
| ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)> { |
| let salt = generate_salt().context("In encrypt_with_password: Failed to generate salt.")?; |
| let derived_key = pw |
| .derive_key(Some(&salt), AES_256_KEY_LENGTH) |
| .context("In encrypt_with_password: Failed to derive password.")?; |
| let mut metadata = BlobMetaData::new(); |
| metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy::Password)); |
| metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Salt(salt)); |
| let (encrypted_key, iv, tag) = aes_gcm_encrypt(super_key, &derived_key) |
| .context("In encrypt_with_password: Failed to encrypt new super key.")?; |
| metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Iv(iv)); |
| metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::AeadTag(tag)); |
| Ok((encrypted_key, metadata)) |
| } |
| |
| // Encrypt the given key blob with the user's super key, if the super key exists and the device |
| // is unlocked. If the super key exists and the device is locked, or LSKF is not setup, |
| // return error. Note that it is out of the scope of this function to check if super encryption |
| // is required. Such check should be performed before calling this function. |
| fn super_encrypt_on_key_init( |
| &self, |
| db: &mut KeystoreDB, |
| legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator, |
| user_id: u32, |
| key_blob: &[u8], |
| ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)> { |
| match UserState::get(db, legacy_migrator, self, user_id) |
| .context("In super_encrypt. Failed to get user state.")? |
| { |
| UserState::LskfUnlocked(super_key) => { |
| Self::encrypt_with_super_key(key_blob, &super_key) |
| .context("In super_encrypt_on_key_init. Failed to encrypt the key.") |
| } |
| UserState::LskfLocked => { |
| Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::LOCKED)).context("In super_encrypt. Device is locked.") |
| } |
| UserState::Uninitialized => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::UNINITIALIZED)) |
| .context("In super_encrypt. LSKF is not setup for the user."), |
| } |
| } |
| |
| //Helper function to encrypt a key with the given super key. Callers should select which super |
| //key to be used. This is called when a key is super encrypted at its creation as well as at its |
| //upgrade. |
| fn encrypt_with_super_key( |
| key_blob: &[u8], |
| super_key: &SuperKey, |
| ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)> { |
| let mut metadata = BlobMetaData::new(); |
| let (encrypted_key, iv, tag) = aes_gcm_encrypt(key_blob, &(super_key.key)) |
| .context("In encrypt_with_super_key: Failed to encrypt new super key.")?; |
| metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::Iv(iv)); |
| metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::AeadTag(tag)); |
| metadata.add(BlobMetaEntry::EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy::KeyId(super_key.id))); |
| Ok((encrypted_key, metadata)) |
| } |
| |
| /// Check if super encryption is required and if so, super-encrypt the key to be stored in |
| /// the database. |
| #[allow(clippy::clippy::too_many_arguments)] |
| pub fn handle_super_encryption_on_key_init( |
| &self, |
| db: &mut KeystoreDB, |
| legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator, |
| domain: &Domain, |
| key_parameters: &[KeyParameter], |
| flags: Option<i32>, |
| user_id: u32, |
| key_blob: &[u8], |
| ) -> Result<(Vec<u8>, BlobMetaData)> { |
| match (*domain, Enforcements::super_encryption_required(key_parameters, flags)) { |
| (Domain::APP, true) => { |
| self.super_encrypt_on_key_init(db, legacy_migrator, user_id, &key_blob).context( |
| "In handle_super_encryption_on_key_init. |
| Failed to super encrypt the key.", |
| ) |
| } |
| _ => Ok((key_blob.to_vec(), BlobMetaData::new())), |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// Check if a given key is super-encrypted, from its metadata. If so, unwrap the key using |
| /// the relevant super key. |
| pub fn unwrap_key_if_required<'a>( |
| &self, |
| metadata: &BlobMetaData, |
| key_blob: &'a [u8], |
| ) -> Result<KeyBlob<'a>> { |
| if Self::key_super_encrypted(&metadata) { |
| let unwrapped_key = self |
| .unwrap_key(key_blob, metadata) |
| .context("In unwrap_key_if_required. Error in unwrapping the key.")?; |
| Ok(unwrapped_key) |
| } else { |
| Ok(KeyBlob::Ref(key_blob)) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// Check if a given key needs re-super-encryption, from its KeyBlob type. |
| /// If so, re-super-encrypt the key and return a new set of metadata, |
| /// containing the new super encryption information. |
| pub fn reencrypt_on_upgrade_if_required<'a>( |
| key_blob_before_upgrade: &KeyBlob, |
| key_after_upgrade: &'a [u8], |
| ) -> Result<(KeyBlob<'a>, Option<BlobMetaData>)> { |
| match key_blob_before_upgrade { |
| KeyBlob::Sensitive(_, super_key) => { |
| let (key, metadata) = Self::encrypt_with_super_key(key_after_upgrade, super_key) |
| .context(concat!( |
| "In reencrypt_on_upgrade_if_required. ", |
| "Failed to re-super-encrypt key on key upgrade." |
| ))?; |
| Ok((KeyBlob::NonSensitive(key), Some(metadata))) |
| } |
| _ => Ok((KeyBlob::Ref(key_after_upgrade), None)), |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Helper function to decide if a key is super encrypted, given metadata. |
| fn key_super_encrypted(metadata: &BlobMetaData) -> bool { |
| if let Some(&EncryptedBy::KeyId(_)) = metadata.encrypted_by() { |
| return true; |
| } |
| false |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// This enum represents different states of the user's life cycle in the device. |
| /// For now, only three states are defined. More states may be added later. |
| pub enum UserState { |
| // The user has registered LSKF and has unlocked the device by entering PIN/Password, |
| // and hence the per-boot super key is available in the cache. |
| LskfUnlocked(SuperKey), |
| // The user has registered LSKF, but has not unlocked the device using password, after reboot. |
| // Hence the per-boot super-key(s) is not available in the cache. |
| // However, the encrypted super key is available in the database. |
| LskfLocked, |
| // There's no user in the device for the given user id, or the user with the user id has not |
| // setup LSKF. |
| Uninitialized, |
| } |
| |
| impl UserState { |
| pub fn get( |
| db: &mut KeystoreDB, |
| legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator, |
| skm: &SuperKeyManager, |
| user_id: u32, |
| ) -> Result<UserState> { |
| match skm.get_per_boot_key_by_user_id(user_id) { |
| Some(super_key) => Ok(UserState::LskfUnlocked(super_key)), |
| None => { |
| //Check if a super key exists in the database or legacy database. |
| //If so, return locked user state. |
| if SuperKeyManager::super_key_exists_in_db_for_user(db, legacy_migrator, user_id) |
| .context("In get.")? |
| { |
| Ok(UserState::LskfLocked) |
| } else { |
| Ok(UserState::Uninitialized) |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// Queries user state when serving password change requests. |
| pub fn get_with_password_changed( |
| db: &mut KeystoreDB, |
| legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator, |
| skm: &SuperKeyManager, |
| user_id: u32, |
| password: Option<&Password>, |
| ) -> Result<UserState> { |
| match skm.get_per_boot_key_by_user_id(user_id) { |
| Some(super_key) => { |
| if password.is_none() { |
| //transitioning to swiping, delete only the super key in database and cache, and |
| //super-encrypted keys in database (and in KM) |
| Self::reset_user(db, skm, legacy_migrator, user_id, true).context( |
| "In get_with_password_changed: Trying to delete keys from the db.", |
| )?; |
| //Lskf is now removed in Keystore |
| Ok(UserState::Uninitialized) |
| } else { |
| //Keystore won't be notified when changing to a new password when LSKF is |
| //already setup. Therefore, ideally this path wouldn't be reached. |
| Ok(UserState::LskfUnlocked(super_key)) |
| } |
| } |
| None => { |
| //Check if a super key exists in the database or legacy database. |
| //If so, return LskfLocked state. |
| //Otherwise, i) if the password is provided, initialize the super key and return |
| //LskfUnlocked state ii) if password is not provided, return Uninitialized state. |
| skm.check_and_initialize_super_key(db, legacy_migrator, user_id, password) |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// Queries user state when serving password unlock requests. |
| pub fn get_with_password_unlock( |
| db: &mut KeystoreDB, |
| legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator, |
| skm: &SuperKeyManager, |
| user_id: u32, |
| password: &Password, |
| ) -> Result<UserState> { |
| match skm.get_per_boot_key_by_user_id(user_id) { |
| Some(super_key) => { |
| log::info!("In get_with_password_unlock. Trying to unlock when already unlocked."); |
| Ok(UserState::LskfUnlocked(super_key)) |
| } |
| None => { |
| //Check if a super key exists in the database or legacy database. |
| //If not, return Uninitialized state. |
| //Otherwise, try to unlock the super key and if successful, |
| //return LskfUnlocked state |
| skm.check_and_unlock_super_key(db, legacy_migrator, user_id, password) |
| .context("In get_with_password_unlock. Failed to unlock super key.") |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// Delete all the keys created on behalf of the user. |
| /// If 'keep_non_super_encrypted_keys' is set to true, delete only the super key and super |
| /// encrypted keys. |
| pub fn reset_user( |
| db: &mut KeystoreDB, |
| skm: &SuperKeyManager, |
| legacy_migrator: &LegacyMigrator, |
| user_id: u32, |
| keep_non_super_encrypted_keys: bool, |
| ) -> Result<()> { |
| // mark keys created on behalf of the user as unreferenced. |
| legacy_migrator |
| .bulk_delete_user(user_id, keep_non_super_encrypted_keys) |
| .context("In reset_user: Trying to delete legacy keys.")?; |
| db.unbind_keys_for_user(user_id as u32, keep_non_super_encrypted_keys) |
| .context("In reset user. Error in unbinding keys.")?; |
| |
| //delete super key in cache, if exists |
| skm.forget_all_keys_for_user(user_id as u32); |
| Ok(()) |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// This enum represents three states a KeyMint Blob can be in, w.r.t super encryption. |
| /// `Sensitive` holds the non encrypted key and a reference to its super key. |
| /// `NonSensitive` holds a non encrypted key that is never supposed to be encrypted. |
| /// `Ref` holds a reference to a key blob when it does not need to be modified if its |
| /// life time allows it. |
| pub enum KeyBlob<'a> { |
| Sensitive(ZVec, SuperKey), |
| NonSensitive(Vec<u8>), |
| Ref(&'a [u8]), |
| } |
| |
| /// Deref returns a reference to the key material in any variant. |
| impl<'a> Deref for KeyBlob<'a> { |
| type Target = [u8]; |
| |
| fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { |
| match self { |
| Self::Sensitive(key, _) => &key, |
| Self::NonSensitive(key) => &key, |
| Self::Ref(key) => key, |
| } |
| } |
| } |