| // Copyright 2020, The Android Open Source Project |
| // |
| // Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| // you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| // You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| // |
| // http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| // |
| // Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| // distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| // WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| // See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| // limitations under the License. |
| |
| #![allow(dead_code)] |
| |
| use crate::{ |
| database::EncryptedBy, database::KeyMetaData, database::KeyMetaEntry, database::KeystoreDB, |
| error::Error, error::ResponseCode, |
| }; |
| use android_system_keystore2::aidl::android::system::keystore2::Domain::Domain; |
| use anyhow::{Context, Result}; |
| use keystore2_crypto::{ |
| aes_gcm_decrypt, aes_gcm_encrypt, derive_key_from_password, generate_salt, ZVec, |
| AES_256_KEY_LENGTH, |
| }; |
| use std::{ |
| collections::HashMap, |
| sync::Arc, |
| sync::{Mutex, Weak}, |
| }; |
| |
| type UserId = u32; |
| |
| #[derive(Default)] |
| struct UserSuperKeys { |
| /// The per boot key is used for LSKF binding of authentication bound keys. There is one |
| /// key per android user. The key is stored on flash encrypted with a key derived from a |
| /// secret, that is itself derived from the user's lock screen knowledge factor (LSKF). |
| /// When the user unlocks the device for the first time, this key is unlocked, i.e., decrypted, |
| /// and stays memory resident until the device reboots. |
| per_boot: Option<Arc<ZVec>>, |
| /// The screen lock key works like the per boot key with the distinction that it is cleared |
| /// from memory when the screen lock is engaged. |
| /// TODO the life cycle is not fully implemented at this time. |
| screen_lock: Option<Arc<ZVec>>, |
| } |
| |
| #[derive(Default)] |
| struct SkmState { |
| user_keys: HashMap<UserId, UserSuperKeys>, |
| key_index: HashMap<i64, Weak<ZVec>>, |
| } |
| |
| #[derive(Default)] |
| pub struct SuperKeyManager { |
| data: Mutex<SkmState>, |
| } |
| |
| impl SuperKeyManager { |
| pub fn new() -> Self { |
| Self { data: Mutex::new(Default::default()) } |
| } |
| |
| pub fn forget_screen_lock_key_for_user(&self, user: UserId) { |
| let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap(); |
| if let Some(usk) = data.user_keys.get_mut(&user) { |
| usk.screen_lock = None; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| pub fn forget_screen_lock_keys(&self) { |
| let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap(); |
| for (_, usk) in data.user_keys.iter_mut() { |
| usk.screen_lock = None; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| pub fn forget_all_keys_for_user(&self, user: UserId) { |
| let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap(); |
| data.user_keys.remove(&user); |
| } |
| |
| pub fn forget_all_keys(&self) { |
| let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap(); |
| data.user_keys.clear(); |
| data.key_index.clear(); |
| } |
| |
| fn install_per_boot_key_for_user(&self, user: UserId, key_id: i64, key: ZVec) { |
| let mut data = self.data.lock().unwrap(); |
| let key = Arc::new(key); |
| data.key_index.insert(key_id, Arc::downgrade(&key)); |
| data.user_keys.entry(user).or_default().per_boot = Some(key); |
| } |
| |
| fn get_key(&self, key_id: &i64) -> Option<Arc<ZVec>> { |
| self.data.lock().unwrap().key_index.get(key_id).and_then(|k| k.upgrade()) |
| } |
| |
| pub fn get_per_boot_key_by_user_id(&self, user_id: u32) -> Option<Arc<ZVec>> { |
| let data = self.data.lock().unwrap(); |
| data.user_keys.get(&user_id).map(|e| e.per_boot.clone()).flatten() |
| } |
| |
| /// This function unlocks the super keys for a given user. |
| /// This means the key is loaded from the database, decrypted and placed in the |
| /// super key cache. If there is no such key a new key is created, encrypted with |
| /// a key derived from the given password and stored in the database. |
| pub fn unlock_user_key(&self, user: UserId, pw: &[u8], db: &mut KeystoreDB) -> Result<()> { |
| let (_, entry) = db |
| .get_or_create_key_with(Domain::APP, user as u64 as i64, &"USER_SUPER_KEY", || { |
| let super_key = keystore2_crypto::generate_aes256_key() |
| .context("In create_new_key: Failed to generate AES 256 key.")?; |
| |
| let salt = |
| generate_salt().context("In create_new_key: Failed to generate salt.")?; |
| let derived_key = derive_key_from_password(pw, Some(&salt), AES_256_KEY_LENGTH) |
| .context("In create_new_key: Failed to derive password.")?; |
| let mut metadata = KeyMetaData::new(); |
| metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::EncryptedBy(EncryptedBy::Password)); |
| metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::Salt(salt)); |
| let (encrypted_key, iv, tag) = aes_gcm_encrypt(&super_key, &derived_key) |
| .context("In create_new_key: Failed to encrypt new super key.")?; |
| metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::Iv(iv)); |
| metadata.add(KeyMetaEntry::AeadTag(tag)); |
| Ok((encrypted_key, metadata)) |
| }) |
| .context("In unlock_user_key: Failed to get key id.")?; |
| |
| let metadata = entry.metadata(); |
| let super_key = match ( |
| metadata.encrypted_by(), |
| metadata.salt(), |
| metadata.iv(), |
| metadata.aead_tag(), |
| entry.km_blob(), |
| ) { |
| (Some(&EncryptedBy::Password), Some(salt), Some(iv), Some(tag), Some(blob)) => { |
| let key = derive_key_from_password(pw, Some(salt), AES_256_KEY_LENGTH) |
| .context("In unlock_user_key: Failed to generate key from password.")?; |
| |
| aes_gcm_decrypt(blob, iv, tag, &key) |
| .context("In unlock_user_key: Failed to decrypt key blob.")? |
| } |
| (enc_by, salt, iv, tag, blob) => { |
| return Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)).context(format!( |
| concat!( |
| "In unlock_user_key: Super key has incomplete metadata.", |
| "Present: encrypted_by: {}, salt: {}, iv: {}, aead_tag: {}, blob: {}." |
| ), |
| enc_by.is_some(), |
| salt.is_some(), |
| iv.is_some(), |
| tag.is_some(), |
| blob.is_some() |
| )); |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| self.install_per_boot_key_for_user(user, entry.id(), super_key); |
| |
| Ok(()) |
| } |
| |
| /// Unwraps an encrypted key blob given metadata identifying the encryption key. |
| /// The function queries `metadata.encrypted_by()` to determine the encryption key. |
| /// It then check if the required key is memory resident, and if so decrypts the |
| /// blob. |
| pub fn unwrap_key(&self, blob: &[u8], metadata: &KeyMetaData) -> Result<ZVec> { |
| match metadata.encrypted_by() { |
| Some(EncryptedBy::KeyId(key_id)) => match self.get_key(key_id) { |
| Some(key) => { |
| Self::unwrap_key_with_key(blob, metadata, &key).context("In unwrap_key.") |
| } |
| None => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::LOCKED)) |
| .context("In unwrap_key: Key is not usable until the user entered their LSKF."), |
| }, |
| _ => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)) |
| .context("In unwrap_key: Cannot determined wrapping key."), |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /// Unwraps an encrypted key blob given an encryption key. |
| fn unwrap_key_with_key(blob: &[u8], metadata: &KeyMetaData, key: &[u8]) -> Result<ZVec> { |
| match (metadata.iv(), metadata.aead_tag()) { |
| (Some(iv), Some(tag)) => aes_gcm_decrypt(blob, iv, tag, key) |
| .context("In unwrap_key_with_key: Failed to decrypt the key blob."), |
| (iv, tag) => Err(Error::Rc(ResponseCode::VALUE_CORRUPTED)).context(format!( |
| concat!( |
| "In unwrap_key_with_key: Key has incomplete metadata.", |
| "Present: iv: {}, aead_tag: {}." |
| ), |
| iv.is_some(), |
| tag.is_some(), |
| )), |
| } |
| } |
| } |