Merge "[SP32.1] Put OffloadControl 1.1 HAL into apex"
diff --git a/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.cpp b/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.cpp
index 4e82b0a..9f0c4c4 100644
--- a/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.cpp
+++ b/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <android-base/file.h>
#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
#include "AtraceDevice.h"
@@ -39,15 +40,11 @@
// gfx
{
"gfx",
- {"Graphics",
- {{"/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/mdss/enable", false},
- {"/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sde/enable", false},
- {"/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/mali_systrace/enable", false}}},
+ {"Graphics", {{"mdss", false}, {"sde", false}, {"mali_systrace", false}}},
},
{
"ion",
- {"ION allocation",
- {{"/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/ion_alloc_buffer_start/enable", false}}},
+ {"ION allocation", {{"kmem/ion_alloc_buffer_start", false}}},
},
};
@@ -65,16 +62,31 @@
return Void();
}
+AtraceDevice::AtraceDevice() {
+ struct stat st;
+
+ tracefs_event_root_ = "/sys/kernel/tracing/events/";
+ if (stat(tracefs_event_root_.c_str(), &st) != 0) {
+ tracefs_event_root_ = "/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/";
+ CHECK(stat(tracefs_event_root_.c_str(), &st) == 0) << "tracefs must be mounted at either"
+ "/sys/kernel/tracing or "
+ "/sys/kernel/debug/tracing";
+ }
+}
+
Return<::android::hardware::atrace::V1_0::Status> AtraceDevice::enableCategories(
- const hidl_vec<hidl_string>& categories) {
+ const hidl_vec<hidl_string>& categories) {
if (!categories.size()) {
return Status::ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
+
for (auto& c : categories) {
if (kTracingMap.count(c)) {
for (auto& p : kTracingMap.at(c).paths) {
- if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile("1", p.first)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to enable tracing on: " << p.first;
+ std::string tracefs_event_enable_path = android::base::StringPrintf(
+ "%s%s/enable", tracefs_event_root_.c_str(), p.first.c_str());
+ if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile("1", tracefs_event_enable_path)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to enable tracing on: " << tracefs_event_enable_path;
if (p.second) {
// disable before return
disableAllCategories();
@@ -91,10 +103,13 @@
Return<::android::hardware::atrace::V1_0::Status> AtraceDevice::disableAllCategories() {
auto ret = Status::SUCCESS;
+
for (auto& c : kTracingMap) {
for (auto& p : c.second.paths) {
- if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile("0", p.first)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to disable tracing on: " << p.first;
+ std::string tracefs_event_enable_path = android::base::StringPrintf(
+ "%s%s/enable", tracefs_event_root_.c_str(), p.first.c_str());
+ if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile("0", tracefs_event_enable_path)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to disable tracing on: " << tracefs_event_enable_path;
if (p.second) {
ret = Status::ERROR_TRACING_POINT;
}
diff --git a/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.h b/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.h
index e700f89..ab87c65 100644
--- a/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.h
+++ b/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.h
@@ -36,12 +36,16 @@
using ::android::hardware::Void;
struct AtraceDevice : public IAtraceDevice {
+ AtraceDevice();
// Methods from ::android::hardware::atrace::V1_0::IAtraceDevice follow.
Return<void> listCategories(listCategories_cb _hidl_cb) override;
Return<::android::hardware::atrace::V1_0::Status> enableCategories(
const hidl_vec<hidl_string>& categories) override;
Return<::android::hardware::atrace::V1_0::Status> disableAllCategories() override;
+ private:
+ std::string tracefs_event_root_;
+
// Methods from ::android::hidl::base::V1_0::IBase follow.
};
diff --git a/atrace/1.0/default/android.hardware.atrace@1.0-service.rc b/atrace/1.0/default/android.hardware.atrace@1.0-service.rc
index eb54c39..7110b45 100644
--- a/atrace/1.0/default/android.hardware.atrace@1.0-service.rc
+++ b/atrace/1.0/default/android.hardware.atrace@1.0-service.rc
@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
on late-init
# vendor graphics trace points
chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sde/enable
+ chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sde/enable
chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/mdss/enable
+ chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/tracing/events/mdss/enable
chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/mali_systrace/enable
+ chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/tracing/events/mali_systrace/enable
# ion allocation trace point
chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/ion_alloc_buffer_start/enable
+ chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/tracing/events/kmem/ion_alloc_buffer_start/enable
service vendor.atrace-hal-1-0 /vendor/bin/hw/android.hardware.atrace@1.0-service
interface android.hardware.atrace@1.0::IAtraceDevice default
diff --git a/audio/7.0/config/api/current.txt b/audio/7.0/config/api/current.txt
index b5b3925..c2585bd 100644
--- a/audio/7.0/config/api/current.txt
+++ b/audio/7.0/config/api/current.txt
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_FM_TUNER;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI_ARC;
+ enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI_EARC;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_IP;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_LINE;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_LOOPBACK;
@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_FM;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI_ARC;
+ enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI_EARC;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HEARING_AID;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_IP;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_LINE;
@@ -208,9 +210,11 @@
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_CELT;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DEFAULT;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DOLBY_TRUEHD;
+ enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DRA;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DSD;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DTS;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DTS_HD;
+ enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DTS_UHD;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_EVRC;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_EVRCB;
enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_EVRCNW;
diff --git a/audio/7.0/config/audio_policy_configuration.xsd b/audio/7.0/config/audio_policy_configuration.xsd
index 4f5614b..e0df359 100644
--- a/audio/7.0/config/audio_policy_configuration.xsd
+++ b/audio/7.0/config/audio_policy_configuration.xsd
@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_BLUETOOTH_A2DP_HEADPHONES"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_BLUETOOTH_A2DP_SPEAKER"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI"/>
+ <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI_EARC"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_AUX_DIGITAL"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_ANLG_DOCK_HEADSET"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_DGTL_DOCK_HEADSET"/>
@@ -303,6 +304,7 @@
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_USB_HEADSET"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BLUETOOTH_BLE"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI_ARC"/>
+ <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI_EARC"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_ECHO_REFERENCE"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BLE_HEADSET"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_DEFAULT"/>
@@ -411,6 +413,8 @@
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_FORMAT_MPEGH_LC_L3"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_FORMAT_MPEGH_LC_L4"/>
<xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_FORMAT_IEC60958"/>
+ <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_FORMAT_DTS_UHD"/>
+ <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_FORMAT_DRA"/>
</xs:restriction>
</xs:simpleType>
<xs:simpleType name="extendableAudioFormat">
diff --git a/audio/7.0/config/update_audio_policy_config.sh b/audio/7.0/config/update_audio_policy_config.sh
index 159fa35..c475dd1 100755
--- a/audio/7.0/config/update_audio_policy_config.sh
+++ b/audio/7.0/config/update_audio_policy_config.sh
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
set -euo pipefail
-if (echo "$@" | grep -qe -h); then
+if (echo "$@" | grep -qe "^-h"); then
echo "This script will update Audio Policy Manager config file"
echo "to the format required by V7.0 XSD schema from a previous"
echo "version."
diff --git a/audio/common/7.0/enums/include/android_audio_policy_configuration_V7_0-enums.h b/audio/common/7.0/enums/include/android_audio_policy_configuration_V7_0-enums.h
index fe3e4ea..a92a277 100644
--- a/audio/common/7.0/enums/include/android_audio_policy_configuration_V7_0-enums.h
+++ b/audio/common/7.0/enums/include/android_audio_policy_configuration_V7_0-enums.h
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@
case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_TELEPHONY_TX:
case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_LINE:
case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI_ARC:
+ case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI_EARC:
case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_SPDIF:
case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_FM:
case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_AUX_LINE:
@@ -199,6 +200,7 @@
case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_USB_HEADSET:
case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BLUETOOTH_BLE:
case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI_ARC:
+ case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI_EARC:
case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_ECHO_REFERENCE:
case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BLE_HEADSET:
case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_DEFAULT:
diff --git a/audio/common/all-versions/default/service/service.cpp b/audio/common/all-versions/default/service/service.cpp
index bbc14ad..898c22d 100644
--- a/audio/common/all-versions/default/service/service.cpp
+++ b/audio/common/all-versions/default/service/service.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#define LOG_TAG "audiohalservice"
+#include <signal.h>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
@@ -45,6 +46,8 @@
}
int main(int /* argc */, char* /* argv */ []) {
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
::android::ProcessState::initWithDriver("/dev/vndbinder");
// start a threadpool for vndbinder interactions
::android::ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
diff --git a/audio/core/all-versions/default/Android.bp b/audio/core/all-versions/default/Android.bp
index f61964e..615655d 100644
--- a/audio/core/all-versions/default/Android.bp
+++ b/audio/core/all-versions/default/Android.bp
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
"android.hardware.audio-impl_headers",
"android.hardware.audio.common.util@all-versions",
"libaudioclient_headers",
+ "libaudioutils_headers",
"libaudio_system_headers",
"libhardware_headers",
"libmedia_headers",
diff --git a/audio/core/all-versions/default/StreamOut.cpp b/audio/core/all-versions/default/StreamOut.cpp
index a089f6b..4fe6601 100644
--- a/audio/core/all-versions/default/StreamOut.cpp
+++ b/audio/core/all-versions/default/StreamOut.cpp
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <HidlUtils.h>
#include <android/log.h>
+#include <audio_utils/Metadata.h>
#include <hardware/audio.h>
#include <util/CoreUtils.h>
#include <utils/Trace.h>
@@ -742,7 +743,11 @@
switch (event) {
case STREAM_EVENT_CBK_TYPE_CODEC_FORMAT_CHANGED: {
hidl_vec<uint8_t> audioMetadata;
- audioMetadata.setToExternal((uint8_t*)param, strlen((char*)param));
+ // void* param is the byte string buffer from byte_string_from_audio_metadata().
+ // As the byte string buffer may have embedded zeroes, we cannot use strlen()
+ // but instead use audio_utils::metadata::dataByteStringLen().
+ audioMetadata.setToExternal((uint8_t*)param, audio_utils::metadata::dataByteStringLen(
+ (const uint8_t*)param));
result = eventCallback->onCodecFormatChanged(audioMetadata);
} break;
default:
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/Android.bp b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/Android.bp
index f24b1f5..c13efde 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/Android.bp
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/Android.bp
@@ -91,13 +91,13 @@
"impl/vhal_v2_0/LinearFakeValueGenerator.cpp",
"impl/vhal_v2_0/JsonFakeValueGenerator.cpp",
"impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.cpp",
+ "impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.cpp",
],
local_include_dirs: ["common/include/vhal_v2_0"],
export_include_dirs: ["impl"],
whole_static_libs: [
"android.hardware.automotive.vehicle@2.0-emulated-user-hal-lib",
"android.hardware.automotive.vehicle@2.0-manager-lib",
- "libqemu_pipe",
],
shared_libs: [
"libbase",
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.cpp b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.cpp
index 548285a..9be9ea7 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.cpp
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.cpp
@@ -31,6 +31,14 @@
GeneratorHub::GeneratorHub(const OnHalEvent& onHalEvent)
: mOnHalEvent(onHalEvent), mThread(&GeneratorHub::run, this) {}
+GeneratorHub::~GeneratorHub() {
+ mShuttingDownFlag.store(true);
+ mCond.notify_all();
+ if (mThread.joinable()) {
+ mThread.join();
+ }
+}
+
void GeneratorHub::registerGenerator(int32_t cookie, FakeValueGeneratorPtr generator) {
{
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> g(mLock);
@@ -58,15 +66,18 @@
}
void GeneratorHub::run() {
- while (true) {
+ while (!mShuttingDownFlag.load()) {
std::unique_lock<std::mutex> g(mLock);
// Pop events whose generator does not exist (may be already unregistered)
while (!mEventQueue.empty()
&& mGenerators.find(mEventQueue.top().cookie) == mGenerators.end()) {
mEventQueue.pop();
}
- // Wait until event queue is not empty
- mCond.wait(g, [this] { return !mEventQueue.empty(); });
+ // Wait until event queue is not empty or shutting down flag is set
+ mCond.wait(g, [this] { return !mEventQueue.empty() || mShuttingDownFlag.load(); });
+ if (mShuttingDownFlag.load()) {
+ break;
+ }
const VhalEvent& curEvent = mEventQueue.top();
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.h b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.h
index dcf6a4f..b25dbf1 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.h
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.h
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
public:
GeneratorHub(const OnHalEvent& onHalEvent);
- ~GeneratorHub() = default;
+ ~GeneratorHub();
/**
* Register a new generator. The generator will be discarded if it could not produce next event.
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
mutable std::mutex mLock;
std::condition_variable mCond;
std::thread mThread;
+ std::atomic<bool> mShuttingDownFlag{false};
};
} // namespace impl
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/PipeComm.cpp b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/PipeComm.cpp
index f024287..81e7c78 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/PipeComm.cpp
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/PipeComm.cpp
@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@
#include <android/hardware/automotive/vehicle/2.0/IVehicle.h>
#include <log/log.h>
-#include <qemu_pipe.h>
#include "PipeComm.h"
+#include "qemu_pipe.h"
#define CAR_SERVICE_NAME "pipe:qemud:car"
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.cpp b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf1a002
--- /dev/null
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "qemu_pipe.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <android-base/file.h>
+
+using android::base::ReadFully;
+using android::base::WriteFully;
+
+// Define QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG if you want to print error messages when an error
+// occurs during pipe operations. The macro should simply take a printf-style
+// formatting string followed by optional arguments.
+#ifndef QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG
+#define QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG(...) (void)0
+#endif
+
+int qemu_pipe_open(const char* pipeName) {
+ if (!pipeName) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ int fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open("/dev/qemu_pipe", O_RDWR));
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("%s: Could not open /dev/qemu_pipe: %s", __FUNCTION__, strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ // Write the pipe name, *including* the trailing zero which is necessary.
+ size_t pipeNameLen = strlen(pipeName);
+ if (WriteFully(fd, pipeName, pipeNameLen + 1U)) {
+ return fd;
+ }
+
+ // now, add 'pipe:' prefix and try again
+ // Note: host side will wait for the trailing '\0' to start
+ // service lookup.
+ const char pipe_prefix[] = "pipe:";
+ if (WriteFully(fd, pipe_prefix, strlen(pipe_prefix)) &&
+ WriteFully(fd, pipeName, pipeNameLen + 1U)) {
+ return fd;
+ }
+ QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("%s: Could not write to %s pipe service: %s", __FUNCTION__, pipeName,
+ strerror(errno));
+ close(fd);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int qemu_pipe_frame_send(int fd, const void* buff, size_t len) {
+ char header[5];
+ snprintf(header, sizeof(header), "%04zx", len);
+ if (!WriteFully(fd, header, 4)) {
+ QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("Can't write qemud frame header: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!WriteFully(fd, buff, len)) {
+ QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("Can't write qemud frame payload: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int qemu_pipe_frame_recv(int fd, void* buff, size_t len) {
+ char header[5];
+ if (!ReadFully(fd, header, 4)) {
+ QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("Can't read qemud frame header: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ header[4] = '\0';
+ size_t size;
+ if (sscanf(header, "%04zx", &size) != 1) {
+ QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("Malformed qemud frame header: [%.*s]", 4, header);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (size > len) {
+ QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("Oversized qemud frame (% bytes, expected <= %)", size, len);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (!ReadFully(fd, buff, size)) {
+ QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("Could not read qemud frame payload: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return size;
+}
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.h b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0987498
--- /dev/null
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+#ifndef ANDROID_CORE_INCLUDE_QEMU_PIPE_H
+#define ANDROID_CORE_INCLUDE_QEMU_PIPE_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+// Try to open a new Qemu fast-pipe. This function returns a file descriptor
+// that can be used to communicate with a named service managed by the
+// emulator.
+//
+// This file descriptor can be used as a standard pipe/socket descriptor.
+//
+// 'pipeName' is the name of the emulator service you want to connect to,
+// and should begin with 'pipe:' (e.g. 'pipe:camera' or 'pipe:opengles').
+// For backward compatibility, the 'pipe:' prefix can be omitted, and in
+// that case, qemu_pipe_open will add it for you.
+
+// On success, return a valid file descriptor, or -1/errno on failure. E.g.:
+//
+// EINVAL -> unknown/unsupported pipeName
+// ENOSYS -> fast pipes not available in this system.
+//
+// ENOSYS should never happen, except if you're trying to run within a
+// misconfigured emulator.
+//
+// You should be able to open several pipes to the same pipe service,
+// except for a few special cases (e.g. GSM modem), where EBUSY will be
+// returned if more than one client tries to connect to it.
+int qemu_pipe_open(const char* pipeName);
+
+// Send a framed message |buff| of |len| bytes through the |fd| descriptor.
+// This really adds a 4-hexchar prefix describing the payload size.
+// Returns 0 on success, and -1 on error.
+int qemu_pipe_frame_send(int fd, const void* buff, size_t len);
+
+// Read a frame message from |fd|, and store it into |buff| of |len| bytes.
+// If the framed message is larger than |len|, then this returns -1 and the
+// content is lost. Otherwise, this returns the size of the message. NOTE:
+// empty messages are possible in a framed wire protocol and do not mean
+// end-of-stream.
+int qemu_pipe_frame_recv(int fd, void* buff, size_t len);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ANDROID_CORE_INCLUDE_QEMU_PIPE_H */
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 4806fef..768142c 100644
--- a/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
"android.hardware.bluetooth@1.0",
"libbluetooth-types",
],
+ test_config: "VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml",
test_suites: [
"general-tests",
"vts",
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09463c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<!-- Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+
+ Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+ http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+ Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ limitations under the License.
+-->
+<configuration description="Runs VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.">
+ <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct" />
+ <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct-native" />
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RootTargetPreparer">
+ </target_preparer>
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.StopServicesSetup">
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.DeviceSetup">
+ <option name="bluetooth" value="off" />
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.PushFilePreparer">
+ <option name="cleanup" value="true" />
+ <option name="push" value="VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest->/data/local/tmp/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest" />
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <test class="com.android.tradefed.testtype.GTest" >
+ <option name="native-test-device-path" value="/data/local/tmp" />
+ <option name="module-name" value="VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest" />
+ </test>
+</configuration>
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/Android.bp b/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
index e64d5a9..7f56647 100644
--- a/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -32,5 +32,6 @@
"android.hardware.bluetooth@1.0",
"libbluetooth-types",
],
+ test_config: "VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.xml",
test_suites: ["general-tests", "vts"],
}
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.xml b/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d64751a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<!-- Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+
+ Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+ http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+ Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ limitations under the License.
+-->
+<configuration description="Runs VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.">
+ <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct" />
+ <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct-native" />
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RootTargetPreparer">
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.DeviceSetup">
+ <option name="bluetooth" value="off" />
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.PushFilePreparer">
+ <option name="cleanup" value="true" />
+ <option name="push" value="VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest->/data/local/tmp/VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest" />
+ </target_preparer>
+
+ <test class="com.android.tradefed.testtype.GTest" >
+ <option name="native-test-device-path" value="/data/local/tmp" />
+ <option name="module-name" value="VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest" />
+ </test>
+</configuration>
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/Android.bp b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/Android.bp
index 5c30f79..3000223 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/Android.bp
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/Android.bp
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
"A2dpSoftwareAudioProvider.cpp",
"HearingAidAudioProvider.cpp",
"LeAudioAudioProvider.cpp",
+ "LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.cpp",
],
header_libs: ["libhardware_headers"],
shared_libs: [
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.cpp b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.cpp
index e1b1ac6..b0d171a 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.cpp
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.cpp
@@ -41,8 +41,12 @@
BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory::hearing_aid_provider_instance_;
LeAudioOutputAudioProvider
BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory::leaudio_output_provider_instance_;
+LeAudioOffloadOutputAudioProvider
+ BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory::leaudio_offload_output_provider_instance_;
LeAudioInputAudioProvider
BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory::leaudio_input_provider_instance_;
+LeAudioOffloadInputAudioProvider
+ BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory::leaudio_offload_input_provider_instance_;
Return<void> BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory::openProvider(
const V2_0::SessionType sessionType, openProvider_cb _hidl_cb) {
@@ -90,9 +94,15 @@
case SessionType::LE_AUDIO_SOFTWARE_ENCODING_DATAPATH:
provider = &leaudio_output_provider_instance_;
break;
+ case SessionType::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_ENCODING_DATAPATH:
+ provider = &leaudio_offload_output_provider_instance_;
+ break;
case SessionType::LE_AUDIO_SOFTWARE_DECODED_DATAPATH:
provider = &leaudio_input_provider_instance_;
break;
+ case SessionType::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_DECODING_DATAPATH:
+ provider = &leaudio_offload_input_provider_instance_;
+ break;
default:
status = BluetoothAudioStatus::FAILURE;
}
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.h b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.h
index fd83694..f8f557e 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.h
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include "BluetoothAudioProvider.h"
#include "HearingAidAudioProvider.h"
#include "LeAudioAudioProvider.h"
+#include "LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.h"
namespace android {
namespace hardware {
@@ -55,6 +56,8 @@
static HearingAidAudioProvider hearing_aid_provider_instance_;
static LeAudioOutputAudioProvider leaudio_output_provider_instance_;
static LeAudioInputAudioProvider leaudio_input_provider_instance_;
+ static LeAudioOffloadOutputAudioProvider leaudio_offload_output_provider_instance_;
+ static LeAudioOffloadInputAudioProvider leaudio_offload_input_provider_instance_;
};
extern "C" IBluetoothAudioProvidersFactory*
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.cpp b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c11bdad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "BTAudioProviderLeAudioOffload"
+
+#include "LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.h"
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+
+#include "BluetoothAudioSessionReport_2_1.h"
+#include "BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.h"
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace bluetooth {
+namespace audio {
+namespace V2_1 {
+namespace implementation {
+
+using ::android::bluetooth::audio::BluetoothAudioSessionReport_2_1;
+using ::android::hardware::Void;
+using ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_0::BitsPerSample;
+using ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_0::ChannelMode;
+using ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::SampleRate;
+
+using DataMQ = MessageQueue<uint8_t, kSynchronizedReadWrite>;
+
+LeAudioOffloadOutputAudioProvider::LeAudioOffloadOutputAudioProvider()
+ : LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider() {
+ session_type_ = SessionType::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_ENCODING_DATAPATH;
+}
+
+LeAudioOffloadInputAudioProvider::LeAudioOffloadInputAudioProvider()
+ : LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider() {
+ session_type_ = SessionType::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_DECODING_DATAPATH;
+}
+
+LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider::LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider()
+ : BluetoothAudioProvider() {}
+
+bool LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider::isValid(const V2_0::SessionType& sessionType) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ", invalid session type for Offloaded Le Audio provider: "
+ << toString(sessionType);
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider::isValid(const SessionType& sessionType) {
+ return (sessionType == session_type_);
+}
+
+Return<void> LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider::startSession_2_1(
+ const sp<V2_0::IBluetoothAudioPort>& hostIf,
+ const AudioConfiguration& audioConfig, startSession_cb _hidl_cb) {
+ /**
+ * Initialize the audio platform if audioConfiguration is supported.
+ * Save the IBluetoothAudioPort interface, so that it can be used
+ * later to send stream control commands to the HAL client, based on
+ * interaction with Audio framework.
+ */
+ if (audioConfig.getDiscriminator() !=
+ AudioConfiguration::hidl_discriminator::leAudioCodecConfig) {
+ LOG(WARNING) << __func__
+ << " - Invalid Audio Configuration=" << toString(audioConfig);
+ _hidl_cb(BluetoothAudioStatus::UNSUPPORTED_CODEC_CONFIGURATION,
+ DataMQ::Descriptor());
+ return Void();
+ }
+
+ if (!android::bluetooth::audio::IsOffloadLeAudioConfigurationValid(session_type_,
+ audioConfig.leAudioCodecConfig())) {
+ LOG(WARNING) << __func__ << " - Unsupported LC3 Offloaded Configuration="
+ << toString(audioConfig.leAudioCodecConfig());
+ _hidl_cb(BluetoothAudioStatus::UNSUPPORTED_CODEC_CONFIGURATION,
+ DataMQ::Descriptor());
+ return Void();
+ }
+
+ return BluetoothAudioProvider::startSession_2_1(hostIf, audioConfig,
+ _hidl_cb);
+}
+
+Return<void> LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider::onSessionReady(startSession_cb _hidl_cb) {
+ BluetoothAudioSessionReport_2_1::OnSessionStarted(session_type_, stack_iface_,
+ nullptr, audio_config_);
+ _hidl_cb(BluetoothAudioStatus::SUCCESS, DataMQ::Descriptor());
+ return Void();
+}
+
+} // namespace implementation
+} // namespace V2_1
+} // namespace audio
+} // namespace bluetooth
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.h b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..564e9a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <android/hardware/bluetooth/audio/2.1/types.h>
+
+#include "BluetoothAudioProvider.h"
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace bluetooth {
+namespace audio {
+namespace V2_1 {
+namespace implementation {
+
+class LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider : public BluetoothAudioProvider {
+ public:
+ LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider();
+
+ bool isValid(const SessionType& sessionType) override;
+ bool isValid(const V2_0::SessionType& sessionType) override;
+
+ Return<void> startSession_2_1(const sp<V2_0::IBluetoothAudioPort>& hostIf,
+ const AudioConfiguration& audioConfig,
+ startSession_cb _hidl_cb) override;
+
+ private:
+ Return<void> onSessionReady(startSession_cb _hidl_cb) override;
+};
+
+class LeAudioOffloadOutputAudioProvider : public LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider {
+ public:
+ LeAudioOffloadOutputAudioProvider();
+};
+
+class LeAudioOffloadInputAudioProvider : public LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider {
+ public:
+ LeAudioOffloadInputAudioProvider();
+};
+
+} // namespace implementation
+} // namespace V2_1
+} // namespace audio
+} // namespace bluetooth
+} // namespace hardware
+} // namespace android
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSessionControl_2_1.h b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSessionControl_2_1.h
index 4d7be21..95f7408 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSessionControl_2_1.h
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSessionControl_2_1.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
std::shared_ptr<BluetoothAudioSession_2_1> session_ptr =
BluetoothAudioSessionInstance_2_1::GetSessionInstance(session_type);
if (session_ptr != nullptr) {
- return session_ptr->GetAudioSession()->IsSessionReady();
+ return session_ptr->IsSessionReady();
}
return false;
}
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.cpp b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.cpp
index 9d91196..c250ef1 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.cpp
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.cpp
@@ -60,6 +60,16 @@
}
}
+bool BluetoothAudioSession_2_1::IsSessionReady() {
+ if (session_type_2_1_ !=
+ SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_ENCODING_DATAPATH) {
+ return audio_session->IsSessionReady();
+ }
+
+ std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> guard(audio_session->mutex_);
+ return audio_session->stack_iface_ != nullptr;
+}
+
std::shared_ptr<BluetoothAudioSession>
BluetoothAudioSession_2_1::GetAudioSession() {
return audio_session;
@@ -70,7 +80,7 @@
const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::AudioConfiguration
BluetoothAudioSession_2_1::GetAudioConfig() {
std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> guard(audio_session->mutex_);
- if (audio_session->IsSessionReady()) {
+ if (IsSessionReady()) {
// If session is unknown it means it should be 2.0 type
if (session_type_2_1_ != SessionType_2_1::UNKNOWN)
return audio_config_2_1_;
@@ -110,20 +120,29 @@
SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_SOFTWARE_ENCODING_DATAPATH ||
session_type_2_1_ ==
SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_SOFTWARE_DECODED_DATAPATH);
- bool is_offload_session =
+ bool is_offload_a2dp_session =
(session_type_2_1_ == SessionType_2_1::A2DP_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_DATAPATH);
+ bool is_offload_le_audio_session =
+ (session_type_2_1_ == SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_ENCODING_DATAPATH ||
+ session_type_2_1_ == SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_DECODING_DATAPATH);
auto audio_config_discriminator = audio_config.getDiscriminator();
bool is_software_audio_config =
(is_software_session &&
audio_config_discriminator ==
::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::AudioConfiguration::
hidl_discriminator::pcmConfig);
- bool is_offload_audio_config =
- (is_offload_session &&
+ bool is_a2dp_offload_audio_config =
+ (is_offload_a2dp_session &&
audio_config_discriminator ==
::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::AudioConfiguration::
hidl_discriminator::codecConfig);
- if (!is_software_audio_config && !is_offload_audio_config) {
+ bool is_le_audio_offload_audio_config =
+ (is_offload_le_audio_session &&
+ audio_config_discriminator ==
+ ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::AudioConfiguration::
+ hidl_discriminator::leAudioCodecConfig);
+ if (!is_software_audio_config && !is_a2dp_offload_audio_config &&
+ !is_le_audio_offload_audio_config) {
return false;
}
audio_config_2_1_ = audio_config;
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.h b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.h
index 5a35153..db82c73 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.h
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.h
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::SessionType&
session_type);
+ // The function helps to check if this session is ready or not
+ // @return: true if the Bluetooth stack has started the specified session
+ bool IsSessionReady();
+
std::shared_ptr<BluetoothAudioSession> GetAudioSession();
// The report function is used to report that the Bluetooth stack has started
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.cpp b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.cpp
index 8b0b0f7..c90ce6d 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.cpp
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.cpp
@@ -122,6 +122,21 @@
return false;
}
+bool IsOffloadLeAudioConfigurationValid(
+ const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::SessionType&
+ session_type,
+ const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::Lc3CodecConfiguration&) {
+
+ if (session_type != SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_ENCODING_DATAPATH &&
+ session_type != SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_DECODING_DATAPATH) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ //TODO: perform checks on le_audio_codec_config once we know supported parameters
+
+ return true;
+}
+
} // namespace audio
} // namespace bluetooth
} // namespace android
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.h b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.h
index 746d9c0..a52636c 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.h
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.h
@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@
const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_0::CodecConfiguration&
codec_config);
+bool IsOffloadLeAudioConfigurationValid(
+ const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::SessionType&
+ session_type,
+ const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::Lc3CodecConfiguration&
+ le_audio_codec_config);
} // namespace audio
} // namespace bluetooth
} // namespace android
diff --git a/broadcastradio/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBroadcastradioV2_0TargetTest.cpp b/broadcastradio/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBroadcastradioV2_0TargetTest.cpp
index 362ab41..615fde0 100644
--- a/broadcastradio/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBroadcastradioV2_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/broadcastradio/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBroadcastradioV2_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -496,10 +496,26 @@
* - program changes exactly to what was requested.
*/
TEST_P(BroadcastRadioHalTest, DabTune) {
+ Result halResult;
+ hidl_vec<DabTableEntry> config;
+ auto cb = [&](Result result, hidl_vec<DabTableEntry> configCb) {
+ halResult = result;
+ config = configCb;
+ };
+ auto hidlResult = mModule->getDabRegionConfig(cb);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(hidlResult.isOk());
+
+ if (halResult == Result::NOT_SUPPORTED) {
+ printSkipped("DAB not supported");
+ return;
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(Result::OK, halResult);
+ ASSERT_NE(config.size(), 0U);
+
ASSERT_TRUE(openSession());
ProgramSelector sel = {};
- uint64_t freq = 178352;
+ uint64_t freq = config[config.size() / 2].frequency;
sel.primaryId = make_identifier(IdentifierType::DAB_FREQUENCY,freq);
std::this_thread::sleep_for(gTuneWorkaround);
diff --git a/camera/common/1.0/default/CameraModule.cpp b/camera/common/1.0/default/CameraModule.cpp
index 27e74f1..16fb85c 100644
--- a/camera/common/1.0/default/CameraModule.cpp
+++ b/camera/common/1.0/default/CameraModule.cpp
@@ -549,7 +549,6 @@
}
}
}
- free_camera_metadata(metadata);
}
mCameraInfoMap.removeItem(cameraId);
diff --git a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/GrantorDescriptor.aidl b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/GrantorDescriptor.aidl
index 0327796..cf7048b 100644
--- a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/GrantorDescriptor.aidl
+++ b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/GrantorDescriptor.aidl
@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
diff --git a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/MQDescriptor.aidl b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/MQDescriptor.aidl
index 56f1de3..add4b64 100644
--- a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/MQDescriptor.aidl
+++ b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/MQDescriptor.aidl
@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@@ -18,7 +33,7 @@
package android.hardware.common.fmq;
@VintfStability
-parcelable MQDescriptor {
+parcelable MQDescriptor<T, Flavor> {
android.hardware.common.fmq.GrantorDescriptor[] grantors;
android.hardware.common.NativeHandle handle;
int quantum;
diff --git a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/SynchronizedReadWrite.aidl b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/SynchronizedReadWrite.aidl
index 264171d..12c61ba 100644
--- a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/SynchronizedReadWrite.aidl
+++ b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/SynchronizedReadWrite.aidl
@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
diff --git a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/UnsynchronizedWrite.aidl b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/UnsynchronizedWrite.aidl
index eaf2ffd..f99528d 100644
--- a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/UnsynchronizedWrite.aidl
+++ b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/UnsynchronizedWrite.aidl
@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/Android.bp b/compatibility_matrices/Android.bp
index 314a809..da55347 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/Android.bp
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/Android.bp
@@ -61,6 +61,19 @@
}
vintf_compatibility_matrix {
+ name: "framework_compatibility_matrix.6.xml",
+ stem: "compatibility_matrix.6.xml",
+ srcs: [
+ "compatibility_matrix.6.xml",
+ ],
+ kernel_configs: [
+ "kernel_config_s_4.19",
+ "kernel_config_s_5.4",
+ "kernel_config_s_5.10",
+ ],
+}
+
+vintf_compatibility_matrix {
name: "framework_compatibility_matrix.current.xml",
stem: "compatibility_matrix.current.xml",
srcs: [
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/Android.mk b/compatibility_matrices/Android.mk
index 85c8ca0..9e715bf 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/Android.mk
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/Android.mk
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@
framework_compatibility_matrix.3.xml \
framework_compatibility_matrix.4.xml \
framework_compatibility_matrix.5.xml \
+ framework_compatibility_matrix.6.xml \
framework_compatibility_matrix.current.xml \
framework_compatibility_matrix.device.xml \
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/build/vintf_compatibility_matrix.go b/compatibility_matrices/build/vintf_compatibility_matrix.go
index f1bd0ae..c72cbde 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/build/vintf_compatibility_matrix.go
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/build/vintf_compatibility_matrix.go
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@
if k, ok := m.(*configs.KernelConfigRule); ok {
inputPaths = append(inputPaths, k.OutputPath())
} else {
- ctx.PropertyErrorf("kernel_config",
+ ctx.PropertyErrorf("kernel_configs",
"module %q is not a kernel_config", ctx.OtherModuleName(m))
}
})
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
index 608890b..a75ed25 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@
<instance>default</instance>
</interface>
</hal>
- <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
<version>3.0</version>
<version>4.0</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
index e5e012c..3b8ee21 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@
<instance>default</instance>
</interface>
</hal>
- <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
<version>3.0</version>
<version>4.0</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
index 8e175f0..0fb21a7 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@
<instance>default</instance>
</interface>
</hal>
- <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
<version>3.0</version>
<version>4.0-1</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.6.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.6.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..039ea84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.6.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,622 @@
+<compatibility-matrix version="1.0" type="framework" level="6">
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.atrace</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IAtraceDevice</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <name>android.hardware.audio</name>
+ <version>6.0</version>
+ <version>7.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IDevicesFactory</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <name>android.hardware.audio.effect</name>
+ <version>6.0</version>
+ <version>7.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IEffectsFactory</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.authsecret</name>
+ <version>1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IAuthSecret</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.authsecret</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IAuthSecret</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.automotive.audiocontrol</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <version>2.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IAudioControl</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.automotive.can</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ICanBus</name>
+ <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+ </interface>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ICanController</name>
+ <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.automotive.evs</name>
+ <version>1.0-1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IEvsEnumerator</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ <regex-instance>[a-z]+/[0-9]+</regex-instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.automotive.occupant_awareness</name>
+ <version>1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IOccupantAwareness</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.automotive.sv</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ISurroundViewService</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.automotive.vehicle</name>
+ <version>2.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IVehicle</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.biometrics.face</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IBiometricsFace</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint</name>
+ <version>2.1-2</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IBiometricsFingerprint</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.bluetooth</name>
+ <version>1.0-1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IBluetoothHci</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.bluetooth.audio</name>
+ <version>2.0-1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IBluetoothAudioProvidersFactory</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.boot</name>
+ <version>1.2</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IBootControl</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.broadcastradio</name>
+ <version>1.0-1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IBroadcastRadioFactory</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.broadcastradio</name>
+ <version>2.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IBroadcastRadio</name>
+ <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.camera.provider</name>
+ <version>2.4-6</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ICameraProvider</name>
+ <regex-instance>[^/]+/[0-9]+</regex-instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.cas</name>
+ <version>1.1-2</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IMediaCasService</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.confirmationui</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IConfirmationUI</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.contexthub</name>
+ <version>1.0-1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IContexthub</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.drm</name>
+ <version>1.3</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ICryptoFactory</name>
+ <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+ </interface>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IDrmFactory</name>
+ <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.dumpstate</name>
+ <version>1.1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IDumpstateDevice</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <name>android.hardware.gatekeeper</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IGatekeeper</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.gnss</name>
+ <version>2.0-1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IGnss</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <name>android.hardware.graphics.allocator</name>
+ <!-- New, non-Go devices should use 4.0, tested in vts_treble_vintf_vendor_test -->
+ <version>2.0</version>
+ <version>3.0</version>
+ <version>4.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IAllocator</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <name>android.hardware.graphics.composer</name>
+ <version>2.1-4</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IComposer</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <name>android.hardware.graphics.mapper</name>
+ <!-- New, non-Go devices should use 4.0, tested in vts_treble_vintf_vendor_test -->
+ <version>2.1</version>
+ <version>3.0</version>
+ <version>4.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IMapper</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <name>android.hardware.health</name>
+ <version>2.1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IHealth</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.health.storage</name>
+ <version>1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IStorage</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.identity</name>
+ <version>1-3</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IIdentityCredentialStore</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.oemlock</name>
+ <version>1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IOemLock</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.ir</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IConsumerIr</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.input.classifier</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IInputClassifier</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
+ <version>3.0</version>
+ <version>4.0-1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IKeymasterDevice</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
+ <version>4.0-1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IKeymasterDevice</name>
+ <instance>strongbox</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.security.keymint</name>
+ <version>1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IKeyMintDevice</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ <instance>strongbox</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.security.keymint</name>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IRemotelyProvisionedComponent</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.light</name>
+ <version>1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ILights</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.media.c2</name>
+ <version>1.0-1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IComponentStore</name>
+ <regex-instance>default[0-9]*</regex-instance>
+ <regex-instance>vendor[0-9]*_software</regex-instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.media.omx</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IOmx</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IOmxStore</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.memtrack</name>
+ <version>1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IMemtrack</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.neuralnetworks</name>
+ <version>1.0-3</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IDevice</name>
+ <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.neuralnetworks</name>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IDevice</name>
+ <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.nfc</name>
+ <version>1.2</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>INfc</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.oemlock</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IOemLock</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="false">
+ <name>android.hardware.power</name>
+ <version>1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IPower</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.power.stats</name>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IPowerStats</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.radio</name>
+ <version>1.6</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IRadio</name>
+ <instance>slot1</instance>
+ <instance>slot2</instance>
+ <instance>slot3</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.radio</name>
+ <version>1.2</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ISap</name>
+ <instance>slot1</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.radio.config</name>
+ <!--
+ See compatibility_matrix.4.xml on versioning of radio config HAL.
+ -->
+ <version>1.1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IRadioConfig</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.radio.config</name>
+ <version>1.3</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IRadioConfig</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.renderscript</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IDevice</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.rebootescrow</name>
+ <version>1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IRebootEscrow</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.secure_element</name>
+ <version>1.0-2</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ISecureElement</name>
+ <regex-instance>eSE[1-9][0-9]*</regex-instance>
+ <regex-instance>SIM[1-9][0-9]*</regex-instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.security.secureclock</name>
+ <version>1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ISecureClock</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.security.sharedsecret</name>
+ <version>1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ISharedSecret</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.sensors</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <version>2.0-1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ISensors</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.soundtrigger</name>
+ <version>2.0-3</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ISoundTriggerHw</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.tetheroffload.config</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IOffloadConfig</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.tetheroffload.control</name>
+ <version>1.1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IOffloadControl</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.thermal</name>
+ <version>2.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IThermal</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.tv.cec</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IHdmiCec</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.tv.input</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ITvInput</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.tv.tuner</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ITuner</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.usb</name>
+ <version>1.0-2</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IUsb</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.usb.gadget</name>
+ <version>1.0-1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IUsbGadget</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.vibrator</name>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IVibrator</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.weaver</name>
+ <version>1.0</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IWeaver</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.weaver</name>
+ <version>1</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IWeaver</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.wifi</name>
+ <version>1.3-4</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IWifi</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.wifi.hostapd</name>
+ <version>1.0-2</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>IHostapd</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+ <name>android.hardware.wifi.supplicant</name>
+ <version>1.2-3</version>
+ <interface>
+ <name>ISupplicant</name>
+ <instance>default</instance>
+ </interface>
+ </hal>
+</compatibility-matrix>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
index 30af25f..0b779ee 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<compatibility-matrix version="1.0" type="framework" level="6">
+<compatibility-matrix version="1.0" type="framework" level="7">
<hal format="hidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.atrace</name>
<version>1.0</version>
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@
<instance>default</instance>
</interface>
</hal>
- <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
<version>3.0</version>
<version>4.0-1</version>
diff --git a/current.txt b/current.txt
index 454d43e..88b067d 100644
--- a/current.txt
+++ b/current.txt
@@ -776,10 +776,12 @@
dabe23dde7c9e3ad65c61def7392f186d7efe7f4216f9b6f9cf0863745b1a9f4 android.hardware.keymaster@4.1::IKeymasterDevice
cd84ab19c590e0e73dd2307b591a3093ee18147ef95e6d5418644463a6620076 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.2::IDevice
f729ee6a5f136b25d79ea6895d24700fce413df555baaecf2c39e4440d15d043 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.0::types
-a84f8dac7a9b75de1cc2936a9b429b9b62b32a31ea88ca52c29f98f5ddc0fa95 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.2::types
-cd331b92312d16ab89f475c39296abbf539efc4114a8c5c2b136ad99b904ef33 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.3::types
+38c1a3eb5c3dfa4cc40b7cf4be0e9850440e2c57197fba7407081679b358aa22 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.2::types
+550619f876cadbea1f718edce120f0e1dd4a6f4bd4c28b59d479677dc86b0aec android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.3::types
c3fec5bd470984402997f78a74b6511efc4063b270f2bd9ee7b78f48b683a1bb android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.3::IDevice
0fdfad62c2ec33b52e6687004e5a1971c02d10b93ee4d26df5ccff7ce032494a android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.3::IPreparedModel
+b40c13f9a9affc806c778c1f8c78e90d4acb50f1d6a6be185d933d7a04b91c5b android.hardware.sensors@1.0::ISensors
+432086950205f5876da85dbd42004b0d0d05b429b9494b4f76a4d888758c5bd8 android.hardware.sensors@1.0::types
e8c86c69c438da8d1549856c1bb3e2d1b8da52722f8235ff49a30f2cce91742c android.hardware.soundtrigger@2.1::ISoundTriggerHwCallback
b9fbb6e2e061ed0960939d48b785e9700210add1f13ed32ecd688d0f1ca20ef7 android.hardware.renderscript@1.0::types
0f53d70e1eadf8d987766db4bf6ae2048004682168f4cab118da576787def3fa android.hardware.radio@1.0::types
@@ -793,5 +795,48 @@
2b5afef68e3e2ff1dab63e4f2ee57337ef2635ec812f49080cadfce966d33b52 android.hardware.radio@1.2::IRadio
# HALs released in Android S
-# NOTE: waiting to freeze HALs until later in the release
-# NOTE: new HALs are recommended to be in AIDL
+59fa68432e374c8d3b7ec098a91a1e023a2c728110bb733237c551afa5929725 android.hardware.audio@7.0::IDevice
+2207948ca127b801c94f667c99dfd139f150b50671e1408d3e855d03efbf631d android.hardware.audio@7.0::IDevicesFactory
+1d201e15c553cd44c62864ac8d7039351ddf048a7ee61e380f6efb0904442eb8 android.hardware.audio@7.0::IPrimaryDevice
+38afa920e6d36013b5a800e8c82eefeebd24602de24441e2f8ce5b3bdf62d3af android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStream
+77d84330418abba5a92b0cdc4e27fa7c85c27344eaf7eeef441b8e88829ee475 android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStreamIn
+9e4d79ed8f3c7e18455f371342ea1802f080bae38f64db746cc433305ee1978b android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStreamOut
+54cbc3c637fe8d4b889ccb5690e5e3069ca8efd9c6607ce1d021a3f47576c67e android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStreamOutCallback
+8036ae0a68a698a79207218018de5f41aed344723f644112ffc99e20e5e2e9ff android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStreamOutEventCallback
+84978dbd15d4fa8be6073d0974755f7718ee0cde519ce71449fb734f53cee46b android.hardware.audio@7.0::types
+6a03a9d8cc917da00e8b88f4abc42db2f741e2d50901e8ab6dea32084a238fbd android.hardware.audio.common@7.0::types
+842b4485a00005fb938f674b12445cb592cd1636f56c7cc447966119070811bd android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IAcousticEchoCancelerEffect
+b62a85e5d745dc35b5a60464c6b33a5bb7a2b8b95863a1374aee77ea29cf8f49 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IAutomaticGainControlEffect
+c8d5e30848191713db7cffccc482e4427816f33c98a24734c8769962f79f855b android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IBassBoostEffect
+7d021ecdf5bb6a61eb9ad193585d4986d1a64cb7fb4b52f219d7380145f2c6f1 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IDownmixEffect
+7fee1e7c7bb3d513a524c8963d1f8f7c2ad856f26c745b4ebc286b40d503264a android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEffect
+7596050ccc00234458dcb4e692056ed3c16f3618c11d7b17cb749cfd5713705d android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEffectBufferProviderCallback
+f2e41467bcf1140a11b219c2e8f77981b955c2941befe66e1cc685b7863ae4c9 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEffectsFactory
+af66fb4addbc477f9fea65fb63475203122a9189624ca8d14e757bc7826d60a4 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEnvironmentalReverbEffect
+2878d007ed55e1a4149ddcd29606962c948d8610642276f91dffd5ed32281824 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEqualizerEffect
+0260ef9e2a3e077de366ebebc0c117c7ee13f46a1eabd4abd66cc6245d0bed98 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::ILoudnessEnhancerEffect
+3586bbc3a7cbe30f9aff0a522524eea9b78eea78280f09c35d43dbab48a1193e android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::INoiseSuppressionEffect
+a7d74d7e7e0b1e3b739f233b7776bf01e868856a536f5cdac0f307e9c2850e64 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IPresetReverbEffect
+b4cbc1f2d38787f2ad069a8e4d10c0896287531a2596f0de0283e390b0ecf05d android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IVirtualizerEffect
+2b5681e1ea6a2db0dc1e84edb96d3de2f7daf306046543e7956be76dcb8f20fb android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IVisualizerEffect
+fa1e2d78e66fd662de93cb479ffd55947fe54f51cb53915814b3d3e3036c86a5 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::types
+4baf8e0eca4aa896cc9ceb7bb676aaf4fa21372ef8b49eed68eced1221c3dc0d android.hardware.bluetooth.audio@2.1::IBluetoothAudioProvider
+d417a9212c8f96e3a06a2f221c8c5756c765355b2b81de2b2a65d4c9eee85401 android.hardware.bluetooth.audio@2.1::IBluetoothAudioProvidersFactory
+c17d9e27abd37ae5a8ff8da08fc5c9b13a264670feef6bbbc9d3ab1915216130 android.hardware.bluetooth.audio@2.1::types
+6763dd2273b1b47f3ac68af9b66870287eba33fb5b4d66e8fe1d30ae18ce24cb android.hardware.boot@1.2::IBootControl
+0c0657fad2239c2c7ec363d3b13f2e002d1c267ca89d2cc96d2b1de0475386cb android.hardware.fastboot@1.1::IFastboot
+3e8866987de4ecb48807c09d4c88ec38365930a22415f1b74edf8b14da17846b android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadio
+715789427a44cc78f9d123b0ceb9e035e4ac2b1049501337c23a512e85b87850 android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadioIndication
+2e9c08c4bc9539d8da28d7de33500f87148f7fa2e377238ee898b41752ac4f29 android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadioResponse
+6475887a9cd5cc8cb803e3a78956d84d7a5fde571407ede2396f3ea5e0c0d3ad android.hardware.radio@1.6::types
+f22813615be1445ddd817655c054fc69dc9efea56c9035cd0757f3cbed190641 android.hardware.radio.config@1.3::IRadioConfig
+c9ad18729268593d14681d88ffad1c97e707444a45e1b4ed804dab949edbd84f android.hardware.radio.config@1.3::IRadioConfigResponse
+78dcb9a6975e8b377cb90bbe952078162960941468c992dcd2e1830a477b8c03 android.hardware.radio.config@1.3::types
+fd43298c43f70130c747a642ee43b0c242ac0cebffb377faa24f2725f0aa6caf android.hardware.tetheroffload.control@1.1::IOffloadControl
+ead4ec8713a2cb40906fe31ba793d21a6b1190143c446690d16a6ea686aa2fea android.hardware.tetheroffload.control@1.1::ITetheringOffloadCallback
+e34b4c7bec5e032c14804707ca924dd6b99ed5ba139da7505fe7d698d0fe178f android.hardware.tetheroffload.control@1.1::types
+
+# ABI preserving changes to HALs during Android T
+62ace52d9c3ff1f60f94118557a2aaf0b953513e59dcd34d5f94ae28d4c7e780 android.hardware.fastboot@1.0::IFastboot
+
+# There should be no more HIDL HALs - please use AIDL instead.
diff --git a/drm/1.0/default/Android.bp b/drm/1.0/default/Android.bp
index af1c076..a5cba5c 100644
--- a/drm/1.0/default/Android.bp
+++ b/drm/1.0/default/Android.bp
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
"-Werror",
"-Wextra",
"-Wall",
+ "-Wthread-safety",
],
shared_libs: [
"liblog",
@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@
export_header_lib_headers: [
"libutils_headers",
],
- export_include_dirs : ["include"]
+ export_include_dirs: ["include"],
}
soong_config_module_type {
diff --git a/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.cpp b/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.cpp
index e6d4e84..8dea7e9 100644
--- a/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.cpp
+++ b/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.cpp
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
uint32_t bufferId) {
sp<IMemory> hidlMemory = mapMemory(base);
+ std::lock_guard<std::mutex> shared_buffer_lock(mSharedBufferLock);
+
// allow mapMemory to return nullptr
mSharedBufferMap[bufferId] = hidlMemory;
return Void();
@@ -65,7 +67,7 @@
const SharedBuffer& source, uint64_t offset,
const DestinationBuffer& destination,
decrypt_cb _hidl_cb) {
-
+ std::unique_lock<std::mutex> shared_buffer_lock(mSharedBufferLock);
if (mSharedBufferMap.find(source.bufferId) == mSharedBufferMap.end()) {
_hidl_cb(Status::ERROR_DRM_CANNOT_HANDLE, 0, "source decrypt buffer base not set");
return Void();
@@ -79,7 +81,7 @@
}
}
- android::CryptoPlugin::Mode legacyMode;
+ android::CryptoPlugin::Mode legacyMode = android::CryptoPlugin::kMode_Unencrypted;
switch(mode) {
case Mode::UNENCRYPTED:
legacyMode = android::CryptoPlugin::kMode_Unencrypted;
@@ -146,7 +148,10 @@
return Void();
}
- if (destBuffer.offset + destBuffer.size > destBase->getSize()) {
+ size_t totalSize = 0;
+ if (__builtin_add_overflow(destBuffer.offset, destBuffer.size, &totalSize) ||
+ totalSize > destBase->getSize()) {
+ android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "176496353");
_hidl_cb(Status::ERROR_DRM_CANNOT_HANDLE, 0, "invalid buffer size");
return Void();
}
@@ -157,7 +162,7 @@
}
base = static_cast<uint8_t *>(static_cast<void *>(destBase->getPointer()));
- destPtr = static_cast<void *>(base + destination.nonsecureMemory.offset);
+ destPtr = static_cast<void*>(base + destination.nonsecureMemory.offset);
} else if (destination.type == BufferType::NATIVE_HANDLE) {
if (!secure) {
_hidl_cb(Status::BAD_VALUE, 0, "native handle destination must be secure");
@@ -170,6 +175,10 @@
_hidl_cb(Status::BAD_VALUE, 0, "invalid destination type");
return Void();
}
+
+ // release mSharedBufferLock
+ shared_buffer_lock.unlock();
+
ssize_t result = mLegacyPlugin->decrypt(secure, keyId.data(), iv.data(),
legacyMode, legacyPattern, srcPtr, legacySubSamples.get(),
subSamples.size(), destPtr, &detailMessage);
diff --git a/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.h b/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.h
index 11cc2aa..0d091fa 100644
--- a/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.h
+++ b/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.h
@@ -17,11 +17,14 @@
#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_DRM_V1_0__CRYPTOPLUGIN_H
#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_DRM_V1_0__CRYPTOPLUGIN_H
-#include <android/hidl/memory/1.0/IMemory.h>
+#include <android-base/thread_annotations.h>
#include <android/hardware/drm/1.0/ICryptoPlugin.h>
+#include <android/hidl/memory/1.0/IMemory.h>
#include <hidl/Status.h>
#include <media/hardware/CryptoAPI.h>
+#include <mutex>
+
namespace android {
namespace hardware {
namespace drm {
@@ -60,19 +63,21 @@
Return<void> setSharedBufferBase(const ::android::hardware::hidl_memory& base,
uint32_t bufferId) override;
- Return<void> decrypt(bool secure, const hidl_array<uint8_t, 16>& keyId,
- const hidl_array<uint8_t, 16>& iv, Mode mode, const Pattern& pattern,
- const hidl_vec<SubSample>& subSamples, const SharedBuffer& source,
- uint64_t offset, const DestinationBuffer& destination,
- decrypt_cb _hidl_cb) override;
+ Return<void> decrypt(
+ bool secure, const hidl_array<uint8_t, 16>& keyId, const hidl_array<uint8_t, 16>& iv,
+ Mode mode, const Pattern& pattern, const hidl_vec<SubSample>& subSamples,
+ const SharedBuffer& source, uint64_t offset, const DestinationBuffer& destination,
+ decrypt_cb _hidl_cb) override NO_THREAD_SAFETY_ANALYSIS; // use unique_lock
-private:
+ private:
android::CryptoPlugin *mLegacyPlugin;
- std::map<uint32_t, sp<IMemory> > mSharedBufferMap;
+ std::map<uint32_t, sp<IMemory>> mSharedBufferMap GUARDED_BY(mSharedBufferLock);
CryptoPlugin() = delete;
CryptoPlugin(const CryptoPlugin &) = delete;
void operator=(const CryptoPlugin &) = delete;
+
+ std::mutex mSharedBufferLock;
};
} // namespace implementation
diff --git a/fastboot/1.0/IFastboot.hal b/fastboot/1.0/IFastboot.hal
index dce3ad7..b39061c 100644
--- a/fastboot/1.0/IFastboot.hal
+++ b/fastboot/1.0/IFastboot.hal
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
/**
* Executes a fastboot OEM command.
*
- * @param oemCmdArgs The oem command that is passed to the fastboot HAL.
+ * @param oemCmd The oem command that is passed to the fastboot HAL.
* @return result Returns the status SUCCESS if the operation is successful,
* INVALID_ARGUMENT for bad arguments,
* FAILURE_UNKNOWN for an invalid/unsupported command.
diff --git a/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index e74cca9..618624e 100644
--- a/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -236,6 +236,10 @@
generatePassword(password, 0);
enrollNewPassword(password, enrollRsp, true);
verifyPassword(password, enrollRsp.data, 1, verifyRsp, true);
+
+ ALOGI("Testing unenrolled password doesn't verify");
+ generatePassword(password, 1);
+ verifyPassword(password, enrollRsp.data, 1, verifyRsp, false);
ALOGI("Testing Enroll+Verify done");
}
@@ -306,6 +310,8 @@
if (first != nullptr && second != nullptr) {
EXPECT_NE(first->user_id, second->user_id);
}
+ // the old enrollment should be invalid now
+ verifyPassword(password, enrollRsp.data, 0, verifyRsp, false);
ALOGI("Testing Untrusted Reenroll done");
}
diff --git a/graphics/common/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.graphics.common/current/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl b/graphics/common/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.graphics.common/current/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
index 8b12169..232e023 100644
--- a/graphics/common/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.graphics.common/current/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
+++ b/graphics/common/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.graphics.common/current/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
int width;
int height;
int layers;
- android.hardware.graphics.common.PixelFormat format;
- android.hardware.graphics.common.BufferUsage usage;
+ android.hardware.graphics.common.PixelFormat format = android.hardware.graphics.common.PixelFormat.UNSPECIFIED;
+ android.hardware.graphics.common.BufferUsage usage = android.hardware.graphics.common.BufferUsage.CPU_READ_NEVER;
int stride;
}
diff --git a/graphics/common/aidl/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl b/graphics/common/aidl/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
index e1e3492..078c512 100644
--- a/graphics/common/aidl/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
+++ b/graphics/common/aidl/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
int width;
int height;
int layers;
- PixelFormat format;
- BufferUsage usage;
+ PixelFormat format = PixelFormat.UNSPECIFIED;
+ BufferUsage usage = BufferUsage.CPU_READ_NEVER;
int stride;
}
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
index 50f282f..46f95dd 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
@@ -73,10 +73,15 @@
IComposerClient::Rect getFrameRect() const { return {0, 0, mDisplayWidth, mDisplayHeight}; }
+ void setDimensions(int32_t displayWidth, int32_t displayHeight) {
+ mDisplayWidth = displayWidth;
+ mDisplayHeight = displayHeight;
+ }
+
private:
const Display mDisplay;
- const int32_t mDisplayWidth;
- const int32_t mDisplayHeight;
+ int32_t mDisplayWidth;
+ int32_t mDisplayHeight;
};
class GraphicsComposerHidlTest : public ::testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
@@ -194,6 +199,31 @@
const std::vector<ContentType>& capabilities,
const ContentType& contentType, const char* contentTypeStr);
+ Error setActiveConfigWithConstraints(
+ VtsDisplay& display, Config config,
+ const IComposerClient::VsyncPeriodChangeConstraints& constraints,
+ VsyncPeriodChangeTimeline* timeline) {
+ const auto error = mComposerClient->setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display.get(), config,
+ constraints, timeline);
+ if (error == Error::NONE) {
+ const int32_t displayWidth = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+ display.get(), config, IComposerClient::Attribute::WIDTH);
+ const int32_t displayHeight = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+ display.get(), config, IComposerClient::Attribute::HEIGHT);
+ display.setDimensions(displayWidth, displayHeight);
+ }
+ return error;
+ }
+
+ void setActiveConfig(VtsDisplay& display, Config config) {
+ mComposerClient->setActiveConfig(display.get(), config);
+ const int32_t displayWidth = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+ display.get(), config, IComposerClient::Attribute::WIDTH);
+ const int32_t displayHeight = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+ display.get(), config, IComposerClient::Attribute::HEIGHT);
+ display.setDimensions(displayWidth, displayHeight);
+ }
+
private:
// use the slot count usually set by SF
static constexpr uint32_t kBufferSlotCount = 64;
@@ -347,7 +377,7 @@
}
TEST_P(GraphicsComposerHidlTest, getDisplayVsyncPeriod) {
- for (const auto& display : mDisplays) {
+ for (VtsDisplay& display : mDisplays) {
for (Config config : mComposerClient->getDisplayConfigs(display.get())) {
VsyncPeriodNanos expectedVsyncPeriodNanos = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
display.get(), config,
@@ -358,8 +388,8 @@
constraints.desiredTimeNanos = systemTime();
constraints.seamlessRequired = false;
- EXPECT_EQ(Error::NONE, mComposerClient->setActiveConfigWithConstraints(
- display.get(), config, constraints, &timeline));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Error::NONE,
+ setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display, config, constraints, &timeline));
if (timeline.refreshRequired) {
sendRefreshFrame(display, &timeline);
@@ -411,11 +441,10 @@
constraints.seamlessRequired = false;
constraints.desiredTimeNanos = systemTime();
- for (const auto& display : mDisplays) {
+ for (VtsDisplay& display : mDisplays) {
Config invalidConfigId = GetInvalidConfigId(display.get());
EXPECT_EQ(Error::BAD_CONFIG,
- mComposerClient->setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display.get(), invalidConfigId,
- constraints, &timeline));
+ setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display, invalidConfigId, constraints, &timeline));
}
}
@@ -426,7 +455,7 @@
constraints.seamlessRequired = true;
constraints.desiredTimeNanos = systemTime();
- for (const auto& display : mDisplays) {
+ for (VtsDisplay& display : mDisplays) {
forEachTwoConfigs(display.get(), [&](Config config1, Config config2) {
const auto configGroup1 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
display.get(), config1,
@@ -435,11 +464,10 @@
display.get(), config2,
IComposerClient::IComposerClient::Attribute::CONFIG_GROUP);
if (configGroup1 != configGroup2) {
- mComposerClient->setActiveConfig(display.get(), config1);
+ setActiveConfig(display, config1);
sendRefreshFrame(display, nullptr);
EXPECT_EQ(Error::SEAMLESS_NOT_ALLOWED,
- mComposerClient->setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display.get(), config2,
- constraints, &timeline));
+ setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display, config2, constraints, &timeline));
}
});
}
@@ -502,6 +530,8 @@
mWriter->presentDisplay();
execute();
+
+ ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(mComposerClient->destroyLayer(display.get(), layer));
}
void GraphicsComposerHidlTest::waitForVsyncPeriodChange(Display display,
@@ -523,9 +553,9 @@
}
void GraphicsComposerHidlTest::Test_setActiveConfigWithConstraints(const TestParameters& params) {
- for (const auto& display : mDisplays) {
+ for (VtsDisplay& display : mDisplays) {
forEachTwoConfigs(display.get(), [&](Config config1, Config config2) {
- mComposerClient->setActiveConfig(display.get(), config1);
+ setActiveConfig(display, config1);
sendRefreshFrame(display, nullptr);
int32_t vsyncPeriod1 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
@@ -543,8 +573,8 @@
IComposerClient::VsyncPeriodChangeConstraints constraints = {
.desiredTimeNanos = systemTime() + params.delayForChange,
.seamlessRequired = false};
- EXPECT_EQ(Error::NONE, mComposerClient->setActiveConfigWithConstraints(
- display.get(), config2, constraints, &timeline));
+ EXPECT_EQ(Error::NONE,
+ setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display, config2, constraints, &timeline));
EXPECT_TRUE(timeline.newVsyncAppliedTimeNanos >= constraints.desiredTimeNanos);
// Refresh rate should change within a reasonable time
diff --git a/identity/TEST_MAPPING b/identity/TEST_MAPPING
index f35f4b7..85cf91f 100644
--- a/identity/TEST_MAPPING
+++ b/identity/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
},
{
"name": "android.hardware.identity-support-lib-test"
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "libeic_test"
}
]
}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index a097895..3224e4b 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@
void startRetrieval(in android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile[] accessControlProfiles, in android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthToken authToken, in byte[] itemsRequest, in byte[] signingKeyBlob, in byte[] sessionTranscript, in byte[] readerSignature, in int[] requestCounts);
void startRetrieveEntryValue(in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize, in int[] accessControlProfileIds);
byte[] retrieveEntryValue(in byte[] encryptedContent);
- void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
- android.hardware.identity.Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"}) void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"}) android.hardware.identity.Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
void setRequestedNamespaces(in android.hardware.identity.RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
void setVerificationToken(in android.hardware.keymaster.VerificationToken verificationToken);
byte[] deleteCredentialWithChallenge(in byte[] challenge);
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
index a713462..19a29ec 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -38,6 +38,6 @@
android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile addAccessControlProfile(in int id, in android.hardware.identity.Certificate readerCertificate, in boolean userAuthenticationRequired, in long timeoutMillis, in long secureUserId);
void beginAddEntry(in int[] accessControlProfileIds, in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize);
byte[] addEntryValue(in byte[] content);
- void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData, out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"}) void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData, out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
void setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(in int expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index d23f88c..8ae293b 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@
*
* @param out deviceNameSpaces the bytes of DeviceNameSpaces.
*/
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"})
void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
/**
@@ -376,6 +377,7 @@
*
* @return an X.509 certificate for the new signing key, signed by the credential key.
*/
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"})
Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
/**
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
index 5f878ee..22bcf61 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -320,6 +320,7 @@
* "accessControlProfiles" : [ * uint ],
* }
*/
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"})
void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData,
out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp b/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp
index a124b1e..28c4893 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
static_libs: [
"libbase",
"libcppbor_external",
+ "libcppcose_rkp",
"libutils",
"libsoft_attestation_cert",
"libkeymaster_portable",
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@
static_libs: [
"libbase",
"libcppbor_external",
+ "libcppcose_rkp",
"libutils",
"libsoft_attestation_cert",
"libkeymaster_portable",
@@ -112,6 +114,43 @@
],
}
+cc_test {
+ name: "libeic_test",
+ srcs: [
+ "EicTests.cpp",
+ "FakeSecureHardwareProxy.cpp",
+ ],
+ cflags: [
+ "-Wall",
+ "-Wextra",
+ "-g",
+ "-DEIC_DEBUG",
+ ],
+ local_include_dirs: [
+ "common",
+ ],
+ shared_libs: [
+ "liblog",
+ "libcrypto",
+ "libkeymaster_messages",
+ ],
+ static_libs: [
+ "libbase",
+ "libcppbor_external",
+ "libcppcose_rkp",
+ "libutils",
+ "libsoft_attestation_cert",
+ "libkeymaster_portable",
+ "libsoft_attestation_cert",
+ "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
+ "android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
+ "android.hardware.identity-libeic-library",
+ ],
+ test_suites: [
+ "general-tests",
+ ],
+}
+
prebuilt_etc {
name: "android.hardware.identity_credential.xml",
sub_dir: "permissions",
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/EicTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/EicTests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a28080d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/EicTests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <optional>
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include "FakeSecureHardwareProxy.h"
+
+// Most of libeic is tested as part of VTS since there's almost a 1:1 mapping between
+// the HAL and libeic interfaces. This test suite is mainly for the few things which
+// doesn't map directly.
+//
+
+using std::optional;
+using std::string;
+using std::vector;
+
+using android::hardware::identity::AccessCheckResult;
+using android::hardware::identity::FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy;
+using android::hardware::identity::FakeSecureHardwareProvisioningProxy;
+
+TEST(EicTest, AccessControlIsEnforced) {
+ // First provision the credential...
+ //
+ FakeSecureHardwareProvisioningProxy provisioningProxy;
+ bool isTestCredential = false;
+ provisioningProxy.initialize(isTestCredential);
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> credKey =
+ provisioningProxy.createCredentialKey({0x01, 0x02}, {0x03, 0x04});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credKey.has_value());
+ string docType = "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL";
+ ASSERT_TRUE(provisioningProxy.startPersonalization(0, {1}, docType, 125));
+
+ vector<int> acpIds = {};
+ string nameSpace = "org.iso.18013.5.1";
+ string name = "NonAccessibleElement";
+ vector<uint8_t> content = {0x63, 0x46, 0x6f, 0x6f}; // "Foo" tstr
+ ASSERT_TRUE(provisioningProxy.beginAddEntry(acpIds, nameSpace, name, content.size()));
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> encContent =
+ provisioningProxy.addEntryValue(acpIds, nameSpace, name, content);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(encContent.has_value());
+ ASSERT_EQ(encContent->size(), content.size() + 28);
+
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> signatureOfToBeSigned = provisioningProxy.finishAddingEntries();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(signatureOfToBeSigned.has_value());
+
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> credData = provisioningProxy.finishGetCredentialData(docType);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credData.has_value());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(provisioningProxy.shutdown());
+
+ // Then present data from it...
+ //
+ FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy presentationProxy;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(presentationProxy.initialize(isTestCredential, docType, credData.value()));
+ AccessCheckResult res =
+ presentationProxy.startRetrieveEntryValue(nameSpace, name, 1, content.size(), acpIds);
+ ASSERT_EQ(res, AccessCheckResult::kNoAccessControlProfiles);
+
+ // Ensure that we can't get the data out if startRetrieveEntryValue() returned
+ // something other than kOk... See b/190757775 for details.
+ //
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> decContent =
+ presentationProxy.retrieveEntryValue(encContent.value(), nameSpace, name, acpIds);
+ ASSERT_FALSE(decContent.has_value());
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char** argv) {
+ ::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
+ return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/common/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/common/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp
index 25f129b..200ee61 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/common/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/common/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp
@@ -210,6 +210,15 @@
"numAccessControlProfileRemaining_ is not zero"));
}
+ // Ensure passed-in profile ids reference valid access control profiles
+ for (const int32_t id : accessControlProfileIds) {
+ if (accessControlProfileIds_.find(id) == accessControlProfileIds_.end()) {
+ return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+ IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
+ "An id in accessControlProfileIds references non-existing ACP"));
+ }
+ }
+
if (remainingEntryCounts_.size() == 0) {
return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA, "No more namespaces to add to"));
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicCbor.c b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicCbor.c
index fe131eb..0e2684f 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicCbor.c
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicCbor.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@
data[4] = size & 0xff;
eicCborAppend(cbor, data, 5);
} else {
- data[0] = (majorType << 5) | 24;
+ data[0] = (majorType << 5) | 27;
data[1] = (((uint64_t)size) >> 56) & 0xff;
data[2] = (((uint64_t)size) >> 48) & 0xff;
data[3] = (((uint64_t)size) >> 40) & 0xff;
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
index 9e033b3..3d13766 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
@@ -633,6 +633,8 @@
// We'll need to calc and store a digest of additionalData to check that it's the same
// additionalData being passed in for every eicPresentationRetrieveEntryValue() call...
+ //
+ ctx->accessCheckOk = false;
if (!eicCborCalcEntryAdditionalData(accessControlProfileIds, numAccessControlProfileIds,
nameSpace, name, additionalDataCbor,
additionalDataCborBufSize, &additionalDataCborSize,
@@ -680,6 +682,7 @@
if (result == EIC_ACCESS_CHECK_RESULT_OK) {
eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cbor, name);
+ ctx->accessCheckOk = true;
}
return result;
}
@@ -702,10 +705,15 @@
calculatedSha256)) {
return false;
}
+
if (eicCryptoMemCmp(calculatedSha256, ctx->additionalDataSha256, EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0) {
eicDebug("SHA-256 mismatch of additionalData");
return false;
}
+ if (!ctx->accessCheckOk) {
+ eicDebug("Attempting to retrieve a value for which access is not granted");
+ return false;
+ }
if (!eicOpsDecryptAes128Gcm(ctx->storageKey, encryptedContent, encryptedContentSize,
additionalDataCbor, additionalDataCborSize, content)) {
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
index 7cad068..c888049 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@
// Set to true initialized as a test credential.
bool testCredential;
+ // Set to true if the evaluation of access control checks in
+ // eicPresentationStartRetrieveEntryValue() resulted EIC_ACCESS_CHECK_RESULT_OK
+ bool accessCheckOk;
+
// These are bitmasks indicating which of the possible 32 access control profiles are
// authorized. They are built up by eicPresentationValidateAccessControlProfile().
//
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp b/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp
index 3592d3e..61d15d2 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
],
static_libs: [
"libcppbor_external",
+ "libcppcose_rkp",
"libkeymaster_portable",
"libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
"android.hardware.keymaster@4.0",
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/DeleteCredentialTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/DeleteCredentialTests.cpp
index d3addf4..7627c9c 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/DeleteCredentialTests.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/DeleteCredentialTests.cpp
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addAccessControlProfile(1, {}, false, 0, 0, &sacp).isOk());
// Single entry - don't care about the returned encrypted data
- ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({0}, "ns", "Some Data", 1).isOk());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({1}, "ns", "Some Data", 1).isOk());
vector<uint8_t> encryptedData;
ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encryptedData).isOk());
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/ProveOwnershipTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/ProveOwnershipTests.cpp
index fa0e293..c622193 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/ProveOwnershipTests.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/ProveOwnershipTests.cpp
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addAccessControlProfile(1, {}, false, 0, 0, &sacp).isOk());
// Single entry - don't care about the returned encrypted data
- ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({0}, "ns", "Some Data", 1).isOk());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({1}, "ns", "Some Data", 1).isOk());
vector<uint8_t> encryptedData;
ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encryptedData).isOk());
diff --git a/identity/support/Android.bp b/identity/support/Android.bp
index 774bc40..db1a945 100644
--- a/identity/support/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/support/Android.bp
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
"android.hardware.keymaster@4.0",
"libcrypto",
"libbase",
+ "libcppcose_rkp",
"libhidlbase",
"libhardware",
"libkeymaster_portable",
diff --git a/identity/support/src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp b/identity/support/src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp
index 4547624..7f4674d 100644
--- a/identity/support/src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp
+++ b/identity/support/src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@
// the VTS tests. Of course, this is a pretend-only game since hopefully no
// relying party is ever going to trust our batch key and those keys above
// it.
- ::keymaster::PureSoftKeymasterContext context(::keymaster::KmVersion::KEYMASTER_4_1,
+ ::keymaster::PureSoftKeymasterContext context(::keymaster::KmVersion::KEYMINT_1,
KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT);
keymaster_error_t error;
@@ -682,10 +682,9 @@
i2d_X509_NAME(subjectName.get(), &subjectPtr);
- uint64_t nowMilliSeconds = time(nullptr) * 1000;
::keymaster::AuthorizationSet auth_set(
::keymaster::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(::keymaster::TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE, nowMilliSeconds)
+ .Authorization(::keymaster::TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE, activeTimeMilliSeconds)
.Authorization(::keymaster::TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER, expireTimeMilliSeconds)
.Authorization(::keymaster::TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge.data(),
challenge.size())
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
index bc294bd..342b3e2 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
ASN1_INTEGER_SET* padding;
ASN1_INTEGER* ec_curve;
ASN1_INTEGER* rsa_public_exponent;
+ ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
ASN1_INTEGER* active_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* origination_expire_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* usage_expire_date_time;
@@ -78,56 +79,84 @@
ASN1_INTEGER* user_auth_type;
ASN1_INTEGER* auth_timeout;
ASN1_NULL* allow_while_on_body;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
ASN1_NULL* all_applications;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* application_id;
ASN1_INTEGER* creation_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* origin;
- ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust;
ASN1_INTEGER* os_version;
ASN1_INTEGER* os_patchlevel;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_application_id;
- ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
- ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
- ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_brand;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_device;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_product;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_serial;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_imei;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_meid;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_manufacturer;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_model;
ASN1_INTEGER* vendor_patchlevel;
ASN1_INTEGER* boot_patchlevel;
} KM_AUTH_LIST;
ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_AUTH_LIST) = {
- ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, purpose, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PURPOSE.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, algorithm, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ALGORITHM.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, key_size, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_KEY_SIZE.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, digest, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_DIGEST.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, padding, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PADDING.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, ec_curve, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_EC_CURVE.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rsa_public_exponent, ASN1_INTEGER,
- TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
- TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
- TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, no_auth_required, ASN1_NULL, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, user_auth_type, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, auth_timeout, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, allow_while_on_body, ASN1_NULL, TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_user_presence_required, ASN1_NULL,
- TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_confirmation_required, ASN1_NULL,
- TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, unlocked_device_required, ASN1_NULL,
- TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, creation_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origin, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ORIGIN.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
- TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, purpose, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PURPOSE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, algorithm, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ALGORITHM.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, key_size, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_KEY_SIZE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, digest, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_DIGEST.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, padding, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PADDING.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, ec_curve, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_EC_CURVE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rsa_public_exponent, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
+
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, no_auth_required, ASN1_NULL, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, user_auth_type, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, auth_timeout, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, allow_while_on_body, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_user_presence_required, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_confirmation_required, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, unlocked_device_required, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, creation_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_CREATION_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origin, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ORIGIN.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_brand, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_device, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_product, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_serial, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_imei, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_meid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_manufacturer, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_model, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_AUTH_LIST);
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_AUTH_LIST);
@@ -259,6 +288,14 @@
copyAuthTag(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_brand, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_device, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_product, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_serial, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_imei, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_meid, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_manufacturer, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_model, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->trusted_user_presence_required, TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
index e0d60fc..01c502c 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
@@ -96,6 +96,18 @@
return count > 0;
}
+// If the given property is available, add it to the tag set under the given tag ID.
+template <Tag tag>
+void add_tag_from_prop(AuthorizationSetBuilder* tags, TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+ const char* prop) {
+ char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+ int len = property_get(prop, value, /* default = */ "");
+ if (len > 0) {
+ tags->Authorization(ttag, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(value),
+ static_cast<size_t>(len));
+ }
+}
+
constexpr char hex_value[256] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
@@ -921,6 +933,23 @@
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
}
+/**
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesInvalidKeySize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesInvalidKeySize) {
+ for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ }
+}
+
INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_HIDL_TEST(NewKeyGenerationTest);
typedef KeymasterHidlTest SigningOperationsTest;
@@ -4392,6 +4421,95 @@
}
/*
+ * AttestationTest.EcAttestationID
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to EC keys with correct attestation ID fields works and generates the
+ * expected output.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestationTest, EcAttestationID) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
+
+ // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+ auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+ "ro.product.manufacturer");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo"));
+ // Include one of the (valid) attestation ID tags.
+ builder.push_back(tag);
+ hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+ auto result = AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain);
+ if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+ EXPECT_GE(cert_chain.size(), 2U);
+
+ std::vector<KeyParameter> expected_hw_enforced = key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced;
+ expected_hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(
+ "challenge", "foo", key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced,
+ hidl_vec<KeyParameter>(expected_hw_enforced), SecLevel(), cert_chain[0]));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * AttestationTest.EcAttestationMismatchID
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to EC keys with incorrect attestation ID fields fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestationTest, EcAttestationMismatchID) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
+
+ // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+ std::string invalid = "completely-invalid";
+ auto invalid_tags =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, invalid.data(),
+ invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, invalid.data(), invalid.size());
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : invalid_tags) {
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo"));
+ // Include one of the invalid attestation ID tags.
+ builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+ hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+ auto result = AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG)
+ << "result: " << static_cast<int32_t>(result);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* AttestationTest.EcAttestationRequiresAttestationAppId
*
* Verifies that attesting to EC keys requires app ID
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp b/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp
index 207a7e8..15230d5 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@
ASN1_INTEGER_SET* padding;
ASN1_INTEGER* ec_curve;
ASN1_INTEGER* rsa_public_exponent;
+ ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
+ ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
ASN1_INTEGER* active_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* origination_expire_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* usage_expire_date_time;
@@ -86,21 +88,27 @@
ASN1_INTEGER* user_auth_type;
ASN1_INTEGER* auth_timeout;
ASN1_NULL* allow_while_on_body;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
ASN1_NULL* all_applications;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* application_id;
ASN1_INTEGER* creation_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* origin;
- ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust;
ASN1_INTEGER* os_version;
ASN1_INTEGER* os_patchlevel;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_application_id;
- ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
- ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
- ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_brand;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_device;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_product;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_serial;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_imei;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_meid;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_manufacturer;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_model;
ASN1_INTEGER* vendor_patchlevel;
ASN1_INTEGER* boot_patchlevel;
- ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
ASN1_NULL* device_unique_attestation;
ASN1_NULL* identity_credential_key;
} KM_AUTH_LIST;
@@ -116,6 +124,7 @@
TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL,
TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
@@ -138,12 +147,27 @@
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_brand, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_device, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_product, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_serial, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_imei, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_meid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_manufacturer, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_model, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER,
TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
- TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, device_unique_attestation, ASN1_NULL,
TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, identity_credential_key, ASN1_NULL,
@@ -279,6 +303,14 @@
copyAuthTag(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_brand, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_device, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_product, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_serial, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_imei, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_meid, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_manufacturer, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_model, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->trusted_user_presence_required, TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h b/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h
index 40eb142..e8db56a 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h
@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@
using V4_0::TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA;
using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID;
using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL;
using V4_0::TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT;
using V4_0::TAG_BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS;
using V4_0::TAG_BLOCK_MODE;
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
index e46cb48..4a57f44 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#define LOG_TAG "keymaster_hidl_hal_test"
#include <cutils/log.h>
+#include <vector>
#include "Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h"
@@ -26,6 +27,8 @@
#include <keymasterV4_1/attestation_record.h>
#include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
+using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test::add_tag_from_prop;
+
// Not to dump the attestation by default. Can enable by specify the parameter
// "--dump_attestations" on lunching VTS
static bool dumpAttestations = false;
@@ -172,10 +175,42 @@
attestation.software_enforced.Sort();
attestation.hardware_enforced.Sort();
- EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filter_tags(attestation.software_enforced))
- << DIFFERENCE(expected_sw_enforced, attestation.software_enforced);
- EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_hw_enforced), filter_tags(attestation.hardware_enforced))
- << DIFFERENCE(expected_hw_enforced, attestation.hardware_enforced);
+ expected_sw_enforced = filter_tags(expected_sw_enforced);
+ expected_hw_enforced = filter_tags(expected_hw_enforced);
+ AuthorizationSet attestation_sw_enforced = filter_tags(attestation.software_enforced);
+ AuthorizationSet attestation_hw_enforced = filter_tags(attestation.hardware_enforced);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_sw_enforced, attestation_sw_enforced)
+ << DIFFERENCE(expected_sw_enforced, attestation_sw_enforced);
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_hw_enforced, attestation_hw_enforced)
+ << DIFFERENCE(expected_hw_enforced, attestation_hw_enforced);
+}
+
+X509_Ptr parse_cert_blob(const std::vector<uint8_t>& blob) {
+ const uint8_t* p = blob.data();
+ return X509_Ptr(d2i_X509(nullptr /* allocate new */, &p, blob.size()));
+}
+
+bool check_certificate_chain_signatures(const hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>& cert_chain) {
+ // TODO: Check that root is self-signed once b/187803288 is resolved.
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < cert_chain.size() - 1; ++i) {
+ X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain[i]));
+ X509_Ptr signing_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain[i + 1]));
+
+ if (!key_cert.get() || !signing_cert.get()) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert.get()));
+ if (!signing_pubkey.get()) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get())) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ return true;
}
} // namespace
@@ -243,7 +278,10 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
- if (dumpAttestations) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_chain[0]));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(check_certificate_chain_signatures(cert_chain));
+ if (dumpAttestations) {
+ for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
+ }
auto [err, attestation] = parse_attestation_record(cert_chain[0]);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, err);
@@ -287,7 +325,10 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
- if (dumpAttestations) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_chain[0]));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(check_certificate_chain_signatures(cert_chain));
+ if (dumpAttestations) {
+ for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
+ }
auto [err, attestation] = parse_attestation_record(cert_chain[0]);
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, err);
@@ -308,6 +349,106 @@
SecLevel());
}
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
+
+ // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+ auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+ "ro.product.manufacturer");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+ HidlBuf challenge("challenge");
+ HidlBuf app_id("foo");
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id);
+ builder.push_back(tag);
+ ErrorCode result = convert(AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain));
+
+ // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+ if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
+ if (dumpAttestations) {
+ for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
+ }
+ auto [err, attestation] = parse_attestation_record(cert_chain[0]);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, err);
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+ hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+ check_attestation_record(
+ attestation, challenge,
+ /* sw_enforced */
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id),
+ hw_enforced, SecLevel());
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
+
+ // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+ std::string invalid = "completely-invalid";
+ auto attestation_id_tags =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, invalid.data(),
+ invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, invalid.data(), invalid.size());
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+ HidlBuf challenge("challenge");
+ HidlBuf app_id("foo");
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id);
+ builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+ ErrorCode result = convert(AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG)
+ << "result: " << static_cast<int32_t>(result);
+ }
+}
+
INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_4_1_HIDL_TEST(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest);
} // namespace test
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h
index f8c1fad..670ccfb 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
#include <android/hardware/keymaster/4.1/IKeymasterDevice.h>
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
+
#include <KeymasterHidlTest.h>
#include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
@@ -159,3 +161,17 @@
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString)
} // namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1::test
+
+namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test {
+
+// If the given property is available, add it to the tag set under the given tag ID.
+template <Tag tag>
+void add_tag_from_prop(AuthorizationSetBuilder* tags, TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+ const char* prop) {
+ std::string prop_value = ::android::base::GetProperty(prop, /* default= */ "");
+ if (!prop_value.empty()) {
+ tags->Authorization(ttag, prop_value.data(), prop_value.size());
+ }
+}
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
index db1df2b..4f21cba 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
long challenge;
long userId;
long authenticatorId;
- android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType;
+ android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType = android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType.NONE;
android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
byte[] mac;
}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
index 0633765..b116dac 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -20,6 +20,6 @@
parcelable VerificationToken {
long challenge;
android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
- android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+ android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel securityLevel = android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel.SOFTWARE;
byte[] mac;
}
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
index 58602aa..99b036a 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
* authenticatorType describes the type of authentication that took place, e.g. password or
* fingerprint.
*/
- HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType;
+ HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType = HardwareAuthenticatorType.NONE;
/**
* timestamp indicates when the user authentication took place, in milliseconds since some
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
index f053254..5efd937 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
/**
* SecurityLevel of the secure environment that generated the token.
*/
- SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+ SecurityLevel securityLevel = SecurityLevel.SOFTWARE;
/**
* 32-byte HMAC-SHA256 of the above values, computed as:
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Burst.h b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Burst.h
index 7849ca7..8bd2fbe 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Burst.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Burst.h
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@
const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
private:
const nn::SharedPreparedModel kPreparedModel;
};
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Device.h b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Device.h
index 4681b9e..db3b2ad 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Device.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Device.h
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@
const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
- bool isUpdatable() const override;
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Execution.h b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Execution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e201e25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Execution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_0_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_0_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/IPreparedModel.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/ProtectCallback.h>
+
+#include "PreparedModel.h"
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_0::utils {
+
+class Execution final : public nn::IExecution, public std::enable_shared_from_this<Execution> {
+ struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+ public:
+ static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> create(
+ std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation);
+
+ Execution(PrivateConstructorTag tag, std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel,
+ Request request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation);
+
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+ nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+ const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+ private:
+ const std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> kPreparedModel;
+ const Request kRequest;
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation kRelocation;
+};
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_0::utils
+
+#endif // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_0_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/PreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/PreparedModel.h
index 8853eea..48be595 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/PreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/PreparedModel.h
@@ -57,10 +57,17 @@
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurst() const override;
std::any getUnderlyingResource() const override;
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeInternal(
+ const V1_0::Request& request, const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
private:
const sp<V1_0::IPreparedModel> kPreparedModel;
const hal::utils::DeathHandler kDeathHandler;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Burst.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Burst.cpp
index e3a9757..1284721 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Burst.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Burst.cpp
@@ -55,4 +55,10 @@
return kPreparedModel->execute(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
}
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> Burst::createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+ return kPreparedModel->createReusableExecution(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+}
+
} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_0::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Device.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Device.cpp
index bb31a26..93bd81a 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Device.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Device.cpp
@@ -106,10 +106,6 @@
return nn::DeviceType::OTHER;
}
-bool Device::isUpdatable() const {
- return false;
-}
-
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& Device::getSupportedExtensions() const {
return kExtensions;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Execution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Execution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a3216b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Execution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "Execution.h"
+
+#include "Callbacks.h"
+#include "Conversions.h"
+#include "Utils.h"
+
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/IPreparedModel.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/types.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/HandleError.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/ProtectCallback.h>
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_0::utils {
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> Execution::create(
+ std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation) {
+ if (preparedModel == nullptr) {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "V1_0::utils::Execution::create must have non-null preparedModel";
+ }
+
+ return std::make_shared<const Execution>(PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(preparedModel),
+ std::move(request), std::move(relocation));
+}
+
+Execution::Execution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/,
+ std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation)
+ : kPreparedModel(std::move(preparedModel)),
+ kRequest(std::move(request)),
+ kRelocation(std::move(relocation)) {}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> Execution::compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/) const {
+ return kPreparedModel->executeInternal(kRequest, kRelocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> Execution::computeFenced(
+ const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& /*waitFor*/, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& /*timeoutDurationAfterFence*/) const {
+ return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE)
+ << "IExecution::computeFenced is not supported on 1.0 HAL service";
+}
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_0::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
index 858571d..00970c0 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include "Burst.h"
#include "Callbacks.h"
#include "Conversions.h"
+#include "Execution.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/IPreparedModel.h>
@@ -61,22 +62,35 @@
const nn::OptionalDuration& /*loopTimeoutDuration*/) const {
// Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
- const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
- hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared)));
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared =
+ NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation)));
const auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(requestInShared)));
+ return executeInternal(hidlRequest, relocation);
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>
+PreparedModel::executeInternal(const V1_0::Request& request,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+ if (relocation.input) {
+ relocation.input->flush();
+ }
+
const auto cb = sp<ExecutionCallback>::make();
const auto scoped = kDeathHandler.protectCallback(cb.get());
- const auto ret = kPreparedModel->execute(hidlRequest, cb);
+ const auto ret = kPreparedModel->execute(request, cb);
const auto status = HANDLE_TRANSPORT_FAILURE(ret);
HANDLE_HAL_STATUS(status) << "execution failed with " << toString(status);
auto result = NN_TRY(cb->get());
- NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
- hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared)));
-
+ if (relocation.output) {
+ relocation.output->flush();
+ }
return result;
}
@@ -91,6 +105,20 @@
<< "IPreparedModel::executeFenced is not supported on 1.0 HAL service";
}
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> PreparedModel::createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming /*measure*/,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& /*loopTimeoutDuration*/) const {
+ // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
+ std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
+
+ auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
+ return Execution::create(shared_from_this(), std::move(hidlRequest), std::move(relocation));
+}
+
nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> PreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst() const {
return Burst::create(shared_from_this());
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
index f19ed77..7820c06 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/IExecutionCallback.h>
#include <gmock/gmock.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
#include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
#include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -224,6 +225,150 @@
EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
}
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecute) {
+ // setup call
+ const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute(_, _))
+ .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+ .WillRepeatedly(Invoke(makeExecute(V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE, V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute repeatedly
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ EXPECT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+ << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteLaunchError) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute(_, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecute(V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE,
+ V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteReturnError) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute(_, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(
+ makeExecute(V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE, V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteTransportFailure) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute(_, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteDeadObject) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute(_, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteCrash) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ const auto ret = [&mockPreparedModel]() -> hardware::Return<V1_0::ErrorStatus> {
+ mockPreparedModel->simulateCrash();
+ return V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE;
+ };
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute(_, _)).Times(1).WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(ret));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedNotSupported) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
TEST(PreparedModelTest, configureExecutionBurst) {
// setup test
const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.1/Device.h b/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.1/Device.h
index 3aec8ee..5e224b5 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.1/Device.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.1/Device.h
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@
const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
- bool isUpdatable() const override;
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/src/Device.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/src/Device.cpp
index d2ef57f..3197ef4 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/src/Device.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/src/Device.cpp
@@ -106,10 +106,6 @@
return nn::DeviceType::UNKNOWN;
}
-bool Device::isUpdatable() const {
- return false;
-}
-
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& Device::getSupportedExtensions() const {
return kExtensions;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.hal b/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.hal
index 03aed86..f5b6ead 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.hal
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.hal
@@ -3618,7 +3618,7 @@
* front of dimension i.
* padding[i, 1] specifies the number of elements to be padded after
* the end of dimension i.
- * * 2: An scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
+ * * 2: A scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
* For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT16}, the
* pad value must be of {@link OperandType::FLOAT16}.
* For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT32}, the
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Device.h b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Device.h
index 489f857..b4bef5e 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Device.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Device.h
@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@
const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
- bool isUpdatable() const override;
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Execution.h b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Execution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c66446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Execution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_2_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_2_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.2/IPreparedModel.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/ProtectCallback.h>
+
+#include "PreparedModel.h"
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_2::utils {
+
+class Execution final : public nn::IExecution, public std::enable_shared_from_this<Execution> {
+ struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+ public:
+ static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> create(
+ std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, V1_0::Request request,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure);
+
+ Execution(PrivateConstructorTag tag, std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel,
+ V1_0::Request request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+ V1_2::MeasureTiming measure);
+
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+ nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+ const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+ private:
+ const std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> kPreparedModel;
+ const V1_0::Request kRequest;
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation kRelocation;
+ const MeasureTiming kMeasure;
+};
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_2::utils
+
+#endif // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_2_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/ExecutionBurstController.h b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/ExecutionBurstController.h
index 9669d8c0..dae1ff3 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/ExecutionBurstController.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/ExecutionBurstController.h
@@ -28,9 +28,11 @@
#include <fmq/MessageQueue.h>
#include <hidl/MQDescriptor.h>
#include <nnapi/IBurst.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
#include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
#include <nnapi/Result.h>
#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
#include <nnapi/hal/ProtectCallback.h>
#include <atomic>
@@ -51,14 +53,14 @@
* across FMQ, making it appear to the runtime as a regular synchronous inference. Additionally,
* this class manages the burst's memory cache.
*/
-class ExecutionBurstController final : public nn::IBurst {
+class ExecutionBurstController final
+ : public nn::IBurst,
+ public std::enable_shared_from_this<ExecutionBurstController> {
struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
public:
- using FallbackFunction =
- std::function<nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>(
- const nn::Request&, nn::MeasureTiming, const nn::OptionalTimePoint&,
- const nn::OptionalDuration&)>;
+ using FallbackFunction = std::function<
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>()>;
/**
* NN runtime memory cache.
@@ -154,10 +156,10 @@
* @return ExecutionBurstController Execution burst controller object.
*/
static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController>> create(
- const sp<IPreparedModel>& preparedModel, FallbackFunction fallback,
+ nn::SharedPreparedModel preparedModel, const sp<IPreparedModel>& hidlPreparedModel,
std::chrono::microseconds pollingTimeWindow);
- ExecutionBurstController(PrivateConstructorTag tag, FallbackFunction fallback,
+ ExecutionBurstController(PrivateConstructorTag tag, nn::SharedPreparedModel preparedModel,
std::unique_ptr<RequestChannelSender> requestChannelSender,
std::unique_ptr<ResultChannelReceiver> resultChannelReceiver,
sp<ExecutionBurstCallback> callback, sp<IBurstContext> burstContext,
@@ -173,9 +175,21 @@
const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+ // See IBurst::createReusableExecution for information on this method.
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
+ // If fallback is not nullptr, this method will invoke the fallback function to try another
+ // execution path if the packet could not be sent. Otherwise, failing to send the packet will
+ // result in an error.
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeInternal(
+ const std::vector<FmqRequestDatum>& requestPacket,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation, FallbackFunction fallback) const;
+
private:
mutable std::atomic_flag mExecutionInFlight = ATOMIC_FLAG_INIT;
- const FallbackFunction kFallback;
+ const nn::SharedPreparedModel kPreparedModel;
const std::unique_ptr<RequestChannelSender> mRequestChannelSender;
const std::unique_ptr<ResultChannelReceiver> mResultChannelReceiver;
const sp<ExecutionBurstCallback> mBurstCallback;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/PreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/PreparedModel.h
index fb11130..35abd79 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/PreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/PreparedModel.h
@@ -58,10 +58,18 @@
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurst() const override;
std::any getUnderlyingResource() const override;
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeInternal(
+ const V1_0::Request& request, MeasureTiming measure,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
private:
nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeSynchronously(
const V1_0::Request& request, MeasureTiming measure) const;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Device.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Device.cpp
index 1954dfa..9fe0de2 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Device.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Device.cpp
@@ -199,10 +199,6 @@
return kDeviceType;
}
-bool Device::isUpdatable() const {
- return false;
-}
-
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& Device::getSupportedExtensions() const {
return kExtensions;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Execution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Execution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18d1c90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Execution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "Execution.h"
+
+#include "Callbacks.h"
+#include "Conversions.h"
+#include "Utils.h"
+
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.1/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.2/IPreparedModel.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/HandleError.h>
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_2::utils {
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> Execution::create(
+ std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, V1_0::Request request,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure) {
+ if (preparedModel == nullptr) {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "V1_2::utils::Execution::create must have non-null preparedModel";
+ }
+
+ return std::make_shared<const Execution>(PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(preparedModel),
+ std::move(request), std::move(relocation), measure);
+}
+
+Execution::Execution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/,
+ std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, V1_0::Request request,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure)
+ : kPreparedModel(std::move(preparedModel)),
+ kRequest(std::move(request)),
+ kRelocation(std::move(relocation)),
+ kMeasure(measure) {}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> Execution::compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/) const {
+ return kPreparedModel->executeInternal(kRequest, kMeasure, kRelocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> Execution::computeFenced(
+ const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& /*waitFor*/, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& /*timeoutDurationAfterFence*/) const {
+ return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE)
+ << "IExecution::computeFenced is not supported on 1.2 HAL service";
+}
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_2::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/ExecutionBurstController.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/ExecutionBurstController.cpp
index 7a17f25..b4b6f68 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/ExecutionBurstController.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/ExecutionBurstController.cpp
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <nnapi/Types.h>
#include <nnapi/Validation.h>
#include <nnapi/hal/1.0/Conversions.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
#include <nnapi/hal/HandleError.h>
#include <nnapi/hal/ProtectCallback.h>
#include <nnapi/hal/TransferValue.h>
@@ -50,6 +51,35 @@
namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_2::utils {
namespace {
+class BurstExecution final : public nn::IExecution,
+ public std::enable_shared_from_this<BurstExecution> {
+ struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+ public:
+ static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const BurstExecution>> create(
+ std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController> controller,
+ std::vector<FmqRequestDatum> request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+ std::vector<ExecutionBurstController::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds);
+
+ BurstExecution(PrivateConstructorTag tag,
+ std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController> controller,
+ std::vector<FmqRequestDatum> request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+ std::vector<ExecutionBurstController::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds);
+
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+ nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+ const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+ private:
+ const std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController> kController;
+ const std::vector<FmqRequestDatum> kRequest;
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation kRelocation;
+ const std::vector<ExecutionBurstController::OptionalCacheHold> kCacheHolds;
+};
+
nn::GeneralResult<sp<IBurstContext>> executionBurstResultCallback(
V1_0::ErrorStatus status, const sp<IBurstContext>& burstContext) {
HANDLE_HAL_STATUS(status) << "IPreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst failed with status "
@@ -209,10 +239,10 @@
// ExecutionBurstController methods
nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController>> ExecutionBurstController::create(
- const sp<V1_2::IPreparedModel>& preparedModel, FallbackFunction fallback,
+ nn::SharedPreparedModel preparedModel, const sp<V1_2::IPreparedModel>& hidlPreparedModel,
std::chrono::microseconds pollingTimeWindow) {
// check inputs
- if (preparedModel == nullptr) {
+ if (preparedModel == nullptr || hidlPreparedModel == nullptr) {
return NN_ERROR() << "ExecutionBurstController::create passed a nullptr";
}
@@ -236,7 +266,7 @@
auto cb = hal::utils::CallbackValue(executionBurstResultCallback);
// configure burst
- const Return<void> ret = preparedModel->configureExecutionBurst(
+ const Return<void> ret = hidlPreparedModel->configureExecutionBurst(
burstCallback, *requestChannelDescriptor, *resultChannelDescriptor, cb);
HANDLE_TRANSPORT_FAILURE(ret);
@@ -250,18 +280,18 @@
// make and return controller
return std::make_shared<const ExecutionBurstController>(
- PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(fallback), std::move(requestChannelSender),
+ PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(preparedModel), std::move(requestChannelSender),
std::move(resultChannelReceiver), std::move(burstCallback), std::move(burstContext),
std::move(memoryCache), std::move(deathHandler));
}
ExecutionBurstController::ExecutionBurstController(
- PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/, FallbackFunction fallback,
+ PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/, nn::SharedPreparedModel preparedModel,
std::unique_ptr<RequestChannelSender> requestChannelSender,
std::unique_ptr<ResultChannelReceiver> resultChannelReceiver,
sp<ExecutionBurstCallback> callback, sp<IBurstContext> burstContext,
std::shared_ptr<MemoryCache> memoryCache, neuralnetworks::utils::DeathHandler deathHandler)
- : kFallback(std::move(fallback)),
+ : kPreparedModel(std::move(preparedModel)),
mRequestChannelSender(std::move(requestChannelSender)),
mResultChannelReceiver(std::move(resultChannelReceiver)),
mBurstCallback(std::move(callback)),
@@ -283,26 +313,98 @@
// systraces. Note that the first point we can begin collecting systraces in
// ExecutionBurstServer is when the RequestChannelReceiver realizes there is data in the FMQ, so
// ExecutionBurstServer collects systraces at different points in the code.
- NNTRACE_FULL(NNTRACE_LAYER_IPC, NNTRACE_PHASE_EXECUTION, "ExecutionBurstController::execute");
+ NNTRACE_RT(NNTRACE_PHASE_EXECUTION, "ExecutionBurstController::execute");
// if the request is valid but of a higher version than what's supported in burst execution,
// fall back to another execution path
if (const auto version = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(nn::validate(request)));
version > nn::Version::ANDROID_Q) {
// fallback to another execution path if the packet could not be sent
- if (kFallback) {
- return kFallback(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
- }
- return NN_ERROR() << "Request object has features not supported by IBurst::execute";
+ return kPreparedModel->execute(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
}
+ // ensure that request is ready for IPC
+ std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared =
+ NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation)));
+
// clear pools field of request, as they will be provided via slots
- const auto requestWithoutPools =
- nn::Request{.inputs = request.inputs, .outputs = request.outputs, .pools = {}};
+ const auto requestWithoutPools = nn::Request{
+ .inputs = requestInShared.inputs, .outputs = requestInShared.outputs, .pools = {}};
auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(
hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(V1_0::utils::unvalidatedConvert(requestWithoutPools)));
const auto hidlMeasure = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(measure)));
+ std::vector<int32_t> slots;
+ std::vector<OptionalCacheHold> holds;
+ slots.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+ holds.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+ for (const auto& memoryPool : requestInShared.pools) {
+ auto [slot, hold] = mMemoryCache->cacheMemory(std::get<nn::SharedMemory>(memoryPool));
+ slots.push_back(slot);
+ holds.push_back(std::move(hold));
+ }
+
+ // send request packet
+ const auto requestPacket = serialize(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, slots);
+ const auto fallback = [this, &request, measure, &deadline, &loopTimeoutDuration] {
+ return kPreparedModel->execute(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
+ };
+ return executeInternal(requestPacket, relocation, fallback);
+}
+
+// See IBurst::createReusableExecution for information on this method.
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> ExecutionBurstController::createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+ NNTRACE_RT(NNTRACE_PHASE_EXECUTION, "ExecutionBurstController::createReusableExecution");
+
+ // if the request is valid but of a higher version than what's supported in burst execution,
+ // fall back to another execution path
+ if (const auto version = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeGeneralFailure(nn::validate(request)));
+ version > nn::Version::ANDROID_Q) {
+ // fallback to another execution path if the packet could not be sent
+ return kPreparedModel->createReusableExecution(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+ }
+
+ // ensure that request is ready for IPC
+ std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
+
+ // clear pools field of request, as they will be provided via slots
+ const auto requestWithoutPools = nn::Request{
+ .inputs = requestInShared.inputs, .outputs = requestInShared.outputs, .pools = {}};
+ auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(V1_0::utils::unvalidatedConvert(requestWithoutPools));
+ const auto hidlMeasure = NN_TRY(convert(measure));
+
+ std::vector<int32_t> slots;
+ std::vector<OptionalCacheHold> holds;
+ slots.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+ holds.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+ for (const auto& memoryPool : requestInShared.pools) {
+ auto [slot, hold] = mMemoryCache->cacheMemory(std::get<nn::SharedMemory>(memoryPool));
+ slots.push_back(slot);
+ holds.push_back(std::move(hold));
+ }
+
+ const auto requestPacket = serialize(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, slots);
+ return BurstExecution::create(shared_from_this(), std::move(requestPacket),
+ std::move(relocation), std::move(holds));
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>
+ExecutionBurstController::executeInternal(const std::vector<FmqRequestDatum>& requestPacket,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation,
+ FallbackFunction fallback) const {
+ NNTRACE_FULL(NNTRACE_LAYER_IPC, NNTRACE_PHASE_EXECUTION,
+ "ExecutionBurstController::executeInternal");
+
// Ensure that at most one execution is in flight at any given time.
const bool alreadyInFlight = mExecutionInFlight.test_and_set();
if (alreadyInFlight) {
@@ -310,22 +412,16 @@
}
const auto guard = base::make_scope_guard([this] { mExecutionInFlight.clear(); });
- std::vector<int32_t> slots;
- std::vector<OptionalCacheHold> holds;
- slots.reserve(request.pools.size());
- holds.reserve(request.pools.size());
- for (const auto& memoryPool : request.pools) {
- auto [slot, hold] = mMemoryCache->cacheMemory(std::get<nn::SharedMemory>(memoryPool));
- slots.push_back(slot);
- holds.push_back(std::move(hold));
+ if (relocation.input) {
+ relocation.input->flush();
}
// send request packet
- const auto sendStatus = mRequestChannelSender->send(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, slots);
+ const auto sendStatus = mRequestChannelSender->sendPacket(requestPacket);
if (!sendStatus.ok()) {
// fallback to another execution path if the packet could not be sent
- if (kFallback) {
- return kFallback(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
+ if (fallback) {
+ return fallback();
}
return NN_ERROR() << "Error sending FMQ packet: " << sendStatus.error();
}
@@ -333,7 +429,47 @@
// get result packet
const auto [status, outputShapes, timing] =
NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(mResultChannelReceiver->getBlocking()));
+
+ if (relocation.output) {
+ relocation.output->flush();
+ }
return executionCallback(status, outputShapes, timing);
}
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const BurstExecution>> BurstExecution::create(
+ std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController> controller,
+ std::vector<FmqRequestDatum> request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+ std::vector<ExecutionBurstController::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds) {
+ if (controller == nullptr) {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "V1_2::utils::BurstExecution::create must have non-null controller";
+ }
+
+ return std::make_shared<const BurstExecution>(PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(controller),
+ std::move(request), std::move(relocation),
+ std::move(cacheHolds));
+}
+
+BurstExecution::BurstExecution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/,
+ std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController> controller,
+ std::vector<FmqRequestDatum> request,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+ std::vector<ExecutionBurstController::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds)
+ : kController(std::move(controller)),
+ kRequest(std::move(request)),
+ kRelocation(std::move(relocation)),
+ kCacheHolds(std::move(cacheHolds)) {}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> BurstExecution::compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/) const {
+ return kController->executeInternal(kRequest, kRelocation, /*fallback=*/nullptr);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+BurstExecution::computeFenced(const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& /*waitFor*/,
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& /*timeoutDurationAfterFence*/) const {
+ return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE)
+ << "IExecution::computeFenced is not supported on burst object";
+}
+
} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_2::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
index b209a44..d0ef36e 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include "Callbacks.h"
#include "Conversions.h"
+#include "Execution.h"
#include "ExecutionBurstController.h"
#include "ExecutionBurstUtils.h"
#include "Utils.h"
@@ -93,19 +94,32 @@
const nn::OptionalDuration& /*loopTimeoutDuration*/) const {
// Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
- const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
- hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared)));
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared =
+ NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation)));
const auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(requestInShared)));
const auto hidlMeasure = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(measure)));
- auto result = kExecuteSynchronously ? executeSynchronously(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure)
- : executeAsynchronously(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure);
+ return executeInternal(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, relocation);
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>
+PreparedModel::executeInternal(const V1_0::Request& request, MeasureTiming measure,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+ if (relocation.input) {
+ relocation.input->flush();
+ }
+
+ auto result = kExecuteSynchronously ? executeSynchronously(request, measure)
+ : executeAsynchronously(request, measure);
auto [outputShapes, timing] = NN_TRY(std::move(result));
- NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
- hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared)));
-
+ if (relocation.output) {
+ relocation.output->flush();
+ }
return std::make_pair(std::move(outputShapes), timing);
}
@@ -120,6 +134,22 @@
<< "IPreparedModel::executeFenced is not supported on 1.2 HAL service";
}
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> PreparedModel::createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& /*loopTimeoutDuration*/) const {
+ // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
+ std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
+
+ auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
+ auto hidlMeasure = NN_TRY(convert(measure));
+ return Execution::create(shared_from_this(), std::move(hidlRequest), std::move(relocation),
+ hidlMeasure);
+}
+
nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> PreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst() const {
auto self = shared_from_this();
auto fallback = [preparedModel = std::move(self)](
@@ -130,7 +160,7 @@
return preparedModel->execute(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
};
const auto pollingTimeWindow = getBurstControllerPollingTimeWindow();
- return ExecutionBurstController::create(kPreparedModel, std::move(fallback), pollingTimeWindow);
+ return ExecutionBurstController::create(shared_from_this(), kPreparedModel, pollingTimeWindow);
}
std::any PreparedModel::getUnderlyingResource() const {
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
index d297b1a..5e2ad79 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.2/IExecutionCallback.h>
#include <gmock/gmock.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
#include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
#include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -334,6 +335,248 @@
EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
}
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSync) {
+ // setup call
+ const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _))
+ .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+ .WillRepeatedly(
+ Invoke(makeExecuteSynchronously(V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute repeatedly
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ EXPECT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+ << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncError) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(
+ makeExecuteSynchronously(V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncTransportFailure) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncDeadObject) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsync) {
+ // setup call
+ const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_2(_, _, _))
+ .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+ .WillRepeatedly(Invoke(makeExecuteAsynchronously(
+ V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE, V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute repeatedly
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ EXPECT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+ << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncLaunchError) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_2(_, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecuteAsynchronously(V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE,
+ V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {},
+ kNoTiming)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncReturnError) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_2(_, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecuteAsynchronously(
+ V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE, V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncTransportFailure) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_2(_, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncDeadObject) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_2(_, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncCrash) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+ const auto ret = [&mockPreparedModel]() -> hardware::Return<V1_0::ErrorStatus> {
+ mockPreparedModel->simulateCrash();
+ return V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE;
+ };
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_2(_, _, _)).Times(1).WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(ret));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedNotSupported) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
TEST(PreparedModelTest, configureExecutionBurst) {
// setup test
const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.hal b/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.hal
index a5dbd5e..a26b858 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.hal
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.hal
@@ -3834,7 +3834,7 @@
* front of dimension i.
* padding[i, 1] specifies the number of elements to be padded after
* the end of dimension i.
- * * 2: An scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
+ * * 2: A scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
* For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT16}, the
* pad value must be of {@link OperandType::FLOAT16}.
* For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT32}, the
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Device.h b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Device.h
index f36b6c0..84f606a 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Device.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Device.h
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@
const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
- bool isUpdatable() const override;
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Execution.h b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Execution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06c33d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Execution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_3_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_3_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+
+#include "PreparedModel.h"
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_3::utils {
+
+class Execution final : public nn::IExecution, public std::enable_shared_from_this<Execution> {
+ struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+ public:
+ static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> create(
+ std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure,
+ OptionalTimeoutDuration loopTimeoutDuration);
+
+ Execution(PrivateConstructorTag tag, std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel,
+ Request request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+ V1_2::MeasureTiming measure, OptionalTimeoutDuration loopTimeoutDuration);
+
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+ nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+ const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+ private:
+ const std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> kPreparedModel;
+ const Request kRequest;
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation kRelocation;
+ const V1_2::MeasureTiming kMeasure;
+ const OptionalTimeoutDuration kLoopTimeoutDuration;
+};
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_3::utils
+
+#endif // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_3_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/PreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/PreparedModel.h
index 690fecc..5acba71 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/PreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/PreparedModel.h
@@ -57,10 +57,26 @@
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurst() const override;
std::any getUnderlyingResource() const override;
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeInternal(
+ const Request& request, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure, const OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const OptionalTimeoutDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
+ nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+ executeFencedInternal(const Request& request, const hidl_vec<hidl_handle>& waitFor,
+ V1_2::MeasureTiming measure, const OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const OptionalTimeoutDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
+ const OptionalTimeoutDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
private:
nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeSynchronously(
const Request& request, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure, const OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Conversions.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Conversions.cpp
index e8a4f55..11225cf 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Conversions.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Conversions.cpp
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@
using Discriminator = hal::V1_3::Request::MemoryPool::hidl_discriminator;
switch (memoryPool.getDiscriminator()) {
case Discriminator::hidlMemory:
- return hal::utils::createSharedMemoryFromHidlMemory(memoryPool.hidlMemory());
+ return unvalidatedConvert(memoryPool.hidlMemory());
case Discriminator::token:
return static_cast<Request::MemoryDomainToken>(memoryPool.token());
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Device.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Device.cpp
index 87c9f32..d710b85 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Device.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Device.cpp
@@ -150,10 +150,6 @@
return kDeviceType;
}
-bool Device::isUpdatable() const {
- return false;
-}
-
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& Device::getSupportedExtensions() const {
return kExtensions;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Execution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Execution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d17cc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Execution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "Execution.h"
+
+#include "Conversions.h"
+#include "PreparedModel.h"
+#include "Utils.h"
+
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.1/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.3/IPreparedModel.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/HandleError.h>
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_3::utils {
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> Execution::create(
+ std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure,
+ OptionalTimeoutDuration loopTimeoutDuration) {
+ if (preparedModel == nullptr) {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "V1_3::utils::Execution::create must have non-null preparedModel";
+ }
+
+ return std::make_shared<const Execution>(PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(preparedModel),
+ std::move(request), std::move(relocation), measure,
+ std::move(loopTimeoutDuration));
+}
+
+Execution::Execution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/,
+ std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure,
+ OptionalTimeoutDuration loopTimeoutDuration)
+ : kPreparedModel(std::move(preparedModel)),
+ kRequest(std::move(request)),
+ kRelocation(std::move(relocation)),
+ kMeasure(measure),
+ kLoopTimeoutDuration(std::move(loopTimeoutDuration)) {}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> Execution::compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const {
+ const auto hidlDeadline = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(deadline)));
+ return kPreparedModel->executeInternal(kRequest, kMeasure, hidlDeadline, kLoopTimeoutDuration,
+ kRelocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> Execution::computeFenced(
+ const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const {
+ const auto hidlWaitFor = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertSyncFences(waitFor));
+ const auto hidlDeadline = NN_TRY(convert(deadline));
+ const auto hidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence = NN_TRY(convert(timeoutDurationAfterFence));
+ return kPreparedModel->executeFencedInternal(kRequest, hidlWaitFor, kMeasure, hidlDeadline,
+ kLoopTimeoutDuration,
+ hidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence, kRelocation);
+}
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_3::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
index fd7f8f2..1623de5 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include "Callbacks.h"
#include "Conversions.h"
+#include "Execution.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/types.h>
@@ -139,8 +140,11 @@
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
// Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
- const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
- hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared)));
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared =
+ NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation)));
const auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(requestInShared)));
const auto hidlMeasure = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(measure)));
@@ -148,16 +152,27 @@
const auto hidlLoopTimeoutDuration =
NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(loopTimeoutDuration)));
+ return executeInternal(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, hidlDeadline, hidlLoopTimeoutDuration,
+ relocation);
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>
+PreparedModel::executeInternal(const Request& request, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const OptionalTimeoutDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+ if (relocation.input) {
+ relocation.input->flush();
+ }
+
auto result = kExecuteSynchronously
- ? executeSynchronously(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, hidlDeadline,
- hidlLoopTimeoutDuration)
- : executeAsynchronously(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, hidlDeadline,
- hidlLoopTimeoutDuration);
+ ? executeSynchronously(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration)
+ : executeAsynchronously(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
auto [outputShapes, timing] = NN_TRY(std::move(result));
- NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
- hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared)));
-
+ if (relocation.output) {
+ relocation.output->flush();
+ }
return std::make_pair(std::move(outputShapes), timing);
}
@@ -168,8 +183,10 @@
const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const {
// Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
- const nn::Request& requestInShared =
- NN_TRY(hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared));
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
const auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
const auto hidlWaitFor = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertSyncFences(waitFor));
@@ -178,27 +195,59 @@
const auto hidlLoopTimeoutDuration = NN_TRY(convert(loopTimeoutDuration));
const auto hidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence = NN_TRY(convert(timeoutDurationAfterFence));
+ return executeFencedInternal(hidlRequest, hidlWaitFor, hidlMeasure, hidlDeadline,
+ hidlLoopTimeoutDuration, hidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence,
+ relocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+PreparedModel::executeFencedInternal(const Request& request, const hidl_vec<hidl_handle>& waitFor,
+ V1_2::MeasureTiming measure, const OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const OptionalTimeoutDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
+ const OptionalTimeoutDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+ if (relocation.input) {
+ relocation.input->flush();
+ }
+
auto cb = hal::utils::CallbackValue(fencedExecutionCallback);
- const auto ret = kPreparedModel->executeFenced(hidlRequest, hidlWaitFor, hidlMeasure,
- hidlDeadline, hidlLoopTimeoutDuration,
- hidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence, cb);
+ const auto ret =
+ kPreparedModel->executeFenced(request, waitFor, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration,
+ timeoutDurationAfterFence, cb);
HANDLE_TRANSPORT_FAILURE(ret);
auto [syncFence, callback] = NN_TRY(cb.take());
// If executeFenced required the request memory to be moved into shared memory, block here until
// the fenced execution has completed and flush the memory back.
- if (maybeRequestInShared.has_value()) {
+ if (relocation.output) {
const auto state = syncFence.syncWait({});
if (state != nn::SyncFence::FenceState::SIGNALED) {
return NN_ERROR() << "syncWait failed with " << state;
}
- NN_TRY(hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared));
+ relocation.output->flush();
}
return std::make_pair(std::move(syncFence), std::move(callback));
}
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> PreparedModel::createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+ // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
+ std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
+
+ auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
+ auto hidlMeasure = NN_TRY(convert(measure));
+ auto hidlLoopTimeoutDuration = NN_TRY(convert(loopTimeoutDuration));
+ return Execution::create(shared_from_this(), std::move(hidlRequest), std::move(relocation),
+ hidlMeasure, std::move(hidlLoopTimeoutDuration));
+}
+
nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> PreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst() const {
auto self = shared_from_this();
auto fallback = [preparedModel = std::move(self)](
@@ -209,7 +258,7 @@
return preparedModel->execute(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
};
const auto pollingTimeWindow = V1_2::utils::getBurstControllerPollingTimeWindow();
- return V1_2::utils::ExecutionBurstController::create(kPreparedModel, std::move(fallback),
+ return V1_2::utils::ExecutionBurstController::create(shared_from_this(), kPreparedModel,
pollingTimeWindow);
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
index 5303c2a..6dbbd6b 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.3/IFencedExecutionCallback.h>
#include <gmock/gmock.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
#include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
#include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -462,6 +463,363 @@
EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
}
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSync) {
+ // setup call
+ const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+ .WillRepeatedly(
+ Invoke(makeExecuteSynchronously(V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute repeatedly
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ EXPECT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+ << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncError) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(
+ makeExecuteSynchronously(V1_3::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncTransportFailure) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncDeadObject) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsync) {
+ // setup call
+ const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+ .WillRepeatedly(Invoke(makeExecuteAsynchronously(
+ V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE, V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute repeatedly
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ EXPECT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+ << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncLaunchError) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecuteAsynchronously(V1_3::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE,
+ V1_3::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {},
+ kNoTiming)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncReturnError) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecuteAsynchronously(
+ V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE, V1_3::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = preparedModel->execute({}, {}, {}, {});
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncTransportFailure) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncDeadObject) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncCrash) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+ const auto ret = [&mockPreparedModel]() -> hardware::Return<V1_3::ErrorStatus> {
+ mockPreparedModel->simulateCrash();
+ return V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE;
+ };
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(ret));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFenced) {
+ // setup call
+ const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+ const auto mockCallback = MockFencedExecutionCallback::create();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockCallback, getExecutionInfo(_))
+ .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+ .WillRepeatedly(Invoke(makeExecuteFencedCallbackReturn(V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE,
+ kNoTiming, kNoTiming)));
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+ .WillRepeatedly(
+ Invoke(makeExecuteFencedReturn(V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE, {}, mockCallback)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute repeatedly
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+ << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+ const auto& [syncFence, callback] = computeResult.value();
+ EXPECT_EQ(syncFence.syncWait({}), nn::SyncFence::FenceState::SIGNALED);
+ ASSERT_NE(callback, nullptr);
+
+ // get results from callback
+ const auto callbackResult = callback();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(callbackResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << callbackResult.error().code
+ << ": " << callbackResult.error().message;
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedCallbackError) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+ const auto mockCallback = MockFencedExecutionCallback::create();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockCallback, getExecutionInfo(_))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecuteFencedCallbackReturn(V1_3::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE,
+ kNoTiming, kNoTiming)));
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecuteFencedReturn(V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE, {}, mockCallback)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code << ": "
+ << computeResult.error().message;
+ const auto& [syncFence, callback] = computeResult.value();
+ EXPECT_NE(syncFence.syncWait({}), nn::SyncFence::FenceState::ACTIVE);
+ ASSERT_NE(callback, nullptr);
+
+ // verify callback failure
+ const auto callbackResult = callback();
+ ASSERT_FALSE(callbackResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(callbackResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedError) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(
+ makeExecuteFencedReturn(V1_3::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {}, nullptr)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedTransportFailure) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedDeadObject) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+ const auto preparedModel =
+ PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
TEST(PreparedModelTest, configureExecutionBurst) {
// setup test
const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl
index 634f39e..eb3d0b0 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl
@@ -34,6 +34,6 @@
package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
@VintfStability
interface IBurst {
- android.hardware.neuralnetworks.ExecutionResult executeSynchronously(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Request request, in long[] memoryIdentifierTokens, in boolean measureTiming, in long deadline, in long loopTimeoutDuration);
+ android.hardware.neuralnetworks.ExecutionResult executeSynchronously(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Request request, in long[] memoryIdentifierTokens, in boolean measureTiming, in long deadlineNs, in long loopTimeoutDurationNs);
void releaseMemoryResource(in long memoryIdentifierToken);
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl
index b328b29..c9c67f2 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl
@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@
boolean[] getSupportedOperations(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Model model);
android.hardware.neuralnetworks.DeviceType getType();
String getVersionString();
- void prepareModel(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Model model, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.ExecutionPreference preference, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Priority priority, in long deadline, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] dataCache, in byte[] token, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.IPreparedModelCallback callback);
- void prepareModelFromCache(in long deadline, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] dataCache, in byte[] token, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.IPreparedModelCallback callback);
+ void prepareModel(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Model model, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.ExecutionPreference preference, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Priority priority, in long deadlineNs, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] dataCache, in byte[] token, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.IPreparedModelCallback callback);
+ void prepareModelFromCache(in long deadlineNs, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] dataCache, in byte[] token, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.IPreparedModelCallback callback);
const int BYTE_SIZE_OF_CACHE_TOKEN = 32;
const int MAX_NUMBER_OF_CACHE_FILES = 32;
const int EXTENSION_TYPE_HIGH_BITS_PREFIX = 15;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl
index 52882cd..fccb5dc 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
@VintfStability
interface IPreparedModel {
- android.hardware.neuralnetworks.ExecutionResult executeSynchronously(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Request request, in boolean measureTiming, in long deadline, in long loopTimeoutDuration);
- android.hardware.neuralnetworks.FencedExecutionResult executeFenced(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Request request, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] waitFor, in boolean measureTiming, in long deadline, in long loopTimeoutDuration, in long duration);
+ android.hardware.neuralnetworks.ExecutionResult executeSynchronously(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Request request, in boolean measureTiming, in long deadlineNs, in long loopTimeoutDurationNs);
+ android.hardware.neuralnetworks.FencedExecutionResult executeFenced(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Request request, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] waitFor, in boolean measureTiming, in long deadlineNs, in long loopTimeoutDurationNs, in long durationNs);
android.hardware.neuralnetworks.IBurst configureExecutionBurst();
const long DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS = 2000000000;
const long MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS = 15000000000;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
index 5a9f4ff..1d9bdd8 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
@@ -34,11 +34,11 @@
package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
@VintfStability
parcelable Operand {
- android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType type;
+ android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType type = android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType.FLOAT32;
int[] dimensions;
float scale;
int zeroPoint;
- android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandLifeTime lifetime;
+ android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandLifeTime lifetime = android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandLifeTime.TEMPORARY_VARIABLE;
android.hardware.neuralnetworks.DataLocation location;
@nullable android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandExtraParams extraParams;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
index de93d8b..ebb361b 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
@@ -34,6 +34,6 @@
package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
@VintfStability
parcelable OperandPerformance {
- android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType type;
+ android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType type = android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType.FLOAT32;
android.hardware.neuralnetworks.PerformanceInfo info;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
index 33fcd60..a4a3fbe 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
@VintfStability
parcelable Operation {
- android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperationType type;
+ android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperationType type = android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperationType.ADD;
int[] inputs;
int[] outputs;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl
index 9690e01..bcc83cf 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl
@@ -34,6 +34,6 @@
package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
@VintfStability
parcelable Timing {
- long timeOnDevice;
- long timeInDriver;
+ long timeOnDeviceNs;
+ long timeInDriverNs;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl
index 85d2a03..decdc48 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl
@@ -77,18 +77,18 @@
* @param measure Specifies whether or not to measure duration of the execution. The duration
* runs from the time the driver sees the call to the executeSynchronously
* function to the time the driver returns from the function.
- * @param deadline The time by which the execution is expected to complete. The time is measured
- * in nanoseconds since epoch of the steady clock (as from
- * std::chrono::steady_clock). If the execution cannot be finished by the
- * deadline, the execution may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline is
- * omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
- * @param loopTimeoutDuration The maximum amount of time in nanoseconds that should be spent
- * executing a {@link OperationType::WHILE} operation. If a loop
- * condition model does not output false within this duration, the
- * execution must be aborted. If -1 is provided, the maximum amount
- * of time is {@link DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}. Other
- * negative values are invalid. When provided, the duration must not
- * exceed {@link MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}.
+ * @param deadlineNs The time by which the execution is expected to complete. The time is
+ * measured in nanoseconds since epoch of the steady clock (as from
+ * std::chrono::steady_clock). If the execution cannot be finished by the
+ * deadline, the execution may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline is
+ * omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
+ * @param loopTimeoutDurationNs The maximum amount of time in nanoseconds that should be spent
+ * executing a {@link OperationType::WHILE} operation. If a loop
+ * condition model does not output false within this duration, the
+ * execution must be aborted. If -1 is provided, the maximum amount
+ * of time is {@link DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}. Other
+ * negative values are invalid. When provided, the duration must
+ * not exceed {@link MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}.
* @return ExecutionResult parcelable, containing the status of the execution, output shapes and
* timing information.
* @throws ServiceSpecificException with one of the following ErrorStatus values:
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@
* - RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED_* if the task was aborted by the driver
*/
ExecutionResult executeSynchronously(in Request request, in long[] memoryIdentifierTokens,
- in boolean measureTiming, in long deadline, in long loopTimeoutDuration);
+ in boolean measureTiming, in long deadlineNs, in long loopTimeoutDurationNs);
/**
* releaseMemoryResource is used by the client to signal to the service that a memory buffer
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl
index c5b4ab1..72e2623 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl
@@ -306,11 +306,11 @@
* @param preference Indicates the intended execution behavior of a prepared model.
* @param priority The priority of the prepared model relative to other prepared models owned by
* the client.
- * @param deadline The time by which the model is expected to be prepared. The time is measured
- * in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts)
- * or ::android::base::boot_clock). If the model cannot be prepared by the
- * deadline, the preparation may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline is
- * omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
+ * @param deadlineNs The time by which the model is expected to be prepared. The time is
+ * measured in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME,
+ * &ts) or ::android::base::boot_clock). If the model cannot be prepared by
+ * the deadline, the preparation may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline
+ * is omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
* @param modelCache A vector of file descriptors for the security-sensitive cache. The length
* of the vector must either be 0 indicating that caching information is not
* provided, or match the numModelCache returned from
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@
* - RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED_* if the task was aborted by the driver
*/
void prepareModel(in Model model, in ExecutionPreference preference, in Priority priority,
- in long deadline, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache,
+ in long deadlineNs, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache,
in ParcelFileDescriptor[] dataCache, in byte[] token,
in IPreparedModelCallback callback);
@@ -395,11 +395,11 @@
* with a set of inputs to the model. Note that the same prepared model object may be used with
* different shapes of inputs on different (possibly concurrent) executions.
*
- * @param deadline The time by which the model is expected to be prepared. The time is measured
- * in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) or
- * ::android::base::boot_clock). If the model cannot be prepared by the
- * deadline, the preparation may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline is
- * omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
+ * @param deadlineNs The time by which the model is expected to be prepared. The time is
+ * measured in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME,
+ * &ts) or ::android::base::boot_clock). If the model cannot be prepared by
+ * the deadline, the preparation may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline
+ * is omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
* @param modelCache A vector of file descriptors for the security-sensitive cache. The length
* of the vector must match the numModelCache returned from
* getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded. The cache file descriptors will be provided in
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@
* the deadline
* - RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED_* if the task was aborted by the driver
*/
- void prepareModelFromCache(in long deadline, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache,
+ void prepareModelFromCache(in long deadlineNs, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache,
in ParcelFileDescriptor[] dataCache, in byte[] token,
in IPreparedModelCallback callback);
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl
index bfab906..956b626 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl
@@ -72,18 +72,18 @@
* @param measure Specifies whether or not to measure duration of the execution. The duration
* runs from the time the driver sees the call to the executeSynchronously
* function to the time the driver returns from the function.
- * @param deadline The time by which the execution is expected to complete. The time is measured
- * in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) or
- * ::android::base::boot_clock). If the execution cannot be finished by the
- * deadline, the execution may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline is
- * omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
- * @param loopTimeoutDuration The maximum amount of time in nanoseconds that should be spent
- * executing a {@link OperationType::WHILE} operation. If a loop
- * condition model does not output false within this duration, the
- * execution must be aborted. If -1 is provided, the maximum amount
- * of time is {@link DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}. Other
- * negative values are invalid. When provided, the duration must not
- * exceed {@link MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}.
+ * @param deadlineNs The time by which the execution is expected to complete. The time is
+ * measured in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME,
+ * &ts) or ::android::base::boot_clock). If the execution cannot be finished
+ * by the deadline, the execution may be aborted. Passing -1 means the
+ * deadline is omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
+ * @param loopTimeoutDurationNs The maximum amount of time in nanoseconds that should be spent
+ * executing a {@link OperationType::WHILE} operation. If a loop
+ * condition model does not output false within this duration, the
+ * execution must be aborted. If -1 is provided, the maximum amount
+ * of time is {@link DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}. Other
+ * negative values are invalid. When provided, the duration must
+ * not exceed {@link MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}.
* @return ExecutionResult parcelable, containing the status of the execution, output shapes and
* timing information.
* @throws ServiceSpecificException with one of the following ErrorStatus values:
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
* - RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED_* if the task was aborted by the driver
*/
ExecutionResult executeSynchronously(in Request request, in boolean measureTiming,
- in long deadline, in long loopTimeoutDuration);
+ in long deadlineNs, in long loopTimeoutDurationNs);
/**
* Launch a fenced asynchronous execution on a prepared model.
@@ -137,22 +137,23 @@
* @param waitFor A vector of sync fence file descriptors. Execution must not start until all
* sync fences have been signaled.
* @param measure Specifies whether or not to measure duration of the execution.
- * @param deadline The time by which the execution is expected to complete. The time is measured
- * in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) or
- * ::android::base::boot_clock). If the execution cannot be finished by the
- * deadline, the execution may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline is
- * omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
- * @param loopTimeoutDuration The maximum amount of time in nanoseconds that should be spent
- * executing a {@link OperationType::WHILE} operation. If a loop
- * condition model does not output false within this duration, the
- * execution must be aborted. If -1 is provided, the maximum amount
- * of time is {@link DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}. Other
- * negative values are invalid. When provided, the duration must not
- * exceed {@link MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}.
- * @param duration The length of time in nanoseconds within which the execution is expected to
- * complete after all sync fences in waitFor are signaled. If the execution
- * cannot be finished within the duration, the execution may be aborted. Passing
- * -1 means the duration is omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
+ * @param deadlineNs The time by which the execution is expected to complete. The time is
+ * measured in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME,
+ * &ts) or ::android::base::boot_clock). If the execution cannot be finished
+ * by the deadline, the execution may be aborted. Passing -1 means the
+ * deadline is omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
+ * @param loopTimeoutDurationNs The maximum amount of time in nanoseconds that should be spent
+ * executing a {@link OperationType::WHILE} operation. If a loop
+ * condition model does not output false within this duration, the
+ * execution must be aborted. If -1 is provided, the maximum amount
+ * of time is {@link DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}. Other
+ * negative values are invalid. When provided, the duration must
+ * not exceed {@link MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}.
+ * @param durationNs The length of time in nanoseconds within which the execution is expected to
+ * complete after all sync fences in waitFor are signaled. If the execution
+ * cannot be finished within the duration, the execution may be aborted.
+ * Passing -1 means the duration is omitted. Other negative values are
+ * invalid.
* @return The FencedExecutionResult parcelable, containing IFencedExecutionCallback and the
* sync fence.
* @throws ServiceSpecificException with one of the following ErrorStatus values:
@@ -165,8 +166,8 @@
* - RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED_* if the task was aborted by the driver
*/
FencedExecutionResult executeFenced(in Request request, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] waitFor,
- in boolean measureTiming, in long deadline, in long loopTimeoutDuration,
- in long duration);
+ in boolean measureTiming, in long deadlineNs, in long loopTimeoutDurationNs,
+ in long durationNs);
/**
* Configure a Burst object used to execute multiple inferences on a prepared model in rapid
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
index 4d2260f..998e06d 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
* {@link IDevice::OPERAND_TYPE_BASE_MAX} is possible and should be interpreted as an extension
* type according to {@link Model::extensionNameToPrefix}.
*/
- OperandType type;
+ OperandType type = OperandType.FLOAT32;
/**
* Dimensions of the operand.
*
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
/**
* How the operand is used.
*/
- OperandLifeTime lifetime;
+ OperandLifeTime lifetime = OperandLifeTime.TEMPORARY_VARIABLE;
/**
* Where to find the data for this operand.
* If the lifetime is TEMPORARY_VARIABLE, SUBGRAPH_INPUT, SUBGRAPH_OUTPUT, or NO_VALUE:
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
index 7fd86f9..7f53967 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
@@ -25,6 +25,6 @@
*/
@VintfStability
parcelable OperandPerformance {
- OperandType type;
+ OperandType type = OperandType.FLOAT32;
PerformanceInfo info;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
index 0c6032f..366d9a4 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
* {@link IDevice::OPERATION_TYPE_BASE_MAX} is possible and should be interpreted as an
* extension type according to {@link Model::extensionNameToPrefix}.
*/
- OperationType type;
+ OperationType type = OperationType.ADD;
/**
* Describes the table that contains the indexes of the inputs of the operation. The offset is
* the index in the operandIndexes table.
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperationType.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperationType.aidl
index 3f49154..e7fb90d 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperationType.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperationType.aidl
@@ -3693,7 +3693,7 @@
* front of dimension i.
* padding[i, 1] specifies the number of elements to be padded after
* the end of dimension i.
- * * 2: An scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
+ * * 2: A scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
* For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT16}, the
* pad value must be of {@link OperandType::FLOAT16}.
* For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT32}, the
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl
index 8130e08..5225096 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl
@@ -28,9 +28,9 @@
/**
* Execution time on device (not driver, which runs on host processor).
*/
- long timeOnDevice;
+ long timeOnDeviceNs;
/**
* Execution time in driver (including time on device).
*/
- long timeInDriver;
+ long timeInDriverNs;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Burst.h b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Burst.h
index 008e4e4..0cc78d4 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Burst.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Burst.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
// Class that adapts aidl_hal::IBurst to nn::IBurst.
-class Burst final : public nn::IBurst {
+class Burst final : public nn::IBurst, public std::enable_shared_from_this<Burst> {
struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
public:
@@ -100,6 +100,16 @@
const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+ // See IBurst::createReusableExecution for information.
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeInternal(
+ const aidl_hal::Request& request, const std::vector<int64_t>& memoryIdentifierTokens,
+ bool measure, int64_t deadline, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
private:
mutable std::atomic_flag mExecutionInFlight = ATOMIC_FLAG_INIT;
const std::shared_ptr<aidl_hal::IBurst> kBurst;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Conversions.h b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Conversions.h
index 5eab9ff..78433a7 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Conversions.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Conversions.h
@@ -95,9 +95,7 @@
GeneralResult<Extension> unvalidatedConvert(const aidl_hal::Extension& extension);
GeneralResult<Extension::OperandTypeInformation> unvalidatedConvert(
const aidl_hal::ExtensionOperandTypeInformation& operandTypeInformation);
-GeneralResult<SharedHandle> unvalidatedConvert(
- const ::aidl::android::hardware::common::NativeHandle& handle);
-GeneralResult<SyncFence> unvalidatedConvert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& syncFence);
+GeneralResult<SharedHandle> unvalidatedConvert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& handle);
GeneralResult<std::vector<Operation>> unvalidatedConvert(
const std::vector<aidl_hal::Operation>& operations);
@@ -113,7 +111,7 @@
GeneralResult<Priority> convert(const aidl_hal::Priority& priority);
GeneralResult<Request> convert(const aidl_hal::Request& request);
GeneralResult<Timing> convert(const aidl_hal::Timing& timing);
-GeneralResult<SyncFence> convert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& syncFence);
+GeneralResult<SharedHandle> convert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& handle);
GeneralResult<std::vector<Extension>> convert(const std::vector<aidl_hal::Extension>& extension);
GeneralResult<std::vector<SharedMemory>> convert(const std::vector<aidl_hal::Memory>& memories);
@@ -160,9 +158,7 @@
nn::GeneralResult<int64_t> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::OptionalDuration& optionalDuration);
nn::GeneralResult<int64_t> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::OptionalTimePoint& optionalTimePoint);
nn::GeneralResult<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::SyncFence& syncFence);
-nn::GeneralResult<common::NativeHandle> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::SharedHandle& sharedHandle);
-nn::GeneralResult<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> unvalidatedConvertCache(
- const nn::SharedHandle& handle);
+nn::GeneralResult<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::SharedHandle& handle);
nn::GeneralResult<std::vector<uint8_t>> convert(const nn::CacheToken& cacheToken);
nn::GeneralResult<BufferDesc> convert(const nn::BufferDesc& bufferDesc);
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Device.h b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Device.h
index eb194e3..1457646 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Device.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Device.h
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@
const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
- bool isUpdatable() const override;
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Execution.h b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Execution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a77ea98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Execution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_AIDL_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_AIDL_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+
+#include "PreparedModel.h"
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+
+class Execution final : public nn::IExecution, public std::enable_shared_from_this<Execution> {
+ struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+ public:
+ static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> create(
+ std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, bool measure, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration);
+
+ Execution(PrivateConstructorTag tag, std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel,
+ Request request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, bool measure,
+ int64_t loopTimeoutDuration);
+
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+ nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+ const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+ private:
+ const std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> kPreparedModel;
+ const Request kRequest;
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation kRelocation;
+ const bool kMeasure;
+ const int64_t kLoopTimeoutDuration;
+};
+
+} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
+
+#endif // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_AIDL_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/PreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/PreparedModel.h
index abce6cc..4035764 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/PreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/PreparedModel.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_AIDL_UTILS_PREPARED_MODEL_H
#include <aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Request.h>
#include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
#include <nnapi/Result.h>
#include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -34,7 +35,8 @@
namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
// Class that adapts aidl_hal::IPreparedModel to nn::IPreparedModel.
-class PreparedModel final : public nn::IPreparedModel {
+class PreparedModel final : public nn::IPreparedModel,
+ public std::enable_shared_from_this<PreparedModel> {
struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
public:
@@ -55,10 +57,25 @@
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurst() const override;
std::any getUnderlyingResource() const override;
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeInternal(
+ const Request& request, bool measure, int64_t deadline, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
+ nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+ executeFencedInternal(const Request& request,
+ const std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>& waitFor, bool measure,
+ int64_t deadline, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+ int64_t timeoutDurationAfterFence,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
private:
const std::shared_ptr<aidl_hal::IPreparedModel> kPreparedModel;
};
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Burst.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Burst.cpp
index 0b475bc..800ac32 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Burst.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Burst.cpp
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android/binder_auto_utils.h>
#include <nnapi/IBurst.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
#include <nnapi/Result.h>
#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
#include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -35,6 +36,39 @@
namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
namespace {
+class BurstExecution final : public nn::IExecution,
+ public std::enable_shared_from_this<BurstExecution> {
+ struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+ public:
+ static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const BurstExecution>> create(
+ std::shared_ptr<const Burst> burst, Request request,
+ std::vector<int64_t> memoryIdentifierTokens, bool measure, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+ std::vector<Burst::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds);
+
+ BurstExecution(PrivateConstructorTag tag, std::shared_ptr<const Burst> burst, Request request,
+ std::vector<int64_t> memoryIdentifierTokens, bool measure,
+ int64_t loopTimeoutDuration, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+ std::vector<Burst::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds);
+
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+ nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+ const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+ private:
+ const std::shared_ptr<const Burst> kBurst;
+ const Request kRequest;
+ const std::vector<int64_t> kMemoryIdentifierTokens;
+ const bool kMeasure;
+ const int64_t kLoopTimeoutDuration;
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation kRelocation;
+ const std::vector<Burst::OptionalCacheHold> kCacheHolds;
+};
+
nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> convertExecutionResults(
const std::vector<OutputShape>& outputShapes, const Timing& timing) {
return std::make_pair(NN_TRY(nn::convert(outputShapes)), NN_TRY(nn::convert(timing)));
@@ -139,17 +173,13 @@
const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
- // Ensure that at most one execution is in flight at any given time.
- const bool alreadyInFlight = mExecutionInFlight.test_and_set();
- if (alreadyInFlight) {
- return NN_ERROR() << "IBurst already has an execution in flight";
- }
- const auto guard = ::android::base::make_scope_guard([this] { mExecutionInFlight.clear(); });
-
// Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
- const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
- hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared)));
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared =
+ NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation)));
const auto aidlRequest = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(requestInShared)));
const auto aidlMeasure = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(measure)));
@@ -159,9 +189,9 @@
std::vector<int64_t> memoryIdentifierTokens;
std::vector<OptionalCacheHold> holds;
- memoryIdentifierTokens.reserve(request.pools.size());
- holds.reserve(request.pools.size());
- for (const auto& memoryPool : request.pools) {
+ memoryIdentifierTokens.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+ holds.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+ for (const auto& memoryPool : requestInShared.pools) {
if (const auto* memory = std::get_if<nn::SharedMemory>(&memoryPool)) {
if (auto cached = kMemoryCache->getMemoryIfAvailable(*memory)) {
auto& [identifier, hold] = *cached;
@@ -172,12 +202,30 @@
}
memoryIdentifierTokens.push_back(-1);
}
- CHECK_EQ(request.pools.size(), memoryIdentifierTokens.size());
+ CHECK_EQ(requestInShared.pools.size(), memoryIdentifierTokens.size());
+
+ return executeInternal(aidlRequest, memoryIdentifierTokens, aidlMeasure, aidlDeadline,
+ aidlLoopTimeoutDuration, relocation);
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> Burst::executeInternal(
+ const Request& request, const std::vector<int64_t>& memoryIdentifierTokens, bool measure,
+ int64_t deadline, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+ // Ensure that at most one execution is in flight at any given time.
+ const bool alreadyInFlight = mExecutionInFlight.test_and_set();
+ if (alreadyInFlight) {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "IBurst already has an execution in flight";
+ }
+ const auto guard = ::android::base::make_scope_guard([this] { mExecutionInFlight.clear(); });
+
+ if (relocation.input) {
+ relocation.input->flush();
+ }
ExecutionResult executionResult;
- const auto ret =
- kBurst->executeSynchronously(aidlRequest, memoryIdentifierTokens, aidlMeasure,
- aidlDeadline, aidlLoopTimeoutDuration, &executionResult);
+ const auto ret = kBurst->executeSynchronously(request, memoryIdentifierTokens, measure,
+ deadline, loopTimeoutDuration, &executionResult);
HANDLE_ASTATUS(ret) << "execute failed";
if (!executionResult.outputSufficientSize) {
auto canonicalOutputShapes =
@@ -188,10 +236,89 @@
auto [outputShapes, timing] = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
convertExecutionResults(executionResult.outputShapes, executionResult.timing)));
- NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
- hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared)));
-
+ if (relocation.output) {
+ relocation.output->flush();
+ }
return std::make_pair(std::move(outputShapes), timing);
}
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> Burst::createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+ // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
+ std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
+
+ auto aidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
+ const auto aidlMeasure = NN_TRY(convert(measure));
+ const auto aidlLoopTimeoutDuration = NN_TRY(convert(loopTimeoutDuration));
+
+ std::vector<int64_t> memoryIdentifierTokens;
+ std::vector<OptionalCacheHold> holds;
+ memoryIdentifierTokens.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+ holds.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+ for (const auto& memoryPool : requestInShared.pools) {
+ if (const auto* memory = std::get_if<nn::SharedMemory>(&memoryPool)) {
+ if (auto cached = kMemoryCache->getMemoryIfAvailable(*memory)) {
+ auto& [identifier, hold] = *cached;
+ memoryIdentifierTokens.push_back(identifier);
+ holds.push_back(std::move(hold));
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ memoryIdentifierTokens.push_back(-1);
+ }
+ CHECK_EQ(requestInShared.pools.size(), memoryIdentifierTokens.size());
+
+ return BurstExecution::create(shared_from_this(), std::move(aidlRequest),
+ std::move(memoryIdentifierTokens), aidlMeasure,
+ aidlLoopTimeoutDuration, std::move(relocation), std::move(holds));
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const BurstExecution>> BurstExecution::create(
+ std::shared_ptr<const Burst> burst, Request request,
+ std::vector<int64_t> memoryIdentifierTokens, bool measure, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+ std::vector<Burst::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds) {
+ if (burst == nullptr) {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "aidl::utils::BurstExecution::create must have non-null burst";
+ }
+
+ return std::make_shared<const BurstExecution>(
+ PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(burst), std::move(request),
+ std::move(memoryIdentifierTokens), measure, loopTimeoutDuration, std::move(relocation),
+ std::move(cacheHolds));
+}
+
+BurstExecution::BurstExecution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/, std::shared_ptr<const Burst> burst,
+ Request request, std::vector<int64_t> memoryIdentifierTokens,
+ bool measure, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+ std::vector<Burst::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds)
+ : kBurst(std::move(burst)),
+ kRequest(std::move(request)),
+ kMemoryIdentifierTokens(std::move(memoryIdentifierTokens)),
+ kMeasure(measure),
+ kLoopTimeoutDuration(loopTimeoutDuration),
+ kRelocation(std::move(relocation)),
+ kCacheHolds(std::move(cacheHolds)) {}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> BurstExecution::compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const {
+ const auto aidlDeadline = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(deadline)));
+ return kBurst->executeInternal(kRequest, kMemoryIdentifierTokens, kMeasure, aidlDeadline,
+ kLoopTimeoutDuration, kRelocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+BurstExecution::computeFenced(const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& /*waitFor*/,
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& /*timeoutDurationAfterFence*/) const {
+ return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE)
+ << "IExecution::computeFenced is not supported on burst object";
+}
+
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Conversions.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Conversions.cpp
index 93ac51c..0517730 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Conversions.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Conversions.cpp
@@ -108,17 +108,6 @@
return canonical;
}
-GeneralResult<Handle> unvalidatedConvertHelper(const NativeHandle& aidlNativeHandle) {
- std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds;
- fds.reserve(aidlNativeHandle.fds.size());
- for (const auto& fd : aidlNativeHandle.fds) {
- auto duplicatedFd = NN_TRY(dupFd(fd.get()));
- fds.emplace_back(duplicatedFd.release());
- }
-
- return Handle{.fds = std::move(fds), .ints = aidlNativeHandle.ints};
-}
-
struct NativeHandleDeleter {
void operator()(native_handle_t* handle) const {
if (handle) {
@@ -410,11 +399,11 @@
}
GeneralResult<Timing> unvalidatedConvert(const aidl_hal::Timing& timing) {
- if (timing.timeInDriver < -1) {
- return NN_ERROR() << "Timing: timeInDriver must not be less than -1";
+ if (timing.timeInDriverNs < -1) {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "Timing: timeInDriverNs must not be less than -1";
}
- if (timing.timeOnDevice < -1) {
- return NN_ERROR() << "Timing: timeOnDevice must not be less than -1";
+ if (timing.timeOnDeviceNs < -1) {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "Timing: timeOnDeviceNs must not be less than -1";
}
constexpr auto convertTiming = [](int64_t halTiming) -> OptionalDuration {
if (halTiming == kNoTiming) {
@@ -422,8 +411,8 @@
}
return nn::Duration(static_cast<uint64_t>(halTiming));
};
- return Timing{.timeOnDevice = convertTiming(timing.timeOnDevice),
- .timeInDriver = convertTiming(timing.timeInDriver)};
+ return Timing{.timeOnDevice = convertTiming(timing.timeOnDeviceNs),
+ .timeInDriver = convertTiming(timing.timeInDriverNs)};
}
GeneralResult<Model::OperandValues> unvalidatedConvert(const std::vector<uint8_t>& operandValues) {
@@ -498,18 +487,14 @@
return static_cast<ExecutionPreference>(executionPreference);
}
-GeneralResult<SharedHandle> unvalidatedConvert(const NativeHandle& aidlNativeHandle) {
- return std::make_shared<const Handle>(NN_TRY(unvalidatedConvertHelper(aidlNativeHandle)));
-}
-
GeneralResult<std::vector<Operation>> unvalidatedConvert(
const std::vector<aidl_hal::Operation>& operations) {
return unvalidatedConvertVec(operations);
}
-GeneralResult<SyncFence> unvalidatedConvert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& syncFence) {
- auto duplicatedFd = NN_TRY(dupFd(syncFence.get()));
- return SyncFence::create(std::move(duplicatedFd));
+GeneralResult<SharedHandle> unvalidatedConvert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& handle) {
+ auto duplicatedFd = NN_TRY(dupFd(handle.get()));
+ return std::make_shared<const Handle>(std::move(duplicatedFd));
}
GeneralResult<Capabilities> convert(const aidl_hal::Capabilities& capabilities) {
@@ -553,8 +538,8 @@
return validatedConvert(timing);
}
-GeneralResult<SyncFence> convert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& syncFence) {
- return validatedConvert(syncFence);
+GeneralResult<SharedHandle> convert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& handle) {
+ return validatedConvert(handle);
}
GeneralResult<std::vector<Extension>> convert(const std::vector<aidl_hal::Extension>& extension) {
@@ -619,17 +604,6 @@
return halObject;
}
-nn::GeneralResult<common::NativeHandle> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::Handle& handle) {
- common::NativeHandle aidlNativeHandle;
- aidlNativeHandle.fds.reserve(handle.fds.size());
- for (const auto& fd : handle.fds) {
- auto duplicatedFd = NN_TRY(nn::dupFd(fd.get()));
- aidlNativeHandle.fds.emplace_back(duplicatedFd.release());
- }
- aidlNativeHandle.ints = handle.ints;
- return aidlNativeHandle;
-}
-
// Helper template for std::visit
template <class... Ts>
struct overloaded : Ts... {
@@ -755,11 +729,6 @@
return measureTiming == nn::MeasureTiming::YES;
}
-nn::GeneralResult<common::NativeHandle> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::SharedHandle& sharedHandle) {
- CHECK(sharedHandle != nullptr);
- return unvalidatedConvert(*sharedHandle);
-}
-
nn::GeneralResult<Memory> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::SharedMemory& memory) {
if (memory == nullptr) {
return (NN_ERROR() << "Unable to convert nullptr memory")
@@ -964,8 +933,8 @@
nn::GeneralResult<Timing> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::Timing& timing) {
return Timing{
- .timeOnDevice = NN_TRY(unvalidatedConvert(timing.timeOnDevice)),
- .timeInDriver = NN_TRY(unvalidatedConvert(timing.timeInDriver)),
+ .timeOnDeviceNs = NN_TRY(unvalidatedConvert(timing.timeOnDevice)),
+ .timeInDriverNs = NN_TRY(unvalidatedConvert(timing.timeInDriver)),
};
}
@@ -997,16 +966,8 @@
return ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor(duplicatedFd.release());
}
-nn::GeneralResult<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> unvalidatedConvertCache(
- const nn::SharedHandle& handle) {
- if (handle->ints.size() != 0) {
- NN_ERROR() << "Cache handle must not contain ints";
- }
- if (handle->fds.size() != 1) {
- NN_ERROR() << "Cache handle must contain exactly one fd but contains "
- << handle->fds.size();
- }
- auto duplicatedFd = NN_TRY(nn::dupFd(handle->fds.front().get()));
+nn::GeneralResult<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::SharedHandle& handle) {
+ auto duplicatedFd = NN_TRY(nn::dupFd(handle->get()));
return ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor(duplicatedFd.release());
}
@@ -1069,16 +1030,7 @@
nn::GeneralResult<std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>> convert(
const std::vector<nn::SharedHandle>& cacheHandles) {
- const auto version = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeGeneralFailure(nn::validate(cacheHandles)));
- if (version > kVersion) {
- return NN_ERROR() << "Insufficient version: " << version << " vs required " << kVersion;
- }
- std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> cacheFds;
- cacheFds.reserve(cacheHandles.size());
- for (const auto& cacheHandle : cacheHandles) {
- cacheFds.push_back(NN_TRY(unvalidatedConvertCache(cacheHandle)));
- }
- return cacheFds;
+ return validatedConvert(cacheHandles);
}
nn::GeneralResult<std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>> convert(
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Device.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Device.cpp
index 02ca861..0fd453b 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Device.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Device.cpp
@@ -178,10 +178,6 @@
return kDeviceType;
}
-bool Device::isUpdatable() const {
- return false;
-}
-
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& Device::getSupportedExtensions() const {
return kExtensions;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Execution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Execution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2aee8a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Execution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "Execution.h"
+
+#include "Conversions.h"
+#include "PreparedModel.h"
+#include "Utils.h"
+
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Request.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/HandleError.h>
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> Execution::create(
+ std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, bool measure, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration) {
+ if (preparedModel == nullptr) {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "aidl::utils::Execution::create must have non-null preparedModel";
+ }
+
+ return std::make_shared<const Execution>(PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(preparedModel),
+ std::move(request), std::move(relocation), measure,
+ loopTimeoutDuration);
+}
+
+Execution::Execution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/,
+ std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, bool measure,
+ int64_t loopTimeoutDuration)
+ : kPreparedModel(std::move(preparedModel)),
+ kRequest(std::move(request)),
+ kRelocation(std::move(relocation)),
+ kMeasure(measure),
+ kLoopTimeoutDuration(loopTimeoutDuration) {}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> Execution::compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const {
+ const auto aidlDeadline = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(deadline)));
+ return kPreparedModel->executeInternal(kRequest, kMeasure, aidlDeadline, kLoopTimeoutDuration,
+ kRelocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> Execution::computeFenced(
+ const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const {
+ const auto aidlWaitFor = NN_TRY(convert(waitFor));
+ const auto aidlDeadline = NN_TRY(convert(deadline));
+ const auto aidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence = NN_TRY(convert(timeoutDurationAfterFence));
+ return kPreparedModel->executeFencedInternal(kRequest, aidlWaitFor, kMeasure, aidlDeadline,
+ kLoopTimeoutDuration,
+ aidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence, kRelocation);
+}
+
+} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
index 003965b..f861d74 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
@@ -19,8 +19,11 @@
#include "Burst.h"
#include "Callbacks.h"
#include "Conversions.h"
+#include "Execution.h"
+#include "ProtectCallback.h"
#include "Utils.h"
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Request.h>
#include <android/binder_auto_utils.h>
#include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
#include <nnapi/Result.h>
@@ -74,18 +77,32 @@
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
// Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
- const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
- hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared)));
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared =
+ NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation)));
const auto aidlRequest = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(requestInShared)));
const auto aidlMeasure = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(measure)));
const auto aidlDeadline = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(deadline)));
const auto aidlLoopTimeoutDuration =
NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(loopTimeoutDuration)));
+ return executeInternal(aidlRequest, aidlMeasure, aidlDeadline, aidlLoopTimeoutDuration,
+ relocation);
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>
+PreparedModel::executeInternal(const Request& request, bool measure, int64_t deadline,
+ int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+ if (relocation.input) {
+ relocation.input->flush();
+ }
ExecutionResult executionResult;
- const auto ret = kPreparedModel->executeSynchronously(
- aidlRequest, aidlMeasure, aidlDeadline, aidlLoopTimeoutDuration, &executionResult);
+ const auto ret = kPreparedModel->executeSynchronously(request, measure, deadline,
+ loopTimeoutDuration, &executionResult);
HANDLE_ASTATUS(ret) << "executeSynchronously failed";
if (!executionResult.outputSufficientSize) {
auto canonicalOutputShapes =
@@ -96,9 +113,9 @@
auto [outputShapes, timing] = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
convertExecutionResults(executionResult.outputShapes, executionResult.timing)));
- NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
- hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared)));
-
+ if (relocation.output) {
+ relocation.output->flush();
+ }
return std::make_pair(std::move(outputShapes), timing);
}
@@ -109,8 +126,10 @@
const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const {
// Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
- const nn::Request& requestInShared =
- NN_TRY(hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared));
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
const auto aidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
const auto aidlWaitFor = NN_TRY(convert(waitFor));
@@ -118,16 +137,30 @@
const auto aidlDeadline = NN_TRY(convert(deadline));
const auto aidlLoopTimeoutDuration = NN_TRY(convert(loopTimeoutDuration));
const auto aidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence = NN_TRY(convert(timeoutDurationAfterFence));
+ return executeFencedInternal(aidlRequest, aidlWaitFor, aidlMeasure, aidlDeadline,
+ aidlLoopTimeoutDuration, aidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence,
+ relocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+PreparedModel::executeFencedInternal(const Request& request,
+ const std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>& waitFor,
+ bool measure, int64_t deadline, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+ int64_t timeoutDurationAfterFence,
+ const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+ if (relocation.input) {
+ relocation.input->flush();
+ }
FencedExecutionResult result;
- const auto ret = kPreparedModel->executeFenced(aidlRequest, aidlWaitFor, aidlMeasure,
- aidlDeadline, aidlLoopTimeoutDuration,
- aidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence, &result);
+ const auto ret =
+ kPreparedModel->executeFenced(request, waitFor, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration,
+ timeoutDurationAfterFence, &result);
HANDLE_ASTATUS(ret) << "executeFenced failed";
auto resultSyncFence = nn::SyncFence::createAsSignaled();
if (result.syncFence.get() != -1) {
- resultSyncFence = NN_TRY(nn::convert(result.syncFence));
+ resultSyncFence = nn::SyncFence::create(NN_TRY(nn::convert(result.syncFence))).value();
}
auto callback = result.callback;
@@ -137,12 +170,12 @@
// If executeFenced required the request memory to be moved into shared memory, block here until
// the fenced execution has completed and flush the memory back.
- if (maybeRequestInShared.has_value()) {
+ if (relocation.output) {
const auto state = resultSyncFence.syncWait({});
if (state != nn::SyncFence::FenceState::SIGNALED) {
return NN_ERROR() << "syncWait failed with " << state;
}
- NN_TRY(hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared));
+ relocation.output->flush();
}
// Create callback which can be used to retrieve the execution error status and timings.
@@ -159,6 +192,23 @@
return std::make_pair(std::move(resultSyncFence), std::move(resultCallback));
}
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> PreparedModel::createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+ // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
+ std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+ hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+ const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryPadding,
+ &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
+
+ auto aidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
+ auto aidlMeasure = NN_TRY(convert(measure));
+ auto aidlLoopTimeoutDuration = NN_TRY(convert(loopTimeoutDuration));
+ return Execution::create(shared_from_this(), std::move(aidlRequest), std::move(relocation),
+ aidlMeasure, aidlLoopTimeoutDuration);
+}
+
nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> PreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst() const {
std::shared_ptr<IBurst> burst;
const auto ret = kPreparedModel->configureExecutionBurst(&burst);
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
index 630a460..8bb5c90 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IFencedExecutionCallback.h>
#include <gmock/gmock.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
#include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
#include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@
using ::testing::SetArgPointee;
const std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> kInvalidPreparedModel;
-constexpr auto kNoTiming = Timing{.timeOnDevice = -1, .timeInDriver = -1};
+constexpr auto kNoTiming = Timing{.timeOnDeviceNs = -1, .timeInDriverNs = -1};
constexpr auto makeStatusOk = [] { return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok(); };
@@ -253,6 +254,225 @@
EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
}
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSync) {
+ // setup call
+ const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ const auto mockExecutionResult = ExecutionResult{
+ .outputSufficientSize = true,
+ .outputShapes = {},
+ .timing = kNoTiming,
+ };
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+ .WillRepeatedly(
+ DoAll(SetArgPointee<4>(mockExecutionResult), InvokeWithoutArgs(makeStatusOk)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute repeatedly
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ EXPECT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+ << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncError) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(makeGeneralFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncTransportFailure) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncDeadObject) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFenced) {
+ // setup call
+ const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ const auto mockCallback = MockFencedExecutionCallback::create();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockCallback, getExecutionInfo(_, _, _))
+ .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+ .WillRepeatedly(DoAll(SetArgPointee<0>(kNoTiming), SetArgPointee<1>(kNoTiming),
+ SetArgPointee<2>(ErrorStatus::NONE), Invoke(makeStatusOk)));
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+ .WillRepeatedly(Invoke(makeFencedExecutionResult(mockCallback)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute repeatedly
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+ << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+ const auto& [syncFence, callback] = computeResult.value();
+ EXPECT_EQ(syncFence.syncWait({}), nn::SyncFence::FenceState::SIGNALED);
+ ASSERT_NE(callback, nullptr);
+
+ // get results from callback
+ const auto callbackResult = callback();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(callbackResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << callbackResult.error().code
+ << ": " << callbackResult.error().message;
+ }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedCallbackError) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ const auto mockCallback = MockFencedExecutionCallback::create();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockCallback, getExecutionInfo(_, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(DoAll(SetArgPointee<0>(kNoTiming), SetArgPointee<1>(kNoTiming),
+ SetArgPointee<2>(ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE),
+ Invoke(makeStatusOk))));
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Invoke(makeFencedExecutionResult(mockCallback)));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code << ": "
+ << computeResult.error().message;
+ const auto& [syncFence, callback] = computeResult.value();
+ EXPECT_NE(syncFence.syncWait({}), nn::SyncFence::FenceState::ACTIVE);
+ ASSERT_NE(callback, nullptr);
+
+ // verify callback failure
+ const auto callbackResult = callback();
+ ASSERT_FALSE(callbackResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(callbackResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedError) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedTransportFailure) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedDeadObject) {
+ // setup test
+ const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+ const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+ // create execution
+ const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+ ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+ // invoke compute
+ const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+ ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
TEST(PreparedModelTest, configureExecutionBurst) {
// setup test
const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/CompilationCachingTests.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/CompilationCachingTests.cpp
index e0b529f..94ce5c1 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/CompilationCachingTests.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/CompilationCachingTests.cpp
@@ -357,16 +357,40 @@
return false;
}
+ // If fallbackModel is not provided, call prepareModelFromCache.
+ // If fallbackModel is provided, and prepareModelFromCache returns GENERAL_FAILURE,
+ // then prepareModel(fallbackModel) will be called.
+ // This replicates the behaviour of the runtime when loading a model from cache.
+ // NNAPI Shim depends on this behaviour and may try to load the model from cache in
+ // prepareModel (shim needs model information when loading from cache).
void prepareModelFromCache(const std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>& modelCache,
const std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>& dataCache,
- std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel>* preparedModel,
- ErrorStatus* status) {
+ std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel>* preparedModel, ErrorStatus* status,
+ const Model* fallbackModel = nullptr) {
// Launch prepare model from cache.
std::shared_ptr<PreparedModelCallback> preparedModelCallback =
ndk::SharedRefBase::make<PreparedModelCallback>();
std::vector<uint8_t> cacheToken(std::begin(mToken), std::end(mToken));
- const auto prepareLaunchStatus = kDevice->prepareModelFromCache(
+ auto prepareLaunchStatus = kDevice->prepareModelFromCache(
kNoDeadline, modelCache, dataCache, cacheToken, preparedModelCallback);
+
+ // The shim does not support prepareModelFromCache() properly, but it
+ // will still attempt to create a model from cache when modelCache or
+ // dataCache is provided in prepareModel(). Instead of failing straight
+ // away, we try to utilize that other code path when fallbackModel is
+ // set. Note that we cannot verify whether the returned model was
+ // actually prepared from cache in that case.
+ if (!prepareLaunchStatus.isOk() &&
+ prepareLaunchStatus.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC &&
+ static_cast<ErrorStatus>(prepareLaunchStatus.getServiceSpecificError()) ==
+ ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE &&
+ mIsCachingSupported && fallbackModel != nullptr) {
+ preparedModelCallback = ndk::SharedRefBase::make<PreparedModelCallback>();
+ prepareLaunchStatus = kDevice->prepareModel(
+ *fallbackModel, ExecutionPreference::FAST_SINGLE_ANSWER, kDefaultPriority,
+ kNoDeadline, modelCache, dataCache, cacheToken, preparedModelCallback);
+ }
+
ASSERT_TRUE(prepareLaunchStatus.isOk() ||
prepareLaunchStatus.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
<< "prepareLaunchStatus: " << prepareLaunchStatus.getDescription();
@@ -382,6 +406,42 @@
*preparedModel = preparedModelCallback->getPreparedModel();
}
+ // Replicate behaviour of runtime when loading model from cache.
+ // Test if prepareModelFromCache behaves correctly when faced with bad
+ // arguments. If prepareModelFromCache is not supported (GENERAL_FAILURE),
+ // it attempts to call prepareModel with same arguments, which is expected either
+ // to not support the model (GENERAL_FAILURE) or return a valid model.
+ void verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(const std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>& modelCache,
+ const std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>& dataCache,
+ const Model* model, const TestModel& testModel) {
+ std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel;
+ ErrorStatus status;
+
+ // Verify that prepareModelFromCache fails either due to bad
+ // arguments (INVALID_ARGUMENT) or GENERAL_FAILURE if not supported.
+ prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status,
+ /*fallbackModel=*/nullptr);
+ if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+
+ // If caching is not supported, attempt calling prepareModel.
+ if (status == ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) {
+ // Fallback with prepareModel should succeed regardless of cache files
+ prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status,
+ /*fallbackModel=*/model);
+ // Unless caching is not supported?
+ if (status != ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) {
+ // But if it is, we should see a valid model.
+ ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::NONE);
+ ASSERT_NE(preparedModel, nullptr);
+ EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel,
+ /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
// Absolute path to the temporary cache directory.
std::string mCacheDir;
@@ -397,7 +457,7 @@
uint8_t mToken[static_cast<uint32_t>(IDevice::BYTE_SIZE_OF_CACHE_TOKEN)] = {};
uint32_t mNumModelCache;
uint32_t mNumDataCache;
- uint32_t mIsCachingSupported;
+ bool mIsCachingSupported;
const std::shared_ptr<IDevice> kDevice;
// The primary data type of the testModel.
@@ -438,7 +498,8 @@
std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
createCacheFds(mModelCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &modelCache);
createCacheFds(mDataCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &dataCache);
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
+ prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status,
+ /*fallbackModel=*/&model);
if (!mIsCachingSupported) {
ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
@@ -498,7 +559,8 @@
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < dataCache.size(); i++) {
ASSERT_GE(read(dataCache[i].get(), &placeholderByte, 1), 0);
}
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
+ prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status,
+ /*fallbackModel=*/&model);
if (!mIsCachingSupported) {
ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
@@ -536,13 +598,7 @@
// Execute and verify results.
EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel, /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
// Check if prepareModelFromCache fails.
- preparedModel = nullptr;
- ErrorStatus status;
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
- if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
- ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
- }
- ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+ verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
}
// Test with number of model cache files smaller than mNumModelCache.
@@ -560,13 +616,7 @@
// Execute and verify results.
EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel, /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
// Check if prepareModelFromCache fails.
- preparedModel = nullptr;
- ErrorStatus status;
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
- if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
- ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
- }
- ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+ verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
}
// Test with number of data cache files greater than mNumDataCache.
@@ -583,13 +633,7 @@
// Execute and verify results.
EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel, /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
// Check if prepareModelFromCache fails.
- preparedModel = nullptr;
- ErrorStatus status;
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
- if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
- ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
- }
- ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+ verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
}
// Test with number of data cache files smaller than mNumDataCache.
@@ -607,13 +651,7 @@
// Execute and verify results.
EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel, /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
// Check if prepareModelFromCache fails.
- preparedModel = nullptr;
- ErrorStatus status;
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
- if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
- ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
- }
- ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+ verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
}
}
@@ -633,68 +671,48 @@
// Test with number of model cache files greater than mNumModelCache.
{
- std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel = nullptr;
- ErrorStatus status;
std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
mModelCache.push_back({mTmpCache});
createCacheFds(mModelCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &modelCache);
createCacheFds(mDataCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &dataCache);
mModelCache.pop_back();
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
- if (status != ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) {
- ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
- }
- ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+
+ verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
}
// Test with number of model cache files smaller than mNumModelCache.
if (mModelCache.size() > 0) {
- std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel = nullptr;
- ErrorStatus status;
std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
auto tmp = mModelCache.back();
mModelCache.pop_back();
createCacheFds(mModelCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &modelCache);
createCacheFds(mDataCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &dataCache);
mModelCache.push_back(tmp);
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
- if (status != ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) {
- ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
- }
- ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+
+ verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
}
// Test with number of data cache files greater than mNumDataCache.
{
- std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel = nullptr;
- ErrorStatus status;
std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
mDataCache.push_back({mTmpCache});
createCacheFds(mModelCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &modelCache);
createCacheFds(mDataCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &dataCache);
mDataCache.pop_back();
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
- if (status != ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) {
- ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
- }
- ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+
+ verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
}
// Test with number of data cache files smaller than mNumDataCache.
if (mDataCache.size() > 0) {
- std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel = nullptr;
- ErrorStatus status;
std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
auto tmp = mDataCache.back();
mDataCache.pop_back();
createCacheFds(mModelCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &modelCache);
createCacheFds(mDataCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &dataCache);
mDataCache.push_back(tmp);
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
- if (status != ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) {
- ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
- }
- ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+
+ verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
}
}
@@ -719,13 +737,7 @@
// Execute and verify results.
EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel, /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
// Check if prepareModelFromCache fails.
- preparedModel = nullptr;
- ErrorStatus status;
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
- if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
- ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
- }
- ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+ verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
}
// Go through each handle in data cache, test with invalid access mode.
@@ -741,13 +753,7 @@
// Execute and verify results.
EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel, /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
// Check if prepareModelFromCache fails.
- preparedModel = nullptr;
- ErrorStatus status;
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
- if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
- ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
- }
- ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+ verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
}
}
@@ -769,30 +775,23 @@
// Go through each handle in model cache, test with invalid access mode.
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mNumModelCache; i++) {
- std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel = nullptr;
- ErrorStatus status;
std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
modelCacheMode[i] = AccessMode::WRITE_ONLY;
createCacheFds(mModelCache, modelCacheMode, &modelCache);
createCacheFds(mDataCache, dataCacheMode, &dataCache);
modelCacheMode[i] = AccessMode::READ_WRITE;
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
- ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
- ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+
+ verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
}
// Go through each handle in data cache, test with invalid access mode.
for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mNumDataCache; i++) {
- std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel = nullptr;
- ErrorStatus status;
std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
dataCacheMode[i] = AccessMode::WRITE_ONLY;
createCacheFds(mModelCache, modelCacheMode, &modelCache);
createCacheFds(mDataCache, dataCacheMode, &dataCache);
dataCacheMode[i] = AccessMode::READ_WRITE;
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
- ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
- ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+ verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
}
}
@@ -872,7 +871,8 @@
std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
createCacheFds(mModelCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &modelCache);
createCacheFds(mDataCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &dataCache);
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
+ prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status,
+ /*fallbackModel=*/nullptr);
// The preparation may fail or succeed, but must not crash. If the preparation succeeds,
// the prepared model must be executed with the correct result and not crash.
@@ -933,7 +933,8 @@
// Spawn a thread to copy the cache content concurrently while preparing from cache.
std::thread thread(copyCacheFiles, std::cref(modelCacheMul), std::cref(mModelCache));
- prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
+ prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status,
+ /*fallbackModel=*/nullptr);
thread.join();
// The preparation may fail or succeed, but must not crash. If the preparation succeeds,
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/GeneratedTestHarness.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/GeneratedTestHarness.cpp
index 1440429..2356ff0 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/GeneratedTestHarness.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/GeneratedTestHarness.cpp
@@ -435,8 +435,8 @@
mInputMemory = TestBlobAHWB::create(std::max<size_t>(inputSize, 1));
mOutputMemory = TestBlobAHWB::create(std::max<size_t>(outputSize, 1));
} else {
- mInputMemory = TestAshmem::create(std::max<size_t>(inputSize, 1));
- mOutputMemory = TestAshmem::create(std::max<size_t>(outputSize, 1));
+ mInputMemory = TestAshmem::create(std::max<size_t>(inputSize, 1), /*aidlReadonly=*/true);
+ mOutputMemory = TestAshmem::create(std::max<size_t>(outputSize, 1), /*aidlReadonly=*/false);
}
CHECK_NE(mInputMemory, nullptr);
CHECK_NE(mOutputMemory, nullptr);
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@
makeOutputInsufficientSize(kInsufficientOutputIndex, &request);
}
- int64_t loopTimeoutDuration = kOmittedTimeoutDuration;
+ int64_t loopTimeoutDurationNs = kOmittedTimeoutDuration;
// OutputType::MISSED_DEADLINE is only used by
// TestKind::INTINITE_LOOP_TIMEOUT tests to verify that an infinite loop is
// aborted after a timeout.
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@
// Override the default loop timeout duration with a small value to
// speed up test execution.
constexpr int64_t kMillisecond = 1'000'000;
- loopTimeoutDuration = 1 * kMillisecond;
+ loopTimeoutDurationNs = 1 * kMillisecond;
}
ErrorStatus executionStatus;
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@
ExecutionResult executionResult;
// execute
const auto ret = preparedModel->executeSynchronously(request, testConfig.measureTiming,
- kNoDeadline, loopTimeoutDuration,
+ kNoDeadline, loopTimeoutDurationNs,
&executionResult);
ASSERT_TRUE(ret.isOk() || ret.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
<< ret.getDescription();
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@
ExecutionResult executionResult;
// execute
ret = burst->executeSynchronously(request, slots, testConfig.measureTiming, kNoDeadline,
- loopTimeoutDuration, &executionResult);
+ loopTimeoutDurationNs, &executionResult);
ASSERT_TRUE(ret.isOk() || ret.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
<< ret.getDescription();
if (ret.isOk()) {
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@
ErrorStatus result = ErrorStatus::NONE;
FencedExecutionResult executionResult;
auto ret = preparedModel->executeFenced(request, {}, testConfig.measureTiming,
- kNoDeadline, loopTimeoutDuration, kNoDuration,
+ kNoDeadline, loopTimeoutDurationNs, kNoDuration,
&executionResult);
ASSERT_TRUE(ret.isOk() || ret.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
<< ret.getDescription();
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@
waitFor.emplace_back(dupFd);
// If a sync fence is returned, try start another run waiting for the sync fence.
ret = preparedModel->executeFenced(request, waitFor, testConfig.measureTiming,
- kNoDeadline, loopTimeoutDuration, kNoDuration,
+ kNoDeadline, loopTimeoutDurationNs, kNoDuration,
&executionResult);
ASSERT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
waitForSyncFence(executionResult.syncFence.get());
@@ -686,8 +686,8 @@
if (!testConfig.measureTiming) {
EXPECT_EQ(timing, kNoTiming);
} else {
- if (timing.timeOnDevice != -1 && timing.timeInDriver != -1) {
- EXPECT_LE(timing.timeOnDevice, timing.timeInDriver);
+ if (timing.timeOnDeviceNs != -1 && timing.timeInDriverNs != -1) {
+ EXPECT_LE(timing.timeOnDeviceNs, timing.timeInDriverNs);
}
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/QualityOfServiceTests.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/QualityOfServiceTests.cpp
index e803e38..bbba887 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/QualityOfServiceTests.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/QualityOfServiceTests.cpp
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
using ExecutionFunction =
std::function<MaybeResults(const std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel>& preparedModel,
- const Request& request, int64_t deadline)>;
+ const Request& request, int64_t deadlineNs)>;
static int64_t makeDeadline(DeadlineBoundType deadlineBoundType) {
const auto getNanosecondsSinceEpoch = [](const auto& time) -> int64_t {
@@ -79,9 +79,9 @@
void runPrepareModelTest(const std::shared_ptr<IDevice>& device, const Model& model,
Priority priority, std::optional<DeadlineBoundType> deadlineBound) {
- int64_t deadline = kNoDeadline;
+ int64_t deadlineNs = kNoDeadline;
if (deadlineBound.has_value()) {
- deadline = makeDeadline(deadlineBound.value());
+ deadlineNs = makeDeadline(deadlineBound.value());
}
// see if service can handle model
@@ -96,8 +96,8 @@
const std::shared_ptr<PreparedModelCallback> preparedModelCallback =
ndk::SharedRefBase::make<PreparedModelCallback>();
const auto prepareLaunchStatus =
- device->prepareModel(model, ExecutionPreference::FAST_SINGLE_ANSWER, priority, deadline,
- {}, {}, kEmptyCacheToken, preparedModelCallback);
+ device->prepareModel(model, ExecutionPreference::FAST_SINGLE_ANSWER, priority,
+ deadlineNs, {}, {}, kEmptyCacheToken, preparedModelCallback);
ASSERT_TRUE(prepareLaunchStatus.isOk())
<< "prepareLaunchStatus: " << prepareLaunchStatus.getDescription();
@@ -156,13 +156,13 @@
}
static MaybeResults executeSynchronously(const std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel>& preparedModel,
- const Request& request, int64_t deadline) {
+ const Request& request, int64_t deadlineNs) {
SCOPED_TRACE("synchronous");
const bool measure = false;
// run execution
ExecutionResult executionResult;
- const auto ret = preparedModel->executeSynchronously(request, measure, deadline,
+ const auto ret = preparedModel->executeSynchronously(request, measure, deadlineNs,
kOmittedTimeoutDuration, &executionResult);
EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk() || ret.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
<< ret.getDescription();
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@
}
static MaybeResults executeBurst(const std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel>& preparedModel,
- const Request& request, int64_t deadline) {
+ const Request& request, int64_t deadlineNs) {
SCOPED_TRACE("burst");
const bool measure = false;
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@
// run execution
ExecutionResult executionResult;
- ret = burst->executeSynchronously(request, slots, measure, deadline, kOmittedTimeoutDuration,
+ ret = burst->executeSynchronously(request, slots, measure, deadlineNs, kOmittedTimeoutDuration,
&executionResult);
EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk() || ret.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
<< ret.getDescription();
@@ -224,10 +224,10 @@
const ExecutionContext& context, bool synchronous,
DeadlineBoundType deadlineBound) {
const ExecutionFunction execute = synchronous ? executeSynchronously : executeBurst;
- const auto deadline = makeDeadline(deadlineBound);
+ const auto deadlineNs = makeDeadline(deadlineBound);
// Perform execution and unpack results.
- const auto results = execute(preparedModel, request, deadline);
+ const auto results = execute(preparedModel, request, deadlineNs);
if (!results.has_value()) return;
const auto& [status, outputShapes, timing] = results.value();
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.cpp
index 3c7f5f7..9af362e 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.cpp
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <android/binder_status.h>
#include <android/hardware_buffer.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <iostream>
#include <limits>
#include <numeric>
@@ -98,19 +99,39 @@
std::multiplies<>{});
}
-std::unique_ptr<TestAshmem> TestAshmem::create(uint32_t size) {
- auto ashmem = std::make_unique<TestAshmem>(size);
+std::unique_ptr<TestAshmem> TestAshmem::create(uint32_t size, bool aidlReadonly) {
+ auto ashmem = std::make_unique<TestAshmem>(size, aidlReadonly);
return ashmem->mIsValid ? std::move(ashmem) : nullptr;
}
-void TestAshmem::initialize(uint32_t size) {
+// This function will create a readonly shared memory with PROT_READ only.
+// The input shared memory must be either Ashmem or mapped-FD.
+static nn::SharedMemory convertSharedMemoryToReadonly(const nn::SharedMemory& sharedMemory) {
+ if (std::holds_alternative<nn::Memory::Ashmem>(sharedMemory->handle)) {
+ const auto& memory = std::get<nn::Memory::Ashmem>(sharedMemory->handle);
+ return nn::createSharedMemoryFromFd(memory.size, PROT_READ, memory.fd.get(), /*offset=*/0)
+ .value();
+ } else if (std::holds_alternative<nn::Memory::Fd>(sharedMemory->handle)) {
+ const auto& memory = std::get<nn::Memory::Fd>(sharedMemory->handle);
+ return nn::createSharedMemoryFromFd(memory.size, PROT_READ, memory.fd.get(), memory.offset)
+ .value();
+ }
+ CHECK(false) << "Unexpected shared memory type";
+ return sharedMemory;
+}
+
+void TestAshmem::initialize(uint32_t size, bool aidlReadonly) {
mIsValid = false;
ASSERT_GT(size, 0);
const auto sharedMemory = nn::createSharedMemory(size).value();
mMappedMemory = nn::map(sharedMemory).value();
mPtr = static_cast<uint8_t*>(std::get<void*>(mMappedMemory.pointer));
CHECK_NE(mPtr, nullptr);
- mAidlMemory = utils::convert(sharedMemory).value();
+ if (aidlReadonly) {
+ mAidlMemory = utils::convert(convertSharedMemoryToReadonly(sharedMemory)).value();
+ } else {
+ mAidlMemory = utils::convert(sharedMemory).value();
+ }
mIsValid = true;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.h b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.h
index 266301c..9dd7359 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.h
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
inline constexpr Priority kDefaultPriority = Priority::MEDIUM;
-inline constexpr Timing kNoTiming = {.timeOnDevice = -1, .timeInDriver = -1};
+inline constexpr Timing kNoTiming = {.timeOnDeviceNs = -1, .timeInDriverNs = -1};
inline constexpr int64_t kNoDeadline = -1;
inline constexpr int64_t kOmittedTimeoutDuration = -1;
inline constexpr int64_t kNoDuration = -1;
@@ -79,15 +79,18 @@
class TestAshmem : public TestMemoryBase {
public:
- static std::unique_ptr<TestAshmem> create(uint32_t size);
+ // If aidlReadonly is true, getAidlMemory will return a sAIDL memory with readonly access;
+ // otherwise, the sAIDL memory has read-write access. This only affects the sAIDL memory.
+ // getPointer will always return a valid address with read-write access.
+ static std::unique_ptr<TestAshmem> create(uint32_t size, bool aidlReadonly = false);
// Prefer TestAshmem::create.
// The constructor calls initialize, which constructs the memory resources. This is a workaround
// that gtest macros cannot be used directly in a constructor.
- TestAshmem(uint32_t size) { initialize(size); }
+ TestAshmem(uint32_t size, bool aidlReadonly) { initialize(size, aidlReadonly); }
private:
- void initialize(uint32_t size);
+ void initialize(uint32_t size, bool aidlReadonly);
nn::Mapping mMappedMemory;
};
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h
index 8fe6b90..702ee92 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include <cutils/native_handle.h>
#include <hidl/HidlSupport.h>
#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/SharedMemory.h>
#include <nnapi/Types.h>
#include <functional>
#include <vector>
@@ -59,19 +60,70 @@
nn::GeneralResult<std::reference_wrapper<const nn::Model>> flushDataFromPointerToShared(
const nn::Model* model, std::optional<nn::Model>* maybeModelInSharedOut);
+// Record a relocation mapping between pointer-based data and shared memory.
+// Only two specializations of this template may exist:
+// - RelocationInfo<const void*> for request inputs
+// - RelocationInfo<void*> for request outputs
+template <typename PointerType>
+struct RelocationInfo {
+ PointerType data;
+ size_t length;
+ size_t offset;
+};
+using InputRelocationInfo = RelocationInfo<const void*>;
+using OutputRelocationInfo = RelocationInfo<void*>;
+
+// Keep track of the relocation mapping between pointer-based data and shared memory pool,
+// and provide method to copy the data between pointers and the shared memory pool.
+// Only two specializations of this template may exist:
+// - RelocationTracker<InputRelocationInfo> for request inputs
+// - RelocationTracker<OutputRelocationInfo> for request outputs
+template <typename RelocationInfoType>
+class RelocationTracker {
+ public:
+ static nn::GeneralResult<std::unique_ptr<RelocationTracker>> create(
+ std::vector<RelocationInfoType> relocationInfos, nn::SharedMemory memory) {
+ auto mapping = NN_TRY(map(memory));
+ return std::make_unique<RelocationTracker<RelocationInfoType>>(
+ std::move(relocationInfos), std::move(memory), std::move(mapping));
+ }
+
+ RelocationTracker(std::vector<RelocationInfoType> relocationInfos, nn::SharedMemory memory,
+ nn::Mapping mapping)
+ : kRelocationInfos(std::move(relocationInfos)),
+ kMemory(std::move(memory)),
+ kMapping(std::move(mapping)) {}
+
+ // Specializations defined in CommonUtils.cpp.
+ // For InputRelocationTracker, this method will copy pointer data to the shared memory pool.
+ // For OutputRelocationTracker, this method will copy shared memory data to the pointers.
+ void flush() const;
+
+ private:
+ const std::vector<RelocationInfoType> kRelocationInfos;
+ const nn::SharedMemory kMemory;
+ const nn::Mapping kMapping;
+};
+using InputRelocationTracker = RelocationTracker<InputRelocationInfo>;
+using OutputRelocationTracker = RelocationTracker<OutputRelocationInfo>;
+
+struct RequestRelocation {
+ std::unique_ptr<InputRelocationTracker> input;
+ std::unique_ptr<OutputRelocationTracker> output;
+};
+
// Relocate pointer-based data to shared memory. If `request` has no
// Request::Argument::LifeTime::POINTER data, the function returns with a reference to `request`. If
// `request` has Request::Argument::LifeTime::POINTER data, the request is copied to
// `maybeRequestInSharedOut` with the POINTER data relocated to a memory pool, and the function
-// returns with a reference to `*maybeRequestInSharedOut`.
-nn::GeneralResult<std::reference_wrapper<const nn::Request>> flushDataFromPointerToShared(
- const nn::Request* request, std::optional<nn::Request>* maybeRequestInSharedOut);
-
-// Undoes `flushDataFromPointerToShared` on a Request object. More specifically,
-// `unflushDataFromSharedToPointer` copies the output shared memory data from the transformed
-// Request object back to the output pointer-based memory in the original Request object.
-nn::GeneralResult<void> unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(
- const nn::Request& request, const std::optional<nn::Request>& maybeRequestInShared);
+// returns with a reference to `*maybeRequestInSharedOut`. The `relocationOut` will be set to track
+// the input and output relocations.
+//
+// Unlike `flushDataFromPointerToShared`, this method will not copy the input pointer data to the
+// shared memory pool. Use `relocationOut` to flush the input or output data after the call.
+nn::GeneralResult<std::reference_wrapper<const nn::Request>> convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ const nn::Request* request, uint32_t alignment, uint32_t padding,
+ std::optional<nn::Request>* maybeRequestInSharedOut, RequestRelocation* relocationOut);
nn::GeneralResult<std::vector<uint32_t>> countNumberOfConsumers(
size_t numberOfOperands, const std::vector<nn::Operation>& operations);
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidBurst.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidBurst.h
index 17b3fd9..e86edda 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidBurst.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidBurst.h
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
};
} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidDevice.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidDevice.h
index d843526..5e62b9a 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidDevice.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidDevice.h
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
class InvalidDevice final : public nn::IDevice {
public:
InvalidDevice(std::string name, std::string versionString, nn::Version featureLevel,
- nn::DeviceType type, bool isUpdatable, std::vector<nn::Extension> extensions,
+ nn::DeviceType type, std::vector<nn::Extension> extensions,
nn::Capabilities capabilities,
std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> numberOfCacheFilesNeeded);
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@
const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
- bool isUpdatable() const override;
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
@@ -71,7 +70,6 @@
const std::string kVersionString;
const nn::Version kFeatureLevel;
const nn::DeviceType kType;
- const bool kIsUpdatable;
const std::vector<nn::Extension> kExtensions;
const nn::Capabilities kCapabilities;
const std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> kNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidExecution.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidExecution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b00221
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidExecution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_INVALID_EXECUTION_H
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_INVALID_EXECUTION_H
+
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+
+class InvalidExecution final : public nn::IExecution {
+ public:
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+ nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+ const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+};
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
+
+#endif // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_INVALID_EXECUTION_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidPreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidPreparedModel.h
index 3e1dca7..de30aae 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidPreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidPreparedModel.h
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurst() const override;
std::any getUnderlyingResource() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientBurst.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientBurst.h
index c92cc41..fde2486 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientBurst.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientBurst.h
@@ -51,7 +51,16 @@
const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
private:
+ bool isValidInternal() const EXCLUDES(mMutex);
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecutionInternal(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const;
+
const Factory kMakeBurst;
mutable std::mutex mMutex;
mutable nn::SharedBurst mBurst GUARDED_BY(mMutex);
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientDevice.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientDevice.h
index 8199c52..84ae799 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientDevice.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientDevice.h
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@
const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
- bool isUpdatable() const override;
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientExecution.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientExecution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0084e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientExecution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_RESILIENT_EXECUTION_H
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_RESILIENT_EXECUTION_H
+
+#include <android-base/thread_annotations.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+
+#include <functional>
+#include <memory>
+#include <mutex>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+
+class ResilientExecution final : public nn::IExecution,
+ public std::enable_shared_from_this<ResilientExecution> {
+ struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+ public:
+ using Factory = std::function<nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution>()>;
+
+ static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const ResilientExecution>> create(
+ Factory makeExecution);
+
+ ResilientExecution(PrivateConstructorTag tag, Factory makeExecution,
+ nn::SharedExecution execution);
+
+ nn::SharedExecution getExecution() const;
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> recover(const nn::IExecution* failingExecution) const;
+
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+ nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+ const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+ private:
+ bool isValidInternal() const EXCLUDES(mMutex);
+
+ const Factory kMakeExecution;
+ mutable std::mutex mMutex;
+ mutable nn::SharedExecution mExecution GUARDED_BY(mMutex);
+};
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
+
+#endif // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_RESILIENT_EXECUTION_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientPreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientPreparedModel.h
index a6c1b19..86533ed 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientPreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientPreparedModel.h
@@ -58,12 +58,19 @@
const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurst() const override;
std::any getUnderlyingResource() const override;
private:
bool isValidInternal() const EXCLUDES(mMutex);
+ nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecutionInternal(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const;
nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurstInternal() const;
const Factory kMakePreparedModel;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/CommonUtils.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/CommonUtils.cpp
index 4d26795..906b0cf 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/CommonUtils.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/CommonUtils.cpp
@@ -89,23 +89,39 @@
});
}
-nn::GeneralResult<hidl_handle> createNativeHandleFrom(base::unique_fd fd,
+nn::GeneralResult<hidl_handle> createNativeHandleFrom(std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds,
const std::vector<int32_t>& ints) {
constexpr size_t kIntMax = std::numeric_limits<int>::max();
+ CHECK_LE(fds.size(), kIntMax);
CHECK_LE(ints.size(), kIntMax);
- native_handle_t* nativeHandle = native_handle_create(1, static_cast<int>(ints.size()));
+ native_handle_t* nativeHandle =
+ native_handle_create(static_cast<int>(fds.size()), static_cast<int>(ints.size()));
if (nativeHandle == nullptr) {
return NN_ERROR() << "Failed to create native_handle";
}
- nativeHandle->data[0] = fd.release();
- std::copy(ints.begin(), ints.end(), nativeHandle->data + 1);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < fds.size(); ++i) {
+ nativeHandle->data[i] = fds[i].release();
+ }
+ std::copy(ints.begin(), ints.end(), nativeHandle->data + nativeHandle->numFds);
hidl_handle handle;
handle.setTo(nativeHandle, /*shouldOwn=*/true);
return handle;
}
+nn::GeneralResult<hidl_handle> createNativeHandleFrom(base::unique_fd fd,
+ const std::vector<int32_t>& ints) {
+ std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds;
+ fds.push_back(std::move(fd));
+ return createNativeHandleFrom(std::move(fds), ints);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<hidl_handle> createNativeHandleFrom(const nn::Memory::Unknown::Handle& handle) {
+ std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds = NN_TRY(nn::dupFds(handle.fds.begin(), handle.fds.end()));
+ return createNativeHandleFrom(std::move(fds), handle.ints);
+}
+
nn::GeneralResult<hidl_memory> createHidlMemoryFrom(const nn::Memory::Ashmem& memory) {
auto fd = NN_TRY(nn::dupFd(memory.fd));
auto handle = NN_TRY(createNativeHandleFrom(std::move(fd), {}));
@@ -139,7 +155,22 @@
}
nn::GeneralResult<hidl_memory> createHidlMemoryFrom(const nn::Memory::Unknown& memory) {
- return hidl_memory(memory.name, NN_TRY(hidlHandleFromSharedHandle(memory.handle)), memory.size);
+ return hidl_memory(memory.name, NN_TRY(createNativeHandleFrom(memory.handle)), memory.size);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::Memory::Unknown::Handle> unknownHandleFromNativeHandle(
+ const native_handle_t* handle) {
+ if (handle == nullptr) {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "unknownHandleFromNativeHandle failed because handle is nullptr";
+ }
+
+ std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds =
+ NN_TRY(nn::dupFds(handle->data + 0, handle->data + handle->numFds));
+
+ std::vector<int> ints(handle->data + handle->numFds,
+ handle->data + handle->numFds + handle->numInts);
+
+ return nn::Memory::Unknown::Handle{.fds = std::move(fds), .ints = std::move(ints)};
}
} // anonymous namespace
@@ -200,10 +231,31 @@
return **maybeModelInSharedOut;
}
-nn::GeneralResult<std::reference_wrapper<const nn::Request>> flushDataFromPointerToShared(
- const nn::Request* request, std::optional<nn::Request>* maybeRequestInSharedOut) {
+template <>
+void InputRelocationTracker::flush() const {
+ // Copy from pointers to shared memory.
+ uint8_t* memoryPtr = static_cast<uint8_t*>(std::get<void*>(kMapping.pointer));
+ for (const auto& [data, length, offset] : kRelocationInfos) {
+ std::memcpy(memoryPtr + offset, data, length);
+ }
+}
+
+template <>
+void OutputRelocationTracker::flush() const {
+ // Copy from shared memory to pointers.
+ const uint8_t* memoryPtr = static_cast<const uint8_t*>(
+ std::visit([](auto ptr) { return static_cast<const void*>(ptr); }, kMapping.pointer));
+ for (const auto& [data, length, offset] : kRelocationInfos) {
+ std::memcpy(data, memoryPtr + offset, length);
+ }
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::reference_wrapper<const nn::Request>> convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+ const nn::Request* request, uint32_t alignment, uint32_t padding,
+ std::optional<nn::Request>* maybeRequestInSharedOut, RequestRelocation* relocationOut) {
CHECK(request != nullptr);
CHECK(maybeRequestInSharedOut != nullptr);
+ CHECK(relocationOut != nullptr);
if (hasNoPointerData(*request)) {
return *request;
@@ -213,8 +265,11 @@
// to the caller through `maybeRequestInSharedOut` if the function succeeds.
nn::Request requestInShared = *request;
+ RequestRelocation relocation;
+
// Change input pointers to shared memory.
- nn::ConstantMemoryBuilder inputBuilder(requestInShared.pools.size());
+ nn::MutableMemoryBuilder inputBuilder(requestInShared.pools.size());
+ std::vector<InputRelocationInfo> inputRelocationInfos;
for (auto& input : requestInShared.inputs) {
const auto& location = input.location;
if (input.lifetime != nn::Request::Argument::LifeTime::POINTER) {
@@ -225,17 +280,21 @@
const void* data = std::visit([](auto ptr) { return static_cast<const void*>(ptr); },
location.pointer);
CHECK(data != nullptr);
- input.location = inputBuilder.append(data, location.length);
+ input.location = inputBuilder.append(location.length, alignment, padding);
+ inputRelocationInfos.push_back({data, input.location.length, input.location.offset});
}
// Allocate input memory.
if (!inputBuilder.empty()) {
auto memory = NN_TRY(inputBuilder.finish());
- requestInShared.pools.push_back(std::move(memory));
+ requestInShared.pools.push_back(memory);
+ relocation.input = NN_TRY(
+ InputRelocationTracker::create(std::move(inputRelocationInfos), std::move(memory)));
}
// Change output pointers to shared memory.
nn::MutableMemoryBuilder outputBuilder(requestInShared.pools.size());
+ std::vector<OutputRelocationInfo> outputRelocationInfos;
for (auto& output : requestInShared.outputs) {
const auto& location = output.location;
if (output.lifetime != nn::Request::Argument::LifeTime::POINTER) {
@@ -243,62 +302,25 @@
}
output.lifetime = nn::Request::Argument::LifeTime::POOL;
- output.location = outputBuilder.append(location.length);
+ void* data = std::get<void*>(location.pointer);
+ CHECK(data != nullptr);
+ output.location = outputBuilder.append(location.length, alignment, padding);
+ outputRelocationInfos.push_back({data, output.location.length, output.location.offset});
}
// Allocate output memory.
if (!outputBuilder.empty()) {
auto memory = NN_TRY(outputBuilder.finish());
- requestInShared.pools.push_back(std::move(memory));
+ requestInShared.pools.push_back(memory);
+ relocation.output = NN_TRY(OutputRelocationTracker::create(std::move(outputRelocationInfos),
+ std::move(memory)));
}
*maybeRequestInSharedOut = requestInShared;
+ *relocationOut = std::move(relocation);
return **maybeRequestInSharedOut;
}
-nn::GeneralResult<void> unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(
- const nn::Request& request, const std::optional<nn::Request>& maybeRequestInShared) {
- if (!maybeRequestInShared.has_value() || maybeRequestInShared->pools.empty() ||
- !std::holds_alternative<nn::SharedMemory>(maybeRequestInShared->pools.back())) {
- return {};
- }
- const auto& requestInShared = *maybeRequestInShared;
-
- // Map the memory.
- const auto& outputMemory = std::get<nn::SharedMemory>(requestInShared.pools.back());
- const auto [pointer, size, context] = NN_TRY(map(outputMemory));
- const uint8_t* constantPointer =
- std::visit([](const auto& o) { return static_cast<const uint8_t*>(o); }, pointer);
-
- // Flush each output pointer.
- CHECK_EQ(request.outputs.size(), requestInShared.outputs.size());
- for (size_t i = 0; i < request.outputs.size(); ++i) {
- const auto& location = request.outputs[i].location;
- const auto& locationInShared = requestInShared.outputs[i].location;
- if (!std::holds_alternative<void*>(location.pointer)) {
- continue;
- }
-
- // Get output pointer and size.
- void* data = std::get<void*>(location.pointer);
- CHECK(data != nullptr);
- const size_t length = location.length;
-
- // Get output pool location.
- CHECK(requestInShared.outputs[i].lifetime == nn::Request::Argument::LifeTime::POOL);
- const size_t index = locationInShared.poolIndex;
- const size_t offset = locationInShared.offset;
- const size_t outputPoolIndex = requestInShared.pools.size() - 1;
- CHECK(locationInShared.length == length);
- CHECK(index == outputPoolIndex);
-
- // Flush memory.
- std::memcpy(data, constantPointer + offset, length);
- }
-
- return {};
-}
-
nn::GeneralResult<std::vector<uint32_t>> countNumberOfConsumers(
size_t numberOfOperands, const std::vector<nn::Operation>& operations) {
return makeGeneralFailure(nn::countNumberOfConsumers(numberOfOperands, operations));
@@ -358,7 +380,7 @@
if (memory.name() != "hardware_buffer_blob") {
auto handle = nn::Memory::Unknown{
- .handle = NN_TRY(sharedHandleFromNativeHandle(memory.handle())),
+ .handle = NN_TRY(unknownHandleFromNativeHandle(memory.handle())),
.size = static_cast<size_t>(memory.size()),
.name = memory.name(),
};
@@ -404,53 +426,19 @@
}
nn::GeneralResult<hidl_handle> hidlHandleFromSharedHandle(const nn::Handle& handle) {
- std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds;
- fds.reserve(handle.fds.size());
- for (const auto& fd : handle.fds) {
- const int dupFd = dup(fd);
- if (dupFd == -1) {
- return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) << "Failed to dup the fd";
- }
- fds.emplace_back(dupFd);
- }
-
- constexpr size_t kIntMax = std::numeric_limits<int>::max();
- CHECK_LE(handle.fds.size(), kIntMax);
- CHECK_LE(handle.ints.size(), kIntMax);
- native_handle_t* nativeHandle = native_handle_create(static_cast<int>(handle.fds.size()),
- static_cast<int>(handle.ints.size()));
- if (nativeHandle == nullptr) {
- return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) << "Failed to create native_handle";
- }
- for (size_t i = 0; i < fds.size(); ++i) {
- nativeHandle->data[i] = fds[i].release();
- }
- std::copy(handle.ints.begin(), handle.ints.end(), &nativeHandle->data[nativeHandle->numFds]);
-
- hidl_handle hidlHandle;
- hidlHandle.setTo(nativeHandle, /*shouldOwn=*/true);
- return hidlHandle;
+ base::unique_fd fd = NN_TRY(nn::dupFd(handle.get()));
+ return createNativeHandleFrom(std::move(fd), {});
}
nn::GeneralResult<nn::Handle> sharedHandleFromNativeHandle(const native_handle_t* handle) {
if (handle == nullptr) {
return NN_ERROR() << "sharedHandleFromNativeHandle failed because handle is nullptr";
}
-
- std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds;
- fds.reserve(handle->numFds);
- for (int i = 0; i < handle->numFds; ++i) {
- const int dupFd = dup(handle->data[i]);
- if (dupFd == -1) {
- return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) << "Failed to dup the fd";
- }
- fds.emplace_back(dupFd);
+ if (handle->numFds != 1 || handle->numInts != 0) {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "sharedHandleFromNativeHandle failed because handle does not only "
+ "hold a single fd";
}
-
- std::vector<int> ints(&handle->data[handle->numFds],
- &handle->data[handle->numFds + handle->numInts]);
-
- return nn::Handle{.fds = std::move(fds), .ints = std::move(ints)};
+ return nn::dupFd(handle->data[0]);
}
nn::GeneralResult<hidl_vec<hidl_handle>> convertSyncFences(
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidBurst.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidBurst.cpp
index 0c34f05..0191533 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidBurst.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidBurst.cpp
@@ -38,4 +38,10 @@
return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidBurst";
}
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> InvalidBurst::createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& /*request*/, nn::MeasureTiming /*measure*/,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& /*loopTimeoutDuration*/) const {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidBurst";
+}
+
} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidDevice.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidDevice.cpp
index 81bca7f..535ccb4 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidDevice.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidDevice.cpp
@@ -32,14 +32,13 @@
namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
InvalidDevice::InvalidDevice(std::string name, std::string versionString, nn::Version featureLevel,
- nn::DeviceType type, bool isUpdatable,
- std::vector<nn::Extension> extensions, nn::Capabilities capabilities,
+ nn::DeviceType type, std::vector<nn::Extension> extensions,
+ nn::Capabilities capabilities,
std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> numberOfCacheFilesNeeded)
: kName(std::move(name)),
kVersionString(std::move(versionString)),
kFeatureLevel(featureLevel),
kType(type),
- kIsUpdatable(isUpdatable),
kExtensions(std::move(extensions)),
kCapabilities(std::move(capabilities)),
kNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded(numberOfCacheFilesNeeded) {}
@@ -60,10 +59,6 @@
return kType;
}
-bool InvalidDevice::isUpdatable() const {
- return kIsUpdatable;
-}
-
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& InvalidDevice::getSupportedExtensions() const {
return kExtensions;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidExecution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidExecution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4edd25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidExecution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "InvalidExecution.h"
+
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> InvalidExecution::compute(
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/) const {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidExecution";
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+InvalidExecution::computeFenced(const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& /*waitFor*/,
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& /*timeoutDurationAfterFence*/) const {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidExecution";
+}
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidPreparedModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidPreparedModel.cpp
index 9081e1f..8195462 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidPreparedModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidPreparedModel.cpp
@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@
return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidPreparedModel";
}
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> InvalidPreparedModel::createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& /*request*/, nn::MeasureTiming /*measure*/,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& /*loopTimeoutDuration*/) const {
+ return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidPreparedModel";
+}
+
nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> InvalidPreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst() const {
return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidPreparedModel";
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientBurst.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientBurst.cpp
index 38ccc62..79cbe39 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientBurst.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientBurst.cpp
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android-base/thread_annotations.h>
#include <nnapi/IBurst.h>
+#include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
#include <nnapi/Result.h>
#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
#include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -29,6 +30,9 @@
#include <optional>
#include <utility>
+#include "InvalidExecution.h"
+#include "ResilientExecution.h"
+
namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
namespace {
@@ -46,11 +50,11 @@
// Attempt recovery and return if it fails.
auto maybeBurst = resilientBurst.recover(burst.get());
if (!maybeBurst.has_value()) {
- auto [resultErrorMessage, resultErrorCode, resultOutputShapes] = std::move(result).error();
- const auto& [recoveryErrorMessage, recoveryErrorCode] = maybeBurst.error();
- return nn::error(resultErrorCode, std::move(resultOutputShapes))
- << resultErrorMessage << ", and failed to recover dead burst object with error "
- << recoveryErrorCode << ": " << recoveryErrorMessage;
+ const auto& [message, code] = maybeBurst.error();
+ std::ostringstream oss;
+ oss << ", and failed to recover dead burst object with error " << code << ": " << message;
+ result.error().message += oss.str();
+ return result;
}
burst = std::move(maybeBurst).value();
@@ -109,4 +113,35 @@
return protect(*this, fn);
}
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> ResilientBurst::createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+#if 0
+ auto self = shared_from_this();
+ ResilientExecution::Factory makeExecution =
+ [burst = std::move(self), request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration] {
+ return burst->createReusableExecutionInternal(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+ };
+ return ResilientExecution::create(std::move(makeExecution));
+#else
+ return createReusableExecutionInternal(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+#endif
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> ResilientBurst::createReusableExecutionInternal(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+ if (!isValidInternal()) {
+ return std::make_shared<const InvalidExecution>();
+ }
+ const auto fn = [&request, measure, &loopTimeoutDuration](const nn::IBurst& burst) {
+ return burst.createReusableExecution(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+ };
+ return protect(*this, fn);
+}
+
+bool ResilientBurst::isValidInternal() const {
+ return true;
+}
+
} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientDevice.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientDevice.cpp
index 13965af..2023c9a 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientDevice.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientDevice.cpp
@@ -122,14 +122,12 @@
};
if (compare(&IDevice::getName) || compare(&IDevice::getVersionString) ||
compare(&IDevice::getFeatureLevel) || compare(&IDevice::getType) ||
- compare(&IDevice::isUpdatable) || compare(&IDevice::getSupportedExtensions) ||
- compare(&IDevice::getCapabilities)) {
+ compare(&IDevice::getSupportedExtensions) || compare(&IDevice::getCapabilities)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Recovered device has different metadata than what is cached. Marking "
"IDevice object as invalid.";
device = std::make_shared<const InvalidDevice>(
- kName, kVersionString, mDevice->getFeatureLevel(), mDevice->getType(),
- mDevice->isUpdatable(), kExtensions, kCapabilities,
- mDevice->getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded());
+ kName, kVersionString, mDevice->getFeatureLevel(), mDevice->getType(), kExtensions,
+ kCapabilities, mDevice->getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded());
mIsValid = false;
}
@@ -153,10 +151,6 @@
return getDevice()->getType();
}
-bool ResilientDevice::isUpdatable() const {
- return getDevice()->isUpdatable();
-}
-
const std::vector<nn::Extension>& ResilientDevice::getSupportedExtensions() const {
return kExtensions;
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientExecution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientExecution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46b404a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientExecution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "ResilientExecution.h"
+
+#include "InvalidBurst.h"
+#include "ResilientBurst.h"
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android-base/thread_annotations.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+
+#include <functional>
+#include <memory>
+#include <mutex>
+#include <sstream>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+namespace {
+
+template <typename FnType>
+auto protect(const ResilientExecution& resilientExecution, const FnType& fn)
+ -> decltype(fn(*resilientExecution.getExecution())) {
+ auto execution = resilientExecution.getExecution();
+ auto result = fn(*execution);
+
+ // Immediately return if prepared model is not dead.
+ if (result.has_value() || result.error().code != nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT) {
+ return result;
+ }
+
+ // Attempt recovery and return if it fails.
+ auto maybeExecution = resilientExecution.recover(execution.get());
+ if (!maybeExecution.has_value()) {
+ const auto& [message, code] = maybeExecution.error();
+ std::ostringstream oss;
+ oss << ", and failed to recover dead prepared model with error " << code << ": " << message;
+ result.error().message += oss.str();
+ return result;
+ }
+ execution = std::move(maybeExecution).value();
+
+ return fn(*execution);
+}
+
+} // namespace
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const ResilientExecution>> ResilientExecution::create(
+ Factory makeExecution) {
+ if (makeExecution == nullptr) {
+ return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT)
+ << "utils::ResilientExecution::create must have non-empty makeExecution";
+ }
+ auto execution = NN_TRY(makeExecution());
+ CHECK(execution != nullptr);
+ return std::make_shared<ResilientExecution>(PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(makeExecution),
+ std::move(execution));
+}
+
+ResilientExecution::ResilientExecution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/, Factory makeExecution,
+ nn::SharedExecution execution)
+ : kMakeExecution(std::move(makeExecution)), mExecution(std::move(execution)) {
+ CHECK(kMakeExecution != nullptr);
+ CHECK(mExecution != nullptr);
+}
+
+nn::SharedExecution ResilientExecution::getExecution() const {
+ std::lock_guard guard(mMutex);
+ return mExecution;
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> ResilientExecution::recover(
+ const nn::IExecution* failingExecution) const {
+ std::lock_guard guard(mMutex);
+
+ // Another caller updated the failing prepared model.
+ if (mExecution.get() != failingExecution) {
+ return mExecution;
+ }
+
+ mExecution = NN_TRY(kMakeExecution());
+ return mExecution;
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>
+ResilientExecution::compute(const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const {
+ const auto fn = [&deadline](const nn::IExecution& execution) {
+ return execution.compute(deadline);
+ };
+ return protect(*this, fn);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+ResilientExecution::computeFenced(const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor,
+ const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const {
+ const auto fn = [&waitFor, &deadline,
+ &timeoutDurationAfterFence](const nn::IExecution& execution) {
+ return execution.computeFenced(waitFor, deadline, timeoutDurationAfterFence);
+ };
+ return protect(*this, fn);
+}
+
+bool ResilientExecution::isValidInternal() const {
+ return true;
+}
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientPreparedModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientPreparedModel.cpp
index 5dd5f99..1ae19bc 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientPreparedModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientPreparedModel.cpp
@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@
#include "ResilientPreparedModel.h"
#include "InvalidBurst.h"
+#include "InvalidExecution.h"
#include "ResilientBurst.h"
+#include "ResilientExecution.h"
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android-base/thread_annotations.h>
@@ -127,6 +129,21 @@
return protect(*this, fn);
}
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> ResilientPreparedModel::createReusableExecution(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+#if 0
+ auto self = shared_from_this();
+ ResilientExecution::Factory makeExecution =
+ [preparedModel = std::move(self), request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration] {
+ return preparedModel->createReusableExecutionInternal(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+ };
+ return ResilientExecution::create(std::move(makeExecution));
+#else
+ return createReusableExecutionInternal(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+#endif
+}
+
nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> ResilientPreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst() const {
#if 0
auto self = shared_from_this();
@@ -140,6 +157,19 @@
#endif
}
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> ResilientPreparedModel::createReusableExecutionInternal(
+ const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+ if (!isValidInternal()) {
+ return std::make_shared<const InvalidExecution>();
+ }
+ const auto fn = [&request, measure,
+ &loopTimeoutDuration](const nn::IPreparedModel& preparedModel) {
+ return preparedModel.createReusableExecution(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+ };
+ return protect(*this, fn);
+}
+
std::any ResilientPreparedModel::getUnderlyingResource() const {
return getPreparedModel()->getUnderlyingResource();
}
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockDevice.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockDevice.h
index b274716..a9428bc 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockDevice.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockDevice.h
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
MOCK_METHOD(const std::string&, getVersionString, (), (const, override));
MOCK_METHOD(Version, getFeatureLevel, (), (const, override));
MOCK_METHOD(DeviceType, getType, (), (const, override));
- MOCK_METHOD(bool, isUpdatable, (), (const, override));
MOCK_METHOD(const std::vector<Extension>&, getSupportedExtensions, (), (const, override));
MOCK_METHOD(const Capabilities&, getCapabilities, (), (const, override));
MOCK_METHOD((std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t>), getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded, (),
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockExecution.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockExecution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91e3428
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockExecution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_TEST_MOCK_EXECUTION
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_TEST_MOCK_EXECUTION
+
+#include <gmock/gmock.h>
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+
+namespace android::nn {
+
+class MockExecution final : public IExecution {
+ public:
+ MOCK_METHOD((ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<OutputShape>, Timing>>), compute,
+ (const OptionalTimePoint& deadline), (const, override));
+ MOCK_METHOD((GeneralResult<std::pair<SyncFence, ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>), computeFenced,
+ (const std::vector<SyncFence>& waitFor, const OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+ const OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence),
+ (const, override));
+};
+
+} // namespace android::nn
+
+#endif // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_TEST_MOCK_EXECUTION
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockPreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockPreparedModel.h
index c004861..c8ce006 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockPreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockPreparedModel.h
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
const OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
const OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence),
(const, override));
+ MOCK_METHOD((GeneralResult<SharedExecution>), createReusableExecution,
+ (const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+ const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration),
+ (const, override));
MOCK_METHOD(GeneralResult<SharedBurst>, configureExecutionBurst, (), (const, override));
MOCK_METHOD(std::any, getUnderlyingResource, (), (const, override));
};
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientExecution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientExecution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0737fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientExecution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <gmock/gmock.h>
+#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/ResilientExecution.h>
+#include <utility>
+#include "MockExecution.h"
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+namespace {
+
+using ::testing::_;
+using ::testing::InvokeWithoutArgs;
+using ::testing::Return;
+
+using SharedMockExecution = std::shared_ptr<const nn::MockExecution>;
+using MockExecutionFactory = ::testing::MockFunction<nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution>()>;
+
+SharedMockExecution createMockExecution() {
+ return std::make_shared<const nn::MockExecution>();
+}
+
+std::tuple<SharedMockExecution, std::unique_ptr<MockExecutionFactory>,
+ std::shared_ptr<const ResilientExecution>>
+setup() {
+ auto mockExecution = std::make_shared<const nn::MockExecution>();
+
+ auto mockExecutionFactory = std::make_unique<MockExecutionFactory>();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(mockExecution));
+
+ auto buffer = ResilientExecution::create(mockExecutionFactory->AsStdFunction()).value();
+ return std::make_tuple(std::move(mockExecution), std::move(mockExecutionFactory),
+ std::move(buffer));
+}
+
+constexpr auto makeError = [](nn::ErrorStatus status) {
+ return [status](const auto&... /*args*/) { return nn::error(status); };
+};
+const auto kReturnGeneralFailure = makeError(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+const auto kReturnDeadObject = makeError(nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+
+const auto kNoExecutionError =
+ nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>{};
+const auto kNoFencedExecutionError =
+ nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>(
+ std::make_pair(nn::SyncFence::createAsSignaled(), nullptr));
+
+} // namespace
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, invalidExecutionFactory) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto invalidExecutionFactory = ResilientExecution::Factory{};
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = ResilientExecution::create(invalidExecutionFactory);
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, executionFactoryFailure) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto invalidExecutionFactory = kReturnGeneralFailure;
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = ResilientExecution::create(invalidExecutionFactory);
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, getExecution) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = execution->getExecution();
+
+ // verify result
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == mockExecution);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, compute) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, compute(_)).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(kNoExecutionError));
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = execution->compute({});
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeError) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, compute(_)).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnGeneralFailure);
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = execution->compute({});
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeDeadObjectFailedRecovery) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, compute(_)).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnDeadObject);
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnGeneralFailure);
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = execution->compute({});
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeDeadObjectSuccessfulRecovery) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, compute(_)).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnDeadObject);
+ const auto recoveredMockExecution = createMockExecution();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*recoveredMockExecution, compute(_)).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(kNoExecutionError));
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(recoveredMockExecution));
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = execution->compute({});
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeFenced) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, computeFenced(_, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Return(kNoFencedExecutionError));
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = execution->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeFencedError) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, computeFenced(_, _, _)).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnGeneralFailure);
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = execution->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeFencedDeadObjectFailedRecovery) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, computeFenced(_, _, _)).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnDeadObject);
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnGeneralFailure);
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = execution->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeFencedDeadObjectSuccessfulRecovery) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, computeFenced(_, _, _)).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnDeadObject);
+ const auto recoveredMockExecution = createMockExecution();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*recoveredMockExecution, computeFenced(_, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Return(kNoFencedExecutionError));
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(recoveredMockExecution));
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = execution->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, recover) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+ const auto recoveredMockExecution = createMockExecution();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(recoveredMockExecution));
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = execution->recover(mockExecution.get());
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result.value() == recoveredMockExecution);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, recoverFailure) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+ const auto recoveredMockExecution = createMockExecution();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnGeneralFailure);
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = execution->recover(mockExecution.get());
+
+ // verify result
+ EXPECT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, someoneElseRecovered) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+ const auto recoveredMockExecution = createMockExecution();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(recoveredMockExecution));
+ execution->recover(mockExecution.get());
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = execution->recover(mockExecution.get());
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result.value() == recoveredMockExecution);
+}
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientPreparedModelTest.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientPreparedModelTest.cpp
index 6d86e10..d396ca8 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientPreparedModelTest.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientPreparedModelTest.cpp
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
const auto kReturnGeneralFailure = makeError(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
const auto kReturnDeadObject = makeError(nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+const auto kNoCreateReusableExecutionError = nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution>{};
const auto kNoExecutionError =
nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>{};
const auto kNoFencedExecutionError =
@@ -231,6 +232,36 @@
<< "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
}
+TEST(ResilientPreparedModelTest, createReusableExecution) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockPreparedModel, mockPreparedModelFactory, preparedModel] = setup();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, createReusableExecution(_, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(Return(kNoCreateReusableExecutionError));
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+ << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientPreparedModelTest, createReusableExecutionError) {
+ // setup call
+ const auto [mockPreparedModel, mockPreparedModelFactory, preparedModel] = setup();
+ EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, createReusableExecution(_, _, _))
+ .Times(1)
+ .WillOnce(kReturnGeneralFailure);
+
+ // run test
+ const auto result = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+
+ // verify result
+ ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+ EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
TEST(ResilientPreparedModelTest, getUnderlyingResource) {
// setup call
const auto [mockPreparedModel, mockPreparedModelFactory, preparedModel] = setup();
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/service/include/nnapi/hal/Service.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/service/include/nnapi/hal/Service.h
index e339627..2fd5237 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/service/include/nnapi/hal/Service.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/service/include/nnapi/hal/Service.h
@@ -22,10 +22,15 @@
#include <memory>
#include <vector>
-namespace android::nn::hal {
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::service {
-std::vector<nn::SharedDevice> getDevices();
+struct SharedDeviceAndUpdatability {
+ nn::SharedDevice device;
+ bool isDeviceUpdatable = false;
+};
-} // namespace android::nn::hal
+std::vector<SharedDeviceAndUpdatability> getDevices(bool includeUpdatableDrivers);
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::service
#endif // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_SERVICE_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/service/src/Service.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/service/src/Service.cpp
index 75ab1f9..2286288 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/service/src/Service.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/service/src/Service.cpp
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <nnapi/hal/1.2/Service.h>
#include <nnapi/hal/1.3/Service.h>
#include <nnapi/hal/aidl/Service.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/aidl/Utils.h>
#include <functional>
#include <memory>
@@ -50,7 +51,7 @@
using getDeviceFn = std::add_pointer_t<nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedDevice>(const std::string&)>;
void getHidlDevicesForVersion(const std::string& descriptor, getDeviceFn getDevice,
- std::vector<nn::SharedDevice>* devices,
+ std::vector<SharedDeviceAndUpdatability>* devices,
std::unordered_set<std::string>* registeredDevices) {
CHECK(devices != nullptr);
CHECK(registeredDevices != nullptr);
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@
if (maybeDevice.has_value()) {
auto device = std::move(maybeDevice).value();
CHECK(device != nullptr);
- devices->push_back(std::move(device));
+ devices->push_back({.device = std::move(device)});
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "getDevice(" << name << ") failed with " << maybeDevice.error().code
<< ": " << maybeDevice.error().message;
@@ -71,8 +72,9 @@
}
}
-void getAidlDevices(std::vector<nn::SharedDevice>* devices,
- std::unordered_set<std::string>* registeredDevices) {
+void getAidlDevices(std::vector<SharedDeviceAndUpdatability>* devices,
+ std::unordered_set<std::string>* registeredDevices,
+ bool includeUpdatableDrivers) {
CHECK(devices != nullptr);
CHECK(registeredDevices != nullptr);
@@ -89,12 +91,21 @@
}
for (const auto& name : names) {
+ bool isDeviceUpdatable = false;
+ if (__builtin_available(android __NNAPI_AIDL_MIN_ANDROID_API__, *)) {
+ const auto instance = std::string(aidl_hal::IDevice::descriptor) + '/' + name;
+ isDeviceUpdatable = AServiceManager_isUpdatableViaApex(instance.c_str());
+ }
+ if (isDeviceUpdatable && !includeUpdatableDrivers) {
+ continue;
+ }
if (const auto [it, unregistered] = registeredDevices->insert(name); unregistered) {
auto maybeDevice = aidl_hal::utils::getDevice(name);
if (maybeDevice.has_value()) {
auto device = std::move(maybeDevice).value();
CHECK(device != nullptr);
- devices->push_back(std::move(device));
+ devices->push_back(
+ {.device = std::move(device), .isDeviceUpdatable = isDeviceUpdatable});
} else {
LOG(ERROR) << "getDevice(" << name << ") failed with " << maybeDevice.error().code
<< ": " << maybeDevice.error().message;
@@ -103,11 +114,13 @@
}
}
-std::vector<nn::SharedDevice> getDevices() {
- std::vector<nn::SharedDevice> devices;
+} // namespace
+
+std::vector<SharedDeviceAndUpdatability> getDevices(bool includeUpdatableDrivers) {
+ std::vector<SharedDeviceAndUpdatability> devices;
std::unordered_set<std::string> registeredDevices;
- getAidlDevices(&devices, ®isteredDevices);
+ getAidlDevices(&devices, ®isteredDevices, includeUpdatableDrivers);
getHidlDevicesForVersion(V1_3::IDevice::descriptor, &V1_3::utils::getDevice, &devices,
®isteredDevices);
@@ -121,13 +134,4 @@
return devices;
}
-} // namespace
} // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::service
-
-namespace android::nn::hal {
-
-std::vector<nn::SharedDevice> getDevices() {
- return hardware::neuralnetworks::service::getDevices();
-}
-
-} // namespace android::nn::hal
diff --git a/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyConsumerResult.aidl b/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyConsumerResult.aidl
index 12d2042..66c8c8c 100644
--- a/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyConsumerResult.aidl
+++ b/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyConsumerResult.aidl
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
*/
int id;
/**
- * Time since boot in milliseconds
+ * Time of data capture in milliseconds since boot (CLOCK_BOOTTIME clock)
*/
long timestampMs;
/**
@@ -38,4 +38,3 @@
*/
EnergyConsumerAttribution[] attribution;
}
-
diff --git a/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyMeasurement.aidl b/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyMeasurement.aidl
index d3e8f46..31fbaa8 100644
--- a/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyMeasurement.aidl
+++ b/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyMeasurement.aidl
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
*/
int id;
/**
- * Approximate time of data capture in millseconds since boot
+ * Time of data capture in milliseconds since boot (CLOCK_BOOTTIME clock)
*/
long timestampMs;
/**
@@ -35,4 +35,3 @@
*/
long energyUWs;
}
-
diff --git a/radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS
index 2384317..9310f8e 100644
--- a/radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
# Telephony team
amitmahajan@google.com
-sanketpadawe@google.com
shuoq@google.com
+jackyu@google.com
# VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-yim@google.com
+dshi@google.com
diff --git a/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.cpp b/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.cpp
index fc37201..5b31acc 100644
--- a/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.cpp
+++ b/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.cpp
@@ -83,6 +83,13 @@
return hasFeature;
}
+bool isSsSsEnabled() {
+ // Do not use checkSubstringInCommandOutput("getprop persist.radio.multisim.config", "")
+ // until b/148904287 is fixed. We need exact matching instead of partial matching. (i.e.
+ // by definition the empty string "" is a substring of any string).
+ return !isDsDsEnabled() && !isTsTsEnabled();
+}
+
bool isDsDsEnabled() {
return testing::checkSubstringInCommandOutput("getprop persist.radio.multisim.config", "dsds");
}
diff --git a/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.h b/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.h
index eeb1d29..fa338a3 100644
--- a/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.h
+++ b/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.h
@@ -80,12 +80,17 @@
bool deviceSupportsFeature(const char* feature);
/*
- * Check if device is in DSDS.
+ * Check if device is in SsSs (Single SIM Single Standby).
+ */
+bool isSsSsEnabled();
+
+/*
+ * Check if device is in DSDS (Dual SIM Dual Standby).
*/
bool isDsDsEnabled();
/*
- * Check if device is in TSTS.
+ * Check if device is in TSTS (Triple SIM Triple Standby).
*/
bool isTsTsEnabled();
diff --git a/radio/1.1/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.1/vts/OWNERS
index 2384317..a07c917 100644
--- a/radio/1.1/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.1/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,8 +1 @@
-# Telephony team
-amitmahajan@google.com
-sanketpadawe@google.com
-shuoq@google.com
-
-# VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-yim@google.com
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.2/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.2/vts/OWNERS
index 245d9d4..a07c917 100644
--- a/radio/1.2/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.2/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,9 +1 @@
-# Telephony team
-amitmahajan@google.com
-sanketpadawe@google.com
-shuoq@google.com
-sasindran@google.com
-
-# VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-yim@google.com
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.3/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.3/vts/OWNERS
index d642064..a07c917 100644
--- a/radio/1.3/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.3/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,10 +1 @@
-# Telephony team
-amitmahajan@google.com
-sanketpadawe@google.com
-shuoq@google.com
-sasindran@google.com
-nazaninb@google.com
-
-# VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-yim@google.com
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.4/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.4/vts/OWNERS
index fd69f36..a07c917 100644
--- a/radio/1.4/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.4/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,8 +1 @@
-# Telephony team
-amitmahajan@google.com
-shuoq@google.com
-sasindran@google.com
-
-# VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-yim@google.com
\ No newline at end of file
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.5/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.5/vts/OWNERS
index 3629a6c..a07c917 100644
--- a/radio/1.5/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.5/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,10 +1 @@
-# Telephony team
-refuhoo@google.com
-amitmahajan@google.com
-jackyu@google.com
-fionaxu@google.com
-# more to add
-
-# VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-dshi@google.com
\ No newline at end of file
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.6/IRadio.hal b/radio/1.6/IRadio.hal
index a4e8811..e2d35d0 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/IRadio.hal
+++ b/radio/1.6/IRadio.hal
@@ -145,7 +145,6 @@
*
* Response function is IRadioResponse.setupDataCallResponse_1_6()
*
- * Note this API is the same as the 1.5
*/
oneway setupDataCall_1_6(int32_t serial, AccessNetwork accessNetwork,
DataProfileInfo dataProfileInfo, bool roamingAllowed,
@@ -177,7 +176,7 @@
* @param serial Serial number of request.
* @param message GsmSmsMessage as defined in types.hal
*
- * Response function is IRadioResponse.sendSMSExpectMoreResponse_1_6()
+ * Response function is IRadioResponse.sendSmsExpectMoreResponse_1_6()
*
* Note this API is the same as the 1.0
*
@@ -185,7 +184,7 @@
* fails. RadioError:SMS_SEND_FAIL_RETRY means retry (i.e. error cause is 332)
* and RadioError:GENERIC_FAILURE means no retry (i.e. error cause is 500)
*/
- oneway sendSMSExpectMore_1_6(int32_t serial, GsmSmsMessage message);
+ oneway sendSmsExpectMore_1_6(int32_t serial, GsmSmsMessage message);
/**
* Send a CDMA SMS message
@@ -267,7 +266,7 @@
* 2. Disable NR dual connectivity {NrDualConnectivityState:DISABLE}
* 3. Disable NR dual connectivity and force secondary cell to be released
* {NrDualConnectivityState:DISABLE_IMMEDIATE}
-
+ *
* Response callback is IRadioResponse.setNRDualConnectivityStateResponse()
*/
oneway setNrDualConnectivityState(int32_t serial,
@@ -372,7 +371,7 @@
*
* Response callback is IRadioResponse.getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmapResponse()
*/
- oneway getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap(uint32_t serial);
+ oneway getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap(int32_t serial);
/**
* Control data throttling at modem.
diff --git a/radio/1.6/IRadioResponse.hal b/radio/1.6/IRadioResponse.hal
index 60b0edc..a1286a5 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/IRadioResponse.hal
+++ b/radio/1.6/IRadioResponse.hal
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
* RadioError:ACCESS_BARRED
* RadioError:BLOCKED_DUE_TO_CALL
*/
- oneway sendSMSExpectMoreResponse_1_6(RadioResponseInfo info, SendSmsResult sms);
+ oneway sendSmsExpectMoreResponse_1_6(RadioResponseInfo info, SendSmsResult sms);
/**
* @param info Response info struct containing response type, serial no. and error
diff --git a/radio/1.6/types.hal b/radio/1.6/types.hal
index 82c9daa..4b75db5 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/types.hal
+++ b/radio/1.6/types.hal
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@
struct QosBandwidth {
/** Maximum bit rate possible on the bearer */
- int32_t maxBitrateKbps;
+ uint32_t maxBitrateKbps;
/** Minimum bit rate that is guaranteed to be provided by the network */
- int32_t guaranteedBitrateKbps;
+ uint32_t guaranteedBitrateKbps;
};
/** LTE/EPS Quality of Service parameters as per 3gpp spec 24.301 sec 9.9.4.3. */
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
/**
* Next header protocol numbers defined by IANA, RFC 5237
*/
-enum QosProtocol : int32_t {
+enum QosProtocol : int8_t {
/** No protocol specified */
UNSPECIFIED = -1,
/** Transmission Control Protocol */
@@ -119,14 +119,14 @@
AH = 51,
};
-enum QosFilterDirection : int32_t {
+enum QosFilterDirection : int8_t {
DOWNLINK = 0,
UPLINK = 1,
BIDIRECTIONAL = 2,
};
/** Allowed port numbers */
-enum QosPortRange : int32_t {
+enum QosPortRange : uint16_t {
MIN = 20,
MAX = 65535
};
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@
};
/** The allowed failure modes on an IWLAN handover failure. */
-enum HandoverFailureMode : int32_t {
+enum HandoverFailureMode : int8_t {
/**
* On data handover failure, fallback to the source data transport when the
* fail cause is due to a hand off preference change.
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@
/**
* NR Dual connectivity state
*/
-enum NrDualConnectivityState: int32_t {
+enum NrDualConnectivityState: int8_t {
/**
* Enable NR dual connectivity. Enabled state does not mean dual connectivity
* is active. It means device is allowed to connect to both primary and secondary.
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@
* the estimated maximum sustainable link bandwidth (as would be measured
* at the Upper PDCP or SNDCP SAP). If the DL Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate is known,
* this value shall not exceed the DL-AMBR for the Internet PDN connection.
- * This must be filled with -1 if network is not connected.
+ * This must be filled with 0 if network is not connected.
*/
uint32_t downlinkCapacityKbps;
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@
* estimated maximum sustainable link bandwidth (as would be measured at the
* Upper PDCP or SNDCP SAP). If the UL Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate is known,
* this value shall not exceed the UL-AMBR for the Internet PDN connection.
- * This must be filled with -1 if network is not connected.
+ * This must be filled with 0 if network is not connected.
*/
uint32_t uplinkCapacityKbps;
@@ -427,7 +427,8 @@
* This bandwidth estimate shall be the estimated maximum sustainable link bandwidth
* (as would be measured at the Upper PDCP or SNDCP SAP). This is valid only
* in if device is connected to both primary and secodary in dual connected
- * mode. This must be filled with -1 if secondary is not connected.
+ * mode. This must be filled with 0 if secondary is not connected or if
+ * modem does not support this feature.
*/
uint32_t secondaryDownlinkCapacityKbps;
@@ -436,12 +437,13 @@
* This bandwidth estimate shall be the estimated
* maximum sustainable link bandwidth (as would be measured at the Upper PDCP or SNDCP SAP).
* This is valid only in if device is connected to both primary and secodary in dual connected
- * mode.This must be filled with -1 if secondary is not connected.
+ * mode.This must be filled with 0 if secondary is not connected or if modem
+ * does not support this feature.
*/
uint32_t secondaryUplinkCapacityKbps;
};
-enum DataThrottlingAction : int32_t {
+enum DataThrottlingAction : int8_t {
/* Clear all existing data throttling. */
NO_DATA_THROTTLING = 0,
@@ -579,9 +581,9 @@
*
* Reference: 3GPP TS 138.214 section 5.2.2.1.
*
- * Range [0, 15], INT_MAX means invalid/unreported.
+ * Range [0, 15], 0xFF means invalid/unreported.
*/
- vec<uint32_t> csiCqiReport;
+ vec<uint8_t> csiCqiReport;
};
/**
@@ -738,22 +740,19 @@
EutranRegistrationInfo eutranInfo;
- struct NgranRegistrationInfo {
- /**
- * Network capabilities for voice over PS services. This info is valid only on NR
- * network and must be present when the device is camped on NR. VopsInfo must be
- * empty when the device is not camped on NR.
- */
- NrVopsInfo nrVopsInfo;
- } ngranInfo;
+ /**
+ * Network capabilities for voice over PS services. This info is valid only on NR
+ * network and must be present when the device is camped on NR. VopsInfo must be
+ * empty when the device is not camped on NR.
+ */
+ NrVopsInfo ngranNrVopsInfo;
- struct GeranRegistrationInfo {
- /**
- * True if the dual transfer mode is supported.
- * Refer to 3GPP TS 44.108 section 3.4.25.3
- */
- bool dtmSupported;
- } geranInfo;
+ /**
+ * True if the dual transfer mode is supported.
+ * Refer to 3GPP TS 44.108 section 3.4.25.3
+ */
+ bool geranDtmSupported;
+
} accessTechnologySpecificInfo;
};
@@ -780,10 +779,10 @@
int32_t uplinkChannelNumber;
/** Downlink cell bandwidth, in kHz */
- int32_t cellBandwidthDownlink;
+ int32_t cellBandwidthDownlinkKhz;
/** Uplink cell bandwidth, in kHz */
- int32_t cellBandwidthUplink;
+ int32_t cellBandwidthUplinkKhz;
/**
* A list of data calls mapped to this physical channel. The context id must match the cid of
@@ -1069,7 +1068,7 @@
SscMode value;
};
-enum SliceStatus : int32_t {
+enum SliceStatus : int8_t {
UNKNOWN,
CONFIGURED, // Configured but not allowed or rejected yet
ALLOWED, // Allowed to be used
@@ -1082,7 +1081,7 @@
* Enum representing session and service continuity mode as defined in
* 3GPP TS 23.501.
*/
-enum SscMode : int32_t {
+enum SscMode : int8_t {
MODE_1 = 1,
MODE_2 = 2,
MODE_3 = 3,
@@ -1091,7 +1090,7 @@
/**
* Public key type from carrier certificate.
*/
-enum PublicKeyType : int32_t {
+enum PublicKeyType : int8_t {
EPDG = 1, // Key type to be used for ePDG
WLAN = 2, // Key type to be used for WLAN
};
@@ -1200,7 +1199,7 @@
* chunk of phonebook data, means this is a last indication with the left
* data.
*/
-enum PbReceivedStatus : int32_t {
+enum PbReceivedStatus : int8_t {
PB_RECEIVED_OK = 1,
PB_RECEIVED_ERROR = 2,
PB_RECEIVED_ABORT = 3,
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.6/vts/OWNERS
index 3629a6c..a07c917 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,10 +1 @@
-# Telephony team
-refuhoo@google.com
-amitmahajan@google.com
-jackyu@google.com
-fionaxu@google.com
-# more to add
-
-# VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-dshi@google.com
\ No newline at end of file
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/Android.bp b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 65b0dd0..2bc6af3 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
defaults: ["VtsHalTargetTestDefaults"],
srcs: [
"radio_hidl_hal_api.cpp",
+ "radio_hidl_hal_misc.cpp",
"radio_hidl_hal_test.cpp",
"radio_response.cpp",
"radio_indication.cpp",
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_api.cpp b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_api.cpp
index 87320da..391166b 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_api.cpp
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_api.cpp
@@ -19,6 +19,82 @@
#define ASSERT_OK(ret) ASSERT_TRUE(ret.isOk())
/*
+ * Test IRadio.setAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap for the response returned.
+ */
+TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, setAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap) {
+ serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
+ ::android::hardware::hidl_bitfield<::android::hardware::radio::V1_4::RadioAccessFamily>
+ allowedNetworkTypesBitmap{};
+ allowedNetworkTypesBitmap |= ::android::hardware::radio::V1_4::RadioAccessFamily::LTE;
+
+ radio_v1_6->setAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap(serial, allowedNetworkTypesBitmap);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
+ EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
+ EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
+
+ if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
+ radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+ {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
+ radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+ {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::RADIO_NOT_AVAILABLE,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INTERNAL_ERR,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::MODEM_ERR,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NO_RESOURCES}));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test IRadio.getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap for the response returned.
+ */
+TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap) {
+ serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
+ ::android::hardware::hidl_bitfield<::android::hardware::radio::V1_4::RadioAccessFamily>
+ allowedNetworkTypesBitmap{};
+ allowedNetworkTypesBitmap |= ::android::hardware::radio::V1_4::RadioAccessFamily::LTE;
+
+ radio_v1_6->setAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap(serial, allowedNetworkTypesBitmap);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
+ EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
+ EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
+
+ if (radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error == ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE) {
+ sleep(3); // wait for modem
+ serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
+ radio_v1_6->getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap(serial);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
+ EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
+ EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
+
+ if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
+ radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+ {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
+ radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+ {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::RADIO_NOT_AVAILABLE,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INTERNAL_ERR,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::MODEM_ERR,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NO_RESOURCES}));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* Test IRadio.setupDataCall_1_6() for the response returned.
*/
TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, setupDataCall_1_6) {
@@ -204,10 +280,10 @@
}
/*
- * Test IRadio_1_6.sendSMSExpectMore() for the response returned.
+ * Test IRadio_1_6.sendSmsExpectMore() for the response returned.
*/
-TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, sendSMSExpectMore_1_6) {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "sendSMSExpectMore";
+TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, sendSmsExpectMore_1_6) {
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "sendSmsExpectMore";
serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
GsmSmsMessage msg;
msg.smscPdu = "";
@@ -227,7 +303,7 @@
::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::SIM_ABSENT},
CHECK_GENERAL_ERROR));
}
- LOG(DEBUG) << "sendSMSExpectMore finished";
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "sendSmsExpectMore finished";
}
/*
@@ -369,7 +445,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
- if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet1) {
+ if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
{::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
@@ -395,7 +471,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
- if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet1) {
+ if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
{::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
@@ -421,7 +497,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
- if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet1) {
+ if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
{::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
@@ -433,6 +509,8 @@
::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS}));
}
+
+ sleep(1);
serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
res = radio_v1_6->setDataThrottling(serial, DataThrottlingAction::THROTTLE_ANCHOR_CARRIER,
@@ -441,7 +519,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
- if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet1) {
+ if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
{::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
@@ -453,6 +531,8 @@
::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS}));
}
+
+ sleep(1);
serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
res = radio_v1_6->setDataThrottling(serial, DataThrottlingAction::HOLD, 60000);
@@ -461,7 +541,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
- if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet1) {
+ if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
{::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
@@ -473,6 +553,8 @@
::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS}));
}
+
+ sleep(1);
serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
res = radio_v1_6->setDataThrottling(serial, DataThrottlingAction::NO_DATA_THROTTLING, 60000);
@@ -480,7 +562,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
- if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet1) {
+ if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
{::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
@@ -492,6 +574,8 @@
::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS}));
}
+
+ sleep(1);
}
/*
@@ -504,11 +588,11 @@
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
- ASSERT_TRUE(
- CheckAnyOfErrors(radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
- {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
- ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
- ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::RADIO_NOT_AVAILABLE}));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+ {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::RADIO_NOT_AVAILABLE,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::SIM_ERR}));
// setSimCardPower_1_6 does not return until the request is handled, and should not trigger
// CardState::ABSENT when turning off power
@@ -526,11 +610,11 @@
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
- ASSERT_TRUE(
- CheckAnyOfErrors(radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
- {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
- ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
- ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::RADIO_NOT_AVAILABLE}));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+ {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::RADIO_NOT_AVAILABLE,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::SIM_ERR}));
// setSimCardPower_1_6 does not return until the request is handled. Just verify that we still
// have CardState::PRESENT after turning the power back on
@@ -577,7 +661,7 @@
// or Emergency_Only.
if (isDsDsEnabled() || isTsTsEnabled()) {
serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
- radio_v1_6->getVoiceRegistrationState(serial);
+ radio_v1_6->getVoiceRegistrationState_1_6(serial);
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
if (isVoiceEmergencyOnly(radioRsp_v1_6->voiceRegResp.regState) ||
isVoiceInService(radioRsp_v1_6->voiceRegResp.regState)) {
@@ -631,7 +715,7 @@
// or Emergency_Only.
if (isDsDsEnabled() || isTsTsEnabled()) {
serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
- radio_v1_6->getVoiceRegistrationState(serial);
+ radio_v1_6->getVoiceRegistrationState_1_6(serial);
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
if (isVoiceEmergencyOnly(radioRsp_v1_6->voiceRegResp.regState) ||
isVoiceInService(radioRsp_v1_6->voiceRegResp.regState)) {
@@ -684,7 +768,7 @@
// or Emergency_Only.
if (isDsDsEnabled() || isTsTsEnabled()) {
serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
- radio_v1_6->getVoiceRegistrationState(serial);
+ radio_v1_6->getVoiceRegistrationState_1_6(serial);
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
if (isVoiceEmergencyOnly(radioRsp_v1_6->voiceRegResp.regState) ||
isVoiceInService(radioRsp_v1_6->voiceRegResp.regState)) {
@@ -813,7 +897,7 @@
/*
* Test IRadio.updateSimPhonebookRecords() for the response returned.
*/
-TEST_F(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, updateSimPhonebookRecords) {
+TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, updateSimPhonebookRecords) {
serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
radio_v1_6->getSimPhonebookCapacity(serial);
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
@@ -843,7 +927,11 @@
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
- EXPECT_EQ(::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
+ radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+ {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED},
+ CHECK_GENERAL_ERROR));
if(pbCapacity.maxAdnRecords > 0
&& pbCapacity.usedAdnRecords < pbCapacity.maxAdnRecords) {
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_misc.cpp b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_misc.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c99d92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_misc.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <regex>
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h>
+
+/*
+ * Test IRadio.getAvailableNetworks() for the response returned.
+ */
+TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, getAvailableNetworks) {
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "getAvailableNetworks";
+ serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
+
+ radio_v1_6->getAvailableNetworks(serial);
+ EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
+ EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.serial);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.type == RadioResponseType::SOLICITED ||
+ radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.type == RadioResponseType::SOLICITED_ACK_EXP);
+
+ if (cardStatus.base.base.base.cardState == CardState::ABSENT) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
+ radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.error,
+ {::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::NONE,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::CANCELLED,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::DEVICE_IN_USE,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::MODEM_ERR,
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED},
+ CHECK_GENERAL_ERROR));
+ } else if (radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.error ==
+ ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::NONE) {
+ static const std::regex kOperatorNumericRe("^[0-9]{5,6}$");
+ for (OperatorInfo info : radioRsp_v1_6->networkInfos) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(
+ std::regex_match(std::string(info.operatorNumeric), kOperatorNumericRe));
+ }
+ }
+
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "getAvailableNetworks finished";
+}
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_test.cpp b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_test.cpp
index 6255f66..00f4468 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_test.cpp
@@ -16,8 +16,39 @@
#include <radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h>
+bool isServiceValidForDeviceConfiguration(hidl_string& serviceName) {
+ if (isSsSsEnabled()) {
+ // Device is configured as SSSS.
+ if (serviceName != RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT1_NAME) {
+ ALOGI("%s instance is not valid for SSSS device.", serviceName.c_str());
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else if (isDsDsEnabled()) {
+ // Device is configured as DSDS.
+ if (serviceName != RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT1_NAME && serviceName != RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT2_NAME) {
+ ALOGI("%s instance is not valid for DSDS device.", serviceName.c_str());
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else if (isTsTsEnabled()) {
+ // Device is configured as TSTS.
+ if (serviceName != RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT1_NAME && serviceName != RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT2_NAME &&
+ serviceName != RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT3_NAME) {
+ ALOGI("%s instance is not valid for TSTS device.", serviceName.c_str());
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
void RadioHidlTest_v1_6::SetUp() {
- radio_v1_6 = android::hardware::radio::V1_6::IRadio::getService(GetParam());
+ hidl_string serviceName = GetParam();
+
+ if (!isServiceValidForDeviceConfiguration(serviceName)) {
+ ALOGI("Skipped the test due to device configuration.");
+ GTEST_SKIP();
+ }
+
+ radio_v1_6 = android::hardware::radio::V1_6::IRadio::getService(serviceName);
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, radio_v1_6.get());
radioRsp_v1_6 = new (std::nothrow) RadioResponse_v1_6(*this);
@@ -86,16 +117,14 @@
* disabled.
* <p/>
* Typical usage within VTS:
- * if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet) return;
+ * if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) return;
*/
-HalDeviceCapabilities RadioHidlTest_v1_6::getRadioHalCapabilities() {
+bool RadioHidlTest_v1_6::getRadioHalCapabilities() {
sp<::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3::IRadioConfig> radioConfig_v1_3 =
::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3::IRadioConfig::getService();
if (radioConfig_v1_3.get() == nullptr) {
// If v1_3 isn't present, the values are initialized to false
- HalDeviceCapabilities radioHalCapabilities;
- memset(&radioHalCapabilities, 0, sizeof(radioHalCapabilities));
- return radioHalCapabilities;
+ return false;
} else {
// Get radioHalDeviceCapabilities from the radio config
sp<RadioConfigResponse> radioConfigRsp = new (std::nothrow) RadioConfigResponse(*this);
@@ -104,6 +133,6 @@
radioConfig_v1_3->getHalDeviceCapabilities(serial);
EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
- return radioConfigRsp->halDeviceCapabilities;
+ return radioConfigRsp->modemReducedFeatureSet1;
}
}
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h
index 4fc17e5..54c2977 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h
@@ -38,19 +38,19 @@
using namespace ::android::hardware::radio::V1_2;
using namespace ::android::hardware::radio::V1_1;
using namespace ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0;
-using namespace ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3;
using ::android::sp;
using ::android::hardware::hidl_string;
using ::android::hardware::hidl_vec;
using ::android::hardware::Return;
using ::android::hardware::Void;
-using ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3::HalDeviceCapabilities;
#define MODEM_EMERGENCY_CALL_ESTABLISH_TIME 3
#define MODEM_EMERGENCY_CALL_DISCONNECT_TIME 3
-#define RADIO_SERVICE_NAME "slot1"
+#define RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT1_NAME "slot1" // HAL instance name for SIM slot 1 or single SIM device
+#define RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT2_NAME "slot2" // HAL instance name for SIM slot 2 on dual SIM device
+#define RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT3_NAME "slot3" // HAL instance name for SIM slot 3 on triple SIM device
class RadioHidlTest_v1_6;
extern ::android::hardware::radio::V1_5::CardStatus cardStatus;
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
public:
hidl_vec<RadioBandMode> radioBandModes;
+ hidl_vec<OperatorInfo> networkInfos;
::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioResponseInfo rspInfo_v1_0;
::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo rspInfo;
@@ -762,7 +763,7 @@
const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& info,
const SendSmsResult& sms);
- Return<void> sendSMSExpectMoreResponse_1_6(
+ Return<void> sendSmsExpectMoreResponse_1_6(
const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& info,
const SendSmsResult& sms);
@@ -1115,7 +1116,7 @@
public:
virtual void SetUp() override;
- HalDeviceCapabilities getRadioHalCapabilities();
+ bool getRadioHalCapabilities();
/* radio service handle */
sp<::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::IRadio> radio_v1_6;
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_response.cpp b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_response.cpp
index 2b6d1bb..e1b9f56 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_response.cpp
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_response.cpp
@@ -274,8 +274,11 @@
}
Return<void> RadioResponse_v1_6::getAvailableNetworksResponse(
- const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioResponseInfo& /*info*/,
- const ::android::hardware::hidl_vec<OperatorInfo>& /*networkInfos*/) {
+ const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioResponseInfo& info,
+ const ::android::hardware::hidl_vec<OperatorInfo>& networkInfos) {
+ rspInfo_v1_0 = info;
+ this->networkInfos = networkInfos;
+ parent_v1_6.notify(info.serial);
return Void();
}
@@ -1090,7 +1093,7 @@
return Void();
}
-Return<void> RadioResponse_v1_6::sendSMSExpectMoreResponse_1_6(
+Return<void> RadioResponse_v1_6::sendSmsExpectMoreResponse_1_6(
const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& info,
const SendSmsResult& sms) {
rspInfo = info;
@@ -1169,10 +1172,13 @@
}
Return<void> RadioResponse_v1_6::getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmapResponse(
- const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& /*info*/,
+ const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& info,
const ::android::hardware::hidl_bitfield<
::android::hardware::radio::V1_4::RadioAccessFamily>
- /*networkTypeBitmap*/) {
+ networkTypeBitmap) {
+ rspInfo = info;
+ networkTypeBitmapResponse = networkTypeBitmap;
+ parent_v1_6.notify(info.serial);
return Void();
}
@@ -1206,8 +1212,9 @@
Return<void> RadioResponse_v1_6::getVoiceRegistrationStateResponse_1_6(
const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& info,
- const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RegStateResult& /*regResponse*/) {
+ const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RegStateResult& regResponse) {
rspInfo = info;
+ voiceRegResp.regState = regResponse.regState;
parent_v1_6.notify(info.serial);
return Void();
}
diff --git a/radio/config/1.3/Android.bp b/radio/config/1.3/Android.bp
index cc5944d..dc0d82c 100644
--- a/radio/config/1.3/Android.bp
+++ b/radio/config/1.3/Android.bp
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
name: "android.hardware.radio.config@1.3",
root: "android.hardware",
srcs: [
- "types.hal",
"IRadioConfig.hal",
"IRadioConfigResponse.hal",
],
diff --git a/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.hal b/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.hal
index 863754f..f6aee31 100644
--- a/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.hal
+++ b/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.hal
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
import android.hardware.radio@1.6::RadioResponseInfo;
import @1.2::IRadioConfigResponse;
-import HalDeviceCapabilities;
/**
* Interface declaring response functions to solicited radio config requests.
@@ -26,8 +25,20 @@
interface IRadioConfigResponse extends @1.2::IRadioConfigResponse {
/**
* @param info Response info struct containing response type, serial no. and error
- * @param capabilities Capabilities struct containing the capabilities of the
- * device related to the Radio HAL
+ * @param modemReducedFeatureSet1 True indicates that the modem does NOT support the following
+ * features.
+ * - Providing either
+ * android.hardware.radio@1.6::LinkCapacityEstimate:secondaryDownlinkCapacityKbps
+ * or android.hardware.radio@1.6::LinkCapacityEstimate:secondaryUplinkCapacityKbps
+ * when given from
+ * android.hardware.radio@1.6::RadioIndication:currentLinkCapacityEstimate
+ * - Calling android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadio.setNrDualConnectivityState
+ * or querying android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadio.isNrDualConnectivityEnabled
+ * - Requesting android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadio.setDataThrottling()
+ * - Providing android.hardware.radio@1.6::SlicingConfig through
+ * android.hardware.radio@1.6::getSlicingConfig()
+ * - Providing android.hardware.radio@1.6::PhysicalChannelConfig through
+ * android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadioIndication.currentPhysicalChannelConfigs_1_6()
*
* Valid errors returned:
* RadioError:NONE
@@ -35,5 +46,5 @@
* RadioError:INTERNAL_ERR
*/
oneway getHalDeviceCapabilitiesResponse(RadioResponseInfo info,
- HalDeviceCapabilities capabilities);
+ bool modemReducedFeatureSet1);
};
diff --git a/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_hidl_hal_utils.h b/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_hidl_hal_utils.h
index 895ae08..7440054 100644
--- a/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_hidl_hal_utils.h
+++ b/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_hidl_hal_utils.h
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
#include <android/hardware/radio/config/1.2/types.h>
#include <android/hardware/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfig.h>
#include <android/hardware/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.h>
-#include <android/hardware/radio/config/1.3/types.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
#include <hidl/GtestPrinter.h>
#include <hidl/ServiceManagement.h>
@@ -47,7 +46,6 @@
using ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_1::ModemsConfig;
using ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_1::PhoneCapability;
using ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_2::SimSlotStatus;
-using ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3::HalDeviceCapabilities;
using ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3::IRadioConfig;
using ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioResponseInfo;
@@ -63,7 +61,7 @@
public:
RadioResponseInfo rspInfo;
PhoneCapability phoneCap;
- HalDeviceCapabilities halDeviceCapabilities;
+ bool modemReducedFeatureSet1;
RadioConfigResponse(RadioResponseWaiter& parent);
virtual ~RadioConfigResponse() = default;
@@ -91,7 +89,7 @@
Return<void> getHalDeviceCapabilitiesResponse(
const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& info,
- const HalDeviceCapabilities& halDeviceCapabilities);
+ bool modemReducedFeatureSet1);
};
/* Callback class for radio config indication */
diff --git a/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_response.cpp b/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_response.cpp
index 11e3cce..6b2d27c 100644
--- a/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_response.cpp
+++ b/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_response.cpp
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
Return<void> RadioConfigResponse::getHalDeviceCapabilitiesResponse(
const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& /* info */,
- const ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3::HalDeviceCapabilities& capabilities) {
- halDeviceCapabilities = capabilities;
+ bool modemReducedFeatures) {
+ modemReducedFeatureSet1 = modemReducedFeatures;
return Void();
}
diff --git a/rebootescrow/aidl/default/Android.bp b/rebootescrow/aidl/default/Android.bp
index b9fb2a9..1f67a3e 100644
--- a/rebootescrow/aidl/default/Android.bp
+++ b/rebootescrow/aidl/default/Android.bp
@@ -87,7 +87,9 @@
],
static_libs: [
"libhadamardutils",
- "libgtest_prod",
+ ],
+ header_libs: [
+ "libgtest_prod_headers",
],
shared_libs: [
"liblog",
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/Android.bp
index 0c11f3b..3796847 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@
},
rust: {
enabled: true,
+ apex_available: [
+ "//apex_available:platform",
+ "com.android.compos",
+ ],
},
},
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index bf30999..fa643fc 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@
void deleteKey(in byte[] keyBlob);
void deleteAllKeys();
void destroyAttestationIds();
- android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult begin(in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose purpose, in byte[] keyBlob, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] params, in android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken authToken);
+ android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult begin(in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose purpose, in byte[] keyBlob, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] params, in @nullable android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken authToken);
void deviceLocked(in boolean passwordOnly, in @nullable android.hardware.security.secureclock.TimeStampToken timestampToken);
void earlyBootEnded();
byte[] convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(in byte[] storageKeyBlob);
- byte[] performOperation(in byte[] request);
+ android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCharacteristics[] getKeyCharacteristics(in byte[] keyBlob, in byte[] appId, in byte[] appData);
const int AUTH_TOKEN_MAC_LENGTH = 32;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index 88c479c..f566462 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
/* @hide */
@VintfStability
interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
+ android.hardware.security.keymint.RpcHardwareInfo getHardwareInfo();
byte[] generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(in boolean testMode, out android.hardware.security.keymint.MacedPublicKey macedPublicKey);
byte[] generateCertificateRequest(in boolean testMode, in android.hardware.security.keymint.MacedPublicKey[] keysToSign, in byte[] endpointEncryptionCertChain, in byte[] challenge, out android.hardware.security.keymint.DeviceInfo deviceInfo, out android.hardware.security.keymint.ProtectedData protectedData);
const int STATUS_FAILED = 1;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/RpcHardwareInfo.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/RpcHardwareInfo.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06bce19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/RpcHardwareInfo.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE. //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL file. Do not edit it manually. There are
+// two cases:
+// 1). this is a frozen version file - do not edit this in any case.
+// 2). this is a 'current' file. If you make a backwards compatible change to
+// the interface (from the latest frozen version), the build system will
+// prompt you to update this file with `m <name>-update-api`.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible change to any AIDL file built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.security.keymint;
+/* @hide */
+@RustDerive(Clone=true, Eq=true, Hash=true, Ord=true, PartialEq=true, PartialOrd=true) @VintfStability
+parcelable RpcHardwareInfo {
+ int versionNumber;
+ @utf8InCpp String rpcAuthorName;
+ int supportedEekCurve = 0;
+ const int CURVE_NONE = 0;
+ const int CURVE_P256 = 1;
+ const int CURVE_25519 = 2;
+}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
index 7591318..e310b44 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@
RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = 1342177480,
INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = 1879048394,
RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST = 536871115,
- BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS = 268435757,
BOOTLOADER_ONLY = 1879048494,
ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = 1879048495,
HARDWARE_TYPE = 268435760,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
index b4bc60c..4e3008f 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
@@ -27,7 +27,19 @@
@VintfStability
@RustDerive(Clone=true, Eq=true, PartialEq=true, Ord=true, PartialOrd=true, Hash=true)
parcelable AttestationKey {
+ /**
+ * Key blob containing a key pair with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY
+ */
byte[] keyBlob;
+
+ /**
+ * Key parameters needed to use the key in keyBlob, notably Tag::APPLICATION_ID and
+ * Tag::APPLICATION_DATA, if they were provided during generation of the key in keyBlob.
+ */
KeyParameter[] attestKeyParams;
+
+ /**
+ * The issuerSubjectName to use in the generated attestation.
+ */
byte[] issuerSubjectName;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
index 2304a58..b5336b9 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
@@ -25,7 +25,10 @@
*/
@VintfStability
parcelable BeginResult {
- /* This is the challenge used in verifyAuthorization. It must be a nonce. */
+ /**
+ * This is the challenge used to verify authorization of an operation.
+ * See IKeyMintOperation.aidl entrypoints updateAad() and update().
+ */
long challenge;
/**
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
index 3ea14a1..32d69cd 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
@@ -37,10 +37,13 @@
* ? "board" : tstr,
* ? "vb_state" : "green" / "yellow" / "orange", // Taken from the AVB values
* ? "bootloader_state" : "locked" / "unlocked", // Taken from the AVB values
+ * ? "vbmeta_digest": bstr, // Taken from the AVB values
* ? "os_version" : tstr, // Same as android.os.Build.VERSION.release
* ? "system_patch_level" : uint, // YYYYMMDD
* ? "boot_patch_level" : uint, // YYYYMMDD
* ? "vendor_patch_level" : uint, // YYYYMMDD
+ * "version" : 1, // The CDDL schema version.
+ * "security_level" : "tee" / "strongbox"
* }
*/
byte[] deviceInfo;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index 1c503c2..88b2a26 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
import android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.IKeyMintOperation;
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCharacteristics;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCreationResult;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyFormat;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyMintHardwareInfo;
@@ -107,7 +108,6 @@
*
* - 168-bit keys.
* - CBC and ECB mode.
-
* - CBC and ECB modes must support unpadded and PKCS7 padding modes. With no padding CBC and
* ECB-mode operations must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the input isn't a
* multiple of the DES block size.
@@ -150,8 +150,8 @@
*
* The IKeyMintDevice must ignore unknown tags.
*
- * The caller must always provide the current date time in the keyParameter CREATION_DATETIME
- * tags.
+ * The caller may provide the current date time in the keyParameter CREATION_DATETIME tag, but
+ * this is optional and informational only.
*
* All authorization tags and their values enforced by an IKeyMintDevice must be cryptographically
* bound to the private/secret key material such that any modification of the portion of the key
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@
* startup, preferably by the bootloader. This bitstring must be cryptographically bound to every
* key managed by the IKeyMintDevice. As above, the recommended mechanism for this cryptographic
* binding is to include the Root of Trust data in the input to the key derivation function used to
- * derive a key that is used to encryp the private/secret key material.
+ * derive a key that is used to encrypt the private/secret key material.
*
* The root of trust consists of a bitstring that must be derived from the public key used by
* Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image and from the lock state of the
@@ -233,8 +233,6 @@
* indistinguishable from random. Thus, if the entropy from any source is good, the output
* must be good.
*
- * TODO(seleneh) specify what mixing functions and cprng we allow.
- *
* @param data Bytes to be mixed into the CRNG seed. The caller must not provide more than 2
* KiB of data per invocation.
*
@@ -247,7 +245,7 @@
* Generates a new cryptographic key, specifying associated parameters, which must be
* cryptographically bound to the key. IKeyMintDevice implementations must disallow any use
* of a key in any way inconsistent with the authorizations specified at generation time. With
- * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure envionment's
+ * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure environment's
* obligation is limited to ensuring that the unenforceable parameters associated with the key
* cannot be modified. In addition, the characteristics returned by generateKey places
* parameters correctly in the tee-enforced and strongbox-enforced lists.
@@ -257,9 +255,6 @@
*
* o Tag::ORIGIN with the value KeyOrigin::GENERATED.
*
- * o Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS with the appropriate value (see KeyBlobUsageRequirements in
- * Tag.aidl).
- *
* o Tag::OS_VERSION, Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL, Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL and Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL with
* appropriate values.
*
@@ -271,15 +266,14 @@
*
* The following parameters are required to generate an RSA key:
*
- * o Tag::Key_SIZE specifies the size of the public modulus, in bits. If omitted, generateKey
+ * o Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size of the public modulus, in bits. If omitted, generateKey
* must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. Required values for TEE IKeyMintDevice
* implementations are 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096. StrongBox IKeyMintDevice implementations
* must support 2048.
*
* o Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT specifies the RSA public exponent value. If omitted, generateKey
* must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. The values 3 and 65537 must be supported. It is
- * recommended to support all prime values up to 2^64. If provided with a non-prime value,
- * generateKey must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ * recommended to support all prime values up to 2^64.
*
* The following parameters are not necessary to generate a usable RSA key, but generateKey must
* not return an error if they are omitted:
@@ -288,7 +282,7 @@
* except AGREE_KEY must be supported for RSA keys.
*
* o Tag::DIGEST specifies digest algorithms that may be used with the new key. TEE
- * IKeyMintDevice implementatiosn must support all Digest values (see digest.aidl) for RSA
+ * IKeyMintDevice implementations must support all Digest values (see digest.aidl) for RSA
* keys. StrongBox IKeyMintDevice implementations must support SHA_2_256.
*
* o Tag::PADDING specifies the padding modes that may be used with the new
@@ -298,11 +292,9 @@
*
* == ECDSA Keys ==
*
- * Either Tag::KEY_SIZE or Tag::EC_CURVE must be provided to generate an ECDSA key. If neither
- * is provided, generateKey must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. If Tag::KEY_SIZE is
- * provided, the possible values are 224, 256, 384 and 521, and must be mapped to Tag::EC_CURVE
- * values P_224, P_256, P_384 and P_521, respectively. TEE IKeyMintDevice implementations
- * must support all curves. StrongBox implementations must support P_256.
+ * Tag::EC_CURVE must be provided to generate an ECDSA key. If it is not provided, generateKey
+ * must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. TEE IKeyMintDevice implementations must support
+ * all curves. StrongBox implementations must support P_256.
*
* == AES Keys ==
*
@@ -312,6 +304,10 @@
* If Tag::BLOCK_MODE is specified with value BlockMode::GCM, then the caller must also provide
* Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH. If omitted, generateKey must return ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
*
+ * == 3DES Keys ==
+ *
+ * Only Tag::KEY_SIZE is required to generate an 3DES key, and its value must be 168. If
+ * omitted, generateKey must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
*
* @param keyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
* provided in params. See above for detailed specifications of which tags are required
@@ -320,10 +316,15 @@
* @param attestationKey, if provided, specifies the key that must be used to sign the
* attestation certificate. If `keyParams` does not contain a Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE
* but `attestationKey` is non-null, the IKeyMintDevice must return
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. If the provided AttestationKey does not contain a key
- * blob containing an asymmetric key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the IKeyMintDevice must
- * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE. If the provided AttestationKey has an empty
- * issuer subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ * ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING. If the provided AttestationKey does not
+ * contain a key blob containing an asymmetric key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the
+ * IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE. If the provided
+ * AttestationKey has an empty issuer subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ *
+ * If `attestationKey` is null and `keyParams` contains Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE but
+ * the KeyMint implementation does not have factory-provisioned attestation keys, it must
+ * return ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED.
*
* @return The result of key creation. See KeyCreationResult.aidl.
*/
@@ -348,13 +349,12 @@
*
* o Tag::ORIGIN (returned in keyCharacteristics) must have the value KeyOrigin::IMPORTED.
*
- * @param inKeyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
+ * @param keyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
* provided in params.
*
- * @param inKeyFormat The format of the key material to import. See KeyFormat in
- * keyformat.aidl.
+ * @param keyFormat The format of the key material to import. See KeyFormat in keyformat.aidl.
*
- * @param inKeyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat.
+ * @param keyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat.
*
* @param attestationKey, if provided, specifies the key that must be used to sign the
* attestation certificate. If `keyParams` does not contain a Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE
@@ -364,6 +364,10 @@
* return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE. If the provided AttestationKey has an empty
* issuer subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
*
+ * If `attestationKey` is null and `keyParams` contains Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE but
+ * the KeyMint implementation does not have factory-provisioned attestation keys, it must
+ * return ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED.
+ *
* @return The result of key creation. See KeyCreationResult.aidl.
*/
KeyCreationResult importKey(in KeyParameter[] keyParams, in KeyFormat keyFormat,
@@ -373,9 +377,8 @@
* Securely imports a key, or key pair, returning a key blob and a description of the imported
* key.
*
- * @param inWrappedKeyData The wrapped key material to import.
- * TODO(seleneh) Decide if we want the wrapped key in DER-encoded ASN.1 format or CBOR
- * format or both. And specify the standarized format.
+ * @param wrappedKeyData The wrapped key material to import, as ASN.1 DER-encoded data
+ * corresponding to the following schema.
*
* KeyDescription ::= SEQUENCE(
* keyFormat INTEGER, # Values from KeyFormat enum.
@@ -393,20 +396,20 @@
*
* Where:
*
- * o keyFormat is an integer from the KeyFormat enum, defining the format of the plaintext
+ * - keyFormat is an integer from the KeyFormat enum, defining the format of the plaintext
* key material.
- * o keyParams is the characteristics of the key to be imported (as with generateKey or
+ * - keyParams is the characteristics of the key to be imported (as with generateKey or
* importKey). If the secure import is successful, these characteristics must be
* associated with the key exactly as if the key material had been insecurely imported
- * with the IKeyMintDevice::importKey. See attestKey() for documentation of the
- * AuthorizationList schema.
- * o encryptedTransportKey is a 256-bit AES key, XORed with a masking key and then encrypted
+ * with the IKeyMintDevice::importKey. See KeyCreationResult.aidl for documentation of
+ * the AuthorizationList schema.
+ * - encryptedTransportKey is a 256-bit AES key, XORed with a masking key and then encrypted
* with the wrapping key specified by wrappingKeyBlob.
- * o keyDescription is a KeyDescription, above.
- * o encryptedKey is the key material of the key to be imported, in format keyFormat, and
+ * - keyDescription is a KeyDescription, above.
+ * - encryptedKey is the key material of the key to be imported, in format keyFormat, and
* encrypted with encryptedEphemeralKey in AES-GCM mode, with the DER-encoded
* representation of keyDescription provided as additional authenticated data.
- * o tag is the tag produced by the AES-GCM encryption of encryptedKey.
+ * - tag is the tag produced by the AES-GCM encryption of encryptedKey.
*
* So, importWrappedKey does the following:
*
@@ -435,7 +438,7 @@
*
* @param passwordSid specifies the password secure ID (SID) of the user that owns the key being
* installed. If the authorization list in wrappedKeyData contains a
- * Tag::USER_SECURE_IDwith a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD bit
+ * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID with a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD bit
* set, the constructed key must be bound to the SID value provided by this argument. If
* the wrappedKeyData does not contain such a tag and value, this argument must be
* ignored.
@@ -478,9 +481,9 @@
* patch level and OS version. This requirement is relaxed for 4.0::IKeymasterDevice and
* IKeyMintDevice, and the OS version in the boot image footer is no longer used.
*
- * @param inKeyBlobToUpgrade The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+ * @param keyBlobToUpgrade The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey().
*
- * @param inUpgradeParams A parameter list containing any parameters needed to complete the
+ * @param upgradeParams A parameter list containing any parameters needed to complete the
* upgrade, including Tag::APPLICATION_ID and Tag::APPLICATION_DATA.
*
* @return A new key blob that references the same key as keyBlobToUpgrade, but is in the new
@@ -494,7 +497,9 @@
* render the key permanently unusable. Keys without Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or
* may not be rendered unusable.
*
- * @param inKeyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+ * @param keyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+ *
+ * @return error See the ErrorCode enum.
*/
void deleteKey(in byte[] keyBlob);
@@ -503,8 +508,6 @@
* this function is called all keys with Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE in their hardware-enforced
* authorization lists must be rendered permanently unusable. Keys without
* Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or may not be rendered unusable.
- *
- * @return error See the ErrorCode enum.
*/
void deleteAllKeys();
@@ -523,28 +526,27 @@
/**
* Begins a cryptographic operation using the specified key. If all is well, begin() must
- * return ErrorCode::OK and create an operation handle which must be passed to subsequent calls
- * to update(), finish() or abort().
+ * return ErrorCode::OK and create an IKeyMintOperation handle which will be used to perform
+ * the cryptographic operation.
*
- * It is critical that each call to begin() be paired with a subsequent call to finish() or
- * abort(), to allow the IKeyMintDevice implementation to clean up any internal operation
- * state. The caller's failure to do this may leak internal state space or other internal
- * resources and may eventually cause begin() to return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS when it
- * runs out of space for operations. Any result other than ErrorCode::OK from begin(), update()
- * or finish() implicitly aborts the operation, in which case abort() need not be called (and
- * must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE if called). IKeyMintDevice implementations
- * must support 32 concurrent operations.
+ * It is critical that each successful call to begin() be paired with a subsequent call to
+ * finish() or abort() on the resulting IKeyMintOperation, to allow the IKeyMintDevice
+ * implementation to clean up any internal operation state. The caller's failure to do this may
+ * leak internal state space or other internal resources and may eventually cause begin() to
+ * return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS when it runs out of space for operations. Any result
+ * other than ErrorCode::OK from begin() will not return an IKeyMintOperation (in which case
+ * calling finish() or abort() is neither possible nor necessary). IKeyMintDevice
+ * implementations must support 32 concurrent operations.
*
* If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were specified during key generation or
* import, calls to begin must include those tags with the originally-specified values in the
- * inParams argument to this method. If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
+ * params argument to this method. If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
*
* == Authorization Enforcement ==
*
* The following key authorization parameters must be enforced by the IKeyMintDevice secure
* environment if the tags were returned in the "hardwareEnforced" list in the
- * KeyCharacteristics. Public key operations, meaning KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and
- * KeyPurpose::VERIFY must be allowed to succeed even if authorization requirements are not met.
+ * KeyCharacteristics.
*
* -- All Key Types --
*
@@ -573,9 +575,9 @@
*
* o Tag::USER_SECURE_ID must be enforced by this method if and only if the key also has
* Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT (if it does not have Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT, the Tag::USER_SECURE_ID
- * requirement must be enforced by update() and finish()). If the key has both, then this
- * method must receive a non-empty HardwareAuthToken in the authToken argument. For the auth
- * token to be valid, all of the following have to be true:
+ * requirement must be enforced by updateAad(), update() and finish()). If the key has both,
+ * then this method must receive a non-empty HardwareAuthToken in the authToken argument. For
+ * the auth token to be valid, all of the following have to be true:
*
* o The HMAC field must validate correctly.
*
@@ -602,32 +604,30 @@
*
* -- RSA Keys --
*
- * All RSA key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams. If unspecified or
+ * All RSA key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in params. If unspecified or
* specified more than once, the begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.
*
- * RSA signing and verification operations need a digest, as do RSA encryption and decryption
- * operations with OAEP padding mode. For those cases, the caller must specify exactly one
- * digest in inParams. If unspecified or specified more than once, begin() must return
+ * RSA signing operations need a digest, as do RSA encryption and decryption operations with
+ * OAEP padding mode. For those cases, the caller must specify exactly one digest in params.
+ * If unspecified or specified more than once, begin() must return
* ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST.
*
* Private key operations (KeyPurpose::DECRYPT and KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of
* digest and padding, which means that the key authorizations need to contain the specified
* values. If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST or
- * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING, as appropriate. Public key operations (KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT
- * and KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are permitted with unauthorized digest or padding modes.
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, as appropriate.
*
* With the exception of PaddingMode::NONE, all RSA padding modes are applicable only to certain
* purposes. Specifically, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN and PaddingMode::RSA_PSS only
- * support signing and verification, while PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and
- * PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP only support encryption and decryption. begin() must return
- * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE if the specified mode does not support the specified
- * purpose.
+ * support signing, while PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP only
+ * support encryption and decryption. begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE
+ * if the specified mode does not support the specified purpose.
*
* There are some important interactions between padding modes and digests:
*
- * o PaddingMode::NONE indicates that a "raw" RSA operation is performed. If signing or
- * verifying, Digest::NONE is specified for the digest. No digest is necessary for unpadded
- * encryption or decryption.
+ * o PaddingMode::NONE indicates that a "raw" RSA operation is performed. If signing,
+ * Digest::NONE is specified for the digest. No digest is necessary for unpadded encryption
+ * or decryption.
*
* o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN padding requires a digest. The digest may be Digest::NONE,
* in which case the KeyMint implementation cannot build a proper PKCS#1 v1.5 signature
@@ -639,37 +639,37 @@
*
* o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_1_5_ENCRYPT padding does not require a digest.
*
- * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE. If
- * Digest::NONE is specified, the begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. In
- * addition, the size of the RSA key must be at least 2 + D bytes larger than the output size
- * of the digest, where D is the size of the digest, in bytes. Otherwise begin() must
- * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. The salt size must be D.
+ * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS padding requires a digest, which must match one of the padding values
+ * in the key authorizations, and which may not be Digest::NONE. begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST if this is not the case. In addition, the size of the RSA
+ * key must be at least 2 + D bytes larger than the output size of the digest, where D is the
+ * size of the digest, in bytes. Otherwise begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. The salt size must be D.
*
- * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE. If
- * Digest::NONE is specified, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. The OAEP
- * mask generation function must be MGF1 and the MGF1 digest must be SHA1, regardless of the
- * OAEP digest specified.
+ * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP padding requires a digest, which must match one of the padding values
+ * in the key authorizations, and which may not be Digest::NONE. begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST if this is not the case. RSA_OAEP padding also requires an
+ * MGF1 digest, specified with Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, which must match one of the MGF1
+ * padding values in the key authorizations and which may not be Digest::NONE. begin() must
+ * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST if this is not the case. The OAEP mask generation
+ * function must be MGF1.
*
* -- EC Keys --
*
- * EC key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams. If unspecified or
- * specified more than once, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.
- *
* Private key operations (KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of digest and padding, which
* means that the key authorizations must contain the specified values. If not, begin() must
- * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. Public key operations (KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are
- * permitted with unauthorized digest or padding.
+ * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
*
* -- AES Keys --
*
* AES key operations must specify exactly one block mode (Tag::BLOCK_MODE) and one padding mode
- * (Tag::PADDING) in inParams. If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
+ * (Tag::PADDING) in params. If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
* begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE or
* ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE. The specified modes must be authorized by the key,
* otherwise begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE or
* ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
*
- * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM, inParams must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH, and the specified
+ * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM, params must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH, and the specified
* value must be a multiple of 8 that is not greater than 128 or less than the value of
* Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations. For MAC lengths greater than 128 or
* non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH. For values less
@@ -682,48 +682,66 @@
*
* If the block mode is BlockMode::CBC, BlockMode::CTR, or BlockMode::GCM, an initialization
* vector or nonce is required. In most cases, callers shouldn't provide an IV or nonce and the
- * IKeyMintDevice implementation must generate a random IV or nonce and return it via
- * Tag::NONCE in outParams. CBC and CTR IVs are 16 bytes. GCM nonces are 12 bytes. If the key
+ * IKeyMintDevice implementation must generate a random IV or nonce and return it via Tag::NONCE
+ * in outParams. CBC and CTR IVs are 16 bytes. GCM nonces are 12 bytes. If the key
* authorizations contain Tag::CALLER_NONCE, then the caller may provide an IV/nonce with
- * Tag::NONCE in inParams. If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
+ * Tag::NONCE in params, which must be of the correct size (if not, return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE). If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
* begin() must return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED. If a nonce is not provided when
- * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice msut generate a random IV/nonce.
+ * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice must generate a random IV/nonce.
+ *
+ * -- 3DES Keys --
+ *
+ * 3DES key operations must specify exactly one block mode (Tag::BLOCK_MODE) and one padding
+ * mode (Tag::PADDING) in params. If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
+ * begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE or
+ * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE. The specified modes must be authorized by the key,
+ * otherwise begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE or
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
+ *
+ * If the block mode is BlockMode::CBC, an initialization vector or nonce is required. In most
+ * cases, callers shouldn't provide an IV or nonce and the IKeyMintDevice implementation must
+ * generate a random IV or nonce and return it via Tag::NONCE in outParams. CBC IVs are 8
+ * bytes. If the key authorizations contain Tag::CALLER_NONCE, then the caller may provide an
+ * IV/nonce with Tag::NONCE in params, which must be of the correct size (if not, return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE). If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
+ * begin() must return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED. If a nonce is not provided when
+ * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice must generate a random IV/nonce.
+ *
*
* -- HMAC keys --
*
- * HMAC key operations must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH in inParams. The specified value must be a
+ * HMAC key operations must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH in params. The specified value must be a
* multiple of 8 that is not greater than the digest length or less than the value of
* Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations. For MAC lengths greater than the digest
* length or non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH. For
* values less than the key's minimum length, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH.
*
- * @param inPurpose The purpose of the operation, one of KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
- * KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, KeyPurpose::SIGN, KeyPurpose::VERIFY, or KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY.
- * Note that for AEAD modes, encryption and decryption imply signing and verification,
- * respectively, but must be specified as KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and KeyPurpose::DECRYPT.
+ * @param purpose The purpose of the operation, one of KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT,
+ * KeyPurpose::SIGN, KeyPurpose::VERIFY, or KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY. Note that for AEAD
+ * modes, encryption and decryption imply signing and verification, respectively, but
+ * must be specified as KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and KeyPurpose::DECRYPT.
*
- * @param inKeyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey(). The key
+ * @param keyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey(). The key
* must have a purpose compatible with purpose and all of its usage requirements must be
* satisfied, or begin() must return an appropriate error code (see above).
*
- * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation. If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or
+ * @param params Additional parameters for the operation. If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or
* Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were provided during generation, they must be provided here, or
* the operation must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB. For operations that require
- * a nonce or IV, on keys that were generated with Tag::CALLER_NONCE, inParams may
+ * a nonce or IV, on keys that were generated with Tag::CALLER_NONCE, params may
* contain a tag Tag::NONCE. If Tag::NONCE is provided for a key without
* Tag:CALLER_NONCE, ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED must be returned.
*
- * @param inAuthToken Authentication token. Callers that provide no token must set all numeric
- * fields to zero and the MAC must be an empty vector. TODO: make this field nullable.
- * b/173483024.
+ * @param authToken Authentication token.
*
* @return BeginResult as output, which contains the challenge, KeyParameters which haves
* additional data from the operation initialization, notably to return the IV or nonce
* from operations that generate an IV or nonce, and IKeyMintOperation object pointer
- * which is used to perform update(), finish() or abort() operations.
+ * which is used to perform updateAad(), update(), finish() or abort() operations.
*/
BeginResult begin(in KeyPurpose purpose, in byte[] keyBlob, in KeyParameter[] params,
- in HardwareAuthToken authToken);
+ in @nullable HardwareAuthToken authToken);
/**
* Called by client to notify the IKeyMintDevice that the device is now locked, and keys with
@@ -737,7 +755,7 @@
* Note that the IKeyMintDevice UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED semantics are slightly different from
* the UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED semantics enforced by keystore. Keystore handles device locking
* on a per-user basis. Because auth tokens do not contain an Android user ID, it's not
- * possible to replicate the keystore enformcement logic in IKeyMintDevice. So from the
+ * possible to replicate the keystore enforcement logic in IKeyMintDevice. So from the
* IKeyMintDevice perspective, any user unlock unlocks all UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED keys.
* Keystore will continue enforcing the per-user device locking.
*
@@ -763,7 +781,7 @@
*/
void earlyBootEnded();
- /*
+ /**
* Called by the client to get a wrapped per-boot ephemeral key from a wrapped storage key.
* Clients will then use the returned per-boot ephemeral key in place of the wrapped storage
* key. Whenever the hardware is presented with a per-boot ephemeral key for an operation, it
@@ -785,16 +803,25 @@
byte[] convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(in byte[] storageKeyBlob);
/**
- * Called by the client to perform a KeyMint operation.
+ * Returns KeyMint-enforced parameters associated with the provided key. The returned tags are
+ * a subset of KeyCharacteristics found in the KeyCreationResult returned by generateKey(),
+ * importKey(), or importWrappedKey(). The returned value is a subset, as it does not include
+ * any Keystore-enforced parameters.
*
- * This method is added primarily as a placeholder. Details will be fleshed before the KeyMint
- * V1 interface is frozen. Until then, implementations must return ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED.
+ * @param keyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey, importKey or importWrappedKey.
*
- * @param request is an encrypted buffer containing a description of the operation the client
- * wishes to perform. Structure, content and encryption are TBD.
+ * @param appId An opaque byte string identifying the client. This value must match the
+ * Tag::APPLICATION_ID data provided during key generation/import. Without the correct
+ * value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to obtain the
+ * key material.
*
- * @return an encrypted buffer containing the result of the operation. Structure, content and
- * encryption are TBD.
+ * @param appData An opaque byte string provided by the application. This value must match the
+ * Tag::APPLICATION_DATA data provided during key generation/import. Without the
+ * correct value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to
+ * obtain the key material.
+ *
+ * @return Characteristics of the generated key. See KeyCreationResult for details.
*/
- byte[] performOperation(in byte[] request);
+ KeyCharacteristics[] getKeyCharacteristics(
+ in byte[] keyBlob, in byte[] appId, in byte[] appData);
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
index d2a993f..ce83044 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@
* update() is called. If updateAad() is called after update(), it must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG.
*
- * If operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
+ * If the operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
*
* If this method returns an error code other than ErrorCode::OK, the operation is aborted and
- * the operation handle must be invalidated. Any future use of the handle, with this method,
- * finish, or abort, must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
+ * the operation handle must be invalidated. Any future use of this object must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
*
* == Authorization Enforcement ==
*
@@ -58,9 +58,10 @@
*
* o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
*
- * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operationHandle
+ * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the value returned from
+ * IKeyMintDevice::begin(), given by the challenge field of the BeginResult structure.
*
- * If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return
+ * If any of these conditions are not met, updateAad() must return
* ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
*
* The caller must provide the auth token on every call to updateAad(), update() and finish().
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@
*
* @param input Additional Authentication Data to be processed.
*
- * @param authToken Authentication token. Can be nullable if not provided.
+ * @param authToken Authentication token, if provided.
*
* @param timeStampToken timestamp token, certifies the freshness of an auth token in case
* the security domain of this KeyMint instance has a different clock than the
@@ -93,18 +94,9 @@
* If operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
*
- * To provide more flexibility for buffer handling, implementations of this method have the
- * option of consuming less data than was provided. The caller is responsible for looping to
- * feed the rest of the data in subsequent calls. The amount of input consumed must be returned
- * in the inputConsumed parameter. Implementations must always consume at least one byte,
- * unless the operation cannot accept any more; if more than zero bytes are provided and zero
- * bytes are consumed, callers must consider this an error and abort the operation.
- * TODO(seleneh) update the code to always consume alll the input data. b/168665179.
- *
- * Implementations may also choose how much data to return, as a result of the update. This is
- * only relevant for encryption and decryption operations, because signing and verification
- * return no data until finish. It is recommended to return data as early as possible, rather
- * than buffer it.
+ * Implementations may choose how much data to return as a result of the update. This is
+ * only relevant for encryption and decryption operations, because signing returns no data
+ * until finish. It is recommended to return data as early as possible, rather than buffer it.
*
* If this method returns an error code other than ErrorCode::OK, the operation is aborted and
* the operation handle must be invalidated. Any future use of the handle, with this method,
@@ -112,8 +104,8 @@
*
* == Authorization Enforcement ==
*
- * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in begin(). The one exception is the
- * case where the key has:
+ * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in IKeyMintDevice::begin(). The one
+ * exception is the case where the key has:
*
* o One or more Tag::USER_SECURE_IDs, and
*
@@ -130,7 +122,8 @@
*
* o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
*
- * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operationHandle
+ * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the challenge value contained in the
+ * BeginResult returned from IKeyMintDevice::begin().
*
* If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return
* ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
@@ -139,22 +132,20 @@
*
* -- RSA keys --
*
- * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire
- * block to be signed or verified in a single update. It may not consume only a portion of the
- * block in these cases. However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple
- * updates, and update() must accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more
- * data to sign than can be used (length of data exceeds RSA key size), update() must return
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+ * For signing operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire block to be
+ * signed in a single update. It may not consume only a portion of the block in these cases.
+ * However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates, and update() must
+ * accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more data to sign than can be used
+ * (length of data exceeds RSA key size), update() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
*
* -- ECDSA keys --
*
- * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire
- * block to be signed or verified in a single update. This method may not consume only a
- * portion of the block. However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates
- * and update() must accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more data to sign
- * than can be used, the data is silently truncated. (This differs from the handling of excess
- * data provided in similar RSA operations. The reason for this is compatibility with legacy
- * clients.)
+ * For signing operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire block to be
+ * signed in a single update. This method may not consume only a portion of the block.
+ * However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates and update() must
+ * accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more data to sign than can be used,
+ * the data is silently truncated. (This differs from the handling of excess data provided in
+ * similar RSA operations. The reason for this is compatibility with legacy clients.)
*
* -- AES keys --
*
@@ -164,8 +155,7 @@
* it must process all but the tag length and buffer the possible tag data for processing during
* finish().
*
- * @param input Data to be processed. Note that update() may or may not consume all of the data
- * provided. See return value.
+ * @param input Data to be processed. update() must consume all input data.
*
* @param authToken Authentication token. Can be nullable if not provided.
*
@@ -182,7 +172,7 @@
in @nullable TimeStampToken timeStampToken);
/**
- * Finalizes a cryptographic operation begun with begin() and invalidates operation.
+ * Finalizes a cryptographic operation begun with begin() and invalidates the operation.
*
* This method is the last one called in an operation, so all processed data must be returned.
*
@@ -190,8 +180,7 @@
* Any future use of the operation, with finish(), update(), or abort(), must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
*
- * Signing operations return the signature as the output. Verification operations accept the
- * signature in the signature parameter, and return no output.
+ * Signing operations return the signature as the output.
*
* == Authorization enforcement ==
*
@@ -230,44 +219,35 @@
* Some additional requirements, depending on the padding mode:
*
* o PaddingMode::NONE. For unpadded signing and encryption operations, if the provided data is
- * shorter than the key, the data must be zero-padded on the left before
- * signing/encryption. If the data is the same length as the key, but numerically larger,
- * finish() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. For verification and decryption
- * operations, the data must be exactly as long as the key. Otherwise, return
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+ * shorter than the key, the data must be zero-padded on the left before signing/encryption.
+ * If the data is the same length as the key, but numerically larger, finish() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. For decryption operations, the data must be exactly as long
+ * as the key. Otherwise, return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
*
* o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS. For PSS-padded signature operations, the PSS salt length must match
- * the size of the PSS digest selected. The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams
+ * the size of the PSS digest selected. The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in params
* on begin() must be used as the PSS digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask
* generation function and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm.
*
- * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP. The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams on begin is
- * used as the OAEP digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask generation function and
- * and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm.
- *
* -- ECDSA keys --
*
- * If the data provided for unpadded signing or verification is too long, truncate it.
+ * If the data provided for undigested signing is too long, truncate it.
*
* -- AES keys --
*
* Some additional conditions, depending on block mode:
*
* o BlockMode::ECB or BlockMode::CBC. If padding is PaddingMode::NONE and the data length is
- * not a multiple of the AES block size, finish() must return
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. If padding is PaddingMode::PKCS7, pad the data per the
- * PKCS#7 specification, including adding an additional padding block if the data is a multiple
- * of the block length.
+ * not a multiple of the AES block size, finish() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. If padding is PaddingMode::PKCS7, pad the data per the
+ * PKCS#7 specification, including adding an additional padding block if the data is a
+ * multiple of the block length.
*
* o BlockMode::GCM. During encryption, after processing all plaintext, compute the tag
* (Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes) and append it to the returned ciphertext. During decryption,
* process the last Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes as the tag. If tag verification fails, finish()
* must return ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED.
*
- * TODO: update() will need to be refactored into 2 function. b/168665179.
- *
- * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation.
- *
* @param input Data to be processed, per the parameters established in the call to begin().
* finish() must consume all provided data or return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
*
@@ -281,11 +261,9 @@
* token.
*
* @param confirmationToken is the confirmation token required by keys with
- * Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.
+ * Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.
*
* @return The output data, if any.
- *
- * @return outParams Any output parameters generated by finish().
*/
byte[] finish(in @nullable byte[] input, in @nullable byte[] signature,
in @nullable HardwareAuthToken authToken,
@@ -293,13 +271,10 @@
in @nullable byte[] confirmationToken);
/**
- * Aborts a cryptographic operation begun with begin(), freeing all internal resources. If an
- * operation was finalized, calling update, finish, or abort yields
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. An operation is finalized if finish or abort was
- * called on it, or if update returned an ErrorCode.
- *
- * @param operationHandle The operation handle returned by begin(). This handle must be
- * invalid when abort() returns.
+ * Aborts a cryptographic operation begun with IKeyMintDevice::begin(), freeing all internal
+ * resources. If an operation was finalized, calling updateAad, update, finish, or abort yields
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. An operation is finalized if finish or abort was called
+ * on it, or if updateAad or update returned an ErrorCode.
*
* @return error See the ErrorCode enum in ErrorCode.aidl.
*/
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index 1ae6762..a29fb08 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
import android.hardware.security.keymint.DeviceInfo;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.MacedPublicKey;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.ProtectedData;
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.RpcHardwareInfo;
/**
* An IRemotelyProvisionedComponent is a secure-side component for which certificates can be
@@ -32,8 +33,8 @@
*
* The root of trust for secure provisioning is something called the "Boot Certificate Chain", or
* BCC. The BCC is a chain of public key certificates, represented as COSE_Sign1 objects containing
- * COSE_Key representations of the public keys. The "root" of the BCC is a self-signed certificate
- * for a device-unique public key, denoted DK_pub. All public keys in the BCC are device-unique. The
+ * COSE_Key representations of the public keys. The "root" of the BCC is
+ * a device-unique public key, denoted DK_pub. All public keys in the BCC are device-unique. The
* public key from each certificate in the chain is used to sign the next certificate in the
* chain. The final, "leaf" certificate contains a public key, denoted KM_pub, whose corresponding
* private key, denoted KM_priv, is available for use by the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.
@@ -57,12 +58,8 @@
* (given the necessary input), but no stage can compute the secret of any preceding stage. Updating
* the firmware or configuration of any stage changes the key pair of that stage, and of all
* subsequent stages, and no attacker who compromised the previous version of the updated firmware
- * can know or predict the post-update key pairs.
- *
- * The first BCC certificate is special because its contained public key, DK_pub, will never change,
- * making it a permanent, device-unique identifier. Although the remaining keys in the BCC are also
- * device-unique, they are not necessarily permanent, since they can change when the device software
- * is updated.
+ * can know or predict the post-update key pairs. It is recommended and expected that the BCC is
+ * constructed using the Open Profile for DICE.
*
* When the provisioning server receives a message signed by KM_priv and containing a BCC that
* chains from DK_pub to KM_pub, it can be certain that (barring vulnerabilities in some boot
@@ -121,6 +118,12 @@
const int STATUS_INVALID_EEK = 5;
/**
+ * @return info which contains information about the underlying IRemotelyProvisionedComponent
+ * hardware, such as version number, component name, author name, and supported curve.
+ */
+ RpcHardwareInfo getHardwareInfo();
+
+ /**
* generateKeyPair generates a new ECDSA P-256 key pair that can be certified. Note that this
* method only generates ECDSA P-256 key pairs, but the interface can be extended to add methods
* for generating keys for other algorithms, if necessary.
@@ -134,7 +137,7 @@
* privateKeyHandle, that the contained public key is for remote certification.
*
* @return data representing a handle to the private key. The format is implementation-defined,
- * but note that specific services may define a required format.
+ * but note that specific services may define a required format. KeyMint does.
*/
byte[] generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(in boolean testMode, out MacedPublicKey macedPublicKey);
@@ -155,65 +158,90 @@
* If testMode is false, the keysToCertify array must not contain any keys flagged as
* test keys. Otherwise, the method must return STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST.
*
- * @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X25519 public key which will be used to encrypt
+ * @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X22519 public key which will be used to encrypt
* the BCC. For flexibility, this is represented as a certificate chain, represented as a
* CBOR array of COSE_Sign1 objects, ordered from root to leaf. The leaf contains the
* X25519 encryption key, each other element is an Ed25519 key signing the next in the
- * chain. The root is self-signed.
+ * chain. The root is self-signed. An implementor may also choose to use P256 as an
+ * alternative curve for signing and encryption instead of Curve 25519.
*
* EekChain = [ + SignedSignatureKey, SignedEek ]
*
* SignedSignatureKey = [ // COSE_Sign1
* protected: bstr .cbor {
- * 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
+ * 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
* },
- * unprotected: { },
- * payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKey,
- * signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
+ * unprotected: {},
+ * payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
+ * bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256,
+ * signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput) /
+ * bstr ECDSA(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
* ]
*
- * SignatureKey = { // COSE_Key
+ * SignatureKeyEd25519 = { // COSE_Key
* 1 : 1, // Key type : Octet Key Pair
- * 3 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
+ * 3 : AlgorithmEdDSA, // Algorithm
* -1 : 6, // Curve : Ed25519
* -2 : bstr // Ed25519 public key
* }
*
+ * SignatureKeyP256 = {
+ * 1 : 2, // Key type : EC2
+ * 3 : AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
+ * -1 : 1, // Curve: P256
+ * -2 : bstr, // X coordinate
+ * -3 : bstr // Y coordinate
+ * }
+ *
* SignatureKeySignatureInput = [
* context: "Signature1",
* body_protected: bstr .cbor {
- * 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
+ * 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
* },
* external_aad: bstr .size 0,
- * payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKey
+ * payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
+ * bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256
* ]
*
* SignedEek = [ // COSE_Sign1
* protected: bstr .cbor {
- * 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
+ * 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
* },
- * unprotected: { },
- * payload: bstr .cbor Eek,
- * signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
+ * unprotected: {},
+ * payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256,
+ * signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput) /
+ * bstr ECDSA(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
* ]
*
- * Eek = { // COSE_Key
- * 1 : 1, // Key type : Octet Key Pair
- * 2 : bstr // KID : EEK ID
- * 3 : -25, // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
- * -1 : 4, // Curve : X25519
- * -2 : bstr // X25519 public key
+ * EekX25519 = { // COSE_Key
+ * 1 : 1, // Key type : Octet Key Pair
+ * 2 : bstr // KID : EEK ID
+ * 3 : -25, // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
+ * -1 : 4, // Curve : X25519
+ * -2 : bstr // Ed25519 public key
+ * }
+ *
+ * EekP256 = { // COSE_Key
+ * 1 : 2, // Key type : EC2
+ * 2 : bstr // KID : EEK ID
+ * 3 : -25, // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
+ * -1 : 1, // Curve : P256
+ * -2 : bstr // Sender X coordinate
+ * -3 : bstr // Sender Y coordinate
* }
*
* EekSignatureInput = [
* context: "Signature1",
* body_protected: bstr .cbor {
- * 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
+ * 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
* },
* external_aad: bstr .size 0,
- * payload: bstr .cbor Eek
+ * payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256
* ]
*
+ * AlgorithmES256 = -7
+ * AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
+ *
* If the contents of endpointEncryptionKey do not match the SignedEek structure above,
* the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
*
@@ -221,7 +249,7 @@
* in the chain, which implies that it must not attempt to validate the signature.
*
* If testMode is false, the method must validate the chain signatures, and must verify
- * that the public key in the root certificate is in its pre-configured set of
+ * that the public key in the root certifictate is in its pre-configured set of
* authorized EEK root keys. If the public key is not in the database, or if signature
* verification fails, the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
*
@@ -229,8 +257,13 @@
* by the secure area. See the description of the 'signature' output parameter for
* details.
*
- * @param out keysToSignMac contains the MAC of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest
- * structure. Specifically, it contains:
+ * @param out DeviceInfo contains the VerifiedDeviceInfo portion of the DeviceInfo array in
+ * CertificateRequest. The structure is described within the DeviceInfo.aidl file.
+ *
+ * @param out ProtectedData contains the encrypted BCC and the ephemeral MAC key used to
+ * authenticate the keysToSign (see keysToSignMac output argument).
+ *
+ * @return The of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest structure. Specifically, it contains:
*
* HMAC-256(EK_mac, .cbor KeysToMacStructure)
*
@@ -241,11 +274,11 @@
* protected : bstr .cbor {
* 1 : 5, // Algorithm : HMAC-256
* },
- * unprotected : { },
+ * unprotected : {},
* // Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
* payload: bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ],
* tag: bstr
- * ]
+ * ]
*
* KeysToMacStructure = [
* context : "MAC0",
@@ -254,9 +287,6 @@
* // Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
* payload : bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ]
* ]
- *
- * @param out ProtectedData contains the encrypted BCC and the ephemeral MAC key used to
- * authenticate the keysToSign (see keysToSignMac output argument).
*/
byte[] generateCertificateRequest(in boolean testMode, in MacedPublicKey[] keysToSign,
in byte[] endpointEncryptionCertChain, in byte[] challenge, out DeviceInfo deviceInfo,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl
index 25fdee3..f0df048 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl
@@ -32,6 +32,17 @@
*/
@VintfStability
parcelable KeyCharacteristics {
+ /**
+ * The security level enforcing this collection of key properties.
+ */
SecurityLevel securityLevel = SecurityLevel.SOFTWARE;
+
+ /**
+ * `authorizations` is a list of key properties that are enforced at this security level.
+ * A key can have different properties enforced by components of different security levels.
+ * For example, some properties are provided by the operating system, which has a
+ * different security level to the IKeyMintDevice.
+ * See the `keyCharacteristics` field in `KeyCreationResult` for more details.
+ */
KeyParameter[] authorizations;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
index c2e21b6..fd6bf65 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
* There are a few variations in what is contained in `certificateChain`, depending on whether
* the caller requested attestation, whether they provided an attestation key (via the
* `attestationKey` parameter of `generateKey()`, `importKey()` or `importWrappedKey()`), and in
- * the non-attestaion case, whether the key can self-sign.
+ * the non-attestation case, whether the key can self-sign.
*
* 1. Asymmetric key attestation with factory key. If Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is provided
* and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generate/import call is null, the returned
@@ -66,10 +66,11 @@
* provisioned attestation key, and the full certificate chain for that factory-provisioned
* attestation key. Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID must also be provided when the
* ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is provided, otherwise ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING will be
- * returned.
+ * returned. KeyMint implementations are not required to support factory-provisioned
+ * attestation keys.
*
* 2. Asymmetric key attestation with caller-provided key. If Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is
- * provided and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generat/import call is non-null and
+ * provided and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generate/import call is non-null and
* contains the key blob of a key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the returned certificate
* chain must contain only an attestation certificate signed with the specified key. The
* caller must know the certificate chain for the provided key. Tag::
@@ -90,6 +91,110 @@
* 5. Symmetric key. If the generated/imported key is symmetric, the certificate chain must
* return empty, any Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE or Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID inputs,
* if provided, are ignored.
+ *
+ * In all cases except the symmetric key, the contents of certificate chain must be DER-encoded
+ * X.509 certificates ordered such that each certificate is signed by the subsequent one, up to
+ * the root which must be self-signed (or contain a fake signature in the case of case 4 above).
+ * The first certificate in the chain signs the public key info of the newly-generated or
+ * newly-imported key pair. In the attestation cases (1 and 2 above), the first certificate
+ * must also satisfy some other requirements:
+ *
+ * o It must have the serial number provided in Tag::CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, or default to 1 if the
+ * tag is not provided.
+ *
+ * o It must have the subject provided in Tag::CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, or default to CN="Android
+ * Keystore Key", if the tag is not provided.
+ *
+ * o It must contain the notBefore and notAfter date-times specified in
+ * Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE and Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER, respectively.
+ *
+ * o It must contain a Key Usage extension with:
+ *
+ * - the digitalSignature bit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ * - the dataEncipherment bit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::DECRYPT,
+ * - the keyEncipherment bit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY,
+ * - the keyAgreement bit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY, and
+ * - the keyCertSignBit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY.
+ *
+ * o it must contain a KeyDescription attestation extension with OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1.17.
+ *
+ * The KeyDescription content is defined by the following ASN.1 schema, which is mostly a
+ * straightforward translation of the KeyMint tag/value parameter lists to ASN.1.
+ *
+ * KeyDescription ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * attestationVersion INTEGER, # Value 100
+ * attestationSecurityLevel SecurityLevel, # See below
+ * keyMintVersion INTEGER, # Value 100
+ * keymintSecurityLevel SecurityLevel, # See below
+ * attestationChallenge OCTET_STRING, # Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE from attestParams
+ * uniqueId OCTET_STRING, # Empty unless key has Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID
+ * softwareEnforced AuthorizationList, # See below
+ * hardwareEnforced AuthorizationList, # See below
+ * }
+ *
+ * SecurityLevel ::= ENUMERATED {
+ * Software (0),
+ * TrustedEnvironment (1),
+ * StrongBox (2),
+ * }
+ *
+ * RootOfTrust ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * verifiedBootKey OCTET_STRING,
+ * deviceLocked BOOLEAN,
+ * verifiedBootState VerifiedBootState,
+ * # verifiedBootHash must contain 32-byte value that represents the state of all binaries
+ * # or other components validated by verified boot. Updating any verified binary or
+ * # component must cause this value to change.
+ * verifiedBootHash OCTET_STRING,
+ * }
+ *
+ * VerifiedBootState ::= ENUMERATED {
+ * Verified (0),
+ * SelfSigned (1),
+ * Unverified (2),
+ * Failed (3),
+ * }
+ *
+ * AuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * purpose [1] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * algorithm [2] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * keySize [3] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * digest [5] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * padding [6] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * ecCurve [10] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * rsaPublicExponent [200] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * mgfDigest [203] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * rollbackResistance [303] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * earlyBootOnly [305] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * activeDateTime [400] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * originationExpireDateTime [401] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * usageExpireDateTime [402] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * usageCountLimit [405] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * noAuthRequired [503] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * userAuthType [504] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * authTimeout [505] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * allowWhileOnBody [506] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * trustedUserPresenceReq [507] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * trustedConfirmationReq [508] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * unlockedDeviceReq [509] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * creationDateTime [701] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * origin [702] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * rootOfTrust [704] EXPLICIT RootOfTrust OPTIONAL,
+ * osVersion [705] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * osPatchLevel [706] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationApplicationId [709] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdBrand [710] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdDevice [711] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdProduct [712] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdSerial [713] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdImei [714] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdMeid [715] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdManufacturer [716] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * attestationIdModel [717] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * vendorPatchLevel [718] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * bootPatchLevel [719] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * deviceUniqueAttestation [720] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * }
*/
Certificate[] certificateChain;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl
index 8da7578..b82dee6 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
* Implementation version of the keymint hardware. The version number is implementation
* defined, and not necessarily globally meaningful. The version is used to distinguish
* between different versions of a given implementation.
- * TODO(seleneh) add the version related info to the code.
*/
int versionNumber;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
index f896125..5840c6b 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
* The origin of a key (or pair), i.e. where it was generated. Note that ORIGIN can be found in
* either the hardware-enforced or software-enforced list for a key, indicating whether the key is
* hardware or software-based. Specifically, a key with GENERATED in the hardware-enforced list
- * must be guaranteed never to have existed outide the secure hardware.
+ * must be guaranteed never to have existed outside the secure hardware.
* @hide
*/
@VintfStability
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyParameterValue.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyParameterValue.aidl
index 59016f2..924f402 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyParameterValue.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyParameterValue.aidl
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
boolean boolValue; // Always true, if present.
int integer;
long longInteger;
- long dateTime;
+ long dateTime; // In milliseconds from epoch
byte[] blob;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
index c874fc3..e141e55 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@
@VintfStability
@Backing(type="int")
enum KeyPurpose {
- /* Usable with RSA, EC and AES keys. */
+ /* Usable with RSA, 3DES and AES keys. */
ENCRYPT = 0,
- /* Usable with RSA, EC and AES keys. */
+ /* Usable with RSA, 3DES and AES keys. */
DECRYPT = 1,
/* Usable with RSA, EC and HMAC keys. */
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
VERIFY = 3,
/* 4 is reserved */
+
/* Usable with wrapping keys. */
WRAP_KEY = 5,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl
index fbb373b..e71a9c9 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@
package android.hardware.security.keymint;
/**
- * TODO(seleneh) update the description.
- *
* Padding modes that may be applied to plaintext for encryption operations. This list includes
* padding modes for both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms. Note that implementations should not
* provide all possible combinations of algorithm and padding, only the
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
index 5199062..31dbb28 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
@@ -40,11 +40,7 @@
* 1 : -25 // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
* },
* unprotected : {
- * -1 : { // COSE_Key
- * 1 : 1, // Key type : Octet Key Pair
- * -1 : 4, // Curve : X25519
- * -2 : bstr // Sender X25519 public key
- * }
+ * -1 : PubKeyX25519 / PubKeyEcdhP256 // Of the sender
* 4 : bstr, // KID : EEK ID
* },
* ciphertext : nil
@@ -67,7 +63,7 @@
* other : bstr // EEK pubkey
* ],
* SuppPubInfo : [
- * 128, // Output key length
+ * 256, // Output key length
* protected : bstr .size 0
* ]
* ]
@@ -75,34 +71,51 @@
* ProtectedDataPayload [
* SignedMac,
* Bcc,
+ * ? AdditionalDKSignatures,
+ * ]
+ * AdditionalDKSignatures = {
+ * + SignerName => DKCertChain
+ * }
+ *
+ * SignerName = tstr
+ *
+ * DKCertChain = [
+ * 2* Certificate // Root -> Leaf. Root is the vendor
+ * // self-signed cert, leaf contains DK_pub
* ]
*
- * SignedMac = [ // COSE_Sign1
- * bstr .cbor { // Protected params
- * 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
+ * Certificate = COSE_Sign1 of a public key
+ *
+ * SignedMac = [ // COSE_Sign1
+ * bstr .cbor { // Protected params
+ * 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
* },
- * { }, // Unprotected params
+ * {}, // Unprotected params
* bstr .size 32, // MAC key
- * bstr PureEd25519(DK_priv, .cbor SignedMac_structure)
+ * bstr PureEd25519(KM_priv, .cbor SignedMac_structure) /
+ * ECDSA(KM_priv, bstr .cbor SignedMac_structure)
* ]
*
* SignedMac_structure = [
* "Signature1",
- * bstr .cbor { // Protected params
- * 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
+ * bstr .cbor { // Protected params
+ * 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
* },
* bstr .cbor SignedMacAad
- * bstr .size 32 // MAC key
+ * bstr .size 32 // MAC key
* ]
*
* SignedMacAad = [
* challenge : bstr,
- * DeviceInfo
+ * VerifiedDeviceInfo,
+ * tag: bstr // This is the tag from COSE_Mac0 of
+ * // KeysToCertify, to tie the key set to
+ * // the signature.
* ]
*
* Bcc = [
- * PubKey, // DK_pub
- * + BccEntry, // Root -> leaf (KM_pub)
+ * PubKeyEd25519 / PubKeyECDSA256, // DK_pub
+ * + BccEntry, // Root -> leaf (KM_pub)
* ]
*
* BccPayload = { // CWT
@@ -120,44 +133,38 @@
* ? -4670549 : bstr, // Authority Hash
* ? -4670550 : bstr, // Authority Descriptor
* ? -4670551 : bstr, // Mode
- * -4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKey // Subject Public Key
+ * -4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKeyEd25519 /
+ * bstr .cbor PubKeyECDSA256 // Subject Public Key
* -4670553 : bstr // Key Usage
* }
*
- * BccEntry = [ // COSE_Sign1
- * protected: bstr .cbor {
- * 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
+ * BccEntry = [ // COSE_Sign1 (untagged)
+ * protected : bstr .cbor {
+ * 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
* },
- * unprotected: { },
+ * unprotected: {},
* payload: bstr .cbor BccPayload,
- * // First entry in the chain is signed by DK_pub, the others are each signed by their
- * // immediate predecessor. See RFC 8032 for signature representation.
- * signature: bstr .cbor PureEd25519(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput)
+ * signature: bstr .cbor PureEd25519(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput) /
+ * bstr .cbor ECDSA(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput)
+ * // See RFC 8032 for details of how to encode the signature value for Ed25519.
* ]
*
- * PubKey = { // COSE_Key
- * 1 : 1, // Key type : octet key pair
- * 3 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
- * 4 : 2, // Ops: Verify
- * -1 : 6, // Curve : Ed25519
- * -2 : bstr // X coordinate, little-endian
- * }
- *
* BccEntryInput = [
* context: "Signature1",
* protected: bstr .cbor {
- * 1 : -8, // Algorithm : EdDSA
+ * 1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm
* },
* external_aad: bstr .size 0,
* payload: bstr .cbor BccPayload
* ]
*
- * DeviceInfo = {
+ * VerifiedDeviceInfo = {
* ? "brand" : tstr,
* ? "manufacturer" : tstr,
* ? "product" : tstr,
* ? "model" : tstr,
* ? "board" : tstr,
+ * ? "device" : tstr,
* ? "vb_state" : "green" / "yellow" / "orange",
* ? "bootloader_state" : "locked" / "unlocked",
* ? "os_version" : tstr,
@@ -165,6 +172,39 @@
* ? "boot_patch_level" : uint, // YYYYMMDD
* ? "vendor_patch_level" : uint, // YYYYMMDD
* }
+ *
+ * PubKeyX25519 = { // COSE_Key
+ * 1 : 1, // Key type : Octet Key Pair
+ * -1 : 4, // Curve : X25519
+ * -2 : bstr // Sender X25519 public key
+ * }
+ *
+ * PubKeyEd25519 = { // COSE_Key
+ * 1 : 1, // Key type : octet key pair
+ * 3 : AlgorithmEdDSA, // Algorithm : EdDSA
+ * 4 : 2, // Ops: Verify
+ * -1 : 6, // Curve : Ed25519
+ * -2 : bstr // X coordinate, little-endian
+ * }
+ *
+ * PubKeyEcdhP256 = { // COSE_Key
+ * 1 : 2, // Key type : EC2
+ * -1 : 1, // Curve : P256
+ * -2 : bstr // Sender X coordinate
+ * -3 : bstr // Sender Y coordinate
+ * }
+ *
+ * PubKeyECDSA256 = { // COSE_Key
+ * 1 : 2, // Key type : EC2
+ * 3 : AlgorithmES256, // Algorithm : ECDSA w/ SHA-256
+ * 4 : 2, // Ops: Verify
+ * -1 : 1, // Curve: P256
+ * -2 : bstr, // X coordinate
+ * -3 : bstr // Y coordinate
+ * }
+ *
+ * AlgorithmES256 = -7
+ * AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
*/
byte[] protectedData;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/RpcHardwareInfo.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/RpcHardwareInfo.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d297f87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/RpcHardwareInfo.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.security.keymint;
+
+/**
+ * RpcHardwareInfo is the hardware information returned by calling RemotelyProvisionedComponent
+ * getHardwareInfo()
+ * @hide
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@RustDerive(Clone=true, Eq=true, PartialEq=true, Ord=true, PartialOrd=true, Hash=true)
+parcelable RpcHardwareInfo {
+ const int CURVE_NONE = 0;
+ const int CURVE_P256 = 1;
+ const int CURVE_25519 = 2;
+
+ /**
+ * Implementation version of the remotely provisioned component hardware. The version number is
+ * implementation defined, and not necessarily globally meaningful. The version is used to
+ * distinguish between different versions of a given implementation.
+ */
+ int versionNumber;
+
+ /**
+ * rpcAuthorName is the name of the author of the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent implementation
+ * (organization name, not individual). This name is implementation defined, so it can be used
+ * to distinguish between different implementations from the same author.
+ */
+ @utf8InCpp String rpcAuthorName;
+
+ /**
+ * supportedEekCurve returns an int representing which curve is supported for validating
+ * signatures over the Endpoint Encryption Key certificate chain and for using the corresponding
+ * signed encryption key in ECDH. Only one curve should be supported, with preference for 25519
+ * if it's available. These values are defined as constants above.
+ *
+ * CURVE_NONE is made the default to help ensure that an implementor doesn't accidentally forget
+ * to provide the correct information here, as the VTS tests will check to make certain that
+ * a passing implementation does not provide CURVE_NONE.
+ */
+ int supportedEekCurve = CURVE_NONE;
+}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
index cde1fc0..972ce2e 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -18,10 +18,6 @@
import android.hardware.security.keymint.TagType;
-// TODO(seleneh) : note aidl currently does not support double nested enum definitions such as
-// ROOT_OF_TRUST = TagType:BYTES | 704. So we are forced to write definations as
-// ROOT_OF_TRUST = (9 << 28) for now. Will need to flip this back later when aidl support is added.
-
/**
* Tag specifies various kinds of tags that can be set in KeyParameter to identify what kind of
* data are stored in KeyParameter.
@@ -33,7 +29,7 @@
/**
* Tag::INVALID should never be set. It means you hit an error.
*/
- INVALID = (0 << 28) | 0,
+ INVALID = 0,
/**
* Tag::PURPOSE specifies the set of purposes for which the key may be used. Possible values
@@ -47,7 +43,7 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- PURPOSE = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 1,
+ PURPOSE = TagType.ENUM_REP | 1,
/**
* Tag::ALGORITHM specifies the cryptographic algorithm with which the key is used. This tag
@@ -56,10 +52,10 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- ALGORITHM = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 2,
+ ALGORITHM = TagType.ENUM | 2,
/**
- * Tag::KEY_SIZE pecifies the size, in bits, of the key, measuring in the normal way for the
+ * Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size, in bits, of the key, measuring in the normal way for the
* key's algorithm. For example, for RSA keys, Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size of the public
* modulus. For AES keys it specifies the length of the secret key material. For 3DES keys it
* specifies the length of the key material, not counting parity bits (though parity bits must
@@ -68,20 +64,20 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- KEY_SIZE = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 3,
+ KEY_SIZE = TagType.UINT | 3,
/**
* Tag::BLOCK_MODE specifies the block cipher mode(s) with which the key may be used. This tag
* is only relevant to AES and 3DES keys. Possible values are defined by the BlockMode enum.
*
* This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. For AES and 3DES operations the caller
- * must specify a Tag::BLOCK_MODE in the additionalParams argument of begin(). If the mode is
- * missing or the specified mode is not in the modes specified for the key during
- * generation/import, the operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE.
+ * must specify a Tag::BLOCK_MODE in the params argument of begin(). If the mode is missing or
+ * the specified mode is not in the modes specified for the key during generation/import, the
+ * operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- BLOCK_MODE = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 4,
+ BLOCK_MODE = TagType.ENUM_REP | 4,
/**
* Tag::DIGEST specifies the digest algorithms that may be used with the key to perform signing
@@ -89,13 +85,13 @@
* values are defined by the Digest enum.
*
* This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. For signing and verification operations,
- * the caller must specify a digest in the additionalParams argument of begin(). If the digest
- * is missing or the specified digest is not in the digests associated with the key, the
- * operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
+ * the caller must specify a digest in the params argument of begin(). If the digest is missing
+ * or the specified digest is not in the digests associated with the key, the operation must
+ * fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- DIGEST = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 5,
+ DIGEST = TagType.ENUM_REP | 5,
/**
* Tag::PADDING specifies the padding modes that may be used with the key. This tag is relevant
@@ -123,7 +119,7 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- PADDING = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 6,
+ PADDING = TagType.ENUM_REP | 6,
/**
* Tag::CALLER_NONCE specifies that the caller can provide a nonce for nonce-requiring
@@ -136,7 +132,7 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- CALLER_NONCE = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 7,
+ CALLER_NONCE = TagType.BOOL | 7,
/**
* Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH specifies the minimum length of MAC that can be requested or verified
@@ -145,22 +141,21 @@
* This value is the minimum MAC length, in bits. It must be a multiple of 8 bits. For HMAC
* keys, the value must be least 64 and no more than 512. For GCM keys, the value must be at
* least 96 and no more than 128. If the provided value violates these requirements,
- * generateKey() or importKey() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ * generateKey() or importKey() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- MIN_MAC_LENGTH = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 8,
+ MIN_MAC_LENGTH = TagType.UINT | 8,
// Tag 9 reserved
/**
- * Tag::EC_CURVE specifies the elliptic curve. EC key generation requests may have
- * Tag:EC_CURVE, Tag::KEY_SIZE, or both. If both are provided and the size and curve do not
- * match, IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ * Tag::EC_CURVE specifies the elliptic curve. Possible values are defined in the EcCurve
+ * enumeration.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- EC_CURVE = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 10,
+ EC_CURVE = TagType.ENUM | 10,
/**
* Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT specifies the value of the public exponent for an RSA key pair.
@@ -174,7 +169,7 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = (5 << 28) /* TagType:ULONG */ | 200,
+ RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = TagType.ULONG | 200,
// Tag 201 reserved
@@ -185,40 +180,22 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 202,
+ INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = TagType.BOOL | 202,
/**
- * Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST specifies the MGF1 digest algorithms that may be used with
- * RSA encryption/decryption with OAEP padding. If the key characteristics supports OAEP
- * and this tag is absent then SHA1 digest is selected by default for MGF1.
+ * Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST specifies the MGF1 digest algorithms that may be used with RSA
+ * encryption/decryption with OAEP padding. Possible values are defined by the Digest enum.
*
- * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. If this tag is present in the key
- * characteristics with one or more values from @4.0::Digest, then for RSA cipher
- * operations with OAEP Padding, the caller must specify a digest in the additionalParams
- * argument of begin operation. If this tag is missing or the specified digest is not in
- * the digests associated with the key then begin operation must fail with
- * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST.
+ * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. RSA cipher operations with OAEP padding
+ * must specify an MGF1 digest in the params argument of begin(). If this tag is missing or the
+ * specified digest is not in the MGF1 digests associated with the key then begin operation must
+ * fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 203,
+ RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST = TagType.ENUM_REP | 203,
- /**
- * TODO(seleneh) this tag needs to be deleted from all codes.
- *
- * Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS specifies the necessary system environment conditions for the
- * generated key to be used. Possible values are defined by the KeyBlobUsageRequirements enum.
- *
- * This tag is specified by the caller during key generation or import to require that the key
- * is usable in the specified condition. If the caller specifies Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS
- * with value KeyBlobUsageRequirements::STANDALONE the IKeyMintDevice must return a key blob
- * that can be used without file system support. This is critical for devices with encrypted
- * disks, where the file system may not be available until after a KeyMint key is used to
- * decrypt the disk.
- *
- * Must be hardware-enforced.
- */
- BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 301,
+ // Tag 301 reserved
/**
* Tag::BOOTLOADER_ONLY specifies only the bootloader can use the key.
@@ -228,7 +205,7 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- BOOTLOADER_ONLY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 302,
+ BOOTLOADER_ONLY = TagType.BOOL | 302,
/**
* Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE specifies that the key has rollback resistance, meaning that when
@@ -241,21 +218,21 @@
* ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE. IKeyMintDevice implementations are not
* required to support rollback resistance.
*
- * Must be hardwared-enforced.
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 303,
+ ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = TagType.BOOL | 303,
// Reserved for future use.
- HARDWARE_TYPE = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 304,
+ HARDWARE_TYPE = TagType.ENUM | 304,
/**
* Keys tagged with EARLY_BOOT_ONLY may only be used during early boot, until
* IKeyMintDevice::earlyBootEnded() is called. Early boot keys may be created after
- * early boot. Early boot keys may not be imprted at all, if Tag::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY is
+ * early boot. Early boot keys may not be imported at all, if Tag::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY is
* provided to IKeyMintDevice::importKey, the import must fail with
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ * ErrorCode::EARLY_BOOT_ENDED.
*/
- EARLY_BOOT_ONLY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 305,
+ EARLY_BOOT_ONLY = TagType.BOOL | 305,
/**
* Tag::ACTIVE_DATETIME specifies the date and time at which the key becomes active, in
@@ -264,7 +241,7 @@
*
* Need not be hardware-enforced.
*/
- ACTIVE_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 400,
+ ACTIVE_DATETIME = TagType.DATE | 400,
/**
* Tag::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME specifies the date and time at which the key expires for
@@ -276,7 +253,7 @@
*
* Need not be hardware-enforced.
*/
- ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 401,
+ ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = TagType.DATE | 401,
/**
* Tag::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME specifies the date and time at which the key expires for
@@ -288,13 +265,9 @@
*
* Need not be hardware-enforced.
*/
- USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 402,
+ USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = TagType.DATE | 402,
/**
- * TODO(seleneh) this tag need to be deleted.
- *
- * TODO(seleneh) this tag need to be deleted.
- *
* Tag::MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS specifies the minimum amount of time that elapses between
* allowed operations using a key. This can be used to rate-limit uses of keys in contexts
* where unlimited use may enable brute force attacks.
@@ -307,13 +280,15 @@
* with ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED. This implies that the IKeyMintDevice must keep a
* table of use counters for keys with this tag. Because memory is often limited, this table
* may have a fixed maximum size and KeyMint may fail operations that attempt to use keys with
- * this tag when the table is full. The table must acommodate at least 8 in-use keys and
+ * this tag when the table is full. The table must accommodate at least 8 in-use keys and
* aggressively reuse table slots when key minimum-usage intervals expire. If an operation
* fails because the table is full, KeyMint returns ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
+ *
+ * TODO(b/191458710): find out if this tag is still supported.
*/
- MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 403,
+ MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS = TagType.UINT | 403,
/**
* Tag::MAX_USES_PER_BOOT specifies the maximum number of times that a key may be used between
@@ -327,13 +302,13 @@
* device is restarted. This implies that the IKeyMintDevice must keep a table of use
* counters for keys with this tag. Because KeyMint memory is often limited, this table can
* have a fixed maximum size and KeyMint can fail operations that attempt to use keys with
- * this tag when the table is full. The table needs to acommodate at least 8 keys. If an
+ * this tag when the table is full. The table needs to accommodate at least 8 keys. If an
* operation fails because the table is full, IKeyMintDevice must
* ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 404,
+ MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = TagType.UINT | 404,
/**
* Tag::USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT specifies the number of times that a key may be used. This can be
@@ -362,14 +337,14 @@
* record. This tag must have the same SecurityLevel as the tag that is added to the key
* characteristics.
*/
- USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT = (3 << 28) | 405, /* TagType:UINT */
+ USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT = TagType.UINT | 405,
/**
* Tag::USER_ID specifies the ID of the Android user that is permitted to use the key.
*
* Must not be hardware-enforced.
*/
- USER_ID = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 501,
+ USER_ID = TagType.UINT | 501,
/**
* Tag::USER_SECURE_ID specifies that a key may only be used under a particular secure user
@@ -386,14 +361,14 @@
* key, and may only be used if the difference between the current time when begin() is called
* and the timestamp in the HardwareAuthToken is less than the value in Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT * 1000
* (the multiplier is because Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT is in seconds, but the HardwareAuthToken
- * timestamp is in milliseconds). Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must returrn
+ * timestamp is in milliseconds). Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must return
* ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
*
* If Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT is not present, then the key is an "auth-per-operation" key. In this
* case, begin() must not require a HardwareAuthToken with appropriate contents. Instead,
* update() and finish() must receive a HardwareAuthToken with Tag::USER_SECURE_ID value in
* userId or authenticatorId fields, and the current operation's operation handle in the
- * challenge field. Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must returrn
+ * challenge field. Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must return
* ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
*
* This tag is repeatable. If repeated, and any one of the values matches the HardwareAuthToken
@@ -402,7 +377,7 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- USER_SECURE_ID = (10 << 28) /* TagType:ULONG_REP */ | 502,
+ USER_SECURE_ID = TagType.ULONG_REP | 502,
/**
* Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED specifies that no authentication is required to use this key. This tag
@@ -410,7 +385,7 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 503,
+ NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = TagType.BOOL | 503,
/**
* Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE specifies the types of user authenticators that may be used to authorize
@@ -429,12 +404,12 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- USER_AUTH_TYPE = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 504,
+ USER_AUTH_TYPE = TagType.ENUM | 504,
/**
* Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT specifies the time in seconds for which the key is authorized for use,
* after user authentication. If
- * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID is present and this tag is not, then the key requies authentication for
+ * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID is present and this tag is not, then the key requires authentication for
* every usage (see begin() for the details of the authentication-per-operation flow).
*
* The value is a 32-bit integer specifying the time in seconds after a successful
@@ -443,7 +418,7 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- AUTH_TIMEOUT = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 505,
+ AUTH_TIMEOUT = TagType.UINT | 505,
/**
* Tag::ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY specifies that the key may be used after authentication timeout if
@@ -451,7 +426,7 @@
*
* Cannot be hardware-enforced.
*/
- ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 506,
+ ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY = TagType.BOOL | 506,
/**
* TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED is an optional feature that specifies that this key must be
@@ -498,13 +473,13 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 507,
+ TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = TagType.BOOL | 507,
/**
* Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED is only applicable to keys with KeyPurpose SIGN, and
* specifies that this key must not be usable unless the user provides confirmation of the data
* to be signed. Confirmation is proven to keyMint via an approval token. See
- * CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, as well as the ConfirmatinUI HAL.
+ * CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, as well as the ConfirmationUI HAL.
*
* If an attempt to use a key with this tag does not have a cryptographically valid
* CONFIRMATION_TOKEN provided to finish() or if the data provided to update()/finish() does not
@@ -512,7 +487,7 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 508,
+ TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED = TagType.BOOL | 508,
/**
* Tag::UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED specifies that the key may only be used when the device is
@@ -520,13 +495,13 @@
*
* Must be software-enforced.
*/
- UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 509,
+ UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED = TagType.BOOL | 509,
/**
* Tag::APPLICATION_ID. When provided to generateKey or importKey, this tag specifies data
* that is necessary during all uses of the key. In particular, calls to exportKey() and
* getKeyCharacteristics() must provide the same value to the clientId parameter, and calls to
- * begin must provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set. If
+ * begin() must provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set. If
* the correct data is not provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
*
* The content of this tag must be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
@@ -536,7 +511,7 @@
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
- APPLICATION_ID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 601,
+ APPLICATION_ID = TagType.BYTES | 601,
/*
* Semantically unenforceable tags, either because they have no specific meaning or because
@@ -550,23 +525,22 @@
* provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set. If the correct
* data is not provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
*
- * The content of this tag msut be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
+ * The content of this tag must be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
* possible for an adversary who has access to all of the secure world secrets but does not have
* access to the tag content to decrypt the key without brute-forcing the tag content, which
* applications can prevent by specifying sufficiently high-entropy content.
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
- APPLICATION_DATA = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 700,
+ APPLICATION_DATA = TagType.BYTES | 700,
/**
* Tag::CREATION_DATETIME specifies the date and time the key was created, in milliseconds since
- * January 1, 1970. This tag is optional and informational only.
+ * January 1, 1970. This tag is optional and informational only, and not enforced by anything.
*
- * Tag::CREATED is informational only, and not enforced by anything. Must be in the
- * software-enforced list, if provided.
+ * Must be in the software-enforced list, if provided.
*/
- CREATION_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 701,
+ CREATION_DATETIME = TagType.DATE | 701,
/**
* Tag::ORIGIN specifies where the key was created, if known. This tag must not be specified
@@ -575,7 +549,7 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- ORIGIN = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 702,
+ ORIGIN = TagType.ENUM | 702,
// 703 is unused.
@@ -587,7 +561,7 @@
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
- ROOT_OF_TRUST = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 704,
+ ROOT_OF_TRUST = TagType.BYTES | 704,
/**
* Tag::OS_VERSION specifies the system OS version with which the key may be used. This tag is
@@ -610,7 +584,7 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- OS_VERSION = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 705,
+ OS_VERSION = TagType.UINT | 705,
/**
* Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL specifies the system security patch level with which the key may be used.
@@ -631,7 +605,7 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- OS_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 706,
+ OS_PATCHLEVEL = TagType.UINT | 706,
/**
* Tag::UNIQUE_ID specifies a unique, time-based identifier. This tag is never provided to or
@@ -650,10 +624,11 @@
* Tag::CREATION_DATETIME by 2592000000, dropping any remainder. T changes every 30 days
* (2592000000 = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000).
*
- * C is the value of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID that is provided to attestKey().
+ * C is the value of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID that is provided to attested key
+ * generation/import operations.
*
- * R is 1 if Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION was provided to attestKey or 0 if the tag was not
- * provided.
+ * R is 1 if Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION was provided to attested key generation/import or 0
+ * if the tag was not provided.
*
* HBK is a unique hardware-bound secret known to the secure environment and never revealed
* by it. The secret must contain at least 128 bits of entropy and be unique to the
@@ -665,20 +640,20 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- UNIQUE_ID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 707,
+ UNIQUE_ID = TagType.BYTES | 707,
/**
- * Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is used to deliver a "challenge" value to the attestKey() method,
- * which must place the value in the KeyDescription SEQUENCE of the attestation extension. See
- * attestKey().
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is used to deliver a "challenge" value to the attested key
+ * generation/import methods, which must place the value in the KeyDescription SEQUENCE of the
+ * attestation extension.
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
- ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 708,
+ ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE = TagType.BYTES | 708,
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID identifies the set of applications which may use a key, used
- * only with attestKey().
+ * only with attested key generation/import operations.
*
* The content of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID is a DER-encoded ASN.1 structure, with the
* following schema:
@@ -700,12 +675,12 @@
*
* Cannot be hardware-enforced.
*/
- ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 709,
+ ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID = TagType.BYTES | 709,
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND provides the device's brand name, as returned by Build.BRAND in
- * Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
- * device's identifiers.
+ * Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must be set only when
+ * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -713,12 +688,12 @@
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
- ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 710,
+ ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND = TagType.BYTES | 710,
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE provides the device's device name, as returned by Build.DEVICE in
- * Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
- * device's identifiers.
+ * Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must be set only when
+ * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -726,12 +701,12 @@
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
- ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 711,
+ ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE = TagType.BYTES | 711,
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT provides the device's product name, as returned by Build.PRODUCT
- * in Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
- * device's identifiers.
+ * in Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must be set only when
+ * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -739,7 +714,7 @@
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
- ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 712,
+ ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT = TagType.BYTES | 712,
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL the device's serial number. This field must be set only when
@@ -751,48 +726,11 @@
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
- ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 713,
+ ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL = TagType.BYTES | 713,
/**
- * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI provides the IMEIs for all radios on the device to attestKey().
- * This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
- *
- * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
- * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
- * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
- *
- * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
- */
- ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 714,
-
- /**
- * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID provides the MEIDs for all radios on the device to attestKey().
- * This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
- *
- * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
- * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
- * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
- *
- * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
- */
- ATTESTATION_ID_MEID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 715,
-
- /**
- * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER provides the device's manufacturer name, as returned by
- * Build.MANUFACTURER in Android, to attstKey(). This field must be set only when requesting
- * attestation of the device's identifiers.
- *
- * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
- * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
- * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
- *
- * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
- */
- ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 716,
-
- /**
- * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL provides the device's model name, as returned by Build.MODEL in
- * Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI provides the IMEIs for all radios on the device to attested key
+ * generation/import operations. This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
* device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
@@ -801,7 +739,46 @@
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
- ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 717,
+ ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI = TagType.BYTES | 714,
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID provides the MEIDs for all radios on the device to attested key
+ * generation/import operations. This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+ * device's identifiers.
+ *
+ * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+ * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+ * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ATTESTATION_ID_MEID = TagType.BYTES | 715,
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER provides the device's manufacturer name, as returned by
+ * Build.MANUFACTURER in Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must
+ * be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
+ *
+ * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+ * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+ * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER = TagType.BYTES | 716,
+
+ /**
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL provides the device's model name, as returned by Build.MODEL in
+ * Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must be set only when
+ * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
+ *
+ * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+ * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+ * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+ *
+ * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+ */
+ ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL = TagType.BYTES | 717,
/**
* Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL specifies the vendor image security patch level with which the key may
@@ -823,7 +800,7 @@
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 718,
+ VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL = TagType.UINT | 718,
/**
* Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL specifies the boot image (kernel) security patch level with which the
@@ -839,27 +816,37 @@
* the value would be 20180605. If the day is not known, 00 may be substituted.
*
* During each boot, the bootloader must provide the patch level of the boot image to the secure
- * envirionment (mechanism is implementation-defined).
+ * environment (mechanism is implementation-defined).
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
- BOOT_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 719,
+ BOOT_PATCHLEVEL = TagType.UINT | 719,
/**
- * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attestKey(). It indicates that
- * attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather than a batch key. When a
- * device-unique key is used, only the attestation certificate is returned; no additional
- * chained certificates are provided. It's up to the caller to recognize the device-unique
- * signing key. Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices may support device-unique
- * attestations. SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must return
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
+ * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attested key generation/import
+ * operations. It indicates that attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather
+ * than a batch key. When a device-unique key is used, the returned chain should contain two
+ * certificates:
+ * * The attestation certificate, containing the attestation extension, as described in
+ KeyCreationResult.aidl.
+ * * A self-signed root certificate, signed by the device-unique key.
+ * No additional chained certificates are provided. Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX
+ * IKeyMintDevices may support device-unique attestations. SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT
+ * IKeyMintDevices must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive
+ * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
* SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices need not support DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, and
* return ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS if they do not support it.
*
+ * The caller needs to obtain the device-unique keys out-of-band and compare them against the
+ * key used to sign the self-signed root certificate.
+ * To ease this process, the IKeyMintDevice implementation should include, both in the subject
+ * and issuer fields of the self-signed root, the unique identifier of the device. Using the
+ * unique identifier will make it straightforward for the caller to link a device to its key.
+ *
* IKeyMintDevice implementations that support device-unique attestation MUST add the
* DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION tag to device-unique attestations.
*/
- DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 720,
+ DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION = TagType.BOOL | 720,
/**
* IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY is never used by IKeyMintDevice, is not a valid argument to key
@@ -867,7 +854,7 @@
* attestation. It is used in attestations produced by the IIdentityCredential HAL when that
* HAL attests to Credential Keys. IIdentityCredential produces KeyMint-style attestations.
*/
- IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 721,
+ IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY = TagType.BOOL | 721,
/**
* To prevent keys from being compromised if an attacker acquires read access to system / kernel
@@ -884,12 +871,13 @@
* ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION is returned when a key with Tag::STORAGE_KEY is provided to
* begin().
*/
- STORAGE_KEY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 722,
+ STORAGE_KEY = TagType.BOOL | 722,
/**
+ * OBSOLETE: Do not use. See IKeyMintOperation.updateAad instead.
* TODO: Delete when keystore1 is deleted.
*/
- ASSOCIATED_DATA = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1000,
+ ASSOCIATED_DATA = TagType.BYTES | 1000,
/**
* Tag::NONCE is used to provide or return a nonce or Initialization Vector (IV) for AES-GCM,
@@ -904,7 +892,7 @@
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
- NONCE = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1001,
+ NONCE = TagType.BYTES | 1001,
/**
* Tag::MAC_LENGTH provides the requested length of a MAC or GCM authentication tag, in bits.
@@ -915,7 +903,7 @@
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
- MAC_LENGTH = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 1003,
+ MAC_LENGTH = TagType.UINT | 1003,
/**
* Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION specifies whether the device has been factory reset since the
@@ -923,7 +911,7 @@
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
- RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 1004,
+ RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION = TagType.BOOL | 1004,
/**
* Tag::CONFIRMATION_TOKEN is used to deliver a cryptographic token proving that the user
@@ -932,38 +920,39 @@
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
- CONFIRMATION_TOKEN = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1005,
+ CONFIRMATION_TOKEN = TagType.BYTES | 1005,
/**
- * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SERIAL specifies the serial number to be assigned to the
- * attestation certificate to be generated for the given key. This parameter should only
- * be passed to keyMint in the attestation parameters during generateKey() and importKey().
+ * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SERIAL specifies the serial number to be assigned to the attestation
+ * certificate to be generated for the given key. This parameter should only be passed to
+ * keyMint in the attestation parameters during generateKey() and importKey(). If not provided,
+ * the serial shall default to 1.
*/
- CERTIFICATE_SERIAL = (8 << 28) /* TagType:BIGNUM */ | 1006,
+ CERTIFICATE_SERIAL = TagType.BIGNUM | 1006,
/**
- * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT the certificate subject. The value is a DER encoded X509 NAME.
- * This value is used when generating a self signed certificates. This tag may be specified
+ * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT the certificate subject. The value is a DER encoded X509 NAME.
+ * This value is used when generating a self signed certificates. This tag may be specified
* during generateKey and importKey. If not provided the subject name shall default to
- * <TODO default subject here>.
+ * CN="Android Keystore Key".
*/
- CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1007,
+ CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT = TagType.BYTES | 1007,
/**
* Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE the beginning of the validity of the certificate in UNIX epoch
- * time in seconds. This value is used when generating attestation or self signed certificates.
- * ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_BEFORE must be returned if this tag is not provided if this tag is
- * not provided to generateKey or importKey.
+ * time in milliseconds. This value is used when generating attestation or self signed
+ * certificates. ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_BEFORE must be returned if this tag is not provided if
+ * this tag is not provided to generateKey or importKey.
*/
- CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 1008,
+ CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE = TagType.DATE | 1008,
/**
- * Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER the end of the validity of the certificate in UNIX epoch
- * time in seconds. This value is used when generating attestation or self signed certificates.
- * ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_AFTER must be returned if this tag is not provided to generateKey
- * or importKey.
+ * Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER the end of the validity of the certificate in UNIX epoch time in
+ * milliseconds. This value is used when generating attestation or self signed certificates.
+ * ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_AFTER must be returned if this tag is not provided to generateKey or
+ * importKey.
*/
- CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 1009,
+ CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER = TagType.DATE | 1009,
/**
* Tag::MAX_BOOT_LEVEL specifies a maximum boot level at which a key should function.
@@ -974,5 +963,5 @@
*
* Cannot be hardware enforced in this version.
*/
- MAX_BOOT_LEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 1010,
+ MAX_BOOT_LEVEL = TagType.UINT | 1010,
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/TagType.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/TagType.aidl
index 1ba6ede..d46e504 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/TagType.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/TagType.aidl
@@ -39,7 +39,21 @@
DATE = 6 << 28,
/** Boolean. If a tag with this type is present, the value is "true". If absent, "false". */
BOOL = 7 << 28,
- /** Byte string containing an arbitrary-length integer, big-endian ordering. */
+ /**
+ * Byte string containing an arbitrary-length integer, in a two's-complement big-endian
+ * ordering. The byte array contains the minimum number of bytes needed to represent the
+ * integer, including at least one sign bit (so zero encodes as the single byte 0x00. This
+ * matches the encoding of both java.math.BigInteger.toByteArray() and contents octets for an
+ * ASN.1 INTEGER value (X.690 section 8.3). Examples:
+ * - value 65536 encodes as 0x01 0x00 0x00
+ * - value 65535 encodes as 0x00 0xFF 0xFF
+ * - value 255 encodes as 0x00 0xFF
+ * - value 1 encodes as 0x01
+ * - value 0 encodes as 0x00
+ * - value -1 encodes as 0xFF
+ * - value -255 encodes as 0xFF 0x01
+ * - value -256 encodes as 0xFF 0x00
+ */
BIGNUM = 8 << 28,
/** Byte string */
BYTES = 9 << 28,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
index ebdc9b7..230534c 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@
"libkeymint",
"liblog",
"libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
- "libremote_provisioner",
"libutils",
],
srcs: [
@@ -51,28 +50,3 @@
vendor: true,
src: "android.hardware.hardware_keystore.xml",
}
-
-cc_library {
- name: "libremote_provisioner",
- vendor_available: true,
- static_libs: [
- "libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
- ],
- shared_libs: [
- "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
- "libbinder_ndk",
- "libcppbor_external",
- "libcppcose",
- "libcrypto",
- "libkeymaster_portable",
- "libkeymint",
- "liblog",
- "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
- ],
- export_include_dirs: [
- ".",
- ],
- srcs: [
- "RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp",
- ],
-}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 5b02729..0000000
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,464 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h"
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <variant>
-
-#include <cppbor.h>
-#include <cppbor_parse.h>
-
-#include <KeyMintUtils.h>
-#include <cppcose/cppcose.h>
-#include <keymaster/keymaster_configuration.h>
-#include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint {
-
-using ::std::string;
-using ::std::tuple;
-using ::std::unique_ptr;
-using ::std::variant;
-using ::std::vector;
-using bytevec = ::std::vector<uint8_t>;
-
-using namespace cppcose;
-using namespace keymaster;
-
-namespace {
-
-// Hard-coded set of acceptable public keys that can act as roots of EEK chains.
-inline const vector<bytevec> kAuthorizedEekRoots = {
- // TODO(drysdale): replace this random value with real root pubkey(s).
- {0x5c, 0xea, 0x4b, 0xd2, 0x31, 0x27, 0x15, 0x5e, 0x62, 0x94, 0x70,
- 0x53, 0x94, 0x43, 0x0f, 0x9a, 0x89, 0xd5, 0xc5, 0x0f, 0x82, 0x9b,
- 0xcd, 0x10, 0xe0, 0x79, 0xef, 0xf3, 0xfa, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x0a},
-};
-
-constexpr auto STATUS_FAILED = RemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_FAILED;
-constexpr auto STATUS_INVALID_EEK = RemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK;
-constexpr auto STATUS_INVALID_MAC = RemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC;
-constexpr uint32_t kAffinePointLength = 32;
-struct AStatusDeleter {
- void operator()(AStatus* p) { AStatus_delete(p); }
-};
-
-// TODO(swillden): Remove the dependency on AStatus stuff. The COSE lib should use something like
-// StatusOr, but it shouldn't depend on AStatus.
-class Status {
- public:
- Status() {}
- Status(int32_t errCode, const std::string& errMsg)
- : status_(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(errCode, errMsg.c_str())) {}
- explicit Status(const std::string& errMsg)
- : status_(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(STATUS_FAILED, errMsg.c_str())) {}
- Status(AStatus* status) : status_(status) {}
- Status(Status&&) = default;
- Status(const Status&) = delete;
-
- operator ::ndk::ScopedAStatus() && { return ndk::ScopedAStatus(status_.release()); }
-
- bool isOk() { return !status_; }
-
- // Don't call getMessage() unless isOk() returns false;
- const char* getMessage() const { return AStatus_getMessage(status_.get()); }
-
- private:
- std::unique_ptr<AStatus, AStatusDeleter> status_;
-};
-
-template <typename T>
-class StatusOr {
- public:
- StatusOr(AStatus* status) : status_(status) {}
- StatusOr(Status status) : status_(std::move(status)) {}
- StatusOr(T val) : value_(std::move(val)) {}
-
- bool isOk() { return status_.isOk(); }
-
- T* operator->() & {
- assert(isOk());
- return &value_.value();
- }
- T& operator*() & {
- assert(isOk());
- return value_.value();
- }
- T&& operator*() && {
- assert(isOk());
- return std::move(value_).value();
- }
-
- const char* getMessage() const {
- assert(!isOk());
- return status_.getMessage();
- }
-
- Status moveError() {
- assert(!isOk());
- return std::move(status_);
- }
-
- T moveValue() { return std::move(value_).value(); }
-
- private:
- Status status_;
- std::optional<T> value_;
-};
-
-StatusOr<std::pair<bytevec /* EEK pub */, bytevec /* EEK ID */>> validateAndExtractEekPubAndId(
- bool testMode, const bytevec& endpointEncryptionCertChain) {
- auto [item, newPos, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(endpointEncryptionCertChain);
-
- if (!item || !item->asArray()) {
- return Status("Error parsing EEK chain" + errMsg);
- }
-
- const cppbor::Array* certArr = item->asArray();
- bytevec lastPubKey;
- for (int i = 0; i < certArr->size(); ++i) {
- auto cosePubKey = verifyAndParseCoseSign1(testMode, certArr->get(i)->asArray(),
- std::move(lastPubKey), bytevec{} /* AAD */);
- if (!cosePubKey) {
- return Status(STATUS_INVALID_EEK,
- "Failed to validate EEK chain: " + cosePubKey.moveMessage());
- }
- lastPubKey = *std::move(cosePubKey);
-
- // In prod mode the first pubkey should match a well-known Google public key.
- if (!testMode && i == 0 &&
- std::find(kAuthorizedEekRoots.begin(), kAuthorizedEekRoots.end(), lastPubKey) ==
- kAuthorizedEekRoots.end()) {
- return Status(STATUS_INVALID_EEK, "Unrecognized root of EEK chain");
- }
- }
-
- auto eek = CoseKey::parseX25519(lastPubKey, true /* requireKid */);
- if (!eek) return Status(STATUS_INVALID_EEK, "Failed to get EEK: " + eek.moveMessage());
-
- return std::make_pair(eek->getBstrValue(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X).value(),
- eek->getBstrValue(CoseKey::KEY_ID).value());
-}
-
-StatusOr<bytevec /* pubkeys */> validateAndExtractPubkeys(bool testMode,
- const vector<MacedPublicKey>& keysToSign,
- const bytevec& macKey) {
- auto pubKeysToMac = cppbor::Array();
- for (auto& keyToSign : keysToSign) {
- auto [macedKeyItem, _, coseMacErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(keyToSign.macedKey);
- if (!macedKeyItem || !macedKeyItem->asArray() ||
- macedKeyItem->asArray()->size() != kCoseMac0EntryCount) {
- return Status("Invalid COSE_Mac0 structure");
- }
-
- auto protectedParms = macedKeyItem->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
- auto unprotectedParms = macedKeyItem->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
- auto payload = macedKeyItem->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
- auto tag = macedKeyItem->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
- if (!protectedParms || !unprotectedParms || !payload || !tag) {
- return Status("Invalid COSE_Mac0 contents");
- }
-
- auto [protectedMap, __, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedParms);
- if (!protectedMap || !protectedMap->asMap()) {
- return Status("Invalid Mac0 protected: " + errMsg);
- }
- auto& algo = protectedMap->asMap()->get(ALGORITHM);
- if (!algo || !algo->asInt() || algo->asInt()->value() != HMAC_256) {
- return Status("Unsupported Mac0 algorithm");
- }
-
- auto pubKey = CoseKey::parse(payload->value(), EC2, ES256, P256);
- if (!pubKey) return Status(pubKey.moveMessage());
-
- bool testKey = static_cast<bool>(pubKey->getMap().get(CoseKey::TEST_KEY));
- if (testMode && !testKey) {
- return Status(BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_PRODUCTION_KEY_IN_TEST_REQUEST,
- "Production key in test request");
- } else if (!testMode && testKey) {
- return Status(BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST,
- "Test key in production request");
- }
-
- auto macTag = generateCoseMac0Mac(macKey, {} /* external_aad */, payload->value());
- if (!macTag) return Status(STATUS_INVALID_MAC, macTag.moveMessage());
- if (macTag->size() != tag->value().size() ||
- CRYPTO_memcmp(macTag->data(), tag->value().data(), macTag->size()) != 0) {
- return Status(STATUS_INVALID_MAC, "MAC tag mismatch");
- }
-
- pubKeysToMac.add(pubKey->moveMap());
- }
-
- return pubKeysToMac.encode();
-}
-
-StatusOr<std::pair<bytevec, bytevec>> buildCosePublicKeyFromKmCert(
- const keymaster_blob_t* km_cert) {
- if (km_cert == nullptr) {
- return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "km_cert is a nullptr");
- }
- const uint8_t* temp = km_cert->data;
- X509* cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &temp, km_cert->data_length);
- if (cert == nullptr) {
- return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "d2i_X509 returned null when attempting to get the cert.");
- }
- EVP_PKEY* pubKey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
- if (pubKey == nullptr) {
- return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "Boringssl failed to get the public key from the cert");
- }
- EC_KEY* ecKey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pubKey);
- if (ecKey == nullptr) {
- return Status(STATUS_FAILED,
- "The key in the certificate returned from GenerateKey is not "
- "an EC key.");
- }
- const EC_POINT* jacobian_coords = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecKey);
- BIGNUM x;
- BIGNUM y;
- BN_CTX* ctx = BN_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == nullptr) {
- return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "Memory allocation failure for BN_CTX");
- }
- if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ecKey), jacobian_coords, &x, &y,
- ctx)) {
- return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "Failed to get affine coordinates");
- }
- bytevec x_bytestring(kAffinePointLength);
- bytevec y_bytestring(kAffinePointLength);
- if (BN_bn2binpad(&x, x_bytestring.data(), kAffinePointLength) != kAffinePointLength) {
- return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "Wrote incorrect number of bytes for x coordinate");
- }
- if (BN_bn2binpad(&y, y_bytestring.data(), kAffinePointLength) != kAffinePointLength) {
- return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "Wrote incorrect number of bytes for y coordinate");
- }
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
- return std::make_pair(x_bytestring, y_bytestring);
-}
-
-cppbor::Array buildCertReqRecipients(const bytevec& pubkey, const bytevec& kid) {
- return cppbor::Array() // Array of recipients
- .add(cppbor::Array() // Recipient
- .add(cppbor::Map() // Protected
- .add(ALGORITHM, ECDH_ES_HKDF_256)
- .canonicalize()
- .encode())
- .add(cppbor::Map() // Unprotected
- .add(COSE_KEY, cppbor::Map()
- .add(CoseKey::KEY_TYPE, OCTET_KEY_PAIR)
- .add(CoseKey::CURVE, cppcose::X25519)
- .add(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X, pubkey)
- .canonicalize())
- .add(KEY_ID, kid)
- .canonicalize())
- .add(cppbor::Null())); // No ciphertext
-}
-
-static keymaster_key_param_t kKeyMintEcdsaP256Params[] = {
- Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_ATTEST_KEY),
- Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_EC), Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256),
- Authorization(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_256),
- Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, KM_EC_CURVE_P_256), Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
- // The certificate generated by KM will be discarded, these values don't matter.
- Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE, 0), Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER, 0)};
-
-} // namespace
-
-RemotelyProvisionedComponent::RemotelyProvisionedComponent(
- std::shared_ptr<keymint::AndroidKeyMintDevice> keymint) {
- std::tie(devicePrivKey_, bcc_) = generateBcc();
- impl_ = keymint->getKeymasterImpl();
-}
-
-RemotelyProvisionedComponent::~RemotelyProvisionedComponent() {}
-
-ScopedAStatus RemotelyProvisionedComponent::generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(bool testMode,
- MacedPublicKey* macedPublicKey,
- bytevec* privateKeyHandle) {
- // TODO(jbires): The following should move from ->GenerateKey to ->GenerateRKPKey and everything
- // after the GenerateKey call should basically be moved into that new function call
- // as well once the issue with libcppbor in system/keymaster is sorted out
- GenerateKeyRequest request(impl_->message_version());
- request.key_description.Reinitialize(kKeyMintEcdsaP256Params,
- array_length(kKeyMintEcdsaP256Params));
- GenerateKeyResponse response(impl_->message_version());
- impl_->GenerateKey(request, &response);
- if (response.error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
- return km_utils::kmError2ScopedAStatus(response.error);
- }
-
- if (response.certificate_chain.entry_count != 1) {
- // Error: Need the single non-signed certificate with the public key in it.
- return Status(STATUS_FAILED,
- "Expected to receive a single certificate from GenerateKey. Instead got: " +
- std::to_string(response.certificate_chain.entry_count));
- }
- auto affineCoords = buildCosePublicKeyFromKmCert(response.certificate_chain.begin());
- if (!affineCoords.isOk()) return affineCoords.moveError();
- cppbor::Map cosePublicKeyMap = cppbor::Map()
- .add(CoseKey::KEY_TYPE, EC2)
- .add(CoseKey::ALGORITHM, ES256)
- .add(CoseKey::CURVE, cppcose::P256)
- .add(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X, affineCoords->first)
- .add(CoseKey::PUBKEY_Y, affineCoords->second);
- if (testMode) {
- cosePublicKeyMap.add(CoseKey::TEST_KEY, cppbor::Null());
- }
-
- bytevec cosePublicKey = cosePublicKeyMap.canonicalize().encode();
-
- auto macedKey = constructCoseMac0(testMode ? remote_prov::kTestMacKey : macKey_,
- {} /* externalAad */, cosePublicKey);
- if (!macedKey) return Status(macedKey.moveMessage());
-
- macedPublicKey->macedKey = macedKey->encode();
- *privateKeyHandle = km_utils::kmBlob2vector(response.key_blob);
- return ScopedAStatus::ok();
-}
-
-ScopedAStatus RemotelyProvisionedComponent::generateCertificateRequest(
- bool testMode, const vector<MacedPublicKey>& keysToSign,
- const bytevec& endpointEncCertChain, const bytevec& challenge, DeviceInfo* deviceInfo,
- ProtectedData* protectedData, bytevec* keysToSignMac) {
- auto pubKeysToSign = validateAndExtractPubkeys(testMode, keysToSign,
- testMode ? remote_prov::kTestMacKey : macKey_);
- if (!pubKeysToSign.isOk()) return pubKeysToSign.moveError();
-
- bytevec ephemeralMacKey = remote_prov::randomBytes(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-
- auto pubKeysToSignMac = generateCoseMac0Mac(ephemeralMacKey, bytevec{}, *pubKeysToSign);
- if (!pubKeysToSignMac) return Status(pubKeysToSignMac.moveMessage());
- *keysToSignMac = *std::move(pubKeysToSignMac);
-
- bytevec devicePrivKey;
- cppbor::Array bcc;
- if (testMode) {
- std::tie(devicePrivKey, bcc) = generateBcc();
- } else {
- devicePrivKey = devicePrivKey_;
- bcc = bcc_.clone();
- }
-
- std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> deviceInfoMap = createDeviceInfo();
- deviceInfo->deviceInfo = deviceInfoMap->encode();
- auto signedMac = constructCoseSign1(devicePrivKey /* Signing key */, //
- ephemeralMacKey /* Payload */,
- cppbor::Array() /* AAD */
- .add(challenge)
- .add(std::move(deviceInfoMap))
- .encode());
- if (!signedMac) return Status(signedMac.moveMessage());
-
- bytevec ephemeralPrivKey(X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN);
- bytevec ephemeralPubKey(X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN);
- X25519_keypair(ephemeralPubKey.data(), ephemeralPrivKey.data());
-
- auto eek = validateAndExtractEekPubAndId(testMode, endpointEncCertChain);
- if (!eek.isOk()) return eek.moveError();
-
- auto sessionKey = x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(ephemeralPubKey, ephemeralPrivKey, eek->first,
- true /* senderIsA */);
- if (!sessionKey) return Status(sessionKey.moveMessage());
-
- auto coseEncrypted =
- constructCoseEncrypt(*sessionKey, remote_prov::randomBytes(kAesGcmNonceLength),
- cppbor::Array() // payload
- .add(signedMac.moveValue())
- .add(std::move(bcc))
- .encode(),
- {}, // aad
- buildCertReqRecipients(ephemeralPubKey, eek->second));
-
- if (!coseEncrypted) return Status(coseEncrypted.moveMessage());
- protectedData->protectedData = coseEncrypted->encode();
-
- return ScopedAStatus::ok();
-}
-
-bytevec RemotelyProvisionedComponent::deriveBytesFromHbk(const string& context,
- size_t numBytes) const {
- bytevec fakeHbk(32, 0);
- bytevec result(numBytes);
-
- // TODO(swillden): Figure out if HKDF can fail. It doesn't seem like it should be able to,
- // but the function does return an error code.
- HKDF(result.data(), numBytes, //
- EVP_sha256(), //
- fakeHbk.data(), fakeHbk.size(), //
- nullptr /* salt */, 0 /* salt len */, //
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(context.data()), context.size());
-
- return result;
-}
-
-std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> RemotelyProvisionedComponent::createDeviceInfo() const {
- auto result = std::make_unique<cppbor::Map>(cppbor::Map());
-
- // The following placeholders show how the DeviceInfo map would be populated.
- // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("brand"), cppbor::Tstr("Google"));
- // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("manufacturer"), cppbor::Tstr("Google"));
- // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("product"), cppbor::Tstr("Fake"));
- // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("model"), cppbor::Tstr("Imaginary"));
- // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("board"), cppbor::Tstr("Chess"));
- // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("vb_state"), cppbor::Tstr("orange"));
- // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("bootloader_state"), cppbor::Tstr("unlocked"));
- // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("os_version"), cppbor::Tstr("SC"));
- // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("system_patch_level"), cppbor::Uint(20210331));
- // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("boot_patch_level"), cppbor::Uint(20210331));
- // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("vendor_patch_level"), cppbor::Uint(20210331));
-
- result->canonicalize();
- return result;
-}
-
-std::pair<bytevec /* privKey */, cppbor::Array /* BCC */>
-RemotelyProvisionedComponent::generateBcc() {
- bytevec privKey(ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN);
- bytevec pubKey(ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
-
- ED25519_keypair(pubKey.data(), privKey.data());
-
- auto coseKey = cppbor::Map()
- .add(CoseKey::KEY_TYPE, OCTET_KEY_PAIR)
- .add(CoseKey::ALGORITHM, EDDSA)
- .add(CoseKey::CURVE, ED25519)
- .add(CoseKey::KEY_OPS, VERIFY)
- .add(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X, pubKey)
- .canonicalize()
- .encode();
- auto sign1Payload = cppbor::Map()
- .add(1 /* Issuer */, "Issuer")
- .add(2 /* Subject */, "Subject")
- .add(-4670552 /* Subject Pub Key */, coseKey)
- .add(-4670553 /* Key Usage (little-endian order) */,
- std::vector<uint8_t>{0x20} /* keyCertSign = 1<<5 */)
- .canonicalize()
- .encode();
- auto coseSign1 = constructCoseSign1(privKey, /* signing key */
- cppbor::Map(), /* extra protected */
- sign1Payload, {} /* AAD */);
- assert(coseSign1);
-
- return {privKey, cppbor::Array().add(coseKey).add(coseSign1.moveValue())};
-}
-
-} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h b/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 8185e26..0000000
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#pragma once
-
-#include <AndroidKeyMintDevice.h>
-#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
-#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.h>
-#include <cppbor.h>
-#include <keymaster/UniquePtr.h>
-#include <keymaster/android_keymaster.h>
-
-namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint {
-
-using ::ndk::ScopedAStatus;
-
-class RemotelyProvisionedComponent : public BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
- public:
- explicit RemotelyProvisionedComponent(std::shared_ptr<keymint::AndroidKeyMintDevice> keymint);
- virtual ~RemotelyProvisionedComponent();
-
- ScopedAStatus generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(bool testMode, MacedPublicKey* macedPublicKey,
- std::vector<uint8_t>* privateKeyHandle) override;
-
- ScopedAStatus generateCertificateRequest(bool testMode,
- const std::vector<MacedPublicKey>& keysToSign,
- const std::vector<uint8_t>& endpointEncCertChain,
- const std::vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
- DeviceInfo* deviceInfo, ProtectedData* protectedData,
- std::vector<uint8_t>* keysToSignMac) override;
-
- private:
- // TODO(swillden): Move these into an appropriate Context class.
- std::vector<uint8_t> deriveBytesFromHbk(const std::string& context, size_t numBytes) const;
- std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> createDeviceInfo() const;
- std::pair<std::vector<uint8_t>, cppbor::Array> generateBcc();
-
- std::vector<uint8_t> macKey_ = deriveBytesFromHbk("Key to MAC public keys", 32);
- std::vector<uint8_t> devicePrivKey_;
- cppbor::Array bcc_;
- std::shared_ptr<::keymaster::AndroidKeymaster> impl_;
-};
-
-} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
index bcebbaf..8092e34 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
@@ -21,14 +21,13 @@
#include <android/binder_process.h>
#include <AndroidKeyMintDevice.h>
+#include <AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice.h>
#include <AndroidSecureClock.h>
#include <AndroidSharedSecret.h>
#include <keymaster/soft_keymaster_logger.h>
-#include "RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h"
-
using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::AndroidKeyMintDevice;
-using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::RemotelyProvisionedComponent;
+using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice;
using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel;
using aidl::android::hardware::security::secureclock::AndroidSecureClock;
using aidl::android::hardware::security::sharedsecret::AndroidSharedSecret;
@@ -56,7 +55,7 @@
// Add Shared Secret Service
addService<AndroidSharedSecret>(keyMint);
// Add Remotely Provisioned Component Service
- addService<RemotelyProvisionedComponent>(keyMint);
+ addService<AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice>(keyMint);
ABinderProcess_joinThreadPool();
return EXIT_FAILURE; // should not reach
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 6c7309e..ff08ce6 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -31,20 +31,21 @@
],
srcs: [
"AttestKeyTest.cpp",
+ "DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp",
"KeyMintTest.cpp",
],
shared_libs: [
"libbinder_ndk",
"libcrypto",
- "libkeymint",
- "libkeymint_support",
],
static_libs: [
"android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
"android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk_platform",
"libcppbor_external",
- "libcppcose",
+ "libcppcose_rkp",
+ "libkeymint",
"libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
+ "libkeymint_support",
"libkeymint_vts_test_utils",
],
test_suites: [
@@ -68,16 +69,16 @@
shared_libs: [
"libbinder_ndk",
"libcrypto",
- "libkeymint",
- "libkeymint_support",
],
static_libs: [
"android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
"android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk_platform",
"libcppbor_external",
- "libcppcose",
+ "libcppcose_rkp",
"libgmock_ndk",
+ "libkeymint",
"libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
+ "libkeymint_support",
],
}
@@ -92,21 +93,20 @@
],
shared_libs: [
"libbinder_ndk",
- "libcppbor_external",
"libcrypto",
- "libkeymaster_portable",
- "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
],
static_libs: [
"android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
"android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk_platform",
- "libcppcose",
+ "libcppbor_external",
+ "libcppcose_rkp",
"libgmock_ndk",
+ "libkeymaster_portable",
"libkeymint",
"libkeymint_support",
"libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
"libkeymint_vts_test_utils",
- "libremote_provisioner",
+ "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
],
test_suites: [
"general-tests",
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
index daa3e18..a312723 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
@@ -35,10 +35,16 @@
using AttestKeyTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.AllRsaSizes
+ *
+ * This test creates self signed RSA attestation keys of various sizes, and verify they can be
+ * used to sign other RSA and EC keys.
+ */
TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AllRsaSizes) {
for (auto size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
/*
- * Create attestaton key.
+ * Create attestation key.
*/
AttestationKey attest_key;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
@@ -50,11 +56,12 @@
{} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
&attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+ ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain)) << "Failed on size " << size;
/*
- * Use attestation key to sign RSA key
+ * Use attestation key to sign RSA signing key
*/
attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
@@ -81,29 +88,77 @@
EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
// Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
- if (attest_key_cert_chain.size() > 0) {
- attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
- }
+ attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+ EXPECT_EQ(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 2);
/*
- * Use attestation key to sign EC key
+ * Use attestation key to sign RSA decryption key
*/
+ attested_key_characteristics.resize(0);
+ attested_key_cert_chain.resize(0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo2")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar2")
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+
+ hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo2", "bar2", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+ attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ // Attestation by itself is not valid (last entry is not self-signed).
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+ // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+ attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+ EXPECT_EQ(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 2);
+
+ /*
+ * Use attestation key to sign EC key. Specify a CREATION_DATETIME for this one.
+ */
+ attested_key_characteristics.resize(0);
+ attested_key_cert_chain.resize(0);
+ uint64_t timestamp = 1619621648000;
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.AttestationChallenge("foo")
.AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Authorization(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, timestamp)
.SetDefaultValidity(),
attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
&attested_key_cert_chain));
+ // The returned key characteristics will include CREATION_DATETIME (checked below)
+ // in SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE; this will be stripped out in the CheckCharacteristics()
+ // call below, to match what getKeyCharacteristics() returns (which doesn't include
+ // any SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE characteristics).
+ CheckCharacteristics(attested_key_blob, attested_key_characteristics);
+
CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+
+ // The client-specified CREATION_DATETIME should be in sw_enforced.
+ // Its presence will also trigger verify_attestation_record() to check that it
+ // is in the attestation extension with a matching value.
+ EXPECT_TRUE(sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, timestamp))
+ << "expected CREATION_TIMESTAMP in sw_enforced:" << sw_enforced
+ << " not in hw_enforced:" << hw_enforced;
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
@@ -111,9 +166,7 @@
EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
// Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
- if (attest_key_cert_chain.size() > 0) {
- attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
- }
+ attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
// Bail early if anything failed.
@@ -121,10 +174,380 @@
}
}
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.RsaAttestedAttestKeys
+ *
+ * This test creates an RSA attestation key signed by factory keys, and varifies it can be
+ * used to sign other RSA and EC keys.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, RsaAttestedAttestKeys) {
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+
+ auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ // An X.509 certificate serial number SHOULD be >0, but this is not policed. Check
+ // that a zero value doesn't cause problems.
+ uint64_t serial_int = 0;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ /*
+ * Create attestation key.
+ */
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+ &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+ EXPECT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(attest_key_cert_chain[0], serial_int, subject, false);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attest_key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attest_key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id, //
+ sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+ attest_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ /*
+ * Use attestation key to sign RSA key
+ */
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = subject_der;
+ vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+
+ auto subject2 = "cert subject";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der2(make_name_from_str(subject2));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int2 = 255;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob2(build_serial_blob(serial_int2));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob2)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der2)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced2 = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced2 = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced2, hw_enforced2, SecLevel(),
+ attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ // Attestation by itself is not valid (last entry is not self-signed).
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+ // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+ attested_key_cert_chain.insert(attested_key_cert_chain.end(), attest_key_cert_chain.begin(),
+ attest_key_cert_chain.end());
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+ EXPECT_GT(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 2);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(attested_key_cert_chain[0], serial_int2, subject2, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.RsaAttestKeyChaining
+ *
+ * This test creates a chain of multiple RSA attest keys, each used to sign the next attest key,
+ * with the last attest key signed by the factory chain.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, RsaAttestKeyChaining) {
+ const int chain_size = 6;
+ vector<vector<uint8_t>> key_blob_list(chain_size);
+ vector<vector<Certificate>> cert_chain_list(chain_size);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+ string sub = "attest key chaining ";
+ char index = '1' + i;
+ string subject = sub + index;
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 7000 + i;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ optional<AttestationKey> attest_key_opt;
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str(sub + (char)(index - 1));
+ attest_key.keyBlob = key_blob_list[i - 1];
+ attest_key_opt = attest_key;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key_opt, &key_blob_list[i], &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+ cert_chain_list[i][0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ /*
+ * The first key is attestated with factory chain, but all the rest of the keys are
+ * not supposed to be returned in attestation certificate chains.
+ */
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+ // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+ cert_chain_list[i].insert(cert_chain_list[i].end(), //
+ cert_chain_list[i - 1].begin(), //
+ cert_chain_list[i - 1].end());
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+ EXPECT_GT(cert_chain_list[i].size(), i + 1);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_list[i][0], serial_int, subject, false);
+ }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob_list[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.EcAttestKeyChaining
+ *
+ * This test creates a chain of multiple Ec attest keys, each used to sign the next attest key,
+ * with the last attest key signed by the factory chain.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, EcAttestKeyChaining) {
+ const int chain_size = 6;
+ vector<vector<uint8_t>> key_blob_list(chain_size);
+ vector<vector<Certificate>> cert_chain_list(chain_size);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+ string sub = "Ec attest key chaining ";
+ char index = '1' + i;
+ string subject = sub + index;
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 800000 + i;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ optional<AttestationKey> attest_key_opt;
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str(sub + (char)(index - 1));
+ attest_key.keyBlob = key_blob_list[i - 1];
+ attest_key_opt = attest_key;
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key_opt, &key_blob_list[i], &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+ cert_chain_list[i][0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ /*
+ * The first key is attestated with factory chain, but all the rest of the keys are
+ * not supposed to be returned in attestation certificate chains.
+ */
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+ // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+ cert_chain_list[i].insert(cert_chain_list[i].end(), //
+ cert_chain_list[i - 1].begin(), //
+ cert_chain_list[i - 1].end());
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+ EXPECT_GT(cert_chain_list[i].size(), i + 1);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_list[i][0], serial_int, subject, false);
+ }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob_list[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.AlternateAttestKeyChaining
+ *
+ * This test creates a chain of multiple attest keys, in the order Ec - RSA - Ec - RSA ....
+ * Each attest key is used to sign the next attest key, with the last attest key signed by
+ * the factory chain. This is to verify different algorithms of attest keys can
+ * cross sign each other and be chained together.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AlternateAttestKeyChaining) {
+ const int chain_size = 6;
+ vector<vector<uint8_t>> key_blob_list(chain_size);
+ vector<vector<Certificate>> cert_chain_list(chain_size);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+ string sub = "Alt attest key chaining ";
+ char index = '1' + i;
+ string subject = sub + index;
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 90000000 + i;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ optional<AttestationKey> attest_key_opt;
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str(sub + (char)(index - 1));
+ attest_key.keyBlob = key_blob_list[i - 1];
+ attest_key_opt = attest_key;
+ }
+
+ if ((i & 0x1) == 1) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key_opt, &key_blob_list[i], &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &cert_chain_list[i]));
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key_opt, &key_blob_list[i], &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &cert_chain_list[i]));
+ }
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+ cert_chain_list[i][0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ if (i > 0) {
+ /*
+ * The first key is attestated with factory chain, but all the rest of the keys are
+ * not supposed to be returned in attestation certificate chains.
+ */
+ EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+ // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+ cert_chain_list[i].insert(cert_chain_list[i].end(), //
+ cert_chain_list[i - 1].begin(), //
+ cert_chain_list[i - 1].end());
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+ EXPECT_GT(cert_chain_list[i].size(), i + 1);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_list[i][0], serial_int, subject, false);
+ }
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob_list[i]);
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, MissingChallenge) {
+ for (auto size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+ /*
+ * Create attestation key.
+ */
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(size, 65537)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+ &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain)) << "Failed on size " << size;
+
+ /*
+ * Use attestation key to sign RSA / ECDSA key but forget to provide a challenge
+ */
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+ vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+ &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+ }
+}
+
TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AllEcCurves) {
for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
/*
- * Create attestaton key.
+ * Create attestation key.
*/
AttestationKey attest_key;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
@@ -133,9 +556,10 @@
.EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
.AttestKey()
.SetDefaultValidity(),
- {} /* attestation siging key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+ {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
&attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+ ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain)) << "Failed on curve " << curve;
@@ -208,7 +632,7 @@
}
TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AttestWithNonAttestKey) {
- // Create non-attestaton key.
+ // Create non-attestation key.
AttestationKey non_attest_key;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> non_attest_key_characteristics;
vector<Certificate> non_attest_key_cert_chain;
@@ -216,9 +640,10 @@
ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(
AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256).SetDefaultValidity(),
- {} /* attestation siging key */, &non_attest_key.keyBlob,
+ {} /* attestation signing key */, &non_attest_key.keyBlob,
&non_attest_key_characteristics, &non_attest_key_cert_chain));
+ ASSERT_GT(non_attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
EXPECT_EQ(non_attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(non_attest_key_cert_chain));
@@ -237,6 +662,124 @@
&attested_key_cert_chain));
}
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, EcdsaAttestationID) {
+ // Create attestation key.
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+ &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+ ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+ // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+ auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+ "ro.product.manufacturer");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << tag);
+ // Use attestation key to sign an ECDSA key, but include an attestation ID field.
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ builder.push_back(tag);
+ vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+ auto result = GenerateKey(builder, attest_key, &attested_key_blob,
+ &attested_key_characteristics, &attested_key_cert_chain);
+ if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+
+ // The attested key characteristics will not contain APPLICATION_ID_* fields (their
+ // spec definitions all have "Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics"), but the
+ // attestation extension should contain them, so make sure the extra tag is added.
+ hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+ SecLevel(),
+ attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+ }
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+}
+
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, EcdsaAttestationMismatchID) {
+ // Create attestation key.
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+ &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+ ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+ // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+ auto attestation_id_tags =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "bogus-brand")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "devious-device")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "punctured-product")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "suspicious-serial")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, "invalid-imei")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, "mismatching-meid")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, "malformed-manufacturer")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "malicious-model");
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << invalid_tag);
+
+ // Use attestation key to sign an ECDSA key, but include an invalid
+ // attestation ID field.
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+ vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+ auto result = GenerateKey(builder, attest_key, &attested_key_blob,
+ &attested_key_characteristics, &attested_key_cert_chain);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG)
+ << "result = " << result;
+ }
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+}
+
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AttestKeyTest);
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3ed3ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "keymint_1_attest_key_test"
+
+#include <cutils/log.h>
+#include <cutils/properties.h>
+#include <keymint_support/key_param_output.h>
+#include <keymint_support/openssl_utils.h>
+
+#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
+
+namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test {
+
+class DeviceUniqueAttestationTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
+ protected:
+ void CheckUniqueAttestationResults(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics,
+ const AuthorizationSet& hw_enforced) {
+ ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+
+ if (KeyMintAidlTestBase::dump_Attestations) {
+ std::cout << bin2hex(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate) << std::endl;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ // The device-unique attestation chain should contain exactly two certificates:
+ // * The leaf with the attestation extension.
+ // * A self-signed root, signed using the device-unique key.
+ ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 2);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+ SecLevel(), cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+ }
+};
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.RsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented
+ *
+ * Verifies that non strongbox implementations do not implement Rsa device unique
+ * attestation.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, RsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+ // Check RSA implementation
+ auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+ .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT || result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented
+ *
+ * Verifies that non strongbox implementations do not implement Ecdsa device unique
+ * attestation.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented) {
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+ // Check Ecdsa implementation
+ auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+ .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT || result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.RsaDeviceUniqueAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that strongbox implementations of Rsa implements device unique
+ * attestation correctly, if implemented.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, RsaDeviceUniqueAttestation) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ int key_size = 2048;
+
+ auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+ .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+ // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+ if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+
+ // Any patchlevels attached to the key should also be present in the attestation extension.
+ AuthorizationSet auths;
+ for (const auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+ auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+ auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (vendor_pl) {
+ hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, *vendor_pl);
+ }
+ auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (boot_pl) {
+ hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, *boot_pl);
+ }
+
+ CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that strongbox implementations of Rsa implements device unique
+ * attestation correctly, if implemented.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestation) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+ auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+ .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+ // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+ if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+ // Any patchlevels attached to the key should also be present in the attestation extension.
+ AuthorizationSet auths;
+ for (const auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+ auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+ auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (vendor_pl) {
+ hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, *vendor_pl);
+ }
+ auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (boot_pl) {
+ hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, *boot_pl);
+ }
+
+ CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID
+ *
+ * Verifies that device unique attestation can include IDs that do match the
+ * local device.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+ auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+ "ro.product.manufacturer");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << tag);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+ .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION);
+ builder.push_back(tag);
+ auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+ // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+ if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+ // Expect the specified tag to be present in the attestation extension.
+ hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+ // Any patchlevels attached to the key should also be present in the attestation extension.
+ AuthorizationSet auths;
+ for (const auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+ auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+ auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (vendor_pl) {
+ hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, *vendor_pl);
+ }
+ auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (boot_pl) {
+ hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, *boot_pl);
+ }
+ CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID
+ *
+ * Verifies that device unique attestation rejects attempts to attest to IDs that
+ * don't match the local device.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+ auto attestation_id_tags =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "bogus-brand")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "devious-device")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "punctured-product")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "suspicious-serial")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, "invalid-imei")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, "mismatching-meid")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, "malformed-manufacturer")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "malicious-model");
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << invalid_tag);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+ .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION);
+ // Add the tag that doesn't match the local device's real ID.
+ builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+ auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG);
+ }
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest);
+
+} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
index 3da0484..5359b3b 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@
#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android/binder_manager.h>
#include <cppbor_parse.h>
-#include <cppcose/cppcose.h>
#include <cutils/properties.h>
#include <gmock/gmock.h>
#include <openssl/mem.h>
#include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
+#include <keymaster/cppcose/cppcose.h>
#include <keymint_support/attestation_record.h>
#include <keymint_support/key_param_output.h>
#include <keymint_support/keymint_utils.h>
@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@
using ::testing::AssertionFailure;
using ::testing::AssertionResult;
using ::testing::AssertionSuccess;
+using ::testing::ElementsAreArray;
using ::testing::MatchesRegex;
+using ::testing::Not;
::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const AuthorizationSet& set) {
if (set.size() == 0)
@@ -59,6 +61,14 @@
namespace test {
namespace {
+
+// Invalid value for a patchlevel (which is of form YYYYMMDD).
+const uint32_t kInvalidPatchlevel = 99998877;
+
+// Overhead for PKCS#1 v1.5 signature padding of undigested messages. Digested messages have
+// additional overhead, for the digest algorithmIdentifier required by PKCS#1.
+const size_t kPkcs1UndigestedSignaturePaddingOverhead = 11;
+
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase::KeyData KeyData;
// Predicate for testing basic characteristics validity in generation or import.
bool KeyCharacteristicsBasicallyValid(SecurityLevel secLevel,
@@ -119,9 +129,7 @@
// Attestations don't contain everything in key authorization lists, so we need to filter the key
// lists to produce the lists that we expect to match the attestations.
auto kTagsToFilter = {
- Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS, //
- Tag::CREATION_DATETIME, //
- Tag::EC_CURVE,
+ Tag::CREATION_DATETIME,
Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE,
Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID,
};
@@ -136,6 +144,15 @@
return filtered;
}
+// Remove any SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE entries from a list of key characteristics.
+void strip_keystore_tags(vector<KeyCharacteristics>* characteristics) {
+ characteristics->erase(std::remove_if(characteristics->begin(), characteristics->end(),
+ [](const auto& entry) {
+ return entry.securityLevel == SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE;
+ }),
+ characteristics->end());
+}
+
string x509NameToStr(X509_NAME* name) {
char* s = X509_NAME_oneline(name, nullptr, 0);
string retval(s);
@@ -148,6 +165,28 @@
bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::arm_deleteAllKeys = false;
bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::dump_Attestations = false;
+uint32_t KeyMintAidlTestBase::boot_patch_level(
+ const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics) {
+ // The boot patchlevel is not available as a property, but should be present
+ // in the key characteristics of any created key.
+ AuthorizationSet allAuths;
+ for (auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+ allAuths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+ auto patchlevel = allAuths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (patchlevel.has_value()) {
+ return patchlevel.value();
+ } else {
+ // No boot patchlevel is available. Return a value that won't match anything
+ // and so will trigger test failures.
+ return kInvalidPatchlevel;
+ }
+}
+
+uint32_t KeyMintAidlTestBase::boot_patch_level() {
+ return boot_patch_level(key_characteristics_);
+}
+
ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result) {
if (result.isOk()) return ErrorCode::OK;
@@ -168,9 +207,11 @@
securityLevel_ = info.securityLevel;
name_.assign(info.keyMintName.begin(), info.keyMintName.end());
author_.assign(info.keyMintAuthorName.begin(), info.keyMintAuthorName.end());
+ timestamp_token_required_ = info.timestampTokenRequired;
os_version_ = getOsVersion();
os_patch_level_ = getOsPatchlevel();
+ vendor_patch_level_ = getVendorPatchlevel();
}
void KeyMintAidlTestBase::SetUp() {
@@ -273,7 +314,8 @@
ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapping_key,
const AuthorizationSet& wrapping_key_desc,
string masking_key,
- const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params) {
+ const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params,
+ int64_t password_sid, int64_t biometric_sid) {
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(wrapping_key_desc, KeyFormat::PKCS8, wrapping_key));
key_characteristics_.clear();
@@ -282,8 +324,7 @@
Status result = keymint_->importWrappedKey(
vector<uint8_t>(wrapped_key.begin(), wrapped_key.end()), key_blob_,
vector<uint8_t>(masking_key.begin(), masking_key.end()),
- unwrapping_params.vector_data(), 0 /* passwordSid */, 0 /* biometricSid */,
- &creationResult);
+ unwrapping_params.vector_data(), password_sid, biometric_sid, &creationResult);
if (result.isOk()) {
EXPECT_PRED2(KeyCharacteristicsBasicallyValid, SecLevel(),
@@ -312,6 +353,65 @@
return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
}
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GetCharacteristics(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const vector<uint8_t>& app_id,
+ const vector<uint8_t>& app_data,
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics) {
+ Status result =
+ keymint_->getKeyCharacteristics(key_blob, app_id, app_data, key_characteristics);
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GetCharacteristics(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics) {
+ vector<uint8_t> empty_app_id, empty_app_data;
+ return GetCharacteristics(key_blob, empty_app_id, empty_app_data, key_characteristics);
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckCharacteristics(
+ const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& generate_characteristics) {
+ // Any key characteristics that were in SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE when returned from
+ // generateKey() should be excluded, as KeyMint will have no record of them.
+ // This applies to CREATION_DATETIME in particular.
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> expected_characteristics(generate_characteristics);
+ strip_keystore_tags(&expected_characteristics);
+
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> retrieved;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GetCharacteristics(key_blob, &retrieved));
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_characteristics, retrieved);
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckAppIdCharacteristics(
+ const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, std::string_view app_id_string,
+ std::string_view app_data_string,
+ const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& generate_characteristics) {
+ // Exclude any SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE characteristics for comparisons.
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> expected_characteristics(generate_characteristics);
+ strip_keystore_tags(&expected_characteristics);
+
+ vector<uint8_t> app_id(app_id_string.begin(), app_id_string.end());
+ vector<uint8_t> app_data(app_data_string.begin(), app_data_string.end());
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> retrieved;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GetCharacteristics(key_blob, app_id, app_data, &retrieved));
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_characteristics, retrieved);
+
+ // Check that key characteristics can't be retrieved if the app ID or app data is missing.
+ vector<uint8_t> empty;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> not_retrieved;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ GetCharacteristics(key_blob, empty, app_data, ¬_retrieved));
+ EXPECT_EQ(not_retrieved.size(), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ GetCharacteristics(key_blob, app_id, empty, ¬_retrieved));
+ EXPECT_EQ(not_retrieved.size(), 0);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+ GetCharacteristics(key_blob, empty, empty, ¬_retrieved));
+ EXPECT_EQ(not_retrieved.size(), 0);
+}
+
ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::DeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob) {
Status result = keymint_->deleteKey(*key_blob);
if (!keep_key_blob) {
@@ -332,6 +432,11 @@
return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
}
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::DestroyAttestationIds() {
+ Status result = keymint_->destroyAttestationIds();
+ return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckedDeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob) {
ErrorCode result = DeleteKey(key_blob, keep_key_blob);
EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::OK || result == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED) << result << endl;
@@ -348,7 +453,7 @@
SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
Status result;
BeginResult out;
- result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), HardwareAuthToken(), &out);
+ result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), std::nullopt, &out);
if (result.isOk()) {
*out_params = out.params;
@@ -366,7 +471,7 @@
Status result;
BeginResult out;
- result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), HardwareAuthToken(), &out);
+ result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), std::nullopt, &out);
if (result.isOk()) {
*out_params = out.params;
@@ -584,6 +689,205 @@
VerifyMessage(key_blob_, message, signature, params);
}
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::LocalVerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("LocalVerifyMessage");
+
+ // Retrieve the public key from the leaf certificate.
+ ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+ X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(key_cert.get());
+ EVP_PKEY_Ptr pub_key(X509_get_pubkey(key_cert.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(pub_key.get());
+
+ Digest digest = params.GetTagValue(TAG_DIGEST).value();
+ PaddingMode padding = PaddingMode::NONE;
+ auto tag = params.GetTagValue(TAG_PADDING);
+ if (tag.has_value()) {
+ padding = tag.value();
+ }
+
+ if (digest == Digest::NONE) {
+ switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pub_key.get())) {
+ case EVP_PKEY_EC: {
+ vector<uint8_t> data((EVP_PKEY_bits(pub_key.get()) + 7) / 8);
+ size_t data_size = std::min(data.size(), message.size());
+ memcpy(data.data(), message.data(), data_size);
+ EC_KEY_Ptr ecdsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pub_key.get()));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(ecdsa.get());
+ ASSERT_EQ(1,
+ ECDSA_verify(0, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(data.data()), data_size,
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.data()),
+ signature.size(), ecdsa.get()));
+ break;
+ }
+ case EVP_PKEY_RSA: {
+ vector<uint8_t> data(EVP_PKEY_size(pub_key.get()));
+ size_t data_size = std::min(data.size(), message.size());
+ memcpy(data.data(), message.data(), data_size);
+
+ RSA_Ptr rsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(const_cast<EVP_PKEY*>(pub_key.get())));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(rsa.get());
+
+ size_t key_len = RSA_size(rsa.get());
+ int openssl_padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+ switch (padding) {
+ case PaddingMode::NONE:
+ ASSERT_TRUE(data_size <= key_len);
+ ASSERT_EQ(key_len, signature.size());
+ openssl_padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+ break;
+ case PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN:
+ ASSERT_TRUE(data_size + kPkcs1UndigestedSignaturePaddingOverhead <=
+ key_len);
+ openssl_padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Unsupported RSA padding mode " << padding;
+ }
+
+ vector<uint8_t> decrypted_data(key_len);
+ int bytes_decrypted = RSA_public_decrypt(
+ signature.size(), reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.data()),
+ decrypted_data.data(), rsa.get(), openssl_padding);
+ ASSERT_GE(bytes_decrypted, 0);
+
+ const uint8_t* compare_pos = decrypted_data.data();
+ size_t bytes_to_compare = bytes_decrypted;
+ uint8_t zero_check_result = 0;
+ if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && data_size < bytes_to_compare) {
+ // If the data is short, for "unpadded" signing we zero-pad to the left. So
+ // during verification we should have zeros on the left of the decrypted data.
+ // Do a constant-time check.
+ const uint8_t* zero_end = compare_pos + bytes_to_compare - data_size;
+ while (compare_pos < zero_end) zero_check_result |= *compare_pos++;
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, zero_check_result);
+ bytes_to_compare = data_size;
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, memcmp(compare_pos, data.data(), bytes_to_compare));
+ break;
+ }
+ default:
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown public key type";
+ }
+ } else {
+ EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
+ const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
+ ASSERT_NE(md, nullptr);
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md, nullptr, pub_key.get()));
+
+ if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_PSS) {
+ EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING), 0);
+ EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx, EVP_MD_size(md)), 0);
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx,
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(message.data()),
+ message.size()));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&digest_ctx,
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.data()),
+ signature.size()));
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
+ }
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::LocalRsaEncryptMessage(const string& message,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("LocalRsaEncryptMessage");
+
+ // Retrieve the public key from the leaf certificate.
+ if (cert_chain_.empty()) {
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "No public key available";
+ return "Failure";
+ }
+ X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+ EVP_PKEY_Ptr pub_key(X509_get_pubkey(key_cert.get()));
+ RSA_Ptr rsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(const_cast<EVP_PKEY*>(pub_key.get())));
+
+ // Retrieve relevant tags.
+ Digest digest = Digest::NONE;
+ Digest mgf_digest = Digest::NONE;
+ PaddingMode padding = PaddingMode::NONE;
+
+ auto digest_tag = params.GetTagValue(TAG_DIGEST);
+ if (digest_tag.has_value()) digest = digest_tag.value();
+ auto pad_tag = params.GetTagValue(TAG_PADDING);
+ if (pad_tag.has_value()) padding = pad_tag.value();
+ auto mgf_tag = params.GetTagValue(TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST);
+ if (mgf_tag.has_value()) mgf_digest = mgf_tag.value();
+
+ const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
+ const EVP_MD* mgf_md = openssl_digest(mgf_digest);
+
+ // Set up encryption context.
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_Ptr ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key.get(), /* engine= */ nullptr));
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx.get()) <= 0) {
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Encryption init failed: " << ERR_peek_last_error();
+ return "Failure";
+ }
+
+ int rc = -1;
+ switch (padding) {
+ case PaddingMode::NONE:
+ rc = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx.get(), RSA_NO_PADDING);
+ break;
+ case PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT:
+ rc = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx.get(), RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+ break;
+ case PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP:
+ rc = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx.get(), RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ if (rc <= 0) {
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Set padding failed: " << ERR_peek_last_error();
+ return "Failure";
+ }
+ if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP) {
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx.get(), md)) {
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Set digest failed: " << ERR_peek_last_error();
+ return "Failure";
+ }
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx.get(), mgf_md)) {
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Set MGF digest failed: " << ERR_peek_last_error();
+ return "Failure";
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Determine output size.
+ size_t outlen;
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx.get(), nullptr /* out */, &outlen,
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(message.data()), message.size()) <= 0) {
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Determine output size failed: " << ERR_peek_last_error();
+ return "Failure";
+ }
+
+ // Left-zero-pad the input if necessary.
+ const uint8_t* to_encrypt = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(message.data());
+ size_t to_encrypt_len = message.size();
+
+ std::unique_ptr<string> zero_padded_message;
+ if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && to_encrypt_len < outlen) {
+ zero_padded_message.reset(new string(outlen, '\0'));
+ memcpy(zero_padded_message->data() + (outlen - to_encrypt_len), message.data(),
+ message.size());
+ to_encrypt = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(zero_padded_message->data());
+ to_encrypt_len = outlen;
+ }
+
+ // Do the encryption.
+ string output(outlen, '\0');
+ if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx.get(), reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(output.data()), &outlen, to_encrypt,
+ to_encrypt_len) <= 0) {
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "Encryption failed: " << ERR_peek_last_error();
+ return "Failure";
+ }
+ return output;
+}
+
string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
@@ -654,6 +958,18 @@
return ciphertext;
}
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode,
+ PaddingMode padding, uint8_t mac_length_bits) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, mac_length_bits);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+ return ciphertext;
+}
+
string KeyMintAidlTestBase::DecryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
const string& ciphertext,
const AuthorizationSet& params) {
@@ -706,16 +1022,7 @@
}
break;
case Algorithm::EC:
- switch (SecLevel()) {
- case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
- case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
- return {224, 256, 384, 521};
- case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
- return {256};
- default:
- ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
- break;
- }
+ ADD_FAILURE() << "EC keys must be specified by curve not size";
break;
case Algorithm::AES:
return {128, 256};
@@ -744,6 +1051,15 @@
return {224, 384, 521};
case Algorithm::AES:
return {192};
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ return {56};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ return {56};
default:
return {};
}
@@ -751,6 +1067,68 @@
return {};
}
+vector<BlockMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidBlockModes(Algorithm algorithm) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ return {
+ BlockMode::CBC,
+ BlockMode::CTR,
+ BlockMode::ECB,
+ BlockMode::GCM,
+ };
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ return {
+ BlockMode::CBC,
+ BlockMode::ECB,
+ };
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+}
+
+vector<PaddingMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm,
+ BlockMode blockMode) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ switch (blockMode) {
+ case BlockMode::CBC:
+ case BlockMode::ECB:
+ return {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+ case BlockMode::CTR:
+ case BlockMode::GCM:
+ return {PaddingMode::NONE};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ };
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ switch (blockMode) {
+ case BlockMode::CBC:
+ case BlockMode::ECB:
+ return {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ };
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+}
+
+vector<PaddingMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm,
+ BlockMode blockMode) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ switch (blockMode) {
+ case BlockMode::CTR:
+ case BlockMode::GCM:
+ return {PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ };
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+}
+
vector<EcCurve> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidCurves() {
if (securityLevel_ == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
return {EcCurve::P_256};
@@ -760,9 +1138,11 @@
}
vector<EcCurve> KeyMintAidlTestBase::InvalidCurves() {
- if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT) return {};
- CHECK(SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX);
- return {EcCurve::P_224, EcCurve::P_384, EcCurve::P_521};
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ return {EcCurve::P_224, EcCurve::P_384, EcCurve::P_521};
+ } else {
+ return {};
+ }
}
vector<Digest> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidDigests(bool withNone, bool withMD5) {
@@ -845,6 +1225,74 @@
return result;
}
+void verify_serial(X509* cert, const uint64_t expected_serial) {
+ BIGNUM_Ptr ser(BN_new());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(cert), ser.get()));
+
+ uint64_t serial;
+ EXPECT_TRUE(BN_get_u64(ser.get(), &serial));
+ EXPECT_EQ(serial, expected_serial);
+}
+
+// Please set self_signed to true for fake certificates or self signed
+// certificates
+void verify_subject(const X509* cert, //
+ const string& subject, //
+ bool self_signed) {
+ char* cert_issuer = //
+ X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), nullptr, 0);
+
+ char* cert_subj = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), nullptr, 0);
+
+ string expected_subject("/CN=");
+ if (subject.empty()) {
+ expected_subject.append("Android Keystore Key");
+ } else {
+ expected_subject.append(subject);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_STREQ(expected_subject.c_str(), cert_subj) << "Cert has wrong subject." << cert_subj;
+
+ if (self_signed) {
+ EXPECT_STREQ(cert_issuer, cert_subj)
+ << "Cert issuer and subject mismatch for self signed certificate.";
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(cert_subj);
+ OPENSSL_free(cert_issuer);
+}
+
+vector<uint8_t> build_serial_blob(const uint64_t serial_int) {
+ BIGNUM_Ptr serial(BN_new());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(BN_set_u64(serial.get(), serial_int));
+
+ int len = BN_num_bytes(serial.get());
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(len);
+ if (BN_bn2bin(serial.get(), serial_blob.data()) != len) {
+ return {};
+ }
+
+ if (serial_blob.empty() || serial_blob[0] & 0x80) {
+ // An empty blob is OpenSSL's encoding of the zero value; we need single zero byte.
+ // Top bit being set indicates a negative number in two's complement, but our input
+ // was positive.
+ // In either case, prepend a zero byte.
+ serial_blob.insert(serial_blob.begin(), 0x00);
+ }
+
+ return serial_blob;
+}
+
+void verify_subject_and_serial(const Certificate& certificate, //
+ const uint64_t expected_serial, //
+ const string& subject, bool self_signed) {
+ X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(certificate.encodedCertificate));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(!!cert.get());
+
+ verify_serial(cert.get(), expected_serial);
+ verify_subject(cert.get(), subject, self_signed);
+}
+
bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge, //
const string& app_id, //
AuthorizationSet expected_sw_enforced, //
@@ -862,9 +1310,9 @@
AuthorizationSet att_sw_enforced;
AuthorizationSet att_hw_enforced;
uint32_t att_attestation_version;
- uint32_t att_keymaster_version;
+ uint32_t att_keymint_version;
SecurityLevel att_attestation_security_level;
- SecurityLevel att_keymaster_security_level;
+ SecurityLevel att_keymint_security_level;
vector<uint8_t> att_challenge;
vector<uint8_t> att_unique_id;
vector<uint8_t> att_app_id;
@@ -873,8 +1321,8 @@
attest_rec->length, //
&att_attestation_version, //
&att_attestation_security_level, //
- &att_keymaster_version, //
- &att_keymaster_security_level, //
+ &att_keymint_version, //
+ &att_keymint_security_level, //
&att_challenge, //
&att_sw_enforced, //
&att_hw_enforced, //
@@ -882,21 +1330,25 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
if (error != ErrorCode::OK) return false;
- EXPECT_GE(att_attestation_version, 3U);
+ EXPECT_EQ(att_attestation_version, 100U);
+ vector<uint8_t> appId(app_id.begin(), app_id.end());
- expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
- vector<uint8_t>(app_id.begin(), app_id.end()));
+ // check challenge and app id only if we expects a non-fake certificate
+ if (challenge.length() > 0) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(challenge.length(), att_challenge.size());
+ EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(challenge.data(), att_challenge.data(), challenge.length()));
- EXPECT_GE(att_keymaster_version, 4U);
- EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymaster_security_level);
+ expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, appId);
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(att_keymint_version, 100U);
+ EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymint_security_level);
EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_attestation_security_level);
- EXPECT_EQ(challenge.length(), att_challenge.size());
- EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(challenge.data(), att_challenge.data(), challenge.length()));
char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {};
// TODO(b/136282179): When running under VTS-on-GSI the TEE-backed
- // keymaster implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD
+ // keymint implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD
// for the BOOT_PATCH_LEVEL.
if (avb_verification_enabled()) {
for (int i = 0; i < att_hw_enforced.size(); i++) {
@@ -935,13 +1387,6 @@
EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
}
- // Alternatively this checks the opposite - a false boolean tag (one that isn't provided in
- // the authorization list during key generation) isn't being attested to in the certificate.
- EXPECT_FALSE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
- EXPECT_FALSE(att_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
- EXPECT_FALSE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
- EXPECT_FALSE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-
if (att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)) {
// For ECDSA keys, either an EC_CURVE or a KEY_SIZE can be specified, but one must be.
EXPECT_TRUE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE) ||
@@ -1007,9 +1452,7 @@
att_sw_enforced.Sort();
expected_sw_enforced.Sort();
- auto a = filtered_tags(expected_sw_enforced);
- auto b = filtered_tags(att_sw_enforced);
- EXPECT_EQ(a, b);
+ EXPECT_EQ(filtered_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filtered_tags(att_sw_enforced));
att_hw_enforced.Sort();
expected_hw_enforced.Sort();
@@ -1078,17 +1521,10 @@
string cert_issuer = x509NameToStr(X509_get_issuer_name(key_cert.get()));
string signer_subj = x509NameToStr(X509_get_subject_name(signing_cert.get()));
if (cert_issuer != signer_subj) {
- return AssertionFailure() << "Cert " << i << " has wrong issuer.\n" << cert_data.str();
- }
-
- if (i == 0) {
- string cert_sub = x509NameToStr(X509_get_subject_name(key_cert.get()));
- if ("/CN=Android Keystore Key" != cert_sub) {
- return AssertionFailure()
- << "Leaf cert has wrong subject, should be CN=Android Keystore Key, was "
- << cert_sub << '\n'
- << cert_data.str();
- }
+ return AssertionFailure() << "Cert " << i << " has wrong issuer.\n"
+ << " Signer subject is " << signer_subj
+ << " Issuer subject is " << cert_issuer << endl
+ << cert_data.str();
}
}
@@ -1190,14 +1626,17 @@
EXPECT_EQ(extractedTag.size(), 32U);
// Compare with tag generated with kTestMacKey. Should only match in test mode
- auto testTag = cppcose::generateCoseMac0Mac(remote_prov::kTestMacKey, {} /* external_aad */,
- payload->value());
+ auto macFunction = [](const cppcose::bytevec& input) {
+ return cppcose::generateHmacSha256(remote_prov::kTestMacKey, input);
+ };
+ auto testTag =
+ cppcose::generateCoseMac0Mac(macFunction, {} /* external_aad */, payload->value());
ASSERT_TRUE(testTag) << "Tag calculation failed: " << testTag.message();
if (testMode) {
- EXPECT_EQ(*testTag, extractedTag);
+ EXPECT_THAT(*testTag, ElementsAreArray(extractedTag));
} else {
- EXPECT_NE(*testTag, extractedTag);
+ EXPECT_THAT(*testTag, Not(ElementsAreArray(extractedTag)));
}
if (payload_value != nullptr) {
*payload_value = payload->value();
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
index da174ce..d592d36 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -16,8 +16,12 @@
#pragma once
+#include <functional>
+#include <string_view>
+
#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
#include <aidl/Vintf.h>
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
#include <binder/ProcessState.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
@@ -71,6 +75,9 @@
IKeyMintDevice& keyMint() { return *keymint_; }
uint32_t os_version() { return os_version_; }
uint32_t os_patch_level() { return os_patch_level_; }
+ uint32_t vendor_patch_level() { return vendor_patch_level_; }
+ uint32_t boot_patch_level(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);
+ uint32_t boot_patch_level();
ErrorCode GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result);
@@ -94,13 +101,34 @@
ErrorCode ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapping_key,
const AuthorizationSet& wrapping_key_desc, string masking_key,
- const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params);
+ const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params, int64_t password_sid,
+ int64_t biometric_sid);
+ ErrorCode ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapping_key,
+ const AuthorizationSet& wrapping_key_desc, string masking_key,
+ const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params) {
+ return ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, masking_key,
+ unwrapping_params, 0 /* password_sid */, 0 /* biometric_sid */);
+ }
+
+ ErrorCode GetCharacteristics(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const vector<uint8_t>& app_id,
+ const vector<uint8_t>& app_data,
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics);
+ ErrorCode GetCharacteristics(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics);
+
+ void CheckCharacteristics(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+ const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& generate_characteristics);
+ void CheckAppIdCharacteristics(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, std::string_view app_id_string,
+ std::string_view app_data_string,
+ const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& generate_characteristics);
ErrorCode DeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob = false);
ErrorCode DeleteKey(bool keep_key_blob = false);
ErrorCode DeleteAllKeys();
+ ErrorCode DestroyAttestationIds();
+
void CheckedDeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob = false);
void CheckedDeleteKey();
@@ -152,7 +180,10 @@
const string& signature, const AuthorizationSet& params);
void VerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
const AuthorizationSet& params);
+ void LocalVerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
+ const AuthorizationSet& params);
+ string LocalRsaEncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params);
string EncryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
const AuthorizationSet& in_params, AuthorizationSet* out_params);
string EncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params,
@@ -165,6 +196,8 @@
const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in);
string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding,
uint8_t mac_length_bits, const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in);
+ string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding,
+ uint8_t mac_length_bits);
string DecryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& ciphertext,
const AuthorizationSet& params);
@@ -177,50 +210,58 @@
template <typename TagType>
std::tuple<KeyData /* aesKey */, KeyData /* hmacKey */, KeyData /* rsaKey */,
KeyData /* ecdsaKey */>
- CreateTestKeys(TagType tagToTest, ErrorCode expectedReturn) {
+ CreateTestKeys(
+ TagType tagToTest, ErrorCode expectedReturn,
+ std::function<void(AuthorizationSetBuilder*)> tagModifier =
+ [](AuthorizationSetBuilder*) {}) {
/* AES */
KeyData aesKeyData;
- ErrorCode errorCode = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .AesEncryptionKey(128)
- .Authorization(tagToTest)
- .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
- &aesKeyData.blob, &aesKeyData.characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder aesBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(tagToTest)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED);
+ tagModifier(&aesBuilder);
+ ErrorCode errorCode =
+ GenerateKey(aesBuilder, &aesKeyData.blob, &aesKeyData.characteristics);
EXPECT_EQ(expectedReturn, errorCode);
/* HMAC */
KeyData hmacKeyData;
- errorCode = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .HmacKey(128)
- .Authorization(tagToTest)
- .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
- .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
- &hmacKeyData.blob, &hmacKeyData.characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder hmacBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Authorization(tagToTest)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED);
+ tagModifier(&hmacBuilder);
+ errorCode = GenerateKey(hmacBuilder, &hmacKeyData.blob, &hmacKeyData.characteristics);
EXPECT_EQ(expectedReturn, errorCode);
/* RSA */
KeyData rsaKeyData;
- errorCode = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
- .Authorization(tagToTest)
- .Digest(Digest::NONE)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .SetDefaultValidity(),
- &rsaKeyData.blob, &rsaKeyData.characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder rsaBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Authorization(tagToTest)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ tagModifier(&rsaBuilder);
+ errorCode = GenerateKey(rsaBuilder, &rsaKeyData.blob, &rsaKeyData.characteristics);
EXPECT_EQ(expectedReturn, errorCode);
/* ECDSA */
KeyData ecdsaKeyData;
- errorCode = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
- .Authorization(tagToTest)
- .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .SetDefaultValidity(),
- &ecdsaKeyData.blob, &ecdsaKeyData.characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder ecdsaBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Authorization(tagToTest)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ tagModifier(&ecdsaBuilder);
+ errorCode = GenerateKey(ecdsaBuilder, &ecdsaKeyData.blob, &ecdsaKeyData.characteristics);
EXPECT_EQ(expectedReturn, errorCode);
return {aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData};
}
@@ -230,6 +271,10 @@
vector<uint32_t> ValidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
vector<uint32_t> InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
+ vector<BlockMode> ValidBlockModes(Algorithm algorithm);
+ vector<PaddingMode> ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm, BlockMode blockMode);
+ vector<PaddingMode> InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm, BlockMode blockMode);
+
vector<EcCurve> ValidCurves();
vector<EcCurve> InvalidCurves();
@@ -262,6 +307,8 @@
std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> keymint_;
uint32_t os_version_;
uint32_t os_patch_level_;
+ uint32_t vendor_patch_level_;
+ bool timestamp_token_required_;
SecurityLevel securityLevel_;
string name_;
@@ -269,12 +316,30 @@
long challenge_;
};
+// If the given property is available, add it to the tag set under the given tag ID.
+template <Tag tag>
+void add_tag_from_prop(AuthorizationSetBuilder* tags, TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+ const char* prop) {
+ std::string prop_value = ::android::base::GetProperty(prop, /* default= */ "");
+ if (!prop_value.empty()) {
+ tags->Authorization(ttag, prop_value.data(), prop_value.size());
+ }
+}
+
+vector<uint8_t> build_serial_blob(const uint64_t serial_int);
+void verify_subject(const X509* cert, const string& subject, bool self_signed);
+void verify_serial(X509* cert, const uint64_t expected_serial);
+void verify_subject_and_serial(const Certificate& certificate, //
+ const uint64_t expected_serial, //
+ const string& subject, bool self_signed);
+
bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge, //
const string& app_id, //
AuthorizationSet expected_sw_enforced, //
AuthorizationSet expected_hw_enforced, //
SecurityLevel security_level,
const vector<uint8_t>& attestation_cert);
+
string bin2hex(const vector<uint8_t>& data);
X509_Ptr parse_cert_blob(const vector<uint8_t>& blob);
vector<uint8_t> make_name_from_str(const string& name);
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index 2d28845..d41d270 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
#include <cutils/log.h>
#include <signal.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
#include <iostream>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
@@ -67,6 +69,8 @@
namespace {
+bool check_patchLevels = false;
+
template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
bool contains(const vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag,
ValueT expected_value) {
@@ -113,109 +117,296 @@
return b;
}
-string rsa_key =
- hex2str("30820275020100300d06092a864886f70d01010105000482025f3082025b"
- "02010002818100c6095409047d8634812d5a218176e45c41d60a75b13901"
- "f234226cffe776521c5a77b9e389417b71c0b6a44d13afe4e4a2805d46c9"
- "da2935adb1ff0c1f24ea06e62b20d776430a4d435157233c6f916783c30e"
- "310fcbd89b85c2d56771169785ac12bca244abda72bfb19fc44d27c81e1d"
- "92de284f4061edfd99280745ea6d2502030100010281801be0f04d9cae37"
- "18691f035338308e91564b55899ffb5084d2460e6630257e05b3ceab0297"
- "2dfabcd6ce5f6ee2589eb67911ed0fac16e43a444b8c861e544a05933657"
- "72f8baf6b22fc9e3c5f1024b063ac080a7b2234cf8aee8f6c47bbf4fd3ac"
- "e7240290bef16c0b3f7f3cdd64ce3ab5912cf6e32f39ab188358afcccd80"
- "81024100e4b49ef50f765d3b24dde01aceaaf130f2c76670a91a61ae08af"
- "497b4a82be6dee8fcdd5e3f7ba1cfb1f0c926b88f88c92bfab137fba2285"
- "227b83c342ff7c55024100ddabb5839c4c7f6bf3d4183231f005b31aa58a"
- "ffdda5c79e4cce217f6bc930dbe563d480706c24e9ebfcab28a6cdefd324"
- "b77e1bf7251b709092c24ff501fd91024023d4340eda3445d8cd26c14411"
- "da6fdca63c1ccd4b80a98ad52b78cc8ad8beb2842c1d280405bc2f6c1bea"
- "214a1d742ab996b35b63a82a5e470fa88dbf823cdd02401b7b57449ad30d"
- "1518249a5f56bb98294d4b6ac12ffc86940497a5a5837a6cf946262b4945"
- "26d328c11e1126380fde04c24f916dec250892db09a6d77cdba351024077"
- "62cd8f4d050da56bd591adb515d24d7ccd32cca0d05f866d583514bd7324"
- "d5f33645e8ed8b4a1cb3cc4a1d67987399f2a09f5b3fb68c88d5e5d90ac3"
- "3492d6");
+string rsa_key = hex2str(
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "30820275" // SEQUENCE length 0x275 (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "300d" // SEQUENCE length 0x0d (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0609" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 9 (algorithm)
+ "2a864886f70d010101" // 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (rsaEncryption)
+ "0500" // NULL (parameters)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "0482025f" // OCTET STRING length 0x25f (privateKey) holding...
+ // RFC 8017 A.1.2
+ "3082025b" // SEQUENCE length 0x25b (RSAPrivateKey) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 value (modulus) ...
+ "00c6095409047d8634812d5a218176e4"
+ "5c41d60a75b13901f234226cffe77652"
+ "1c5a77b9e389417b71c0b6a44d13afe4"
+ "e4a2805d46c9da2935adb1ff0c1f24ea"
+ "06e62b20d776430a4d435157233c6f91"
+ "6783c30e310fcbd89b85c2d567711697"
+ "85ac12bca244abda72bfb19fc44d27c8"
+ "1e1d92de284f4061edfd99280745ea6d"
+ "25"
+ "0203010001" // INTEGER length 3 value 0x10001 (publicExponent)
+ "028180" // INTEGER length 0x80 (privateExponent) value...
+ "1be0f04d9cae3718691f035338308e91"
+ "564b55899ffb5084d2460e6630257e05"
+ "b3ceab02972dfabcd6ce5f6ee2589eb6"
+ "7911ed0fac16e43a444b8c861e544a05"
+ "93365772f8baf6b22fc9e3c5f1024b06"
+ "3ac080a7b2234cf8aee8f6c47bbf4fd3"
+ "ace7240290bef16c0b3f7f3cdd64ce3a"
+ "b5912cf6e32f39ab188358afcccd8081"
+ "0241" // INTEGER length 0x41 (prime1)
+ "00e4b49ef50f765d3b24dde01aceaaf1"
+ "30f2c76670a91a61ae08af497b4a82be"
+ "6dee8fcdd5e3f7ba1cfb1f0c926b88f8"
+ "8c92bfab137fba2285227b83c342ff7c"
+ "55"
+ "0241" // INTEGER length 0x41 (prime2)
+ "00ddabb5839c4c7f6bf3d4183231f005"
+ "b31aa58affdda5c79e4cce217f6bc930"
+ "dbe563d480706c24e9ebfcab28a6cdef"
+ "d324b77e1bf7251b709092c24ff501fd"
+ "91"
+ "0240" // INTEGER length 0x40 (exponent1)
+ "23d4340eda3445d8cd26c14411da6fdc"
+ "a63c1ccd4b80a98ad52b78cc8ad8beb2"
+ "842c1d280405bc2f6c1bea214a1d742a"
+ "b996b35b63a82a5e470fa88dbf823cdd"
+ "0240" // INTEGER length 0x40 (exponent2)
+ "1b7b57449ad30d1518249a5f56bb9829"
+ "4d4b6ac12ffc86940497a5a5837a6cf9"
+ "46262b494526d328c11e1126380fde04"
+ "c24f916dec250892db09a6d77cdba351"
+ "0240" // INTEGER length 0x40 (coefficient)
+ "7762cd8f4d050da56bd591adb515d24d"
+ "7ccd32cca0d05f866d583514bd7324d5"
+ "f33645e8ed8b4a1cb3cc4a1d67987399"
+ "f2a09f5b3fb68c88d5e5d90ac33492d6"
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKey)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
/*
* DER-encoded PKCS#8 format RSA key. Generated using:
*
* openssl genrsa 2048 | openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -nocrypt -outform der | hexdump -e '30/1 "%02X" "\n"'
*/
-string rsa_2048_key =
- hex2str("308204BD020100300D06092A864886F70D0101010500048204A7308204A3"
- "0201000282010100BEBC342B56D443B1299F9A6A7056E80A897E318476A5"
- "A18029E63B2ED739A61791D339F58DC763D9D14911F2EDEC383DEE11F631"
- "9B44510E7A3ECD9B79B97382E49500ACF8117DC89CAF0E621F77756554A2"
- "FD4664BFE7AB8B59AB48340DBFA27B93B5A81F6ECDEB02D0759307128DF3"
- "E3BAD4055C8B840216DFAA5700670E6C5126F0962FCB70FF308F25049164"
- "CCF76CC2DA66A7DD9A81A714C2809D69186133D29D84568E892B6FFBF319"
- "9BDB14383EE224407F190358F111A949552ABA6714227D1BD7F6B20DD0CB"
- "88F9467B719339F33BFF35B3870B3F62204E4286B0948EA348B524544B5F"
- "9838F29EE643B079EEF8A713B220D7806924CDF7295070C5020301000102"
- "82010069F377F35F2F584EF075353CCD1CA99738DB3DBC7C7FF35F9366CE"
- "176DFD1B135AB10030344ABF5FBECF1D4659FDEF1C0FC430834BE1BE3911"
- "951377BB3D563A2EA9CA8F4AD9C48A8CE6FD516A735C662686C7B4B3C09A"
- "7B8354133E6F93F790D59EAEB92E84C9A4339302CCE28FDF04CCCAFA7DE3"
- "F3A827D4F6F7D38E68B0EC6AB706645BF074A4E4090D06FB163124365FD5"
- "EE7A20D350E9958CC30D91326E1B292E9EF5DB408EC42DAF737D20149704"
- "D0A678A0FB5B5446863B099228A352D604BA8091A164D01D5AB05397C71E"
- "AD20BE2A08FC528FE442817809C787FEE4AB97F97B9130D022153EDC6EB6"
- "CBE7B0F8E3473F2E901209B5DB10F93604DB0102818100E83C0998214941"
- "EA4F9293F1B77E2E99E6CF305FAF358238E126124FEAF2EB9724B2EA7B78"
- "E6032343821A80E55D1D88FB12D220C3F41A56142FEC85796D1917F1E8C7"
- "74F142B67D3D6E7B7E6B4383E94DB5929089DBB346D5BDAB40CC2D96EE04"
- "09475E175C63BF78CFD744136740838127EA723FF3FE7FA368C1311B4A4E"
- "0502818100D240FCC0F5D7715CDE21CB2DC86EA146132EA3B06F61FF2AF5"
- "4BF38473F59DADCCE32B5F4CC32DD0BA6F509347B4B5B1B58C39F95E4798"
- "CCBB43E83D0119ACF532F359CA743C85199F0286610E200997D731291717"
- "9AC9B67558773212EC961E8BCE7A3CC809BC5486A96E4B0E6AF394D94E06"
- "6A0900B7B70E82A44FB30053C102818100AD15DA1CBD6A492B66851BA8C3"
- "16D38AB700E2CFDDD926A658003513C54BAA152B30021D667D20078F500F"
- "8AD3E7F3945D74A891ED1A28EAD0FEEAEC8C14A8E834CF46A13D1378C99D"
- "18940823CFDD27EC5810D59339E0C34198AC638E09C87CBB1B634A9864AE"
- "9F4D5EB2D53514F67B4CAEC048C8AB849A02E397618F3271350281801FA2"
- "C1A5331880A92D8F3E281C617108BF38244F16E352E69ED417C7153F9EC3"
- "18F211839C643DCF8B4DD67CE2AC312E95178D5D952F06B1BF779F491692"
- "4B70F582A23F11304E02A5E7565AE22A35E74FECC8B6FDC93F92A1A37703"
- "E4CF0E63783BD02EB716A7ECBBFA606B10B74D01579522E7EF84D91FC522"
- "292108D902C1028180796FE3825F9DCC85DF22D58690065D93898ACD65C0"
- "87BEA8DA3A63BF4549B795E2CD0E3BE08CDEBD9FCF1720D9CDC5070D74F4"
- "0DED8E1102C52152A31B6165F83A6722AECFCC35A493D7634664B888A08D"
- "3EB034F12EA28BFEE346E205D334827F778B16ED40872BD29FCB36536B6E"
- "93FFB06778696B4A9D81BB0A9423E63DE5");
+string rsa_2048_key = hex2str(
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "308204BD" // SEQUENCE length 0x4bd (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "300D" // SEQUENCE length 0x0d (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0609" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 9 (algorithm)
+ "2A864886F70D010101" // 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (rsaEncryption)
+ "0500" // NULL (parameters)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "048204A7" // OCTET STRING length 0x25f (privateKey) holding...
+ // RFC 8017 A.1.2
+ "308204A3" // SEQUENCE length 0x4a3 (RSAPrivateKey) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "02820101" // INTEGER length 0x101 value (modulus) ...
+ "00BEBC342B56D443B1299F9A6A7056E8"
+ "0A897E318476A5A18029E63B2ED739A6"
+ "1791D339F58DC763D9D14911F2EDEC38"
+ "3DEE11F6319B44510E7A3ECD9B79B973"
+ "82E49500ACF8117DC89CAF0E621F7775"
+ "6554A2FD4664BFE7AB8B59AB48340DBF"
+ "A27B93B5A81F6ECDEB02D0759307128D"
+ "F3E3BAD4055C8B840216DFAA5700670E"
+ "6C5126F0962FCB70FF308F25049164CC"
+ "F76CC2DA66A7DD9A81A714C2809D6918"
+ "6133D29D84568E892B6FFBF3199BDB14"
+ "383EE224407F190358F111A949552ABA"
+ "6714227D1BD7F6B20DD0CB88F9467B71"
+ "9339F33BFF35B3870B3F62204E4286B0"
+ "948EA348B524544B5F9838F29EE643B0"
+ "79EEF8A713B220D7806924CDF7295070"
+ "C5"
+ "0203010001" // INTEGER length 3 value 0x10001 (publicExponent)
+ "02820100" // INTEGER length 0x100 (privateExponent) value...
+ "69F377F35F2F584EF075353CCD1CA997"
+ "38DB3DBC7C7FF35F9366CE176DFD1B13"
+ "5AB10030344ABF5FBECF1D4659FDEF1C"
+ "0FC430834BE1BE3911951377BB3D563A"
+ "2EA9CA8F4AD9C48A8CE6FD516A735C66"
+ "2686C7B4B3C09A7B8354133E6F93F790"
+ "D59EAEB92E84C9A4339302CCE28FDF04"
+ "CCCAFA7DE3F3A827D4F6F7D38E68B0EC"
+ "6AB706645BF074A4E4090D06FB163124"
+ "365FD5EE7A20D350E9958CC30D91326E"
+ "1B292E9EF5DB408EC42DAF737D201497"
+ "04D0A678A0FB5B5446863B099228A352"
+ "D604BA8091A164D01D5AB05397C71EAD"
+ "20BE2A08FC528FE442817809C787FEE4"
+ "AB97F97B9130D022153EDC6EB6CBE7B0"
+ "F8E3473F2E901209B5DB10F93604DB01"
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (prime1)
+ "00E83C0998214941EA4F9293F1B77E2E"
+ "99E6CF305FAF358238E126124FEAF2EB"
+ "9724B2EA7B78E6032343821A80E55D1D"
+ "88FB12D220C3F41A56142FEC85796D19"
+ "17F1E8C774F142B67D3D6E7B7E6B4383"
+ "E94DB5929089DBB346D5BDAB40CC2D96"
+ "EE0409475E175C63BF78CFD744136740"
+ "838127EA723FF3FE7FA368C1311B4A4E"
+ "05"
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (prime2)
+ "00D240FCC0F5D7715CDE21CB2DC86EA1"
+ "46132EA3B06F61FF2AF54BF38473F59D"
+ "ADCCE32B5F4CC32DD0BA6F509347B4B5"
+ "B1B58C39F95E4798CCBB43E83D0119AC"
+ "F532F359CA743C85199F0286610E2009"
+ "97D7312917179AC9B67558773212EC96"
+ "1E8BCE7A3CC809BC5486A96E4B0E6AF3"
+ "94D94E066A0900B7B70E82A44FB30053"
+ "C1"
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (exponent1)
+ "00AD15DA1CBD6A492B66851BA8C316D3"
+ "8AB700E2CFDDD926A658003513C54BAA"
+ "152B30021D667D20078F500F8AD3E7F3"
+ "945D74A891ED1A28EAD0FEEAEC8C14A8"
+ "E834CF46A13D1378C99D18940823CFDD"
+ "27EC5810D59339E0C34198AC638E09C8"
+ "7CBB1B634A9864AE9F4D5EB2D53514F6"
+ "7B4CAEC048C8AB849A02E397618F3271"
+ "35"
+ "028180" // INTEGER length 0x80 (exponent2)
+ "1FA2C1A5331880A92D8F3E281C617108"
+ "BF38244F16E352E69ED417C7153F9EC3"
+ "18F211839C643DCF8B4DD67CE2AC312E"
+ "95178D5D952F06B1BF779F4916924B70"
+ "F582A23F11304E02A5E7565AE22A35E7"
+ "4FECC8B6FDC93F92A1A37703E4CF0E63"
+ "783BD02EB716A7ECBBFA606B10B74D01"
+ "579522E7EF84D91FC522292108D902C1"
+ "028180" // INTEGER length 0x80 (coefficient)
+ "796FE3825F9DCC85DF22D58690065D93"
+ "898ACD65C087BEA8DA3A63BF4549B795"
+ "E2CD0E3BE08CDEBD9FCF1720D9CDC507"
+ "0D74F40DED8E1102C52152A31B6165F8"
+ "3A6722AECFCC35A493D7634664B888A0"
+ "8D3EB034F12EA28BFEE346E205D33482"
+ "7F778B16ED40872BD29FCB36536B6E93"
+ "FFB06778696B4A9D81BB0A9423E63DE5"
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKey)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
-string ec_256_key =
- hex2str("308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30"
- "6b0201010420737c2ecd7b8d1940bf2930aa9b4ed3ff941eed09366bc032"
- "99986481f3a4d859a14403420004bf85d7720d07c25461683bc648b4778a"
- "9a14dd8a024e3bdd8c7ddd9ab2b528bbc7aa1b51f14ebbbb0bd0ce21bcc4"
- "1c6eb00083cf3376d11fd44949e0b2183bfe");
+string ec_256_key = hex2str(
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "308187" // SEQUENCE length 0x87 (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0 (version)
+ "3013" // SEQUENCE length 0x13 (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0607" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 7 (algorithm)
+ "2a8648ce3d0201" // 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (ecPublicKey)
+ "0608" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 8 (param)
+ "2a8648ce3d030107" // 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "046d" // OCTET STRING length 0x6d (privateKey) holding...
+ "306b" // SEQUENCE length 0x6b (ECPrivateKey)
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 1 (version)
+ "0420" // OCTET STRING length 0x20 (privateKey)
+ "737c2ecd7b8d1940bf2930aa9b4ed3ff"
+ "941eed09366bc03299986481f3a4d859"
+ "a144" // TAG [1] len 0x44 (publicKey) {
+ "03420004bf85d7720d07c25461683bc6"
+ "48b4778a9a14dd8a024e3bdd8c7ddd9a"
+ "b2b528bbc7aa1b51f14ebbbb0bd0ce21"
+ "bcc41c6eb00083cf3376d11fd44949e0"
+ "b2183bfe"
+ // } end SEQUENCE (ECPrivateKey)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
-string ec_521_key =
- hex2str("3081EE020100301006072A8648CE3D020106052B810400230481D63081D3"
- "02010104420011458C586DB5DAA92AFAB03F4FE46AA9D9C3CE9A9B7A006A"
- "8384BEC4C78E8E9D18D7D08B5BCFA0E53C75B064AD51C449BAE0258D54B9"
- "4B1E885DED08ED4FB25CE9A1818903818600040149EC11C6DF0FA122C6A9"
- "AFD9754A4FA9513A627CA329E349535A5629875A8ADFBE27DCB932C05198"
- "6377108D054C28C6F39B6F2C9AF81802F9F326B842FF2E5F3C00AB7635CF"
- "B36157FC0882D574A10D839C1A0C049DC5E0D775E2EE50671A208431BB45"
- "E78E70BEFE930DB34818EE4D5C26259F5C6B8E28A652950F9F88D7B4B2C9"
- "D9");
+string ec_521_key = hex2str(
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "3081EE" // SEQUENCE length 0xee (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0 (version)
+ "3010" // SEQUENCE length 0x10 (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0607" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 7 (algorithm)
+ "2A8648CE3D0201" // 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (ecPublicKey)
+ "0605" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 5 (param)
+ "2B81040023" // 1.3.132.0.35 (secp521r1)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "0481D6" // OCTET STRING length 0xd6 (privateKey) holding...
+ "3081D3" // SEQUENCE length 0xd3 (ECPrivateKey)
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 1 (version)
+ "0442" // OCTET STRING length 0x42 (privateKey)
+ "0011458C586DB5DAA92AFAB03F4FE46A"
+ "A9D9C3CE9A9B7A006A8384BEC4C78E8E"
+ "9D18D7D08B5BCFA0E53C75B064AD51C4"
+ "49BAE0258D54B94B1E885DED08ED4FB2"
+ "5CE9"
+ "A18189" // TAG [1] len 0x89 (publicKey) {
+ "03818600040149EC11C6DF0FA122C6A9"
+ "AFD9754A4FA9513A627CA329E349535A"
+ "5629875A8ADFBE27DCB932C051986377"
+ "108D054C28C6F39B6F2C9AF81802F9F3"
+ "26B842FF2E5F3C00AB7635CFB36157FC"
+ "0882D574A10D839C1A0C049DC5E0D775"
+ "E2EE50671A208431BB45E78E70BEFE93"
+ "0DB34818EE4D5C26259F5C6B8E28A652"
+ "950F9F88D7B4B2C9D9"
+ // } end SEQUENCE (ECPrivateKey)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
-string ec_256_key_rfc5915 =
- hex2str("308193020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107047930"
- "770201010420782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8158cfa9c67b818b3"
- "8e8d21c9fa750c1da00a06082a8648ce3d030107a14403420004e2cc561e"
- "e701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c919d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf8e68c9"
- "05464666f98dad4f01573ba81078b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c550682f");
+string ec_256_key_rfc5915 = hex2str(
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "308193" // SEQUENCE length 0x93 (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0 (version)
+ "3013" // SEQUENCE length 0x13 (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0607" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 7 (algorithm)
+ "2a8648ce3d0201" // 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (ecPublicKey)
+ "0608" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 8 (param)
+ "2a8648ce3d030107" // 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "0479" // OCTET STRING length 0x79 (privateKey) holding...
+ // RFC 5915 s3
+ "3077" // SEQUENCE length 0x77 (ECPrivateKey)
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 1 (version)
+ "0420" // OCTET STRING length 0x42 (privateKey)
+ "782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8"
+ "158cfa9c67b818b38e8d21c9fa750c1d"
+ "a00a" // TAG [0] length 0xa (parameters)
+ "0608" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 8
+ "2a8648ce3d030107" // 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
+ // } end TAG [0]
+ "a144" // TAG [1] length 0x44 (publicKey) {
+ "0342" // BIT STRING length 0x42
+ "00" // no pad bits
+ "04e2cc561ee701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c9"
+ "19d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf"
+ "8e68c905464666f98dad4f01573ba810"
+ "78b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c55068"
+ "2f"
+ // } end SEQUENCE (ECPrivateKey)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
-string ec_256_key_sec1 =
- hex2str("308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30"
- "6b0201010420782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8158cfa9c67b818b3"
- "8e8d21c9fa750c1da14403420004e2cc561ee701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c919"
- "d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf8e68c905464666f98dad4f01573ba8"
- "1078b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c550682f");
+string ec_256_key_sec1 = hex2str(
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "308187" // SEQUENCE length 0x87 (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0 (version)
+ "3013" // SEQUENCE length 0x13 (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0607" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 7 (algorithm)
+ "2a8648ce3d0201" // 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (ecPublicKey)
+ "0608" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 8 (param)
+ "2a8648ce3d030107" // 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "046d" // OCTET STRING length 0x6d (privateKey) holding...
+ // SEC1-v2 C.4
+ "306b" // SEQUENCE length 0x6b (ECPrivateKey)
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (version)
+ "0420" // OCTET STRING length 0x20 (privateKey)
+ "782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8"
+ "158cfa9c67b818b38e8d21c9fa750c1d"
+ "a144" // TAG [1] length 0x44 (publicKey) {
+ "0342" // BIT STRING length 0x42
+ "00" // no pad bits
+ "04e2cc561ee701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c9"
+ "19d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf"
+ "8e68c905464666f98dad4f01573ba810"
+ "78b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c55068"
+ "2f"
+ // } end TAG [1] (publicKey)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
struct RSA_Delete {
void operator()(RSA* p) { RSA_free(p); }
@@ -291,37 +482,376 @@
class NewKeyGenerationTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
protected:
void CheckBaseParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
- // TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
-
- AuthorizationSet auths;
- for (auto& entry : keyCharacteristics) {
- auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
- }
-
- EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+ AuthorizationSet auths = CheckCommonParams(keyCharacteristics);
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
- EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
-
- // Verify that App data and ROT are NOT included.
- EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
- EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
// Check that some unexpected tags/values are NOT present.
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+ }
+
+ void CheckSymmetricParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
+ AuthorizationSet auths = CheckCommonParams(keyCharacteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
+ }
+
+ AuthorizationSet CheckCommonParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
+ // TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
+ AuthorizationSet auths;
+ for (auto& entry : keyCharacteristics) {
+ auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+
+ // Verify that App data, ROT and auth timeout are NOT included.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 301U));
- auto os_ver = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
- ASSERT_TRUE(os_ver);
- EXPECT_EQ(*os_ver, os_version());
+ // None of the tests specify CREATION_DATETIME so check that the KeyMint implementation
+ // never adds it.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME));
+ // Check OS details match the original hardware info.
+ auto os_ver = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(os_ver);
+ EXPECT_EQ(*os_ver, os_version());
auto os_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL);
- ASSERT_TRUE(os_pl);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(os_pl);
EXPECT_EQ(*os_pl, os_patch_level());
+
+ if (check_patchLevels) {
+ // Should include vendor and boot patchlevels.
+ auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(vendor_pl);
+ EXPECT_EQ(*vendor_pl, vendor_patch_level());
+ auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(boot_pl);
+ }
+
+ return auths;
}
};
/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.Aes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required AES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Aes) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesInvalidSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesInvalidSize) {
+ for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ // No key size specified
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesInvalidPadding
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid padding on AES keys gives a failure
+ * somewhere along the way.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesInvalidPadding) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+
+ auto result = GenerateKey(builder);
+ if (result == ErrorCode::OK) {
+ // Key creation was OK but has generated a key that cannot be used.
+ auto params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(block_mode).Padding(padding_mode);
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ params.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+ auto result = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE ||
+ result == ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB)
+ << "unexpected result: " << result;
+ } else {
+ // The KeyMint implementation detected that the generated key
+ // is unusable.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, result);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesGcmMissingMinMac
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesGcmMissingMinMac) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ BlockMode block_mode = BlockMode::GCM;
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ // No MIN_MAC_LENGTH provided.
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+ GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesGcmMinMacOutOfRange
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid min MAC size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesGcmMinMacOutOfRange) {
+ for (size_t min_mac_len : {88, 136}) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ BlockMode block_mode = BlockMode::GCM;
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_len)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+ GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required 3DES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDes) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDesWithAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required 3DES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ *
+ * Request attestation, which doesn't help for symmetric keys (as there is no public key to
+ * put in a certificate) but which isn't an error.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDesWithAttestation) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDesInvalidSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for 3-DES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDesInvalidSize) {
+ for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Omitting the key size fails.
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "3DES-default-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.Rsa
*
* Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes, and that the resulting keys
@@ -340,6 +870,7 @@
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
@@ -355,28 +886,38 @@
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaWithAttestation
*
- * Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes, and that the resulting keys
- * have correct characteristics.
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes with attestation, and that the
+ * resulting keys have correct characteristics.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithAttestation) {
- for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
- auto challenge = "hello";
- auto app_id = "foo";
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+ auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 66;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
- .Digest(Digest::NONE)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
- .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
- .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .SetDefaultValidity(),
- &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
@@ -385,6 +926,7 @@
<< "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
@@ -443,6 +985,7 @@
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
@@ -470,6 +1013,195 @@
}
/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaEncryptionWithAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint attestation for RSA encryption keys with challenge and
+ * app id is also successful.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaEncryptionWithAttestation) {
+ auto key_size = 2048;
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+
+ auto subject = "subj 2";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 111166;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(key_size, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ AuthorizationSet auths;
+ for (auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+ auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+
+ // Verify that App data and ROT are NOT included.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
+
+ // Check that some unexpected tags/values are NOT present.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 301U));
+
+ auto os_ver = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(os_ver);
+ EXPECT_EQ(*os_ver, os_version());
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
+
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+ ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id, //
+ sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+ cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaWithSelfSign
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to RSA key generation is successful, and returns
+ * self signed certificate if no challenge is provided. And signing etc
+ * works as expected.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithSelfSign) {
+ auto subject = "cert subj subj subj subj subj subj 22222222222222222222";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 0;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
+
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+ ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaWithAttestationMissAppId
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to RSA checks for missing app ID.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithAttestationMissAppId) {
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaWithAttestationAppIdIgnored
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to RSA ignores app id if challenge is missing.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithAttestationAppIdIgnored) {
+ auto key_size = 2048;
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+
+ auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 1;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
+
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+ ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+}
+
+/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.LimitedUsageRsa
*
* Verifies that KeyMint can generate all required RSA key sizes with limited usage, and that the
@@ -489,6 +1221,7 @@
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
@@ -516,25 +1249,35 @@
* resulting keys have correct characteristics and attestation.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, LimitedUsageRsaWithAttestation) {
- for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
- auto challenge = "hello";
- auto app_id = "foo";
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+ auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 66;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
- .Digest(Digest::NONE)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
- .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
- .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 1)
- .SetDefaultValidity(),
- &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 1)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
@@ -554,6 +1297,7 @@
// Check the usage count limit tag also appears in the attestation.
EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
@@ -600,28 +1344,407 @@
}
/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaMissingParams
+ *
+ * Verifies that omitting optional tags works.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaMissingParams) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().RsaKey(key_size, 65537).SetDefaultValidity()));
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.Ecdsa
*
* Verifies that keymint can generate all required EC key sizes, and that the resulting keys
* have correct characteristics.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Ecdsa) {
- for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+ for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.SetDefaultValidity(),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics));
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
- EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
- << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that for all Ecdsa key sizes, if challenge and app id is provided,
+ * an attestation will be generated.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestation) {
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+
+ auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+ ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id, //
+ sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+ cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestationTags
+ *
+ * Verifies that creation of an attested ECDSA key includes various tags in the
+ * attestation extension.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestationTags) {
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+ auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+ uint64_t serial_int = 0x1010;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+ const AuthorizationSetBuilder base_builder =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+ // Various tags that map to fields in the attestation extension ASN.1 schema.
+ auto extra_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, 1619621648000)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, 1619621648000)
+ .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, 1619621999000)
+ .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 42)
+ .Authorization(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 100000)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY)
+ .Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, 1619621648000);
+ for (const KeyParameter& tag : extra_tags) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "tag-" << tag);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = base_builder;
+ builder.push_back(tag);
+ auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+ if (result == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE &&
+ tag.tag == TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG &&
+ (tag.tag == TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY || tag.tag == TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED)) {
+ // Optional tag not supported by this KeyMint implementation.
+ continue;
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+ ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, /* self_signed = */ false);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ if (tag.tag != TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID) {
+ // Expect to find most of the extra tags in the key characteristics
+ // of the generated key (but not for ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID).
+ EXPECT_TRUE(hw_enforced.Contains(tag.tag) || sw_enforced.Contains(tag.tag))
+ << tag << " not in hw:" << hw_enforced << " nor sw:" << sw_enforced;
+ }
+
+ // Verifying the attestation record will check for the specific tag because
+ // it's included in the authorizations.
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id, sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+ SecLevel(), cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+
+ // Device attestation IDs should be rejected for normal attestation requests; these fields
+ // are only used for device unique attestation.
+ auto invalid_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "brand")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "device")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "product")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "serial")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, "imei")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, "meid")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, "manufacturer")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "model");
+ for (const KeyParameter& tag : invalid_tags) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "tag-" << tag);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ builder.push_back(tag);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS,
+ GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestationTagNoApplicationId
+ *
+ * Verifies that creation of an attested ECDSA key does not include APPLICATION_ID.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestationTagNoApplicationId) {
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto attest_app_id = "foo";
+ auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+ uint64_t serial_int = 0x1010;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ // Earlier versions of the attestation extension schema included a slot:
+ // applicationId [601] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+ // This should never have been included, and should never be filled in.
+ // Generate an attested key that include APPLICATION_ID and APPLICATION_DATA,
+ // to confirm that this field never makes it into the attestation extension.
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(attest_app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "client_id")
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+ ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+ ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, /* self_signed = */ false);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, attest_app_id, sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+ SecLevel(), cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+ // Check that the app id is not in the cert.
+ string app_id = "clientid";
+ std::vector<uint8_t> needle(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(app_id.data()),
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(app_id.data()) + app_id.size());
+ ASSERT_EQ(std::search(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.begin(),
+ cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.end(), needle.begin(), needle.end()),
+ cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.end());
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaSelfSignAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that if no challenge is provided to an Ecdsa key generation, then
+ * the key will generate a self signed attestation.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaSelfSignAttestation) {
+ auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+ vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+ uint64_t serial_int = 0x123456FFF1234;
+ vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+ for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+ verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
+ ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestationRequireAppId
+ *
+ * Verifies that if attestation challenge is provided to Ecdsa key generation, then
+ * app id must also be provided or else it will fail.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestationRequireAppId) {
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaIgnoreAppId
+ *
+ * Verifies that if no challenge is provided to the Ecdsa key generation, then
+ * any appid will be ignored, and keymint will generate a self sign certificate.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaIgnoreAppId) {
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+
+ for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+ ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AttestationApplicationIDLengthProperlyEncoded
+ *
+ * Verifies that the Attestation Application ID software enforced tag has a proper length encoding.
+ * Some implementations break strict encoding rules by encoding a length between 127 and 256 in one
+ * byte. Proper DER encoding specifies that for lengths greater than 127, one byte should be used
+ * to specify how many following bytes will be used to encode the length.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AttestationApplicationIDLengthProperlyEncoded) {
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ std::vector<uint32_t> app_id_lengths{143, 258};
+
+ for (uint32_t length : app_id_lengths) {
+ const string app_id(length, 'a');
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)) << "Curve P256 missing";
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+ ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id, //
+ sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+ cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
}
@@ -634,11 +1757,11 @@
* resulting keys have correct characteristics.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, LimitedUsageEcdsa) {
- for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+ for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 1)
.SetDefaultValidity(),
@@ -646,12 +1769,12 @@
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
- EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
- << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
// Check the usage count limit tag appears in the authorizations.
AuthorizationSet auths;
@@ -668,7 +1791,7 @@
/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaDefaultSize
*
- * Verifies that failing to specify a key size for EC key generation returns
+ * Verifies that failing to specify a curve for EC key generation returns
* UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaDefaultSize) {
@@ -687,20 +1810,23 @@
* UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
*/
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaInvalidSize) {
- for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+ for (auto curve : InvalidCurves()) {
vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.SetDefaultValidity(),
&key_blob, &key_characteristics));
}
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .EcdsaSigningKey(190)
- .Digest(Digest::NONE)
- .SetDefaultValidity()));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 190)
+ .SigningKey()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .SetDefaultValidity()));
}
/*
@@ -712,33 +1838,17 @@
TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaMismatchKeySize) {
if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT,
- GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .EcdsaSigningKey(224)
- .Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
- .Digest(Digest::NONE)
- .SetDefaultValidity()));
+ auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 224)
+ .Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .SetDefaultValidity());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT ||
+ result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
}
/*
- * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAllValidSizes
- *
- * Verifies that keymint supports all required EC key sizes.
- */
-TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAllValidSizes) {
- auto valid_sizes = ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC);
- for (size_t size : valid_sizes) {
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .EcdsaSigningKey(size)
- .Digest(Digest::NONE)
- .SetDefaultValidity()))
- << "Failed to generate size: " << size;
- CheckedDeleteKey();
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaInvalidCurves
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAllValidCurves
*
* Verifies that keymint does not support any curve designated as unsupported.
*/
@@ -778,6 +1888,43 @@
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacNoAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that for Hmac key generation, no attestation will be generated even if challenge
+ * and app id are provided.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacNoAttestation) {
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+
+ for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ constexpr size_t key_size = 128;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(key_size)
+ .Digest(digest)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+ CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
@@ -808,6 +1955,7 @@
ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+ CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
@@ -854,6 +2002,16 @@
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ // STRONGBOX devices must not support keys larger than 512 bits.
+ size_t key_size = 520;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(key_size)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)))
+ << "HMAC key size " << key_size << " unexpectedly valid";
+ }
}
/*
@@ -887,6 +2045,15 @@
CheckedDeleteKey();
}
}
+
+ // Minimum MAC length must be no more than 512 bits.
+ size_t min_mac_length = 520;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_length)))
+ << "HMAC min mac length " << min_mac_length << " invalid.";
}
/*
@@ -922,6 +2089,47 @@
.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
}
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesNoAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that attestation parameters to AES keys are ignored and generateKey
+ * will succeed.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesNoAttestation) {
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDesNoAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting parameters to 3DES keys are ignored and generate key
+ * will be successful. No attestation should be generated.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDesNoAttestation) {
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)));
+ ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+}
+
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(NewKeyGenerationTest);
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase SigningOperationsTest;
@@ -941,6 +2149,50 @@
string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
string signature = SignMessage(
message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+ LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests
+ *
+ * Verifies RSA signature/verification for all padding modes and digests.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests) {
+ auto authorizations = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */))
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(authorizations));
+
+ string message(128, 'a');
+ string corrupt_message(message);
+ ++corrupt_message[corrupt_message.size() / 2];
+
+ for (auto padding :
+ {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN}) {
+ for (auto digest : ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
+ if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && digest != Digest::NONE) {
+ // Digesting only makes sense with padding.
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_PSS && digest == Digest::NONE) {
+ // PSS requires digesting.
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ string signature =
+ SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
+ LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
+ }
+ }
}
/*
@@ -957,6 +2209,9 @@
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
.SetDefaultValidity()));
+
+ CheckAppIdCharacteristics(key_blob_, "clientid", "appdata", key_characteristics_);
+
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
@@ -1196,6 +2451,38 @@
}
/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaNonUniqueParams
+ *
+ * Verifies that an operation with multiple padding modes is rejected.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNonUniqueParams) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA1)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+ .SetDefaultValidity()));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+
+ auto result = Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA1)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+}
+
+/*
* SigningOperationsTest.RsaUnsupportedPadding
*
* Verifies that RSA operations fail with the correct error (but key gen succeeds) when used
@@ -1212,6 +2499,20 @@
ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256 /* supported digest */)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP) /* padding mode for encryption only */
+ .SetDefaultValidity()));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
}
/*
@@ -1235,7 +2536,7 @@
}
/*
- * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoDigest
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoPadding
*
* Verifies that RSA operations fail when no padding mode is specified. PaddingMode::NONE is
* supported in some cases (as validated in other tests), but a mode must be specified.
@@ -1316,27 +2617,35 @@
}
/*
- * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves
*
- * Verifies that ECDSA operations succeed with all possible key sizes and hashes.
+ * Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
*/
-TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes) {
- for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
- for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */)) {
- ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
- .Digest(digest)
- .SetDefaultValidity());
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate ECDSA key with size " << key_size
- << " and digest " << digest;
- if (error != ErrorCode::OK) continue;
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves) {
+ auto digests = ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */);
- string message(1024, 'a');
- if (digest == Digest::NONE) message.resize(key_size / 8);
- SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
- CheckedDeleteKey();
+ string message = "1234567890";
+ string corrupt_message = "2234567890";
+ for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "Curve::" << curve);
+ ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
+ .Digest(digests)
+ .SetDefaultValidity());
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate key for EC curve " << curve;
+ if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
+ continue;
}
+
+ for (auto digest : digests) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "Digest::" << digest);
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
+ LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
+ }
+
+ auto rc = DeleteKey();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(rc == ErrorCode::OK || rc == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
}
}
@@ -1372,7 +2681,7 @@
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaNoDigestHugeData) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.SetDefaultValidity()));
string message(1 * 1024, 'a');
@@ -1387,11 +2696,14 @@
TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")
.Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
.SetDefaultValidity()));
+
+ CheckAppIdCharacteristics(key_blob_, "clientid", "appdata", key_characteristics_);
+
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE)));
AbortIfNeeded();
@@ -1414,6 +2726,23 @@
}
/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaIncompatibleDigest
+ *
+ * Verifies that using an EC key requires compatible digest.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaIncompatibleDigest) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA1)
+ .SetDefaultValidity()));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)));
+ AbortIfNeeded();
+}
+
+/*
* SigningOperationsTest.AesEcbSign
*
* Verifies that attempts to use AES keys to sign fail in the correct way.
@@ -1474,6 +2803,26 @@
}
/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256InvalidMacLength
+ *
+ * Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC whose length is
+ * not a multiple of 8.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacSha256InvalidMacLength) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160)));
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 161),
+ &output_params));
+}
+
+/*
* SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256TooSmallMacLength
*
* Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC smaller than the
@@ -1571,207 +2920,6 @@
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase VerificationOperationsTest;
/*
- * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
- *
- * Verifies that a simple RSA signature/verification sequence succeeds.
- */
-TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaSuccess) {
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
- .Digest(Digest::NONE)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
- .SetDefaultValidity()));
- string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
- string signature = SignMessage(
- message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
- VerifyMessage(message, signature,
- AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
-}
-
-/*
- * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
- *
- * Verifies RSA signature/verification for all padding modes and digests.
- */
-TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests) {
- auto authorizations = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
- .Digest(ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */))
- .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
- .SetDefaultValidity();
-
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(authorizations));
-
- string message(128, 'a');
- string corrupt_message(message);
- ++corrupt_message[corrupt_message.size() / 2];
-
- for (auto padding :
- {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN}) {
- for (auto digest : ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
- if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && digest != Digest::NONE) {
- // Digesting only makes sense with padding.
- continue;
- }
-
- if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_PSS && digest == Digest::NONE) {
- // PSS requires digesting.
- continue;
- }
-
- string signature =
- SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
- VerifyMessage(message, signature,
- AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
-
- /* TODO(seleneh) add exportkey tests back later when we have decided on
- * the new api.
- if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
- // Verify with OpenSSL.
- vector<uint8_t> pubkey;
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey));
-
- const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
- EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr, &p, pubkey.size()));
- ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
-
- EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
- const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
- ASSERT_NE(md, nullptr);
- EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md,
- nullptr, pkey.get()));
-
- switch (padding) {
- case PaddingMode::RSA_PSS:
- EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx,
- RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING), 0); EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx,
- EVP_MD_size(md)), 0); break; case PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN:
- // PKCS1 is the default; don't need to set anything.
- break;
- default:
- FAIL();
- break;
- }
-
- EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(),
- message.size())); EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&digest_ctx,
- reinterpret_cast<const
- uint8_t*>(signature.data()), signature.size())); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
- }
- */
-
- // Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
- string corrupt_signature(signature);
- ++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
-
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
- Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
- AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
- string result;
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result));
-
- // Corrupt message shouldn't verify
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
- Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
- AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result));
- }
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
- *
- * Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
- */
-TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves) {
- auto digests = ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */);
-
- string message = "1234567890";
- string corrupt_message = "2234567890";
- for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
- ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
- .Digest(digests)
- .SetDefaultValidity());
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate key for EC curve " << curve;
- if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
- continue;
- }
-
- for (auto digest : digests) {
- string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
- VerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
-
- /* TODO(seleneh) add exportkey tests back later when we have decided on
- * the new api.
-
- // Verify with OpenSSL
- if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
- vector<uint8_t> pubkey;
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey))
- << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
- const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
- EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr, &p, pubkey.size()));
- ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
-
- EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
- const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
-
- EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md,
- nullptr, pkey.get()))
- << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
- EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(),
- message.size()))
- << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
- EXPECT_EQ(1,
- EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&digest_ctx,
- reinterpret_cast<const
- uint8_t*>(signature.data()), signature.size()))
- << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
- }
- */
- // Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
- string corrupt_signature(signature);
- ++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
-
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
- Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
- << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
- string result;
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result))
- << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
- // Corrupt message shouldn't verify
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
- Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
- << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result))
- << curve << ' ' << digest;
- }
-
- auto rc = DeleteKey();
- ASSERT_TRUE(rc == ErrorCode::OK || rc == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
- }
-}
-
-/*
* VerificationOperationsTest.HmacSigningKeyCannotVerify
*
* Verifies HMAC signing and verification, but that a signing key cannot be used to verify.
@@ -1888,7 +3036,49 @@
string message(1024 / 8, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
- VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+ LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.RsaSuccessWithoutParams
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an RSA key pair without specifying parameters
+ * works correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaSuccessWithoutParams) {
+ uint32_t key_size;
+ string key;
+
+ if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+ key_size = 2048;
+ key = rsa_2048_key;
+ } else {
+ key_size = 1024;
+ key = rsa_key;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SigningKey()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, key));
+
+ // Key size and public exponent are determined from the imported key material.
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U);
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message(1024 / 8, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
+ string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
+ LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
@@ -1931,13 +3121,12 @@
TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSuccess) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.SetDefaultValidity(),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
- CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
@@ -1946,7 +3135,7 @@
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
- VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+ LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
@@ -1958,13 +3147,12 @@
TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256RFC5915Success) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.SetDefaultValidity(),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key_rfc5915));
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
- CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
@@ -1973,7 +3161,7 @@
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
- VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+ LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
@@ -1984,13 +3172,12 @@
TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256SEC1Success) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.SetDefaultValidity(),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key_sec1));
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
- CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
@@ -1999,7 +3186,7 @@
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
- VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+ LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
@@ -2011,13 +3198,12 @@
if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .EcdsaSigningKey(521)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_521)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.SetDefaultValidity(),
KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_521_key));
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
- CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 521U);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_521);
CheckOrigin();
@@ -2025,22 +3211,7 @@
string message(32, 'a');
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
- VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
-}
-
-/*
- * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaSizeMismatch
- *
- * Verifies that importing an ECDSA key pair with a size that doesn't match the key fails in the
- * correct way.
- */
-TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSizeMismatch) {
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
- ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .EcdsaSigningKey(224 /* Doesn't match key */)
- .Digest(Digest::NONE)
- .SetDefaultValidity(),
- KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
+ LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
}
/*
@@ -2086,7 +3257,113 @@
}
/*
- * ImportKeyTest.AesSuccess
+ * ImportKeyTest.AesFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an invalid AES key fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, AesFailure) {
+ string key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+ uint32_t bitlen = key.size() * 8;
+ for (uint32_t key_size : {bitlen - 1, bitlen + 1, bitlen - 8, bitlen + 8}) {
+ // Explicit key size doesn't match that of the provided key.
+ auto result = ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH ||
+ result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE)
+ << "unexpected result: " << result;
+ }
+
+ // Explicit key size matches that of the provided key, but it's not a valid size.
+ string long_key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(long_key.size() * 8)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, long_key));
+ string short_key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(short_key.size() * 8)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, short_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.TripleDesSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using a 3DES key works.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, TripleDesSuccess) {
+ string key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358");
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 168U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB);
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.TripleDesFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an invalid 3DES key fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, TripleDesFailure) {
+ string key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358");
+ uint32_t bitlen = key.size() * 7;
+ for (uint32_t key_size : {bitlen - 1, bitlen + 1, bitlen - 8, bitlen + 8}) {
+ // Explicit key size doesn't match that of the provided key.
+ auto result = ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH ||
+ result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE)
+ << "unexpected result: " << result;
+ }
+ // Explicit key size matches that of the provided key, but it's not a valid size.
+ string long_key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f735800");
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(long_key.size() * 7)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, long_key));
+ string short_key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f73");
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(short_key.size() * 7)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, short_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.HmacKeySuccess
*
* Verifies that importing and using an HMAC key works.
*/
@@ -2112,57 +3389,230 @@
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(ImportKeyTest);
auto wrapped_key = hex2str(
- "3082017902010004820100934bf94e2aa28a3f83c9f79297250262fbe3276b5a1c91159bbfa3ef8957aac8"
- "4b59b30b455a79c2973480823d8b3863c3deef4a8e243590268d80e18751a0e130f67ce6a1ace9f79b95e0"
- "97474febc981195b1d13a69086c0863f66a7b7fdb48792227b1ac5e2489febdf087ab5486483033a6f001c"
- "a5d1ec1e27f5c30f4cec2642074a39ae68aee552e196627a8e3d867e67a8c01b11e75f13cca0a97ab668b5"
- "0cda07a8ecb7cd8e3dd7009c9636534f6f239cffe1fc8daa466f78b676c7119efb96bce4e69ca2a25d0b34"
- "ed9c3ff999b801597d5220e307eaa5bee507fb94d1fa69f9e519b2de315bac92c36f2ea1fa1df4478c0dde"
- "deae8c70e0233cd098040cd796b02c370f1fa4cc0124f1302e0201033029a1083106020100020101a20302"
- "0120a30402020100a4053103020101a6053103020140bf83770205000420ccd540855f833a5e1480bfd2d3"
- "6faf3aeee15df5beabe2691bc82dde2a7aa910041064c9f689c60ff6223ab6e6999e0eb6e5");
+ // IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+ "30820179" // SEQUENCE length 0x179 (SecureKeyWrapper) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "04820100" // OCTET STRING length 0x100 (encryptedTransportKey)
+ "934bf94e2aa28a3f83c9f79297250262"
+ "fbe3276b5a1c91159bbfa3ef8957aac8"
+ "4b59b30b455a79c2973480823d8b3863"
+ "c3deef4a8e243590268d80e18751a0e1"
+ "30f67ce6a1ace9f79b95e097474febc9"
+ "81195b1d13a69086c0863f66a7b7fdb4"
+ "8792227b1ac5e2489febdf087ab54864"
+ "83033a6f001ca5d1ec1e27f5c30f4cec"
+ "2642074a39ae68aee552e196627a8e3d"
+ "867e67a8c01b11e75f13cca0a97ab668"
+ "b50cda07a8ecb7cd8e3dd7009c963653"
+ "4f6f239cffe1fc8daa466f78b676c711"
+ "9efb96bce4e69ca2a25d0b34ed9c3ff9"
+ "99b801597d5220e307eaa5bee507fb94"
+ "d1fa69f9e519b2de315bac92c36f2ea1"
+ "fa1df4478c0ddedeae8c70e0233cd098"
+ "040c" // OCTET STRING length 0x0c (initializationVector)
+ "d796b02c370f1fa4cc0124f1"
+ "302e" // SEQUENCE length 0x2e (KeyDescription) {
+ "020103" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x03 (keyFormat = RAW)
+ "3029" // SEQUENCE length 0x29 (AuthorizationList) {
+ "a108" // [1] context-specific constructed tag=1 length 0x08 { (purpose)
+ "3106" // SET length 0x06
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (Encrypt)
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (Decrypt)
+ // } end SET
+ // } end [1]
+ "a203" // [2] context-specific constructed tag=2 length 0x02 { (algorithm)
+ "020120" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x20 (AES)
+ // } end [2]
+ "a304" // [3] context-specific constructed tag=3 length 0x04 { (keySize)
+ "02020100" // INTEGER length 2 value 0x100
+ // } end [3]
+ "a405" // [4] context-specific constructed tag=4 length 0x05 { (blockMode)
+ "3103" // SET length 0x03 {
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (ECB)
+ // } end SET
+ // } end [4]
+ "a605" // [6] context-specific constructed tag=6 length 0x05 { (padding)
+ "3103" // SET length 0x03 {
+ "020140" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x40 (PKCS7)
+ // } end SET
+ // } end [5]
+ "bf837702" // [503] context-specific constructed tag=503=0x1F7 length 0x02 {
+ // (noAuthRequired)
+ "0500" // NULL
+ // } end [503]
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AuthorizationList)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (KeyDescription)
+ "0420" // OCTET STRING length 0x20 (encryptedKey)
+ "ccd540855f833a5e1480bfd2d36faf3a"
+ "eee15df5beabe2691bc82dde2a7aa910"
+ "0410" // OCTET STRING length 0x10 (tag)
+ "64c9f689c60ff6223ab6e6999e0eb6e5"
+ // } SEQUENCE (SecureKeyWrapper)
+);
auto wrapped_key_masked = hex2str(
- "3082017902010004820100aad93ed5924f283b4bb5526fbe7a1412f9d9749ec30db9062b29e574a8546f33"
- "c88732452f5b8e6a391ee76c39ed1712c61d8df6213dec1cffbc17a8c6d04c7b30893d8daa9b2015213e21"
- "946821553207f8f9931c4caba23ed3bee28b36947e47f10e0a5c3dc51c988a628daad3e5e1f4005e79c2d5"
- "a96c284b4b8d7e4948f331e5b85dd5a236f85579f3ea1d1b848487470bdb0ab4f81a12bee42c99fe0df4be"
- "e3759453e69ad1d68a809ce06b949f7694a990429b2fe81e066ff43e56a21602db70757922a4bcc23ab89f"
- "1e35da77586775f423e519c2ea394caf48a28d0c8020f1dcf6b3a68ec246f615ae96dae9a079b1f6eb9590"
- "33c1af5c125fd94168040c6d9721d08589581ab49204a3302e0201033029a1083106020100020101a20302"
- "0120a30402020100a4053103020101a6053103020140bf83770205000420a61c6e247e25b3e6e69aa78eb0"
- "3c2d4ac20d1f99a9a024a76f35c8e2cab9b68d04102560c70109ae67c030f00b98b512a670");
+ // IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+ "30820179" // SEQUENCE length 0x179 (SecureKeyWrapper) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "04820100" // OCTET STRING length 0x100 (encryptedTransportKey)
+ "aad93ed5924f283b4bb5526fbe7a1412"
+ "f9d9749ec30db9062b29e574a8546f33"
+ "c88732452f5b8e6a391ee76c39ed1712"
+ "c61d8df6213dec1cffbc17a8c6d04c7b"
+ "30893d8daa9b2015213e219468215532"
+ "07f8f9931c4caba23ed3bee28b36947e"
+ "47f10e0a5c3dc51c988a628daad3e5e1"
+ "f4005e79c2d5a96c284b4b8d7e4948f3"
+ "31e5b85dd5a236f85579f3ea1d1b8484"
+ "87470bdb0ab4f81a12bee42c99fe0df4"
+ "bee3759453e69ad1d68a809ce06b949f"
+ "7694a990429b2fe81e066ff43e56a216"
+ "02db70757922a4bcc23ab89f1e35da77"
+ "586775f423e519c2ea394caf48a28d0c"
+ "8020f1dcf6b3a68ec246f615ae96dae9"
+ "a079b1f6eb959033c1af5c125fd94168"
+ "040c" // OCTET STRING length 0x0c (initializationVector)
+ "6d9721d08589581ab49204a3"
+ "302e" // SEQUENCE length 0x2e (KeyDescription) {
+ "020103" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x03 (keyFormat = RAW)
+ "3029" // SEQUENCE length 0x29 (AuthorizationList) {
+ "a108" // [1] context-specific constructed tag=1 length 0x08 { (purpose)
+ "3106" // SET length 0x06
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (Encrypt)
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (Decrypt)
+ // } end SET
+ // } end [1]
+ "a203" // [2] context-specific constructed tag=2 length 0x02 { (algorithm)
+ "020120" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x20 (AES)
+ // } end [2]
+ "a304" // [3] context-specific constructed tag=3 length 0x04 { (keySize)
+ "02020100" // INTEGER length 2 value 0x100
+ // } end [3]
+ "a405" // [4] context-specific constructed tag=4 length 0x05 { (blockMode
+ "3103" // SET length 0x03 {
+ "020101" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (ECB)
+ // } end SET
+ // } end [4]
+ "a605" // [6] context-specific constructed tag=6 length 0x05 { (padding)
+ "3103" // SET length 0x03 {
+ "020140" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x40 (PKCS7)
+ // } end SET
+ // } end [5]
+ "bf837702" // [503] context-specific constructed tag=503=0x1F7 length 0x02 {
+ // (noAuthRequired)
+ "0500" // NULL
+ // } end [503]
+ // } end SEQUENCE (AuthorizationList)
+ // } end SEQUENCE (KeyDescription)
+ "0420" // OCTET STRING length 0x20 (encryptedKey)
+ "a61c6e247e25b3e6e69aa78eb03c2d4a"
+ "c20d1f99a9a024a76f35c8e2cab9b68d"
+ "0410" // OCTET STRING length 0x10 (tag)
+ "2560c70109ae67c030f00b98b512a670"
+ // } SEQUENCE (SecureKeyWrapper)
+);
auto wrapping_key = hex2str(
- "308204be020100300d06092a864886f70d0101010500048204a8308204a40201000282010100aec367931d"
- "8900ce56b0067f7d70e1fc653f3f34d194c1fed50018fb43db937b06e673a837313d56b1c725150a3fef86"
- "acbddc41bb759c2854eae32d35841efb5c18d82bc90a1cb5c1d55adf245b02911f0b7cda88c421ff0ebafe"
- "7c0d23be312d7bd5921ffaea1347c157406fef718f682643e4e5d33c6703d61c0cf7ac0bf4645c11f5c137"
- "4c3886427411c449796792e0bef75dec858a2123c36753e02a95a96d7c454b504de385a642e0dfc3e60ac3"
- "a7ee4991d0d48b0172a95f9536f02ba13cecccb92b727db5c27e5b2f5cec09600b286af5cf14c42024c61d"
- "dfe71c2a8d7458f185234cb00e01d282f10f8fc6721d2aed3f4833cca2bd8fa62821dd5502030100010282"
- "0100431447b6251908112b1ee76f99f3711a52b6630960046c2de70de188d833f8b8b91e4d785caeeeaf4f"
- "0f74414e2cda40641f7fe24f14c67a88959bdb27766df9e710b630a03adc683b5d2c43080e52bee71e9eae"
- "b6de297a5fea1072070d181c822bccff087d63c940ba8a45f670feb29fb4484d1c95e6d2579ba02aae0a00"
- "900c3ebf490e3d2cd7ee8d0e20c536e4dc5a5097272888cddd7e91f228b1c4d7474c55b8fcd618c4a957bb"
- "ddd5ad7407cc312d8d98a5caf7e08f4a0d6b45bb41c652659d5a5ba05b663737a8696281865ba20fbdd7f8"
- "51e6c56e8cbe0ddbbf24dc03b2d2cb4c3d540fb0af52e034a2d06698b128e5f101e3b51a34f8d8b4f86181"
- "02818100de392e18d682c829266cc3454e1d6166242f32d9a1d10577753e904ea7d08bff841be5bac82a16"
- "4c5970007047b8c517db8f8f84e37bd5988561bdf503d4dc2bdb38f885434ae42c355f725c9a60f91f0788"
- "e1f1a97223b524b5357fdf72e2f696bab7d78e32bf92ba8e1864eab1229e91346130748a6e3c124f9149d7"
- "1c743502818100c95387c0f9d35f137b57d0d65c397c5e21cc251e47008ed62a542409c8b6b6ac7f8967b3"
- "863ca645fcce49582a9aa17349db6c4a95affdae0dae612e1afac99ed39a2d934c880440aed8832f984316"
- "3a47f27f392199dc1202f9a0f9bd08308007cb1e4e7f58309366a7de25f7c3c9b880677c068e1be936e812"
- "88815252a8a102818057ff8ca1895080b2cae486ef0adfd791fb0235c0b8b36cd6c136e52e4085f4ea5a06"
- "3212a4f105a3764743e53281988aba073f6e0027298e1c4378556e0efca0e14ece1af76ad0b030f27af6f0"
- "ab35fb73a060d8b1a0e142fa2647e93b32e36d8282ae0a4de50ab7afe85500a16f43a64719d6e2b9439823"
- "719cd08bcd03178102818100ba73b0bb28e3f81e9bd1c568713b101241acc607976c4ddccc90e65b6556ca"
- "31516058f92b6e09f3b160ff0e374ec40d78ae4d4979fde6ac06a1a400c61dd31254186af30b22c10582a8"
- "a43e34fe949c5f3b9755bae7baa7b7b7a6bd03b38cef55c86885fc6c1978b9cee7ef33da507c9df6b9277c"
- "ff1e6aaa5d57aca528466102818100c931617c77829dfb1270502be9195c8f2830885f57dba869536811e6"
- "864236d0c4736a0008a145af36b8357a7c3d139966d04c4e00934ea1aede3bb6b8ec841dc95e3f579751e2"
- "bfdfe27ae778983f959356210723287b0affcc9f727044d48c373f1babde0724fa17a4fd4da0902c7c9b9b"
- "f27ba61be6ad02dfddda8f4e6822");
+ // RFC 5208 s5
+ "308204be" // SEQUENCE length 0x4be (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "300d" // SEQUENCE length 0x0d (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+ "0609" // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 0x09 (algorithm)
+ "2a864886f70d010101" // 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 encryption scheme)
+ "0500" // NULL (parameters)
+ // } SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+ "048204a8" // OCTET STRING len 0x4a8 (privateKey), which contains...
+ // RFC 8017 A.1.2
+ "308204a4" // SEQUENCE len 0x4a4 (RSAPrivateKey) {
+ "020100" // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+ "02820101" // INTEGER length 0x0101 (modulus) value...
+ "00aec367931d8900ce56b0067f7d70e1" // 0x10
+ "fc653f3f34d194c1fed50018fb43db93" // 0x20
+ "7b06e673a837313d56b1c725150a3fef" // 0x30
+ "86acbddc41bb759c2854eae32d35841e" // 0x40
+ "fb5c18d82bc90a1cb5c1d55adf245b02" // 0x50
+ "911f0b7cda88c421ff0ebafe7c0d23be" // 0x60
+ "312d7bd5921ffaea1347c157406fef71" // 0x70
+ "8f682643e4e5d33c6703d61c0cf7ac0b" // 0x80
+ "f4645c11f5c1374c3886427411c44979" // 0x90
+ "6792e0bef75dec858a2123c36753e02a" // 0xa0
+ "95a96d7c454b504de385a642e0dfc3e6" // 0xb0
+ "0ac3a7ee4991d0d48b0172a95f9536f0" // 0xc0
+ "2ba13cecccb92b727db5c27e5b2f5cec" // 0xd0
+ "09600b286af5cf14c42024c61ddfe71c" // 0xe0
+ "2a8d7458f185234cb00e01d282f10f8f" // 0xf0
+ "c6721d2aed3f4833cca2bd8fa62821dd" // 0x100
+ "55" // 0x101
+ "0203010001" // INTEGER length 3 value 0x10001 (publicExponent)
+ "02820100" // INTEGER length 0x100 (privateExponent) value...
+ "431447b6251908112b1ee76f99f3711a" // 0x10
+ "52b6630960046c2de70de188d833f8b8" // 0x20
+ "b91e4d785caeeeaf4f0f74414e2cda40" // 0x30
+ "641f7fe24f14c67a88959bdb27766df9" // 0x40
+ "e710b630a03adc683b5d2c43080e52be" // 0x50
+ "e71e9eaeb6de297a5fea1072070d181c" // 0x60
+ "822bccff087d63c940ba8a45f670feb2" // 0x70
+ "9fb4484d1c95e6d2579ba02aae0a0090" // 0x80
+ "0c3ebf490e3d2cd7ee8d0e20c536e4dc" // 0x90
+ "5a5097272888cddd7e91f228b1c4d747" // 0xa0
+ "4c55b8fcd618c4a957bbddd5ad7407cc" // 0xb0
+ "312d8d98a5caf7e08f4a0d6b45bb41c6" // 0xc0
+ "52659d5a5ba05b663737a8696281865b" // 0xd0
+ "a20fbdd7f851e6c56e8cbe0ddbbf24dc" // 0xe0
+ "03b2d2cb4c3d540fb0af52e034a2d066" // 0xf0
+ "98b128e5f101e3b51a34f8d8b4f86181" // 0x100
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (prime1) value...
+ "00de392e18d682c829266cc3454e1d61" // 0x10
+ "66242f32d9a1d10577753e904ea7d08b" // 0x20
+ "ff841be5bac82a164c5970007047b8c5" // 0x30
+ "17db8f8f84e37bd5988561bdf503d4dc" // 0x40
+ "2bdb38f885434ae42c355f725c9a60f9" // 0x50
+ "1f0788e1f1a97223b524b5357fdf72e2" // 0x60
+ "f696bab7d78e32bf92ba8e1864eab122" // 0x70
+ "9e91346130748a6e3c124f9149d71c74" // 0x80
+ "35"
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (prime2) value...
+ "00c95387c0f9d35f137b57d0d65c397c" // 0x10
+ "5e21cc251e47008ed62a542409c8b6b6" // 0x20
+ "ac7f8967b3863ca645fcce49582a9aa1" // 0x30
+ "7349db6c4a95affdae0dae612e1afac9" // 0x40
+ "9ed39a2d934c880440aed8832f984316" // 0x50
+ "3a47f27f392199dc1202f9a0f9bd0830" // 0x60
+ "8007cb1e4e7f58309366a7de25f7c3c9" // 0x70
+ "b880677c068e1be936e81288815252a8" // 0x80
+ "a1"
+ "028180" // INTEGER length 0x80 (exponent1) value...
+ "57ff8ca1895080b2cae486ef0adfd791" // 0x10
+ "fb0235c0b8b36cd6c136e52e4085f4ea" // 0x20
+ "5a063212a4f105a3764743e53281988a" // 0x30
+ "ba073f6e0027298e1c4378556e0efca0" // 0x40
+ "e14ece1af76ad0b030f27af6f0ab35fb" // 0x50
+ "73a060d8b1a0e142fa2647e93b32e36d" // 0x60
+ "8282ae0a4de50ab7afe85500a16f43a6" // 0x70
+ "4719d6e2b9439823719cd08bcd031781" // 0x80
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (exponent2) value...
+ "00ba73b0bb28e3f81e9bd1c568713b10" // 0x10
+ "1241acc607976c4ddccc90e65b6556ca" // 0x20
+ "31516058f92b6e09f3b160ff0e374ec4" // 0x30
+ "0d78ae4d4979fde6ac06a1a400c61dd3" // 0x40
+ "1254186af30b22c10582a8a43e34fe94" // 0x50
+ "9c5f3b9755bae7baa7b7b7a6bd03b38c" // 0x60
+ "ef55c86885fc6c1978b9cee7ef33da50" // 0x70
+ "7c9df6b9277cff1e6aaa5d57aca52846" // 0x80
+ "61"
+ "028181" // INTEGER length 0x81 (coefficient) value...
+ "00c931617c77829dfb1270502be9195c" // 0x10
+ "8f2830885f57dba869536811e6864236" // 0x20
+ "d0c4736a0008a145af36b8357a7c3d13" // 0x30
+ "9966d04c4e00934ea1aede3bb6b8ec84" // 0x40
+ "1dc95e3f579751e2bfdfe27ae778983f" // 0x50
+ "959356210723287b0affcc9f727044d4" // 0x60
+ "8c373f1babde0724fa17a4fd4da0902c" // 0x70
+ "7c9b9bf27ba61be6ad02dfddda8f4e68" // 0x80
+ "22"
+ // } SEQUENCE
+ // } SEQUENCE ()
+);
string zero_masking_key =
hex2str("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000");
@@ -2191,6 +3641,36 @@
EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
}
+/*
+ * ImportWrappedKeyTest.SuccessSidsIgnored
+ *
+ * Verifies that password_sid and biometric_sid are ignored on import if the authorizations don't
+ * include Tag:USER_SECURE_ID.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, SuccessSidsIgnored) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+ int64_t password_sid = 42;
+ int64_t biometric_sid = 24;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP),
+ password_sid, biometric_sid));
+
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, SuccessMasked) {
auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
@@ -2237,6 +3717,36 @@
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
}
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, WrongPaddingMode) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+}
+
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, WrongDigest) {
+ auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_512)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
+ ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+}
+
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(ImportWrappedKeyTest);
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase EncryptionOperationsTest;
@@ -2244,31 +3754,35 @@
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingSuccess
*
- * Verifies that raw RSA encryption works.
+ * Verifies that raw RSA decryption works.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingSuccess) {
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
- .SetDefaultValidity()));
+ for (uint64_t exponent : {3, 65537}) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, exponent)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .SetDefaultValidity()));
- string message = string(2048 / 8, 'a');
- auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
- string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
- EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
+ string message = string(2048 / 8, 'a');
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ string ciphertext1 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
- string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
- EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
+ string ciphertext2 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
- // Unpadded RSA is deterministic
- EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+ // Unpadded RSA is deterministic
+ EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
}
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingShortMessage
*
- * Verifies that raw RSA encryption of short messages works.
+ * Verifies that raw RSA decryption of short messages works.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingShortMessage) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
@@ -2280,76 +3794,47 @@
string message = "1";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
- string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string ciphertext = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext.size());
string expected_plaintext = string(2048U / 8 - 1, 0) + message;
string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
EXPECT_EQ(expected_plaintext, plaintext);
-
- // Degenerate case, encrypting a numeric 1 yields 0x00..01 as the ciphertext.
- message = static_cast<char>(1);
- ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
- EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext.size());
- EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext, string(2048U / 8 - 1, 0) + message);
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLong
- *
- * Verifies that raw RSA encryption of too-long messages fails in the expected way.
- */
-TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingTooLong) {
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
- .SetDefaultValidity()));
-
- string message(2048 / 8 + 1, 'a');
-
- auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
-
- string result;
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &result));
-}
-
-/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLarge
- *
- * Verifies that raw RSA encryption of too-large (numerically) messages fails in the expected
- * way.
- */
-// TODO(seleneh) add RsaNoPaddingTooLarge test back after decided and implemented new
-// version of ExportKey inside generateKey
-
-/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepSuccess
*
- * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations work, with all digests.
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP decryption operations work, with all digests.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepSuccess) {
auto digests = ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */);
size_t key_size = 2048; // Need largish key for SHA-512 test.
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .RsaEncryptionKey(key_size, 65537)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
- .Digest(digests)
- .SetDefaultValidity()));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(key_size, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Digest(digests)
+ .Authorization(TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, Digest::SHA1)
+ .SetDefaultValidity()));
string message = "Hello";
for (auto digest : digests) {
- auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP);
- string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "digest-" << digest);
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(digest)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+ .Authorization(TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, Digest::SHA1);
+ string ciphertext1 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
if (HasNonfatalFailure()) std::cout << "-->" << digest << std::endl;
EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext1.size());
- string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string ciphertext2 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext2.size());
// OAEP randomizes padding so every result should be different (with astronomically high
@@ -2379,7 +3864,7 @@
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
*
- * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP decryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
* without a digest.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepInvalidDigest) {
@@ -2389,16 +3874,33 @@
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.SetDefaultValidity()));
- string message = "Hello World!";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP).Digest(Digest::NONE);
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidPadding
*
- * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to decrypt
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP decryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
+ * with a padding value that is only suitable for signing/verifying.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepInvalidPadding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+ .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+ .SetDefaultValidity()));
+
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS).Digest(Digest::NONE);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepDecryptWithWrongDigest
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP decryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to decrypt
* with a different digest than was used to encrypt.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepDecryptWithWrongDigest) {
@@ -2411,7 +3913,7 @@
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA_2_256)
.SetDefaultValidity()));
string message = "Hello World!";
- string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(
+ string ciphertext = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(
message,
AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_224).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP));
@@ -2424,34 +3926,9 @@
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepTooLarge
- *
- * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to encrypt a
- * too-large message.
- */
-TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepTooLarge) {
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
- .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
- .SetDefaultValidity()));
- constexpr size_t digest_size = 256 /* SHA_2_256 */ / 8;
- constexpr size_t oaep_overhead = 2 * digest_size + 2;
- string message(2048 / 8 - oaep_overhead + 1, 'a');
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
- .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)));
- string result;
- ErrorCode error = Finish(message, &result);
- EXPECT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH || error == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
- EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
-}
-
-/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepWithMGFDigestSuccess
*
- * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations work, with all SHA 256 digests and all type of MGF1
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP decryption operations work, with all SHA 256 digests and all type of MGF1
* digests.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepWithMGFDigestSuccess) {
@@ -2473,11 +3950,11 @@
.Authorization(TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, digest)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP);
- string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string ciphertext1 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
if (HasNonfatalFailure()) std::cout << "-->" << digest << std::endl;
EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext1.size());
- string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string ciphertext2 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext2.size());
// OAEP randomizes padding so every result should be different (with astronomically high
@@ -2507,7 +3984,7 @@
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepWithMGFIncompatibleDigest
*
- * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP decryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
* with incompatible MGF digest.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepWithMGFIncompatibleDigest) {
@@ -2525,7 +4002,7 @@
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_224);
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
}
/*
@@ -2549,7 +4026,7 @@
.Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, Digest::NONE);
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MGF_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MGF_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
}
/*
@@ -2566,10 +4043,10 @@
string message = "Hello World!";
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT);
- string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string ciphertext1 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
- string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string ciphertext2 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
// PKCS1 v1.5 randomizes padding so every result should be different.
@@ -2593,27 +4070,6 @@
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1TooLarge
- *
- * Verifies that RSA PKCS encryption fails in the correct way when the mssage is too large.
- */
-TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1TooLarge) {
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT)
- .SetDefaultValidity()));
- string message(2048 / 8 - 10, 'a');
-
- auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT);
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
- string result;
- ErrorCode error = Finish(message, &result);
- EXPECT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH || error == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
- EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
-}
-
-/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.EcdsaEncrypt
*
* Verifies that attempting to use ECDSA keys to encrypt fails in the correct way.
@@ -2621,7 +4077,7 @@
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, EcdsaEncrypt) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::NONE)
.SetDefaultValidity()));
auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE);
@@ -2680,7 +4136,49 @@
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbRoundTripSuccess
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbUnknownTag
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES ECB operations ignore unknown tags.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbUnknownTag) {
+ int32_t unknown_tag_value = ((7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 150);
+ Tag unknown_tag = static_cast<Tag>(unknown_tag_value);
+ KeyParameter unknown_param;
+ unknown_param.tag = unknown_tag;
+
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(unknown_param),
+ &key_blob_, &key_characteristics));
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ // Unknown tags should not be returned in key characteristics.
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+ EXPECT_EQ(hw_enforced.find(unknown_tag), -1);
+ EXPECT_EQ(sw_enforced.find(unknown_tag), -1);
+
+ // Encrypt without mentioning the unknown parameter.
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
+
+ // Decrypt including the unknown parameter.
+ auto decrypt_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(unknown_param);
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, decrypt_params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesWrongMode
*
* Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized mode is specified.
*/
@@ -2690,11 +4188,8 @@
.AesEncryptionKey(128)
.Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
-
ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
- // Two-block message.
- string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
EXPECT_EQ(
ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE,
Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
@@ -2702,6 +4197,55 @@
}
/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesWrongPadding
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized padding is specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesWrongPadding) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(
+ ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE,
+ Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesInvalidParams
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an duplicate parameters are specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesInvalidParams) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+ ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+ auto result = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE ||
+ result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE);
+
+ result = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE ||
+ result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
+}
+
+/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesWrongPurpose
*
* Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized purpose is
@@ -2742,25 +4286,30 @@
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize
*
* Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when provided an input that is not a
* multiple of the block size and no padding is specified.
*/
-TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .AesEncryptionKey(128)
- .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
- // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
- string message(16 * 2 - 1, 'a');
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
+ for (BlockMode blockMode : {BlockMode::ECB, BlockMode::CBC}) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, blockMode)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
+ string message(16 * 2 - 1, 'a');
- auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
- string ciphertext;
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &ciphertext));
- EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(blockMode).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet out_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &out_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &ciphertext));
+ EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
}
/*
@@ -3080,7 +4629,7 @@
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCbcRoundTripSuccess
*
* Verifies that keymint fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size nonce.
*/
@@ -3320,6 +4869,31 @@
}
/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmDifferentAutoNonces
+ *
+ * Verifies that encrypting the same data with KeyMint generated nonces produces different outputs.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmDifferentAutoNonces) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+ .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+ string aad = "foobar";
+ string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+
+ string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128);
+ string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128);
+ string ciphertext3 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128);
+
+ ASSERT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+ ASSERT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext3);
+ ASSERT_NE(ciphertext2, ciphertext3);
+}
+
+/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmTooShortTag
*
* Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when a too-short tag length is specified.
@@ -3547,6 +5121,9 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(message, &ciphertext));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG, UpdateAad("foo"));
+ // The failure should have already cancelled the operation.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE, Abort());
+
op_ = {};
}
@@ -3746,11 +5323,8 @@
.BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
- for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
- auto inParams =
- AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
- }
+ auto inParams = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
}
/*
@@ -3916,6 +5490,25 @@
}
/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesInvalidCallerIv
+ *
+ * Validates that keymint fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size IV.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesInvalidCallerIv) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf("abcdefg"));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCallerIv
*
* Validates that 3DES keys can allow caller-specified IVs, and use them correctly.
@@ -3953,7 +5546,7 @@
/*
* EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerNonceProhibited.
*
- * Verifies that 3DES keys without TAG_CALLER_NONCE do not allow caller-specified IVS.
+ * Verifies that 3DES keys without TAG_CALLER_NONCE do not allow caller-specified IVs.
*/
TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerNonceProhibited) {
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
@@ -4001,25 +5594,29 @@
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize
*
* Verifies that unpadded CBC operations reject inputs that are not a multiple of block size.
*/
-TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
- ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
- .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
- // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
- string message = "123456789012345";
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
+ for (BlockMode blockMode : {BlockMode::ECB, BlockMode::CBC}) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .BlockMode(blockMode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+ // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
+ string message = "123456789012345";
- auto begin_params =
- AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
- AuthorizationSet output_params;
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &output_params));
- string ciphertext;
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, "", &ciphertext));
+ auto begin_params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(blockMode).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &output_params));
+ string ciphertext;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, "", &ciphertext));
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey();
+ }
}
/*
@@ -4427,6 +6024,19 @@
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(UsageCountLimitTest);
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase GetHardwareInfoTest;
+
+TEST_P(GetHardwareInfoTest, GetHardwareInfo) {
+ // Retrieving hardware info should give the same result each time.
+ KeyMintHardwareInfo info;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint().getHardwareInfo(&info).isOk());
+ KeyMintHardwareInfo info2;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint().getHardwareInfo(&info2).isOk());
+ EXPECT_EQ(info, info2);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(GetHardwareInfoTest);
+
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase AddEntropyTest;
/*
@@ -4458,6 +6068,16 @@
EXPECT_TRUE(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf(string(2 * 1024, 'a'))).isOk());
}
+/*
+ * AddEntropyTest.AddTooLargeEntropy
+ *
+ * Verifies that the addRngEntropy method rejects more than 2KiB of data.
+ */
+TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddTooLargeEntropy) {
+ ErrorCode rc = GetReturnErrorCode(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf(string(2 * 1024 + 1, 'a'))));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, rc);
+}
+
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AddEntropyTest);
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase KeyDeletionTest;
@@ -4569,6 +6189,28 @@
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(KeyDeletionTest);
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase KeyUpgradeTest;
+
+/**
+ * KeyUpgradeTest.UpgradeInvalidKey
+ *
+ * This test checks that the HAL excepts invalid key blobs..
+ */
+TEST_P(KeyUpgradeTest, UpgradeInvalidKey) {
+ AidlBuf key_blob = AidlBuf("just some garbage data which is not a valid key blob");
+
+ std::vector<uint8_t> new_blob;
+ Status result = keymint_->upgradeKey(key_blob,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")
+ .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
+ .vector_data(),
+ &new_blob);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB, GetReturnErrorCode(result));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(KeyUpgradeTest);
+
using UpgradeKeyTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
/*
@@ -4637,7 +6279,7 @@
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase TransportLimitTest;
/*
- * TransportLimitTest.FinishInput
+ * TransportLimitTest.LargeFinishInput
*
* Verifies that passing input data to finish succeeds as expected.
*/
@@ -4792,19 +6434,99 @@
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(KeyAgreementTest);
+using DestroyAttestationIdsTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
+
+// This is a problematic test, as it can render the device under test permanently unusable.
+// Re-enable and run at your own risk.
+TEST_P(DestroyAttestationIdsTest, DISABLED_DestroyTest) {
+ auto result = DestroyAttestationIds();
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::OK || result == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(DestroyAttestationIdsTest);
+
using EarlyBootKeyTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
+/*
+ * EarlyBootKeyTest.CreateEarlyBootKeys
+ *
+ * Verifies that creating early boot keys succeeds, even at a later stage (after boot).
+ */
TEST_P(EarlyBootKeyTest, CreateEarlyBootKeys) {
+ // Early boot keys can be created after early boot.
auto [aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData] =
CreateTestKeys(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, ErrorCode::OK);
+ for (const auto& keyData : {aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData}) {
+ ASSERT_GT(keyData.blob.size(), 0U);
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(keyData.characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)) << crypto_params;
+ }
CheckedDeleteKey(&aesKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&hmacKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&rsaKeyData.blob);
CheckedDeleteKey(&ecdsaKeyData.blob);
}
-// This is a more comprenhensive test, but it can only be run on a machine which is still in early
+/*
+ * EarlyBootKeyTest.CreateAttestedEarlyBootKey
+ *
+ * Verifies that creating an early boot key with attestation succeeds.
+ */
+TEST_P(EarlyBootKeyTest, CreateAttestedEarlyBootKey) {
+ auto [aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData] = CreateTestKeys(
+ TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, ErrorCode::OK, [](AuthorizationSetBuilder* builder) {
+ builder->AttestationChallenge("challenge");
+ builder->AttestationApplicationId("app_id");
+ });
+
+ for (const auto& keyData : {aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData}) {
+ ASSERT_GT(keyData.blob.size(), 0U);
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(keyData.characteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)) << crypto_params;
+ }
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&aesKeyData.blob);
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&hmacKeyData.blob);
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&rsaKeyData.blob);
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&ecdsaKeyData.blob);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EarlyBootKeyTest.UseEarlyBootKeyFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that using early boot keys at a later stage fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(EarlyBootKeyTest, UseEarlyBootKeyFailure) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)
+ .HmacKey(128)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)));
+ AuthorizationSet output_params;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::EARLY_BOOT_ENDED, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 256),
+ &output_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EarlyBootKeyTest.ImportEarlyBootKeyFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing early boot keys fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(EarlyBootKeyTest, ImportEarlyBootKeyFailure) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::EARLY_BOOT_ENDED, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
+}
+
+// This is a more comprehensive test, but it can only be run on a machine which is still in early
// boot stage, which no proper Android device is by the time we can run VTS. To use this,
// un-disable it and modify vold to remove the call to earlyBootEnded(). Running the test will end
// early boot, so you'll have to reboot between runs.
@@ -4872,7 +6594,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, UseEcdsaKey(ecdsaKeyData.blob));
ErrorCode rc = GetReturnErrorCode(
- keyMint().deviceLocked(false /* passwordOnly */, {} /* verificationToken */));
+ keyMint().deviceLocked(false /* passwordOnly */, {} /* timestampToken */));
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, rc);
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED, UseAesKey(aesKeyData.blob));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED, UseHmacKey(hmacKeyData.blob));
@@ -4887,16 +6609,6 @@
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(UnlockedDeviceRequiredTest);
-using PerformOperationTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
-
-TEST_P(PerformOperationTest, RequireUnimplemented) {
- vector<uint8_t> response;
- auto result = keymint_->performOperation({} /* request */, &response);
- ASSERT_EQ(GetReturnErrorCode(result), ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
-}
-
-INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(PerformOperationTest);
-
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
@@ -4921,6 +6633,10 @@
} else {
std::cout << "NOT dumping attestations" << std::endl;
}
+ // TODO(drysdale): Remove this flag when available KeyMint devices comply with spec
+ if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--check_patchLevels") {
+ aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test::check_patchLevels = true;
+ }
}
}
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
index 9e52b20..a177317 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
@@ -16,13 +16,13 @@
#define LOG_TAG "VtsRemotelyProvisionableComponentTests"
-#include <RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
+#include <AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice.h>
#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.h>
#include <android/binder_manager.h>
#include <cppbor_parse.h>
-#include <cppcose/cppcose.h>
#include <gmock/gmock.h>
+#include <keymaster/cppcose/cppcose.h>
#include <keymaster/keymaster_configuration.h>
#include <keymint_support/authorization_set.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@
cppbor::Array() // SignedMacAad
.add(challenge_)
.add(std::move(deviceInfoMap))
+ .add(keysToSignMac)
.encode());
ASSERT_TRUE(macKey) << macKey.message();
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/performance/KeyMintBenchmark.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/performance/KeyMintBenchmark.cpp
index 6c795f5..54b6fdc 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/performance/KeyMintBenchmark.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/performance/KeyMintBenchmark.cpp
@@ -228,8 +228,7 @@
AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
Status result;
BeginResult out;
- result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob_, in_params.vector_data(), HardwareAuthToken(),
- &out);
+ result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob_, in_params.vector_data(), std::nullopt, &out);
if (result.isOk()) {
*out_params = out.params;
op_ = out.operation;
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/Android.bp b/security/keymint/support/Android.bp
index 4c4258b..718133a 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/Android.bp
@@ -57,25 +57,8 @@
"include",
],
shared_libs: [
- "libcppcose",
"libcppbor_external",
+ "libcppcose_rkp",
"libcrypto",
],
}
-
-cc_library {
- name: "libcppcose",
- vendor_available: true,
- host_supported: true,
- srcs: [
- "cppcose.cpp",
- ],
- export_include_dirs: [
- "include",
- ],
- shared_libs: [
- "libcppbor_external",
- "libcrypto",
- "liblog",
- ],
-}
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp b/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
index a48f770..2462228 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST);
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST);
+// Fields ordered in tag order.
typedef struct km_auth_list {
ASN1_INTEGER_SET* purpose;
ASN1_INTEGER* algorithm;
@@ -72,32 +73,38 @@
ASN1_INTEGER_SET* padding;
ASN1_INTEGER* ec_curve;
ASN1_INTEGER* rsa_public_exponent;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_SET* mgf_digest;
+ ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
+ ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
ASN1_INTEGER* active_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* origination_expire_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* usage_expire_date_time;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* usage_count_limit;
ASN1_NULL* no_auth_required;
ASN1_INTEGER* user_auth_type;
ASN1_INTEGER* auth_timeout;
ASN1_NULL* allow_while_on_body;
- ASN1_NULL* all_applications;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING* application_id;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
ASN1_INTEGER* creation_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* origin;
- ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust;
ASN1_INTEGER* os_version;
ASN1_INTEGER* os_patchlevel;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_application_id;
- ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
- ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
- ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_brand;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_device;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_product;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_serial;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_imei;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_meid;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_manufacturer;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_model;
ASN1_INTEGER* vendor_patchlevel;
ASN1_INTEGER* boot_patchlevel;
- ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
ASN1_NULL* device_unique_attestation;
- ASN1_NULL* storage_key;
ASN1_NULL* identity_credential;
- ASN1_INTEGER* usage_count_limit;
} KM_AUTH_LIST;
ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_AUTH_LIST) = {
@@ -109,13 +116,18 @@
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, ec_curve, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_EC_CURVE.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rsa_public_exponent, ASN1_INTEGER,
TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, mgf_digest, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL,
TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_count_limit, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, no_auth_required, ASN1_NULL, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, user_auth_type, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, auth_timeout, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT.maskedTag()),
@@ -133,19 +145,31 @@
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_brand, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_device, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_product, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_serial, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_imei, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_meid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_manufacturer, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_model, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER,
TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
- TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, device_unique_attestation, ASN1_NULL,
TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, storage_key, ASN1_NULL, TAG_STORAGE_KEY.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, identity_credential, ASN1_NULL,
TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_count_limit, ASN1_INTEGER,
- TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT.maskedTag()),
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_AUTH_LIST);
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_AUTH_LIST);
@@ -155,9 +179,9 @@
ASN1_INTEGER* keymint_version;
ASN1_ENUMERATED* keymint_security_level;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_challenge;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* unique_id;
KM_AUTH_LIST* software_enforced;
KM_AUTH_LIST* tee_enforced;
- ASN1_INTEGER* unique_id;
} KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION;
ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION) = {
@@ -253,41 +277,52 @@
}
// Extract the values from the specified ASN.1 record and place them in auth_list.
+// Does nothing with root-of-trust field.
static ErrorCode extract_auth_list(const KM_AUTH_LIST* record, AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
if (!record) return ErrorCode::OK;
- copyAuthTag(record->active_date_time, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->algorithm, TAG_ALGORITHM, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->application_id, TAG_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->auth_timeout, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->creation_date_time, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->digest, TAG_DIGEST, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->ec_curve, TAG_EC_CURVE, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->key_size, TAG_KEY_SIZE, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->no_auth_required, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->origin, TAG_ORIGIN, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->origination_expire_date_time, TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->os_patchlevel, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->os_version, TAG_OS_VERSION, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->padding, TAG_PADDING, auth_list);
+ // Fields ordered in tag order.
copyAuthTag(record->purpose, TAG_PURPOSE, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->rollback_resistance, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->algorithm, TAG_ALGORITHM, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->key_size, TAG_KEY_SIZE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->digest, TAG_DIGEST, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->padding, TAG_PADDING, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->ec_curve, TAG_EC_CURVE, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->rsa_public_exponent, TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->mgf_digest, TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->rollback_resistance, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->early_boot_only, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->active_date_time, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->origination_expire_date_time, TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->usage_count_limit, TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->no_auth_required, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->auth_timeout, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->allow_while_on_body, TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->trusted_user_presence_required, TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->trusted_confirmation_required, TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED,
auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->unlocked_device_required, TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->early_boot_only, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->creation_date_time, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->origin, TAG_ORIGIN, auth_list);
+ // root_of_trust dealt with separately
+ copyAuthTag(record->os_version, TAG_OS_VERSION, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->os_patchlevel, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_brand, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_device, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_product, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_serial, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_imei, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_meid, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_manufacturer, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_model, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->device_unique_attestation, TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->storage_key, TAG_STORAGE_KEY, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->identity_credential, TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->usage_count_limit, TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, auth_list);
return ErrorCode::OK;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/cppcose.cpp b/security/keymint/support/cppcose.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index bafb2b6..0000000
--- a/security/keymint/support/cppcose.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,467 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include <cppcose/cppcose.h>
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <iostream>
-
-#include <cppbor.h>
-#include <cppbor_parse.h>
-
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-namespace cppcose {
-
-namespace {
-
-ErrMsgOr<bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX>> aesGcmInitAndProcessAad(const bytevec& key,
- const bytevec& nonce,
- const bytevec& aad,
- bool encrypt) {
- if (key.size() != kAesGcmKeySize) return "Invalid key size";
-
- bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new());
- if (!ctx) return "Failed to allocate cipher context";
-
- if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_256_gcm(), nullptr /* engine */, key.data(),
- nonce.data(), encrypt ? 1 : 0)) {
- return "Failed to initialize cipher";
- }
-
- int outlen;
- if (!aad.empty() && !EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx.get(), nullptr /* out; null means AAD */, &outlen,
- aad.data(), aad.size())) {
- return "Failed to process AAD";
- }
-
- return std::move(ctx);
-}
-
-} // namespace
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> generateCoseMac0Mac(const bytevec& macKey, const bytevec& externalAad,
- const bytevec& payload) {
- auto macStructure = cppbor::Array()
- .add("MAC0")
- .add(cppbor::Map().add(ALGORITHM, HMAC_256).canonicalize().encode())
- .add(externalAad)
- .add(payload)
- .encode();
-
- bytevec macTag(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- uint8_t* out = macTag.data();
- unsigned int outLen;
- out = HMAC(EVP_sha256(), //
- macKey.data(), macKey.size(), //
- macStructure.data(), macStructure.size(), //
- out, &outLen);
-
- assert(out != nullptr && outLen == macTag.size());
- if (out == nullptr || outLen != macTag.size()) {
- return "Error computing public key MAC";
- }
-
- return macTag;
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseMac0(const bytevec& macKey, const bytevec& externalAad,
- const bytevec& payload) {
- auto tag = generateCoseMac0Mac(macKey, externalAad, payload);
- if (!tag) return tag.moveMessage();
-
- return cppbor::Array()
- .add(cppbor::Map().add(ALGORITHM, HMAC_256).canonicalize().encode())
- .add(cppbor::Map() /* unprotected */)
- .add(payload)
- .add(tag.moveValue());
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* payload */> parseCoseMac0(const cppbor::Item* macItem) {
- auto mac = macItem ? macItem->asArray() : nullptr;
- if (!mac || mac->size() != kCoseMac0EntryCount) {
- return "Invalid COSE_Mac0";
- }
-
- auto protectedParms = mac->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
- auto unprotectedParms = mac->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
- auto payload = mac->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
- auto tag = mac->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
- if (!protectedParms || !unprotectedParms || !payload || !tag) {
- return "Invalid COSE_Mac0 contents";
- }
-
- return payload->value();
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* payload */> verifyAndParseCoseMac0(const cppbor::Item* macItem,
- const bytevec& macKey) {
- auto mac = macItem ? macItem->asArray() : nullptr;
- if (!mac || mac->size() != kCoseMac0EntryCount) {
- return "Invalid COSE_Mac0";
- }
-
- auto protectedParms = mac->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
- auto unprotectedParms = mac->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
- auto payload = mac->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
- auto tag = mac->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
- if (!protectedParms || !unprotectedParms || !payload || !tag) {
- return "Invalid COSE_Mac0 contents";
- }
-
- auto [protectedMap, _, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedParms);
- if (!protectedMap || !protectedMap->asMap()) {
- return "Invalid Mac0 protected: " + errMsg;
- }
- auto& algo = protectedMap->asMap()->get(ALGORITHM);
- if (!algo || !algo->asInt() || algo->asInt()->value() != HMAC_256) {
- return "Unsupported Mac0 algorithm";
- }
-
- auto macTag = generateCoseMac0Mac(macKey, {} /* external_aad */, payload->value());
- if (!macTag) return macTag.moveMessage();
-
- if (macTag->size() != tag->value().size() ||
- CRYPTO_memcmp(macTag->data(), tag->value().data(), macTag->size()) != 0) {
- return "MAC tag mismatch";
- }
-
- return payload->value();
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> createCoseSign1Signature(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& protectedParams,
- const bytevec& payload, const bytevec& aad) {
- bytevec signatureInput = cppbor::Array()
- .add("Signature1") //
- .add(protectedParams)
- .add(aad)
- .add(payload)
- .encode();
-
- if (key.size() != ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN) return "Invalid signing key";
- bytevec signature(ED25519_SIGNATURE_LEN);
- if (!ED25519_sign(signature.data(), signatureInput.data(), signatureInput.size(), key.data())) {
- return "Signing failed";
- }
-
- return signature;
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseSign1(const bytevec& key, cppbor::Map protectedParams,
- const bytevec& payload, const bytevec& aad) {
- bytevec protParms = protectedParams.add(ALGORITHM, EDDSA).canonicalize().encode();
- auto signature = createCoseSign1Signature(key, protParms, payload, aad);
- if (!signature) return signature.moveMessage();
-
- return cppbor::Array()
- .add(protParms)
- .add(cppbor::Map() /* unprotected parameters */)
- .add(payload)
- .add(*signature);
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseSign1(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& payload,
- const bytevec& aad) {
- return constructCoseSign1(key, {} /* protectedParams */, payload, aad);
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> verifyAndParseCoseSign1(bool ignoreSignature, const cppbor::Array* coseSign1,
- const bytevec& signingCoseKey, const bytevec& aad) {
- if (!coseSign1 || coseSign1->size() != kCoseSign1EntryCount) {
- return "Invalid COSE_Sign1";
- }
-
- const cppbor::Bstr* protectedParams = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
- const cppbor::Map* unprotectedParams = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
- const cppbor::Bstr* payload = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1Payload)->asBstr();
- const cppbor::Bstr* signature = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1Signature)->asBstr();
-
- if (!protectedParams || !unprotectedParams || !payload || !signature) {
- return "Invalid COSE_Sign1";
- }
-
- auto [parsedProtParams, _, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedParams);
- if (!parsedProtParams) {
- return errMsg + " when parsing protected params.";
- }
- if (!parsedProtParams->asMap()) {
- return "Protected params must be a map";
- }
-
- auto& algorithm = parsedProtParams->asMap()->get(ALGORITHM);
- if (!algorithm || !algorithm->asInt() || algorithm->asInt()->value() != EDDSA) {
- return "Unsupported signature algorithm";
- }
-
- if (!ignoreSignature) {
- bool selfSigned = signingCoseKey.empty();
- auto key = CoseKey::parseEd25519(selfSigned ? payload->value() : signingCoseKey);
- if (!key) return "Bad signing key: " + key.moveMessage();
-
- bytevec signatureInput = cppbor::Array()
- .add("Signature1")
- .add(*protectedParams)
- .add(aad)
- .add(*payload)
- .encode();
-
- if (!ED25519_verify(signatureInput.data(), signatureInput.size(), signature->value().data(),
- key->getBstrValue(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X)->data())) {
- return "Signature verification failed";
- }
- }
-
- return payload->value();
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> createCoseEncryptCiphertext(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce,
- const bytevec& protectedParams,
- const bytevec& plaintextPayload, const bytevec& aad) {
- auto ciphertext = aesGcmEncrypt(key, nonce,
- cppbor::Array() // Enc strucure as AAD
- .add("Encrypt") // Context
- .add(protectedParams) // Protected
- .add(aad) // External AAD
- .encode(),
- plaintextPayload);
-
- if (!ciphertext) return ciphertext.moveMessage();
- return ciphertext.moveValue();
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseEncrypt(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce,
- const bytevec& plaintextPayload, const bytevec& aad,
- cppbor::Array recipients) {
- auto encryptProtectedHeader = cppbor::Map() //
- .add(ALGORITHM, AES_GCM_256)
- .canonicalize()
- .encode();
-
- auto ciphertext =
- createCoseEncryptCiphertext(key, nonce, encryptProtectedHeader, plaintextPayload, aad);
- if (!ciphertext) return ciphertext.moveMessage();
-
- return cppbor::Array()
- .add(encryptProtectedHeader) // Protected
- .add(cppbor::Map().add(IV, nonce).canonicalize()) // Unprotected
- .add(*ciphertext) // Payload
- .add(std::move(recipients));
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<std::pair<bytevec /* pubkey */, bytevec /* key ID */>> getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(
- const cppbor::Item* coseEncrypt) {
- if (!coseEncrypt || !coseEncrypt->asArray() ||
- coseEncrypt->asArray()->size() != kCoseEncryptEntryCount) {
- return "Invalid COSE_Encrypt";
- }
-
- auto& recipients = coseEncrypt->asArray()->get(kCoseEncryptRecipients);
- if (!recipients || !recipients->asArray() || recipients->asArray()->size() != 1) {
- return "Invalid recipients list";
- }
-
- auto& recipient = recipients->asArray()->get(0);
- if (!recipient || !recipient->asArray() || recipient->asArray()->size() != 3) {
- return "Invalid COSE_recipient";
- }
-
- auto& ciphertext = recipient->asArray()->get(2);
- if (!ciphertext->asSimple() || !ciphertext->asSimple()->asNull()) {
- return "Unexpected value in recipients ciphertext field " +
- cppbor::prettyPrint(ciphertext.get());
- }
-
- auto& protParms = recipient->asArray()->get(0);
- if (!protParms || !protParms->asBstr()) return "Invalid protected params";
- auto [parsedProtParms, _, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(protParms->asBstr());
- if (!parsedProtParms) return "Failed to parse protected params: " + errMsg;
- if (!parsedProtParms->asMap()) return "Invalid protected params";
-
- auto& algorithm = parsedProtParms->asMap()->get(ALGORITHM);
- if (!algorithm || !algorithm->asInt() || algorithm->asInt()->value() != ECDH_ES_HKDF_256) {
- return "Invalid algorithm";
- }
-
- auto& unprotParms = recipient->asArray()->get(1);
- if (!unprotParms || !unprotParms->asMap()) return "Invalid unprotected params";
-
- auto& senderCoseKey = unprotParms->asMap()->get(COSE_KEY);
- if (!senderCoseKey || !senderCoseKey->asMap()) return "Invalid sender COSE_Key";
-
- auto& keyType = senderCoseKey->asMap()->get(CoseKey::KEY_TYPE);
- if (!keyType || !keyType->asInt() || keyType->asInt()->value() != OCTET_KEY_PAIR) {
- return "Invalid key type";
- }
-
- auto& curve = senderCoseKey->asMap()->get(CoseKey::CURVE);
- if (!curve || !curve->asInt() || curve->asInt()->value() != X25519) {
- return "Unsupported curve";
- }
-
- auto& pubkey = senderCoseKey->asMap()->get(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X);
- if (!pubkey || !pubkey->asBstr() ||
- pubkey->asBstr()->value().size() != X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN) {
- return "Invalid X25519 public key";
- }
-
- auto& key_id = unprotParms->asMap()->get(KEY_ID);
- if (key_id && key_id->asBstr()) {
- return std::make_pair(pubkey->asBstr()->value(), key_id->asBstr()->value());
- }
-
- // If no key ID, just return an empty vector.
- return std::make_pair(pubkey->asBstr()->value(), bytevec{});
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> decryptCoseEncrypt(const bytevec& key, const cppbor::Item* coseEncrypt,
- const bytevec& external_aad) {
- if (!coseEncrypt || !coseEncrypt->asArray() ||
- coseEncrypt->asArray()->size() != kCoseEncryptEntryCount) {
- return "Invalid COSE_Encrypt";
- }
-
- auto& protParms = coseEncrypt->asArray()->get(kCoseEncryptProtectedParams);
- auto& unprotParms = coseEncrypt->asArray()->get(kCoseEncryptUnprotectedParams);
- auto& ciphertext = coseEncrypt->asArray()->get(kCoseEncryptPayload);
- auto& recipients = coseEncrypt->asArray()->get(kCoseEncryptRecipients);
-
- if (!protParms || !protParms->asBstr() || !unprotParms || !ciphertext || !recipients) {
- return "Invalid COSE_Encrypt";
- }
-
- auto [parsedProtParams, _, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(protParms->asBstr()->value());
- if (!parsedProtParams) {
- return errMsg + " when parsing protected params.";
- }
- if (!parsedProtParams->asMap()) {
- return "Protected params must be a map";
- }
-
- auto& algorithm = parsedProtParams->asMap()->get(ALGORITHM);
- if (!algorithm || !algorithm->asInt() || algorithm->asInt()->value() != AES_GCM_256) {
- return "Unsupported encryption algorithm";
- }
-
- if (!unprotParms->asMap() || unprotParms->asMap()->size() != 1) {
- return "Invalid unprotected params";
- }
-
- auto& nonce = unprotParms->asMap()->get(IV);
- if (!nonce || !nonce->asBstr() || nonce->asBstr()->value().size() != kAesGcmNonceLength) {
- return "Invalid nonce";
- }
-
- if (!ciphertext->asBstr()) return "Invalid ciphertext";
-
- auto aad = cppbor::Array() // Enc strucure as AAD
- .add("Encrypt") // Context
- .add(protParms->asBstr()->value()) // Protected
- .add(external_aad) // External AAD
- .encode();
-
- return aesGcmDecrypt(key, nonce->asBstr()->value(), aad, ciphertext->asBstr()->value());
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(const bytevec& pubKeyA, const bytevec& privKeyA,
- const bytevec& pubKeyB, bool senderIsA) {
- bytevec rawSharedKey(X25519_SHARED_KEY_LEN);
- if (!::X25519(rawSharedKey.data(), privKeyA.data(), pubKeyB.data())) {
- return "ECDH operation failed";
- }
-
- bytevec kdfContext = cppbor::Array()
- .add(AES_GCM_256)
- .add(cppbor::Array() // Sender Info
- .add(cppbor::Bstr("client"))
- .add(bytevec{} /* nonce */)
- .add(senderIsA ? pubKeyA : pubKeyB))
- .add(cppbor::Array() // Recipient Info
- .add(cppbor::Bstr("server"))
- .add(bytevec{} /* nonce */)
- .add(senderIsA ? pubKeyB : pubKeyA))
- .add(cppbor::Array() // SuppPubInfo
- .add(128) // output key length
- .add(bytevec{})) // protected
- .encode();
-
- bytevec retval(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- bytevec salt{};
- if (!HKDF(retval.data(), retval.size(), //
- EVP_sha256(), //
- rawSharedKey.data(), rawSharedKey.size(), //
- salt.data(), salt.size(), //
- kdfContext.data(), kdfContext.size())) {
- return "ECDH HKDF failed";
- }
-
- return retval;
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> aesGcmEncrypt(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce, const bytevec& aad,
- const bytevec& plaintext) {
- auto ctx = aesGcmInitAndProcessAad(key, nonce, aad, true /* encrypt */);
- if (!ctx) return ctx.moveMessage();
-
- bytevec ciphertext(plaintext.size() + kAesGcmTagSize);
- int outlen;
- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx->get(), ciphertext.data(), &outlen, plaintext.data(),
- plaintext.size())) {
- return "Failed to encrypt plaintext";
- }
- assert(plaintext.size() == outlen);
-
- if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx->get(), ciphertext.data() + outlen, &outlen)) {
- return "Failed to finalize encryption";
- }
- assert(outlen == 0);
-
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx->get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, kAesGcmTagSize,
- ciphertext.data() + plaintext.size())) {
- return "Failed to retrieve tag";
- }
-
- return ciphertext;
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> aesGcmDecrypt(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce, const bytevec& aad,
- const bytevec& ciphertextWithTag) {
- auto ctx = aesGcmInitAndProcessAad(key, nonce, aad, false /* encrypt */);
- if (!ctx) return ctx.moveMessage();
-
- if (ciphertextWithTag.size() < kAesGcmTagSize) return "Missing tag";
-
- bytevec plaintext(ciphertextWithTag.size() - kAesGcmTagSize);
- int outlen;
- if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx->get(), plaintext.data(), &outlen, ciphertextWithTag.data(),
- ciphertextWithTag.size() - kAesGcmTagSize)) {
- return "Failed to decrypt plaintext";
- }
- assert(plaintext.size() == outlen);
-
- bytevec tag(ciphertextWithTag.end() - kAesGcmTagSize, ciphertextWithTag.end());
- if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx->get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, kAesGcmTagSize, tag.data())) {
- return "Failed to set tag: " + std::to_string(ERR_peek_last_error());
- }
-
- if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx->get(), nullptr, &outlen)) {
- return "Failed to finalize encryption";
- }
- assert(outlen == 0);
-
- return plaintext;
-}
-
-} // namespace cppcose
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/include/cppcose/cppcose.h b/security/keymint/support/include/cppcose/cppcose.h
deleted file mode 100644
index a936bfd..0000000
--- a/security/keymint/support/include/cppcose/cppcose.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,288 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#pragma once
-
-#include <memory>
-#include <optional>
-#include <string>
-#include <vector>
-
-#include <cppbor.h>
-#include <cppbor_parse.h>
-
-#include <openssl/cipher.h>
-#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
-#include <openssl/digest.h>
-#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-namespace cppcose {
-
-using bytevec = std::vector<uint8_t>;
-
-constexpr int kCoseSign1EntryCount = 4;
-constexpr int kCoseSign1ProtectedParams = 0;
-constexpr int kCoseSign1UnprotectedParams = 1;
-constexpr int kCoseSign1Payload = 2;
-constexpr int kCoseSign1Signature = 3;
-
-constexpr int kCoseMac0EntryCount = 4;
-constexpr int kCoseMac0ProtectedParams = 0;
-constexpr int kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams = 1;
-constexpr int kCoseMac0Payload = 2;
-constexpr int kCoseMac0Tag = 3;
-
-constexpr int kCoseEncryptEntryCount = 4;
-constexpr int kCoseEncryptProtectedParams = 0;
-constexpr int kCoseEncryptUnprotectedParams = 1;
-constexpr int kCoseEncryptPayload = 2;
-constexpr int kCoseEncryptRecipients = 3;
-
-enum Label : int {
- ALGORITHM = 1,
- KEY_ID = 4,
- IV = 5,
- COSE_KEY = -1,
-};
-
-enum CoseKeyAlgorithm : int {
- AES_GCM_256 = 3,
- HMAC_256 = 5,
- ES256 = -7, // ECDSA with SHA-256
- EDDSA = -8,
- ECDH_ES_HKDF_256 = -25,
-};
-
-enum CoseKeyCurve : int { P256 = 1, X25519 = 4, ED25519 = 6 };
-enum CoseKeyType : int { OCTET_KEY_PAIR = 1, EC2 = 2, SYMMETRIC_KEY = 4 };
-enum CoseKeyOps : int { SIGN = 1, VERIFY = 2, ENCRYPT = 3, DECRYPT = 4 };
-
-constexpr int kAesGcmNonceLength = 12;
-constexpr int kAesGcmTagSize = 16;
-constexpr int kAesGcmKeySize = 32;
-
-template <typename T>
-class ErrMsgOr {
- public:
- ErrMsgOr(std::string errMsg) : errMsg_(std::move(errMsg)) {}
- ErrMsgOr(const char* errMsg) : errMsg_(errMsg) {}
- ErrMsgOr(T val) : value_(std::move(val)) {}
-
- operator bool() const { return value_.has_value(); }
-
- T* operator->() & {
- assert(value_);
- return &value_.value();
- }
- T& operator*() & {
- assert(value_);
- return value_.value();
- };
- T&& operator*() && {
- assert(value_);
- return std::move(value_).value();
- };
-
- const std::string& message() { return errMsg_; }
- std::string moveMessage() { return std::move(errMsg_); }
-
- T moveValue() {
- assert(value_);
- return std::move(value_).value();
- }
-
- private:
- std::string errMsg_;
- std::optional<T> value_;
-};
-
-class CoseKey {
- public:
- CoseKey() {}
- CoseKey(const CoseKey&) = delete;
- CoseKey(CoseKey&&) = default;
-
- enum Label : int {
- KEY_TYPE = 1,
- KEY_ID = 2,
- ALGORITHM = 3,
- KEY_OPS = 4,
- CURVE = -1,
- PUBKEY_X = -2,
- PUBKEY_Y = -3,
- PRIVATE_KEY = -4,
- TEST_KEY = -70000 // Application-defined
- };
-
- static ErrMsgOr<CoseKey> parse(const bytevec& coseKey) {
- auto [parsedKey, _, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(coseKey);
- if (!parsedKey) return errMsg + " when parsing key";
- if (!parsedKey->asMap()) return "CoseKey must be a map";
- return CoseKey(static_cast<cppbor::Map*>(parsedKey.release()));
- }
-
- static ErrMsgOr<CoseKey> parse(const bytevec& coseKey, CoseKeyType expectedKeyType,
- CoseKeyAlgorithm expectedAlgorithm, CoseKeyCurve expectedCurve) {
- auto key = parse(coseKey);
- if (!key) return key;
-
- if (!key->checkIntValue(CoseKey::KEY_TYPE, expectedKeyType) ||
- !key->checkIntValue(CoseKey::ALGORITHM, expectedAlgorithm) ||
- !key->checkIntValue(CoseKey::CURVE, expectedCurve)) {
- return "Unexpected key type:";
- }
-
- return key;
- }
-
- static ErrMsgOr<CoseKey> parseEd25519(const bytevec& coseKey) {
- auto key = parse(coseKey, OCTET_KEY_PAIR, EDDSA, ED25519);
- if (!key) return key;
-
- auto& pubkey = key->getMap().get(PUBKEY_X);
- if (!pubkey || !pubkey->asBstr() ||
- pubkey->asBstr()->value().size() != ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) {
- return "Invalid Ed25519 public key";
- }
-
- return key;
- }
-
- static ErrMsgOr<CoseKey> parseX25519(const bytevec& coseKey, bool requireKid) {
- auto key = parse(coseKey, OCTET_KEY_PAIR, ECDH_ES_HKDF_256, X25519);
- if (!key) return key;
-
- auto& pubkey = key->getMap().get(PUBKEY_X);
- if (!pubkey || !pubkey->asBstr() ||
- pubkey->asBstr()->value().size() != X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN) {
- return "Invalid X25519 public key";
- }
-
- auto& kid = key->getMap().get(KEY_ID);
- if (requireKid && (!kid || !kid->asBstr())) {
- return "Missing KID";
- }
-
- return key;
- }
-
- static ErrMsgOr<CoseKey> parseP256(const bytevec& coseKey) {
- auto key = parse(coseKey, EC2, ES256, P256);
- if (!key) return key;
-
- auto& pubkey_x = key->getMap().get(PUBKEY_X);
- auto& pubkey_y = key->getMap().get(PUBKEY_Y);
- if (!pubkey_x || !pubkey_y || !pubkey_x->asBstr() || !pubkey_y->asBstr() ||
- pubkey_x->asBstr()->value().size() != 32 || pubkey_y->asBstr()->value().size() != 32) {
- return "Invalid P256 public key";
- }
-
- return key;
- }
-
- std::optional<int> getIntValue(Label label) {
- const auto& value = key_->get(label);
- if (!value || !value->asInt()) return {};
- return value->asInt()->value();
- }
-
- std::optional<bytevec> getBstrValue(Label label) {
- const auto& value = key_->get(label);
- if (!value || !value->asBstr()) return {};
- return value->asBstr()->value();
- }
-
- const cppbor::Map& getMap() const { return *key_; }
- cppbor::Map&& moveMap() { return std::move(*key_); }
-
- bool checkIntValue(Label label, int expectedValue) {
- const auto& value = key_->get(label);
- return value && value->asInt() && value->asInt()->value() == expectedValue;
- }
-
- void add(Label label, int value) { key_->add(label, value); }
- void add(Label label, bytevec value) { key_->add(label, std::move(value)); }
-
- bytevec encode() { return key_->canonicalize().encode(); }
-
- private:
- CoseKey(cppbor::Map* parsedKey) : key_(parsedKey) {}
-
- // This is the full parsed key structure.
- std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> key_;
-};
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> generateCoseMac0Mac(const bytevec& macKey, const bytevec& externalAad,
- const bytevec& payload);
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseMac0(const bytevec& macKey, const bytevec& externalAad,
- const bytevec& payload);
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* payload */> parseCoseMac0(const cppbor::Item* macItem);
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* payload */> verifyAndParseCoseMac0(const cppbor::Item* macItem,
- const bytevec& macKey);
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> createCoseSign1Signature(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& protectedParams,
- const bytevec& payload, const bytevec& aad);
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseSign1(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& payload,
- const bytevec& aad);
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseSign1(const bytevec& key, cppbor::Map extraProtectedFields,
- const bytevec& payload, const bytevec& aad);
-/**
- * Verify and parse a COSE_Sign1 message, returning the payload.
- *
- * @param ignoreSignature indicates whether signature verification should be skipped. If true, no
- * verification of the signature will be done.
- *
- * @param coseSign1 is the COSE_Sign1 to verify and parse.
- *
- * @param signingCoseKey is a CBOR-encoded COSE_Key to use to verify the signature. The bytevec may
- * be empty, in which case the function assumes that coseSign1's payload is the COSE_Key to
- * use, i.e. that coseSign1 is a self-signed "certificate".
- */
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* payload */> verifyAndParseCoseSign1(bool ignoreSignature,
- const cppbor::Array* coseSign1,
- const bytevec& signingCoseKey,
- const bytevec& aad);
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> createCoseEncryptCiphertext(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce,
- const bytevec& protectedParams, const bytevec& aad);
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseEncrypt(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce,
- const bytevec& plaintextPayload, const bytevec& aad,
- cppbor::Array recipients);
-ErrMsgOr<std::pair<bytevec /* pubkey */, bytevec /* key ID */>> getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(
- const cppbor::Item* encryptItem);
-inline ErrMsgOr<std::pair<bytevec /* pubkey */, bytevec /* key ID */>>
-getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(const std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Item>& encryptItem) {
- return getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(encryptItem.get());
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* plaintextPayload */> decryptCoseEncrypt(const bytevec& key,
- const cppbor::Item* encryptItem,
- const bytevec& aad);
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(const bytevec& senderPubKey, const bytevec& senderPrivKey,
- const bytevec& recipientPubKey, bool senderIsA);
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* ciphertextWithTag */> aesGcmEncrypt(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce,
- const bytevec& aad,
- const bytevec& plaintext);
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* plaintext */> aesGcmDecrypt(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce,
- const bytevec& aad,
- const bytevec& ciphertextWithTag);
-
-} // namespace cppcose
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_tags.h b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_tags.h
index ae21125..5b2a6f3 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_tags.h
+++ b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_tags.h
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@
TAG_RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION_t, TAG_PURPOSE_t, TAG_ALGORITHM_t, TAG_BLOCK_MODE_t,
TAG_DIGEST_t, TAG_PADDING_t, TAG_ORIGIN_t, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE_t, TAG_EC_CURVE_t,
TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL_t, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL_t, TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED_t,
- TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED_t>;
+ TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED_t, TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL_t, TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT_t>;
template <typename TypedTagType>
struct TypedTag2ValueType;
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
index 53d5b96..e1ead21 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
+++ b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
@@ -38,5 +38,6 @@
uint32_t getOsVersion();
uint32_t getOsPatchlevel();
+uint32_t getVendorPatchlevel();
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/include/remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h b/security/keymint/support/include/remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h
index 5e205a2..e4261f3 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/include/remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h
+++ b/security/keymint/support/include/remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#include <vector>
-#include <cppcose/cppcose.h>
+#include <keymaster/cppcose/cppcose.h>
namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::remote_prov {
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
index e73d602..1e0733f 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
@@ -31,10 +31,12 @@
constexpr size_t kPlatformVersionMatchCount = kSubminorVersionMatch + 1;
constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.build.version.security_patch";
-constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-[0-9]{2}$";
+constexpr char kVendorPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.vendor.build.security_patch";
+constexpr char kPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})$";
constexpr size_t kYearMatch = 1;
constexpr size_t kMonthMatch = 2;
-constexpr size_t kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount = kMonthMatch + 1;
+constexpr size_t kDayMatch = 3;
+constexpr size_t kPatchlevelMatchCount = kDayMatch + 1;
uint32_t match_to_uint32(const char* expression, const regmatch_t& match) {
if (match.rm_so == -1) return 0;
@@ -52,8 +54,6 @@
return prop_value;
}
-} // anonymous namespace
-
uint32_t getOsVersion(const char* version_str) {
regex_t regex;
if (regcomp(®ex, kPlatformVersionRegex, REG_EXTENDED)) {
@@ -75,20 +75,16 @@
return (major * 100 + minor) * 100 + subminor;
}
-uint32_t getOsVersion() {
- std::string version = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformVersionProp);
- return getOsVersion(version.c_str());
-}
+enum class PatchlevelOutput { kYearMonthDay, kYearMonth };
-uint32_t getOsPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str) {
+uint32_t getPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str, PatchlevelOutput detail) {
regex_t regex;
- if (regcomp(®ex, kPlatformPatchlevelRegex, REG_EXTENDED) != 0) {
+ if (regcomp(®ex, kPatchlevelRegex, REG_EXTENDED) != 0) {
return 0;
}
- regmatch_t matches[kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount];
- int not_match =
- regexec(®ex, patchlevel_str, kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount, matches, 0 /* flags */);
+ regmatch_t matches[kPatchlevelMatchCount];
+ int not_match = regexec(®ex, patchlevel_str, kPatchlevelMatchCount, matches, 0 /* flags */);
regfree(®ex);
if (not_match) {
return 0;
@@ -100,12 +96,35 @@
if (month < 1 || month > 12) {
return 0;
}
- return year * 100 + month;
+
+ switch (detail) {
+ case PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonthDay: {
+ uint32_t day = match_to_uint32(patchlevel_str, matches[kDayMatch]);
+ if (day < 1 || day > 31) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return year * 10000 + month * 100 + day;
+ }
+ case PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonth:
+ return year * 100 + month;
+ }
+}
+
+} // anonymous namespace
+
+uint32_t getOsVersion() {
+ std::string version = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformVersionProp);
+ return getOsVersion(version.c_str());
}
uint32_t getOsPatchlevel() {
std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformPatchlevelProp);
- return getOsPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
+ return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str(), PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonth);
+}
+
+uint32_t getVendorPatchlevel() {
+ std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kVendorPatchlevelProp);
+ return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str(), PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonthDay);
}
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/secureclock/aidl/Android.bp b/security/secureclock/aidl/Android.bp
index c78be3b..6a2b753 100644
--- a/security/secureclock/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/security/secureclock/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@
},
rust: {
enabled: true,
+ apex_available: [
+ "//apex_available:platform",
+ "com.android.compos",
+ ],
},
},
}
diff --git a/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl b/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
index 71b4278..fcf2ee8 100644
--- a/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
+++ b/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
@@ -39,20 +39,18 @@
* 32-byte HMAC-SHA256 of the above values, computed as:
*
* HMAC(H,
- * ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL || challenge || timestamp || securityLevel )
+ * ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL || challenge || timestamp || 1 )
*
* where:
*
- * ``ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL'' is a sting constant defined in ISecureClock.aidl.
+ * ``ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL'' is a string constant defined in ISecureClock.aidl.
*
* ``H'' is the shared HMAC key (see computeSharedHmac() in ISharedSecret).
*
* ``||'' represents concatenation
*
* The representation of challenge and timestamp is as 64-bit unsigned integers in big-endian
- * order. SecurityLevel is represented as a 32-bit unsigned integer in big-endian order as
- * described in android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel. It represents the security
- * level of the secure clock environment.
+ * order. 1, above, is a 32-bit unsigned integer, also big-endian.
*/
byte[] mac;
}
diff --git a/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp b/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
index 31f4854..bf332d5 100644
--- a/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
+++ b/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result1.error);
EXPECT_EQ(1U, result1.token.challenge);
EXPECT_GT(result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+ EXPECT_EQ(32U, result1.token.mac.size());
unsigned long time_to_sleep = 200;
sleep_ms(time_to_sleep);
@@ -123,6 +124,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result2.error);
EXPECT_EQ(2U, result2.token.challenge);
EXPECT_GT(result2.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+ EXPECT_EQ(32U, result2.token.mac.size());
auto host_time_delta = result2_time - result1_time;
@@ -153,6 +155,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result1.error);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, result1.token.challenge);
EXPECT_GT(result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+ EXPECT_EQ(32U, result1.token.mac.size());
unsigned long time_to_sleep = 200;
sleep_ms(time_to_sleep);
@@ -162,6 +165,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result2.error);
EXPECT_EQ(1U, result2.token.challenge);
EXPECT_GT(result2.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+ EXPECT_EQ(32U, result2.token.mac.size());
auto host_time_delta = result2_time - result1_time;
diff --git a/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp b/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp
index 8426120..919f882 100644
--- a/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp
+++ b/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@
SharedSecretParameters params;
auto error = GetReturnErrorCode(sharedSecret->getSharedSecretParameters(¶ms));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(params.seed.size() == 0 || params.seed.size() == 32);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(params.nonce.size() == 32);
+
GetParamsResult result;
result.tie() = std::tie(error, params);
return result;
@@ -234,6 +237,45 @@
}
}
+TEST_F(SharedSecretAidlTest, ComputeSharedSecretShortNonce) {
+ auto sharedSecrets = allSharedSecrets();
+ if (sharedSecrets.empty()) {
+ GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping the test as no shared secret service is found.";
+ }
+ auto fixup_hmac = finally([&]() { computeAllSharedSecrets(getAllSharedSecretParameters()); });
+
+ auto params = getAllSharedSecretParameters();
+ ASSERT_EQ(sharedSecrets.size(), params.size())
+ << "One or more shared secret services failed to provide parameters.";
+
+ // All should be well in the normal case
+ auto responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+
+ ASSERT_GT(responses.size(), 0U);
+ vector<uint8_t> correct_response = responses[0].sharing_check;
+ verifyResponses(correct_response, responses);
+
+ // Pick a random param and shorten that nonce by one.
+ size_t param_to_tweak = rand() % params.size();
+ auto& to_tweak = params[param_to_tweak].nonce;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(to_tweak.size() == 32);
+ to_tweak.resize(31);
+
+ responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < responses.size(); ++i) {
+ if (i == param_to_tweak) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, responses[i].error)
+ << "Shared secret service that provided tweaked param should fail to compute "
+ "shared secret";
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, responses[i].error) << "Others should succeed";
+ EXPECT_NE(correct_response, responses[i].sharing_check)
+ << "Others should calculate a different shared secret, due to the tweaked "
+ "nonce.";
+ }
+ }
+}
+
TEST_F(SharedSecretAidlTest, ComputeSharedSecretCorruptSeed) {
auto sharedSecrets = allSharedSecrets();
if (sharedSecrets.empty()) {
@@ -275,6 +317,45 @@
}
}
}
+
+TEST_F(SharedSecretAidlTest, ComputeSharedSecretShortSeed) {
+ auto sharedSecrets = allSharedSecrets();
+ if (sharedSecrets.empty()) {
+ GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping the test as no shared secret service is found.";
+ }
+ auto fixup_hmac = finally([&]() { computeAllSharedSecrets(getAllSharedSecretParameters()); });
+ auto params = getAllSharedSecretParameters();
+ ASSERT_EQ(sharedSecrets.size(), params.size())
+ << "One or more shared secret service failed to provide parameters.";
+
+ // All should be well in the normal case
+ auto responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+
+ ASSERT_GT(responses.size(), 0U);
+ vector<uint8_t> correct_response = responses[0].sharing_check;
+ verifyResponses(correct_response, responses);
+
+ // Pick a random param and modify the seed to be of (invalid) length 31.
+ auto param_to_tweak = rand() % params.size();
+ auto& to_tweak = params[param_to_tweak].seed;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(to_tweak.size() == 32 || to_tweak.size() == 0);
+ to_tweak.resize(31);
+
+ responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < responses.size(); ++i) {
+ if (i == param_to_tweak) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, responses[i].error)
+ << "Shared secret service that provided tweaked param should fail to compute "
+ "shared secret";
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, responses[i].error) << "Others should succeed";
+ EXPECT_NE(correct_response, responses[i].sharing_check)
+ << "Others should calculate a different shared secret, due to the tweaked "
+ "nonce.";
+ }
+ }
+}
+
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::sharedsecret::test
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
diff --git a/sensors/1.0/ISensors.hal b/sensors/1.0/ISensors.hal
index 8d41de2..0e172ef 100644
--- a/sensors/1.0/ISensors.hal
+++ b/sensors/1.0/ISensors.hal
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
* Flush adds a FLUSH_COMPLETE metadata event to the end of the "batch mode"
* FIFO for the specified sensor and flushes the FIFO. If the FIFO is empty
* or if the sensor doesn't support batching (FIFO size zero), return
- * SUCCESS and add a trivial FLUSH_COMPLETE event added to the event stream.
+ * OK and add a trivial FLUSH_COMPLETE event added to the event stream.
* This applies to all sensors other than one-shot sensors. If the sensor
* is a one-shot sensor, flush must return BAD_VALUE and not generate any
* flush complete metadata. If the sensor is not active at the time flush()
diff --git a/sensors/1.0/types.hal b/sensors/1.0/types.hal
index cbbe92f..ac7be06 100644
--- a/sensors/1.0/types.hal
+++ b/sensors/1.0/types.hal
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@
/**
* High performance mode hint. Device is able to use up more power and take
- * more reources to improve throughput and latency in high performance mode.
+ * more resources to improve throughput and latency in high performance mode.
* One possible use case is virtual reality, when sensor latency need to be
* carefully controlled.
* int32_t: 1 or 0, denote if device is in/out of high performance mode,
diff --git a/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index 56bc9cf..1f579ba 100644
--- a/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
});
}
-// Test if sensor list returned is valid
+// Test if sensor hal can switch to different operation modes
TEST_P(SensorsHidlTest, SetOperationMode) {
std::vector<SensorInfo> sensorList = getSensorsList();
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@
ASSERT_EQ(Result::OK, S()->setOperationMode(OperationMode::NORMAL));
}
-// Test if sensor list returned is valid
+// Test if sensor hal can receive injected events in loopback mode
TEST_P(SensorsHidlTest, InjectSensorEventData) {
std::vector<SensorInfo> sensorList = getSensorsList();
std::vector<SensorInfo> sensorSupportInjection;
diff --git a/tetheroffload/control/1.1/ITetheringOffloadCallback.hal b/tetheroffload/control/1.1/ITetheringOffloadCallback.hal
index 7a7d56d..9c74641 100644
--- a/tetheroffload/control/1.1/ITetheringOffloadCallback.hal
+++ b/tetheroffload/control/1.1/ITetheringOffloadCallback.hal
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@
interface ITetheringOffloadCallback extends @1.0::ITetheringOffloadCallback {
/**
* Called when an asynchronous event is generated by the hardware
- * management process. Events which are common for 1.0 and 1.1 HAL
- * MUST be fired on both 1.0 and 1.1 callback.
+ * management process. Implementations that report events via this callback
+ * should not invoke onEvent of 1.0 HAL.
*/
oneway onEvent_1_1(OffloadCallbackEvent event);
};
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp
index 2e27475..67f6bae 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp
@@ -53,12 +53,15 @@
return failure();
}
- auto status = mCas->setSessionPrivateData(sessionId, hidlPvtData);
- if (status != android::hardware::cas::V1_0::Status::OK) {
- ALOGW("[vts] Failed to set session private data");
- mCas->closeSession(sessionId);
- return failure();
+ if (hidlPvtData.size() > 0) {
+ auto status = mCas->setSessionPrivateData(sessionId, hidlPvtData);
+ if (status != android::hardware::cas::V1_0::Status::OK) {
+ ALOGW("[vts] Failed to set session private data");
+ mCas->closeSession(sessionId);
+ return failure();
+ }
}
+
return success();
}
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index 4c92665..b39abe3 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -56,9 +56,6 @@
}
void TunerFilterHidlTest::testTimeFilter(TimeFilterConfig filterConf) {
- if (!timeFilter.support) {
- return;
- }
uint32_t demuxId;
sp<IDemux> demux;
DemuxCapabilities caps;
@@ -161,27 +158,36 @@
void TunerRecordHidlTest::recordSingleFilterTest(FilterConfig filterConf,
FrontendConfig frontendConf, DvrConfig dvrConf) {
- uint32_t feId;
uint32_t demuxId;
sp<IDemux> demux;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
+ mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
+
+ DvrConfig dvrSourceConfig;
+ if (mLnbId || record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ uint32_t feId;
+ mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+ if (mLnbId) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setLnb(*mLnbId));
+ }
+ if (frontendConf.isSoftwareFe) {
+ mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[record.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
+ }
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+ mFrontendTests.setDvrTests(mDvrTests);
+ } else {
+ dvrSourceConfig = dvrMap[record.dvrSourceId];
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrSourceConfig.type, dvrSourceConfig.bufferSize));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrPlayback(dvrSourceConfig.settings));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrPlaybackMQDescriptor());
+ }
+
uint32_t filterId;
sp<IFilter> filter;
-
- mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
- ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
- if (mLnbId) {
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setLnb(*mLnbId));
- }
- if (frontendConf.isSoftwareFe) {
- mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[record.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
- }
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
- mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
- mFrontendTests.setDvrTests(mDvrTests);
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrConf.type, dvrConf.bufferSize));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrRecord(dvrConf.settings));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrRecordMQDescriptor());
@@ -195,17 +201,39 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.attachFilterToDvr(filter));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.startDvrRecord());
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.startFilter(filterId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+ if (mLnbId || record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+ } else {
+ // Start DVR Source
+ mDvrTests.startPlaybackInputThread(dvrSourceConfig.playbackInputFile,
+ dvrSourceConfig.settings.playback());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.startDvrPlayback());
+ }
+
mDvrTests.testRecordOutput();
mDvrTests.stopRecordThread();
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+ if (mLnbId || record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+ } else {
+ mDvrTests.stopPlaybackThread();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.stopDvrPlayback());
+ }
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.stopFilter(filterId));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.stopDvrRecord());
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.detachFilterToDvr(filter));
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(filterId));
mDvrTests.closeDvrRecord();
+
+ if (mLnbId || record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+ } else {
+ mDvrTests.closeDvrPlayback();
+ }
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
}
void TunerRecordHidlTest::recordSingleFilterTestWithLnb(FilterConfig filterConf,
@@ -236,23 +264,34 @@
void TunerRecordHidlTest::attachSingleFilterToRecordDvrTest(FilterConfig filterConf,
FrontendConfig frontendConf,
DvrConfig dvrConf) {
- uint32_t feId;
uint32_t demuxId;
sp<IDemux> demux;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
+ mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
+
+ DvrConfig dvrSourceConfig;
+ if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ uint32_t feId;
+ mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+ } else {
+ dvrSourceConfig = dvrMap[record.dvrSourceId];
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrSourceConfig.type, dvrSourceConfig.bufferSize));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrPlayback(dvrSourceConfig.settings));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrPlaybackMQDescriptor());
+ }
+
uint32_t filterId;
sp<IFilter> filter;
-
- mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
- ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
- mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrConf.type, dvrConf.bufferSize));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrRecord(dvrConf.settings));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrRecordMQDescriptor());
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.openFilterInDemux(filterConf.type, filterConf.bufferSize));
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.getNewlyOpenedFilterId(filterId));
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.configFilter(filterConf.settings, filterId));
@@ -268,30 +307,43 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(filterId));
mDvrTests.closeDvrRecord();
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+
+ if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+ }
}
void TunerDescramblerHidlTest::scrambledBroadcastTest(set<struct FilterConfig> mediaFilterConfs,
FrontendConfig frontendConf,
DescramblerConfig descConfig) {
- uint32_t feId;
uint32_t demuxId;
sp<IDemux> demux;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
+
+ DvrConfig dvrSourceConfig;
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ uint32_t feId;
+ mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+ if (frontendConf.isSoftwareFe) {
+ mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
+ }
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+ mFrontendTests.setDemux(demux);
+ } else {
+ dvrSourceConfig = dvrMap[descrambling.dvrSourceId];
+ mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrSourceConfig.type, dvrSourceConfig.bufferSize));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrPlayback(dvrSourceConfig.settings));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrPlaybackMQDescriptor());
+ }
+
set<uint32_t> filterIds;
uint32_t filterId;
set<struct FilterConfig>::iterator config;
set<uint32_t>::iterator id;
-
- mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
- if (frontendConf.isSoftwareFe) {
- mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
- }
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
- mFrontendTests.setDemux(demux);
for (config = mediaFilterConfs.begin(); config != mediaFilterConfs.end(); config++) {
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.openFilterInDemux((*config).type, (*config).bufferSize));
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.getNewlyOpenedFilterId(filterId));
@@ -314,10 +366,26 @@
for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.startFilter(*id));
}
- // tune test
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ // tune test
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+ } else {
+ // Start DVR Source
+ mDvrTests.startPlaybackInputThread(dvrSourceConfig.playbackInputFile,
+ dvrSourceConfig.settings.playback());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.startDvrPlayback());
+ }
+
ASSERT_TRUE(filterDataOutputTest());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+ } else {
+ mDvrTests.stopPlaybackThread();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.stopDvrPlayback());
+ }
+
for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.stopFilter(*id));
}
@@ -328,27 +396,45 @@
for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(*id));
}
+
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+ } else {
+ mDvrTests.closeDvrPlayback();
+ }
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
}
TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, TuneFrontend) {
description("Tune one Frontend with specific setting and check Lock event");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
mFrontendTests.tuneTest(frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
}
TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, AutoScanFrontend) {
description("Run an auto frontend scan with specific setting and check lock scanMessage");
+ if (!scan.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
mFrontendTests.scanTest(frontendMap[scan.frontendId], FrontendScanType::SCAN_AUTO);
}
TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, BlindScanFrontend) {
description("Run an blind frontend scan with specific setting and check lock scanMessage");
+ if (!scan.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
mFrontendTests.scanTest(frontendMap[scan.frontendId], FrontendScanType::SCAN_BLIND);
}
TEST_P(TunerLnbHidlTest, SendDiseqcMessageToLnb) {
description("Open and configure an Lnb with specific settings then send a diseqc msg to it.");
+ if (!lnbLive.support) {
+ return;
+ }
if (lnbMap[lnbLive.lnbId].name.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
vector<uint32_t> ids;
ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.getLnbIds(ids));
@@ -370,6 +456,9 @@
TEST_P(TunerDemuxHidlTest, openDemux) {
description("Open and close a Demux.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
uint32_t feId;
uint32_t demuxId;
sp<IDemux> demux;
@@ -385,6 +474,9 @@
TEST_P(TunerDemuxHidlTest, getAvSyncTime) {
description("Get the A/V sync time from a PCR filter.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
if (live.pcrFilterId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
return;
}
@@ -423,6 +515,9 @@
TEST_P(TunerFilterHidlTest, StartFilterInDemux) {
description("Open and start a filter in Demux.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
// TODO use paramterized tests
configSingleFilterInDemuxTest(filterMap[live.videoFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
}
@@ -457,22 +552,34 @@
TEST_P(TunerFilterHidlTest, testTimeFilter) {
description("Open a timer filter in Demux and set time stamp.");
+ if (!timeFilter.support) {
+ return;
+ }
// TODO use paramterized tests
testTimeFilter(timeFilterMap[timeFilter.timeFilterId]);
}
TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, BroadcastDataFlowVideoFilterTest) {
description("Test Video Filter functionality in Broadcast use case.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterMap[live.videoFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
}
TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, BroadcastDataFlowAudioFilterTest) {
description("Test Audio Filter functionality in Broadcast use case.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterMap[live.audioFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
}
TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, BroadcastDataFlowSectionFilterTest) {
description("Test Section Filter functionality in Broadcast use case.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
if (live.sectionFilterId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
return;
}
@@ -481,6 +588,9 @@
TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, IonBufferTest) {
description("Test the av filter data bufferring.");
+ if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ return;
+ }
broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterMap[live.videoFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
}
@@ -501,6 +611,22 @@
playbackSingleFilterTest(filterMap[playback.sectionFilterId], dvrMap[playback.dvrId]);
}
+TEST_P(TunerPlaybackHidlTest, PlaybackDataFlowWithTsAudioFilterTest) {
+ description("Feed ts data from playback and configure Ts audio filter to get output");
+ if (!playback.support) {
+ return;
+ }
+ playbackSingleFilterTest(filterMap[playback.audioFilterId], dvrMap[playback.dvrId]);
+}
+
+TEST_P(TunerPlaybackHidlTest, PlaybackDataFlowWithTsVideoFilterTest) {
+ description("Feed ts data from playback and configure Ts video filter to get output");
+ if (!playback.support) {
+ return;
+ }
+ playbackSingleFilterTest(filterMap[playback.videoFilterId], dvrMap[playback.dvrId]);
+}
+
TEST_P(TunerRecordHidlTest, AttachFiltersToRecordTest) {
description("Attach a single filter to the record dvr test.");
// TODO use paramterized tests
@@ -522,7 +648,7 @@
TEST_P(TunerRecordHidlTest, LnbRecordDataFlowWithTsRecordFilterTest) {
description("Feed ts data from Fe with Lnb to recording and test with ts record filter");
- if (lnbRecord.support) {
+ if (!lnbRecord.support) {
return;
}
recordSingleFilterTestWithLnb(filterMap[lnbRecord.recordFilterId],
@@ -532,27 +658,34 @@
TEST_P(TunerDescramblerHidlTest, CreateDescrambler) {
description("Create Descrambler");
- if (descrambling.support) {
+ if (!descrambling.support) {
return;
}
- uint32_t feId;
uint32_t demuxId;
sp<IDemux> demux;
- mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendMap[descrambling.frontendId].type, feId);
- ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
- ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ uint32_t feId;
+ mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendMap[descrambling.frontendId].type, feId);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+ }
+
ASSERT_TRUE(mDescramblerTests.openDescrambler(demuxId));
ASSERT_TRUE(mDescramblerTests.closeDescrambler());
ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
- ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+ }
}
TEST_P(TunerDescramblerHidlTest, ScrambledBroadcastDataFlowMediaFiltersTest) {
description("Test ts audio filter in scrambled broadcast use case");
- if (descrambling.support) {
+ if (!descrambling.support) {
return;
}
set<FilterConfig> filterConfs;
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
index 65f8615..8328e0c 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
@@ -148,10 +148,32 @@
};
inline bool validateConnections() {
- bool feIsValid = frontendMap.find(live.frontendId) != frontendMap.end() &&
- frontendMap.find(scan.frontendId) != frontendMap.end();
- feIsValid &= record.support ? frontendMap.find(record.frontendId) != frontendMap.end() : true;
- feIsValid &= descrambling.support
+ if ((!live.hasFrontendConnection || !scan.hasFrontendConnection) && !playback.support) {
+ ALOGW("[vts config] VTS must support either a DVR source or a Frontend source.");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (record.support && !record.hasFrontendConnection &&
+ record.dvrSourceId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
+ ALOGW("[vts config] Record must support either a DVR source or a Frontend source.");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (descrambling.support && !descrambling.hasFrontendConnection &&
+ descrambling.dvrSourceId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
+ ALOGW("[vts config] Descrambling must support either a DVR source or a Frontend source.");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ bool feIsValid = live.hasFrontendConnection
+ ? frontendMap.find(live.frontendId) != frontendMap.end()
+ : true;
+ feIsValid &= scan.hasFrontendConnection ? frontendMap.find(scan.frontendId) != frontendMap.end()
+ : true;
+ feIsValid &= record.support && record.hasFrontendConnection
+ ? frontendMap.find(record.frontendId) != frontendMap.end()
+ : true;
+ feIsValid &= (descrambling.support && descrambling.hasFrontendConnection)
? frontendMap.find(descrambling.frontendId) != frontendMap.end()
: true;
feIsValid &= lnbLive.support ? frontendMap.find(lnbLive.frontendId) != frontendMap.end() : true;
@@ -163,18 +185,28 @@
return false;
}
- bool dvrIsValid = frontendMap[live.frontendId].isSoftwareFe
+ bool dvrIsValid = (live.hasFrontendConnection && frontendMap[live.frontendId].isSoftwareFe)
? dvrMap.find(live.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end()
: true;
dvrIsValid &= playback.support ? dvrMap.find(playback.dvrId) != dvrMap.end() : true;
if (record.support) {
- if (frontendMap[record.frontendId].isSoftwareFe) {
- dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+ if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ if (frontendMap[record.frontendId].isSoftwareFe) {
+ dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+ }
+ } else {
+ dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrSourceId) != dvrMap.end();
}
dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrRecordId) != dvrMap.end();
}
- if (descrambling.support && frontendMap[descrambling.frontendId].isSoftwareFe) {
- dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+ if (descrambling.support) {
+ if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+ if (frontendMap[descrambling.frontendId].isSoftwareFe) {
+ dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+ }
+ } else {
+ dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(descrambling.dvrSourceId) != dvrMap.end();
+ }
}
if (!dvrIsValid) {
@@ -182,8 +214,10 @@
return false;
}
- bool filterIsValid = filterMap.find(live.audioFilterId) != filterMap.end() &&
- filterMap.find(live.videoFilterId) != filterMap.end();
+ bool filterIsValid = (live.hasFrontendConnection)
+ ? filterMap.find(live.audioFilterId) != filterMap.end() &&
+ filterMap.find(live.videoFilterId) != filterMap.end()
+ : true;
filterIsValid &= playback.support
? (filterMap.find(playback.audioFilterId) != filterMap.end() &&
filterMap.find(playback.videoFilterId) != filterMap.end())
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigReader.h b/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigReader.h
index 90499c4..e1f5695 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigReader.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigReader.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtConstellation;
using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtGuardInterval;
using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtHierarchy;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtPlpMode;
using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtSettings;
using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtStandard;
using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtTransmissionMode;
@@ -120,6 +121,7 @@
};
struct LiveBroadcastHardwareConnections {
+ bool hasFrontendConnection;
string frontendId;
string dvrSoftwareFeId;
string audioFilterId;
@@ -130,6 +132,7 @@
};
struct ScanHardwareConnections {
+ bool hasFrontendConnection;
string frontendId;
};
@@ -145,19 +148,23 @@
struct DvrRecordHardwareConnections {
bool support;
+ bool hasFrontendConnection;
string frontendId;
string dvrRecordId;
string dvrSoftwareFeId;
string recordFilterId;
+ string dvrSourceId;
};
struct DescramblingHardwareConnections {
bool support;
+ bool hasFrontendConnection;
string frontendId;
string dvrSoftwareFeId;
string audioFilterId;
string videoFilterId;
string descramblerId;
+ string dvrSourceId;
/* list string of extra filters; */
};
@@ -362,8 +369,6 @@
int size = privateData.size();
descramblerMap[id].hidlPvtData.resize(size);
memcpy(descramblerMap[id].hidlPvtData.data(), privateData.data(), size);
- } else {
- descramblerMap[id].hidlPvtData.resize(256);
}
}
}
@@ -395,7 +400,14 @@
}
static void connectLiveBroadcast(LiveBroadcastHardwareConnections& live) {
- auto liveConfig = *getDataFlowConfiguration().getFirstClearLiveBroadcast();
+ auto dataFlow = getDataFlowConfiguration();
+ if (dataFlow.hasClearLiveBroadcast()) {
+ live.hasFrontendConnection = true;
+ } else {
+ live.hasFrontendConnection = false;
+ return;
+ }
+ auto liveConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstClearLiveBroadcast();
live.frontendId = liveConfig.getFrontendConnection();
live.audioFilterId = liveConfig.getAudioFilterConnection();
@@ -416,8 +428,15 @@
}
static void connectScan(ScanHardwareConnections& scan) {
- auto scanConfig = getDataFlowConfiguration().getFirstScan();
- scan.frontendId = scanConfig->getFrontendConnection();
+ auto dataFlow = getDataFlowConfiguration();
+ if (dataFlow.hasScan()) {
+ scan.hasFrontendConnection = true;
+ } else {
+ scan.hasFrontendConnection = false;
+ return;
+ }
+ auto scanConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstScan();
+ scan.frontendId = scanConfig.getFrontendConnection();
}
static void connectDvrPlayback(DvrPlaybackHardwareConnections& playback) {
@@ -425,6 +444,7 @@
if (dataFlow.hasDvrPlayback()) {
playback.support = true;
} else {
+ playback.support = false;
return;
}
auto playbackConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstDvrPlayback();
@@ -443,15 +463,23 @@
if (dataFlow.hasDvrRecord()) {
record.support = true;
} else {
+ record.support = false;
return;
}
auto recordConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstDvrRecord();
- record.frontendId = recordConfig.getFrontendConnection();
record.recordFilterId = recordConfig.getRecordFilterConnection();
record.dvrRecordId = recordConfig.getDvrRecordConnection();
if (recordConfig.hasDvrSoftwareFeConnection()) {
record.dvrSoftwareFeId = recordConfig.getDvrSoftwareFeConnection();
}
+ if (recordConfig.getHasFrontendConnection()) {
+ record.hasFrontendConnection = true;
+ record.dvrSourceId = emptyHardwareId;
+ record.frontendId = recordConfig.getFrontendConnection();
+ } else {
+ record.hasFrontendConnection = false;
+ record.dvrSourceId = recordConfig.getDvrSourceConnection();
+ }
}
static void connectDescrambling(DescramblingHardwareConnections& descrambling) {
@@ -459,16 +487,24 @@
if (dataFlow.hasDescrambling()) {
descrambling.support = true;
} else {
+ descrambling.support = false;
return;
}
auto descConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstDescrambling();
- descrambling.frontendId = descConfig.getFrontendConnection();
descrambling.descramblerId = descConfig.getDescramblerConnection();
descrambling.audioFilterId = descConfig.getAudioFilterConnection();
descrambling.videoFilterId = descConfig.getVideoFilterConnection();
if (descConfig.hasDvrSoftwareFeConnection()) {
descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId = descConfig.getDvrSoftwareFeConnection();
}
+ if (descConfig.getHasFrontendConnection()) {
+ descrambling.hasFrontendConnection = true;
+ descrambling.dvrSourceId = emptyHardwareId;
+ descrambling.frontendId = descConfig.getFrontendConnection();
+ } else {
+ descrambling.hasFrontendConnection = false;
+ descrambling.dvrSourceId = descConfig.getDvrSourceConnection();
+ }
}
static void connectLnbLive(LnbLiveHardwareConnections& lnbLive) {
@@ -476,6 +512,7 @@
if (dataFlow.hasLnbLive()) {
lnbLive.support = true;
} else {
+ lnbLive.support = false;
return;
}
auto lnbLiveConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstLnbLive();
@@ -495,6 +532,7 @@
if (dataFlow.hasLnbRecord()) {
lnbRecord.support = true;
} else {
+ lnbRecord.support = false;
return;
}
auto lnbRecordConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstLnbRecord();
@@ -514,6 +552,7 @@
if (dataFlow.hasTimeFilter()) {
timeFilter.support = true;
} else {
+ timeFilter.support = false;
return;
}
auto timeFilterConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstTimeFilter();
@@ -534,8 +573,26 @@
feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getTransmissionMode());
dvbtSettings.bandwidth = static_cast<FrontendDvbtBandwidth>(
feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getBandwidth());
+ dvbtSettings.constellation = static_cast<FrontendDvbtConstellation>(
+ feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getConstellation());
+ dvbtSettings.hierarchy = static_cast<FrontendDvbtHierarchy>(
+ feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getHierarchy());
+ dvbtSettings.hpCoderate = static_cast<FrontendDvbtCoderate>(
+ feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getHpCoderate());
+ dvbtSettings.lpCoderate = static_cast<FrontendDvbtCoderate>(
+ feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getLpCoderate());
+ dvbtSettings.guardInterval = static_cast<FrontendDvbtGuardInterval>(
+ feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getGuardInterval());
dvbtSettings.isHighPriority =
feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getIsHighPriority();
+ dvbtSettings.standard = static_cast<FrontendDvbtStandard>(
+ feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getStandard());
+ dvbtSettings.isMiso = feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getIsMiso();
+ dvbtSettings.plpMode = static_cast<FrontendDvbtPlpMode>(
+ feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getPlpMode());
+ dvbtSettings.plpId = feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getPlpId();
+ dvbtSettings.plpGroupId = feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getPlpGroupId();
+
return dvbtSettings;
}
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt b/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt
index 4255a60..3476414 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt
@@ -48,12 +48,16 @@
method @Nullable public String getAudioFilterConnection();
method @Nullable public String getDescramblerConnection();
method @Nullable public String getDvrSoftwareFeConnection();
+ method @Nullable public String getDvrSourceConnection();
method @Nullable public String getFrontendConnection();
+ method @Nullable public boolean getHasFrontendConnection();
method @Nullable public String getVideoFilterConnection();
method public void setAudioFilterConnection(@Nullable String);
method public void setDescramblerConnection(@Nullable String);
method public void setDvrSoftwareFeConnection(@Nullable String);
+ method public void setDvrSourceConnection(@Nullable String);
method public void setFrontendConnection(@Nullable String);
+ method public void setHasFrontendConnection(@Nullable boolean);
method public void setVideoFilterConnection(@Nullable String);
}
@@ -73,11 +77,15 @@
ctor public DataFlowConfiguration.DvrRecord();
method @Nullable public String getDvrRecordConnection();
method @Nullable public String getDvrSoftwareFeConnection();
+ method @Nullable public String getDvrSourceConnection();
method @Nullable public String getFrontendConnection();
+ method @Nullable public boolean getHasFrontendConnection();
method @Nullable public String getRecordFilterConnection();
method public void setDvrRecordConnection(@Nullable String);
method public void setDvrSoftwareFeConnection(@Nullable String);
+ method public void setDvrSourceConnection(@Nullable String);
method public void setFrontendConnection(@Nullable String);
+ method public void setHasFrontendConnection(@Nullable boolean);
method public void setRecordFilterConnection(@Nullable String);
}
@@ -152,10 +160,30 @@
public class DvbtFrontendSettings {
ctor public DvbtFrontendSettings();
method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getBandwidth();
+ method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getConstellation();
+ method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getGuardInterval();
+ method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getHierarchy();
+ method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getHpCoderate();
method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getIsHighPriority();
+ method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getIsMiso();
+ method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getLpCoderate();
+ method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getPlpGroupId();
+ method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getPlpId();
+ method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getPlpMode();
+ method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getStandard();
method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getTransmissionMode();
method public void setBandwidth(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+ method public void setConstellation(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+ method public void setGuardInterval(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+ method public void setHierarchy(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+ method public void setHpCoderate(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
method public void setIsHighPriority(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+ method public void setIsMiso(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+ method public void setLpCoderate(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+ method public void setPlpGroupId(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+ method public void setPlpId(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+ method public void setPlpMode(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+ method public void setStandard(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
method public void setTransmissionMode(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
}
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config.xml b/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config.xml
index 570171e..347e984 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config.xml
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config.xml
@@ -54,7 +54,10 @@
<frontends>
<frontend id="FE_DEFAULT" type="DVBT" isSoftwareFrontend="true"
connectToCicamId="0" frequency="578000" endFrequency="800000">
- <dvbtFrontendSettings bandwidth="8" transmissionMode="1" isHighPriority="1"/>
+ <dvbtFrontendSettings bandwidth="8" transmissionMode="1" isHighPriority="1"
+ constellation="1" hierarchy="1" hpCoderate="1" lpCoderate="1"
+ guardInterval="1" standard="1" isMiso="0" plpMode="1"
+ plpId="0" plpGroupId="0"/>
</frontend>
<frontend id="FE_DVBS_0" type="DVBS" isSoftwareFrontend="true"
connectToCicamId="0" frequency="578000" endFrequency="800000">
@@ -196,7 +199,8 @@
sectionFilterConnection="FILTER_TS_SECTION_0"
dvrSoftwareFeConnection="DVR_PLAYBACK_0"/>
<scan frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"/>
- <descrambling frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
+ <descrambling hasFrontendConnection="true"
+ frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
descramblerConnection="DESCRAMBLER_0"
audioFilterConnection="FILTER_AUDIO_DEFAULT"
videoFilterConnection="FILTER_VIDEO_DEFAULT"
@@ -205,7 +209,8 @@
audioFilterConnection="FILTER_AUDIO_DEFAULT"
videoFilterConnection="FILTER_VIDEO_DEFAULT"
sectionFilterConnection="FILTER_TS_SECTION_0"/>
- <dvrRecord frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
+ <dvrRecord hasFrontendConnection="true"
+ frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
recordFilterConnection="FILTER_TS_RECORD_0"
dvrRecordConnection="DVR_RECORD_0"
dvrSoftwareFeConnection="DVR_PLAYBACK_0"/>
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd b/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd
index 3fe93ff..7f31a11 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd
@@ -52,8 +52,18 @@
<xs:complexType name="dvbtFrontendSettings">
<xs:attribute name="bandwidth" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
- <xs:attribute name="transmissionMode" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+ <xs:attribute name="constellation" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+ <xs:attribute name="guardInterval" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+ <xs:attribute name="hierarchy" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+ <xs:attribute name="hpCoderate" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+ <xs:attribute name="lpCoderate" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="isHighPriority" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+ <xs:attribute name="isMiso" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+ <xs:attribute name="plpGroupId" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+ <xs:attribute name="plpId" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+ <xs:attribute name="plpMode" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+ <xs:attribute name="standard" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+ <xs:attribute name="transmissionMode" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
<xs:complexType name="dvbsFrontendSettings">
<xs:attribute name="inputStreamId" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
@@ -534,7 +544,9 @@
<!-- DATA FLOW CONFIGURATION SESSION -->
<xs:complexType name="dataFlowConfiguration">
<xs:sequence>
- <xs:element name="clearLiveBroadcast" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1">
+ <!-- clearLiveBroadcast is only optional when there is no physical frontend. In this
+ case, the dvrPlayback config is required. -->
+ <xs:element name="clearLiveBroadcast" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="audioFilterConnection" type="filterId" use="required"/>
@@ -546,20 +558,27 @@
<xs:attribute name="dvrSoftwareFeConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
- <xs:element name="scan" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1">
+ <!-- scan is only optional when there is no physical frontend. In this case, the
+ dvrPlayback config is required. -->
+ <xs:element name="scan" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
<xs:complexType>
<xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="descrambling" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
<xs:complexType>
+ <!-- If there is a software or hardware frontend connection or not. If false,
+ dvrSourceConnection config is required when testing dvrRecord. -->
+ <xs:attribute name="hasFrontendConnection" type="xs:boolean" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="descramblerConnection" type="descramblerId" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="audioFilterConnection" type="filterId" use="required"/>
<xs:attribute name="videoFilterConnection" type="filterId" use="required"/>
<!-- TODO: b/182519645 allow the users to insert extra filters -->
- <!-- DVR is only required when the frontend is using the software input -->
+ <!-- This DVR is only required when the frontend is using the software input -->
<xs:attribute name="dvrSoftwareFeConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
+ <!-- This Dvr is only required when there's no frontend(sw or hw) connection -->
+ <xs:attribute name="dvrSourceConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="dvrPlayback" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
@@ -573,10 +592,15 @@
</xs:element>
<xs:element name="dvrRecord" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
<xs:complexType>
- <xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="required"/>
+ <!-- If there is a software or hardware frontend connection or not. If false,
+ dvrSourceConnection config is required when testing dvrRecord. -->
+ <xs:attribute name="hasFrontendConnection" type="xs:boolean" use="required"/>
+ <xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="dvrRecordConnection" type="dvrId" use="required"/>
- <!-- DVR is only required when the frontend is using the software input -->
+ <!-- This Dvr is only required when the frontend is using the software input -->
<xs:attribute name="dvrSoftwareFeConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
+ <!-- This Dvr is only required when there's no frontend(sw or hw) connection -->
+ <xs:attribute name="dvrSourceConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
<xs:attribute name="recordFilterConnection" type="filterId" use="required"/>
</xs:complexType>
</xs:element>
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.vibrator/current/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl b/vibrator/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.vibrator/current/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
index 8cb259f..7431804 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.vibrator/current/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.vibrator/current/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
@@ -19,6 +19,6 @@
@VintfStability
parcelable CompositeEffect {
int delayMs;
- android.hardware.vibrator.CompositePrimitive primitive;
+ android.hardware.vibrator.CompositePrimitive primitive = android.hardware.vibrator.CompositePrimitive.NOOP;
float scale;
}
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl b/vibrator/aidl/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
index 406a899..5a990c0 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
parcelable CompositeEffect {
/* Period of silence preceding primitive. */
int delayMs;
- CompositePrimitive primitive;
+ CompositePrimitive primitive = CompositePrimitive.NOOP;
/*
* 0.0 (inclusive) - 1.0 (inclusive),
* where 0.0 is minimum "feelable" amplitude.
diff --git a/wifi/supplicant/1.0/vts/functional/supplicant_sta_iface_hidl_test.cpp b/wifi/supplicant/1.0/vts/functional/supplicant_sta_iface_hidl_test.cpp
index e4fe52c..bdca32c 100644
--- a/wifi/supplicant/1.0/vts/functional/supplicant_sta_iface_hidl_test.cpp
+++ b/wifi/supplicant/1.0/vts/functional/supplicant_sta_iface_hidl_test.cpp
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
#include "supplicant_hidl_call_util.h"
#include "supplicant_hidl_test_utils.h"
+#include <cutils/properties.h>
using ::android::sp;
using ::android::hardware::hidl_array;
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@
constexpr uint32_t kTestRadioWorkFrequency = 2412;
constexpr uint32_t kTestRadioWorkTimeout = 8;
constexpr uint32_t kTestRadioWorkId = 16;
-constexpr int8_t kTestCountryCode[] = {'U', 'S'};
+int8_t kTestCountryCode[] = {'U', 'S'};
constexpr uint8_t kTestWpsDeviceType[] = {[0 ... 7] = 0x01};
constexpr uint16_t kTestWpsConfigMethods = 0xffff;
} // namespace
@@ -454,6 +455,10 @@
* SetCountryCode.
*/
TEST_P(SupplicantStaIfaceHidlTest, SetCountryCode) {
+ std::array<char, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX> buffer;
+ property_get("ro.boot.wificountrycode", buffer.data(), "US");
+ kTestCountryCode[0] = buffer.data()[0];
+ kTestCountryCode[1] = buffer.data()[1];
sta_iface_->setCountryCode(
kTestCountryCode, [](const SupplicantStatus& status) {
EXPECT_EQ(SupplicantStatusCode::SUCCESS, status.code);