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Alan Stokes9fd57b02024-05-28 09:50:22 +01001/*
2 * Copyright 2024 The Android Open Source Project
3 *
4 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
5 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
6 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
7 *
8 * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
9 *
10 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
11 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
12 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
13 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
14 * limitations under the License.
15 */
16
17//! Rust wrapper for the VM Payload API, allowing virtual machine payload code to be written in
18//! Rust. This wraps the raw C API, accessed via bindgen, into a more idiomatic Rust interface.
19//!
Jiyong Parkb51c0282024-07-22 12:58:26 +090020//! See `https://cs.android.com/android/platform/superproject/main/+/main:packages/modules/Virtualization/libs/libvm_payload/README.md`
Alan Stokes9fd57b02024-05-28 09:50:22 +010021//! for more information on the VM Payload API.
22
23mod attestation;
24
Alan Stokesc874cd22024-06-11 16:23:18 +010025pub use attestation::{request_attestation, AttestationError, AttestationResult};
Alan Stokes9fd57b02024-05-28 09:50:22 +010026use binder::unstable_api::AsNative;
27use binder::{FromIBinder, Strong};
28use std::ffi::{c_void, CStr, OsStr};
29use std::os::unix::ffi::OsStrExt;
30use std::path::Path;
31use std::ptr;
32use vm_payload_bindgen::{
33 AIBinder, AVmPayload_getApkContentsPath, AVmPayload_getEncryptedStoragePath,
34 AVmPayload_getVmInstanceSecret, AVmPayload_notifyPayloadReady, AVmPayload_runVsockRpcServer,
35};
36
Alan Stokesc874cd22024-06-11 16:23:18 +010037/// The functions declared here are restricted to VMs created with a config file;
38/// they will fail, or panic, if called in other VMs. The ability to create such VMs
39/// requires the android.permission.USE_CUSTOM_VIRTUAL_MACHINE permission, and is
40/// therefore not available to privileged or third party apps.
41///
42/// These functions can be used by tests, if the permission is granted via shell.
43pub mod restricted {
44 pub use crate::attestation::request_attestation_for_testing;
45}
46
Alan Stokes9fd57b02024-05-28 09:50:22 +010047/// Marks the main function of the VM payload.
48///
49/// When the VM is run, this function is called. If it returns, the VM ends normally with a 0 exit
50/// code.
51///
52/// Example:
53///
54/// ```rust
55/// use log::info;
56///
57/// vm_payload::main!(vm_main);
58///
59/// fn vm_main() {
60/// android_logger::init_once(
61/// android_logger::Config::default()
62/// .with_tag("example_vm_payload")
63/// .with_max_level(log::LevelFilter::Info),
64/// );
65/// info!("Hello world");
66/// }
67/// ```
68#[macro_export]
69macro_rules! main {
70 ($name:path) => {
71 // Export a symbol with a name matching the extern declaration below.
72 #[export_name = "rust_main"]
73 fn __main() {
74 // Ensure that the main function provided by the application has the correct type.
75 $name()
76 }
77 };
78}
79
80// This is the real C entry point for the VM; we just forward to the Rust entry point.
81#[allow(non_snake_case)]
82#[no_mangle]
83extern "C" fn AVmPayload_main() {
84 extern "Rust" {
85 fn rust_main();
86 }
87
88 // SAFETY: rust_main is provided by the application using the `main!` macro above, which makes
89 // sure it has the right type.
90 unsafe { rust_main() }
91}
92
93/// Notifies the host that the payload is ready.
94///
95/// If the host app has set a `VirtualMachineCallback` for the VM, its
96/// `onPayloadReady` method will be called.
97///
98/// Note that subsequent calls to this function after the first have no effect;
99/// `onPayloadReady` is never called more than once.
100pub fn notify_payload_ready() {
101 // SAFETY: Invokes a method from the bindgen library `vm_payload_bindgen` which is safe to
102 // call at any time.
103 unsafe { AVmPayload_notifyPayloadReady() };
104}
105
106/// Runs a binder RPC server, serving the supplied binder service implementation on the given vsock
107/// port.
108///
109/// If and when the server is ready for connections (i.e. it is listening on the port),
110/// [`notify_payload_ready`] is called to notify the host that the server is ready. This is
111/// appropriate for VM payloads that serve a single binder service - which is common.
112///
113/// Note that this function does not return. The calling thread joins the binder
114/// thread pool to handle incoming messages.
115pub fn run_single_vsock_service<T>(service: Strong<T>, port: u32) -> !
116where
117 T: FromIBinder + ?Sized,
118{
119 extern "C" fn on_ready(_param: *mut c_void) {
120 notify_payload_ready();
121 }
122
123 let mut service = service.as_binder();
124 // The cast here is needed because the compiler doesn't know that our vm_payload_bindgen
125 // AIBinder is the same type as binder_ndk_sys::AIBinder.
126 let service = service.as_native_mut() as *mut AIBinder;
127 let param = ptr::null_mut();
128 // SAFETY: We have a strong reference to the service, so the raw pointer remains valid. It is
129 // safe for on_ready to be invoked at any time, with any parameter.
130 unsafe { AVmPayload_runVsockRpcServer(service, port, Some(on_ready), param) }
131}
132
133/// Gets the path to the contents of the APK containing the VM payload. It is a directory, under
134/// which are the unzipped contents of the APK containing the payload, all read-only
135/// but accessible to the payload.
136pub fn apk_contents_path() -> &'static Path {
137 // SAFETY: AVmPayload_getApkContentsPath always returns a non-null pointer to a
138 // nul-terminated C string with static lifetime.
139 let c_str = unsafe { CStr::from_ptr(AVmPayload_getApkContentsPath()) };
140 Path::new(OsStr::from_bytes(c_str.to_bytes()))
141}
142
143/// Gets the path to the encrypted persistent storage for the VM, if any. This is
144/// a directory under which any files or directories created will be stored on
145/// behalf of the VM by the host app. All data is encrypted using a key known
146/// only to the VM, so the host cannot decrypt it, but may delete it.
147///
148/// Returns `None` if no encrypted storage was requested in the VM configuration.
149pub fn encrypted_storage_path() -> Option<&'static Path> {
150 // SAFETY: AVmPayload_getEncryptedStoragePath returns either null or a pointer to a
151 // nul-terminated C string with static lifetime.
152 let ptr = unsafe { AVmPayload_getEncryptedStoragePath() };
153 if ptr.is_null() {
154 None
155 } else {
156 // SAFETY: We know the pointer is not null, and so it is a valid C string.
157 let c_str = unsafe { CStr::from_ptr(ptr) };
158 Some(Path::new(OsStr::from_bytes(c_str.to_bytes())))
159 }
160}
161
162/// Retrieves all or part of a 32-byte secret that is bound to this unique VM
163/// instance and the supplied identifier. The secret can be used e.g. as an
164/// encryption key.
165///
166/// Every VM has a secret that is derived from a device-specific value known to
167/// the hypervisor, the code that runs in the VM and its non-modifiable
168/// configuration; it is not made available to the host OS.
169///
170/// This function performs a further derivation from the VM secret and the
171/// supplied identifier. As long as the VM identity doesn't change the same value
172/// will be returned for the same identifier, even if the VM is stopped &
173/// restarted or the device rebooted.
174///
175/// If multiple secrets are required for different purposes, a different
176/// identifier should be used for each. The identifiers otherwise are arbitrary
177/// byte sequences and do not need to be kept secret; typically they are
178/// hardcoded in the calling code.
179///
180/// The secret is returned in [`secret`], truncated to its size, which must be between
181/// 1 and 32 bytes (inclusive) or the function will panic.
Alan Stokesc874cd22024-06-11 16:23:18 +0100182pub fn get_vm_instance_secret(identifier: &[u8], secret: &mut [u8]) {
Alan Stokes9fd57b02024-05-28 09:50:22 +0100183 let secret_size = secret.len();
184 assert!((1..=32).contains(&secret_size), "VM instance secrets can be up to 32 bytes long");
185
186 // SAFETY: The function only reads from `[identifier]` within its bounds, and only writes to
187 // `[secret]` within its bounds. Neither reference is retained, and we know neither is null.
188 unsafe {
189 AVmPayload_getVmInstanceSecret(
190 identifier.as_ptr() as *const c_void,
191 identifier.len(),
192 secret.as_mut_ptr() as *mut c_void,
193 secret_size,
194 )
195 }
196}