diff --git a/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.cpp b/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.cpp
index 4e82b0a..9f0c4c4 100644
--- a/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.cpp
+++ b/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 #include <android-base/file.h>
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
 
 #include "AtraceDevice.h"
 
@@ -39,15 +40,11 @@
         // gfx
         {
                 "gfx",
-                {"Graphics",
-                 {{"/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/mdss/enable", false},
-                  {"/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sde/enable", false},
-                  {"/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/mali_systrace/enable", false}}},
+                {"Graphics", {{"mdss", false}, {"sde", false}, {"mali_systrace", false}}},
         },
         {
                 "ion",
-                {"ION allocation",
-                 {{"/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/ion_alloc_buffer_start/enable", false}}},
+                {"ION allocation", {{"kmem/ion_alloc_buffer_start", false}}},
         },
 };
 
@@ -65,16 +62,31 @@
     return Void();
 }
 
+AtraceDevice::AtraceDevice() {
+    struct stat st;
+
+    tracefs_event_root_ = "/sys/kernel/tracing/events/";
+    if (stat(tracefs_event_root_.c_str(), &st) != 0) {
+        tracefs_event_root_ = "/sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/";
+        CHECK(stat(tracefs_event_root_.c_str(), &st) == 0) << "tracefs must be mounted at either"
+                                                              "/sys/kernel/tracing or "
+                                                              "/sys/kernel/debug/tracing";
+    }
+}
+
 Return<::android::hardware::atrace::V1_0::Status> AtraceDevice::enableCategories(
-    const hidl_vec<hidl_string>& categories) {
+        const hidl_vec<hidl_string>& categories) {
     if (!categories.size()) {
         return Status::ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
     }
+
     for (auto& c : categories) {
         if (kTracingMap.count(c)) {
             for (auto& p : kTracingMap.at(c).paths) {
-                if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile("1", p.first)) {
-                    LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to enable tracing on: " << p.first;
+                std::string tracefs_event_enable_path = android::base::StringPrintf(
+                        "%s%s/enable", tracefs_event_root_.c_str(), p.first.c_str());
+                if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile("1", tracefs_event_enable_path)) {
+                    LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to enable tracing on: " << tracefs_event_enable_path;
                     if (p.second) {
                         // disable before return
                         disableAllCategories();
@@ -91,10 +103,13 @@
 
 Return<::android::hardware::atrace::V1_0::Status> AtraceDevice::disableAllCategories() {
     auto ret = Status::SUCCESS;
+
     for (auto& c : kTracingMap) {
         for (auto& p : c.second.paths) {
-            if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile("0", p.first)) {
-                LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to disable tracing on: " << p.first;
+            std::string tracefs_event_enable_path = android::base::StringPrintf(
+                    "%s%s/enable", tracefs_event_root_.c_str(), p.first.c_str());
+            if (!android::base::WriteStringToFile("0", tracefs_event_enable_path)) {
+                LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to disable tracing on: " << tracefs_event_enable_path;
                 if (p.second) {
                     ret = Status::ERROR_TRACING_POINT;
                 }
diff --git a/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.h b/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.h
index e700f89..ab87c65 100644
--- a/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.h
+++ b/atrace/1.0/default/AtraceDevice.h
@@ -36,12 +36,16 @@
 using ::android::hardware::Void;
 
 struct AtraceDevice : public IAtraceDevice {
+    AtraceDevice();
     // Methods from ::android::hardware::atrace::V1_0::IAtraceDevice follow.
     Return<void> listCategories(listCategories_cb _hidl_cb) override;
     Return<::android::hardware::atrace::V1_0::Status> enableCategories(
         const hidl_vec<hidl_string>& categories) override;
     Return<::android::hardware::atrace::V1_0::Status> disableAllCategories() override;
 
+  private:
+    std::string tracefs_event_root_;
+
     // Methods from ::android::hidl::base::V1_0::IBase follow.
 };
 
diff --git a/atrace/1.0/default/android.hardware.atrace@1.0-service.rc b/atrace/1.0/default/android.hardware.atrace@1.0-service.rc
index eb54c39..7110b45 100644
--- a/atrace/1.0/default/android.hardware.atrace@1.0-service.rc
+++ b/atrace/1.0/default/android.hardware.atrace@1.0-service.rc
@@ -1,10 +1,14 @@
 on late-init
     # vendor graphics trace points
     chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/sde/enable
+    chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sde/enable
     chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/mdss/enable
+    chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/tracing/events/mdss/enable
     chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/mali_systrace/enable
+    chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/tracing/events/mali_systrace/enable
     # ion allocation trace point
     chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/events/kmem/ion_alloc_buffer_start/enable
+    chmod 0666 /sys/kernel/tracing/events/kmem/ion_alloc_buffer_start/enable
 
 service vendor.atrace-hal-1-0 /vendor/bin/hw/android.hardware.atrace@1.0-service
     interface android.hardware.atrace@1.0::IAtraceDevice default
diff --git a/audio/7.0/config/api/current.txt b/audio/7.0/config/api/current.txt
index b5b3925..c2585bd 100644
--- a/audio/7.0/config/api/current.txt
+++ b/audio/7.0/config/api/current.txt
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_FM_TUNER;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI_ARC;
+    enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI_EARC;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_IP;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_LINE;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_LOOPBACK;
@@ -140,6 +141,7 @@
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_FM;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI_ARC;
+    enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI_EARC;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HEARING_AID;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_IP;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioDevice AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_LINE;
@@ -208,9 +210,11 @@
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_CELT;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DEFAULT;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DOLBY_TRUEHD;
+    enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DRA;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DSD;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DTS;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DTS_HD;
+    enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_DTS_UHD;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_EVRC;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_EVRCB;
     enum_constant public static final android.audio.policy.configuration.V7_0.AudioFormat AUDIO_FORMAT_EVRCNW;
diff --git a/audio/7.0/config/audio_policy_configuration.xsd b/audio/7.0/config/audio_policy_configuration.xsd
index 4f5614b..e0df359 100644
--- a/audio/7.0/config/audio_policy_configuration.xsd
+++ b/audio/7.0/config/audio_policy_configuration.xsd
@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_BLUETOOTH_A2DP_HEADPHONES"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_BLUETOOTH_A2DP_SPEAKER"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI"/>
+            <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI_EARC"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_AUX_DIGITAL"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_ANLG_DOCK_HEADSET"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_DGTL_DOCK_HEADSET"/>
@@ -303,6 +304,7 @@
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_USB_HEADSET"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BLUETOOTH_BLE"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI_ARC"/>
+            <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI_EARC"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_ECHO_REFERENCE"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BLE_HEADSET"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_DEFAULT"/>
@@ -411,6 +413,8 @@
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_FORMAT_MPEGH_LC_L3"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_FORMAT_MPEGH_LC_L4"/>
             <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_FORMAT_IEC60958"/>
+            <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_FORMAT_DTS_UHD"/>
+            <xs:enumeration value="AUDIO_FORMAT_DRA"/>
         </xs:restriction>
     </xs:simpleType>
     <xs:simpleType name="extendableAudioFormat">
diff --git a/audio/7.0/config/update_audio_policy_config.sh b/audio/7.0/config/update_audio_policy_config.sh
index 159fa35..c475dd1 100755
--- a/audio/7.0/config/update_audio_policy_config.sh
+++ b/audio/7.0/config/update_audio_policy_config.sh
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@
 
 set -euo pipefail
 
-if (echo "$@" | grep -qe -h); then
+if (echo "$@" | grep -qe "^-h"); then
     echo "This script will update Audio Policy Manager config file"
     echo "to the format required by V7.0 XSD schema from a previous"
     echo "version."
diff --git a/audio/common/7.0/enums/include/android_audio_policy_configuration_V7_0-enums.h b/audio/common/7.0/enums/include/android_audio_policy_configuration_V7_0-enums.h
index fe3e4ea..a92a277 100644
--- a/audio/common/7.0/enums/include/android_audio_policy_configuration_V7_0-enums.h
+++ b/audio/common/7.0/enums/include/android_audio_policy_configuration_V7_0-enums.h
@@ -157,6 +157,7 @@
         case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_TELEPHONY_TX:
         case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_LINE:
         case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI_ARC:
+        case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_HDMI_EARC:
         case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_SPDIF:
         case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_FM:
         case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_OUT_AUX_LINE:
@@ -199,6 +200,7 @@
         case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_USB_HEADSET:
         case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BLUETOOTH_BLE:
         case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI_ARC:
+        case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_HDMI_EARC:
         case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_ECHO_REFERENCE:
         case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_BLE_HEADSET:
         case AudioDevice::AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_DEFAULT:
diff --git a/audio/common/all-versions/default/service/service.cpp b/audio/common/all-versions/default/service/service.cpp
index bbc14ad..898c22d 100644
--- a/audio/common/all-versions/default/service/service.cpp
+++ b/audio/common/all-versions/default/service/service.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 #define LOG_TAG "audiohalservice"
 
+#include <signal.h>
 #include <string>
 #include <vector>
 
@@ -45,6 +46,8 @@
 }
 
 int main(int /* argc */, char* /* argv */ []) {
+    signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
     ::android::ProcessState::initWithDriver("/dev/vndbinder");
     // start a threadpool for vndbinder interactions
     ::android::ProcessState::self()->startThreadPool();
diff --git a/audio/core/all-versions/default/Android.bp b/audio/core/all-versions/default/Android.bp
index f61964e..615655d 100644
--- a/audio/core/all-versions/default/Android.bp
+++ b/audio/core/all-versions/default/Android.bp
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
         "android.hardware.audio-impl_headers",
         "android.hardware.audio.common.util@all-versions",
         "libaudioclient_headers",
+        "libaudioutils_headers",
         "libaudio_system_headers",
         "libhardware_headers",
         "libmedia_headers",
diff --git a/audio/core/all-versions/default/StreamOut.cpp b/audio/core/all-versions/default/StreamOut.cpp
index a089f6b..4fe6601 100644
--- a/audio/core/all-versions/default/StreamOut.cpp
+++ b/audio/core/all-versions/default/StreamOut.cpp
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 
 #include <HidlUtils.h>
 #include <android/log.h>
+#include <audio_utils/Metadata.h>
 #include <hardware/audio.h>
 #include <util/CoreUtils.h>
 #include <utils/Trace.h>
@@ -742,7 +743,11 @@
     switch (event) {
         case STREAM_EVENT_CBK_TYPE_CODEC_FORMAT_CHANGED: {
             hidl_vec<uint8_t> audioMetadata;
-            audioMetadata.setToExternal((uint8_t*)param, strlen((char*)param));
+            // void* param is the byte string buffer from byte_string_from_audio_metadata().
+            // As the byte string buffer may have embedded zeroes, we cannot use strlen()
+            // but instead use audio_utils::metadata::dataByteStringLen().
+            audioMetadata.setToExternal((uint8_t*)param, audio_utils::metadata::dataByteStringLen(
+                                                                 (const uint8_t*)param));
             result = eventCallback->onCodecFormatChanged(audioMetadata);
         } break;
         default:
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/Android.bp b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/Android.bp
index f24b1f5..c13efde 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/Android.bp
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/Android.bp
@@ -91,13 +91,13 @@
         "impl/vhal_v2_0/LinearFakeValueGenerator.cpp",
         "impl/vhal_v2_0/JsonFakeValueGenerator.cpp",
         "impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.cpp",
+        "impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.cpp",
     ],
     local_include_dirs: ["common/include/vhal_v2_0"],
     export_include_dirs: ["impl"],
     whole_static_libs: [
         "android.hardware.automotive.vehicle@2.0-emulated-user-hal-lib",
         "android.hardware.automotive.vehicle@2.0-manager-lib",
-        "libqemu_pipe",
     ],
     shared_libs: [
         "libbase",
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.cpp b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.cpp
index 548285a..9be9ea7 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.cpp
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.cpp
@@ -31,6 +31,14 @@
 GeneratorHub::GeneratorHub(const OnHalEvent& onHalEvent)
     : mOnHalEvent(onHalEvent), mThread(&GeneratorHub::run, this) {}
 
+GeneratorHub::~GeneratorHub() {
+    mShuttingDownFlag.store(true);
+    mCond.notify_all();
+    if (mThread.joinable()) {
+        mThread.join();
+    }
+}
+
 void GeneratorHub::registerGenerator(int32_t cookie, FakeValueGeneratorPtr generator) {
     {
         std::lock_guard<std::mutex> g(mLock);
@@ -58,15 +66,18 @@
 }
 
 void GeneratorHub::run() {
-    while (true) {
+    while (!mShuttingDownFlag.load()) {
         std::unique_lock<std::mutex> g(mLock);
         // Pop events whose generator does not exist (may be already unregistered)
         while (!mEventQueue.empty()
                && mGenerators.find(mEventQueue.top().cookie) == mGenerators.end()) {
              mEventQueue.pop();
         }
-        // Wait until event queue is not empty
-        mCond.wait(g, [this] { return !mEventQueue.empty(); });
+        // Wait until event queue is not empty or shutting down flag is set
+        mCond.wait(g, [this] { return !mEventQueue.empty() || mShuttingDownFlag.load(); });
+        if (mShuttingDownFlag.load()) {
+            break;
+        }
 
         const VhalEvent& curEvent = mEventQueue.top();
 
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.h b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.h
index dcf6a4f..b25dbf1 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.h
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/GeneratorHub.h
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
 
 public:
     GeneratorHub(const OnHalEvent& onHalEvent);
-    ~GeneratorHub() = default;
+    ~GeneratorHub();
 
     /**
      * Register a new generator. The generator will be discarded if it could not produce next event.
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
     mutable std::mutex mLock;
     std::condition_variable mCond;
     std::thread mThread;
+    std::atomic<bool> mShuttingDownFlag{false};
 };
 
 }  // namespace impl
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/PipeComm.cpp b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/PipeComm.cpp
index f024287..81e7c78 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/PipeComm.cpp
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/PipeComm.cpp
@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@
 
 #include <android/hardware/automotive/vehicle/2.0/IVehicle.h>
 #include <log/log.h>
-#include <qemu_pipe.h>
 
 #include "PipeComm.h"
+#include "qemu_pipe.h"
 
 #define CAR_SERVICE_NAME "pipe:qemud:car"
 
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.cpp b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf1a002
--- /dev/null
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "qemu_pipe.h"
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <android-base/file.h>
+
+using android::base::ReadFully;
+using android::base::WriteFully;
+
+// Define QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG if you want to print error messages when an error
+// occurs during pipe operations. The macro should simply take a printf-style
+// formatting string followed by optional arguments.
+#ifndef QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG
+#define QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG(...) (void)0
+#endif
+
+int qemu_pipe_open(const char* pipeName) {
+    if (!pipeName) {
+        errno = EINVAL;
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    int fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open("/dev/qemu_pipe", O_RDWR));
+    if (fd < 0) {
+        QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("%s: Could not open /dev/qemu_pipe: %s", __FUNCTION__, strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    // Write the pipe name, *including* the trailing zero which is necessary.
+    size_t pipeNameLen = strlen(pipeName);
+    if (WriteFully(fd, pipeName, pipeNameLen + 1U)) {
+        return fd;
+    }
+
+    // now, add 'pipe:' prefix and try again
+    // Note: host side will wait for the trailing '\0' to start
+    // service lookup.
+    const char pipe_prefix[] = "pipe:";
+    if (WriteFully(fd, pipe_prefix, strlen(pipe_prefix)) &&
+        WriteFully(fd, pipeName, pipeNameLen + 1U)) {
+        return fd;
+    }
+    QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("%s: Could not write to %s pipe service: %s", __FUNCTION__, pipeName,
+                    strerror(errno));
+    close(fd);
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int qemu_pipe_frame_send(int fd, const void* buff, size_t len) {
+    char header[5];
+    snprintf(header, sizeof(header), "%04zx", len);
+    if (!WriteFully(fd, header, 4)) {
+        QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("Can't write qemud frame header: %s", strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (!WriteFully(fd, buff, len)) {
+        QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("Can't write qemud frame payload: %s", strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int qemu_pipe_frame_recv(int fd, void* buff, size_t len) {
+    char header[5];
+    if (!ReadFully(fd, header, 4)) {
+        QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("Can't read qemud frame header: %s", strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+    header[4] = '\0';
+    size_t size;
+    if (sscanf(header, "%04zx", &size) != 1) {
+        QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("Malformed qemud frame header: [%.*s]", 4, header);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (size > len) {
+        QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("Oversized qemud frame (% bytes, expected <= %)", size, len);
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (!ReadFully(fd, buff, size)) {
+        QEMU_PIPE_DEBUG("Could not read qemud frame payload: %s", strerror(errno));
+        return -1;
+    }
+    return size;
+}
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.h b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0987498
--- /dev/null
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/default/impl/vhal_v2_0/qemu_pipe.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+#ifndef ANDROID_CORE_INCLUDE_QEMU_PIPE_H
+#define ANDROID_CORE_INCLUDE_QEMU_PIPE_H
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+// Try to open a new Qemu fast-pipe. This function returns a file descriptor
+// that can be used to communicate with a named service managed by the
+// emulator.
+//
+// This file descriptor can be used as a standard pipe/socket descriptor.
+//
+// 'pipeName' is the name of the emulator service you want to connect to,
+// and should begin with 'pipe:' (e.g. 'pipe:camera' or 'pipe:opengles').
+// For backward compatibility, the 'pipe:' prefix can be omitted, and in
+// that case, qemu_pipe_open will add it for you.
+
+// On success, return a valid file descriptor, or -1/errno on failure. E.g.:
+//
+// EINVAL  -> unknown/unsupported pipeName
+// ENOSYS  -> fast pipes not available in this system.
+//
+// ENOSYS should never happen, except if you're trying to run within a
+// misconfigured emulator.
+//
+// You should be able to open several pipes to the same pipe service,
+// except for a few special cases (e.g. GSM modem), where EBUSY will be
+// returned if more than one client tries to connect to it.
+int qemu_pipe_open(const char* pipeName);
+
+// Send a framed message |buff| of |len| bytes through the |fd| descriptor.
+// This really adds a 4-hexchar prefix describing the payload size.
+// Returns 0 on success, and -1 on error.
+int qemu_pipe_frame_send(int fd, const void* buff, size_t len);
+
+// Read a frame message from |fd|, and store it into |buff| of |len| bytes.
+// If the framed message is larger than |len|, then this returns -1 and the
+// content is lost. Otherwise, this returns the size of the message. NOTE:
+// empty messages are possible in a framed wire protocol and do not mean
+// end-of-stream.
+int qemu_pipe_frame_recv(int fd, void* buff, size_t len);
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* ANDROID_CORE_INCLUDE_QEMU_PIPE_H */
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 4806fef..768142c 100644
--- a/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
         "android.hardware.bluetooth@1.0",
         "libbluetooth-types",
     ],
+    test_config: "VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml",
     test_suites: [
         "general-tests",
         "vts",
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..09463c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bluetooth/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<!-- Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+
+     Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+     you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+     You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+          http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+     Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+     distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+     WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+     See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+     limitations under the License.
+-->
+<configuration description="Runs VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest.">
+    <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct" />
+    <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct-native" />
+
+    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RootTargetPreparer">
+    </target_preparer>
+    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.StopServicesSetup">
+    </target_preparer>
+
+    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.DeviceSetup">
+        <option name="bluetooth" value="off" />
+    </target_preparer>
+
+    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.PushFilePreparer">
+        <option name="cleanup" value="true" />
+        <option name="push" value="VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest->/data/local/tmp/VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest" />
+    </target_preparer>
+
+    <test class="com.android.tradefed.testtype.GTest" >
+        <option name="native-test-device-path" value="/data/local/tmp" />
+        <option name="module-name" value="VtsHalBluetoothV1_0TargetTest" />
+    </test>
+</configuration>
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/Android.bp b/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
index e64d5a9..7f56647 100644
--- a/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -32,5 +32,6 @@
         "android.hardware.bluetooth@1.0",
         "libbluetooth-types",
     ],
+    test_config: "VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.xml",
     test_suites: ["general-tests", "vts"],
 }
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.xml b/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d64751a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bluetooth/1.1/vts/functional/VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
+<!-- Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+
+     Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+     you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+     You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+          http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+     Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+     distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+     WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+     See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+     limitations under the License.
+-->
+<configuration description="Runs VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest.">
+    <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct" />
+    <option name="test-suite-tag" value="apct-native" />
+
+    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.RootTargetPreparer">
+    </target_preparer>
+
+    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.DeviceSetup">
+        <option name="bluetooth" value="off" />
+    </target_preparer>
+
+    <target_preparer class="com.android.tradefed.targetprep.PushFilePreparer">
+        <option name="cleanup" value="true" />
+        <option name="push" value="VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest->/data/local/tmp/VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest" />
+    </target_preparer>
+
+    <test class="com.android.tradefed.testtype.GTest" >
+        <option name="native-test-device-path" value="/data/local/tmp" />
+        <option name="module-name" value="VtsHalBluetoothV1_1TargetTest" />
+    </test>
+</configuration>
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/Android.bp b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/Android.bp
index 5c30f79..3000223 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/Android.bp
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/Android.bp
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
         "A2dpSoftwareAudioProvider.cpp",
         "HearingAidAudioProvider.cpp",
         "LeAudioAudioProvider.cpp",
+        "LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.cpp",
     ],
     header_libs: ["libhardware_headers"],
     shared_libs: [
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.cpp b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.cpp
index e1b1ac6..b0d171a 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.cpp
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.cpp
@@ -41,8 +41,12 @@
     BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory::hearing_aid_provider_instance_;
 LeAudioOutputAudioProvider
     BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory::leaudio_output_provider_instance_;
+LeAudioOffloadOutputAudioProvider
+    BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory::leaudio_offload_output_provider_instance_;
 LeAudioInputAudioProvider
     BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory::leaudio_input_provider_instance_;
+LeAudioOffloadInputAudioProvider
+    BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory::leaudio_offload_input_provider_instance_;
 
 Return<void> BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory::openProvider(
     const V2_0::SessionType sessionType, openProvider_cb _hidl_cb) {
@@ -90,9 +94,15 @@
     case SessionType::LE_AUDIO_SOFTWARE_ENCODING_DATAPATH:
       provider = &leaudio_output_provider_instance_;
       break;
+    case SessionType::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_ENCODING_DATAPATH:
+      provider = &leaudio_offload_output_provider_instance_;
+      break;
     case SessionType::LE_AUDIO_SOFTWARE_DECODED_DATAPATH:
       provider = &leaudio_input_provider_instance_;
       break;
+    case SessionType::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_DECODING_DATAPATH:
+      provider = &leaudio_offload_input_provider_instance_;
+      break;
     default:
       status = BluetoothAudioStatus::FAILURE;
   }
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.h b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.h
index fd83694..f8f557e 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.h
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/BluetoothAudioProvidersFactory.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include "BluetoothAudioProvider.h"
 #include "HearingAidAudioProvider.h"
 #include "LeAudioAudioProvider.h"
+#include "LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.h"
 
 namespace android {
 namespace hardware {
@@ -55,6 +56,8 @@
   static HearingAidAudioProvider hearing_aid_provider_instance_;
   static LeAudioOutputAudioProvider leaudio_output_provider_instance_;
   static LeAudioInputAudioProvider leaudio_input_provider_instance_;
+  static LeAudioOffloadOutputAudioProvider leaudio_offload_output_provider_instance_;
+  static LeAudioOffloadInputAudioProvider leaudio_offload_input_provider_instance_;
 };
 
 extern "C" IBluetoothAudioProvidersFactory*
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.cpp b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c11bdad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "BTAudioProviderLeAudioOffload"
+
+#include "LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.h"
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+
+#include "BluetoothAudioSessionReport_2_1.h"
+#include "BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.h"
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace bluetooth {
+namespace audio {
+namespace V2_1 {
+namespace implementation {
+
+using ::android::bluetooth::audio::BluetoothAudioSessionReport_2_1;
+using ::android::hardware::Void;
+using ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_0::BitsPerSample;
+using ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_0::ChannelMode;
+using ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::SampleRate;
+
+using DataMQ = MessageQueue<uint8_t, kSynchronizedReadWrite>;
+
+LeAudioOffloadOutputAudioProvider::LeAudioOffloadOutputAudioProvider()
+    : LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider() {
+  session_type_ = SessionType::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_ENCODING_DATAPATH;
+}
+
+LeAudioOffloadInputAudioProvider::LeAudioOffloadInputAudioProvider()
+    : LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider() {
+  session_type_ = SessionType::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_DECODING_DATAPATH;
+}
+
+LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider::LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider()
+    : BluetoothAudioProvider() {}
+
+bool LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider::isValid(const V2_0::SessionType& sessionType) {
+  LOG(ERROR) << __func__ << ", invalid session type for Offloaded Le Audio provider: "
+             << toString(sessionType);
+
+  return false;
+}
+
+bool LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider::isValid(const SessionType& sessionType) {
+  return (sessionType == session_type_);
+}
+
+Return<void> LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider::startSession_2_1(
+    const sp<V2_0::IBluetoothAudioPort>& hostIf,
+    const AudioConfiguration& audioConfig, startSession_cb _hidl_cb) {
+  /**
+   * Initialize the audio platform if audioConfiguration is supported.
+   * Save the IBluetoothAudioPort interface, so that it can be used
+   * later to send stream control commands to the HAL client, based on
+   * interaction with Audio framework.
+   */
+  if (audioConfig.getDiscriminator() !=
+      AudioConfiguration::hidl_discriminator::leAudioCodecConfig) {
+    LOG(WARNING) << __func__
+                 << " - Invalid Audio Configuration=" << toString(audioConfig);
+    _hidl_cb(BluetoothAudioStatus::UNSUPPORTED_CODEC_CONFIGURATION,
+             DataMQ::Descriptor());
+    return Void();
+  }
+
+  if (!android::bluetooth::audio::IsOffloadLeAudioConfigurationValid(session_type_,
+                 audioConfig.leAudioCodecConfig())) {
+    LOG(WARNING) << __func__ << " - Unsupported LC3 Offloaded Configuration="
+                 << toString(audioConfig.leAudioCodecConfig());
+    _hidl_cb(BluetoothAudioStatus::UNSUPPORTED_CODEC_CONFIGURATION,
+             DataMQ::Descriptor());
+    return Void();
+  }
+
+  return BluetoothAudioProvider::startSession_2_1(hostIf, audioConfig,
+                                                  _hidl_cb);
+}
+
+Return<void> LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider::onSessionReady(startSession_cb _hidl_cb) {
+  BluetoothAudioSessionReport_2_1::OnSessionStarted(session_type_, stack_iface_,
+                                                    nullptr, audio_config_);
+  _hidl_cb(BluetoothAudioStatus::SUCCESS, DataMQ::Descriptor());
+  return Void();
+}
+
+}  // namespace implementation
+}  // namespace V2_1
+}  // namespace audio
+}  // namespace bluetooth
+}  // namespace hardware
+}  // namespace android
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.h b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..564e9a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/2.1/default/LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#pragma once
+
+#include <android/hardware/bluetooth/audio/2.1/types.h>
+
+#include "BluetoothAudioProvider.h"
+
+namespace android {
+namespace hardware {
+namespace bluetooth {
+namespace audio {
+namespace V2_1 {
+namespace implementation {
+
+class LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider : public BluetoothAudioProvider {
+ public:
+  LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider();
+
+  bool isValid(const SessionType& sessionType) override;
+  bool isValid(const V2_0::SessionType& sessionType) override;
+
+  Return<void> startSession_2_1(const sp<V2_0::IBluetoothAudioPort>& hostIf,
+                                const AudioConfiguration& audioConfig,
+                                startSession_cb _hidl_cb) override;
+
+ private:
+  Return<void> onSessionReady(startSession_cb _hidl_cb) override;
+};
+
+class LeAudioOffloadOutputAudioProvider : public LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider {
+ public:
+  LeAudioOffloadOutputAudioProvider();
+};
+
+class LeAudioOffloadInputAudioProvider : public LeAudioOffloadAudioProvider {
+ public:
+  LeAudioOffloadInputAudioProvider();
+};
+
+}  // namespace implementation
+}  // namespace V2_1
+}  // namespace audio
+}  // namespace bluetooth
+}  // namespace hardware
+}  // namespace android
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSessionControl_2_1.h b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSessionControl_2_1.h
index 4d7be21..95f7408 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSessionControl_2_1.h
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSessionControl_2_1.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
     std::shared_ptr<BluetoothAudioSession_2_1> session_ptr =
         BluetoothAudioSessionInstance_2_1::GetSessionInstance(session_type);
     if (session_ptr != nullptr) {
-      return session_ptr->GetAudioSession()->IsSessionReady();
+      return session_ptr->IsSessionReady();
     }
     return false;
   }
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.cpp b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.cpp
index 9d91196..c250ef1 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.cpp
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.cpp
@@ -60,6 +60,16 @@
   }
 }
 
+bool BluetoothAudioSession_2_1::IsSessionReady() {
+  if (session_type_2_1_ !=
+      SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_ENCODING_DATAPATH) {
+    return audio_session->IsSessionReady();
+  }
+
+  std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> guard(audio_session->mutex_);
+  return audio_session->stack_iface_ != nullptr;
+}
+
 std::shared_ptr<BluetoothAudioSession>
 BluetoothAudioSession_2_1::GetAudioSession() {
   return audio_session;
@@ -70,7 +80,7 @@
 const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::AudioConfiguration
 BluetoothAudioSession_2_1::GetAudioConfig() {
   std::lock_guard<std::recursive_mutex> guard(audio_session->mutex_);
-  if (audio_session->IsSessionReady()) {
+  if (IsSessionReady()) {
     // If session is unknown it means it should be 2.0 type
     if (session_type_2_1_ != SessionType_2_1::UNKNOWN)
       return audio_config_2_1_;
@@ -110,20 +120,29 @@
            SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_SOFTWARE_ENCODING_DATAPATH ||
        session_type_2_1_ ==
            SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_SOFTWARE_DECODED_DATAPATH);
-  bool is_offload_session =
+  bool is_offload_a2dp_session =
       (session_type_2_1_ == SessionType_2_1::A2DP_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_DATAPATH);
+  bool is_offload_le_audio_session =
+      (session_type_2_1_ == SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_ENCODING_DATAPATH ||
+       session_type_2_1_ == SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_DECODING_DATAPATH);
   auto audio_config_discriminator = audio_config.getDiscriminator();
   bool is_software_audio_config =
       (is_software_session &&
        audio_config_discriminator ==
            ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::AudioConfiguration::
                hidl_discriminator::pcmConfig);
-  bool is_offload_audio_config =
-      (is_offload_session &&
+  bool is_a2dp_offload_audio_config =
+      (is_offload_a2dp_session &&
        audio_config_discriminator ==
            ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::AudioConfiguration::
                hidl_discriminator::codecConfig);
-  if (!is_software_audio_config && !is_offload_audio_config) {
+  bool is_le_audio_offload_audio_config =
+      (is_offload_le_audio_session &&
+       audio_config_discriminator ==
+           ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::AudioConfiguration::
+               hidl_discriminator::leAudioCodecConfig);
+  if (!is_software_audio_config && !is_a2dp_offload_audio_config &&
+      !is_le_audio_offload_audio_config) {
     return false;
   }
   audio_config_2_1_ = audio_config;
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.h b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.h
index 5a35153..db82c73 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.h
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSession_2_1.h
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
       const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::SessionType&
           session_type);
 
+  // The function helps to check if this session is ready or not
+  // @return: true if the Bluetooth stack has started the specified session
+  bool IsSessionReady();
+
   std::shared_ptr<BluetoothAudioSession> GetAudioSession();
 
   // The report function is used to report that the Bluetooth stack has started
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.cpp b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.cpp
index 8b0b0f7..c90ce6d 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.cpp
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.cpp
@@ -122,6 +122,21 @@
   return false;
 }
 
+bool IsOffloadLeAudioConfigurationValid(
+    const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::SessionType&
+        session_type,
+    const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::Lc3CodecConfiguration&) {
+
+  if (session_type != SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_ENCODING_DATAPATH &&
+      session_type != SessionType_2_1::LE_AUDIO_HARDWARE_OFFLOAD_DECODING_DATAPATH) {
+    return false;
+  }
+
+  //TODO: perform checks on le_audio_codec_config once we know supported parameters
+
+  return true;
+}
+
 }  // namespace audio
 }  // namespace bluetooth
 }  // namespace android
diff --git a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.h b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.h
index 746d9c0..a52636c 100644
--- a/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.h
+++ b/bluetooth/audio/utils/session/BluetoothAudioSupportedCodecsDB_2_1.h
@@ -41,6 +41,11 @@
     const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_0::CodecConfiguration&
         codec_config);
 
+bool IsOffloadLeAudioConfigurationValid(
+    const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::SessionType&
+        session_type,
+    const ::android::hardware::bluetooth::audio::V2_1::Lc3CodecConfiguration&
+        le_audio_codec_config);
 }  // namespace audio
 }  // namespace bluetooth
 }  // namespace android
diff --git a/broadcastradio/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBroadcastradioV2_0TargetTest.cpp b/broadcastradio/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBroadcastradioV2_0TargetTest.cpp
index 362ab41..615fde0 100644
--- a/broadcastradio/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBroadcastradioV2_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/broadcastradio/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalBroadcastradioV2_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -496,10 +496,26 @@
  *  - program changes exactly to what was requested.
  */
 TEST_P(BroadcastRadioHalTest, DabTune) {
+    Result halResult;
+    hidl_vec<DabTableEntry> config;
+    auto cb = [&](Result result, hidl_vec<DabTableEntry> configCb) {
+        halResult = result;
+        config = configCb;
+    };
+    auto hidlResult = mModule->getDabRegionConfig(cb);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(hidlResult.isOk());
+
+    if (halResult == Result::NOT_SUPPORTED) {
+        printSkipped("DAB not supported");
+        return;
+    }
+    ASSERT_EQ(Result::OK, halResult);
+    ASSERT_NE(config.size(), 0U);
+
     ASSERT_TRUE(openSession());
 
     ProgramSelector sel = {};
-    uint64_t freq = 178352;
+    uint64_t freq = config[config.size() / 2].frequency;
     sel.primaryId = make_identifier(IdentifierType::DAB_FREQUENCY,freq);
 
     std::this_thread::sleep_for(gTuneWorkaround);
diff --git a/camera/common/1.0/default/CameraModule.cpp b/camera/common/1.0/default/CameraModule.cpp
index 27e74f1..16fb85c 100644
--- a/camera/common/1.0/default/CameraModule.cpp
+++ b/camera/common/1.0/default/CameraModule.cpp
@@ -549,7 +549,6 @@
                 }
             }
         }
-        free_camera_metadata(metadata);
     }
 
     mCameraInfoMap.removeItem(cameraId);
diff --git a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/GrantorDescriptor.aidl b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/GrantorDescriptor.aidl
index 0327796..cf7048b 100644
--- a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/GrantorDescriptor.aidl
+++ b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/GrantorDescriptor.aidl
@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
 // THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
diff --git a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/MQDescriptor.aidl b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/MQDescriptor.aidl
index 56f1de3..add4b64 100644
--- a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/MQDescriptor.aidl
+++ b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/MQDescriptor.aidl
@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
 // THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
@@ -18,7 +33,7 @@
 
 package android.hardware.common.fmq;
 @VintfStability
-parcelable MQDescriptor {
+parcelable MQDescriptor<T, Flavor> {
   android.hardware.common.fmq.GrantorDescriptor[] grantors;
   android.hardware.common.NativeHandle handle;
   int quantum;
diff --git a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/SynchronizedReadWrite.aidl b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/SynchronizedReadWrite.aidl
index 264171d..12c61ba 100644
--- a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/SynchronizedReadWrite.aidl
+++ b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/SynchronizedReadWrite.aidl
@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
 // THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
diff --git a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/UnsynchronizedWrite.aidl b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/UnsynchronizedWrite.aidl
index eaf2ffd..f99528d 100644
--- a/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/UnsynchronizedWrite.aidl
+++ b/common/fmq/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.common.fmq/current/android/hardware/common/fmq/UnsynchronizedWrite.aidl
@@ -1,3 +1,18 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
 // THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
 ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/Android.bp b/compatibility_matrices/Android.bp
index 314a809..da55347 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/Android.bp
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/Android.bp
@@ -61,6 +61,19 @@
 }
 
 vintf_compatibility_matrix {
+    name: "framework_compatibility_matrix.6.xml",
+    stem: "compatibility_matrix.6.xml",
+    srcs: [
+        "compatibility_matrix.6.xml",
+    ],
+    kernel_configs: [
+        "kernel_config_s_4.19",
+        "kernel_config_s_5.4",
+        "kernel_config_s_5.10",
+    ],
+}
+
+vintf_compatibility_matrix {
     name: "framework_compatibility_matrix.current.xml",
     stem: "compatibility_matrix.current.xml",
     srcs: [
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/Android.mk b/compatibility_matrices/Android.mk
index 85c8ca0..9e715bf 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/Android.mk
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/Android.mk
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@
     framework_compatibility_matrix.3.xml \
     framework_compatibility_matrix.4.xml \
     framework_compatibility_matrix.5.xml \
+    framework_compatibility_matrix.6.xml \
     framework_compatibility_matrix.current.xml \
     framework_compatibility_matrix.device.xml \
 
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/build/vintf_compatibility_matrix.go b/compatibility_matrices/build/vintf_compatibility_matrix.go
index f1bd0ae..c72cbde 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/build/vintf_compatibility_matrix.go
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/build/vintf_compatibility_matrix.go
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@
 		if k, ok := m.(*configs.KernelConfigRule); ok {
 			inputPaths = append(inputPaths, k.OutputPath())
 		} else {
-			ctx.PropertyErrorf("kernel_config",
+			ctx.PropertyErrorf("kernel_configs",
 				"module %q is not a kernel_config", ctx.OtherModuleName(m))
 		}
 	})
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
index 608890b..a75ed25 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
         <version>3.0</version>
         <version>4.0</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
index e5e012c..3b8ee21 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
         <version>3.0</version>
         <version>4.0</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
index 8e175f0..0fb21a7 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
         <version>3.0</version>
         <version>4.0-1</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.6.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.6.xml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..039ea84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.6.xml
@@ -0,0 +1,622 @@
+<compatibility-matrix version="1.0" type="framework" level="6">
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.atrace</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IAtraceDevice</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+        <name>android.hardware.audio</name>
+        <version>6.0</version>
+        <version>7.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IDevicesFactory</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+        <name>android.hardware.audio.effect</name>
+        <version>6.0</version>
+        <version>7.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IEffectsFactory</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+         <name>android.hardware.authsecret</name>
+         <version>1</version>
+         <interface>
+             <name>IAuthSecret</name>
+             <instance>default</instance>
+         </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.authsecret</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IAuthSecret</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.automotive.audiocontrol</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <version>2.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IAudioControl</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.automotive.can</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ICanBus</name>
+            <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+        </interface>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ICanController</name>
+            <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.automotive.evs</name>
+        <version>1.0-1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IEvsEnumerator</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+            <regex-instance>[a-z]+/[0-9]+</regex-instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.automotive.occupant_awareness</name>
+        <version>1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IOccupantAwareness</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.automotive.sv</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ISurroundViewService</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.automotive.vehicle</name>
+        <version>2.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IVehicle</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.biometrics.face</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IBiometricsFace</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint</name>
+        <version>2.1-2</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IBiometricsFingerprint</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.bluetooth</name>
+        <version>1.0-1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IBluetoothHci</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.bluetooth.audio</name>
+        <version>2.0-1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IBluetoothAudioProvidersFactory</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.boot</name>
+        <version>1.2</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IBootControl</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.broadcastradio</name>
+        <version>1.0-1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IBroadcastRadioFactory</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.broadcastradio</name>
+        <version>2.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IBroadcastRadio</name>
+            <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.camera.provider</name>
+        <version>2.4-6</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ICameraProvider</name>
+            <regex-instance>[^/]+/[0-9]+</regex-instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.cas</name>
+        <version>1.1-2</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IMediaCasService</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.confirmationui</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IConfirmationUI</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.contexthub</name>
+        <version>1.0-1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IContexthub</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.drm</name>
+        <version>1.3</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ICryptoFactory</name>
+            <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+        </interface>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IDrmFactory</name>
+            <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.dumpstate</name>
+        <version>1.1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IDumpstateDevice</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+        <name>android.hardware.gatekeeper</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IGatekeeper</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.gnss</name>
+        <version>2.0-1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IGnss</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+        <name>android.hardware.graphics.allocator</name>
+        <!-- New, non-Go devices should use 4.0, tested in vts_treble_vintf_vendor_test -->
+        <version>2.0</version>
+        <version>3.0</version>
+        <version>4.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IAllocator</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+        <name>android.hardware.graphics.composer</name>
+        <version>2.1-4</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IComposer</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+        <name>android.hardware.graphics.mapper</name>
+        <!-- New, non-Go devices should use 4.0, tested in vts_treble_vintf_vendor_test -->
+        <version>2.1</version>
+        <version>3.0</version>
+        <version>4.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IMapper</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+        <name>android.hardware.health</name>
+        <version>2.1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IHealth</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.health.storage</name>
+        <version>1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IStorage</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.identity</name>
+        <version>1-3</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IIdentityCredentialStore</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.oemlock</name>
+        <version>1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IOemLock</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.ir</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IConsumerIr</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.input.classifier</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IInputClassifier</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
+        <version>3.0</version>
+        <version>4.0-1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IKeymasterDevice</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
+        <version>4.0-1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IKeymasterDevice</name>
+            <instance>strongbox</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.security.keymint</name>
+        <version>1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IKeyMintDevice</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+            <instance>strongbox</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.security.keymint</name>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IRemotelyProvisionedComponent</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.light</name>
+        <version>1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ILights</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.media.c2</name>
+        <version>1.0-1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IComponentStore</name>
+            <regex-instance>default[0-9]*</regex-instance>
+            <regex-instance>vendor[0-9]*_software</regex-instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.media.omx</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IOmx</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IOmxStore</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.memtrack</name>
+        <version>1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IMemtrack</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.neuralnetworks</name>
+        <version>1.0-3</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IDevice</name>
+            <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.neuralnetworks</name>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IDevice</name>
+            <regex-instance>.*</regex-instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.nfc</name>
+        <version>1.2</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>INfc</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.oemlock</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IOemLock</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="false">
+        <name>android.hardware.power</name>
+        <version>1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IPower</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.power.stats</name>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IPowerStats</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.radio</name>
+        <version>1.6</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IRadio</name>
+            <instance>slot1</instance>
+            <instance>slot2</instance>
+            <instance>slot3</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.radio</name>
+        <version>1.2</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ISap</name>
+            <instance>slot1</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.radio.config</name>
+        <!--
+        See compatibility_matrix.4.xml on versioning of radio config HAL.
+        -->
+        <version>1.1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IRadioConfig</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.radio.config</name>
+        <version>1.3</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IRadioConfig</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.renderscript</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IDevice</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.rebootescrow</name>
+        <version>1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IRebootEscrow</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.secure_element</name>
+        <version>1.0-2</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ISecureElement</name>
+            <regex-instance>eSE[1-9][0-9]*</regex-instance>
+            <regex-instance>SIM[1-9][0-9]*</regex-instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.security.secureclock</name>
+        <version>1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ISecureClock</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.security.sharedsecret</name>
+        <version>1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ISharedSecret</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.sensors</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <version>2.0-1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ISensors</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.soundtrigger</name>
+        <version>2.0-3</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ISoundTriggerHw</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.tetheroffload.config</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IOffloadConfig</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.tetheroffload.control</name>
+        <version>1.1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IOffloadControl</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.thermal</name>
+        <version>2.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IThermal</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.tv.cec</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IHdmiCec</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.tv.input</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ITvInput</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.tv.tuner</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ITuner</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.usb</name>
+        <version>1.0-2</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IUsb</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.usb.gadget</name>
+        <version>1.0-1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IUsbGadget</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.vibrator</name>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IVibrator</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.weaver</name>
+        <version>1.0</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IWeaver</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="aidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.weaver</name>
+        <version>1</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IWeaver</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.wifi</name>
+        <version>1.3-4</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IWifi</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.wifi.hostapd</name>
+        <version>1.0-2</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>IHostapd</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
+        <name>android.hardware.wifi.supplicant</name>
+        <version>1.2-3</version>
+        <interface>
+            <name>ISupplicant</name>
+            <instance>default</instance>
+        </interface>
+    </hal>
+</compatibility-matrix>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
index 30af25f..0b779ee 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-<compatibility-matrix version="1.0" type="framework" level="6">
+<compatibility-matrix version="1.0" type="framework" level="7">
     <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.atrace</name>
         <version>1.0</version>
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
         <version>3.0</version>
         <version>4.0-1</version>
diff --git a/current.txt b/current.txt
index 454d43e..88b067d 100644
--- a/current.txt
+++ b/current.txt
@@ -776,10 +776,12 @@
 dabe23dde7c9e3ad65c61def7392f186d7efe7f4216f9b6f9cf0863745b1a9f4 android.hardware.keymaster@4.1::IKeymasterDevice
 cd84ab19c590e0e73dd2307b591a3093ee18147ef95e6d5418644463a6620076 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.2::IDevice
 f729ee6a5f136b25d79ea6895d24700fce413df555baaecf2c39e4440d15d043 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.0::types
-a84f8dac7a9b75de1cc2936a9b429b9b62b32a31ea88ca52c29f98f5ddc0fa95 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.2::types
-cd331b92312d16ab89f475c39296abbf539efc4114a8c5c2b136ad99b904ef33 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.3::types
+38c1a3eb5c3dfa4cc40b7cf4be0e9850440e2c57197fba7407081679b358aa22 android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.2::types
+550619f876cadbea1f718edce120f0e1dd4a6f4bd4c28b59d479677dc86b0aec android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.3::types
 c3fec5bd470984402997f78a74b6511efc4063b270f2bd9ee7b78f48b683a1bb android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.3::IDevice
 0fdfad62c2ec33b52e6687004e5a1971c02d10b93ee4d26df5ccff7ce032494a android.hardware.neuralnetworks@1.3::IPreparedModel
+b40c13f9a9affc806c778c1f8c78e90d4acb50f1d6a6be185d933d7a04b91c5b android.hardware.sensors@1.0::ISensors
+432086950205f5876da85dbd42004b0d0d05b429b9494b4f76a4d888758c5bd8 android.hardware.sensors@1.0::types
 e8c86c69c438da8d1549856c1bb3e2d1b8da52722f8235ff49a30f2cce91742c android.hardware.soundtrigger@2.1::ISoundTriggerHwCallback
 b9fbb6e2e061ed0960939d48b785e9700210add1f13ed32ecd688d0f1ca20ef7 android.hardware.renderscript@1.0::types
 0f53d70e1eadf8d987766db4bf6ae2048004682168f4cab118da576787def3fa android.hardware.radio@1.0::types
@@ -793,5 +795,48 @@
 2b5afef68e3e2ff1dab63e4f2ee57337ef2635ec812f49080cadfce966d33b52 android.hardware.radio@1.2::IRadio
 
 # HALs released in Android S
-# NOTE: waiting to freeze HALs until later in the release
-# NOTE: new HALs are recommended to be in AIDL
+59fa68432e374c8d3b7ec098a91a1e023a2c728110bb733237c551afa5929725 android.hardware.audio@7.0::IDevice
+2207948ca127b801c94f667c99dfd139f150b50671e1408d3e855d03efbf631d android.hardware.audio@7.0::IDevicesFactory
+1d201e15c553cd44c62864ac8d7039351ddf048a7ee61e380f6efb0904442eb8 android.hardware.audio@7.0::IPrimaryDevice
+38afa920e6d36013b5a800e8c82eefeebd24602de24441e2f8ce5b3bdf62d3af android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStream
+77d84330418abba5a92b0cdc4e27fa7c85c27344eaf7eeef441b8e88829ee475 android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStreamIn
+9e4d79ed8f3c7e18455f371342ea1802f080bae38f64db746cc433305ee1978b android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStreamOut
+54cbc3c637fe8d4b889ccb5690e5e3069ca8efd9c6607ce1d021a3f47576c67e android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStreamOutCallback
+8036ae0a68a698a79207218018de5f41aed344723f644112ffc99e20e5e2e9ff android.hardware.audio@7.0::IStreamOutEventCallback
+84978dbd15d4fa8be6073d0974755f7718ee0cde519ce71449fb734f53cee46b android.hardware.audio@7.0::types
+6a03a9d8cc917da00e8b88f4abc42db2f741e2d50901e8ab6dea32084a238fbd android.hardware.audio.common@7.0::types
+842b4485a00005fb938f674b12445cb592cd1636f56c7cc447966119070811bd android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IAcousticEchoCancelerEffect
+b62a85e5d745dc35b5a60464c6b33a5bb7a2b8b95863a1374aee77ea29cf8f49 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IAutomaticGainControlEffect
+c8d5e30848191713db7cffccc482e4427816f33c98a24734c8769962f79f855b android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IBassBoostEffect
+7d021ecdf5bb6a61eb9ad193585d4986d1a64cb7fb4b52f219d7380145f2c6f1 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IDownmixEffect
+7fee1e7c7bb3d513a524c8963d1f8f7c2ad856f26c745b4ebc286b40d503264a android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEffect
+7596050ccc00234458dcb4e692056ed3c16f3618c11d7b17cb749cfd5713705d android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEffectBufferProviderCallback
+f2e41467bcf1140a11b219c2e8f77981b955c2941befe66e1cc685b7863ae4c9 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEffectsFactory
+af66fb4addbc477f9fea65fb63475203122a9189624ca8d14e757bc7826d60a4 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEnvironmentalReverbEffect
+2878d007ed55e1a4149ddcd29606962c948d8610642276f91dffd5ed32281824 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IEqualizerEffect
+0260ef9e2a3e077de366ebebc0c117c7ee13f46a1eabd4abd66cc6245d0bed98 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::ILoudnessEnhancerEffect
+3586bbc3a7cbe30f9aff0a522524eea9b78eea78280f09c35d43dbab48a1193e android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::INoiseSuppressionEffect
+a7d74d7e7e0b1e3b739f233b7776bf01e868856a536f5cdac0f307e9c2850e64 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IPresetReverbEffect
+b4cbc1f2d38787f2ad069a8e4d10c0896287531a2596f0de0283e390b0ecf05d android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IVirtualizerEffect
+2b5681e1ea6a2db0dc1e84edb96d3de2f7daf306046543e7956be76dcb8f20fb android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IVisualizerEffect
+fa1e2d78e66fd662de93cb479ffd55947fe54f51cb53915814b3d3e3036c86a5 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::types
+4baf8e0eca4aa896cc9ceb7bb676aaf4fa21372ef8b49eed68eced1221c3dc0d android.hardware.bluetooth.audio@2.1::IBluetoothAudioProvider
+d417a9212c8f96e3a06a2f221c8c5756c765355b2b81de2b2a65d4c9eee85401 android.hardware.bluetooth.audio@2.1::IBluetoothAudioProvidersFactory
+c17d9e27abd37ae5a8ff8da08fc5c9b13a264670feef6bbbc9d3ab1915216130 android.hardware.bluetooth.audio@2.1::types
+6763dd2273b1b47f3ac68af9b66870287eba33fb5b4d66e8fe1d30ae18ce24cb android.hardware.boot@1.2::IBootControl
+0c0657fad2239c2c7ec363d3b13f2e002d1c267ca89d2cc96d2b1de0475386cb android.hardware.fastboot@1.1::IFastboot
+3e8866987de4ecb48807c09d4c88ec38365930a22415f1b74edf8b14da17846b android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadio
+715789427a44cc78f9d123b0ceb9e035e4ac2b1049501337c23a512e85b87850 android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadioIndication
+2e9c08c4bc9539d8da28d7de33500f87148f7fa2e377238ee898b41752ac4f29 android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadioResponse
+6475887a9cd5cc8cb803e3a78956d84d7a5fde571407ede2396f3ea5e0c0d3ad android.hardware.radio@1.6::types
+f22813615be1445ddd817655c054fc69dc9efea56c9035cd0757f3cbed190641 android.hardware.radio.config@1.3::IRadioConfig
+c9ad18729268593d14681d88ffad1c97e707444a45e1b4ed804dab949edbd84f android.hardware.radio.config@1.3::IRadioConfigResponse
+78dcb9a6975e8b377cb90bbe952078162960941468c992dcd2e1830a477b8c03 android.hardware.radio.config@1.3::types
+fd43298c43f70130c747a642ee43b0c242ac0cebffb377faa24f2725f0aa6caf android.hardware.tetheroffload.control@1.1::IOffloadControl
+ead4ec8713a2cb40906fe31ba793d21a6b1190143c446690d16a6ea686aa2fea android.hardware.tetheroffload.control@1.1::ITetheringOffloadCallback
+e34b4c7bec5e032c14804707ca924dd6b99ed5ba139da7505fe7d698d0fe178f android.hardware.tetheroffload.control@1.1::types
+
+# ABI preserving changes to HALs during Android T
+62ace52d9c3ff1f60f94118557a2aaf0b953513e59dcd34d5f94ae28d4c7e780 android.hardware.fastboot@1.0::IFastboot
+
+# There should be no more HIDL HALs - please use AIDL instead.
diff --git a/drm/1.0/default/Android.bp b/drm/1.0/default/Android.bp
index af1c076..a5cba5c 100644
--- a/drm/1.0/default/Android.bp
+++ b/drm/1.0/default/Android.bp
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
         "-Werror",
         "-Wextra",
         "-Wall",
+        "-Wthread-safety",
     ],
     shared_libs: [
         "liblog",
@@ -42,7 +43,7 @@
     export_header_lib_headers: [
         "libutils_headers",
     ],
-    export_include_dirs : ["include"]
+    export_include_dirs: ["include"],
 }
 
 soong_config_module_type {
diff --git a/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.cpp b/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.cpp
index e6d4e84..8dea7e9 100644
--- a/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.cpp
+++ b/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.cpp
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@
             uint32_t bufferId) {
         sp<IMemory> hidlMemory = mapMemory(base);
 
+        std::lock_guard<std::mutex> shared_buffer_lock(mSharedBufferLock);
+
         // allow mapMemory to return nullptr
         mSharedBufferMap[bufferId] = hidlMemory;
         return Void();
@@ -65,7 +67,7 @@
             const SharedBuffer& source, uint64_t offset,
             const DestinationBuffer& destination,
             decrypt_cb _hidl_cb) {
-
+        std::unique_lock<std::mutex> shared_buffer_lock(mSharedBufferLock);
         if (mSharedBufferMap.find(source.bufferId) == mSharedBufferMap.end()) {
             _hidl_cb(Status::ERROR_DRM_CANNOT_HANDLE, 0, "source decrypt buffer base not set");
             return Void();
@@ -79,7 +81,7 @@
             }
         }
 
-        android::CryptoPlugin::Mode legacyMode;
+        android::CryptoPlugin::Mode legacyMode = android::CryptoPlugin::kMode_Unencrypted;
         switch(mode) {
         case Mode::UNENCRYPTED:
             legacyMode = android::CryptoPlugin::kMode_Unencrypted;
@@ -146,7 +148,10 @@
                 return Void();
             }
 
-            if (destBuffer.offset + destBuffer.size > destBase->getSize()) {
+            size_t totalSize = 0;
+            if (__builtin_add_overflow(destBuffer.offset, destBuffer.size, &totalSize) ||
+                totalSize > destBase->getSize()) {
+                android_errorWriteLog(0x534e4554, "176496353");
                 _hidl_cb(Status::ERROR_DRM_CANNOT_HANDLE, 0, "invalid buffer size");
                 return Void();
             }
@@ -157,7 +162,7 @@
             }
 
             base = static_cast<uint8_t *>(static_cast<void *>(destBase->getPointer()));
-            destPtr = static_cast<void *>(base + destination.nonsecureMemory.offset);
+            destPtr = static_cast<void*>(base + destination.nonsecureMemory.offset);
         } else if (destination.type == BufferType::NATIVE_HANDLE) {
             if (!secure) {
                 _hidl_cb(Status::BAD_VALUE, 0, "native handle destination must be secure");
@@ -170,6 +175,10 @@
             _hidl_cb(Status::BAD_VALUE, 0, "invalid destination type");
             return Void();
         }
+
+        // release mSharedBufferLock
+        shared_buffer_lock.unlock();
+
         ssize_t result = mLegacyPlugin->decrypt(secure, keyId.data(), iv.data(),
                 legacyMode, legacyPattern, srcPtr, legacySubSamples.get(),
                 subSamples.size(), destPtr, &detailMessage);
diff --git a/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.h b/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.h
index 11cc2aa..0d091fa 100644
--- a/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.h
+++ b/drm/1.0/default/CryptoPlugin.h
@@ -17,11 +17,14 @@
 #ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_DRM_V1_0__CRYPTOPLUGIN_H
 #define ANDROID_HARDWARE_DRM_V1_0__CRYPTOPLUGIN_H
 
-#include <android/hidl/memory/1.0/IMemory.h>
+#include <android-base/thread_annotations.h>
 #include <android/hardware/drm/1.0/ICryptoPlugin.h>
+#include <android/hidl/memory/1.0/IMemory.h>
 #include <hidl/Status.h>
 #include <media/hardware/CryptoAPI.h>
 
+#include <mutex>
+
 namespace android {
 namespace hardware {
 namespace drm {
@@ -60,19 +63,21 @@
     Return<void> setSharedBufferBase(const ::android::hardware::hidl_memory& base,
         uint32_t bufferId) override;
 
-    Return<void> decrypt(bool secure, const hidl_array<uint8_t, 16>& keyId,
-            const hidl_array<uint8_t, 16>& iv, Mode mode, const Pattern& pattern,
-            const hidl_vec<SubSample>& subSamples, const SharedBuffer& source,
-            uint64_t offset, const DestinationBuffer& destination,
-            decrypt_cb _hidl_cb) override;
+    Return<void> decrypt(
+            bool secure, const hidl_array<uint8_t, 16>& keyId, const hidl_array<uint8_t, 16>& iv,
+            Mode mode, const Pattern& pattern, const hidl_vec<SubSample>& subSamples,
+            const SharedBuffer& source, uint64_t offset, const DestinationBuffer& destination,
+            decrypt_cb _hidl_cb) override NO_THREAD_SAFETY_ANALYSIS;  // use unique_lock
 
-private:
+  private:
     android::CryptoPlugin *mLegacyPlugin;
-    std::map<uint32_t, sp<IMemory> > mSharedBufferMap;
+    std::map<uint32_t, sp<IMemory>> mSharedBufferMap GUARDED_BY(mSharedBufferLock);
 
     CryptoPlugin() = delete;
     CryptoPlugin(const CryptoPlugin &) = delete;
     void operator=(const CryptoPlugin &) = delete;
+
+    std::mutex mSharedBufferLock;
 };
 
 }  // namespace implementation
diff --git a/fastboot/1.0/IFastboot.hal b/fastboot/1.0/IFastboot.hal
index dce3ad7..b39061c 100644
--- a/fastboot/1.0/IFastboot.hal
+++ b/fastboot/1.0/IFastboot.hal
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
     /**
      * Executes a fastboot OEM command.
      *
-     * @param oemCmdArgs The oem command that is passed to the fastboot HAL.
+     * @param oemCmd The oem command that is passed to the fastboot HAL.
      * @return result Returns the status SUCCESS if the operation is successful,
      *     INVALID_ARGUMENT for bad arguments,
      *     FAILURE_UNKNOWN for an invalid/unsupported command.
diff --git a/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index e74cca9..618624e 100644
--- a/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -236,6 +236,10 @@
   generatePassword(password, 0);
   enrollNewPassword(password, enrollRsp, true);
   verifyPassword(password, enrollRsp.data, 1, verifyRsp, true);
+
+  ALOGI("Testing unenrolled password doesn't verify");
+  generatePassword(password, 1);
+  verifyPassword(password, enrollRsp.data, 1, verifyRsp, false);
   ALOGI("Testing Enroll+Verify done");
 }
 
@@ -306,6 +310,8 @@
   if (first != nullptr && second != nullptr) {
     EXPECT_NE(first->user_id, second->user_id);
   }
+  // the old enrollment should be invalid now
+  verifyPassword(password, enrollRsp.data, 0, verifyRsp, false);
   ALOGI("Testing Untrusted Reenroll done");
 }
 
diff --git a/graphics/common/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.graphics.common/current/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl b/graphics/common/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.graphics.common/current/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
index 8b12169..232e023 100644
--- a/graphics/common/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.graphics.common/current/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
+++ b/graphics/common/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.graphics.common/current/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
   int width;
   int height;
   int layers;
-  android.hardware.graphics.common.PixelFormat format;
-  android.hardware.graphics.common.BufferUsage usage;
+  android.hardware.graphics.common.PixelFormat format = android.hardware.graphics.common.PixelFormat.UNSPECIFIED;
+  android.hardware.graphics.common.BufferUsage usage = android.hardware.graphics.common.BufferUsage.CPU_READ_NEVER;
   int stride;
 }
diff --git a/graphics/common/aidl/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl b/graphics/common/aidl/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
index e1e3492..078c512 100644
--- a/graphics/common/aidl/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
+++ b/graphics/common/aidl/android/hardware/graphics/common/HardwareBufferDescription.aidl
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
     int width;
     int height;
     int layers;
-    PixelFormat format;
-    BufferUsage usage;
+    PixelFormat format = PixelFormat.UNSPECIFIED;
+    BufferUsage usage = BufferUsage.CPU_READ_NEVER;
     int stride;
 }
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
index 50f282f..46f95dd 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
@@ -73,10 +73,15 @@
 
     IComposerClient::Rect getFrameRect() const { return {0, 0, mDisplayWidth, mDisplayHeight}; }
 
+    void setDimensions(int32_t displayWidth, int32_t displayHeight) {
+        mDisplayWidth = displayWidth;
+        mDisplayHeight = displayHeight;
+    }
+
   private:
     const Display mDisplay;
-    const int32_t mDisplayWidth;
-    const int32_t mDisplayHeight;
+    int32_t mDisplayWidth;
+    int32_t mDisplayHeight;
 };
 
 class GraphicsComposerHidlTest : public ::testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
@@ -194,6 +199,31 @@
                                        const std::vector<ContentType>& capabilities,
                                        const ContentType& contentType, const char* contentTypeStr);
 
+    Error setActiveConfigWithConstraints(
+            VtsDisplay& display, Config config,
+            const IComposerClient::VsyncPeriodChangeConstraints& constraints,
+            VsyncPeriodChangeTimeline* timeline) {
+        const auto error = mComposerClient->setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display.get(), config,
+                                                                           constraints, timeline);
+        if (error == Error::NONE) {
+            const int32_t displayWidth = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+                    display.get(), config, IComposerClient::Attribute::WIDTH);
+            const int32_t displayHeight = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+                    display.get(), config, IComposerClient::Attribute::HEIGHT);
+            display.setDimensions(displayWidth, displayHeight);
+        }
+        return error;
+    }
+
+    void setActiveConfig(VtsDisplay& display, Config config) {
+        mComposerClient->setActiveConfig(display.get(), config);
+        const int32_t displayWidth = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+                display.get(), config, IComposerClient::Attribute::WIDTH);
+        const int32_t displayHeight = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+                display.get(), config, IComposerClient::Attribute::HEIGHT);
+        display.setDimensions(displayWidth, displayHeight);
+    }
+
   private:
     // use the slot count usually set by SF
     static constexpr uint32_t kBufferSlotCount = 64;
@@ -347,7 +377,7 @@
 }
 
 TEST_P(GraphicsComposerHidlTest, getDisplayVsyncPeriod) {
-    for (const auto& display : mDisplays) {
+    for (VtsDisplay& display : mDisplays) {
         for (Config config : mComposerClient->getDisplayConfigs(display.get())) {
             VsyncPeriodNanos expectedVsyncPeriodNanos = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
                     display.get(), config,
@@ -358,8 +388,8 @@
 
             constraints.desiredTimeNanos = systemTime();
             constraints.seamlessRequired = false;
-            EXPECT_EQ(Error::NONE, mComposerClient->setActiveConfigWithConstraints(
-                                           display.get(), config, constraints, &timeline));
+            EXPECT_EQ(Error::NONE,
+                      setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display, config, constraints, &timeline));
 
             if (timeline.refreshRequired) {
                 sendRefreshFrame(display, &timeline);
@@ -411,11 +441,10 @@
     constraints.seamlessRequired = false;
     constraints.desiredTimeNanos = systemTime();
 
-    for (const auto& display : mDisplays) {
+    for (VtsDisplay& display : mDisplays) {
         Config invalidConfigId = GetInvalidConfigId(display.get());
         EXPECT_EQ(Error::BAD_CONFIG,
-                  mComposerClient->setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display.get(), invalidConfigId,
-                                                                  constraints, &timeline));
+                  setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display, invalidConfigId, constraints, &timeline));
     }
 }
 
@@ -426,7 +455,7 @@
     constraints.seamlessRequired = true;
     constraints.desiredTimeNanos = systemTime();
 
-    for (const auto& display : mDisplays) {
+    for (VtsDisplay& display : mDisplays) {
         forEachTwoConfigs(display.get(), [&](Config config1, Config config2) {
             const auto configGroup1 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
                     display.get(), config1,
@@ -435,11 +464,10 @@
                     display.get(), config2,
                     IComposerClient::IComposerClient::Attribute::CONFIG_GROUP);
             if (configGroup1 != configGroup2) {
-                mComposerClient->setActiveConfig(display.get(), config1);
+                setActiveConfig(display, config1);
                 sendRefreshFrame(display, nullptr);
                 EXPECT_EQ(Error::SEAMLESS_NOT_ALLOWED,
-                          mComposerClient->setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display.get(), config2,
-                                                                          constraints, &timeline));
+                          setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display, config2, constraints, &timeline));
             }
         });
     }
@@ -502,6 +530,8 @@
 
     mWriter->presentDisplay();
     execute();
+
+    ASSERT_NO_FATAL_FAILURE(mComposerClient->destroyLayer(display.get(), layer));
 }
 
 void GraphicsComposerHidlTest::waitForVsyncPeriodChange(Display display,
@@ -523,9 +553,9 @@
 }
 
 void GraphicsComposerHidlTest::Test_setActiveConfigWithConstraints(const TestParameters& params) {
-    for (const auto& display : mDisplays) {
+    for (VtsDisplay& display : mDisplays) {
         forEachTwoConfigs(display.get(), [&](Config config1, Config config2) {
-            mComposerClient->setActiveConfig(display.get(), config1);
+            setActiveConfig(display, config1);
             sendRefreshFrame(display, nullptr);
 
             int32_t vsyncPeriod1 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
@@ -543,8 +573,8 @@
             IComposerClient::VsyncPeriodChangeConstraints constraints = {
                     .desiredTimeNanos = systemTime() + params.delayForChange,
                     .seamlessRequired = false};
-            EXPECT_EQ(Error::NONE, mComposerClient->setActiveConfigWithConstraints(
-                                           display.get(), config2, constraints, &timeline));
+            EXPECT_EQ(Error::NONE,
+                      setActiveConfigWithConstraints(display, config2, constraints, &timeline));
 
             EXPECT_TRUE(timeline.newVsyncAppliedTimeNanos >= constraints.desiredTimeNanos);
             // Refresh rate should change within a reasonable time
diff --git a/identity/TEST_MAPPING b/identity/TEST_MAPPING
index f35f4b7..85cf91f 100644
--- a/identity/TEST_MAPPING
+++ b/identity/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "android.hardware.identity-support-lib-test"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "libeic_test"
     }
   ]
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index a097895..3224e4b 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -43,8 +43,8 @@
   void startRetrieval(in android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile[] accessControlProfiles, in android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthToken authToken, in byte[] itemsRequest, in byte[] signingKeyBlob, in byte[] sessionTranscript, in byte[] readerSignature, in int[] requestCounts);
   void startRetrieveEntryValue(in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize, in int[] accessControlProfileIds);
   byte[] retrieveEntryValue(in byte[] encryptedContent);
-  void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
-  android.hardware.identity.Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
+  @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"}) void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
+  @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"}) android.hardware.identity.Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
   void setRequestedNamespaces(in android.hardware.identity.RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
   void setVerificationToken(in android.hardware.keymaster.VerificationToken verificationToken);
   byte[] deleteCredentialWithChallenge(in byte[] challenge);
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
index a713462..19a29ec 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -38,6 +38,6 @@
   android.hardware.identity.SecureAccessControlProfile addAccessControlProfile(in int id, in android.hardware.identity.Certificate readerCertificate, in boolean userAuthenticationRequired, in long timeoutMillis, in long secureUserId);
   void beginAddEntry(in int[] accessControlProfileIds, in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize);
   byte[] addEntryValue(in byte[] content);
-  void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData, out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
+  @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"}) void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData, out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
   void setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(in int expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index d23f88c..8ae293b 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -324,6 +324,7 @@
      *
      * @param out deviceNameSpaces the bytes of DeviceNameSpaces.
      */
+    @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"})
     void finishRetrieval(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces);
 
     /**
@@ -376,6 +377,7 @@
      *
      * @return an X.509 certificate for the new signing key, signed by the credential key.
      */
+    @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"})
     Certificate generateSigningKeyPair(out byte[] signingKeyBlob);
 
     /**
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
index 5f878ee..22bcf61 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IWritableIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -320,6 +320,7 @@
      *              "accessControlProfiles" : [ * uint ],
      *          }
      */
+    @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"})
     void finishAddingEntries(out byte[] credentialData,
         out byte[] proofOfProvisioningSignature);
 
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp b/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp
index a124b1e..28c4893 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
     static_libs: [
         "libbase",
         "libcppbor_external",
+        "libcppcose_rkp",
         "libutils",
         "libsoft_attestation_cert",
         "libkeymaster_portable",
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@
     static_libs: [
         "libbase",
         "libcppbor_external",
+        "libcppcose_rkp",
         "libutils",
         "libsoft_attestation_cert",
         "libkeymaster_portable",
@@ -112,6 +114,43 @@
     ],
 }
 
+cc_test {
+    name: "libeic_test",
+    srcs: [
+        "EicTests.cpp",
+        "FakeSecureHardwareProxy.cpp",
+    ],
+    cflags: [
+        "-Wall",
+        "-Wextra",
+        "-g",
+        "-DEIC_DEBUG",
+    ],
+    local_include_dirs: [
+         "common",
+    ],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "liblog",
+        "libcrypto",
+        "libkeymaster_messages",
+    ],
+    static_libs: [
+        "libbase",
+        "libcppbor_external",
+        "libcppcose_rkp",
+        "libutils",
+        "libsoft_attestation_cert",
+        "libkeymaster_portable",
+        "libsoft_attestation_cert",
+        "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
+        "android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
+        "android.hardware.identity-libeic-library",
+    ],
+    test_suites: [
+        "general-tests",
+    ],
+}
+
 prebuilt_etc {
     name: "android.hardware.identity_credential.xml",
     sub_dir: "permissions",
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/EicTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/EicTests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a28080d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/EicTests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <optional>
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include "FakeSecureHardwareProxy.h"
+
+// Most of libeic is tested as part of VTS since there's almost a 1:1 mapping between
+// the HAL and libeic interfaces. This test suite is mainly for the few things which
+// doesn't map directly.
+//
+
+using std::optional;
+using std::string;
+using std::vector;
+
+using android::hardware::identity::AccessCheckResult;
+using android::hardware::identity::FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy;
+using android::hardware::identity::FakeSecureHardwareProvisioningProxy;
+
+TEST(EicTest, AccessControlIsEnforced) {
+    // First provision the credential...
+    //
+    FakeSecureHardwareProvisioningProxy provisioningProxy;
+    bool isTestCredential = false;
+    provisioningProxy.initialize(isTestCredential);
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> credKey =
+            provisioningProxy.createCredentialKey({0x01, 0x02}, {0x03, 0x04});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credKey.has_value());
+    string docType = "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL";
+    ASSERT_TRUE(provisioningProxy.startPersonalization(0, {1}, docType, 125));
+
+    vector<int> acpIds = {};
+    string nameSpace = "org.iso.18013.5.1";
+    string name = "NonAccessibleElement";
+    vector<uint8_t> content = {0x63, 0x46, 0x6f, 0x6f};  // "Foo" tstr
+    ASSERT_TRUE(provisioningProxy.beginAddEntry(acpIds, nameSpace, name, content.size()));
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> encContent =
+            provisioningProxy.addEntryValue(acpIds, nameSpace, name, content);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(encContent.has_value());
+    ASSERT_EQ(encContent->size(), content.size() + 28);
+
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> signatureOfToBeSigned = provisioningProxy.finishAddingEntries();
+    ASSERT_TRUE(signatureOfToBeSigned.has_value());
+
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> credData = provisioningProxy.finishGetCredentialData(docType);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credData.has_value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(provisioningProxy.shutdown());
+
+    // Then present data from it...
+    //
+    FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy presentationProxy;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(presentationProxy.initialize(isTestCredential, docType, credData.value()));
+    AccessCheckResult res =
+            presentationProxy.startRetrieveEntryValue(nameSpace, name, 1, content.size(), acpIds);
+    ASSERT_EQ(res, AccessCheckResult::kNoAccessControlProfiles);
+
+    // Ensure that we can't get the data out if startRetrieveEntryValue() returned
+    // something other than kOk... See b/190757775 for details.
+    //
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> decContent =
+            presentationProxy.retrieveEntryValue(encContent.value(), nameSpace, name, acpIds);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(decContent.has_value());
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char** argv) {
+    ::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
+    return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/common/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/common/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp
index 25f129b..200ee61 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/common/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/common/WritableIdentityCredential.cpp
@@ -210,6 +210,15 @@
                 "numAccessControlProfileRemaining_ is not zero"));
     }
 
+    // Ensure passed-in profile ids reference valid access control profiles
+    for (const int32_t id : accessControlProfileIds) {
+        if (accessControlProfileIds_.find(id) == accessControlProfileIds_.end()) {
+            return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+                    IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
+                    "An id in accessControlProfileIds references non-existing ACP"));
+        }
+    }
+
     if (remainingEntryCounts_.size() == 0) {
         return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
                 IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA, "No more namespaces to add to"));
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicCbor.c b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicCbor.c
index fe131eb..0e2684f 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicCbor.c
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicCbor.c
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@
         data[4] = size & 0xff;
         eicCborAppend(cbor, data, 5);
     } else {
-        data[0] = (majorType << 5) | 24;
+        data[0] = (majorType << 5) | 27;
         data[1] = (((uint64_t)size) >> 56) & 0xff;
         data[2] = (((uint64_t)size) >> 48) & 0xff;
         data[3] = (((uint64_t)size) >> 40) & 0xff;
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
index 9e033b3..3d13766 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
@@ -633,6 +633,8 @@
 
     // We'll need to calc and store a digest of additionalData to check that it's the same
     // additionalData being passed in for every eicPresentationRetrieveEntryValue() call...
+    //
+    ctx->accessCheckOk = false;
     if (!eicCborCalcEntryAdditionalData(accessControlProfileIds, numAccessControlProfileIds,
                                         nameSpace, name, additionalDataCbor,
                                         additionalDataCborBufSize, &additionalDataCborSize,
@@ -680,6 +682,7 @@
 
     if (result == EIC_ACCESS_CHECK_RESULT_OK) {
         eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cbor, name);
+        ctx->accessCheckOk = true;
     }
     return result;
 }
@@ -702,10 +705,15 @@
                                         calculatedSha256)) {
         return false;
     }
+
     if (eicCryptoMemCmp(calculatedSha256, ctx->additionalDataSha256, EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0) {
         eicDebug("SHA-256 mismatch of additionalData");
         return false;
     }
+    if (!ctx->accessCheckOk) {
+        eicDebug("Attempting to retrieve a value for which access is not granted");
+        return false;
+    }
 
     if (!eicOpsDecryptAes128Gcm(ctx->storageKey, encryptedContent, encryptedContentSize,
                                 additionalDataCbor, additionalDataCborSize, content)) {
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
index 7cad068..c888049 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@
     // Set to true initialized as a test credential.
     bool testCredential;
 
+    // Set to true if the evaluation of access control checks in
+    // eicPresentationStartRetrieveEntryValue() resulted EIC_ACCESS_CHECK_RESULT_OK
+    bool accessCheckOk;
+
     // These are bitmasks indicating which of the possible 32 access control profiles are
     // authorized. They are built up by eicPresentationValidateAccessControlProfile().
     //
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp b/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp
index 3592d3e..61d15d2 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/Android.bp
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
     ],
     static_libs: [
         "libcppbor_external",
+        "libcppcose_rkp",
         "libkeymaster_portable",
         "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
         "android.hardware.keymaster@4.0",
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/DeleteCredentialTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/DeleteCredentialTests.cpp
index d3addf4..7627c9c 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/DeleteCredentialTests.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/DeleteCredentialTests.cpp
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addAccessControlProfile(1, {}, false, 0, 0, &sacp).isOk());
 
     // Single entry - don't care about the returned encrypted data
-    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({0}, "ns", "Some Data", 1).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({1}, "ns", "Some Data", 1).isOk());
     vector<uint8_t> encryptedData;
     ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encryptedData).isOk());
 
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/ProveOwnershipTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/ProveOwnershipTests.cpp
index fa0e293..c622193 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/ProveOwnershipTests.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/ProveOwnershipTests.cpp
@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addAccessControlProfile(1, {}, false, 0, 0, &sacp).isOk());
 
     // Single entry - don't care about the returned encrypted data
-    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({0}, "ns", "Some Data", 1).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(wc->beginAddEntry({1}, "ns", "Some Data", 1).isOk());
     vector<uint8_t> encryptedData;
     ASSERT_TRUE(wc->addEntryValue({9}, &encryptedData).isOk());
 
diff --git a/identity/support/Android.bp b/identity/support/Android.bp
index 774bc40..db1a945 100644
--- a/identity/support/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/support/Android.bp
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
         "android.hardware.keymaster@4.0",
         "libcrypto",
         "libbase",
+        "libcppcose_rkp",
         "libhidlbase",
         "libhardware",
         "libkeymaster_portable",
diff --git a/identity/support/src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp b/identity/support/src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp
index 4547624..7f4674d 100644
--- a/identity/support/src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp
+++ b/identity/support/src/IdentityCredentialSupport.cpp
@@ -644,7 +644,7 @@
     // the VTS tests. Of course, this is a pretend-only game since hopefully no
     // relying party is ever going to trust our batch key and those keys above
     // it.
-    ::keymaster::PureSoftKeymasterContext context(::keymaster::KmVersion::KEYMASTER_4_1,
+    ::keymaster::PureSoftKeymasterContext context(::keymaster::KmVersion::KEYMINT_1,
                                                   KM_SECURITY_LEVEL_TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT);
 
     keymaster_error_t error;
@@ -682,10 +682,9 @@
 
     i2d_X509_NAME(subjectName.get(), &subjectPtr);
 
-    uint64_t nowMilliSeconds = time(nullptr) * 1000;
     ::keymaster::AuthorizationSet auth_set(
             ::keymaster::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                    .Authorization(::keymaster::TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE, nowMilliSeconds)
+                    .Authorization(::keymaster::TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE, activeTimeMilliSeconds)
                     .Authorization(::keymaster::TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER, expireTimeMilliSeconds)
                     .Authorization(::keymaster::TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge.data(),
                                    challenge.size())
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
index bc294bd..342b3e2 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
     ASN1_INTEGER_SET* padding;
     ASN1_INTEGER* ec_curve;
     ASN1_INTEGER* rsa_public_exponent;
+    ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
     ASN1_INTEGER* active_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* origination_expire_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* usage_expire_date_time;
@@ -78,56 +79,84 @@
     ASN1_INTEGER* user_auth_type;
     ASN1_INTEGER* auth_timeout;
     ASN1_NULL* allow_while_on_body;
+    ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
+    ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
+    ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
     ASN1_NULL* all_applications;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING* application_id;
     ASN1_INTEGER* creation_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* origin;
-    ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
     KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust;
     ASN1_INTEGER* os_version;
     ASN1_INTEGER* os_patchlevel;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_application_id;
-    ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
-    ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
-    ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_brand;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_device;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_product;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_serial;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_imei;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_meid;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_manufacturer;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_model;
     ASN1_INTEGER* vendor_patchlevel;
     ASN1_INTEGER* boot_patchlevel;
 } KM_AUTH_LIST;
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_AUTH_LIST) = {
-    ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, purpose, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PURPOSE.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, algorithm, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ALGORITHM.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, key_size, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_KEY_SIZE.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, digest, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_DIGEST.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, padding, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PADDING.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, ec_curve, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_EC_CURVE.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rsa_public_exponent, ASN1_INTEGER,
-                 TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
-                 TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
-                 TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, no_auth_required, ASN1_NULL, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, user_auth_type, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, auth_timeout, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, allow_while_on_body, ASN1_NULL, TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_user_presence_required, ASN1_NULL,
-                 TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_confirmation_required, ASN1_NULL,
-                 TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, unlocked_device_required, ASN1_NULL,
-                 TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, creation_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origin, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ORIGIN.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
-                 TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, purpose, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PURPOSE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, algorithm, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ALGORITHM.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, key_size, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_KEY_SIZE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, digest, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_DIGEST.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, padding, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PADDING.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, ec_curve, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_EC_CURVE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rsa_public_exponent, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                     TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL,
+                     TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
+
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                     TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                     TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, no_auth_required, ASN1_NULL, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, user_auth_type, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, auth_timeout, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, allow_while_on_body, ASN1_NULL,
+                     TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_user_presence_required, ASN1_NULL,
+                     TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_confirmation_required, ASN1_NULL,
+                     TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, unlocked_device_required, ASN1_NULL,
+                     TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, creation_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                     TAG_CREATION_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origin, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ORIGIN.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_brand, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_device, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_product, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_serial, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_imei, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_meid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_manufacturer, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_model, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                     TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_AUTH_LIST);
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_AUTH_LIST);
 
@@ -259,6 +288,14 @@
     copyAuthTag(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_brand, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_device, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_product, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_serial, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_imei, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_meid, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_manufacturer, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_model, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->trusted_user_presence_required, TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
index e0d60fc..01c502c 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
@@ -96,6 +96,18 @@
     return count > 0;
 }
 
+// If the given property is available, add it to the tag set under the given tag ID.
+template <Tag tag>
+void add_tag_from_prop(AuthorizationSetBuilder* tags, TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+                       const char* prop) {
+    char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+    int len = property_get(prop, value, /* default = */ "");
+    if (len > 0) {
+        tags->Authorization(ttag, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(value),
+                            static_cast<size_t>(len));
+    }
+}
+
 constexpr char hex_value[256] = {0, 0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,  //
                                  0, 0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,  //
                                  0, 0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,  //
@@ -921,6 +933,23 @@
                               .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
 }
 
+/**
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesInvalidKeySize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesInvalidKeySize) {
+    for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+                                      .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+    }
+}
+
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_HIDL_TEST(NewKeyGenerationTest);
 
 typedef KeymasterHidlTest SigningOperationsTest;
@@ -4392,6 +4421,95 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * AttestationTest.EcAttestationID
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to EC keys with correct attestation ID fields works and generates the
+ * expected output.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestationTest, EcAttestationID) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
+
+    // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+    auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+                      "ro.product.manufacturer");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo"));
+        // Include one of the (valid) attestation ID tags.
+        builder.push_back(tag);
+        hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+        auto result = AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain);
+        if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+        EXPECT_GE(cert_chain.size(), 2U);
+
+        std::vector<KeyParameter> expected_hw_enforced = key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced;
+        expected_hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(
+                "challenge", "foo", key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced,
+                hidl_vec<KeyParameter>(expected_hw_enforced), SecLevel(), cert_chain[0]));
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * AttestationTest.EcAttestationMismatchID
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to EC keys with incorrect attestation ID fields fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestationTest, EcAttestationMismatchID) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
+
+    // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+    std::string invalid = "completely-invalid";
+    auto invalid_tags =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, invalid.data(),
+                                   invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, invalid.data(), invalid.size());
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : invalid_tags) {
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo"));
+        // Include one of the invalid attestation ID tags.
+        builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+        hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+        auto result = AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG)
+                << "result: " << static_cast<int32_t>(result);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
  * AttestationTest.EcAttestationRequiresAttestationAppId
  *
  * Verifies that attesting to EC keys requires app ID
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp b/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp
index 207a7e8..15230d5 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@
     ASN1_INTEGER_SET* padding;
     ASN1_INTEGER* ec_curve;
     ASN1_INTEGER* rsa_public_exponent;
+    ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
+    ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
     ASN1_INTEGER* active_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* origination_expire_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* usage_expire_date_time;
@@ -86,21 +88,27 @@
     ASN1_INTEGER* user_auth_type;
     ASN1_INTEGER* auth_timeout;
     ASN1_NULL* allow_while_on_body;
+    ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
+    ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
+    ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
     ASN1_NULL* all_applications;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING* application_id;
     ASN1_INTEGER* creation_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* origin;
-    ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
     KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust;
     ASN1_INTEGER* os_version;
     ASN1_INTEGER* os_patchlevel;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_application_id;
-    ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
-    ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
-    ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_brand;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_device;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_product;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_serial;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_imei;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_meid;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_manufacturer;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_model;
     ASN1_INTEGER* vendor_patchlevel;
     ASN1_INTEGER* boot_patchlevel;
-    ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
     ASN1_NULL* device_unique_attestation;
     ASN1_NULL* identity_credential_key;
 } KM_AUTH_LIST;
@@ -116,6 +124,7 @@
                      TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL,
                      TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
                      TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
@@ -138,12 +147,27 @@
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_brand, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_device, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_product, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_serial, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_imei, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_meid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_manufacturer, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_model, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER,
                      TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
-                     TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, device_unique_attestation, ASN1_NULL,
                      TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, identity_credential_key, ASN1_NULL,
@@ -279,6 +303,14 @@
     copyAuthTag(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_brand, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_device, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_product, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_serial, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_imei, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_meid, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_manufacturer, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_model, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->trusted_user_presence_required, TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h b/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h
index 40eb142..e8db56a 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h
@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@
 using V4_0::TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA;
 using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID;
 using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL;
 using V4_0::TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT;
 using V4_0::TAG_BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS;
 using V4_0::TAG_BLOCK_MODE;
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
index e46cb48..4a57f44 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 #define LOG_TAG "keymaster_hidl_hal_test"
 #include <cutils/log.h>
+#include <vector>
 
 #include "Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h"
 
@@ -26,6 +27,8 @@
 #include <keymasterV4_1/attestation_record.h>
 #include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
 
+using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test::add_tag_from_prop;
+
 // Not to dump the attestation by default. Can enable by specify the parameter
 // "--dump_attestations" on lunching VTS
 static bool dumpAttestations = false;
@@ -172,10 +175,42 @@
     attestation.software_enforced.Sort();
     attestation.hardware_enforced.Sort();
 
-    EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filter_tags(attestation.software_enforced))
-            << DIFFERENCE(expected_sw_enforced, attestation.software_enforced);
-    EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_hw_enforced), filter_tags(attestation.hardware_enforced))
-            << DIFFERENCE(expected_hw_enforced, attestation.hardware_enforced);
+    expected_sw_enforced = filter_tags(expected_sw_enforced);
+    expected_hw_enforced = filter_tags(expected_hw_enforced);
+    AuthorizationSet attestation_sw_enforced = filter_tags(attestation.software_enforced);
+    AuthorizationSet attestation_hw_enforced = filter_tags(attestation.hardware_enforced);
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(expected_sw_enforced, attestation_sw_enforced)
+            << DIFFERENCE(expected_sw_enforced, attestation_sw_enforced);
+    EXPECT_EQ(expected_hw_enforced, attestation_hw_enforced)
+            << DIFFERENCE(expected_hw_enforced, attestation_hw_enforced);
+}
+
+X509_Ptr parse_cert_blob(const std::vector<uint8_t>& blob) {
+    const uint8_t* p = blob.data();
+    return X509_Ptr(d2i_X509(nullptr /* allocate new */, &p, blob.size()));
+}
+
+bool check_certificate_chain_signatures(const hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>& cert_chain) {
+    // TODO: Check that root is self-signed once b/187803288 is resolved.
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < cert_chain.size() - 1; ++i) {
+        X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain[i]));
+        X509_Ptr signing_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain[i + 1]));
+
+        if (!key_cert.get() || !signing_cert.get()) {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert.get()));
+        if (!signing_pubkey.get()) {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        if (!X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get())) {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+    return true;
 }
 
 }  // namespace
@@ -243,7 +278,10 @@
 
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
     EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
-    if (dumpAttestations) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_chain[0]));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(check_certificate_chain_signatures(cert_chain));
+    if (dumpAttestations) {
+      for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
+    }
     auto [err, attestation] = parse_attestation_record(cert_chain[0]);
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, err);
 
@@ -287,7 +325,10 @@
 
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
     EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
-    if (dumpAttestations) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_chain[0]));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(check_certificate_chain_signatures(cert_chain));
+    if (dumpAttestations) {
+      for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
+    }
     auto [err, attestation] = parse_attestation_record(cert_chain[0]);
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, err);
 
@@ -308,6 +349,106 @@
             SecLevel());
 }
 
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID) {
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                         .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                         .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                         .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                         .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
+
+    // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+    auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+                      "ro.product.manufacturer");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+        HidlBuf challenge("challenge");
+        HidlBuf app_id("foo");
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id);
+        builder.push_back(tag);
+        ErrorCode result = convert(AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain));
+
+        // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+        if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+        EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
+        if (dumpAttestations) {
+            for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
+        }
+        auto [err, attestation] = parse_attestation_record(cert_chain[0]);
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, err);
+
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                        .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                        .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+                        .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+        hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+        check_attestation_record(
+                attestation, challenge,
+                /* sw_enforced */
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id),
+                hw_enforced, SecLevel());
+    }
+}
+
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID) {
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                         .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                         .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                         .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                         .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
+
+    // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+    std::string invalid = "completely-invalid";
+    auto attestation_id_tags =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, invalid.data(),
+                                   invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, invalid.data(), invalid.size());
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+        HidlBuf challenge("challenge");
+        HidlBuf app_id("foo");
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id);
+        builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+        ErrorCode result = convert(AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain));
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG)
+                << "result: " << static_cast<int32_t>(result);
+    }
+}
+
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_4_1_HIDL_TEST(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest);
 
 }  // namespace test
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h
index f8c1fad..670ccfb 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 
 #include <android/hardware/keymaster/4.1/IKeymasterDevice.h>
 
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
+
 #include <KeymasterHidlTest.h>
 #include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
 
@@ -159,3 +161,17 @@
                              android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString)
 
 }  // namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1::test
+
+namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test {
+
+// If the given property is available, add it to the tag set under the given tag ID.
+template <Tag tag>
+void add_tag_from_prop(AuthorizationSetBuilder* tags, TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+                       const char* prop) {
+    std::string prop_value = ::android::base::GetProperty(prop, /* default= */ "");
+    if (!prop_value.empty()) {
+        tags->Authorization(ttag, prop_value.data(), prop_value.size());
+    }
+}
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
index db1df2b..4f21cba 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
   long challenge;
   long userId;
   long authenticatorId;
-  android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType = android.hardware.keymaster.HardwareAuthenticatorType.NONE;
   android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
   byte[] mac;
 }
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
index 0633765..b116dac 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.keymaster/current/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -20,6 +20,6 @@
 parcelable VerificationToken {
   long challenge;
   android.hardware.keymaster.Timestamp timestamp;
-  android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+  android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel securityLevel = android.hardware.keymaster.SecurityLevel.SOFTWARE;
   byte[] mac;
 }
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
index 58602aa..99b036a 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/HardwareAuthToken.aidl
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
      * authenticatorType describes the type of authentication that took place, e.g. password or
      * fingerprint.
      */
-    HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType;
+    HardwareAuthenticatorType authenticatorType = HardwareAuthenticatorType.NONE;
 
     /**
      * timestamp indicates when the user authentication took place, in milliseconds since some
diff --git a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
index f053254..5efd937 100644
--- a/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
+++ b/keymaster/aidl/android/hardware/keymaster/VerificationToken.aidl
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
     /**
      * SecurityLevel of the secure environment that generated the token.
      */
-    SecurityLevel securityLevel;
+    SecurityLevel securityLevel = SecurityLevel.SOFTWARE;
 
     /**
      * 32-byte HMAC-SHA256 of the above values, computed as:
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Burst.h b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Burst.h
index 7849ca7..8bd2fbe 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Burst.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Burst.h
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@
             const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
             const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
 
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+            const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
   private:
     const nn::SharedPreparedModel kPreparedModel;
 };
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Device.h b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Device.h
index 4681b9e..db3b2ad 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Device.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Device.h
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@
     const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
     nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
     nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
-    bool isUpdatable() const override;
     const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
     const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
     std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Execution.h b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Execution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e201e25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/Execution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_0_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_0_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/IPreparedModel.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/ProtectCallback.h>
+
+#include "PreparedModel.h"
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_0::utils {
+
+class Execution final : public nn::IExecution, public std::enable_shared_from_this<Execution> {
+    struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+  public:
+    static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> create(
+            std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+            hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation);
+
+    Execution(PrivateConstructorTag tag, std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel,
+              Request request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation);
+
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+            const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+    nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+            const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+  private:
+    const std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> kPreparedModel;
+    const Request kRequest;
+    const hal::utils::RequestRelocation kRelocation;
+};
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_0::utils
+
+#endif  // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_0_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/PreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/PreparedModel.h
index 8853eea..48be595 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/PreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.0/PreparedModel.h
@@ -57,10 +57,17 @@
             const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
             const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
 
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+            const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
     nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurst() const override;
 
     std::any getUnderlyingResource() const override;
 
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeInternal(
+            const V1_0::Request& request, const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
   private:
     const sp<V1_0::IPreparedModel> kPreparedModel;
     const hal::utils::DeathHandler kDeathHandler;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Burst.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Burst.cpp
index e3a9757..1284721 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Burst.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Burst.cpp
@@ -55,4 +55,10 @@
     return kPreparedModel->execute(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
 }
 
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> Burst::createReusableExecution(
+        const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+    return kPreparedModel->createReusableExecution(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+}
+
 }  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_0::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Device.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Device.cpp
index bb31a26..93bd81a 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Device.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Device.cpp
@@ -106,10 +106,6 @@
     return nn::DeviceType::OTHER;
 }
 
-bool Device::isUpdatable() const {
-    return false;
-}
-
 const std::vector<nn::Extension>& Device::getSupportedExtensions() const {
     return kExtensions;
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Execution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Execution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a3216b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/Execution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "Execution.h"
+
+#include "Callbacks.h"
+#include "Conversions.h"
+#include "Utils.h"
+
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/IPreparedModel.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/types.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/HandleError.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/ProtectCallback.h>
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_0::utils {
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> Execution::create(
+        std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+        hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation) {
+    if (preparedModel == nullptr) {
+        return NN_ERROR() << "V1_0::utils::Execution::create must have non-null preparedModel";
+    }
+
+    return std::make_shared<const Execution>(PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(preparedModel),
+                                             std::move(request), std::move(relocation));
+}
+
+Execution::Execution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/,
+                     std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+                     hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation)
+    : kPreparedModel(std::move(preparedModel)),
+      kRequest(std::move(request)),
+      kRelocation(std::move(relocation)) {}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> Execution::compute(
+        const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/) const {
+    return kPreparedModel->executeInternal(kRequest, kRelocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> Execution::computeFenced(
+        const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& /*waitFor*/, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& /*timeoutDurationAfterFence*/) const {
+    return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE)
+           << "IExecution::computeFenced is not supported on 1.0 HAL service";
+}
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_0::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
index 858571d..00970c0 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include "Burst.h"
 #include "Callbacks.h"
 #include "Conversions.h"
+#include "Execution.h"
 #include "Utils.h"
 
 #include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/IPreparedModel.h>
@@ -61,22 +62,35 @@
         const nn::OptionalDuration& /*loopTimeoutDuration*/) const {
     // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
     std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
-    const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
-            hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared)));
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared =
+            NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+                    &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+                    &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation)));
 
     const auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(requestInShared)));
 
+    return executeInternal(hidlRequest, relocation);
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>
+PreparedModel::executeInternal(const V1_0::Request& request,
+                               const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+    if (relocation.input) {
+        relocation.input->flush();
+    }
+
     const auto cb = sp<ExecutionCallback>::make();
     const auto scoped = kDeathHandler.protectCallback(cb.get());
 
-    const auto ret = kPreparedModel->execute(hidlRequest, cb);
+    const auto ret = kPreparedModel->execute(request, cb);
     const auto status = HANDLE_TRANSPORT_FAILURE(ret);
     HANDLE_HAL_STATUS(status) << "execution failed with " << toString(status);
 
     auto result = NN_TRY(cb->get());
-    NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
-            hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared)));
-
+    if (relocation.output) {
+        relocation.output->flush();
+    }
     return result;
 }
 
@@ -91,6 +105,20 @@
            << "IPreparedModel::executeFenced is not supported on 1.0 HAL service";
 }
 
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> PreparedModel::createReusableExecution(
+        const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming /*measure*/,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& /*loopTimeoutDuration*/) const {
+    // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
+    std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+            &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+            &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
+
+    auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
+    return Execution::create(shared_from_this(), std::move(hidlRequest), std::move(relocation));
+}
+
 nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> PreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst() const {
     return Burst::create(shared_from_this());
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
index f19ed77..7820c06 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.0/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/IExecutionCallback.h>
 #include <gmock/gmock.h>
 #include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
 #include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
 #include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
 #include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -224,6 +225,150 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
 }
 
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecute) {
+    // setup call
+    const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute(_, _))
+            .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+            .WillRepeatedly(Invoke(makeExecute(V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE, V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute repeatedly
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+        const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+        EXPECT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+                                               << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+    }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteLaunchError) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute(_, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecute(V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE,
+                                         V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteReturnError) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute(_, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(
+                    makeExecute(V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE, V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteTransportFailure) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute(_, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteDeadObject) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute(_, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteCrash) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    const auto ret = [&mockPreparedModel]() -> hardware::Return<V1_0::ErrorStatus> {
+        mockPreparedModel->simulateCrash();
+        return V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE;
+    };
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute(_, _)).Times(1).WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(ret));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedNotSupported) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
 TEST(PreparedModelTest, configureExecutionBurst) {
     // setup test
     const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.1/Device.h b/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.1/Device.h
index 3aec8ee..5e224b5 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.1/Device.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.1/Device.h
@@ -52,7 +52,6 @@
     const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
     nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
     nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
-    bool isUpdatable() const override;
     const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
     const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
     std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/src/Device.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/src/Device.cpp
index d2ef57f..3197ef4 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/src/Device.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.1/utils/src/Device.cpp
@@ -106,10 +106,6 @@
     return nn::DeviceType::UNKNOWN;
 }
 
-bool Device::isUpdatable() const {
-    return false;
-}
-
 const std::vector<nn::Extension>& Device::getSupportedExtensions() const {
     return kExtensions;
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.hal b/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.hal
index 03aed86..f5b6ead 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.hal
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.hal
@@ -3618,7 +3618,7 @@
      *      front of dimension i.
      *      padding[i, 1] specifies the number of elements to be padded after
      *      the end of dimension i.
-     * * 2: An scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
+     * * 2: A scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
      *      For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT16}, the
      *      pad value must be of {@link OperandType::FLOAT16}.
      *      For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT32}, the
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Device.h b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Device.h
index 489f857..b4bef5e 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Device.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Device.h
@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@
     const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
     nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
     nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
-    bool isUpdatable() const override;
     const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
     const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
     std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Execution.h b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Execution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9c66446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/Execution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_2_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_2_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.2/IPreparedModel.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/ProtectCallback.h>
+
+#include "PreparedModel.h"
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_2::utils {
+
+class Execution final : public nn::IExecution, public std::enable_shared_from_this<Execution> {
+    struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+  public:
+    static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> create(
+            std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, V1_0::Request request,
+            hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure);
+
+    Execution(PrivateConstructorTag tag, std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel,
+              V1_0::Request request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+              V1_2::MeasureTiming measure);
+
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+            const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+    nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+            const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+  private:
+    const std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> kPreparedModel;
+    const V1_0::Request kRequest;
+    const hal::utils::RequestRelocation kRelocation;
+    const MeasureTiming kMeasure;
+};
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_2::utils
+
+#endif  // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_2_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/ExecutionBurstController.h b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/ExecutionBurstController.h
index 9669d8c0..dae1ff3 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/ExecutionBurstController.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/ExecutionBurstController.h
@@ -28,9 +28,11 @@
 #include <fmq/MessageQueue.h>
 #include <hidl/MQDescriptor.h>
 #include <nnapi/IBurst.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
 #include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
 #include <nnapi/Result.h>
 #include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
 #include <nnapi/hal/ProtectCallback.h>
 
 #include <atomic>
@@ -51,14 +53,14 @@
  * across FMQ, making it appear to the runtime as a regular synchronous inference. Additionally,
  * this class manages the burst's memory cache.
  */
-class ExecutionBurstController final : public nn::IBurst {
+class ExecutionBurstController final
+    : public nn::IBurst,
+      public std::enable_shared_from_this<ExecutionBurstController> {
     struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
 
   public:
-    using FallbackFunction =
-            std::function<nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>(
-                    const nn::Request&, nn::MeasureTiming, const nn::OptionalTimePoint&,
-                    const nn::OptionalDuration&)>;
+    using FallbackFunction = std::function<
+            nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>()>;
 
     /**
      * NN runtime memory cache.
@@ -154,10 +156,10 @@
      * @return ExecutionBurstController Execution burst controller object.
      */
     static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController>> create(
-            const sp<IPreparedModel>& preparedModel, FallbackFunction fallback,
+            nn::SharedPreparedModel preparedModel, const sp<IPreparedModel>& hidlPreparedModel,
             std::chrono::microseconds pollingTimeWindow);
 
-    ExecutionBurstController(PrivateConstructorTag tag, FallbackFunction fallback,
+    ExecutionBurstController(PrivateConstructorTag tag, nn::SharedPreparedModel preparedModel,
                              std::unique_ptr<RequestChannelSender> requestChannelSender,
                              std::unique_ptr<ResultChannelReceiver> resultChannelReceiver,
                              sp<ExecutionBurstCallback> callback, sp<IBurstContext> burstContext,
@@ -173,9 +175,21 @@
             const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
             const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
 
+    // See IBurst::createReusableExecution for information on this method.
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+            const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
+    // If fallback is not nullptr, this method will invoke the fallback function to try another
+    // execution path if the packet could not be sent. Otherwise, failing to send the packet will
+    // result in an error.
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeInternal(
+            const std::vector<FmqRequestDatum>& requestPacket,
+            const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation, FallbackFunction fallback) const;
+
   private:
     mutable std::atomic_flag mExecutionInFlight = ATOMIC_FLAG_INIT;
-    const FallbackFunction kFallback;
+    const nn::SharedPreparedModel kPreparedModel;
     const std::unique_ptr<RequestChannelSender> mRequestChannelSender;
     const std::unique_ptr<ResultChannelReceiver> mResultChannelReceiver;
     const sp<ExecutionBurstCallback> mBurstCallback;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/PreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/PreparedModel.h
index fb11130..35abd79 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/PreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.2/PreparedModel.h
@@ -58,10 +58,18 @@
             const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
             const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
 
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+            const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
     nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurst() const override;
 
     std::any getUnderlyingResource() const override;
 
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeInternal(
+            const V1_0::Request& request, MeasureTiming measure,
+            const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
   private:
     nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeSynchronously(
             const V1_0::Request& request, MeasureTiming measure) const;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Device.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Device.cpp
index 1954dfa..9fe0de2 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Device.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Device.cpp
@@ -199,10 +199,6 @@
     return kDeviceType;
 }
 
-bool Device::isUpdatable() const {
-    return false;
-}
-
 const std::vector<nn::Extension>& Device::getSupportedExtensions() const {
     return kExtensions;
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Execution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Execution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..18d1c90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/Execution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "Execution.h"
+
+#include "Callbacks.h"
+#include "Conversions.h"
+#include "Utils.h"
+
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.1/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.2/IPreparedModel.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/HandleError.h>
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_2::utils {
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> Execution::create(
+        std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, V1_0::Request request,
+        hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure) {
+    if (preparedModel == nullptr) {
+        return NN_ERROR() << "V1_2::utils::Execution::create must have non-null preparedModel";
+    }
+
+    return std::make_shared<const Execution>(PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(preparedModel),
+                                             std::move(request), std::move(relocation), measure);
+}
+
+Execution::Execution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/,
+                     std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, V1_0::Request request,
+                     hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure)
+    : kPreparedModel(std::move(preparedModel)),
+      kRequest(std::move(request)),
+      kRelocation(std::move(relocation)),
+      kMeasure(measure) {}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> Execution::compute(
+        const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/) const {
+    return kPreparedModel->executeInternal(kRequest, kMeasure, kRelocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> Execution::computeFenced(
+        const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& /*waitFor*/, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& /*timeoutDurationAfterFence*/) const {
+    return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE)
+           << "IExecution::computeFenced is not supported on 1.2 HAL service";
+}
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_2::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/ExecutionBurstController.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/ExecutionBurstController.cpp
index 7a17f25..b4b6f68 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/ExecutionBurstController.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/ExecutionBurstController.cpp
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #include <nnapi/Types.h>
 #include <nnapi/Validation.h>
 #include <nnapi/hal/1.0/Conversions.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
 #include <nnapi/hal/HandleError.h>
 #include <nnapi/hal/ProtectCallback.h>
 #include <nnapi/hal/TransferValue.h>
@@ -50,6 +51,35 @@
 namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_2::utils {
 namespace {
 
+class BurstExecution final : public nn::IExecution,
+                             public std::enable_shared_from_this<BurstExecution> {
+    struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+  public:
+    static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const BurstExecution>> create(
+            std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController> controller,
+            std::vector<FmqRequestDatum> request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+            std::vector<ExecutionBurstController::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds);
+
+    BurstExecution(PrivateConstructorTag tag,
+                   std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController> controller,
+                   std::vector<FmqRequestDatum> request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+                   std::vector<ExecutionBurstController::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds);
+
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+            const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+    nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+            const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+  private:
+    const std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController> kController;
+    const std::vector<FmqRequestDatum> kRequest;
+    const hal::utils::RequestRelocation kRelocation;
+    const std::vector<ExecutionBurstController::OptionalCacheHold> kCacheHolds;
+};
+
 nn::GeneralResult<sp<IBurstContext>> executionBurstResultCallback(
         V1_0::ErrorStatus status, const sp<IBurstContext>& burstContext) {
     HANDLE_HAL_STATUS(status) << "IPreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst failed with status "
@@ -209,10 +239,10 @@
 // ExecutionBurstController methods
 
 nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController>> ExecutionBurstController::create(
-        const sp<V1_2::IPreparedModel>& preparedModel, FallbackFunction fallback,
+        nn::SharedPreparedModel preparedModel, const sp<V1_2::IPreparedModel>& hidlPreparedModel,
         std::chrono::microseconds pollingTimeWindow) {
     // check inputs
-    if (preparedModel == nullptr) {
+    if (preparedModel == nullptr || hidlPreparedModel == nullptr) {
         return NN_ERROR() << "ExecutionBurstController::create passed a nullptr";
     }
 
@@ -236,7 +266,7 @@
     auto cb = hal::utils::CallbackValue(executionBurstResultCallback);
 
     // configure burst
-    const Return<void> ret = preparedModel->configureExecutionBurst(
+    const Return<void> ret = hidlPreparedModel->configureExecutionBurst(
             burstCallback, *requestChannelDescriptor, *resultChannelDescriptor, cb);
     HANDLE_TRANSPORT_FAILURE(ret);
 
@@ -250,18 +280,18 @@
 
     // make and return controller
     return std::make_shared<const ExecutionBurstController>(
-            PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(fallback), std::move(requestChannelSender),
+            PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(preparedModel), std::move(requestChannelSender),
             std::move(resultChannelReceiver), std::move(burstCallback), std::move(burstContext),
             std::move(memoryCache), std::move(deathHandler));
 }
 
 ExecutionBurstController::ExecutionBurstController(
-        PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/, FallbackFunction fallback,
+        PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/, nn::SharedPreparedModel preparedModel,
         std::unique_ptr<RequestChannelSender> requestChannelSender,
         std::unique_ptr<ResultChannelReceiver> resultChannelReceiver,
         sp<ExecutionBurstCallback> callback, sp<IBurstContext> burstContext,
         std::shared_ptr<MemoryCache> memoryCache, neuralnetworks::utils::DeathHandler deathHandler)
-    : kFallback(std::move(fallback)),
+    : kPreparedModel(std::move(preparedModel)),
       mRequestChannelSender(std::move(requestChannelSender)),
       mResultChannelReceiver(std::move(resultChannelReceiver)),
       mBurstCallback(std::move(callback)),
@@ -283,26 +313,98 @@
     // systraces. Note that the first point we can begin collecting systraces in
     // ExecutionBurstServer is when the RequestChannelReceiver realizes there is data in the FMQ, so
     // ExecutionBurstServer collects systraces at different points in the code.
-    NNTRACE_FULL(NNTRACE_LAYER_IPC, NNTRACE_PHASE_EXECUTION, "ExecutionBurstController::execute");
+    NNTRACE_RT(NNTRACE_PHASE_EXECUTION, "ExecutionBurstController::execute");
 
     // if the request is valid but of a higher version than what's supported in burst execution,
     // fall back to another execution path
     if (const auto version = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(nn::validate(request)));
         version > nn::Version::ANDROID_Q) {
         // fallback to another execution path if the packet could not be sent
-        if (kFallback) {
-            return kFallback(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
-        }
-        return NN_ERROR() << "Request object has features not supported by IBurst::execute";
+        return kPreparedModel->execute(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
     }
 
+    // ensure that request is ready for IPC
+    std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared =
+            NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+                    &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+                    &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation)));
+
     // clear pools field of request, as they will be provided via slots
-    const auto requestWithoutPools =
-            nn::Request{.inputs = request.inputs, .outputs = request.outputs, .pools = {}};
+    const auto requestWithoutPools = nn::Request{
+            .inputs = requestInShared.inputs, .outputs = requestInShared.outputs, .pools = {}};
     auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(
             hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(V1_0::utils::unvalidatedConvert(requestWithoutPools)));
     const auto hidlMeasure = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(measure)));
 
+    std::vector<int32_t> slots;
+    std::vector<OptionalCacheHold> holds;
+    slots.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+    holds.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+    for (const auto& memoryPool : requestInShared.pools) {
+        auto [slot, hold] = mMemoryCache->cacheMemory(std::get<nn::SharedMemory>(memoryPool));
+        slots.push_back(slot);
+        holds.push_back(std::move(hold));
+    }
+
+    // send request packet
+    const auto requestPacket = serialize(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, slots);
+    const auto fallback = [this, &request, measure, &deadline, &loopTimeoutDuration] {
+        return kPreparedModel->execute(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
+    };
+    return executeInternal(requestPacket, relocation, fallback);
+}
+
+// See IBurst::createReusableExecution for information on this method.
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> ExecutionBurstController::createReusableExecution(
+        const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+    NNTRACE_RT(NNTRACE_PHASE_EXECUTION, "ExecutionBurstController::createReusableExecution");
+
+    // if the request is valid but of a higher version than what's supported in burst execution,
+    // fall back to another execution path
+    if (const auto version = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeGeneralFailure(nn::validate(request)));
+        version > nn::Version::ANDROID_Q) {
+        // fallback to another execution path if the packet could not be sent
+        return kPreparedModel->createReusableExecution(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+    }
+
+    // ensure that request is ready for IPC
+    std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+            &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+            &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
+
+    // clear pools field of request, as they will be provided via slots
+    const auto requestWithoutPools = nn::Request{
+            .inputs = requestInShared.inputs, .outputs = requestInShared.outputs, .pools = {}};
+    auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(V1_0::utils::unvalidatedConvert(requestWithoutPools));
+    const auto hidlMeasure = NN_TRY(convert(measure));
+
+    std::vector<int32_t> slots;
+    std::vector<OptionalCacheHold> holds;
+    slots.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+    holds.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+    for (const auto& memoryPool : requestInShared.pools) {
+        auto [slot, hold] = mMemoryCache->cacheMemory(std::get<nn::SharedMemory>(memoryPool));
+        slots.push_back(slot);
+        holds.push_back(std::move(hold));
+    }
+
+    const auto requestPacket = serialize(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, slots);
+    return BurstExecution::create(shared_from_this(), std::move(requestPacket),
+                                  std::move(relocation), std::move(holds));
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>
+ExecutionBurstController::executeInternal(const std::vector<FmqRequestDatum>& requestPacket,
+                                          const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation,
+                                          FallbackFunction fallback) const {
+    NNTRACE_FULL(NNTRACE_LAYER_IPC, NNTRACE_PHASE_EXECUTION,
+                 "ExecutionBurstController::executeInternal");
+
     // Ensure that at most one execution is in flight at any given time.
     const bool alreadyInFlight = mExecutionInFlight.test_and_set();
     if (alreadyInFlight) {
@@ -310,22 +412,16 @@
     }
     const auto guard = base::make_scope_guard([this] { mExecutionInFlight.clear(); });
 
-    std::vector<int32_t> slots;
-    std::vector<OptionalCacheHold> holds;
-    slots.reserve(request.pools.size());
-    holds.reserve(request.pools.size());
-    for (const auto& memoryPool : request.pools) {
-        auto [slot, hold] = mMemoryCache->cacheMemory(std::get<nn::SharedMemory>(memoryPool));
-        slots.push_back(slot);
-        holds.push_back(std::move(hold));
+    if (relocation.input) {
+        relocation.input->flush();
     }
 
     // send request packet
-    const auto sendStatus = mRequestChannelSender->send(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, slots);
+    const auto sendStatus = mRequestChannelSender->sendPacket(requestPacket);
     if (!sendStatus.ok()) {
         // fallback to another execution path if the packet could not be sent
-        if (kFallback) {
-            return kFallback(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
+        if (fallback) {
+            return fallback();
         }
         return NN_ERROR() << "Error sending FMQ packet: " << sendStatus.error();
     }
@@ -333,7 +429,47 @@
     // get result packet
     const auto [status, outputShapes, timing] =
             NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(mResultChannelReceiver->getBlocking()));
+
+    if (relocation.output) {
+        relocation.output->flush();
+    }
     return executionCallback(status, outputShapes, timing);
 }
 
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const BurstExecution>> BurstExecution::create(
+        std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController> controller,
+        std::vector<FmqRequestDatum> request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+        std::vector<ExecutionBurstController::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds) {
+    if (controller == nullptr) {
+        return NN_ERROR() << "V1_2::utils::BurstExecution::create must have non-null controller";
+    }
+
+    return std::make_shared<const BurstExecution>(PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(controller),
+                                                  std::move(request), std::move(relocation),
+                                                  std::move(cacheHolds));
+}
+
+BurstExecution::BurstExecution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/,
+                               std::shared_ptr<const ExecutionBurstController> controller,
+                               std::vector<FmqRequestDatum> request,
+                               hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+                               std::vector<ExecutionBurstController::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds)
+    : kController(std::move(controller)),
+      kRequest(std::move(request)),
+      kRelocation(std::move(relocation)),
+      kCacheHolds(std::move(cacheHolds)) {}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> BurstExecution::compute(
+        const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/) const {
+    return kController->executeInternal(kRequest, kRelocation, /*fallback=*/nullptr);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+BurstExecution::computeFenced(const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& /*waitFor*/,
+                              const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/,
+                              const nn::OptionalDuration& /*timeoutDurationAfterFence*/) const {
+    return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE)
+           << "IExecution::computeFenced is not supported on burst object";
+}
+
 }  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_2::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
index b209a44..d0ef36e 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 
 #include "Callbacks.h"
 #include "Conversions.h"
+#include "Execution.h"
 #include "ExecutionBurstController.h"
 #include "ExecutionBurstUtils.h"
 #include "Utils.h"
@@ -93,19 +94,32 @@
         const nn::OptionalDuration& /*loopTimeoutDuration*/) const {
     // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
     std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
-    const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
-            hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared)));
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared =
+            NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+                    &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+                    &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation)));
 
     const auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(requestInShared)));
     const auto hidlMeasure = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(measure)));
 
-    auto result = kExecuteSynchronously ? executeSynchronously(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure)
-                                        : executeAsynchronously(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure);
+    return executeInternal(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, relocation);
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>
+PreparedModel::executeInternal(const V1_0::Request& request, MeasureTiming measure,
+                               const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+    if (relocation.input) {
+        relocation.input->flush();
+    }
+
+    auto result = kExecuteSynchronously ? executeSynchronously(request, measure)
+                                        : executeAsynchronously(request, measure);
     auto [outputShapes, timing] = NN_TRY(std::move(result));
 
-    NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
-            hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared)));
-
+    if (relocation.output) {
+        relocation.output->flush();
+    }
     return std::make_pair(std::move(outputShapes), timing);
 }
 
@@ -120,6 +134,22 @@
            << "IPreparedModel::executeFenced is not supported on 1.2 HAL service";
 }
 
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> PreparedModel::createReusableExecution(
+        const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& /*loopTimeoutDuration*/) const {
+    // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
+    std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+            &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+            &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
+
+    auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
+    auto hidlMeasure = NN_TRY(convert(measure));
+    return Execution::create(shared_from_this(), std::move(hidlRequest), std::move(relocation),
+                             hidlMeasure);
+}
+
 nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> PreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst() const {
     auto self = shared_from_this();
     auto fallback = [preparedModel = std::move(self)](
@@ -130,7 +160,7 @@
         return preparedModel->execute(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
     };
     const auto pollingTimeWindow = getBurstControllerPollingTimeWindow();
-    return ExecutionBurstController::create(kPreparedModel, std::move(fallback), pollingTimeWindow);
+    return ExecutionBurstController::create(shared_from_this(), kPreparedModel, pollingTimeWindow);
 }
 
 std::any PreparedModel::getUnderlyingResource() const {
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
index d297b1a..5e2ad79 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.2/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.2/IExecutionCallback.h>
 #include <gmock/gmock.h>
 #include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
 #include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
 #include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
 #include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -334,6 +335,248 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
 }
 
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSync) {
+    // setup call
+    const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _))
+            .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+            .WillRepeatedly(
+                    Invoke(makeExecuteSynchronously(V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute repeatedly
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+        const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+        EXPECT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+                                               << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+    }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncError) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(
+                    makeExecuteSynchronously(V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncTransportFailure) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncDeadObject) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsync) {
+    // setup call
+    const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_2(_, _, _))
+            .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+            .WillRepeatedly(Invoke(makeExecuteAsynchronously(
+                    V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE, V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute repeatedly
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+        const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+        EXPECT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+                                               << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+    }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncLaunchError) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_2(_, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecuteAsynchronously(V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE,
+                                                       V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {},
+                                                       kNoTiming)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncReturnError) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_2(_, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecuteAsynchronously(
+                    V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE, V1_0::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncTransportFailure) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_2(_, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncDeadObject) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_2(_, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncCrash) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+    const auto ret = [&mockPreparedModel]() -> hardware::Return<V1_0::ErrorStatus> {
+        mockPreparedModel->simulateCrash();
+        return V1_0::ErrorStatus::NONE;
+    };
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_2(_, _, _)).Times(1).WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(ret));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedNotSupported) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
 TEST(PreparedModelTest, configureExecutionBurst) {
     // setup test
     const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.hal b/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.hal
index a5dbd5e..a26b858 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.hal
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.hal
@@ -3834,7 +3834,7 @@
      *      front of dimension i.
      *      padding[i, 1] specifies the number of elements to be padded after
      *      the end of dimension i.
-     * * 2: An scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
+     * * 2: A scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
      *      For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT16}, the
      *      pad value must be of {@link OperandType::FLOAT16}.
      *      For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT32}, the
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Device.h b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Device.h
index f36b6c0..84f606a 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Device.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Device.h
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@
     const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
     nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
     nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
-    bool isUpdatable() const override;
     const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
     const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
     std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Execution.h b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Execution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06c33d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/Execution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_3_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_3_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+
+#include "PreparedModel.h"
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_3::utils {
+
+class Execution final : public nn::IExecution, public std::enable_shared_from_this<Execution> {
+    struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+  public:
+    static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> create(
+            std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+            hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure,
+            OptionalTimeoutDuration loopTimeoutDuration);
+
+    Execution(PrivateConstructorTag tag, std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel,
+              Request request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+              V1_2::MeasureTiming measure, OptionalTimeoutDuration loopTimeoutDuration);
+
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+            const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+    nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+            const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+  private:
+    const std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> kPreparedModel;
+    const Request kRequest;
+    const hal::utils::RequestRelocation kRelocation;
+    const V1_2::MeasureTiming kMeasure;
+    const OptionalTimeoutDuration kLoopTimeoutDuration;
+};
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_3::utils
+
+#endif  // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_1_3_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/PreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/PreparedModel.h
index 690fecc..5acba71 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/PreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/include/nnapi/hal/1.3/PreparedModel.h
@@ -57,10 +57,26 @@
             const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
             const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
 
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+            const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
     nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurst() const override;
 
     std::any getUnderlyingResource() const override;
 
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeInternal(
+            const Request& request, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure, const OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+            const OptionalTimeoutDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
+            const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
+    nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+    executeFencedInternal(const Request& request, const hidl_vec<hidl_handle>& waitFor,
+                          V1_2::MeasureTiming measure, const OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+                          const OptionalTimeoutDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
+                          const OptionalTimeoutDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence,
+                          const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
   private:
     nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeSynchronously(
             const Request& request, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure, const OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Conversions.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Conversions.cpp
index e8a4f55..11225cf 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Conversions.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Conversions.cpp
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@
     using Discriminator = hal::V1_3::Request::MemoryPool::hidl_discriminator;
     switch (memoryPool.getDiscriminator()) {
         case Discriminator::hidlMemory:
-            return hal::utils::createSharedMemoryFromHidlMemory(memoryPool.hidlMemory());
+            return unvalidatedConvert(memoryPool.hidlMemory());
         case Discriminator::token:
             return static_cast<Request::MemoryDomainToken>(memoryPool.token());
     }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Device.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Device.cpp
index 87c9f32..d710b85 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Device.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Device.cpp
@@ -150,10 +150,6 @@
     return kDeviceType;
 }
 
-bool Device::isUpdatable() const {
-    return false;
-}
-
 const std::vector<nn::Extension>& Device::getSupportedExtensions() const {
     return kExtensions;
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Execution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Execution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..3d17cc3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/Execution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "Execution.h"
+
+#include "Conversions.h"
+#include "PreparedModel.h"
+#include "Utils.h"
+
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.1/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.2/types.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.3/IPreparedModel.h>
+#include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.3/types.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/HandleError.h>
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_3::utils {
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> Execution::create(
+        std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+        hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure,
+        OptionalTimeoutDuration loopTimeoutDuration) {
+    if (preparedModel == nullptr) {
+        return NN_ERROR() << "V1_3::utils::Execution::create must have non-null preparedModel";
+    }
+
+    return std::make_shared<const Execution>(PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(preparedModel),
+                                             std::move(request), std::move(relocation), measure,
+                                             std::move(loopTimeoutDuration));
+}
+
+Execution::Execution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/,
+                     std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+                     hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure,
+                     OptionalTimeoutDuration loopTimeoutDuration)
+    : kPreparedModel(std::move(preparedModel)),
+      kRequest(std::move(request)),
+      kRelocation(std::move(relocation)),
+      kMeasure(measure),
+      kLoopTimeoutDuration(std::move(loopTimeoutDuration)) {}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> Execution::compute(
+        const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const {
+    const auto hidlDeadline = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(deadline)));
+    return kPreparedModel->executeInternal(kRequest, kMeasure, hidlDeadline, kLoopTimeoutDuration,
+                                           kRelocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> Execution::computeFenced(
+        const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const {
+    const auto hidlWaitFor = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertSyncFences(waitFor));
+    const auto hidlDeadline = NN_TRY(convert(deadline));
+    const auto hidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence = NN_TRY(convert(timeoutDurationAfterFence));
+    return kPreparedModel->executeFencedInternal(kRequest, hidlWaitFor, kMeasure, hidlDeadline,
+                                                 kLoopTimeoutDuration,
+                                                 hidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence, kRelocation);
+}
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::V1_3::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
index fd7f8f2..1623de5 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 
 #include "Callbacks.h"
 #include "Conversions.h"
+#include "Execution.h"
 #include "Utils.h"
 
 #include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.0/types.h>
@@ -139,8 +140,11 @@
         const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
     // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
     std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
-    const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
-            hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared)));
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared =
+            NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+                    &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+                    &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation)));
 
     const auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(requestInShared)));
     const auto hidlMeasure = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(measure)));
@@ -148,16 +152,27 @@
     const auto hidlLoopTimeoutDuration =
             NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(loopTimeoutDuration)));
 
+    return executeInternal(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, hidlDeadline, hidlLoopTimeoutDuration,
+                           relocation);
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>
+PreparedModel::executeInternal(const Request& request, V1_2::MeasureTiming measure,
+                               const OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+                               const OptionalTimeoutDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
+                               const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+    if (relocation.input) {
+        relocation.input->flush();
+    }
+
     auto result = kExecuteSynchronously
-                          ? executeSynchronously(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, hidlDeadline,
-                                                 hidlLoopTimeoutDuration)
-                          : executeAsynchronously(hidlRequest, hidlMeasure, hidlDeadline,
-                                                  hidlLoopTimeoutDuration);
+                          ? executeSynchronously(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration)
+                          : executeAsynchronously(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
     auto [outputShapes, timing] = NN_TRY(std::move(result));
 
-    NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
-            hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared)));
-
+    if (relocation.output) {
+        relocation.output->flush();
+    }
     return std::make_pair(std::move(outputShapes), timing);
 }
 
@@ -168,8 +183,10 @@
                              const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const {
     // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
     std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
-    const nn::Request& requestInShared =
-            NN_TRY(hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared));
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+            &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+            &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
 
     const auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
     const auto hidlWaitFor = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertSyncFences(waitFor));
@@ -178,27 +195,59 @@
     const auto hidlLoopTimeoutDuration = NN_TRY(convert(loopTimeoutDuration));
     const auto hidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence = NN_TRY(convert(timeoutDurationAfterFence));
 
+    return executeFencedInternal(hidlRequest, hidlWaitFor, hidlMeasure, hidlDeadline,
+                                 hidlLoopTimeoutDuration, hidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence,
+                                 relocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+PreparedModel::executeFencedInternal(const Request& request, const hidl_vec<hidl_handle>& waitFor,
+                                     V1_2::MeasureTiming measure, const OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+                                     const OptionalTimeoutDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
+                                     const OptionalTimeoutDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence,
+                                     const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+    if (relocation.input) {
+        relocation.input->flush();
+    }
+
     auto cb = hal::utils::CallbackValue(fencedExecutionCallback);
 
-    const auto ret = kPreparedModel->executeFenced(hidlRequest, hidlWaitFor, hidlMeasure,
-                                                   hidlDeadline, hidlLoopTimeoutDuration,
-                                                   hidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence, cb);
+    const auto ret =
+            kPreparedModel->executeFenced(request, waitFor, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration,
+                                          timeoutDurationAfterFence, cb);
     HANDLE_TRANSPORT_FAILURE(ret);
     auto [syncFence, callback] = NN_TRY(cb.take());
 
     // If executeFenced required the request memory to be moved into shared memory, block here until
     // the fenced execution has completed and flush the memory back.
-    if (maybeRequestInShared.has_value()) {
+    if (relocation.output) {
         const auto state = syncFence.syncWait({});
         if (state != nn::SyncFence::FenceState::SIGNALED) {
             return NN_ERROR() << "syncWait failed with " << state;
         }
-        NN_TRY(hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared));
+        relocation.output->flush();
     }
 
     return std::make_pair(std::move(syncFence), std::move(callback));
 }
 
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> PreparedModel::createReusableExecution(
+        const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+    // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
+    std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+            &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kMinMemoryPadding,
+            &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
+
+    auto hidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
+    auto hidlMeasure = NN_TRY(convert(measure));
+    auto hidlLoopTimeoutDuration = NN_TRY(convert(loopTimeoutDuration));
+    return Execution::create(shared_from_this(), std::move(hidlRequest), std::move(relocation),
+                             hidlMeasure, std::move(hidlLoopTimeoutDuration));
+}
+
 nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> PreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst() const {
     auto self = shared_from_this();
     auto fallback = [preparedModel = std::move(self)](
@@ -209,7 +258,7 @@
         return preparedModel->execute(request, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration);
     };
     const auto pollingTimeWindow = V1_2::utils::getBurstControllerPollingTimeWindow();
-    return V1_2::utils::ExecutionBurstController::create(kPreparedModel, std::move(fallback),
+    return V1_2::utils::ExecutionBurstController::create(shared_from_this(), kPreparedModel,
                                                          pollingTimeWindow);
 }
 
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
index 5303c2a..6dbbd6b 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/1.3/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <android/hardware/neuralnetworks/1.3/IFencedExecutionCallback.h>
 #include <gmock/gmock.h>
 #include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
 #include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
 #include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
 #include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -462,6 +463,363 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
 }
 
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSync) {
+    // setup call
+    const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+            .WillRepeatedly(
+                    Invoke(makeExecuteSynchronously(V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute repeatedly
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+        const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+        EXPECT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+                                               << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+    }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncError) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(
+                    makeExecuteSynchronously(V1_3::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncTransportFailure) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncDeadObject) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsync) {
+    // setup call
+    const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+            .WillRepeatedly(Invoke(makeExecuteAsynchronously(
+                    V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE, V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute repeatedly
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+        const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+        EXPECT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+                                               << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+    }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncLaunchError) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecuteAsynchronously(V1_3::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE,
+                                                       V1_3::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {},
+                                                       kNoTiming)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncReturnError) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecuteAsynchronously(
+                    V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE, V1_3::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {}, kNoTiming)));
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = preparedModel->execute({}, {}, {}, {});
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncTransportFailure) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncDeadObject) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteAsyncCrash) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/false).value();
+    const auto ret = [&mockPreparedModel]() -> hardware::Return<V1_3::ErrorStatus> {
+        mockPreparedModel->simulateCrash();
+        return V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE;
+    };
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, execute_1_3(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(ret));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFenced) {
+    // setup call
+    const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+    const auto mockCallback = MockFencedExecutionCallback::create();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockCallback, getExecutionInfo(_))
+            .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+            .WillRepeatedly(Invoke(makeExecuteFencedCallbackReturn(V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE,
+                                                                   kNoTiming, kNoTiming)));
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+            .WillRepeatedly(
+                    Invoke(makeExecuteFencedReturn(V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE, {}, mockCallback)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute repeatedly
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+        const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+        ASSERT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+                                               << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+        const auto& [syncFence, callback] = computeResult.value();
+        EXPECT_EQ(syncFence.syncWait({}), nn::SyncFence::FenceState::SIGNALED);
+        ASSERT_NE(callback, nullptr);
+
+        // get results from callback
+        const auto callbackResult = callback();
+        ASSERT_TRUE(callbackResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << callbackResult.error().code
+                                                << ": " << callbackResult.error().message;
+    }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedCallbackError) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+    const auto mockCallback = MockFencedExecutionCallback::create();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockCallback, getExecutionInfo(_))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecuteFencedCallbackReturn(V1_3::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE,
+                                                             kNoTiming, kNoTiming)));
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(makeExecuteFencedReturn(V1_3::ErrorStatus::NONE, {}, mockCallback)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code << ": "
+                                           << computeResult.error().message;
+    const auto& [syncFence, callback] = computeResult.value();
+    EXPECT_NE(syncFence.syncWait({}), nn::SyncFence::FenceState::ACTIVE);
+    ASSERT_NE(callback, nullptr);
+
+    // verify callback failure
+    const auto callbackResult = callback();
+    ASSERT_FALSE(callbackResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(callbackResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedError) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(
+                    makeExecuteFencedReturn(V1_3::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE, {}, nullptr)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedTransportFailure) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedDeadObject) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = createMockPreparedModel();
+    const auto preparedModel =
+            PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel, /*executeSynchronously=*/true).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
 TEST(PreparedModelTest, configureExecutionBurst) {
     // setup test
     const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl
index 634f39e..eb3d0b0 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl
@@ -34,6 +34,6 @@
 package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
 @VintfStability
 interface IBurst {
-  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.ExecutionResult executeSynchronously(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Request request, in long[] memoryIdentifierTokens, in boolean measureTiming, in long deadline, in long loopTimeoutDuration);
+  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.ExecutionResult executeSynchronously(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Request request, in long[] memoryIdentifierTokens, in boolean measureTiming, in long deadlineNs, in long loopTimeoutDurationNs);
   void releaseMemoryResource(in long memoryIdentifierToken);
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl
index b328b29..c9c67f2 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl
@@ -41,8 +41,8 @@
   boolean[] getSupportedOperations(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Model model);
   android.hardware.neuralnetworks.DeviceType getType();
   String getVersionString();
-  void prepareModel(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Model model, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.ExecutionPreference preference, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Priority priority, in long deadline, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] dataCache, in byte[] token, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.IPreparedModelCallback callback);
-  void prepareModelFromCache(in long deadline, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] dataCache, in byte[] token, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.IPreparedModelCallback callback);
+  void prepareModel(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Model model, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.ExecutionPreference preference, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Priority priority, in long deadlineNs, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] dataCache, in byte[] token, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.IPreparedModelCallback callback);
+  void prepareModelFromCache(in long deadlineNs, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] dataCache, in byte[] token, in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.IPreparedModelCallback callback);
   const int BYTE_SIZE_OF_CACHE_TOKEN = 32;
   const int MAX_NUMBER_OF_CACHE_FILES = 32;
   const int EXTENSION_TYPE_HIGH_BITS_PREFIX = 15;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl
index 52882cd..fccb5dc 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@
 package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
 @VintfStability
 interface IPreparedModel {
-  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.ExecutionResult executeSynchronously(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Request request, in boolean measureTiming, in long deadline, in long loopTimeoutDuration);
-  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.FencedExecutionResult executeFenced(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Request request, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] waitFor, in boolean measureTiming, in long deadline, in long loopTimeoutDuration, in long duration);
+  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.ExecutionResult executeSynchronously(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Request request, in boolean measureTiming, in long deadlineNs, in long loopTimeoutDurationNs);
+  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.FencedExecutionResult executeFenced(in android.hardware.neuralnetworks.Request request, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] waitFor, in boolean measureTiming, in long deadlineNs, in long loopTimeoutDurationNs, in long durationNs);
   android.hardware.neuralnetworks.IBurst configureExecutionBurst();
   const long DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS = 2000000000;
   const long MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS = 15000000000;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
index 5a9f4ff..1d9bdd8 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
@@ -34,11 +34,11 @@
 package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
 @VintfStability
 parcelable Operand {
-  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType type;
+  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType type = android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType.FLOAT32;
   int[] dimensions;
   float scale;
   int zeroPoint;
-  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandLifeTime lifetime;
+  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandLifeTime lifetime = android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandLifeTime.TEMPORARY_VARIABLE;
   android.hardware.neuralnetworks.DataLocation location;
   @nullable android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandExtraParams extraParams;
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
index de93d8b..ebb361b 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
@@ -34,6 +34,6 @@
 package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
 @VintfStability
 parcelable OperandPerformance {
-  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType type;
+  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType type = android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperandType.FLOAT32;
   android.hardware.neuralnetworks.PerformanceInfo info;
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
index 33fcd60..a4a3fbe 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
 package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
 @VintfStability
 parcelable Operation {
-  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperationType type;
+  android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperationType type = android.hardware.neuralnetworks.OperationType.ADD;
   int[] inputs;
   int[] outputs;
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl
index 9690e01..bcc83cf 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.neuralnetworks/current/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl
@@ -34,6 +34,6 @@
 package android.hardware.neuralnetworks;
 @VintfStability
 parcelable Timing {
-  long timeOnDevice;
-  long timeInDriver;
+  long timeOnDeviceNs;
+  long timeInDriverNs;
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl
index 85d2a03..decdc48 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IBurst.aidl
@@ -77,18 +77,18 @@
      * @param measure Specifies whether or not to measure duration of the execution. The duration
      *                runs from the time the driver sees the call to the executeSynchronously
      *                function to the time the driver returns from the function.
-     * @param deadline The time by which the execution is expected to complete. The time is measured
-     *                 in nanoseconds since epoch of the steady clock (as from
-     *                 std::chrono::steady_clock). If the execution cannot be finished by the
-     *                 deadline, the execution may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline is
-     *                 omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
-     * @param loopTimeoutDuration The maximum amount of time in nanoseconds that should be spent
-     *                            executing a {@link OperationType::WHILE} operation. If a loop
-     *                            condition model does not output false within this duration, the
-     *                            execution must be aborted. If -1 is provided, the maximum amount
-     *                            of time is {@link DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}. Other
-     *                            negative values are invalid. When provided, the duration must not
-     *                            exceed {@link MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}.
+     * @param deadlineNs The time by which the execution is expected to complete. The time is
+     *                   measured in nanoseconds since epoch of the steady clock (as from
+     *                   std::chrono::steady_clock). If the execution cannot be finished by the
+     *                   deadline, the execution may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline is
+     *                   omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
+     * @param loopTimeoutDurationNs The maximum amount of time in nanoseconds that should be spent
+     *                              executing a {@link OperationType::WHILE} operation. If a loop
+     *                              condition model does not output false within this duration, the
+     *                              execution must be aborted. If -1 is provided, the maximum amount
+     *                              of time is {@link DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}. Other
+     *                              negative values are invalid. When provided, the duration must
+     *                              not exceed {@link MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}.
      * @return ExecutionResult parcelable, containing the status of the execution, output shapes and
      *     timing information.
      * @throws ServiceSpecificException with one of the following ErrorStatus values:
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@
      *     - RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED_* if the task was aborted by the driver
      */
     ExecutionResult executeSynchronously(in Request request, in long[] memoryIdentifierTokens,
-            in boolean measureTiming, in long deadline, in long loopTimeoutDuration);
+            in boolean measureTiming, in long deadlineNs, in long loopTimeoutDurationNs);
 
     /**
      * releaseMemoryResource is used by the client to signal to the service that a memory buffer
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl
index c5b4ab1..72e2623 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IDevice.aidl
@@ -306,11 +306,11 @@
      * @param preference Indicates the intended execution behavior of a prepared model.
      * @param priority The priority of the prepared model relative to other prepared models owned by
      *                 the client.
-     * @param deadline The time by which the model is expected to be prepared. The time is measured
-     *                 in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts)
-     *                 or ::android::base::boot_clock). If the model cannot be prepared by the
-     *                 deadline, the preparation may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline is
-     *                 omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
+     * @param deadlineNs The time by which the model is expected to be prepared. The time is
+     *                   measured in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME,
+     *                   &ts) or ::android::base::boot_clock). If the model cannot be prepared by
+     *                   the deadline, the preparation may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline
+     *                   is omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
      * @param modelCache A vector of file descriptors for the security-sensitive cache. The length
      *                   of the vector must either be 0 indicating that caching information is not
      *                   provided, or match the numModelCache returned from
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@
      *     - RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED_* if the task was aborted by the driver
      */
     void prepareModel(in Model model, in ExecutionPreference preference, in Priority priority,
-            in long deadline, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache,
+            in long deadlineNs, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache,
             in ParcelFileDescriptor[] dataCache, in byte[] token,
             in IPreparedModelCallback callback);
 
@@ -395,11 +395,11 @@
      * with a set of inputs to the model. Note that the same prepared model object may be used with
      * different shapes of inputs on different (possibly concurrent) executions.
      *
-     * @param deadline The time by which the model is expected to be prepared. The time is measured
-     *                 in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) or
-     *                 ::android::base::boot_clock). If the model cannot be prepared by the
-     *                 deadline, the preparation may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline is
-     *                 omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
+     * @param deadlineNs The time by which the model is expected to be prepared. The time is
+     *                   measured in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME,
+     *                   &ts) or ::android::base::boot_clock). If the model cannot be prepared by
+     *                   the deadline, the preparation may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline
+     *                   is omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
      * @param modelCache A vector of file descriptors for the security-sensitive cache. The length
      *                   of the vector must match the numModelCache returned from
      *                   getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded. The cache file descriptors will be provided in
@@ -426,7 +426,7 @@
      *       the deadline
      *     - RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED_* if the task was aborted by the driver
      */
-    void prepareModelFromCache(in long deadline, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache,
+    void prepareModelFromCache(in long deadlineNs, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] modelCache,
             in ParcelFileDescriptor[] dataCache, in byte[] token,
             in IPreparedModelCallback callback);
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl
index bfab906..956b626 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.aidl
@@ -72,18 +72,18 @@
      * @param measure Specifies whether or not to measure duration of the execution. The duration
      *                runs from the time the driver sees the call to the executeSynchronously
      *                function to the time the driver returns from the function.
-     * @param deadline The time by which the execution is expected to complete. The time is measured
-     *                 in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) or
-     *                 ::android::base::boot_clock). If the execution cannot be finished by the
-     *                 deadline, the execution may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline is
-     *                 omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
-     * @param loopTimeoutDuration The maximum amount of time in nanoseconds that should be spent
-     *                            executing a {@link OperationType::WHILE} operation. If a loop
-     *                            condition model does not output false within this duration, the
-     *                            execution must be aborted. If -1 is provided, the maximum amount
-     *                            of time is {@link DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}. Other
-     *                            negative values are invalid. When provided, the duration must not
-     *                            exceed {@link MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}.
+     * @param deadlineNs The time by which the execution is expected to complete. The time is
+     *                   measured in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME,
+     *                   &ts) or ::android::base::boot_clock). If the execution cannot be finished
+     *                   by the deadline, the execution may be aborted. Passing -1 means the
+     *                   deadline is omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
+     * @param loopTimeoutDurationNs The maximum amount of time in nanoseconds that should be spent
+     *                              executing a {@link OperationType::WHILE} operation. If a loop
+     *                              condition model does not output false within this duration, the
+     *                              execution must be aborted. If -1 is provided, the maximum amount
+     *                              of time is {@link DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}. Other
+     *                              negative values are invalid. When provided, the duration must
+     *                              not exceed {@link MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}.
      * @return ExecutionResult parcelable, containing the status of the execution, output shapes and
      *     timing information.
      * @throws ServiceSpecificException with one of the following ErrorStatus values:
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
      *     - RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED_* if the task was aborted by the driver
      */
     ExecutionResult executeSynchronously(in Request request, in boolean measureTiming,
-            in long deadline, in long loopTimeoutDuration);
+            in long deadlineNs, in long loopTimeoutDurationNs);
 
     /**
      * Launch a fenced asynchronous execution on a prepared model.
@@ -137,22 +137,23 @@
      * @param waitFor A vector of sync fence file descriptors. Execution must not start until all
      *                sync fences have been signaled.
      * @param measure Specifies whether or not to measure duration of the execution.
-     * @param deadline The time by which the execution is expected to complete. The time is measured
-     *                 in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) or
-     *                 ::android::base::boot_clock). If the execution cannot be finished by the
-     *                 deadline, the execution may be aborted. Passing -1 means the deadline is
-     *                 omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
-     * @param loopTimeoutDuration The maximum amount of time in nanoseconds that should be spent
-     *                            executing a {@link OperationType::WHILE} operation. If a loop
-     *                            condition model does not output false within this duration, the
-     *                            execution must be aborted. If -1 is provided, the maximum amount
-     *                            of time is {@link DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}. Other
-     *                            negative values are invalid. When provided, the duration must not
-     *                            exceed {@link MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}.
-     * @param duration The length of time in nanoseconds within which the execution is expected to
-     *                 complete after all sync fences in waitFor are signaled. If the execution
-     *                 cannot be finished within the duration, the execution may be aborted. Passing
-     *                 -1 means the duration is omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
+     * @param deadlineNs The time by which the execution is expected to complete. The time is
+     *                   measured in nanoseconds since boot (as from clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME,
+     *                   &ts) or ::android::base::boot_clock). If the execution cannot be finished
+     *                   by the deadline, the execution may be aborted. Passing -1 means the
+     *                   deadline is omitted. Other negative values are invalid.
+     * @param loopTimeoutDurationNs The maximum amount of time in nanoseconds that should be spent
+     *                              executing a {@link OperationType::WHILE} operation. If a loop
+     *                              condition model does not output false within this duration, the
+     *                              execution must be aborted. If -1 is provided, the maximum amount
+     *                              of time is {@link DEFAULT_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}. Other
+     *                              negative values are invalid. When provided, the duration must
+     *                              not exceed {@link MAXIMUM_LOOP_TIMEOUT_DURATION_NS}.
+     * @param durationNs The length of time in nanoseconds within which the execution is expected to
+     *                   complete after all sync fences in waitFor are signaled. If the execution
+     *                   cannot be finished within the duration, the execution may be aborted.
+     *                   Passing -1 means the duration is omitted. Other negative values are
+     *                   invalid.
      * @return The FencedExecutionResult parcelable, containing IFencedExecutionCallback and the
      *         sync fence.
      * @throws ServiceSpecificException with one of the following ErrorStatus values:
@@ -165,8 +166,8 @@
      *     - RESOURCE_EXHAUSTED_* if the task was aborted by the driver
      */
     FencedExecutionResult executeFenced(in Request request, in ParcelFileDescriptor[] waitFor,
-            in boolean measureTiming, in long deadline, in long loopTimeoutDuration,
-            in long duration);
+            in boolean measureTiming, in long deadlineNs, in long loopTimeoutDurationNs,
+            in long durationNs);
 
     /**
      * Configure a Burst object used to execute multiple inferences on a prepared model in rapid
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
index 4d2260f..998e06d 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operand.aidl
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@
      * {@link IDevice::OPERAND_TYPE_BASE_MAX} is possible and should be interpreted as an extension
      * type according to {@link Model::extensionNameToPrefix}.
      */
-    OperandType type;
+    OperandType type = OperandType.FLOAT32;
     /**
      * Dimensions of the operand.
      *
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@
     /**
      * How the operand is used.
      */
-    OperandLifeTime lifetime;
+    OperandLifeTime lifetime = OperandLifeTime.TEMPORARY_VARIABLE;
     /**
      * Where to find the data for this operand.
      * If the lifetime is TEMPORARY_VARIABLE, SUBGRAPH_INPUT, SUBGRAPH_OUTPUT, or NO_VALUE:
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
index 7fd86f9..7f53967 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperandPerformance.aidl
@@ -25,6 +25,6 @@
  */
 @VintfStability
 parcelable OperandPerformance {
-    OperandType type;
+    OperandType type = OperandType.FLOAT32;
     PerformanceInfo info;
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
index 0c6032f..366d9a4 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Operation.aidl
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
      * {@link IDevice::OPERATION_TYPE_BASE_MAX} is possible and should be interpreted as an
      * extension type according to {@link Model::extensionNameToPrefix}.
      */
-    OperationType type;
+    OperationType type = OperationType.ADD;
     /**
      * Describes the table that contains the indexes of the inputs of the operation. The offset is
      * the index in the operandIndexes table.
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperationType.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperationType.aidl
index 3f49154..e7fb90d 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperationType.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/OperationType.aidl
@@ -3693,7 +3693,7 @@
      *      front of dimension i.
      *      padding[i, 1] specifies the number of elements to be padded after
      *      the end of dimension i.
-     * * 2: An scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
+     * * 2: A scalar specifying the value to use for padding input0.
      *      For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT16}, the
      *      pad value must be of {@link OperandType::FLOAT16}.
      *      For input tensor of {@link OperandType::TENSOR_FLOAT32}, the
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl
index 8130e08..5225096 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Timing.aidl
@@ -28,9 +28,9 @@
     /**
      * Execution time on device (not driver, which runs on host processor).
      */
-    long timeOnDevice;
+    long timeOnDeviceNs;
     /**
      * Execution time in driver (including time on device).
      */
-    long timeInDriver;
+    long timeInDriverNs;
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Burst.h b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Burst.h
index 008e4e4..0cc78d4 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Burst.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Burst.h
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
 
 // Class that adapts aidl_hal::IBurst to nn::IBurst.
-class Burst final : public nn::IBurst {
+class Burst final : public nn::IBurst, public std::enable_shared_from_this<Burst> {
     struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
 
   public:
@@ -100,6 +100,16 @@
             const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
             const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
 
+    // See IBurst::createReusableExecution for information.
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+            const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeInternal(
+            const aidl_hal::Request& request, const std::vector<int64_t>& memoryIdentifierTokens,
+            bool measure, int64_t deadline, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+            const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
   private:
     mutable std::atomic_flag mExecutionInFlight = ATOMIC_FLAG_INIT;
     const std::shared_ptr<aidl_hal::IBurst> kBurst;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Conversions.h b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Conversions.h
index 5eab9ff..78433a7 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Conversions.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Conversions.h
@@ -95,9 +95,7 @@
 GeneralResult<Extension> unvalidatedConvert(const aidl_hal::Extension& extension);
 GeneralResult<Extension::OperandTypeInformation> unvalidatedConvert(
         const aidl_hal::ExtensionOperandTypeInformation& operandTypeInformation);
-GeneralResult<SharedHandle> unvalidatedConvert(
-        const ::aidl::android::hardware::common::NativeHandle& handle);
-GeneralResult<SyncFence> unvalidatedConvert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& syncFence);
+GeneralResult<SharedHandle> unvalidatedConvert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& handle);
 
 GeneralResult<std::vector<Operation>> unvalidatedConvert(
         const std::vector<aidl_hal::Operation>& operations);
@@ -113,7 +111,7 @@
 GeneralResult<Priority> convert(const aidl_hal::Priority& priority);
 GeneralResult<Request> convert(const aidl_hal::Request& request);
 GeneralResult<Timing> convert(const aidl_hal::Timing& timing);
-GeneralResult<SyncFence> convert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& syncFence);
+GeneralResult<SharedHandle> convert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& handle);
 
 GeneralResult<std::vector<Extension>> convert(const std::vector<aidl_hal::Extension>& extension);
 GeneralResult<std::vector<SharedMemory>> convert(const std::vector<aidl_hal::Memory>& memories);
@@ -160,9 +158,7 @@
 nn::GeneralResult<int64_t> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::OptionalDuration& optionalDuration);
 nn::GeneralResult<int64_t> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::OptionalTimePoint& optionalTimePoint);
 nn::GeneralResult<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::SyncFence& syncFence);
-nn::GeneralResult<common::NativeHandle> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::SharedHandle& sharedHandle);
-nn::GeneralResult<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> unvalidatedConvertCache(
-        const nn::SharedHandle& handle);
+nn::GeneralResult<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::SharedHandle& handle);
 
 nn::GeneralResult<std::vector<uint8_t>> convert(const nn::CacheToken& cacheToken);
 nn::GeneralResult<BufferDesc> convert(const nn::BufferDesc& bufferDesc);
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Device.h b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Device.h
index eb194e3..1457646 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Device.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Device.h
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@
     const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
     nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
     nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
-    bool isUpdatable() const override;
     const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
     const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
     std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Execution.h b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Execution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a77ea98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/Execution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_AIDL_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_AIDL_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
+
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+
+#include "PreparedModel.h"
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+
+class Execution final : public nn::IExecution, public std::enable_shared_from_this<Execution> {
+    struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+  public:
+    static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> create(
+            std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+            hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, bool measure, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration);
+
+    Execution(PrivateConstructorTag tag, std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel,
+              Request request, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, bool measure,
+              int64_t loopTimeoutDuration);
+
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+            const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+    nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+            const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+  private:
+    const std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> kPreparedModel;
+    const Request kRequest;
+    const hal::utils::RequestRelocation kRelocation;
+    const bool kMeasure;
+    const int64_t kLoopTimeoutDuration;
+};
+
+}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
+
+#endif  // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_AIDL_UTILS_EXECUTION_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/PreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/PreparedModel.h
index abce6cc..4035764 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/PreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/include/nnapi/hal/aidl/PreparedModel.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_AIDL_UTILS_PREPARED_MODEL_H
 
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IPreparedModel.h>
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Request.h>
 #include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
 #include <nnapi/Result.h>
 #include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -34,7 +35,8 @@
 namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
 
 // Class that adapts aidl_hal::IPreparedModel to nn::IPreparedModel.
-class PreparedModel final : public nn::IPreparedModel {
+class PreparedModel final : public nn::IPreparedModel,
+                            public std::enable_shared_from_this<PreparedModel> {
     struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
 
   public:
@@ -55,10 +57,25 @@
             const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
             const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
 
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+            const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
     nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurst() const override;
 
     std::any getUnderlyingResource() const override;
 
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> executeInternal(
+            const Request& request, bool measure, int64_t deadline, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+            const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
+    nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+    executeFencedInternal(const Request& request,
+                          const std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>& waitFor, bool measure,
+                          int64_t deadline, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+                          int64_t timeoutDurationAfterFence,
+                          const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const;
+
   private:
     const std::shared_ptr<aidl_hal::IPreparedModel> kPreparedModel;
 };
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Burst.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Burst.cpp
index 0b475bc..800ac32 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Burst.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Burst.cpp
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
 #include <android/binder_auto_utils.h>
 #include <nnapi/IBurst.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
 #include <nnapi/Result.h>
 #include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
 #include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -35,6 +36,39 @@
 namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
 namespace {
 
+class BurstExecution final : public nn::IExecution,
+                             public std::enable_shared_from_this<BurstExecution> {
+    struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+  public:
+    static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const BurstExecution>> create(
+            std::shared_ptr<const Burst> burst, Request request,
+            std::vector<int64_t> memoryIdentifierTokens, bool measure, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+            hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+            std::vector<Burst::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds);
+
+    BurstExecution(PrivateConstructorTag tag, std::shared_ptr<const Burst> burst, Request request,
+                   std::vector<int64_t> memoryIdentifierTokens, bool measure,
+                   int64_t loopTimeoutDuration, hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+                   std::vector<Burst::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds);
+
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+            const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+    nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+            const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+  private:
+    const std::shared_ptr<const Burst> kBurst;
+    const Request kRequest;
+    const std::vector<int64_t> kMemoryIdentifierTokens;
+    const bool kMeasure;
+    const int64_t kLoopTimeoutDuration;
+    const hal::utils::RequestRelocation kRelocation;
+    const std::vector<Burst::OptionalCacheHold> kCacheHolds;
+};
+
 nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> convertExecutionResults(
         const std::vector<OutputShape>& outputShapes, const Timing& timing) {
     return std::make_pair(NN_TRY(nn::convert(outputShapes)), NN_TRY(nn::convert(timing)));
@@ -139,17 +173,13 @@
         const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
         const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
         const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
-    // Ensure that at most one execution is in flight at any given time.
-    const bool alreadyInFlight = mExecutionInFlight.test_and_set();
-    if (alreadyInFlight) {
-        return NN_ERROR() << "IBurst already has an execution in flight";
-    }
-    const auto guard = ::android::base::make_scope_guard([this] { mExecutionInFlight.clear(); });
-
     // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
     std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
-    const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
-            hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared)));
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared =
+            NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+                    &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryPadding,
+                    &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation)));
 
     const auto aidlRequest = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(requestInShared)));
     const auto aidlMeasure = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(measure)));
@@ -159,9 +189,9 @@
 
     std::vector<int64_t> memoryIdentifierTokens;
     std::vector<OptionalCacheHold> holds;
-    memoryIdentifierTokens.reserve(request.pools.size());
-    holds.reserve(request.pools.size());
-    for (const auto& memoryPool : request.pools) {
+    memoryIdentifierTokens.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+    holds.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+    for (const auto& memoryPool : requestInShared.pools) {
         if (const auto* memory = std::get_if<nn::SharedMemory>(&memoryPool)) {
             if (auto cached = kMemoryCache->getMemoryIfAvailable(*memory)) {
                 auto& [identifier, hold] = *cached;
@@ -172,12 +202,30 @@
         }
         memoryIdentifierTokens.push_back(-1);
     }
-    CHECK_EQ(request.pools.size(), memoryIdentifierTokens.size());
+    CHECK_EQ(requestInShared.pools.size(), memoryIdentifierTokens.size());
+
+    return executeInternal(aidlRequest, memoryIdentifierTokens, aidlMeasure, aidlDeadline,
+                           aidlLoopTimeoutDuration, relocation);
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> Burst::executeInternal(
+        const Request& request, const std::vector<int64_t>& memoryIdentifierTokens, bool measure,
+        int64_t deadline, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+        const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+    // Ensure that at most one execution is in flight at any given time.
+    const bool alreadyInFlight = mExecutionInFlight.test_and_set();
+    if (alreadyInFlight) {
+        return NN_ERROR() << "IBurst already has an execution in flight";
+    }
+    const auto guard = ::android::base::make_scope_guard([this] { mExecutionInFlight.clear(); });
+
+    if (relocation.input) {
+        relocation.input->flush();
+    }
 
     ExecutionResult executionResult;
-    const auto ret =
-            kBurst->executeSynchronously(aidlRequest, memoryIdentifierTokens, aidlMeasure,
-                                         aidlDeadline, aidlLoopTimeoutDuration, &executionResult);
+    const auto ret = kBurst->executeSynchronously(request, memoryIdentifierTokens, measure,
+                                                  deadline, loopTimeoutDuration, &executionResult);
     HANDLE_ASTATUS(ret) << "execute failed";
     if (!executionResult.outputSufficientSize) {
         auto canonicalOutputShapes =
@@ -188,10 +236,89 @@
     auto [outputShapes, timing] = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
             convertExecutionResults(executionResult.outputShapes, executionResult.timing)));
 
-    NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
-            hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared)));
-
+    if (relocation.output) {
+        relocation.output->flush();
+    }
     return std::make_pair(std::move(outputShapes), timing);
 }
 
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> Burst::createReusableExecution(
+        const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+    // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
+    std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+            &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryPadding,
+            &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
+
+    auto aidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
+    const auto aidlMeasure = NN_TRY(convert(measure));
+    const auto aidlLoopTimeoutDuration = NN_TRY(convert(loopTimeoutDuration));
+
+    std::vector<int64_t> memoryIdentifierTokens;
+    std::vector<OptionalCacheHold> holds;
+    memoryIdentifierTokens.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+    holds.reserve(requestInShared.pools.size());
+    for (const auto& memoryPool : requestInShared.pools) {
+        if (const auto* memory = std::get_if<nn::SharedMemory>(&memoryPool)) {
+            if (auto cached = kMemoryCache->getMemoryIfAvailable(*memory)) {
+                auto& [identifier, hold] = *cached;
+                memoryIdentifierTokens.push_back(identifier);
+                holds.push_back(std::move(hold));
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+        memoryIdentifierTokens.push_back(-1);
+    }
+    CHECK_EQ(requestInShared.pools.size(), memoryIdentifierTokens.size());
+
+    return BurstExecution::create(shared_from_this(), std::move(aidlRequest),
+                                  std::move(memoryIdentifierTokens), aidlMeasure,
+                                  aidlLoopTimeoutDuration, std::move(relocation), std::move(holds));
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const BurstExecution>> BurstExecution::create(
+        std::shared_ptr<const Burst> burst, Request request,
+        std::vector<int64_t> memoryIdentifierTokens, bool measure, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+        hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+        std::vector<Burst::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds) {
+    if (burst == nullptr) {
+        return NN_ERROR() << "aidl::utils::BurstExecution::create must have non-null burst";
+    }
+
+    return std::make_shared<const BurstExecution>(
+            PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(burst), std::move(request),
+            std::move(memoryIdentifierTokens), measure, loopTimeoutDuration, std::move(relocation),
+            std::move(cacheHolds));
+}
+
+BurstExecution::BurstExecution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/, std::shared_ptr<const Burst> burst,
+                               Request request, std::vector<int64_t> memoryIdentifierTokens,
+                               bool measure, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+                               hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation,
+                               std::vector<Burst::OptionalCacheHold> cacheHolds)
+    : kBurst(std::move(burst)),
+      kRequest(std::move(request)),
+      kMemoryIdentifierTokens(std::move(memoryIdentifierTokens)),
+      kMeasure(measure),
+      kLoopTimeoutDuration(loopTimeoutDuration),
+      kRelocation(std::move(relocation)),
+      kCacheHolds(std::move(cacheHolds)) {}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> BurstExecution::compute(
+        const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const {
+    const auto aidlDeadline = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(deadline)));
+    return kBurst->executeInternal(kRequest, kMemoryIdentifierTokens, kMeasure, aidlDeadline,
+                                   kLoopTimeoutDuration, kRelocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+BurstExecution::computeFenced(const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& /*waitFor*/,
+                              const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/,
+                              const nn::OptionalDuration& /*timeoutDurationAfterFence*/) const {
+    return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE)
+           << "IExecution::computeFenced is not supported on burst object";
+}
+
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Conversions.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Conversions.cpp
index 93ac51c..0517730 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Conversions.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Conversions.cpp
@@ -108,17 +108,6 @@
     return canonical;
 }
 
-GeneralResult<Handle> unvalidatedConvertHelper(const NativeHandle& aidlNativeHandle) {
-    std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds;
-    fds.reserve(aidlNativeHandle.fds.size());
-    for (const auto& fd : aidlNativeHandle.fds) {
-        auto duplicatedFd = NN_TRY(dupFd(fd.get()));
-        fds.emplace_back(duplicatedFd.release());
-    }
-
-    return Handle{.fds = std::move(fds), .ints = aidlNativeHandle.ints};
-}
-
 struct NativeHandleDeleter {
     void operator()(native_handle_t* handle) const {
         if (handle) {
@@ -410,11 +399,11 @@
 }
 
 GeneralResult<Timing> unvalidatedConvert(const aidl_hal::Timing& timing) {
-    if (timing.timeInDriver < -1) {
-        return NN_ERROR() << "Timing: timeInDriver must not be less than -1";
+    if (timing.timeInDriverNs < -1) {
+        return NN_ERROR() << "Timing: timeInDriverNs must not be less than -1";
     }
-    if (timing.timeOnDevice < -1) {
-        return NN_ERROR() << "Timing: timeOnDevice must not be less than -1";
+    if (timing.timeOnDeviceNs < -1) {
+        return NN_ERROR() << "Timing: timeOnDeviceNs must not be less than -1";
     }
     constexpr auto convertTiming = [](int64_t halTiming) -> OptionalDuration {
         if (halTiming == kNoTiming) {
@@ -422,8 +411,8 @@
         }
         return nn::Duration(static_cast<uint64_t>(halTiming));
     };
-    return Timing{.timeOnDevice = convertTiming(timing.timeOnDevice),
-                  .timeInDriver = convertTiming(timing.timeInDriver)};
+    return Timing{.timeOnDevice = convertTiming(timing.timeOnDeviceNs),
+                  .timeInDriver = convertTiming(timing.timeInDriverNs)};
 }
 
 GeneralResult<Model::OperandValues> unvalidatedConvert(const std::vector<uint8_t>& operandValues) {
@@ -498,18 +487,14 @@
     return static_cast<ExecutionPreference>(executionPreference);
 }
 
-GeneralResult<SharedHandle> unvalidatedConvert(const NativeHandle& aidlNativeHandle) {
-    return std::make_shared<const Handle>(NN_TRY(unvalidatedConvertHelper(aidlNativeHandle)));
-}
-
 GeneralResult<std::vector<Operation>> unvalidatedConvert(
         const std::vector<aidl_hal::Operation>& operations) {
     return unvalidatedConvertVec(operations);
 }
 
-GeneralResult<SyncFence> unvalidatedConvert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& syncFence) {
-    auto duplicatedFd = NN_TRY(dupFd(syncFence.get()));
-    return SyncFence::create(std::move(duplicatedFd));
+GeneralResult<SharedHandle> unvalidatedConvert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& handle) {
+    auto duplicatedFd = NN_TRY(dupFd(handle.get()));
+    return std::make_shared<const Handle>(std::move(duplicatedFd));
 }
 
 GeneralResult<Capabilities> convert(const aidl_hal::Capabilities& capabilities) {
@@ -553,8 +538,8 @@
     return validatedConvert(timing);
 }
 
-GeneralResult<SyncFence> convert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& syncFence) {
-    return validatedConvert(syncFence);
+GeneralResult<SharedHandle> convert(const ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor& handle) {
+    return validatedConvert(handle);
 }
 
 GeneralResult<std::vector<Extension>> convert(const std::vector<aidl_hal::Extension>& extension) {
@@ -619,17 +604,6 @@
     return halObject;
 }
 
-nn::GeneralResult<common::NativeHandle> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::Handle& handle) {
-    common::NativeHandle aidlNativeHandle;
-    aidlNativeHandle.fds.reserve(handle.fds.size());
-    for (const auto& fd : handle.fds) {
-        auto duplicatedFd = NN_TRY(nn::dupFd(fd.get()));
-        aidlNativeHandle.fds.emplace_back(duplicatedFd.release());
-    }
-    aidlNativeHandle.ints = handle.ints;
-    return aidlNativeHandle;
-}
-
 // Helper template for std::visit
 template <class... Ts>
 struct overloaded : Ts... {
@@ -755,11 +729,6 @@
     return measureTiming == nn::MeasureTiming::YES;
 }
 
-nn::GeneralResult<common::NativeHandle> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::SharedHandle& sharedHandle) {
-    CHECK(sharedHandle != nullptr);
-    return unvalidatedConvert(*sharedHandle);
-}
-
 nn::GeneralResult<Memory> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::SharedMemory& memory) {
     if (memory == nullptr) {
         return (NN_ERROR() << "Unable to convert nullptr memory")
@@ -964,8 +933,8 @@
 
 nn::GeneralResult<Timing> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::Timing& timing) {
     return Timing{
-            .timeOnDevice = NN_TRY(unvalidatedConvert(timing.timeOnDevice)),
-            .timeInDriver = NN_TRY(unvalidatedConvert(timing.timeInDriver)),
+            .timeOnDeviceNs = NN_TRY(unvalidatedConvert(timing.timeOnDevice)),
+            .timeInDriverNs = NN_TRY(unvalidatedConvert(timing.timeInDriver)),
     };
 }
 
@@ -997,16 +966,8 @@
     return ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor(duplicatedFd.release());
 }
 
-nn::GeneralResult<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> unvalidatedConvertCache(
-        const nn::SharedHandle& handle) {
-    if (handle->ints.size() != 0) {
-        NN_ERROR() << "Cache handle must not contain ints";
-    }
-    if (handle->fds.size() != 1) {
-        NN_ERROR() << "Cache handle must contain exactly one fd but contains "
-                   << handle->fds.size();
-    }
-    auto duplicatedFd = NN_TRY(nn::dupFd(handle->fds.front().get()));
+nn::GeneralResult<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> unvalidatedConvert(const nn::SharedHandle& handle) {
+    auto duplicatedFd = NN_TRY(nn::dupFd(handle->get()));
     return ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor(duplicatedFd.release());
 }
 
@@ -1069,16 +1030,7 @@
 
 nn::GeneralResult<std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>> convert(
         const std::vector<nn::SharedHandle>& cacheHandles) {
-    const auto version = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeGeneralFailure(nn::validate(cacheHandles)));
-    if (version > kVersion) {
-        return NN_ERROR() << "Insufficient version: " << version << " vs required " << kVersion;
-    }
-    std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> cacheFds;
-    cacheFds.reserve(cacheHandles.size());
-    for (const auto& cacheHandle : cacheHandles) {
-        cacheFds.push_back(NN_TRY(unvalidatedConvertCache(cacheHandle)));
-    }
-    return cacheFds;
+    return validatedConvert(cacheHandles);
 }
 
 nn::GeneralResult<std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>> convert(
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Device.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Device.cpp
index 02ca861..0fd453b 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Device.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Device.cpp
@@ -178,10 +178,6 @@
     return kDeviceType;
 }
 
-bool Device::isUpdatable() const {
-    return false;
-}
-
 const std::vector<nn::Extension>& Device::getSupportedExtensions() const {
     return kExtensions;
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Execution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Execution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2aee8a6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/Execution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "Execution.h"
+
+#include "Conversions.h"
+#include "PreparedModel.h"
+#include "Utils.h"
+
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Request.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/HandleError.h>
+
+#include <memory>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+// See hardware/interfaces/neuralnetworks/utils/README.md for more information on HIDL interface
+// lifetimes across processes and for protecting asynchronous calls across HIDL.
+
+namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const Execution>> Execution::create(
+        std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+        hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, bool measure, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration) {
+    if (preparedModel == nullptr) {
+        return NN_ERROR() << "aidl::utils::Execution::create must have non-null preparedModel";
+    }
+
+    return std::make_shared<const Execution>(PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(preparedModel),
+                                             std::move(request), std::move(relocation), measure,
+                                             loopTimeoutDuration);
+}
+
+Execution::Execution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/,
+                     std::shared_ptr<const PreparedModel> preparedModel, Request request,
+                     hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation, bool measure,
+                     int64_t loopTimeoutDuration)
+    : kPreparedModel(std::move(preparedModel)),
+      kRequest(std::move(request)),
+      kRelocation(std::move(relocation)),
+      kMeasure(measure),
+      kLoopTimeoutDuration(loopTimeoutDuration) {}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> Execution::compute(
+        const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const {
+    const auto aidlDeadline = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(deadline)));
+    return kPreparedModel->executeInternal(kRequest, kMeasure, aidlDeadline, kLoopTimeoutDuration,
+                                           kRelocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> Execution::computeFenced(
+        const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const {
+    const auto aidlWaitFor = NN_TRY(convert(waitFor));
+    const auto aidlDeadline = NN_TRY(convert(deadline));
+    const auto aidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence = NN_TRY(convert(timeoutDurationAfterFence));
+    return kPreparedModel->executeFencedInternal(kRequest, aidlWaitFor, kMeasure, aidlDeadline,
+                                                 kLoopTimeoutDuration,
+                                                 aidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence, kRelocation);
+}
+
+}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
index 003965b..f861d74 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/src/PreparedModel.cpp
@@ -19,8 +19,11 @@
 #include "Burst.h"
 #include "Callbacks.h"
 #include "Conversions.h"
+#include "Execution.h"
+#include "ProtectCallback.h"
 #include "Utils.h"
 
+#include <aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/Request.h>
 #include <android/binder_auto_utils.h>
 #include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
 #include <nnapi/Result.h>
@@ -74,18 +77,32 @@
         const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
     // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
     std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
-    const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
-            hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared)));
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared =
+            NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+                    &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryPadding,
+                    &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation)));
 
     const auto aidlRequest = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(requestInShared)));
     const auto aidlMeasure = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(measure)));
     const auto aidlDeadline = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(deadline)));
     const auto aidlLoopTimeoutDuration =
             NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(convert(loopTimeoutDuration)));
+    return executeInternal(aidlRequest, aidlMeasure, aidlDeadline, aidlLoopTimeoutDuration,
+                           relocation);
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>
+PreparedModel::executeInternal(const Request& request, bool measure, int64_t deadline,
+                               int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+                               const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+    if (relocation.input) {
+        relocation.input->flush();
+    }
 
     ExecutionResult executionResult;
-    const auto ret = kPreparedModel->executeSynchronously(
-            aidlRequest, aidlMeasure, aidlDeadline, aidlLoopTimeoutDuration, &executionResult);
+    const auto ret = kPreparedModel->executeSynchronously(request, measure, deadline,
+                                                          loopTimeoutDuration, &executionResult);
     HANDLE_ASTATUS(ret) << "executeSynchronously failed";
     if (!executionResult.outputSufficientSize) {
         auto canonicalOutputShapes =
@@ -96,9 +113,9 @@
     auto [outputShapes, timing] = NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
             convertExecutionResults(executionResult.outputShapes, executionResult.timing)));
 
-    NN_TRY(hal::utils::makeExecutionFailure(
-            hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared)));
-
+    if (relocation.output) {
+        relocation.output->flush();
+    }
     return std::make_pair(std::move(outputShapes), timing);
 }
 
@@ -109,8 +126,10 @@
                              const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const {
     // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
     std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
-    const nn::Request& requestInShared =
-            NN_TRY(hal::utils::flushDataFromPointerToShared(&request, &maybeRequestInShared));
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+            &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryPadding,
+            &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
 
     const auto aidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
     const auto aidlWaitFor = NN_TRY(convert(waitFor));
@@ -118,16 +137,30 @@
     const auto aidlDeadline = NN_TRY(convert(deadline));
     const auto aidlLoopTimeoutDuration = NN_TRY(convert(loopTimeoutDuration));
     const auto aidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence = NN_TRY(convert(timeoutDurationAfterFence));
+    return executeFencedInternal(aidlRequest, aidlWaitFor, aidlMeasure, aidlDeadline,
+                                 aidlLoopTimeoutDuration, aidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence,
+                                 relocation);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+PreparedModel::executeFencedInternal(const Request& request,
+                                     const std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>& waitFor,
+                                     bool measure, int64_t deadline, int64_t loopTimeoutDuration,
+                                     int64_t timeoutDurationAfterFence,
+                                     const hal::utils::RequestRelocation& relocation) const {
+    if (relocation.input) {
+        relocation.input->flush();
+    }
 
     FencedExecutionResult result;
-    const auto ret = kPreparedModel->executeFenced(aidlRequest, aidlWaitFor, aidlMeasure,
-                                                   aidlDeadline, aidlLoopTimeoutDuration,
-                                                   aidlTimeoutDurationAfterFence, &result);
+    const auto ret =
+            kPreparedModel->executeFenced(request, waitFor, measure, deadline, loopTimeoutDuration,
+                                          timeoutDurationAfterFence, &result);
     HANDLE_ASTATUS(ret) << "executeFenced failed";
 
     auto resultSyncFence = nn::SyncFence::createAsSignaled();
     if (result.syncFence.get() != -1) {
-        resultSyncFence = NN_TRY(nn::convert(result.syncFence));
+        resultSyncFence = nn::SyncFence::create(NN_TRY(nn::convert(result.syncFence))).value();
     }
 
     auto callback = result.callback;
@@ -137,12 +170,12 @@
 
     // If executeFenced required the request memory to be moved into shared memory, block here until
     // the fenced execution has completed and flush the memory back.
-    if (maybeRequestInShared.has_value()) {
+    if (relocation.output) {
         const auto state = resultSyncFence.syncWait({});
         if (state != nn::SyncFence::FenceState::SIGNALED) {
             return NN_ERROR() << "syncWait failed with " << state;
         }
-        NN_TRY(hal::utils::unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(request, maybeRequestInShared));
+        relocation.output->flush();
     }
 
     // Create callback which can be used to retrieve the execution error status and timings.
@@ -159,6 +192,23 @@
     return std::make_pair(std::move(resultSyncFence), std::move(resultCallback));
 }
 
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> PreparedModel::createReusableExecution(
+        const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+    // Ensure that request is ready for IPC.
+    std::optional<nn::Request> maybeRequestInShared;
+    hal::utils::RequestRelocation relocation;
+    const nn::Request& requestInShared = NN_TRY(hal::utils::convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+            &request, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryAlignment, nn::kDefaultRequestMemoryPadding,
+            &maybeRequestInShared, &relocation));
+
+    auto aidlRequest = NN_TRY(convert(requestInShared));
+    auto aidlMeasure = NN_TRY(convert(measure));
+    auto aidlLoopTimeoutDuration = NN_TRY(convert(loopTimeoutDuration));
+    return Execution::create(shared_from_this(), std::move(aidlRequest), std::move(relocation),
+                             aidlMeasure, aidlLoopTimeoutDuration);
+}
+
 nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> PreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst() const {
     std::shared_ptr<IBurst> burst;
     const auto ret = kPreparedModel->configureExecutionBurst(&burst);
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
index 630a460..8bb5c90 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/utils/test/PreparedModelTest.cpp
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/neuralnetworks/IFencedExecutionCallback.h>
 #include <gmock/gmock.h>
 #include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
 #include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
 #include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
 #include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -39,7 +40,7 @@
 using ::testing::SetArgPointee;
 
 const std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> kInvalidPreparedModel;
-constexpr auto kNoTiming = Timing{.timeOnDevice = -1, .timeInDriver = -1};
+constexpr auto kNoTiming = Timing{.timeOnDeviceNs = -1, .timeInDriverNs = -1};
 
 constexpr auto makeStatusOk = [] { return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok(); };
 
@@ -253,6 +254,225 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
 }
 
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSync) {
+    // setup call
+    const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    const auto mockExecutionResult = ExecutionResult{
+            .outputSufficientSize = true,
+            .outputShapes = {},
+            .timing = kNoTiming,
+    };
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+            .WillRepeatedly(
+                    DoAll(SetArgPointee<4>(mockExecutionResult), InvokeWithoutArgs(makeStatusOk)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute repeatedly
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+        const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+        EXPECT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+                                               << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+    }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncError) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(makeGeneralFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncTransportFailure) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteSyncDeadObject) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeSynchronously(_, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->compute({});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFenced) {
+    // setup call
+    const uint32_t kNumberOfComputations = 2;
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    const auto mockCallback = MockFencedExecutionCallback::create();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockCallback, getExecutionInfo(_, _, _))
+            .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+            .WillRepeatedly(DoAll(SetArgPointee<0>(kNoTiming), SetArgPointee<1>(kNoTiming),
+                                  SetArgPointee<2>(ErrorStatus::NONE), Invoke(makeStatusOk)));
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(kNumberOfComputations)
+            .WillRepeatedly(Invoke(makeFencedExecutionResult(mockCallback)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute repeatedly
+    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < kNumberOfComputations; i++) {
+        const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+        ASSERT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code
+                                               << ": " << computeResult.error().message;
+        const auto& [syncFence, callback] = computeResult.value();
+        EXPECT_EQ(syncFence.syncWait({}), nn::SyncFence::FenceState::SIGNALED);
+        ASSERT_NE(callback, nullptr);
+
+        // get results from callback
+        const auto callbackResult = callback();
+        ASSERT_TRUE(callbackResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << callbackResult.error().code
+                                                << ": " << callbackResult.error().message;
+    }
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedCallbackError) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    const auto mockCallback = MockFencedExecutionCallback::create();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockCallback, getExecutionInfo(_, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(DoAll(SetArgPointee<0>(kNoTiming), SetArgPointee<1>(kNoTiming),
+                                   SetArgPointee<2>(ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE),
+                                   Invoke(makeStatusOk))));
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Invoke(makeFencedExecutionResult(mockCallback)));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(computeResult.has_value()) << "Failed with " << computeResult.error().code << ": "
+                                           << computeResult.error().message;
+    const auto& [syncFence, callback] = computeResult.value();
+    EXPECT_NE(syncFence.syncWait({}), nn::SyncFence::FenceState::ACTIVE);
+    ASSERT_NE(callback, nullptr);
+
+    // verify callback failure
+    const auto callbackResult = callback();
+    ASSERT_FALSE(callbackResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(callbackResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedError) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedTransportFailure) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeGeneralTransportFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(PreparedModelTest, reusableExecuteFencedDeadObject) {
+    // setup test
+    const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
+    const auto preparedModel = PreparedModel::create(mockPreparedModel).value();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, executeFenced(_, _, _, _, _, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(InvokeWithoutArgs(makeDeadObjectFailure));
+
+    // create execution
+    const auto createResult = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(createResult.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << createResult.error().code << ": " << createResult.error().message;
+    ASSERT_NE(createResult.value(), nullptr);
+
+    // invoke compute
+    const auto computeResult = createResult.value()->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+    ASSERT_FALSE(computeResult.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(computeResult.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
 TEST(PreparedModelTest, configureExecutionBurst) {
     // setup test
     const auto mockPreparedModel = MockPreparedModel::create();
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/CompilationCachingTests.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/CompilationCachingTests.cpp
index e0b529f..94ce5c1 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/CompilationCachingTests.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/CompilationCachingTests.cpp
@@ -357,16 +357,40 @@
         return false;
     }
 
+    // If fallbackModel is not provided, call prepareModelFromCache.
+    // If fallbackModel is provided, and prepareModelFromCache returns GENERAL_FAILURE,
+    // then prepareModel(fallbackModel) will be called.
+    // This replicates the behaviour of the runtime when loading a model from cache.
+    // NNAPI Shim depends on this behaviour and may try to load the model from cache in
+    // prepareModel (shim needs model information when loading from cache).
     void prepareModelFromCache(const std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>& modelCache,
                                const std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>& dataCache,
-                               std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel>* preparedModel,
-                               ErrorStatus* status) {
+                               std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel>* preparedModel, ErrorStatus* status,
+                               const Model* fallbackModel = nullptr) {
         // Launch prepare model from cache.
         std::shared_ptr<PreparedModelCallback> preparedModelCallback =
                 ndk::SharedRefBase::make<PreparedModelCallback>();
         std::vector<uint8_t> cacheToken(std::begin(mToken), std::end(mToken));
-        const auto prepareLaunchStatus = kDevice->prepareModelFromCache(
+        auto prepareLaunchStatus = kDevice->prepareModelFromCache(
                 kNoDeadline, modelCache, dataCache, cacheToken, preparedModelCallback);
+
+        // The shim does not support prepareModelFromCache() properly, but it
+        // will still attempt to create a model from cache when modelCache or
+        // dataCache is provided in prepareModel(). Instead of failing straight
+        // away, we try to utilize that other code path when fallbackModel is
+        // set. Note that we cannot verify whether the returned model was
+        // actually prepared from cache in that case.
+        if (!prepareLaunchStatus.isOk() &&
+            prepareLaunchStatus.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC &&
+            static_cast<ErrorStatus>(prepareLaunchStatus.getServiceSpecificError()) ==
+                    ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE &&
+            mIsCachingSupported && fallbackModel != nullptr) {
+            preparedModelCallback = ndk::SharedRefBase::make<PreparedModelCallback>();
+            prepareLaunchStatus = kDevice->prepareModel(
+                    *fallbackModel, ExecutionPreference::FAST_SINGLE_ANSWER, kDefaultPriority,
+                    kNoDeadline, modelCache, dataCache, cacheToken, preparedModelCallback);
+        }
+
         ASSERT_TRUE(prepareLaunchStatus.isOk() ||
                     prepareLaunchStatus.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
                 << "prepareLaunchStatus: " << prepareLaunchStatus.getDescription();
@@ -382,6 +406,42 @@
         *preparedModel = preparedModelCallback->getPreparedModel();
     }
 
+    // Replicate behaviour of runtime when loading model from cache.
+    // Test if prepareModelFromCache behaves correctly when faced with bad
+    // arguments. If prepareModelFromCache is not supported (GENERAL_FAILURE),
+    // it attempts to call prepareModel with same arguments, which is expected either
+    // to not support the model (GENERAL_FAILURE) or return a valid model.
+    void verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(const std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>& modelCache,
+                                         const std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor>& dataCache,
+                                         const Model* model, const TestModel& testModel) {
+        std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel;
+        ErrorStatus status;
+
+        // Verify that prepareModelFromCache fails either due to bad
+        // arguments (INVALID_ARGUMENT) or GENERAL_FAILURE if not supported.
+        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status,
+                              /*fallbackModel=*/nullptr);
+        if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
+            ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+        }
+        ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+
+        // If caching is not supported, attempt calling prepareModel.
+        if (status == ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) {
+            // Fallback with prepareModel should succeed regardless of cache files
+            prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status,
+                                  /*fallbackModel=*/model);
+            // Unless caching is not supported?
+            if (status != ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) {
+                // But if it is, we should see a valid model.
+                ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::NONE);
+                ASSERT_NE(preparedModel, nullptr);
+                EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel,
+                                      /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
     // Absolute path to the temporary cache directory.
     std::string mCacheDir;
 
@@ -397,7 +457,7 @@
     uint8_t mToken[static_cast<uint32_t>(IDevice::BYTE_SIZE_OF_CACHE_TOKEN)] = {};
     uint32_t mNumModelCache;
     uint32_t mNumDataCache;
-    uint32_t mIsCachingSupported;
+    bool mIsCachingSupported;
 
     const std::shared_ptr<IDevice> kDevice;
     // The primary data type of the testModel.
@@ -438,7 +498,8 @@
         std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
         createCacheFds(mModelCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &modelCache);
         createCacheFds(mDataCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &dataCache);
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
+        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status,
+                              /*fallbackModel=*/&model);
         if (!mIsCachingSupported) {
             ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
             ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
@@ -498,7 +559,8 @@
         for (uint32_t i = 0; i < dataCache.size(); i++) {
             ASSERT_GE(read(dataCache[i].get(), &placeholderByte, 1), 0);
         }
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
+        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status,
+                              /*fallbackModel=*/&model);
         if (!mIsCachingSupported) {
             ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
             ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
@@ -536,13 +598,7 @@
         // Execute and verify results.
         EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel, /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
         // Check if prepareModelFromCache fails.
-        preparedModel = nullptr;
-        ErrorStatus status;
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
-        if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
-            ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
-        }
-        ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+        verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
     }
 
     // Test with number of model cache files smaller than mNumModelCache.
@@ -560,13 +616,7 @@
         // Execute and verify results.
         EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel, /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
         // Check if prepareModelFromCache fails.
-        preparedModel = nullptr;
-        ErrorStatus status;
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
-        if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
-            ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
-        }
-        ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+        verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
     }
 
     // Test with number of data cache files greater than mNumDataCache.
@@ -583,13 +633,7 @@
         // Execute and verify results.
         EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel, /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
         // Check if prepareModelFromCache fails.
-        preparedModel = nullptr;
-        ErrorStatus status;
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
-        if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
-            ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
-        }
-        ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+        verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
     }
 
     // Test with number of data cache files smaller than mNumDataCache.
@@ -607,13 +651,7 @@
         // Execute and verify results.
         EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel, /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
         // Check if prepareModelFromCache fails.
-        preparedModel = nullptr;
-        ErrorStatus status;
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
-        if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
-            ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
-        }
-        ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+        verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
     }
 }
 
@@ -633,68 +671,48 @@
 
     // Test with number of model cache files greater than mNumModelCache.
     {
-        std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel = nullptr;
-        ErrorStatus status;
         std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
         mModelCache.push_back({mTmpCache});
         createCacheFds(mModelCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &modelCache);
         createCacheFds(mDataCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &dataCache);
         mModelCache.pop_back();
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
-        if (status != ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) {
-            ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
-        }
-        ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+
+        verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
     }
 
     // Test with number of model cache files smaller than mNumModelCache.
     if (mModelCache.size() > 0) {
-        std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel = nullptr;
-        ErrorStatus status;
         std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
         auto tmp = mModelCache.back();
         mModelCache.pop_back();
         createCacheFds(mModelCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &modelCache);
         createCacheFds(mDataCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &dataCache);
         mModelCache.push_back(tmp);
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
-        if (status != ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) {
-            ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
-        }
-        ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+
+        verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
     }
 
     // Test with number of data cache files greater than mNumDataCache.
     {
-        std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel = nullptr;
-        ErrorStatus status;
         std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
         mDataCache.push_back({mTmpCache});
         createCacheFds(mModelCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &modelCache);
         createCacheFds(mDataCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &dataCache);
         mDataCache.pop_back();
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
-        if (status != ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) {
-            ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
-        }
-        ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+
+        verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
     }
 
     // Test with number of data cache files smaller than mNumDataCache.
     if (mDataCache.size() > 0) {
-        std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel = nullptr;
-        ErrorStatus status;
         std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
         auto tmp = mDataCache.back();
         mDataCache.pop_back();
         createCacheFds(mModelCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &modelCache);
         createCacheFds(mDataCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &dataCache);
         mDataCache.push_back(tmp);
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
-        if (status != ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) {
-            ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
-        }
-        ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+
+        verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
     }
 }
 
@@ -719,13 +737,7 @@
         // Execute and verify results.
         EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel, /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
         // Check if prepareModelFromCache fails.
-        preparedModel = nullptr;
-        ErrorStatus status;
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
-        if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
-            ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
-        }
-        ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+        verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
     }
 
     // Go through each handle in data cache, test with invalid access mode.
@@ -741,13 +753,7 @@
         // Execute and verify results.
         EvaluatePreparedModel(kDevice, preparedModel, testModel, /*testKind=*/TestKind::GENERAL);
         // Check if prepareModelFromCache fails.
-        preparedModel = nullptr;
-        ErrorStatus status;
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
-        if (status != ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT) {
-            ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
-        }
-        ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+        verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
     }
 }
 
@@ -769,30 +775,23 @@
 
     // Go through each handle in model cache, test with invalid access mode.
     for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mNumModelCache; i++) {
-        std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel = nullptr;
-        ErrorStatus status;
         std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
         modelCacheMode[i] = AccessMode::WRITE_ONLY;
         createCacheFds(mModelCache, modelCacheMode, &modelCache);
         createCacheFds(mDataCache, dataCacheMode, &dataCache);
         modelCacheMode[i] = AccessMode::READ_WRITE;
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
-        ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
-        ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+
+        verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
     }
 
     // Go through each handle in data cache, test with invalid access mode.
     for (uint32_t i = 0; i < mNumDataCache; i++) {
-        std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel> preparedModel = nullptr;
-        ErrorStatus status;
         std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
         dataCacheMode[i] = AccessMode::WRITE_ONLY;
         createCacheFds(mModelCache, modelCacheMode, &modelCache);
         createCacheFds(mDataCache, dataCacheMode, &dataCache);
         dataCacheMode[i] = AccessMode::READ_WRITE;
-        prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
-        ASSERT_EQ(status, ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
-        ASSERT_EQ(preparedModel, nullptr);
+        verifyModelPreparationBehaviour(modelCache, dataCache, &model, testModel);
     }
 }
 
@@ -872,7 +871,8 @@
             std::vector<ndk::ScopedFileDescriptor> modelCache, dataCache;
             createCacheFds(mModelCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &modelCache);
             createCacheFds(mDataCache, AccessMode::READ_WRITE, &dataCache);
-            prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
+            prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status,
+                                  /*fallbackModel=*/nullptr);
 
             // The preparation may fail or succeed, but must not crash. If the preparation succeeds,
             // the prepared model must be executed with the correct result and not crash.
@@ -933,7 +933,8 @@
 
             // Spawn a thread to copy the cache content concurrently while preparing from cache.
             std::thread thread(copyCacheFiles, std::cref(modelCacheMul), std::cref(mModelCache));
-            prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status);
+            prepareModelFromCache(modelCache, dataCache, &preparedModel, &status,
+                                  /*fallbackModel=*/nullptr);
             thread.join();
 
             // The preparation may fail or succeed, but must not crash. If the preparation succeeds,
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/GeneratedTestHarness.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/GeneratedTestHarness.cpp
index 1440429..2356ff0 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/GeneratedTestHarness.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/GeneratedTestHarness.cpp
@@ -435,8 +435,8 @@
         mInputMemory = TestBlobAHWB::create(std::max<size_t>(inputSize, 1));
         mOutputMemory = TestBlobAHWB::create(std::max<size_t>(outputSize, 1));
     } else {
-        mInputMemory = TestAshmem::create(std::max<size_t>(inputSize, 1));
-        mOutputMemory = TestAshmem::create(std::max<size_t>(outputSize, 1));
+        mInputMemory = TestAshmem::create(std::max<size_t>(inputSize, 1), /*aidlReadonly=*/true);
+        mOutputMemory = TestAshmem::create(std::max<size_t>(outputSize, 1), /*aidlReadonly=*/false);
     }
     CHECK_NE(mInputMemory, nullptr);
     CHECK_NE(mOutputMemory, nullptr);
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@
         makeOutputInsufficientSize(kInsufficientOutputIndex, &request);
     }
 
-    int64_t loopTimeoutDuration = kOmittedTimeoutDuration;
+    int64_t loopTimeoutDurationNs = kOmittedTimeoutDuration;
     // OutputType::MISSED_DEADLINE is only used by
     // TestKind::INTINITE_LOOP_TIMEOUT tests to verify that an infinite loop is
     // aborted after a timeout.
@@ -555,7 +555,7 @@
         // Override the default loop timeout duration with a small value to
         // speed up test execution.
         constexpr int64_t kMillisecond = 1'000'000;
-        loopTimeoutDuration = 1 * kMillisecond;
+        loopTimeoutDurationNs = 1 * kMillisecond;
     }
 
     ErrorStatus executionStatus;
@@ -568,7 +568,7 @@
             ExecutionResult executionResult;
             // execute
             const auto ret = preparedModel->executeSynchronously(request, testConfig.measureTiming,
-                                                                 kNoDeadline, loopTimeoutDuration,
+                                                                 kNoDeadline, loopTimeoutDurationNs,
                                                                  &executionResult);
             ASSERT_TRUE(ret.isOk() || ret.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
                     << ret.getDescription();
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@
             ExecutionResult executionResult;
             // execute
             ret = burst->executeSynchronously(request, slots, testConfig.measureTiming, kNoDeadline,
-                                              loopTimeoutDuration, &executionResult);
+                                              loopTimeoutDurationNs, &executionResult);
             ASSERT_TRUE(ret.isOk() || ret.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
                     << ret.getDescription();
             if (ret.isOk()) {
@@ -635,7 +635,7 @@
             ErrorStatus result = ErrorStatus::NONE;
             FencedExecutionResult executionResult;
             auto ret = preparedModel->executeFenced(request, {}, testConfig.measureTiming,
-                                                    kNoDeadline, loopTimeoutDuration, kNoDuration,
+                                                    kNoDeadline, loopTimeoutDurationNs, kNoDuration,
                                                     &executionResult);
             ASSERT_TRUE(ret.isOk() || ret.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
                     << ret.getDescription();
@@ -649,7 +649,7 @@
                 waitFor.emplace_back(dupFd);
                 // If a sync fence is returned, try start another run waiting for the sync fence.
                 ret = preparedModel->executeFenced(request, waitFor, testConfig.measureTiming,
-                                                   kNoDeadline, loopTimeoutDuration, kNoDuration,
+                                                   kNoDeadline, loopTimeoutDurationNs, kNoDuration,
                                                    &executionResult);
                 ASSERT_TRUE(ret.isOk());
                 waitForSyncFence(executionResult.syncFence.get());
@@ -686,8 +686,8 @@
     if (!testConfig.measureTiming) {
         EXPECT_EQ(timing, kNoTiming);
     } else {
-        if (timing.timeOnDevice != -1 && timing.timeInDriver != -1) {
-            EXPECT_LE(timing.timeOnDevice, timing.timeInDriver);
+        if (timing.timeOnDeviceNs != -1 && timing.timeInDriverNs != -1) {
+            EXPECT_LE(timing.timeOnDeviceNs, timing.timeInDriverNs);
         }
     }
 
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/QualityOfServiceTests.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/QualityOfServiceTests.cpp
index e803e38..bbba887 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/QualityOfServiceTests.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/QualityOfServiceTests.cpp
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
 
 using ExecutionFunction =
         std::function<MaybeResults(const std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel>& preparedModel,
-                                   const Request& request, int64_t deadline)>;
+                                   const Request& request, int64_t deadlineNs)>;
 
 static int64_t makeDeadline(DeadlineBoundType deadlineBoundType) {
     const auto getNanosecondsSinceEpoch = [](const auto& time) -> int64_t {
@@ -79,9 +79,9 @@
 
 void runPrepareModelTest(const std::shared_ptr<IDevice>& device, const Model& model,
                          Priority priority, std::optional<DeadlineBoundType> deadlineBound) {
-    int64_t deadline = kNoDeadline;
+    int64_t deadlineNs = kNoDeadline;
     if (deadlineBound.has_value()) {
-        deadline = makeDeadline(deadlineBound.value());
+        deadlineNs = makeDeadline(deadlineBound.value());
     }
 
     // see if service can handle model
@@ -96,8 +96,8 @@
     const std::shared_ptr<PreparedModelCallback> preparedModelCallback =
             ndk::SharedRefBase::make<PreparedModelCallback>();
     const auto prepareLaunchStatus =
-            device->prepareModel(model, ExecutionPreference::FAST_SINGLE_ANSWER, priority, deadline,
-                                 {}, {}, kEmptyCacheToken, preparedModelCallback);
+            device->prepareModel(model, ExecutionPreference::FAST_SINGLE_ANSWER, priority,
+                                 deadlineNs, {}, {}, kEmptyCacheToken, preparedModelCallback);
     ASSERT_TRUE(prepareLaunchStatus.isOk())
             << "prepareLaunchStatus: " << prepareLaunchStatus.getDescription();
 
@@ -156,13 +156,13 @@
 }
 
 static MaybeResults executeSynchronously(const std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel>& preparedModel,
-                                         const Request& request, int64_t deadline) {
+                                         const Request& request, int64_t deadlineNs) {
     SCOPED_TRACE("synchronous");
     const bool measure = false;
 
     // run execution
     ExecutionResult executionResult;
-    const auto ret = preparedModel->executeSynchronously(request, measure, deadline,
+    const auto ret = preparedModel->executeSynchronously(request, measure, deadlineNs,
                                                          kOmittedTimeoutDuration, &executionResult);
     EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk() || ret.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
             << ret.getDescription();
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@
 }
 
 static MaybeResults executeBurst(const std::shared_ptr<IPreparedModel>& preparedModel,
-                                 const Request& request, int64_t deadline) {
+                                 const Request& request, int64_t deadlineNs) {
     SCOPED_TRACE("burst");
     const bool measure = false;
 
@@ -200,7 +200,7 @@
 
     // run execution
     ExecutionResult executionResult;
-    ret = burst->executeSynchronously(request, slots, measure, deadline, kOmittedTimeoutDuration,
+    ret = burst->executeSynchronously(request, slots, measure, deadlineNs, kOmittedTimeoutDuration,
                                       &executionResult);
     EXPECT_TRUE(ret.isOk() || ret.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
             << ret.getDescription();
@@ -224,10 +224,10 @@
                       const ExecutionContext& context, bool synchronous,
                       DeadlineBoundType deadlineBound) {
     const ExecutionFunction execute = synchronous ? executeSynchronously : executeBurst;
-    const auto deadline = makeDeadline(deadlineBound);
+    const auto deadlineNs = makeDeadline(deadlineBound);
 
     // Perform execution and unpack results.
-    const auto results = execute(preparedModel, request, deadline);
+    const auto results = execute(preparedModel, request, deadlineNs);
     if (!results.has_value()) return;
     const auto& [status, outputShapes, timing] = results.value();
 
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.cpp b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.cpp
index 3c7f5f7..9af362e 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.cpp
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include <android/binder_status.h>
 #include <android/hardware_buffer.h>
 
+#include <sys/mman.h>
 #include <iostream>
 #include <limits>
 #include <numeric>
@@ -98,19 +99,39 @@
                            std::multiplies<>{});
 }
 
-std::unique_ptr<TestAshmem> TestAshmem::create(uint32_t size) {
-    auto ashmem = std::make_unique<TestAshmem>(size);
+std::unique_ptr<TestAshmem> TestAshmem::create(uint32_t size, bool aidlReadonly) {
+    auto ashmem = std::make_unique<TestAshmem>(size, aidlReadonly);
     return ashmem->mIsValid ? std::move(ashmem) : nullptr;
 }
 
-void TestAshmem::initialize(uint32_t size) {
+// This function will create a readonly shared memory with PROT_READ only.
+// The input shared memory must be either Ashmem or mapped-FD.
+static nn::SharedMemory convertSharedMemoryToReadonly(const nn::SharedMemory& sharedMemory) {
+    if (std::holds_alternative<nn::Memory::Ashmem>(sharedMemory->handle)) {
+        const auto& memory = std::get<nn::Memory::Ashmem>(sharedMemory->handle);
+        return nn::createSharedMemoryFromFd(memory.size, PROT_READ, memory.fd.get(), /*offset=*/0)
+                .value();
+    } else if (std::holds_alternative<nn::Memory::Fd>(sharedMemory->handle)) {
+        const auto& memory = std::get<nn::Memory::Fd>(sharedMemory->handle);
+        return nn::createSharedMemoryFromFd(memory.size, PROT_READ, memory.fd.get(), memory.offset)
+                .value();
+    }
+    CHECK(false) << "Unexpected shared memory type";
+    return sharedMemory;
+}
+
+void TestAshmem::initialize(uint32_t size, bool aidlReadonly) {
     mIsValid = false;
     ASSERT_GT(size, 0);
     const auto sharedMemory = nn::createSharedMemory(size).value();
     mMappedMemory = nn::map(sharedMemory).value();
     mPtr = static_cast<uint8_t*>(std::get<void*>(mMappedMemory.pointer));
     CHECK_NE(mPtr, nullptr);
-    mAidlMemory = utils::convert(sharedMemory).value();
+    if (aidlReadonly) {
+        mAidlMemory = utils::convert(convertSharedMemoryToReadonly(sharedMemory)).value();
+    } else {
+        mAidlMemory = utils::convert(sharedMemory).value();
+    }
     mIsValid = true;
 }
 
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.h b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.h
index 266301c..9dd7359 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/aidl/vts/functional/Utils.h
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
 
 inline constexpr Priority kDefaultPriority = Priority::MEDIUM;
 
-inline constexpr Timing kNoTiming = {.timeOnDevice = -1, .timeInDriver = -1};
+inline constexpr Timing kNoTiming = {.timeOnDeviceNs = -1, .timeInDriverNs = -1};
 inline constexpr int64_t kNoDeadline = -1;
 inline constexpr int64_t kOmittedTimeoutDuration = -1;
 inline constexpr int64_t kNoDuration = -1;
@@ -79,15 +79,18 @@
 
 class TestAshmem : public TestMemoryBase {
   public:
-    static std::unique_ptr<TestAshmem> create(uint32_t size);
+    // If aidlReadonly is true, getAidlMemory will return a sAIDL memory with readonly access;
+    // otherwise, the sAIDL memory has read-write access. This only affects the sAIDL memory.
+    // getPointer will always return a valid address with read-write access.
+    static std::unique_ptr<TestAshmem> create(uint32_t size, bool aidlReadonly = false);
 
     // Prefer TestAshmem::create.
     // The constructor calls initialize, which constructs the memory resources. This is a workaround
     // that gtest macros cannot be used directly in a constructor.
-    TestAshmem(uint32_t size) { initialize(size); }
+    TestAshmem(uint32_t size, bool aidlReadonly) { initialize(size, aidlReadonly); }
 
   private:
-    void initialize(uint32_t size);
+    void initialize(uint32_t size, bool aidlReadonly);
     nn::Mapping mMappedMemory;
 };
 
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h
index 8fe6b90..702ee92 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/CommonUtils.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include <cutils/native_handle.h>
 #include <hidl/HidlSupport.h>
 #include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/SharedMemory.h>
 #include <nnapi/Types.h>
 #include <functional>
 #include <vector>
@@ -59,19 +60,70 @@
 nn::GeneralResult<std::reference_wrapper<const nn::Model>> flushDataFromPointerToShared(
         const nn::Model* model, std::optional<nn::Model>* maybeModelInSharedOut);
 
+// Record a relocation mapping between pointer-based data and shared memory.
+// Only two specializations of this template may exist:
+// - RelocationInfo<const void*> for request inputs
+// - RelocationInfo<void*> for request outputs
+template <typename PointerType>
+struct RelocationInfo {
+    PointerType data;
+    size_t length;
+    size_t offset;
+};
+using InputRelocationInfo = RelocationInfo<const void*>;
+using OutputRelocationInfo = RelocationInfo<void*>;
+
+// Keep track of the relocation mapping between pointer-based data and shared memory pool,
+// and provide method to copy the data between pointers and the shared memory pool.
+// Only two specializations of this template may exist:
+// - RelocationTracker<InputRelocationInfo> for request inputs
+// - RelocationTracker<OutputRelocationInfo> for request outputs
+template <typename RelocationInfoType>
+class RelocationTracker {
+  public:
+    static nn::GeneralResult<std::unique_ptr<RelocationTracker>> create(
+            std::vector<RelocationInfoType> relocationInfos, nn::SharedMemory memory) {
+        auto mapping = NN_TRY(map(memory));
+        return std::make_unique<RelocationTracker<RelocationInfoType>>(
+                std::move(relocationInfos), std::move(memory), std::move(mapping));
+    }
+
+    RelocationTracker(std::vector<RelocationInfoType> relocationInfos, nn::SharedMemory memory,
+                      nn::Mapping mapping)
+        : kRelocationInfos(std::move(relocationInfos)),
+          kMemory(std::move(memory)),
+          kMapping(std::move(mapping)) {}
+
+    // Specializations defined in CommonUtils.cpp.
+    // For InputRelocationTracker, this method will copy pointer data to the shared memory pool.
+    // For OutputRelocationTracker, this method will copy shared memory data to the pointers.
+    void flush() const;
+
+  private:
+    const std::vector<RelocationInfoType> kRelocationInfos;
+    const nn::SharedMemory kMemory;
+    const nn::Mapping kMapping;
+};
+using InputRelocationTracker = RelocationTracker<InputRelocationInfo>;
+using OutputRelocationTracker = RelocationTracker<OutputRelocationInfo>;
+
+struct RequestRelocation {
+    std::unique_ptr<InputRelocationTracker> input;
+    std::unique_ptr<OutputRelocationTracker> output;
+};
+
 // Relocate pointer-based data to shared memory. If `request` has no
 // Request::Argument::LifeTime::POINTER data, the function returns with a reference to `request`. If
 // `request` has Request::Argument::LifeTime::POINTER data, the request is copied to
 // `maybeRequestInSharedOut` with the POINTER data relocated to a memory pool, and the function
-// returns with a reference to `*maybeRequestInSharedOut`.
-nn::GeneralResult<std::reference_wrapper<const nn::Request>> flushDataFromPointerToShared(
-        const nn::Request* request, std::optional<nn::Request>* maybeRequestInSharedOut);
-
-// Undoes `flushDataFromPointerToShared` on a Request object. More specifically,
-// `unflushDataFromSharedToPointer` copies the output shared memory data from the transformed
-// Request object back to the output pointer-based memory in the original Request object.
-nn::GeneralResult<void> unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(
-        const nn::Request& request, const std::optional<nn::Request>& maybeRequestInShared);
+// returns with a reference to `*maybeRequestInSharedOut`. The `relocationOut` will be set to track
+// the input and output relocations.
+//
+// Unlike `flushDataFromPointerToShared`, this method will not copy the input pointer data to the
+// shared memory pool. Use `relocationOut` to flush the input or output data after the call.
+nn::GeneralResult<std::reference_wrapper<const nn::Request>> convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+        const nn::Request* request, uint32_t alignment, uint32_t padding,
+        std::optional<nn::Request>* maybeRequestInSharedOut, RequestRelocation* relocationOut);
 
 nn::GeneralResult<std::vector<uint32_t>> countNumberOfConsumers(
         size_t numberOfOperands, const std::vector<nn::Operation>& operations);
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidBurst.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidBurst.h
index 17b3fd9..e86edda 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidBurst.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidBurst.h
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
             const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
             const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
             const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+            const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
 };
 
 }  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidDevice.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidDevice.h
index d843526..5e62b9a 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidDevice.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidDevice.h
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 class InvalidDevice final : public nn::IDevice {
   public:
     InvalidDevice(std::string name, std::string versionString, nn::Version featureLevel,
-                  nn::DeviceType type, bool isUpdatable, std::vector<nn::Extension> extensions,
+                  nn::DeviceType type, std::vector<nn::Extension> extensions,
                   nn::Capabilities capabilities,
                   std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> numberOfCacheFilesNeeded);
 
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@
     const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
     nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
     nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
-    bool isUpdatable() const override;
     const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
     const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
     std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
@@ -71,7 +70,6 @@
     const std::string kVersionString;
     const nn::Version kFeatureLevel;
     const nn::DeviceType kType;
-    const bool kIsUpdatable;
     const std::vector<nn::Extension> kExtensions;
     const nn::Capabilities kCapabilities;
     const std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> kNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidExecution.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidExecution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5b00221
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidExecution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_INVALID_EXECUTION_H
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_INVALID_EXECUTION_H
+
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+
+class InvalidExecution final : public nn::IExecution {
+  public:
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+            const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+    nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+            const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+};
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
+
+#endif  // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_INVALID_EXECUTION_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidPreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidPreparedModel.h
index 3e1dca7..de30aae 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidPreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/InvalidPreparedModel.h
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@
             const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
             const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
 
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+            const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
     nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurst() const override;
 
     std::any getUnderlyingResource() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientBurst.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientBurst.h
index c92cc41..fde2486 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientBurst.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientBurst.h
@@ -51,7 +51,16 @@
             const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
             const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
 
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+            const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
   private:
+    bool isValidInternal() const EXCLUDES(mMutex);
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecutionInternal(
+            const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const;
+
     const Factory kMakeBurst;
     mutable std::mutex mMutex;
     mutable nn::SharedBurst mBurst GUARDED_BY(mMutex);
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientDevice.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientDevice.h
index 8199c52..84ae799 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientDevice.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientDevice.h
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@
     const std::string& getVersionString() const override;
     nn::Version getFeatureLevel() const override;
     nn::DeviceType getType() const override;
-    bool isUpdatable() const override;
     const std::vector<nn::Extension>& getSupportedExtensions() const override;
     const nn::Capabilities& getCapabilities() const override;
     std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded() const override;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientExecution.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientExecution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d0084e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientExecution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_RESILIENT_EXECUTION_H
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_RESILIENT_EXECUTION_H
+
+#include <android-base/thread_annotations.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+
+#include <functional>
+#include <memory>
+#include <mutex>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+
+class ResilientExecution final : public nn::IExecution,
+                                 public std::enable_shared_from_this<ResilientExecution> {
+    struct PrivateConstructorTag {};
+
+  public:
+    using Factory = std::function<nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution>()>;
+
+    static nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const ResilientExecution>> create(
+            Factory makeExecution);
+
+    ResilientExecution(PrivateConstructorTag tag, Factory makeExecution,
+                       nn::SharedExecution execution);
+
+    nn::SharedExecution getExecution() const;
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> recover(const nn::IExecution* failingExecution) const;
+
+    nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> compute(
+            const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const override;
+
+    nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>> computeFenced(
+            const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor, const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
+
+  private:
+    bool isValidInternal() const EXCLUDES(mMutex);
+
+    const Factory kMakeExecution;
+    mutable std::mutex mMutex;
+    mutable nn::SharedExecution mExecution GUARDED_BY(mMutex);
+};
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
+
+#endif  // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_RESILIENT_EXECUTION_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientPreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientPreparedModel.h
index a6c1b19..86533ed 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientPreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/include/nnapi/hal/ResilientPreparedModel.h
@@ -58,12 +58,19 @@
             const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
             const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const override;
 
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecution(
+            const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const override;
+
     nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurst() const override;
 
     std::any getUnderlyingResource() const override;
 
   private:
     bool isValidInternal() const EXCLUDES(mMutex);
+    nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> createReusableExecutionInternal(
+            const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+            const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const;
     nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> configureExecutionBurstInternal() const;
 
     const Factory kMakePreparedModel;
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/CommonUtils.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/CommonUtils.cpp
index 4d26795..906b0cf 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/CommonUtils.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/CommonUtils.cpp
@@ -89,23 +89,39 @@
                   });
 }
 
-nn::GeneralResult<hidl_handle> createNativeHandleFrom(base::unique_fd fd,
+nn::GeneralResult<hidl_handle> createNativeHandleFrom(std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds,
                                                       const std::vector<int32_t>& ints) {
     constexpr size_t kIntMax = std::numeric_limits<int>::max();
+    CHECK_LE(fds.size(), kIntMax);
     CHECK_LE(ints.size(), kIntMax);
-    native_handle_t* nativeHandle = native_handle_create(1, static_cast<int>(ints.size()));
+    native_handle_t* nativeHandle =
+            native_handle_create(static_cast<int>(fds.size()), static_cast<int>(ints.size()));
     if (nativeHandle == nullptr) {
         return NN_ERROR() << "Failed to create native_handle";
     }
 
-    nativeHandle->data[0] = fd.release();
-    std::copy(ints.begin(), ints.end(), nativeHandle->data + 1);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < fds.size(); ++i) {
+        nativeHandle->data[i] = fds[i].release();
+    }
+    std::copy(ints.begin(), ints.end(), nativeHandle->data + nativeHandle->numFds);
 
     hidl_handle handle;
     handle.setTo(nativeHandle, /*shouldOwn=*/true);
     return handle;
 }
 
+nn::GeneralResult<hidl_handle> createNativeHandleFrom(base::unique_fd fd,
+                                                      const std::vector<int32_t>& ints) {
+    std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds;
+    fds.push_back(std::move(fd));
+    return createNativeHandleFrom(std::move(fds), ints);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<hidl_handle> createNativeHandleFrom(const nn::Memory::Unknown::Handle& handle) {
+    std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds = NN_TRY(nn::dupFds(handle.fds.begin(), handle.fds.end()));
+    return createNativeHandleFrom(std::move(fds), handle.ints);
+}
+
 nn::GeneralResult<hidl_memory> createHidlMemoryFrom(const nn::Memory::Ashmem& memory) {
     auto fd = NN_TRY(nn::dupFd(memory.fd));
     auto handle = NN_TRY(createNativeHandleFrom(std::move(fd), {}));
@@ -139,7 +155,22 @@
 }
 
 nn::GeneralResult<hidl_memory> createHidlMemoryFrom(const nn::Memory::Unknown& memory) {
-    return hidl_memory(memory.name, NN_TRY(hidlHandleFromSharedHandle(memory.handle)), memory.size);
+    return hidl_memory(memory.name, NN_TRY(createNativeHandleFrom(memory.handle)), memory.size);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::Memory::Unknown::Handle> unknownHandleFromNativeHandle(
+        const native_handle_t* handle) {
+    if (handle == nullptr) {
+        return NN_ERROR() << "unknownHandleFromNativeHandle failed because handle is nullptr";
+    }
+
+    std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds =
+            NN_TRY(nn::dupFds(handle->data + 0, handle->data + handle->numFds));
+
+    std::vector<int> ints(handle->data + handle->numFds,
+                          handle->data + handle->numFds + handle->numInts);
+
+    return nn::Memory::Unknown::Handle{.fds = std::move(fds), .ints = std::move(ints)};
 }
 
 }  // anonymous namespace
@@ -200,10 +231,31 @@
     return **maybeModelInSharedOut;
 }
 
-nn::GeneralResult<std::reference_wrapper<const nn::Request>> flushDataFromPointerToShared(
-        const nn::Request* request, std::optional<nn::Request>* maybeRequestInSharedOut) {
+template <>
+void InputRelocationTracker::flush() const {
+    // Copy from pointers to shared memory.
+    uint8_t* memoryPtr = static_cast<uint8_t*>(std::get<void*>(kMapping.pointer));
+    for (const auto& [data, length, offset] : kRelocationInfos) {
+        std::memcpy(memoryPtr + offset, data, length);
+    }
+}
+
+template <>
+void OutputRelocationTracker::flush() const {
+    // Copy from shared memory to pointers.
+    const uint8_t* memoryPtr = static_cast<const uint8_t*>(
+            std::visit([](auto ptr) { return static_cast<const void*>(ptr); }, kMapping.pointer));
+    for (const auto& [data, length, offset] : kRelocationInfos) {
+        std::memcpy(data, memoryPtr + offset, length);
+    }
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::reference_wrapper<const nn::Request>> convertRequestFromPointerToShared(
+        const nn::Request* request, uint32_t alignment, uint32_t padding,
+        std::optional<nn::Request>* maybeRequestInSharedOut, RequestRelocation* relocationOut) {
     CHECK(request != nullptr);
     CHECK(maybeRequestInSharedOut != nullptr);
+    CHECK(relocationOut != nullptr);
 
     if (hasNoPointerData(*request)) {
         return *request;
@@ -213,8 +265,11 @@
     // to the caller through `maybeRequestInSharedOut` if the function succeeds.
     nn::Request requestInShared = *request;
 
+    RequestRelocation relocation;
+
     // Change input pointers to shared memory.
-    nn::ConstantMemoryBuilder inputBuilder(requestInShared.pools.size());
+    nn::MutableMemoryBuilder inputBuilder(requestInShared.pools.size());
+    std::vector<InputRelocationInfo> inputRelocationInfos;
     for (auto& input : requestInShared.inputs) {
         const auto& location = input.location;
         if (input.lifetime != nn::Request::Argument::LifeTime::POINTER) {
@@ -225,17 +280,21 @@
         const void* data = std::visit([](auto ptr) { return static_cast<const void*>(ptr); },
                                       location.pointer);
         CHECK(data != nullptr);
-        input.location = inputBuilder.append(data, location.length);
+        input.location = inputBuilder.append(location.length, alignment, padding);
+        inputRelocationInfos.push_back({data, input.location.length, input.location.offset});
     }
 
     // Allocate input memory.
     if (!inputBuilder.empty()) {
         auto memory = NN_TRY(inputBuilder.finish());
-        requestInShared.pools.push_back(std::move(memory));
+        requestInShared.pools.push_back(memory);
+        relocation.input = NN_TRY(
+                InputRelocationTracker::create(std::move(inputRelocationInfos), std::move(memory)));
     }
 
     // Change output pointers to shared memory.
     nn::MutableMemoryBuilder outputBuilder(requestInShared.pools.size());
+    std::vector<OutputRelocationInfo> outputRelocationInfos;
     for (auto& output : requestInShared.outputs) {
         const auto& location = output.location;
         if (output.lifetime != nn::Request::Argument::LifeTime::POINTER) {
@@ -243,62 +302,25 @@
         }
 
         output.lifetime = nn::Request::Argument::LifeTime::POOL;
-        output.location = outputBuilder.append(location.length);
+        void* data = std::get<void*>(location.pointer);
+        CHECK(data != nullptr);
+        output.location = outputBuilder.append(location.length, alignment, padding);
+        outputRelocationInfos.push_back({data, output.location.length, output.location.offset});
     }
 
     // Allocate output memory.
     if (!outputBuilder.empty()) {
         auto memory = NN_TRY(outputBuilder.finish());
-        requestInShared.pools.push_back(std::move(memory));
+        requestInShared.pools.push_back(memory);
+        relocation.output = NN_TRY(OutputRelocationTracker::create(std::move(outputRelocationInfos),
+                                                                   std::move(memory)));
     }
 
     *maybeRequestInSharedOut = requestInShared;
+    *relocationOut = std::move(relocation);
     return **maybeRequestInSharedOut;
 }
 
-nn::GeneralResult<void> unflushDataFromSharedToPointer(
-        const nn::Request& request, const std::optional<nn::Request>& maybeRequestInShared) {
-    if (!maybeRequestInShared.has_value() || maybeRequestInShared->pools.empty() ||
-        !std::holds_alternative<nn::SharedMemory>(maybeRequestInShared->pools.back())) {
-        return {};
-    }
-    const auto& requestInShared = *maybeRequestInShared;
-
-    // Map the memory.
-    const auto& outputMemory = std::get<nn::SharedMemory>(requestInShared.pools.back());
-    const auto [pointer, size, context] = NN_TRY(map(outputMemory));
-    const uint8_t* constantPointer =
-            std::visit([](const auto& o) { return static_cast<const uint8_t*>(o); }, pointer);
-
-    // Flush each output pointer.
-    CHECK_EQ(request.outputs.size(), requestInShared.outputs.size());
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < request.outputs.size(); ++i) {
-        const auto& location = request.outputs[i].location;
-        const auto& locationInShared = requestInShared.outputs[i].location;
-        if (!std::holds_alternative<void*>(location.pointer)) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        // Get output pointer and size.
-        void* data = std::get<void*>(location.pointer);
-        CHECK(data != nullptr);
-        const size_t length = location.length;
-
-        // Get output pool location.
-        CHECK(requestInShared.outputs[i].lifetime == nn::Request::Argument::LifeTime::POOL);
-        const size_t index = locationInShared.poolIndex;
-        const size_t offset = locationInShared.offset;
-        const size_t outputPoolIndex = requestInShared.pools.size() - 1;
-        CHECK(locationInShared.length == length);
-        CHECK(index == outputPoolIndex);
-
-        // Flush memory.
-        std::memcpy(data, constantPointer + offset, length);
-    }
-
-    return {};
-}
-
 nn::GeneralResult<std::vector<uint32_t>> countNumberOfConsumers(
         size_t numberOfOperands, const std::vector<nn::Operation>& operations) {
     return makeGeneralFailure(nn::countNumberOfConsumers(numberOfOperands, operations));
@@ -358,7 +380,7 @@
 
     if (memory.name() != "hardware_buffer_blob") {
         auto handle = nn::Memory::Unknown{
-                .handle = NN_TRY(sharedHandleFromNativeHandle(memory.handle())),
+                .handle = NN_TRY(unknownHandleFromNativeHandle(memory.handle())),
                 .size = static_cast<size_t>(memory.size()),
                 .name = memory.name(),
         };
@@ -404,53 +426,19 @@
 }
 
 nn::GeneralResult<hidl_handle> hidlHandleFromSharedHandle(const nn::Handle& handle) {
-    std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds;
-    fds.reserve(handle.fds.size());
-    for (const auto& fd : handle.fds) {
-        const int dupFd = dup(fd);
-        if (dupFd == -1) {
-            return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) << "Failed to dup the fd";
-        }
-        fds.emplace_back(dupFd);
-    }
-
-    constexpr size_t kIntMax = std::numeric_limits<int>::max();
-    CHECK_LE(handle.fds.size(), kIntMax);
-    CHECK_LE(handle.ints.size(), kIntMax);
-    native_handle_t* nativeHandle = native_handle_create(static_cast<int>(handle.fds.size()),
-                                                         static_cast<int>(handle.ints.size()));
-    if (nativeHandle == nullptr) {
-        return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) << "Failed to create native_handle";
-    }
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < fds.size(); ++i) {
-        nativeHandle->data[i] = fds[i].release();
-    }
-    std::copy(handle.ints.begin(), handle.ints.end(), &nativeHandle->data[nativeHandle->numFds]);
-
-    hidl_handle hidlHandle;
-    hidlHandle.setTo(nativeHandle, /*shouldOwn=*/true);
-    return hidlHandle;
+    base::unique_fd fd = NN_TRY(nn::dupFd(handle.get()));
+    return createNativeHandleFrom(std::move(fd), {});
 }
 
 nn::GeneralResult<nn::Handle> sharedHandleFromNativeHandle(const native_handle_t* handle) {
     if (handle == nullptr) {
         return NN_ERROR() << "sharedHandleFromNativeHandle failed because handle is nullptr";
     }
-
-    std::vector<base::unique_fd> fds;
-    fds.reserve(handle->numFds);
-    for (int i = 0; i < handle->numFds; ++i) {
-        const int dupFd = dup(handle->data[i]);
-        if (dupFd == -1) {
-            return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE) << "Failed to dup the fd";
-        }
-        fds.emplace_back(dupFd);
+    if (handle->numFds != 1 || handle->numInts != 0) {
+        return NN_ERROR() << "sharedHandleFromNativeHandle failed because handle does not only "
+                             "hold a single fd";
     }
-
-    std::vector<int> ints(&handle->data[handle->numFds],
-                          &handle->data[handle->numFds + handle->numInts]);
-
-    return nn::Handle{.fds = std::move(fds), .ints = std::move(ints)};
+    return nn::dupFd(handle->data[0]);
 }
 
 nn::GeneralResult<hidl_vec<hidl_handle>> convertSyncFences(
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidBurst.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidBurst.cpp
index 0c34f05..0191533 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidBurst.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidBurst.cpp
@@ -38,4 +38,10 @@
     return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidBurst";
 }
 
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> InvalidBurst::createReusableExecution(
+        const nn::Request& /*request*/, nn::MeasureTiming /*measure*/,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& /*loopTimeoutDuration*/) const {
+    return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidBurst";
+}
+
 }  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidDevice.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidDevice.cpp
index 81bca7f..535ccb4 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidDevice.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidDevice.cpp
@@ -32,14 +32,13 @@
 namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
 
 InvalidDevice::InvalidDevice(std::string name, std::string versionString, nn::Version featureLevel,
-                             nn::DeviceType type, bool isUpdatable,
-                             std::vector<nn::Extension> extensions, nn::Capabilities capabilities,
+                             nn::DeviceType type, std::vector<nn::Extension> extensions,
+                             nn::Capabilities capabilities,
                              std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t> numberOfCacheFilesNeeded)
     : kName(std::move(name)),
       kVersionString(std::move(versionString)),
       kFeatureLevel(featureLevel),
       kType(type),
-      kIsUpdatable(isUpdatable),
       kExtensions(std::move(extensions)),
       kCapabilities(std::move(capabilities)),
       kNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded(numberOfCacheFilesNeeded) {}
@@ -60,10 +59,6 @@
     return kType;
 }
 
-bool InvalidDevice::isUpdatable() const {
-    return kIsUpdatable;
-}
-
 const std::vector<nn::Extension>& InvalidDevice::getSupportedExtensions() const {
     return kExtensions;
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidExecution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidExecution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4edd25
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidExecution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "InvalidExecution.h"
+
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>> InvalidExecution::compute(
+        const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/) const {
+    return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidExecution";
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+InvalidExecution::computeFenced(const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& /*waitFor*/,
+                                const nn::OptionalTimePoint& /*deadline*/,
+                                const nn::OptionalDuration& /*timeoutDurationAfterFence*/) const {
+    return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidExecution";
+}
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidPreparedModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidPreparedModel.cpp
index 9081e1f..8195462 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidPreparedModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/InvalidPreparedModel.cpp
@@ -42,6 +42,12 @@
     return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidPreparedModel";
 }
 
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> InvalidPreparedModel::createReusableExecution(
+        const nn::Request& /*request*/, nn::MeasureTiming /*measure*/,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& /*loopTimeoutDuration*/) const {
+    return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidPreparedModel";
+}
+
 nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> InvalidPreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst() const {
     return NN_ERROR() << "InvalidPreparedModel";
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientBurst.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientBurst.cpp
index 38ccc62..79cbe39 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientBurst.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientBurst.cpp
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
 #include <android-base/thread_annotations.h>
 #include <nnapi/IBurst.h>
+#include <nnapi/IPreparedModel.h>
 #include <nnapi/Result.h>
 #include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
 #include <nnapi/Types.h>
@@ -29,6 +30,9 @@
 #include <optional>
 #include <utility>
 
+#include "InvalidExecution.h"
+#include "ResilientExecution.h"
+
 namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
 namespace {
 
@@ -46,11 +50,11 @@
     // Attempt recovery and return if it fails.
     auto maybeBurst = resilientBurst.recover(burst.get());
     if (!maybeBurst.has_value()) {
-        auto [resultErrorMessage, resultErrorCode, resultOutputShapes] = std::move(result).error();
-        const auto& [recoveryErrorMessage, recoveryErrorCode] = maybeBurst.error();
-        return nn::error(resultErrorCode, std::move(resultOutputShapes))
-               << resultErrorMessage << ", and failed to recover dead burst object with error "
-               << recoveryErrorCode << ": " << recoveryErrorMessage;
+        const auto& [message, code] = maybeBurst.error();
+        std::ostringstream oss;
+        oss << ", and failed to recover dead burst object with error " << code << ": " << message;
+        result.error().message += oss.str();
+        return result;
     }
     burst = std::move(maybeBurst).value();
 
@@ -109,4 +113,35 @@
     return protect(*this, fn);
 }
 
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> ResilientBurst::createReusableExecution(
+        const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+#if 0
+    auto self = shared_from_this();
+    ResilientExecution::Factory makeExecution =
+            [burst = std::move(self), request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration] {
+        return burst->createReusableExecutionInternal(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+    };
+    return ResilientExecution::create(std::move(makeExecution));
+#else
+    return createReusableExecutionInternal(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+#endif
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> ResilientBurst::createReusableExecutionInternal(
+        const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+    if (!isValidInternal()) {
+        return std::make_shared<const InvalidExecution>();
+    }
+    const auto fn = [&request, measure, &loopTimeoutDuration](const nn::IBurst& burst) {
+        return burst.createReusableExecution(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+    };
+    return protect(*this, fn);
+}
+
+bool ResilientBurst::isValidInternal() const {
+    return true;
+}
+
 }  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientDevice.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientDevice.cpp
index 13965af..2023c9a 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientDevice.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientDevice.cpp
@@ -122,14 +122,12 @@
     };
     if (compare(&IDevice::getName) || compare(&IDevice::getVersionString) ||
         compare(&IDevice::getFeatureLevel) || compare(&IDevice::getType) ||
-        compare(&IDevice::isUpdatable) || compare(&IDevice::getSupportedExtensions) ||
-        compare(&IDevice::getCapabilities)) {
+        compare(&IDevice::getSupportedExtensions) || compare(&IDevice::getCapabilities)) {
         LOG(ERROR) << "Recovered device has different metadata than what is cached. Marking "
                       "IDevice object as invalid.";
         device = std::make_shared<const InvalidDevice>(
-                kName, kVersionString, mDevice->getFeatureLevel(), mDevice->getType(),
-                mDevice->isUpdatable(), kExtensions, kCapabilities,
-                mDevice->getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded());
+                kName, kVersionString, mDevice->getFeatureLevel(), mDevice->getType(), kExtensions,
+                kCapabilities, mDevice->getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded());
         mIsValid = false;
     }
 
@@ -153,10 +151,6 @@
     return getDevice()->getType();
 }
 
-bool ResilientDevice::isUpdatable() const {
-    return getDevice()->isUpdatable();
-}
-
 const std::vector<nn::Extension>& ResilientDevice::getSupportedExtensions() const {
     return kExtensions;
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientExecution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientExecution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..46b404a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientExecution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include "ResilientExecution.h"
+
+#include "InvalidBurst.h"
+#include "ResilientBurst.h"
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <android-base/thread_annotations.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+#include <nnapi/Result.h>
+#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+
+#include <functional>
+#include <memory>
+#include <mutex>
+#include <sstream>
+#include <utility>
+#include <vector>
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+namespace {
+
+template <typename FnType>
+auto protect(const ResilientExecution& resilientExecution, const FnType& fn)
+        -> decltype(fn(*resilientExecution.getExecution())) {
+    auto execution = resilientExecution.getExecution();
+    auto result = fn(*execution);
+
+    // Immediately return if prepared model is not dead.
+    if (result.has_value() || result.error().code != nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT) {
+        return result;
+    }
+
+    // Attempt recovery and return if it fails.
+    auto maybeExecution = resilientExecution.recover(execution.get());
+    if (!maybeExecution.has_value()) {
+        const auto& [message, code] = maybeExecution.error();
+        std::ostringstream oss;
+        oss << ", and failed to recover dead prepared model with error " << code << ": " << message;
+        result.error().message += oss.str();
+        return result;
+    }
+    execution = std::move(maybeExecution).value();
+
+    return fn(*execution);
+}
+
+}  // namespace
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::shared_ptr<const ResilientExecution>> ResilientExecution::create(
+        Factory makeExecution) {
+    if (makeExecution == nullptr) {
+        return NN_ERROR(nn::ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT)
+               << "utils::ResilientExecution::create must have non-empty makeExecution";
+    }
+    auto execution = NN_TRY(makeExecution());
+    CHECK(execution != nullptr);
+    return std::make_shared<ResilientExecution>(PrivateConstructorTag{}, std::move(makeExecution),
+                                                std::move(execution));
+}
+
+ResilientExecution::ResilientExecution(PrivateConstructorTag /*tag*/, Factory makeExecution,
+                                       nn::SharedExecution execution)
+    : kMakeExecution(std::move(makeExecution)), mExecution(std::move(execution)) {
+    CHECK(kMakeExecution != nullptr);
+    CHECK(mExecution != nullptr);
+}
+
+nn::SharedExecution ResilientExecution::getExecution() const {
+    std::lock_guard guard(mMutex);
+    return mExecution;
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> ResilientExecution::recover(
+        const nn::IExecution* failingExecution) const {
+    std::lock_guard guard(mMutex);
+
+    // Another caller updated the failing prepared model.
+    if (mExecution.get() != failingExecution) {
+        return mExecution;
+    }
+
+    mExecution = NN_TRY(kMakeExecution());
+    return mExecution;
+}
+
+nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>
+ResilientExecution::compute(const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline) const {
+    const auto fn = [&deadline](const nn::IExecution& execution) {
+        return execution.compute(deadline);
+    };
+    return protect(*this, fn);
+}
+
+nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>
+ResilientExecution::computeFenced(const std::vector<nn::SyncFence>& waitFor,
+                                  const nn::OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+                                  const nn::OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence) const {
+    const auto fn = [&waitFor, &deadline,
+                     &timeoutDurationAfterFence](const nn::IExecution& execution) {
+        return execution.computeFenced(waitFor, deadline, timeoutDurationAfterFence);
+    };
+    return protect(*this, fn);
+}
+
+bool ResilientExecution::isValidInternal() const {
+    return true;
+}
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientPreparedModel.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientPreparedModel.cpp
index 5dd5f99..1ae19bc 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientPreparedModel.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/src/ResilientPreparedModel.cpp
@@ -17,7 +17,9 @@
 #include "ResilientPreparedModel.h"
 
 #include "InvalidBurst.h"
+#include "InvalidExecution.h"
 #include "ResilientBurst.h"
+#include "ResilientExecution.h"
 
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
 #include <android-base/thread_annotations.h>
@@ -127,6 +129,21 @@
     return protect(*this, fn);
 }
 
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> ResilientPreparedModel::createReusableExecution(
+        const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+#if 0
+    auto self = shared_from_this();
+    ResilientExecution::Factory makeExecution =
+            [preparedModel = std::move(self), request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration] {
+        return preparedModel->createReusableExecutionInternal(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+    };
+    return ResilientExecution::create(std::move(makeExecution));
+#else
+    return createReusableExecutionInternal(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+#endif
+}
+
 nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedBurst> ResilientPreparedModel::configureExecutionBurst() const {
 #if 0
     auto self = shared_from_this();
@@ -140,6 +157,19 @@
 #endif
 }
 
+nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution> ResilientPreparedModel::createReusableExecutionInternal(
+        const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+        const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration) const {
+    if (!isValidInternal()) {
+        return std::make_shared<const InvalidExecution>();
+    }
+    const auto fn = [&request, measure,
+                     &loopTimeoutDuration](const nn::IPreparedModel& preparedModel) {
+        return preparedModel.createReusableExecution(request, measure, loopTimeoutDuration);
+    };
+    return protect(*this, fn);
+}
+
 std::any ResilientPreparedModel::getUnderlyingResource() const {
     return getPreparedModel()->getUnderlyingResource();
 }
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockDevice.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockDevice.h
index b274716..a9428bc 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockDevice.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockDevice.h
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
     MOCK_METHOD(const std::string&, getVersionString, (), (const, override));
     MOCK_METHOD(Version, getFeatureLevel, (), (const, override));
     MOCK_METHOD(DeviceType, getType, (), (const, override));
-    MOCK_METHOD(bool, isUpdatable, (), (const, override));
     MOCK_METHOD(const std::vector<Extension>&, getSupportedExtensions, (), (const, override));
     MOCK_METHOD(const Capabilities&, getCapabilities, (), (const, override));
     MOCK_METHOD((std::pair<uint32_t, uint32_t>), getNumberOfCacheFilesNeeded, (),
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockExecution.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockExecution.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..91e3428
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockExecution.h
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_TEST_MOCK_EXECUTION
+#define ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_TEST_MOCK_EXECUTION
+
+#include <gmock/gmock.h>
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <nnapi/IExecution.h>
+
+namespace android::nn {
+
+class MockExecution final : public IExecution {
+  public:
+    MOCK_METHOD((ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<OutputShape>, Timing>>), compute,
+                (const OptionalTimePoint& deadline), (const, override));
+    MOCK_METHOD((GeneralResult<std::pair<SyncFence, ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>), computeFenced,
+                (const std::vector<SyncFence>& waitFor, const OptionalTimePoint& deadline,
+                 const OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence),
+                (const, override));
+};
+
+}  // namespace android::nn
+
+#endif  // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_COMMON_TEST_MOCK_EXECUTION
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockPreparedModel.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockPreparedModel.h
index c004861..c8ce006 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockPreparedModel.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/MockPreparedModel.h
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
                  const OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration,
                  const OptionalDuration& timeoutDurationAfterFence),
                 (const, override));
+    MOCK_METHOD((GeneralResult<SharedExecution>), createReusableExecution,
+                (const nn::Request& request, nn::MeasureTiming measure,
+                 const nn::OptionalDuration& loopTimeoutDuration),
+                (const, override));
     MOCK_METHOD(GeneralResult<SharedBurst>, configureExecutionBurst, (), (const, override));
     MOCK_METHOD(std::any, getUnderlyingResource, (), (const, override));
 };
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientExecution.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientExecution.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c0737fb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientExecution.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,260 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <gmock/gmock.h>
+#include <nnapi/TypeUtils.h>
+#include <nnapi/Types.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/ResilientExecution.h>
+#include <utility>
+#include "MockExecution.h"
+
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils {
+namespace {
+
+using ::testing::_;
+using ::testing::InvokeWithoutArgs;
+using ::testing::Return;
+
+using SharedMockExecution = std::shared_ptr<const nn::MockExecution>;
+using MockExecutionFactory = ::testing::MockFunction<nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution>()>;
+
+SharedMockExecution createMockExecution() {
+    return std::make_shared<const nn::MockExecution>();
+}
+
+std::tuple<SharedMockExecution, std::unique_ptr<MockExecutionFactory>,
+           std::shared_ptr<const ResilientExecution>>
+setup() {
+    auto mockExecution = std::make_shared<const nn::MockExecution>();
+
+    auto mockExecutionFactory = std::make_unique<MockExecutionFactory>();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(mockExecution));
+
+    auto buffer = ResilientExecution::create(mockExecutionFactory->AsStdFunction()).value();
+    return std::make_tuple(std::move(mockExecution), std::move(mockExecutionFactory),
+                           std::move(buffer));
+}
+
+constexpr auto makeError = [](nn::ErrorStatus status) {
+    return [status](const auto&... /*args*/) { return nn::error(status); };
+};
+const auto kReturnGeneralFailure = makeError(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+const auto kReturnDeadObject = makeError(nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+
+const auto kNoExecutionError =
+        nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>{};
+const auto kNoFencedExecutionError =
+        nn::GeneralResult<std::pair<nn::SyncFence, nn::ExecuteFencedInfoCallback>>(
+                std::make_pair(nn::SyncFence::createAsSignaled(), nullptr));
+
+}  // namespace
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, invalidExecutionFactory) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto invalidExecutionFactory = ResilientExecution::Factory{};
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = ResilientExecution::create(invalidExecutionFactory);
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, executionFactoryFailure) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto invalidExecutionFactory = kReturnGeneralFailure;
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = ResilientExecution::create(invalidExecutionFactory);
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, getExecution) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = execution->getExecution();
+
+    // verify result
+    EXPECT_TRUE(result == mockExecution);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, compute) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, compute(_)).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(kNoExecutionError));
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = execution->compute({});
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeError) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, compute(_)).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnGeneralFailure);
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = execution->compute({});
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeDeadObjectFailedRecovery) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, compute(_)).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnDeadObject);
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnGeneralFailure);
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = execution->compute({});
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeDeadObjectSuccessfulRecovery) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, compute(_)).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnDeadObject);
+    const auto recoveredMockExecution = createMockExecution();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*recoveredMockExecution, compute(_)).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(kNoExecutionError));
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(recoveredMockExecution));
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = execution->compute({});
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeFenced) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, computeFenced(_, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Return(kNoFencedExecutionError));
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = execution->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeFencedError) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, computeFenced(_, _, _)).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnGeneralFailure);
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = execution->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeFencedDeadObjectFailedRecovery) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, computeFenced(_, _, _)).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnDeadObject);
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnGeneralFailure);
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = execution->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, computeFencedDeadObjectSuccessfulRecovery) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecution, computeFenced(_, _, _)).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnDeadObject);
+    const auto recoveredMockExecution = createMockExecution();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*recoveredMockExecution, computeFenced(_, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Return(kNoFencedExecutionError));
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(recoveredMockExecution));
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = execution->computeFenced({}, {}, {});
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, recover) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+    const auto recoveredMockExecution = createMockExecution();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(recoveredMockExecution));
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = execution->recover(mockExecution.get());
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+    EXPECT_TRUE(result.value() == recoveredMockExecution);
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, recoverFailure) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+    const auto recoveredMockExecution = createMockExecution();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(kReturnGeneralFailure);
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = execution->recover(mockExecution.get());
+
+    // verify result
+    EXPECT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientExecutionTest, someoneElseRecovered) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockExecution, mockExecutionFactory, execution] = setup();
+    const auto recoveredMockExecution = createMockExecution();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockExecutionFactory, Call()).Times(1).WillOnce(Return(recoveredMockExecution));
+    execution->recover(mockExecution.get());
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = execution->recover(mockExecution.get());
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+    EXPECT_TRUE(result.value() == recoveredMockExecution);
+}
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::utils
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientPreparedModelTest.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientPreparedModelTest.cpp
index 6d86e10..d396ca8 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientPreparedModelTest.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/common/test/ResilientPreparedModelTest.cpp
@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@
 const auto kReturnGeneralFailure = makeError(nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
 const auto kReturnDeadObject = makeError(nn::ErrorStatus::DEAD_OBJECT);
 
+const auto kNoCreateReusableExecutionError = nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedExecution>{};
 const auto kNoExecutionError =
         nn::ExecutionResult<std::pair<std::vector<nn::OutputShape>, nn::Timing>>{};
 const auto kNoFencedExecutionError =
@@ -231,6 +232,36 @@
             << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
 }
 
+TEST(ResilientPreparedModelTest, createReusableExecution) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockPreparedModel, mockPreparedModelFactory, preparedModel] = setup();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, createReusableExecution(_, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(Return(kNoCreateReusableExecutionError));
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result.has_value())
+            << "Failed with " << result.error().code << ": " << result.error().message;
+}
+
+TEST(ResilientPreparedModelTest, createReusableExecutionError) {
+    // setup call
+    const auto [mockPreparedModel, mockPreparedModelFactory, preparedModel] = setup();
+    EXPECT_CALL(*mockPreparedModel, createReusableExecution(_, _, _))
+            .Times(1)
+            .WillOnce(kReturnGeneralFailure);
+
+    // run test
+    const auto result = preparedModel->createReusableExecution({}, {}, {});
+
+    // verify result
+    ASSERT_FALSE(result.has_value());
+    EXPECT_EQ(result.error().code, nn::ErrorStatus::GENERAL_FAILURE);
+}
+
 TEST(ResilientPreparedModelTest, getUnderlyingResource) {
     // setup call
     const auto [mockPreparedModel, mockPreparedModelFactory, preparedModel] = setup();
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/service/include/nnapi/hal/Service.h b/neuralnetworks/utils/service/include/nnapi/hal/Service.h
index e339627..2fd5237 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/service/include/nnapi/hal/Service.h
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/service/include/nnapi/hal/Service.h
@@ -22,10 +22,15 @@
 #include <memory>
 #include <vector>
 
-namespace android::nn::hal {
+namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::service {
 
-std::vector<nn::SharedDevice> getDevices();
+struct SharedDeviceAndUpdatability {
+    nn::SharedDevice device;
+    bool isDeviceUpdatable = false;
+};
 
-}  // namespace android::nn::hal
+std::vector<SharedDeviceAndUpdatability> getDevices(bool includeUpdatableDrivers);
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::service
 
 #endif  // ANDROID_HARDWARE_INTERFACES_NEURALNETWORKS_UTILS_SERVICE_H
diff --git a/neuralnetworks/utils/service/src/Service.cpp b/neuralnetworks/utils/service/src/Service.cpp
index 75ab1f9..2286288 100644
--- a/neuralnetworks/utils/service/src/Service.cpp
+++ b/neuralnetworks/utils/service/src/Service.cpp
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 #include <nnapi/hal/1.2/Service.h>
 #include <nnapi/hal/1.3/Service.h>
 #include <nnapi/hal/aidl/Service.h>
+#include <nnapi/hal/aidl/Utils.h>
 
 #include <functional>
 #include <memory>
@@ -50,7 +51,7 @@
 using getDeviceFn = std::add_pointer_t<nn::GeneralResult<nn::SharedDevice>(const std::string&)>;
 
 void getHidlDevicesForVersion(const std::string& descriptor, getDeviceFn getDevice,
-                              std::vector<nn::SharedDevice>* devices,
+                              std::vector<SharedDeviceAndUpdatability>* devices,
                               std::unordered_set<std::string>* registeredDevices) {
     CHECK(devices != nullptr);
     CHECK(registeredDevices != nullptr);
@@ -62,7 +63,7 @@
             if (maybeDevice.has_value()) {
                 auto device = std::move(maybeDevice).value();
                 CHECK(device != nullptr);
-                devices->push_back(std::move(device));
+                devices->push_back({.device = std::move(device)});
             } else {
                 LOG(ERROR) << "getDevice(" << name << ") failed with " << maybeDevice.error().code
                            << ": " << maybeDevice.error().message;
@@ -71,8 +72,9 @@
     }
 }
 
-void getAidlDevices(std::vector<nn::SharedDevice>* devices,
-                    std::unordered_set<std::string>* registeredDevices) {
+void getAidlDevices(std::vector<SharedDeviceAndUpdatability>* devices,
+                    std::unordered_set<std::string>* registeredDevices,
+                    bool includeUpdatableDrivers) {
     CHECK(devices != nullptr);
     CHECK(registeredDevices != nullptr);
 
@@ -89,12 +91,21 @@
     }
 
     for (const auto& name : names) {
+        bool isDeviceUpdatable = false;
+        if (__builtin_available(android __NNAPI_AIDL_MIN_ANDROID_API__, *)) {
+            const auto instance = std::string(aidl_hal::IDevice::descriptor) + '/' + name;
+            isDeviceUpdatable = AServiceManager_isUpdatableViaApex(instance.c_str());
+        }
+        if (isDeviceUpdatable && !includeUpdatableDrivers) {
+            continue;
+        }
         if (const auto [it, unregistered] = registeredDevices->insert(name); unregistered) {
             auto maybeDevice = aidl_hal::utils::getDevice(name);
             if (maybeDevice.has_value()) {
                 auto device = std::move(maybeDevice).value();
                 CHECK(device != nullptr);
-                devices->push_back(std::move(device));
+                devices->push_back(
+                        {.device = std::move(device), .isDeviceUpdatable = isDeviceUpdatable});
             } else {
                 LOG(ERROR) << "getDevice(" << name << ") failed with " << maybeDevice.error().code
                            << ": " << maybeDevice.error().message;
@@ -103,11 +114,13 @@
     }
 }
 
-std::vector<nn::SharedDevice> getDevices() {
-    std::vector<nn::SharedDevice> devices;
+}  // namespace
+
+std::vector<SharedDeviceAndUpdatability> getDevices(bool includeUpdatableDrivers) {
+    std::vector<SharedDeviceAndUpdatability> devices;
     std::unordered_set<std::string> registeredDevices;
 
-    getAidlDevices(&devices, &registeredDevices);
+    getAidlDevices(&devices, &registeredDevices, includeUpdatableDrivers);
 
     getHidlDevicesForVersion(V1_3::IDevice::descriptor, &V1_3::utils::getDevice, &devices,
                              &registeredDevices);
@@ -121,13 +134,4 @@
     return devices;
 }
 
-}  // namespace
 }  // namespace android::hardware::neuralnetworks::service
-
-namespace android::nn::hal {
-
-std::vector<nn::SharedDevice> getDevices() {
-    return hardware::neuralnetworks::service::getDevices();
-}
-
-}  // namespace android::nn::hal
diff --git a/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyConsumerResult.aidl b/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyConsumerResult.aidl
index 12d2042..66c8c8c 100644
--- a/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyConsumerResult.aidl
+++ b/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyConsumerResult.aidl
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@
      */
     int id;
     /**
-     * Time since boot in milliseconds
+     * Time of data capture in milliseconds since boot (CLOCK_BOOTTIME clock)
      */
     long timestampMs;
     /**
@@ -38,4 +38,3 @@
      */
     EnergyConsumerAttribution[] attribution;
 }
-
diff --git a/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyMeasurement.aidl b/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyMeasurement.aidl
index d3e8f46..31fbaa8 100644
--- a/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyMeasurement.aidl
+++ b/power/stats/aidl/android/hardware/power/stats/EnergyMeasurement.aidl
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
      */
     int id;
     /**
-     * Approximate time of data capture in millseconds since boot
+     * Time of data capture in milliseconds since boot (CLOCK_BOOTTIME clock)
      */
     long timestampMs;
     /**
@@ -35,4 +35,3 @@
      */
     long energyUWs;
 }
-
diff --git a/radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS
index 2384317..9310f8e 100644
--- a/radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.0/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
 # Telephony team
 amitmahajan@google.com
-sanketpadawe@google.com
 shuoq@google.com
+jackyu@google.com
 
 # VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-yim@google.com
+dshi@google.com
diff --git a/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.cpp b/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.cpp
index fc37201..5b31acc 100644
--- a/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.cpp
+++ b/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.cpp
@@ -83,6 +83,13 @@
     return hasFeature;
 }
 
+bool isSsSsEnabled() {
+    // Do not use checkSubstringInCommandOutput("getprop persist.radio.multisim.config", "")
+    // until b/148904287 is fixed. We need exact matching instead of partial matching. (i.e.
+    // by definition the empty string "" is a substring of any string).
+    return !isDsDsEnabled() && !isTsTsEnabled();
+}
+
 bool isDsDsEnabled() {
     return testing::checkSubstringInCommandOutput("getprop persist.radio.multisim.config", "dsds");
 }
diff --git a/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.h b/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.h
index eeb1d29..fa338a3 100644
--- a/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.h
+++ b/radio/1.0/vts/functional/vts_test_util.h
@@ -80,12 +80,17 @@
 bool deviceSupportsFeature(const char* feature);
 
 /*
- * Check if device is in DSDS.
+ * Check if device is in SsSs (Single SIM Single Standby).
+ */
+bool isSsSsEnabled();
+
+/*
+ * Check if device is in DSDS (Dual SIM Dual Standby).
  */
 bool isDsDsEnabled();
 
 /*
- * Check if device is in TSTS.
+ * Check if device is in TSTS (Triple SIM Triple Standby).
  */
 bool isTsTsEnabled();
 
diff --git a/radio/1.1/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.1/vts/OWNERS
index 2384317..a07c917 100644
--- a/radio/1.1/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.1/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,8 +1 @@
-# Telephony team
-amitmahajan@google.com
-sanketpadawe@google.com
-shuoq@google.com
-
-# VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-yim@google.com
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.2/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.2/vts/OWNERS
index 245d9d4..a07c917 100644
--- a/radio/1.2/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.2/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,9 +1 @@
-# Telephony team
-amitmahajan@google.com
-sanketpadawe@google.com
-shuoq@google.com
-sasindran@google.com
-
-# VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-yim@google.com
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.3/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.3/vts/OWNERS
index d642064..a07c917 100644
--- a/radio/1.3/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.3/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,10 +1 @@
-# Telephony team
-amitmahajan@google.com
-sanketpadawe@google.com
-shuoq@google.com
-sasindran@google.com
-nazaninb@google.com
-
-# VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-yim@google.com
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.4/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.4/vts/OWNERS
index fd69f36..a07c917 100644
--- a/radio/1.4/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.4/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,8 +1 @@
-# Telephony team
-amitmahajan@google.com
-shuoq@google.com
-sasindran@google.com
-
-# VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-yim@google.com
\ No newline at end of file
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.5/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.5/vts/OWNERS
index 3629a6c..a07c917 100644
--- a/radio/1.5/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.5/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,10 +1 @@
-# Telephony team
-refuhoo@google.com
-amitmahajan@google.com
-jackyu@google.com
-fionaxu@google.com
-# more to add
-
-# VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-dshi@google.com
\ No newline at end of file
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.6/IRadio.hal b/radio/1.6/IRadio.hal
index a4e8811..e2d35d0 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/IRadio.hal
+++ b/radio/1.6/IRadio.hal
@@ -145,7 +145,6 @@
      *
      * Response function is IRadioResponse.setupDataCallResponse_1_6()
      *
-     * Note this API is the same as the 1.5
      */
     oneway setupDataCall_1_6(int32_t serial, AccessNetwork accessNetwork,
             DataProfileInfo dataProfileInfo, bool roamingAllowed,
@@ -177,7 +176,7 @@
      * @param serial Serial number of request.
      * @param message GsmSmsMessage as defined in types.hal
      *
-     * Response function is IRadioResponse.sendSMSExpectMoreResponse_1_6()
+     * Response function is IRadioResponse.sendSmsExpectMoreResponse_1_6()
      *
      * Note this API is the same as the 1.0
      *
@@ -185,7 +184,7 @@
      * fails. RadioError:SMS_SEND_FAIL_RETRY means retry (i.e. error cause is 332)
      * and RadioError:GENERIC_FAILURE means no retry (i.e. error cause is 500)
      */
-    oneway sendSMSExpectMore_1_6(int32_t serial, GsmSmsMessage message);
+    oneway sendSmsExpectMore_1_6(int32_t serial, GsmSmsMessage message);
 
     /**
      * Send a CDMA SMS message
@@ -267,7 +266,7 @@
      * 2. Disable NR dual connectivity {NrDualConnectivityState:DISABLE}
      * 3. Disable NR dual connectivity and force secondary cell to be released
      * {NrDualConnectivityState:DISABLE_IMMEDIATE}
-
+     *
      * Response callback is IRadioResponse.setNRDualConnectivityStateResponse()
      */
     oneway setNrDualConnectivityState(int32_t serial,
@@ -372,7 +371,7 @@
      *
      * Response callback is IRadioResponse.getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmapResponse()
      */
-    oneway getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap(uint32_t serial);
+    oneway getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap(int32_t serial);
 
     /**
      * Control data throttling at modem.
diff --git a/radio/1.6/IRadioResponse.hal b/radio/1.6/IRadioResponse.hal
index 60b0edc..a1286a5 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/IRadioResponse.hal
+++ b/radio/1.6/IRadioResponse.hal
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@
      *   RadioError:ACCESS_BARRED
      *   RadioError:BLOCKED_DUE_TO_CALL
      */
-    oneway sendSMSExpectMoreResponse_1_6(RadioResponseInfo info, SendSmsResult sms);
+    oneway sendSmsExpectMoreResponse_1_6(RadioResponseInfo info, SendSmsResult sms);
 
     /**
      * @param info Response info struct containing response type, serial no. and error
diff --git a/radio/1.6/types.hal b/radio/1.6/types.hal
index 82c9daa..4b75db5 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/types.hal
+++ b/radio/1.6/types.hal
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@
 
 struct QosBandwidth {
     /** Maximum bit rate possible on the bearer */
-    int32_t maxBitrateKbps;
+    uint32_t maxBitrateKbps;
     /** Minimum bit rate that is guaranteed to be provided by the network */
-    int32_t guaranteedBitrateKbps;
+    uint32_t guaranteedBitrateKbps;
 };
 
 /** LTE/EPS Quality of Service parameters as per 3gpp spec 24.301 sec 9.9.4.3. */
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@
 /**
  * Next header protocol numbers defined by IANA, RFC 5237
  */
-enum QosProtocol : int32_t {
+enum QosProtocol : int8_t {
     /** No protocol specified */
     UNSPECIFIED = -1,
     /** Transmission Control Protocol */
@@ -119,14 +119,14 @@
     AH = 51,
 };
 
-enum QosFilterDirection : int32_t {
+enum QosFilterDirection : int8_t {
     DOWNLINK = 0,
     UPLINK = 1,
     BIDIRECTIONAL = 2,
 };
 
 /** Allowed port numbers */
-enum QosPortRange : int32_t {
+enum QosPortRange : uint16_t {
     MIN = 20,
     MAX = 65535
 };
@@ -248,7 +248,7 @@
 };
 
 /** The allowed failure modes on an IWLAN handover failure. */
-enum HandoverFailureMode : int32_t {
+enum HandoverFailureMode : int8_t {
     /**
      * On data handover failure, fallback to the source data transport when the
      * fail cause is due to a hand off preference change.
@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@
 /**
  * NR Dual connectivity state
  */
-enum NrDualConnectivityState: int32_t {
+enum NrDualConnectivityState: int8_t {
     /**
      * Enable NR dual connectivity. Enabled state does not mean dual connectivity
      * is active. It means device is allowed to connect to both primary and secondary.
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@
     * the estimated maximum sustainable link bandwidth (as would be measured
     * at the Upper PDCP or SNDCP SAP). If the DL Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate is known,
     * this value shall not exceed the DL-AMBR for the Internet PDN connection.
-    * This must be filled with -1 if network is not connected.
+    * This must be filled with 0 if network is not connected.
     */
    uint32_t downlinkCapacityKbps;
 
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@
     * estimated maximum sustainable link bandwidth (as would be measured at the
     * Upper PDCP or SNDCP SAP). If the UL Aggregate Maximum Bit Rate is known,
     * this value shall not exceed the UL-AMBR for the Internet PDN connection.
-    * This must be filled with -1 if network is not connected.
+    * This must be filled with 0 if network is not connected.
     */
    uint32_t uplinkCapacityKbps;
 
@@ -427,7 +427,8 @@
     * This bandwidth estimate shall be the estimated maximum sustainable link bandwidth
     * (as would be measured at the Upper PDCP or SNDCP SAP). This is valid only
     * in if device is connected to both primary and secodary in dual connected
-    * mode. This must be filled with -1 if secondary is not connected.
+    * mode. This must be filled with 0 if secondary is not connected or if
+    * modem does not support this feature.
     */
    uint32_t secondaryDownlinkCapacityKbps;
 
@@ -436,12 +437,13 @@
     * This bandwidth estimate shall be the estimated
     * maximum sustainable link bandwidth (as would be measured at the Upper PDCP or SNDCP SAP).
     * This is valid only in if device is connected to both primary and secodary in dual connected
-    * mode.This must be filled with -1 if secondary is not connected.
+    * mode.This must be filled with 0 if secondary is not connected or if modem
+    * does not support this feature.
     */
    uint32_t secondaryUplinkCapacityKbps;
 };
 
-enum DataThrottlingAction : int32_t {
+enum DataThrottlingAction : int8_t {
     /* Clear all existing data throttling. */
     NO_DATA_THROTTLING = 0,
 
@@ -579,9 +581,9 @@
      *
      * Reference: 3GPP TS 138.214 section 5.2.2.1.
      *
-     * Range [0, 15], INT_MAX means invalid/unreported.
+     * Range [0, 15], 0xFF means invalid/unreported.
      */
-    vec<uint32_t> csiCqiReport;
+    vec<uint8_t> csiCqiReport;
 };
 
 /**
@@ -738,22 +740,19 @@
 
         EutranRegistrationInfo eutranInfo;
 
-        struct NgranRegistrationInfo {
-            /**
-             * Network capabilities for voice over PS services. This info is valid only on NR
-             * network and must be present when the device is camped on NR. VopsInfo must be
-             * empty when the device is not camped on NR.
-             */
-            NrVopsInfo nrVopsInfo;
-        } ngranInfo;
+        /**
+         * Network capabilities for voice over PS services. This info is valid only on NR
+         * network and must be present when the device is camped on NR. VopsInfo must be
+         * empty when the device is not camped on NR.
+         */
+        NrVopsInfo ngranNrVopsInfo;
 
-        struct GeranRegistrationInfo {
-            /**
-             * True if the dual transfer mode is supported.
-             * Refer to 3GPP TS 44.108 section 3.4.25.3
-             */
-            bool dtmSupported;
-        } geranInfo;
+        /**
+         * True if the dual transfer mode is supported.
+         * Refer to 3GPP TS 44.108 section 3.4.25.3
+         */
+        bool geranDtmSupported;
+
     } accessTechnologySpecificInfo;
 };
 
@@ -780,10 +779,10 @@
     int32_t uplinkChannelNumber;
 
     /** Downlink cell bandwidth, in kHz */
-    int32_t cellBandwidthDownlink;
+    int32_t cellBandwidthDownlinkKhz;
 
     /** Uplink cell bandwidth, in kHz */
-    int32_t cellBandwidthUplink;
+    int32_t cellBandwidthUplinkKhz;
 
     /**
      * A list of data calls mapped to this physical channel. The context id must match the cid of
@@ -1069,7 +1068,7 @@
     SscMode value;
 };
 
-enum SliceStatus : int32_t {
+enum SliceStatus : int8_t {
     UNKNOWN,
     CONFIGURED, // Configured but not allowed or rejected yet
     ALLOWED,    // Allowed to be used
@@ -1082,7 +1081,7 @@
  * Enum representing session and service continuity mode as defined in
  * 3GPP TS 23.501.
  */
-enum SscMode : int32_t {
+enum SscMode : int8_t {
     MODE_1 = 1,
     MODE_2 = 2,
     MODE_3 = 3,
@@ -1091,7 +1090,7 @@
 /**
  * Public key type from carrier certificate.
  */
-enum PublicKeyType : int32_t {
+enum PublicKeyType : int8_t {
     EPDG    = 1,                   // Key type to be used for ePDG
     WLAN    = 2,                   // Key type to be used for WLAN
 };
@@ -1200,7 +1199,7 @@
  *   chunk of phonebook data, means this is a last indication with the left
  *   data.
  */
-enum PbReceivedStatus : int32_t {
+enum PbReceivedStatus : int8_t {
     PB_RECEIVED_OK = 1,
     PB_RECEIVED_ERROR = 2,
     PB_RECEIVED_ABORT = 3,
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/OWNERS b/radio/1.6/vts/OWNERS
index 3629a6c..a07c917 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,10 +1 @@
-# Telephony team
-refuhoo@google.com
-amitmahajan@google.com
-jackyu@google.com
-fionaxu@google.com
-# more to add
-
-# VTS team
-yuexima@google.com
-dshi@google.com
\ No newline at end of file
+include ../../1.0/vts/OWNERS
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/Android.bp b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 65b0dd0..2bc6af3 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
     defaults: ["VtsHalTargetTestDefaults"],
     srcs: [
         "radio_hidl_hal_api.cpp",
+        "radio_hidl_hal_misc.cpp",
         "radio_hidl_hal_test.cpp",
         "radio_response.cpp",
         "radio_indication.cpp",
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_api.cpp b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_api.cpp
index 87320da..391166b 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_api.cpp
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_api.cpp
@@ -19,6 +19,82 @@
 #define ASSERT_OK(ret) ASSERT_TRUE(ret.isOk())
 
 /*
+ * Test IRadio.setAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap for the response returned.
+ */
+TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, setAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap) {
+    serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
+    ::android::hardware::hidl_bitfield<::android::hardware::radio::V1_4::RadioAccessFamily>
+            allowedNetworkTypesBitmap{};
+    allowedNetworkTypesBitmap |= ::android::hardware::radio::V1_4::RadioAccessFamily::LTE;
+
+    radio_v1_6->setAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap(serial, allowedNetworkTypesBitmap);
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
+    EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
+    EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
+
+    if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
+                radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+                {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
+    } else {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
+                radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+                {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::RADIO_NOT_AVAILABLE,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INTERNAL_ERR,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::MODEM_ERR,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NO_RESOURCES}));
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Test IRadio.getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap for the response returned.
+ */
+TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap) {
+    serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
+    ::android::hardware::hidl_bitfield<::android::hardware::radio::V1_4::RadioAccessFamily>
+            allowedNetworkTypesBitmap{};
+    allowedNetworkTypesBitmap |= ::android::hardware::radio::V1_4::RadioAccessFamily::LTE;
+
+    radio_v1_6->setAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap(serial, allowedNetworkTypesBitmap);
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
+    EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
+    EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
+
+    if (radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error == ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE) {
+        sleep(3);  // wait for modem
+        serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
+        radio_v1_6->getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap(serial);
+
+        EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
+        EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
+        EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
+
+        if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
+            ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
+                    radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+                    {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
+        } else {
+            ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
+                    radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+                    {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
+                     ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::RADIO_NOT_AVAILABLE,
+                     ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED,
+                     ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+                     ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INTERNAL_ERR,
+                     ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
+                     ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::MODEM_ERR,
+                     ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NO_RESOURCES}));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
  * Test IRadio.setupDataCall_1_6() for the response returned.
  */
 TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, setupDataCall_1_6) {
@@ -204,10 +280,10 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * Test IRadio_1_6.sendSMSExpectMore() for the response returned.
+ * Test IRadio_1_6.sendSmsExpectMore() for the response returned.
  */
-TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, sendSMSExpectMore_1_6) {
-    LOG(DEBUG) << "sendSMSExpectMore";
+TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, sendSmsExpectMore_1_6) {
+    LOG(DEBUG) << "sendSmsExpectMore";
     serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
     GsmSmsMessage msg;
     msg.smscPdu = "";
@@ -227,7 +303,7 @@
              ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::SIM_ABSENT},
             CHECK_GENERAL_ERROR));
     }
-    LOG(DEBUG) << "sendSMSExpectMore finished";
+    LOG(DEBUG) << "sendSmsExpectMore finished";
 }
 
 /*
@@ -369,7 +445,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
     EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
     EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
-    if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet1) {
+    if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
         ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
                 radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
                 {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
@@ -395,7 +471,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
     EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
     EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
-    if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet1) {
+    if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
         ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
                 radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
                 {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
@@ -421,7 +497,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
     EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
     EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
-    if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet1) {
+    if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
         ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
                 radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
                 {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
@@ -433,6 +509,8 @@
                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS}));
     }
+
+    sleep(1);
     serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
 
     res = radio_v1_6->setDataThrottling(serial, DataThrottlingAction::THROTTLE_ANCHOR_CARRIER,
@@ -441,7 +519,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
     EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
     EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
-    if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet1) {
+    if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
         ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
                 radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
                 {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
@@ -453,6 +531,8 @@
                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS}));
     }
+
+    sleep(1);
     serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
 
     res = radio_v1_6->setDataThrottling(serial, DataThrottlingAction::HOLD, 60000);
@@ -461,7 +541,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
     EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
     EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
-    if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet1) {
+    if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
         ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
                 radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
                 {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
@@ -473,6 +553,8 @@
                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS}));
     }
+
+    sleep(1);
     serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
 
     res = radio_v1_6->setDataThrottling(serial, DataThrottlingAction::NO_DATA_THROTTLING, 60000);
@@ -480,7 +562,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
     EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
     EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
-    if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet1) {
+    if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) {
         ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
                 radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
                 {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED}));
@@ -492,6 +574,8 @@
                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS}));
     }
+
+    sleep(1);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -504,11 +588,11 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
     EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
     EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(
-            CheckAnyOfErrors(radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
-                             {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
-                              ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
-                              ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::RADIO_NOT_AVAILABLE}));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+                                 {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
+                                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
+                                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::RADIO_NOT_AVAILABLE,
+                                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::SIM_ERR}));
 
     // setSimCardPower_1_6 does not return  until the request is handled, and should not trigger
     // CardState::ABSENT when turning off power
@@ -526,11 +610,11 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
     EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
     EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(
-            CheckAnyOfErrors(radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
-                             {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
-                              ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
-                              ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::RADIO_NOT_AVAILABLE}));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+                                 {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
+                                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::INVALID_ARGUMENTS,
+                                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::RADIO_NOT_AVAILABLE,
+                                  ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::SIM_ERR}));
 
     // setSimCardPower_1_6 does not return  until the request is handled. Just verify that we still
     // have CardState::PRESENT after turning the power back on
@@ -577,7 +661,7 @@
     // or Emergency_Only.
     if (isDsDsEnabled() || isTsTsEnabled()) {
         serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
-        radio_v1_6->getVoiceRegistrationState(serial);
+        radio_v1_6->getVoiceRegistrationState_1_6(serial);
         EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
         if (isVoiceEmergencyOnly(radioRsp_v1_6->voiceRegResp.regState) ||
             isVoiceInService(radioRsp_v1_6->voiceRegResp.regState)) {
@@ -631,7 +715,7 @@
     // or Emergency_Only.
     if (isDsDsEnabled() || isTsTsEnabled()) {
         serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
-        radio_v1_6->getVoiceRegistrationState(serial);
+        radio_v1_6->getVoiceRegistrationState_1_6(serial);
         EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
         if (isVoiceEmergencyOnly(radioRsp_v1_6->voiceRegResp.regState) ||
             isVoiceInService(radioRsp_v1_6->voiceRegResp.regState)) {
@@ -684,7 +768,7 @@
     // or Emergency_Only.
     if (isDsDsEnabled() || isTsTsEnabled()) {
         serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
-        radio_v1_6->getVoiceRegistrationState(serial);
+        radio_v1_6->getVoiceRegistrationState_1_6(serial);
         EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
         if (isVoiceEmergencyOnly(radioRsp_v1_6->voiceRegResp.regState) ||
             isVoiceInService(radioRsp_v1_6->voiceRegResp.regState)) {
@@ -813,7 +897,7 @@
 /*
  * Test IRadio.updateSimPhonebookRecords() for the response returned.
  */
-TEST_F(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, updateSimPhonebookRecords) {
+TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, updateSimPhonebookRecords) {
     serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
     radio_v1_6->getSimPhonebookCapacity(serial);
     EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
@@ -843,7 +927,11 @@
         EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
         EXPECT_EQ(RadioResponseType::SOLICITED, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.type);
         EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.serial);
-        EXPECT_EQ(::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
+            radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo.error,
+            {::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::NONE,
+             ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioError::REQUEST_NOT_SUPPORTED},
+             CHECK_GENERAL_ERROR));
 
         if(pbCapacity.maxAdnRecords > 0
                 && pbCapacity.usedAdnRecords < pbCapacity.maxAdnRecords) {
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_misc.cpp b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_misc.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..8c99d92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_misc.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <regex>
+
+#include <android-base/logging.h>
+#include <radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h>
+
+/*
+ * Test IRadio.getAvailableNetworks() for the response returned.
+ */
+TEST_P(RadioHidlTest_v1_6, getAvailableNetworks) {
+    LOG(DEBUG) << "getAvailableNetworks";
+    serial = GetRandomSerialNumber();
+
+    radio_v1_6->getAvailableNetworks(serial);
+    EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
+    EXPECT_EQ(serial, radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.serial);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.type == RadioResponseType::SOLICITED ||
+                radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.type == RadioResponseType::SOLICITED_ACK_EXP);
+
+    if (cardStatus.base.base.base.cardState == CardState::ABSENT) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(CheckAnyOfErrors(
+                radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.error,
+                {::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::NONE,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::CANCELLED,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::DEVICE_IN_USE,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::MODEM_ERR,
+                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED},
+                CHECK_GENERAL_ERROR));
+    } else if (radioRsp_v1_6->rspInfo_v1_0.error ==
+               ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioError::NONE) {
+        static const std::regex kOperatorNumericRe("^[0-9]{5,6}$");
+        for (OperatorInfo info : radioRsp_v1_6->networkInfos) {
+            ASSERT_TRUE(
+                    std::regex_match(std::string(info.operatorNumeric), kOperatorNumericRe));
+        }
+    }
+
+    LOG(DEBUG) << "getAvailableNetworks finished";
+}
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_test.cpp b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_test.cpp
index 6255f66..00f4468 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_test.cpp
@@ -16,8 +16,39 @@
 
 #include <radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h>
 
+bool isServiceValidForDeviceConfiguration(hidl_string& serviceName) {
+    if (isSsSsEnabled()) {
+        // Device is configured as SSSS.
+        if (serviceName != RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT1_NAME) {
+            ALOGI("%s instance is not valid for SSSS device.", serviceName.c_str());
+            return false;
+        }
+    } else if (isDsDsEnabled()) {
+        // Device is configured as DSDS.
+        if (serviceName != RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT1_NAME && serviceName != RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT2_NAME) {
+            ALOGI("%s instance is not valid for DSDS device.", serviceName.c_str());
+            return false;
+        }
+    } else if (isTsTsEnabled()) {
+        // Device is configured as TSTS.
+        if (serviceName != RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT1_NAME && serviceName != RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT2_NAME &&
+            serviceName != RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT3_NAME) {
+            ALOGI("%s instance is not valid for TSTS device.", serviceName.c_str());
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+    return true;
+}
+
 void RadioHidlTest_v1_6::SetUp() {
-    radio_v1_6 = android::hardware::radio::V1_6::IRadio::getService(GetParam());
+    hidl_string serviceName = GetParam();
+
+    if (!isServiceValidForDeviceConfiguration(serviceName)) {
+        ALOGI("Skipped the test due to device configuration.");
+        GTEST_SKIP();
+    }
+
+    radio_v1_6 = android::hardware::radio::V1_6::IRadio::getService(serviceName);
     ASSERT_NE(nullptr, radio_v1_6.get());
 
     radioRsp_v1_6 = new (std::nothrow) RadioResponse_v1_6(*this);
@@ -86,16 +117,14 @@
  * disabled.
  * <p/>
  * Typical usage within VTS:
- * if (getRadioHalCapabilities().modemReducedFeatureSet) return;
+ * if (getRadioHalCapabilities()) return;
  */
-HalDeviceCapabilities RadioHidlTest_v1_6::getRadioHalCapabilities() {
+bool RadioHidlTest_v1_6::getRadioHalCapabilities() {
     sp<::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3::IRadioConfig> radioConfig_v1_3 =
             ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3::IRadioConfig::getService();
     if (radioConfig_v1_3.get() == nullptr) {
         // If v1_3 isn't present, the values are initialized to false
-        HalDeviceCapabilities radioHalCapabilities;
-        memset(&radioHalCapabilities, 0, sizeof(radioHalCapabilities));
-        return radioHalCapabilities;
+        return false;
     } else {
         // Get radioHalDeviceCapabilities from the radio config
         sp<RadioConfigResponse> radioConfigRsp = new (std::nothrow) RadioConfigResponse(*this);
@@ -104,6 +133,6 @@
 
         radioConfig_v1_3->getHalDeviceCapabilities(serial);
         EXPECT_EQ(std::cv_status::no_timeout, wait());
-        return radioConfigRsp->halDeviceCapabilities;
+        return radioConfigRsp->modemReducedFeatureSet1;
     }
 }
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h
index 4fc17e5..54c2977 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_hidl_hal_utils_v1_6.h
@@ -38,19 +38,19 @@
 using namespace ::android::hardware::radio::V1_2;
 using namespace ::android::hardware::radio::V1_1;
 using namespace ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0;
-using namespace ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3;
 
 using ::android::sp;
 using ::android::hardware::hidl_string;
 using ::android::hardware::hidl_vec;
 using ::android::hardware::Return;
 using ::android::hardware::Void;
-using ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3::HalDeviceCapabilities;
 
 #define MODEM_EMERGENCY_CALL_ESTABLISH_TIME 3
 #define MODEM_EMERGENCY_CALL_DISCONNECT_TIME 3
 
-#define RADIO_SERVICE_NAME "slot1"
+#define RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT1_NAME "slot1"  // HAL instance name for SIM slot 1 or single SIM device
+#define RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT2_NAME "slot2"  // HAL instance name for SIM slot 2 on dual SIM device
+#define RADIO_SERVICE_SLOT3_NAME "slot3"  // HAL instance name for SIM slot 3 on triple SIM device
 
 class RadioHidlTest_v1_6;
 extern ::android::hardware::radio::V1_5::CardStatus cardStatus;
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
 
   public:
     hidl_vec<RadioBandMode> radioBandModes;
+    hidl_vec<OperatorInfo> networkInfos;
 
     ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioResponseInfo rspInfo_v1_0;
     ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo rspInfo;
@@ -762,7 +763,7 @@
             const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& info,
             const SendSmsResult& sms);
 
-    Return<void> sendSMSExpectMoreResponse_1_6(
+    Return<void> sendSmsExpectMoreResponse_1_6(
             const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& info,
             const SendSmsResult& sms);
 
@@ -1115,7 +1116,7 @@
   public:
     virtual void SetUp() override;
 
-    HalDeviceCapabilities getRadioHalCapabilities();
+    bool getRadioHalCapabilities();
 
     /* radio service handle */
     sp<::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::IRadio> radio_v1_6;
diff --git a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_response.cpp b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_response.cpp
index 2b6d1bb..e1b9f56 100644
--- a/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_response.cpp
+++ b/radio/1.6/vts/functional/radio_response.cpp
@@ -274,8 +274,11 @@
 }
 
 Return<void> RadioResponse_v1_6::getAvailableNetworksResponse(
-        const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioResponseInfo& /*info*/,
-        const ::android::hardware::hidl_vec<OperatorInfo>& /*networkInfos*/) {
+        const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioResponseInfo& info,
+        const ::android::hardware::hidl_vec<OperatorInfo>& networkInfos) {
+    rspInfo_v1_0 = info;
+    this->networkInfos = networkInfos;
+    parent_v1_6.notify(info.serial);
     return Void();
 }
 
@@ -1090,7 +1093,7 @@
     return Void();
 }
 
-Return<void> RadioResponse_v1_6::sendSMSExpectMoreResponse_1_6(
+Return<void> RadioResponse_v1_6::sendSmsExpectMoreResponse_1_6(
         const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& info,
         const SendSmsResult& sms) {
     rspInfo = info;
@@ -1169,10 +1172,13 @@
 }
 
 Return<void> RadioResponse_v1_6::getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmapResponse(
-        const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& /*info*/,
+        const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& info,
         const ::android::hardware::hidl_bitfield<
                 ::android::hardware::radio::V1_4::RadioAccessFamily>
-        /*networkTypeBitmap*/) {
+                networkTypeBitmap) {
+    rspInfo = info;
+    networkTypeBitmapResponse = networkTypeBitmap;
+    parent_v1_6.notify(info.serial);
     return Void();
 }
 
@@ -1206,8 +1212,9 @@
 
 Return<void> RadioResponse_v1_6::getVoiceRegistrationStateResponse_1_6(
         const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& info,
-        const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RegStateResult& /*regResponse*/) {
+        const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RegStateResult& regResponse) {
     rspInfo = info;
+    voiceRegResp.regState = regResponse.regState;
     parent_v1_6.notify(info.serial);
     return Void();
 }
diff --git a/radio/config/1.3/Android.bp b/radio/config/1.3/Android.bp
index cc5944d..dc0d82c 100644
--- a/radio/config/1.3/Android.bp
+++ b/radio/config/1.3/Android.bp
@@ -13,7 +13,6 @@
     name: "android.hardware.radio.config@1.3",
     root: "android.hardware",
     srcs: [
-        "types.hal",
         "IRadioConfig.hal",
         "IRadioConfigResponse.hal",
     ],
diff --git a/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.hal b/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.hal
index 863754f..f6aee31 100644
--- a/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.hal
+++ b/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.hal
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@
 
 import android.hardware.radio@1.6::RadioResponseInfo;
 import @1.2::IRadioConfigResponse;
-import HalDeviceCapabilities;
 
 /**
  * Interface declaring response functions to solicited radio config requests.
@@ -26,8 +25,20 @@
 interface IRadioConfigResponse extends @1.2::IRadioConfigResponse {
     /**
      * @param info Response info struct containing response type, serial no. and error
-     * @param capabilities Capabilities struct containing the capabilities of the
-     * device related to the Radio HAL
+     * @param modemReducedFeatureSet1 True indicates that the modem does NOT support the following
+     *        features.
+     *        - Providing either
+     *          android.hardware.radio@1.6::LinkCapacityEstimate:secondaryDownlinkCapacityKbps
+     *          or android.hardware.radio@1.6::LinkCapacityEstimate:secondaryUplinkCapacityKbps
+     *          when given from
+     *          android.hardware.radio@1.6::RadioIndication:currentLinkCapacityEstimate
+     *        - Calling android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadio.setNrDualConnectivityState
+     *          or querying android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadio.isNrDualConnectivityEnabled
+     *        - Requesting android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadio.setDataThrottling()
+     *        - Providing android.hardware.radio@1.6::SlicingConfig through
+     *          android.hardware.radio@1.6::getSlicingConfig()
+     *        - Providing android.hardware.radio@1.6::PhysicalChannelConfig through
+     *          android.hardware.radio@1.6::IRadioIndication.currentPhysicalChannelConfigs_1_6()
      *
      * Valid errors returned:
      *   RadioError:NONE
@@ -35,5 +46,5 @@
      *   RadioError:INTERNAL_ERR
      */
     oneway getHalDeviceCapabilitiesResponse(RadioResponseInfo info,
-        HalDeviceCapabilities capabilities);
+        bool modemReducedFeatureSet1);
 };
diff --git a/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_hidl_hal_utils.h b/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_hidl_hal_utils.h
index 895ae08..7440054 100644
--- a/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_hidl_hal_utils.h
+++ b/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_hidl_hal_utils.h
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
 #include <android/hardware/radio/config/1.2/types.h>
 #include <android/hardware/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfig.h>
 #include <android/hardware/radio/config/1.3/IRadioConfigResponse.h>
-#include <android/hardware/radio/config/1.3/types.h>
 #include <gtest/gtest.h>
 #include <hidl/GtestPrinter.h>
 #include <hidl/ServiceManagement.h>
@@ -47,7 +46,6 @@
 using ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_1::ModemsConfig;
 using ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_1::PhoneCapability;
 using ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_2::SimSlotStatus;
-using ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3::HalDeviceCapabilities;
 using ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3::IRadioConfig;
 using ::android::hardware::radio::V1_0::RadioResponseInfo;
 
@@ -63,7 +61,7 @@
   public:
     RadioResponseInfo rspInfo;
     PhoneCapability phoneCap;
-    HalDeviceCapabilities halDeviceCapabilities;
+    bool modemReducedFeatureSet1;
 
     RadioConfigResponse(RadioResponseWaiter& parent);
     virtual ~RadioConfigResponse() = default;
@@ -91,7 +89,7 @@
 
     Return<void> getHalDeviceCapabilitiesResponse(
             const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& info,
-            const HalDeviceCapabilities& halDeviceCapabilities);
+            bool modemReducedFeatureSet1);
 };
 
 /* Callback class for radio config indication */
diff --git a/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_response.cpp b/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_response.cpp
index 11e3cce..6b2d27c 100644
--- a/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_response.cpp
+++ b/radio/config/1.3/vts/functional/radio_config_response.cpp
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
 
 Return<void> RadioConfigResponse::getHalDeviceCapabilitiesResponse(
         const ::android::hardware::radio::V1_6::RadioResponseInfo& /* info */,
-        const ::android::hardware::radio::config::V1_3::HalDeviceCapabilities& capabilities) {
-    halDeviceCapabilities = capabilities;
+        bool modemReducedFeatures) {
+    modemReducedFeatureSet1 = modemReducedFeatures;
     return Void();
 }
diff --git a/rebootescrow/aidl/default/Android.bp b/rebootescrow/aidl/default/Android.bp
index b9fb2a9..1f67a3e 100644
--- a/rebootescrow/aidl/default/Android.bp
+++ b/rebootescrow/aidl/default/Android.bp
@@ -87,7 +87,9 @@
     ],
     static_libs: [
         "libhadamardutils",
-        "libgtest_prod",
+    ],
+    header_libs: [
+        "libgtest_prod_headers",
     ],
     shared_libs: [
         "liblog",
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/Android.bp
index 0c11f3b..3796847 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -30,6 +30,10 @@
         },
         rust: {
             enabled: true,
+            apex_available: [
+                "//apex_available:platform",
+                "com.android.compos",
+            ],
         },
     },
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index bf30999..fa643fc 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@
   void deleteKey(in byte[] keyBlob);
   void deleteAllKeys();
   void destroyAttestationIds();
-  android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult begin(in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose purpose, in byte[] keyBlob, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] params, in android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken authToken);
+  android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult begin(in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyPurpose purpose, in byte[] keyBlob, in android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyParameter[] params, in @nullable android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken authToken);
   void deviceLocked(in boolean passwordOnly, in @nullable android.hardware.security.secureclock.TimeStampToken timestampToken);
   void earlyBootEnded();
   byte[] convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(in byte[] storageKeyBlob);
-  byte[] performOperation(in byte[] request);
+  android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCharacteristics[] getKeyCharacteristics(in byte[] keyBlob, in byte[] appId, in byte[] appData);
   const int AUTH_TOKEN_MAC_LENGTH = 32;
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index 88c479c..f566462 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 /* @hide */
 @VintfStability
 interface IRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
+  android.hardware.security.keymint.RpcHardwareInfo getHardwareInfo();
   byte[] generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(in boolean testMode, out android.hardware.security.keymint.MacedPublicKey macedPublicKey);
   byte[] generateCertificateRequest(in boolean testMode, in android.hardware.security.keymint.MacedPublicKey[] keysToSign, in byte[] endpointEncryptionCertChain, in byte[] challenge, out android.hardware.security.keymint.DeviceInfo deviceInfo, out android.hardware.security.keymint.ProtectedData protectedData);
   const int STATUS_FAILED = 1;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/RpcHardwareInfo.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/RpcHardwareInfo.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..06bce19
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/RpcHardwareInfo.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+// THIS FILE IS IMMUTABLE. DO NOT EDIT IN ANY CASE.                          //
+///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+// This file is a snapshot of an AIDL file. Do not edit it manually. There are
+// two cases:
+// 1). this is a frozen version file - do not edit this in any case.
+// 2). this is a 'current' file. If you make a backwards compatible change to
+//     the interface (from the latest frozen version), the build system will
+//     prompt you to update this file with `m <name>-update-api`.
+//
+// You must not make a backward incompatible change to any AIDL file built
+// with the aidl_interface module type with versions property set. The module
+// type is used to build AIDL files in a way that they can be used across
+// independently updatable components of the system. If a device is shipped
+// with such a backward incompatible change, it has a high risk of breaking
+// later when a module using the interface is updated, e.g., Mainline modules.
+
+package android.hardware.security.keymint;
+/* @hide */
+@RustDerive(Clone=true, Eq=true, Hash=true, Ord=true, PartialEq=true, PartialOrd=true) @VintfStability
+parcelable RpcHardwareInfo {
+  int versionNumber;
+  @utf8InCpp String rpcAuthorName;
+  int supportedEekCurve = 0;
+  const int CURVE_NONE = 0;
+  const int CURVE_P256 = 1;
+  const int CURVE_25519 = 2;
+}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
index 7591318..e310b44 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@
   RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = 1342177480,
   INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = 1879048394,
   RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST = 536871115,
-  BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS = 268435757,
   BOOTLOADER_ONLY = 1879048494,
   ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = 1879048495,
   HARDWARE_TYPE = 268435760,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
index b4bc60c..4e3008f 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
@@ -27,7 +27,19 @@
 @VintfStability
 @RustDerive(Clone=true, Eq=true, PartialEq=true, Ord=true, PartialOrd=true, Hash=true)
 parcelable AttestationKey {
+    /**
+     * Key blob containing a key pair with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY
+     */
     byte[] keyBlob;
+
+    /**
+     * Key parameters needed to use the key in keyBlob, notably Tag::APPLICATION_ID and
+     * Tag::APPLICATION_DATA, if they were provided during generation of the key in keyBlob.
+     */
     KeyParameter[] attestKeyParams;
+
+    /**
+     * The issuerSubjectName to use in the generated attestation.
+     */
     byte[] issuerSubjectName;
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
index 2304a58..b5336b9 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
@@ -25,7 +25,10 @@
  */
 @VintfStability
 parcelable BeginResult {
-    /* This is the challenge used in verifyAuthorization.  It must be a nonce. */
+    /**
+     * This is the challenge used to verify authorization of an operation.
+     * See IKeyMintOperation.aidl entrypoints updateAad() and update().
+     */
     long challenge;
 
     /**
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
index 3ea14a1..32d69cd 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/DeviceInfo.aidl
@@ -37,10 +37,13 @@
      *         ? "board" : tstr,
      *         ? "vb_state" : "green" / "yellow" / "orange",    // Taken from the AVB values
      *         ? "bootloader_state" : "locked" / "unlocked",    // Taken from the AVB values
+     *         ? "vbmeta_digest": bstr,                         // Taken from the AVB values
      *         ? "os_version" : tstr,                    // Same as android.os.Build.VERSION.release
      *         ? "system_patch_level" : uint,                   // YYYYMMDD
      *         ? "boot_patch_level" : uint,                     // YYYYMMDD
      *         ? "vendor_patch_level" : uint,                   // YYYYMMDD
+     *         "version" : 1,                      // The CDDL schema version.
+     *         "security_level" : "tee" / "strongbox"
      *     }
      */
     byte[] deviceInfo;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index 1c503c2..88b2a26 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.IKeyMintOperation;
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCharacteristics;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCreationResult;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyFormat;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyMintHardwareInfo;
@@ -107,7 +108,6 @@
  *
  *      - 168-bit keys.
  *      - CBC and ECB mode.
-
  *      - CBC and ECB modes must support unpadded and PKCS7 padding modes.  With no padding CBC and
  *        ECB-mode operations must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the input isn't a
  *        multiple of the DES block size.
@@ -150,8 +150,8 @@
  *
  * The IKeyMintDevice must ignore unknown tags.
  *
- * The caller must always provide the current date time in the keyParameter CREATION_DATETIME
- * tags.
+ * The caller may provide the current date time in the keyParameter CREATION_DATETIME tag, but
+ * this is optional and informational only.
  *
  * All authorization tags and their values enforced by an IKeyMintDevice must be cryptographically
  * bound to the private/secret key material such that any modification of the portion of the key
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@
  * startup, preferably by the bootloader.  This bitstring must be cryptographically bound to every
  * key managed by the IKeyMintDevice.  As above, the recommended mechanism for this cryptographic
  * binding is to include the Root of Trust data in the input to the key derivation function used to
- * derive a key that is used to encryp the private/secret key material.
+ * derive a key that is used to encrypt the private/secret key material.
  *
  * The root of trust consists of a bitstring that must be derived from the public key used by
  * Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image and from the lock state of the
@@ -233,8 +233,6 @@
      * indistinguishable from random.  Thus, if the entropy from any source is good, the output
      * must be good.
      *
-     * TODO(seleneh) specify what mixing functions and cprng we allow.
-     *
      * @param data Bytes to be mixed into the CRNG seed.  The caller must not provide more than 2
      *        KiB of data per invocation.
      *
@@ -247,7 +245,7 @@
      * Generates a new cryptographic key, specifying associated parameters, which must be
      * cryptographically bound to the key.  IKeyMintDevice implementations must disallow any use
      * of a key in any way inconsistent with the authorizations specified at generation time.  With
-     * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure envionment's
+     * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure environment's
      * obligation is limited to ensuring that the unenforceable parameters associated with the key
      * cannot be modified.  In addition, the characteristics returned by generateKey places
      * parameters correctly in the tee-enforced and strongbox-enforced lists.
@@ -257,9 +255,6 @@
      *
      * o Tag::ORIGIN with the value KeyOrigin::GENERATED.
      *
-     * o Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS with the appropriate value (see KeyBlobUsageRequirements in
-     *   Tag.aidl).
-     *
      * o Tag::OS_VERSION, Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL, Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL and Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL with
      *   appropriate values.
      *
@@ -271,15 +266,14 @@
      *
      * The following parameters are required to generate an RSA key:
      *
-     * o Tag::Key_SIZE specifies the size of the public modulus, in bits.  If omitted, generateKey
+     * o Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size of the public modulus, in bits.  If omitted, generateKey
      *   must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.  Required values for TEE IKeyMintDevice
      *   implementations are 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096.  StrongBox IKeyMintDevice implementations
      *   must support 2048.
      *
      * o Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT specifies the RSA public exponent value.  If omitted, generateKey
      *   must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.  The values 3 and 65537 must be supported.  It is
-     *   recommended to support all prime values up to 2^64.  If provided with a non-prime value,
-     *   generateKey must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+     *   recommended to support all prime values up to 2^64.
      *
      * The following parameters are not necessary to generate a usable RSA key, but generateKey must
      * not return an error if they are omitted:
@@ -288,7 +282,7 @@
      *   except AGREE_KEY must be supported for RSA keys.
      *
      * o Tag::DIGEST specifies digest algorithms that may be used with the new key.  TEE
-     *   IKeyMintDevice implementatiosn must support all Digest values (see digest.aidl) for RSA
+     *   IKeyMintDevice implementations must support all Digest values (see digest.aidl) for RSA
      *   keys.  StrongBox IKeyMintDevice implementations must support SHA_2_256.
      *
      * o Tag::PADDING specifies the padding modes that may be used with the new
@@ -298,11 +292,9 @@
      *
      * == ECDSA Keys ==
      *
-     * Either Tag::KEY_SIZE or Tag::EC_CURVE must be provided to generate an ECDSA key.  If neither
-     * is provided, generateKey must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.  If Tag::KEY_SIZE is
-     * provided, the possible values are 224, 256, 384 and 521, and must be mapped to Tag::EC_CURVE
-     * values P_224, P_256, P_384 and P_521, respectively.  TEE IKeyMintDevice implementations
-     * must support all curves.  StrongBox implementations must support P_256.
+     * Tag::EC_CURVE must be provided to generate an ECDSA key.  If it is not provided, generateKey
+     * must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. TEE IKeyMintDevice implementations must support
+     * all curves.  StrongBox implementations must support P_256.
      *
      * == AES Keys ==
      *
@@ -312,6 +304,10 @@
      * If Tag::BLOCK_MODE is specified with value BlockMode::GCM, then the caller must also provide
      * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH.  If omitted, generateKey must return ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
      *
+     * == 3DES Keys ==
+     *
+     * Only Tag::KEY_SIZE is required to generate an 3DES key, and its value must be 168.  If
+     * omitted, generateKey must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
      *
      * @param keyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
      *        provided in params.  See above for detailed specifications of which tags are required
@@ -320,10 +316,15 @@
      * @param attestationKey, if provided, specifies the key that must be used to sign the
      *        attestation certificate.  If `keyParams` does not contain a Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE
      *        but `attestationKey` is non-null, the IKeyMintDevice must return
-     *        ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.  If the provided AttestationKey does not contain a key
-     *        blob containing an asymmetric key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the IKeyMintDevice must
-     *        return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE.  If the provided AttestationKey has an empty
-     *        issuer subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+     *        ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING. If the provided AttestationKey does not
+     *        contain a key blob containing an asymmetric key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the
+     *        IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE.  If the provided
+     *        AttestationKey has an empty issuer subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return
+     *        ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+     *
+     *        If `attestationKey` is null and `keyParams` contains Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE but
+     *        the KeyMint implementation does not have factory-provisioned attestation keys, it must
+     *        return ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED.
      *
      * @return The result of key creation.  See KeyCreationResult.aidl.
      */
@@ -348,13 +349,12 @@
      *
      * o Tag::ORIGIN (returned in keyCharacteristics) must have the value KeyOrigin::IMPORTED.
      *
-     * @param inKeyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
+     * @param keyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
      *        provided in params.
      *
-     * @param inKeyFormat The format of the key material to import.  See KeyFormat in
-     *        keyformat.aidl.
+     * @param keyFormat The format of the key material to import.  See KeyFormat in keyformat.aidl.
      *
-     * @param inKeyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat.
+     * @param keyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat.
      *
      * @param attestationKey, if provided, specifies the key that must be used to sign the
      *        attestation certificate.  If `keyParams` does not contain a Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE
@@ -364,6 +364,10 @@
      *        return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PURPOSE.  If the provided AttestationKey has an empty
      *        issuer subject name, the IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
      *
+     *        If `attestationKey` is null and `keyParams` contains Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE but
+     *        the KeyMint implementation does not have factory-provisioned attestation keys, it must
+     *        return ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_KEYS_NOT_PROVISIONED.
+     *
      * @return The result of key creation.  See KeyCreationResult.aidl.
      */
     KeyCreationResult importKey(in KeyParameter[] keyParams, in KeyFormat keyFormat,
@@ -373,9 +377,8 @@
      * Securely imports a key, or key pair, returning a key blob and a description of the imported
      * key.
      *
-     * @param inWrappedKeyData The wrapped key material to import.
-     *     TODO(seleneh) Decide if we want the wrapped key in DER-encoded ASN.1 format or CBOR
-     *     format or both.  And specify the standarized format.
+     * @param wrappedKeyData The wrapped key material to import, as ASN.1 DER-encoded data
+     *        corresponding to the following schema.
      *
      *     KeyDescription ::= SEQUENCE(
      *         keyFormat INTEGER,                   # Values from KeyFormat enum.
@@ -393,20 +396,20 @@
      *
      *     Where:
      *
-     *     o keyFormat is an integer from the KeyFormat enum, defining the format of the plaintext
+     *     - keyFormat is an integer from the KeyFormat enum, defining the format of the plaintext
      *       key material.
-     *     o keyParams is the characteristics of the key to be imported (as with generateKey or
+     *     - keyParams is the characteristics of the key to be imported (as with generateKey or
      *       importKey).  If the secure import is successful, these characteristics must be
      *       associated with the key exactly as if the key material had been insecurely imported
-     *       with the IKeyMintDevice::importKey.  See attestKey() for documentation of the
-     *       AuthorizationList schema.
-     *     o encryptedTransportKey is a 256-bit AES key, XORed with a masking key and then encrypted
+     *       with the IKeyMintDevice::importKey.  See KeyCreationResult.aidl for documentation of
+     *       the AuthorizationList schema.
+     *     - encryptedTransportKey is a 256-bit AES key, XORed with a masking key and then encrypted
      *       with the wrapping key specified by wrappingKeyBlob.
-     *     o keyDescription is a KeyDescription, above.
-     *     o encryptedKey is the key material of the key to be imported, in format keyFormat, and
+     *     - keyDescription is a KeyDescription, above.
+     *     - encryptedKey is the key material of the key to be imported, in format keyFormat, and
      *       encrypted with encryptedEphemeralKey in AES-GCM mode, with the DER-encoded
      *       representation of keyDescription provided as additional authenticated data.
-     *     o tag is the tag produced by the AES-GCM encryption of encryptedKey.
+     *     - tag is the tag produced by the AES-GCM encryption of encryptedKey.
      *
      * So, importWrappedKey does the following:
      *
@@ -435,7 +438,7 @@
      *
      * @param passwordSid specifies the password secure ID (SID) of the user that owns the key being
      *        installed.  If the authorization list in wrappedKeyData contains a
-     *        Tag::USER_SECURE_IDwith a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD bit
+     *        Tag::USER_SECURE_ID with a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD bit
      *        set, the constructed key must be bound to the SID value provided by this argument.  If
      *        the wrappedKeyData does not contain such a tag and value, this argument must be
      *        ignored.
@@ -478,9 +481,9 @@
      * patch level and OS version.  This requirement is relaxed for 4.0::IKeymasterDevice and
      * IKeyMintDevice, and the OS version in the boot image footer is no longer used.
      *
-     * @param inKeyBlobToUpgrade The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+     * @param keyBlobToUpgrade The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey().
      *
-     * @param inUpgradeParams A parameter list containing any parameters needed to complete the
+     * @param upgradeParams A parameter list containing any parameters needed to complete the
      *        upgrade, including Tag::APPLICATION_ID and Tag::APPLICATION_DATA.
      *
      * @return A new key blob that references the same key as keyBlobToUpgrade, but is in the new
@@ -494,7 +497,9 @@
      * render the key permanently unusable.  Keys without Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or
      * may not be rendered unusable.
      *
-     * @param inKeyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+     * @param keyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+     *
+     * @return error See the ErrorCode enum.
      */
     void deleteKey(in byte[] keyBlob);
 
@@ -503,8 +508,6 @@
      * this function is called all keys with Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE in their hardware-enforced
      * authorization lists must be rendered permanently unusable.  Keys without
      * Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or may not be rendered unusable.
-     *
-     * @return error See the ErrorCode enum.
      */
     void deleteAllKeys();
 
@@ -523,28 +526,27 @@
 
     /**
      * Begins a cryptographic operation using the specified key.  If all is well, begin() must
-     * return ErrorCode::OK and create an operation handle which must be passed to subsequent calls
-     * to update(), finish() or abort().
+     * return ErrorCode::OK and create an IKeyMintOperation handle which will be used to perform
+     * the cryptographic operation.
      *
-     * It is critical that each call to begin() be paired with a subsequent call to finish() or
-     * abort(), to allow the IKeyMintDevice implementation to clean up any internal operation
-     * state.  The caller's failure to do this may leak internal state space or other internal
-     * resources and may eventually cause begin() to return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS when it
-     * runs out of space for operations.  Any result other than ErrorCode::OK from begin(), update()
-     * or finish() implicitly aborts the operation, in which case abort() need not be called (and
-     * must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE if called).  IKeyMintDevice implementations
-     * must support 32 concurrent operations.
+     * It is critical that each successful call to begin() be paired with a subsequent call to
+     * finish() or abort() on the resulting IKeyMintOperation, to allow the IKeyMintDevice
+     * implementation to clean up any internal operation state.  The caller's failure to do this may
+     * leak internal state space or other internal resources and may eventually cause begin() to
+     * return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS when it runs out of space for operations.  Any result
+     * other than ErrorCode::OK from begin() will not return an IKeyMintOperation (in which case
+     * calling finish() or abort() is neither possible nor necessary). IKeyMintDevice
+     * implementations must support 32 concurrent operations.
      *
      * If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were specified during key generation or
      * import, calls to begin must include those tags with the originally-specified values in the
-     * inParams argument to this method.  If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
+     * params argument to this method.  If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
      *
      * == Authorization Enforcement ==
      *
      * The following key authorization parameters must be enforced by the IKeyMintDevice secure
      * environment if the tags were returned in the "hardwareEnforced" list in the
-     * KeyCharacteristics.  Public key operations, meaning KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and
-     * KeyPurpose::VERIFY must be allowed to succeed even if authorization requirements are not met.
+     * KeyCharacteristics.
      *
      * -- All Key Types --
      *
@@ -573,9 +575,9 @@
      *
      * o Tag::USER_SECURE_ID must be enforced by this method if and only if the key also has
      *   Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT (if it does not have Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT, the Tag::USER_SECURE_ID
-     *   requirement must be enforced by update() and finish()).  If the key has both, then this
-     *   method must receive a non-empty HardwareAuthToken in the authToken argument.  For the auth
-     *   token to be valid, all of the following have to be true:
+     *   requirement must be enforced by updateAad(), update() and finish()).  If the key has both,
+     *   then this method must receive a non-empty HardwareAuthToken in the authToken argument.  For
+     *   the auth token to be valid, all of the following have to be true:
      *
      *   o The HMAC field must validate correctly.
      *
@@ -602,32 +604,30 @@
      *
      * -- RSA Keys --
      *
-     * All RSA key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams.  If unspecified or
+     * All RSA key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in params.  If unspecified or
      * specified more than once, the begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.
      *
-     * RSA signing and verification operations need a digest, as do RSA encryption and decryption
-     * operations with OAEP padding mode.  For those cases, the caller must specify exactly one
-     * digest in inParams.  If unspecified or specified more than once, begin() must return
+     * RSA signing operations need a digest, as do RSA encryption and decryption operations with
+     * OAEP padding mode.  For those cases, the caller must specify exactly one digest in params.
+     * If unspecified or specified more than once, begin() must return
      * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST.
      *
      * Private key operations (KeyPurpose::DECRYPT and KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of
      * digest and padding, which means that the key authorizations need to contain the specified
      * values.  If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST or
-     * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING, as appropriate.  Public key operations (KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT
-     * and KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are permitted with unauthorized digest or padding modes.
+     * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, as appropriate.
      *
      * With the exception of PaddingMode::NONE, all RSA padding modes are applicable only to certain
      * purposes.  Specifically, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN and PaddingMode::RSA_PSS only
-     * support signing and verification, while PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and
-     * PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP only support encryption and decryption.  begin() must return
-     * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE if the specified mode does not support the specified
-     * purpose.
+     * support signing, while PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP only
+     * support encryption and decryption.  begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE
+     * if the specified mode does not support the specified purpose.
      *
      * There are some important interactions between padding modes and digests:
      *
-     * o PaddingMode::NONE indicates that a "raw" RSA operation is performed.  If signing or
-     *   verifying, Digest::NONE is specified for the digest.  No digest is necessary for unpadded
-     *   encryption or decryption.
+     * o PaddingMode::NONE indicates that a "raw" RSA operation is performed.  If signing,
+     *   Digest::NONE is specified for the digest.  No digest is necessary for unpadded encryption
+     *   or decryption.
      *
      * o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN padding requires a digest.  The digest may be Digest::NONE,
      *   in which case the KeyMint implementation cannot build a proper PKCS#1 v1.5 signature
@@ -639,37 +639,37 @@
      *
      * o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_1_5_ENCRYPT padding does not require a digest.
      *
-     * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE.  If
-     *   Digest::NONE is specified, the begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.  In
-     *   addition, the size of the RSA key must be at least 2 + D bytes larger than the output size
-     *   of the digest, where D is the size of the digest, in bytes.  Otherwise begin() must
-     *   return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.  The salt size must be D.
+     * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS padding requires a digest, which must match one of the padding values
+     *   in the key authorizations, and which may not be Digest::NONE.  begin() must return
+     *   ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST if this is not the case.  In addition, the size of the RSA
+     *   key must be at least 2 + D bytes larger than the output size of the digest, where D is the
+     *   size of the digest, in bytes.  Otherwise begin() must return
+     *   ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.  The salt size must be D.
      *
-     * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE.  If
-     *   Digest::NONE is specified, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.  The OAEP
-     *   mask generation function must be MGF1 and the MGF1 digest must be SHA1, regardless of the
-     *   OAEP digest specified.
+     * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP padding requires a digest, which must match one of the padding values
+     *   in the key authorizations, and which may not be Digest::NONE.  begin() must return
+     *   ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST if this is not the case.  RSA_OAEP padding also requires an
+     *   MGF1 digest, specified with Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, which must match one of the MGF1
+     *   padding values in the key authorizations and which may not be Digest::NONE.  begin() must
+     *   return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST if this is not the case. The OAEP mask generation
+     *   function must be MGF1.
      *
      * -- EC Keys --
      *
-     * EC key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams.  If unspecified or
-     * specified more than once, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.
-     *
      * Private key operations (KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of digest and padding, which
      * means that the key authorizations must contain the specified values.  If not, begin() must
-     * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.  Public key operations (KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are
-     * permitted with unauthorized digest or padding.
+     * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
      *
      * -- AES Keys --
      *
      * AES key operations must specify exactly one block mode (Tag::BLOCK_MODE) and one padding mode
-     * (Tag::PADDING) in inParams.  If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
+     * (Tag::PADDING) in params.  If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
      * begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE or
      * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.  The specified modes must be authorized by the key,
      * otherwise begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE or
      * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
      *
-     * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM, inParams must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH, and the specified
+     * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM, params must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH, and the specified
      * value must be a multiple of 8 that is not greater than 128 or less than the value of
      * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations.  For MAC lengths greater than 128 or
      * non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH.  For values less
@@ -682,48 +682,66 @@
      *
      * If the block mode is BlockMode::CBC, BlockMode::CTR, or BlockMode::GCM, an initialization
      * vector or nonce is required.  In most cases, callers shouldn't provide an IV or nonce and the
-     * IKeyMintDevice implementation must generate a random IV or nonce and return it via
-     * Tag::NONCE in outParams.  CBC and CTR IVs are 16 bytes.  GCM nonces are 12 bytes.  If the key
+     * IKeyMintDevice implementation must generate a random IV or nonce and return it via Tag::NONCE
+     * in outParams.  CBC and CTR IVs are 16 bytes.  GCM nonces are 12 bytes.  If the key
      * authorizations contain Tag::CALLER_NONCE, then the caller may provide an IV/nonce with
-     * Tag::NONCE in inParams.  If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
+     * Tag::NONCE in params, which must be of the correct size (if not, return
+     * ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE).  If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
      * begin() must return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED.  If a nonce is not provided when
-     * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice msut generate a random IV/nonce.
+     * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice must generate a random IV/nonce.
+     *
+     * -- 3DES Keys --
+     *
+     * 3DES key operations must specify exactly one block mode (Tag::BLOCK_MODE) and one padding
+     * mode (Tag::PADDING) in params.  If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
+     * begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE or
+     * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.  The specified modes must be authorized by the key,
+     * otherwise begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE or
+     * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
+     *
+     * If the block mode is BlockMode::CBC, an initialization vector or nonce is required.  In most
+     * cases, callers shouldn't provide an IV or nonce and the IKeyMintDevice implementation must
+     * generate a random IV or nonce and return it via Tag::NONCE in outParams.  CBC IVs are 8
+     * bytes.  If the key authorizations contain Tag::CALLER_NONCE, then the caller may provide an
+     * IV/nonce with Tag::NONCE in params, which must be of the correct size (if not, return
+     * ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE).  If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
+     * begin() must return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED.  If a nonce is not provided when
+     * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice must generate a random IV/nonce.
+     *
      *
      * -- HMAC keys --
      *
-     * HMAC key operations must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH in inParams.  The specified value must be a
+     * HMAC key operations must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH in params.  The specified value must be a
      * multiple of 8 that is not greater than the digest length or less than the value of
      * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations.  For MAC lengths greater than the digest
      * length or non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH.  For
      * values less than the key's minimum length, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH.
      *
-     * @param inPurpose The purpose of the operation, one of KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
-     *        KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, KeyPurpose::SIGN, KeyPurpose::VERIFY, or KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY.
-     *        Note that for AEAD modes, encryption and decryption imply signing and verification,
-     *        respectively, but must be specified as KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and KeyPurpose::DECRYPT.
+     * @param purpose The purpose of the operation, one of KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT,
+     *        KeyPurpose::SIGN, KeyPurpose::VERIFY, or KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY.  Note that for AEAD
+     *        modes, encryption and decryption imply signing and verification, respectively, but
+     *        must be specified as KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and KeyPurpose::DECRYPT.
      *
-     * @param inKeyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey().  The key
+     * @param keyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey().  The key
      *        must have a purpose compatible with purpose and all of its usage requirements must be
      *        satisfied, or begin() must return an appropriate error code (see above).
      *
-     * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation.  If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or
+     * @param params Additional parameters for the operation.  If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or
      *        Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were provided during generation, they must be provided here, or
      *        the operation must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.  For operations that require
-     *        a nonce or IV, on keys that were generated with Tag::CALLER_NONCE, inParams may
+     *        a nonce or IV, on keys that were generated with Tag::CALLER_NONCE, params may
      *        contain a tag Tag::NONCE.  If Tag::NONCE is provided for a key without
      *        Tag:CALLER_NONCE, ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED must be returned.
      *
-     * @param inAuthToken Authentication token.  Callers that provide no token must set all numeric
-     *        fields to zero and the MAC must be an empty vector.  TODO: make this field nullable.
-     *        b/173483024.
+     * @param authToken Authentication token.
      *
      * @return BeginResult as output, which contains the challenge, KeyParameters which haves
      *         additional data from the operation initialization, notably to return the IV or nonce
      *         from operations that generate an IV or nonce, and IKeyMintOperation object pointer
-     *         which is used to perform update(), finish() or abort() operations.
+     *         which is used to perform updateAad(), update(), finish() or abort() operations.
      */
     BeginResult begin(in KeyPurpose purpose, in byte[] keyBlob, in KeyParameter[] params,
-            in HardwareAuthToken authToken);
+            in @nullable HardwareAuthToken authToken);
 
     /**
      * Called by client to notify the IKeyMintDevice that the device is now locked, and keys with
@@ -737,7 +755,7 @@
      * Note that the IKeyMintDevice UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED semantics are slightly different from
      * the UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED semantics enforced by keystore.  Keystore handles device locking
      * on a per-user basis.  Because auth tokens do not contain an Android user ID, it's not
-     * possible to replicate the keystore enformcement logic in IKeyMintDevice.  So from the
+     * possible to replicate the keystore enforcement logic in IKeyMintDevice.  So from the
      * IKeyMintDevice perspective, any user unlock unlocks all UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED keys.
      * Keystore will continue enforcing the per-user device locking.
      *
@@ -763,7 +781,7 @@
      */
     void earlyBootEnded();
 
-    /*
+    /**
      * Called by the client to get a wrapped per-boot ephemeral key from a wrapped storage key.
      * Clients will then use the returned per-boot ephemeral key in place of the wrapped storage
      * key. Whenever the hardware is presented with a per-boot ephemeral key for an operation, it
@@ -785,16 +803,25 @@
     byte[] convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(in byte[] storageKeyBlob);
 
     /**
-     * Called by the client to perform a KeyMint operation.
+     * Returns KeyMint-enforced parameters associated with the provided key. The returned tags are
+     * a subset of KeyCharacteristics found in the KeyCreationResult returned by generateKey(),
+     * importKey(), or importWrappedKey(). The returned value is a subset, as it does not include
+     * any Keystore-enforced parameters.
      *
-     *  This method is added primarily as a placeholder.  Details will be fleshed before the KeyMint
-     *  V1 interface is frozen.  Until then, implementations must return ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED.
+     * @param keyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey, importKey or importWrappedKey.
      *
-     * @param request is an encrypted buffer containing a description of the operation the client
-     *        wishes to perform.  Structure, content and encryption are TBD.
+     * @param appId An opaque byte string identifying the client.  This value must match the
+     *        Tag::APPLICATION_ID data provided during key generation/import.  Without the correct
+     *        value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to obtain the
+     *        key material.
      *
-     * @return an encrypted buffer containing the result of the operation.  Structure, content and
-     *         encryption are TBD.
+     * @param appData An opaque byte string provided by the application.  This value must match the
+     *        Tag::APPLICATION_DATA data provided during key generation/import.  Without the
+     *        correct value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to
+     *        obtain the key material.
+     *
+     * @return Characteristics of the generated key. See KeyCreationResult for details.
      */
-    byte[] performOperation(in byte[] request);
+    KeyCharacteristics[] getKeyCharacteristics(
+            in byte[] keyBlob, in byte[] appId, in byte[] appData);
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
index d2a993f..ce83044 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@
      * update() is called.  If updateAad() is called after update(), it must return
      * ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG.
      *
-     * If operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
+     * If the operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
      * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
      *
      * If this method returns an error code other than ErrorCode::OK, the operation is aborted and
-     * the operation handle must be invalidated.  Any future use of the handle, with this method,
-     * finish, or abort, must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
+     * the operation handle must be invalidated.  Any future use of this object must return
+     * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
      *
      * == Authorization Enforcement ==
      *
@@ -58,9 +58,10 @@
      *
      *   o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
      *
-     *   o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operationHandle
+     *   o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the value returned from
+     *     IKeyMintDevice::begin(), given by the challenge field of the BeginResult structure.
      *
-     *   If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return
+     *   If any of these conditions are not met, updateAad() must return
      *   ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
      *
      * The caller must provide the auth token on every call to updateAad(), update() and finish().
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@
      *
      * @param input Additional Authentication Data to be processed.
      *
-     * @param authToken Authentication token. Can be nullable if not provided.
+     * @param authToken Authentication token, if provided.
      *
      * @param timeStampToken timestamp token, certifies the freshness of an auth token in case
      *        the security domain of this KeyMint instance has a different clock than the
@@ -93,18 +94,9 @@
      * If operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
      * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
      *
-     * To provide more flexibility for buffer handling, implementations of this method have the
-     * option of consuming less data than was provided.  The caller is responsible for looping to
-     * feed the rest of the data in subsequent calls.  The amount of input consumed must be returned
-     * in the inputConsumed parameter.  Implementations must always consume at least one byte,
-     * unless the operation cannot accept any more; if more than zero bytes are provided and zero
-     * bytes are consumed, callers must consider this an error and abort the operation.
-     * TODO(seleneh) update the code to always consume alll the input data. b/168665179.
-     *
-     * Implementations may also choose how much data to return, as a result of the update.  This is
-     * only relevant for encryption and decryption operations, because signing and verification
-     * return no data until finish.  It is recommended to return data as early as possible, rather
-     * than buffer it.
+     * Implementations may choose how much data to return as a result of the update.  This is
+     * only relevant for encryption and decryption operations, because signing returns no data
+     * until finish.  It is recommended to return data as early as possible, rather than buffer it.
      *
      * If this method returns an error code other than ErrorCode::OK, the operation is aborted and
      * the operation handle must be invalidated.  Any future use of the handle, with this method,
@@ -112,8 +104,8 @@
      *
      * == Authorization Enforcement ==
      *
-     * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in begin().  The one exception is the
-     * case where the key has:
+     * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in IKeyMintDevice::begin().  The one
+     * exception is the case where the key has:
      *
      * o One or more Tag::USER_SECURE_IDs, and
      *
@@ -130,7 +122,8 @@
      *
      *   o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
      *
-     *   o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operationHandle
+     *   o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the challenge value contained in the
+     *     BeginResult returned from IKeyMintDevice::begin().
      *
      *   If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return
      *   ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
@@ -139,22 +132,20 @@
      *
      * -- RSA keys --
      *
-     * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire
-     * block to be signed or verified in a single update.  It may not consume only a portion of the
-     * block in these cases.  However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple
-     * updates, and update() must accept the data this way as well.  If the caller provides more
-     * data to sign than can be used (length of data exceeds RSA key size), update() must return
-     * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+     * For signing operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire block to be
+     * signed in a single update.  It may not consume only a portion of the block in these cases.
+     * However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates, and update() must
+     * accept the data this way as well.  If the caller provides more data to sign than can be used
+     * (length of data exceeds RSA key size), update() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
      *
      * -- ECDSA keys --
      *
-     * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire
-     * block to be signed or verified in a single update.  This method may not consume only a
-     * portion of the block.  However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates
-     * and update() must accept the data this way as well.  If the caller provides more data to sign
-     * than can be used, the data is silently truncated.  (This differs from the handling of excess
-     * data provided in similar RSA operations.  The reason for this is compatibility with legacy
-     * clients.)
+     * For signing operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire block to be
+     * signed in a single update.  This method may not consume only a portion of the block.
+     * However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates and update() must
+     * accept the data this way as well.  If the caller provides more data to sign than can be used,
+     * the data is silently truncated.  (This differs from the handling of excess data provided in
+     * similar RSA operations.  The reason for this is compatibility with legacy clients.)
      *
      * -- AES keys --
      *
@@ -164,8 +155,7 @@
      * it must process all but the tag length and buffer the possible tag data for processing during
      * finish().
      *
-     * @param input Data to be processed.  Note that update() may or may not consume all of the data
-     *        provided.  See return value.
+     * @param input Data to be processed.  update() must consume all input data.
      *
      * @param authToken Authentication token. Can be nullable if not provided.
      *
@@ -182,7 +172,7 @@
             in @nullable TimeStampToken timeStampToken);
 
     /**
-     * Finalizes a cryptographic operation begun with begin() and invalidates operation.
+     * Finalizes a cryptographic operation begun with begin() and invalidates the operation.
      *
      * This method is the last one called in an operation, so all processed data must be returned.
      *
@@ -190,8 +180,7 @@
      * Any future use of the operation, with finish(), update(), or abort(), must return
      * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
      *
-     * Signing operations return the signature as the output.  Verification operations accept the
-     * signature in the signature parameter, and return no output.
+     * Signing operations return the signature as the output.
      *
      * == Authorization enforcement ==
      *
@@ -230,44 +219,35 @@
      * Some additional requirements, depending on the padding mode:
      *
      * o PaddingMode::NONE.  For unpadded signing and encryption operations, if the provided data is
-     *   shorter than the key, the data must be zero-padded on the left before
-     *   signing/encryption.  If the data is the same length as the key, but numerically larger,
-     *   finish() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.  For verification and decryption
-     *   operations, the data must be exactly as long as the key.  Otherwise, return
-     *   ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+     *   shorter than the key, the data must be zero-padded on the left before signing/encryption.
+     *   If the data is the same length as the key, but numerically larger, finish() must return
+     *   ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.  For decryption operations, the data must be exactly as long
+     *   as the key.  Otherwise, return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
      *
      * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS.  For PSS-padded signature operations, the PSS salt length must match
-     *   the size of the PSS digest selected.  The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams
+     *   the size of the PSS digest selected.  The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in params
      *   on begin() must be used as the PSS digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask
      *   generation function and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm.
      *
-     * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP.  The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams on begin is
-     *   used as the OAEP digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask generation function and
-     *   and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm.
-     *
      * -- ECDSA keys --
      *
-     * If the data provided for unpadded signing or verification is too long, truncate it.
+     * If the data provided for undigested signing is too long, truncate it.
      *
      * -- AES keys --
      *
      * Some additional conditions, depending on block mode:
      *
      * o BlockMode::ECB or BlockMode::CBC.  If padding is PaddingMode::NONE and the data length is
-     *  not a multiple of the AES block size, finish() must return
-     *  ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.  If padding is PaddingMode::PKCS7, pad the data per the
-     *  PKCS#7 specification, including adding an additional padding block if the data is a multiple
-     *  of the block length.
+     *   not a multiple of the AES block size, finish() must return
+     *   ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.  If padding is PaddingMode::PKCS7, pad the data per the
+     *   PKCS#7 specification, including adding an additional padding block if the data is a
+     *   multiple of the block length.
      *
      * o BlockMode::GCM.  During encryption, after processing all plaintext, compute the tag
      *   (Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes) and append it to the returned ciphertext.  During decryption,
      *   process the last Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes as the tag.  If tag verification fails, finish()
      *   must return ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED.
      *
-     * TODO: update() will need to be refactored into 2 function. b/168665179.
-     *
-     * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation.
-     *
      * @param input Data to be processed, per the parameters established in the call to begin().
      *        finish() must consume all provided data or return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
      *
@@ -281,11 +261,9 @@
      *        token.
      *
      * @param confirmationToken is the confirmation token required by keys with
-     * Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.
+     *        Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.
      *
      * @return The output data, if any.
-     *
-     * @return outParams Any output parameters generated by finish().
      */
     byte[] finish(in @nullable byte[] input, in @nullable byte[] signature,
             in @nullable HardwareAuthToken authToken,
@@ -293,13 +271,10 @@
             in @nullable byte[] confirmationToken);
 
     /**
-     * Aborts a cryptographic operation begun with begin(), freeing all internal resources. If an
-     * operation was finalized, calling update, finish, or abort yields
-     * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. An operation is finalized if finish or abort was
-     * called on it, or if update returned an ErrorCode.
-     *
-     * @param operationHandle The operation handle returned by begin().  This handle must be
-     *        invalid when abort() returns.
+     * Aborts a cryptographic operation begun with IKeyMintDevice::begin(), freeing all internal
+     * resources.  If an operation was finalized, calling updateAad, update, finish, or abort yields
+     * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. An operation is finalized if finish or abort was called
+     * on it, or if updateAad or update returned an ErrorCode.
      *
      * @return error See the ErrorCode enum in ErrorCode.aidl.
      */
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index 1ae6762..a29fb08 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.DeviceInfo;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.MacedPublicKey;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.ProtectedData;
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.RpcHardwareInfo;
 
 /**
  * An IRemotelyProvisionedComponent is a secure-side component for which certificates can be
@@ -32,8 +33,8 @@
  *
  * The root of trust for secure provisioning is something called the "Boot Certificate Chain", or
  * BCC. The BCC is a chain of public key certificates, represented as COSE_Sign1 objects containing
- * COSE_Key representations of the public keys. The "root" of the BCC is a self-signed certificate
- * for a device-unique public key, denoted DK_pub. All public keys in the BCC are device-unique. The
+ * COSE_Key representations of the public keys. The "root" of the BCC is
+ * a device-unique public key, denoted DK_pub. All public keys in the BCC are device-unique. The
  * public key from each certificate in the chain is used to sign the next certificate in the
  * chain. The final, "leaf" certificate contains a public key, denoted KM_pub, whose corresponding
  * private key, denoted KM_priv, is available for use by the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.
@@ -57,12 +58,8 @@
  * (given the necessary input), but no stage can compute the secret of any preceding stage. Updating
  * the firmware or configuration of any stage changes the key pair of that stage, and of all
  * subsequent stages, and no attacker who compromised the previous version of the updated firmware
- * can know or predict the post-update key pairs.
- *
- * The first BCC certificate is special because its contained public key, DK_pub, will never change,
- * making it a permanent, device-unique identifier. Although the remaining keys in the BCC are also
- * device-unique, they are not necessarily permanent, since they can change when the device software
- * is updated.
+ * can know or predict the post-update key pairs. It is recommended and expected that the BCC is
+ * constructed using the Open Profile for DICE.
  *
  * When the provisioning server receives a message signed by KM_priv and containing a BCC that
  * chains from DK_pub to KM_pub, it can be certain that (barring vulnerabilities in some boot
@@ -121,6 +118,12 @@
     const int STATUS_INVALID_EEK = 5;
 
     /**
+     * @return info which contains information about the underlying IRemotelyProvisionedComponent
+     *         hardware, such as version number, component name, author name, and supported curve.
+     */
+    RpcHardwareInfo getHardwareInfo();
+
+    /**
      * generateKeyPair generates a new ECDSA P-256 key pair that can be certified.  Note that this
      * method only generates ECDSA P-256 key pairs, but the interface can be extended to add methods
      * for generating keys for other algorithms, if necessary.
@@ -134,7 +137,7 @@
      *        privateKeyHandle, that the contained public key is for remote certification.
      *
      * @return data representing a handle to the private key. The format is implementation-defined,
-     *         but note that specific services may define a required format.
+     *         but note that specific services may define a required format. KeyMint does.
      */
     byte[] generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(in boolean testMode, out MacedPublicKey macedPublicKey);
 
@@ -155,65 +158,90 @@
      *        If testMode is false, the keysToCertify array must not contain any keys flagged as
      *        test keys. Otherwise, the method must return STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST.
      *
-     * @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X25519 public key which will be used to encrypt
+     * @param in endpointEncryptionKey contains an X22519 public key which will be used to encrypt
      *        the BCC. For flexibility, this is represented as a certificate chain, represented as a
      *        CBOR array of COSE_Sign1 objects, ordered from root to leaf. The leaf contains the
      *        X25519 encryption key, each other element is an Ed25519 key signing the next in the
-     *        chain. The root is self-signed.
+     *        chain. The root is self-signed. An implementor may also choose to use P256 as an
+     *        alternative curve for signing and encryption instead of Curve 25519.
      *
      *            EekChain = [ + SignedSignatureKey, SignedEek ]
      *
      *            SignedSignatureKey = [              // COSE_Sign1
      *                protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                    1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  // Algorithm
      *                },
-     *                unprotected: { },
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKey,
-     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
+     *                unprotected: {},
+     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
+     *                         bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256,
+     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput) /
+     *                           bstr ECDSA(.cbor SignatureKeySignatureInput)
      *            ]
      *
-     *            SignatureKey = {                    // COSE_Key
+     *            SignatureKeyEd25519 = {                    // COSE_Key
      *                 1 : 1,                         // Key type : Octet Key Pair
-     *                 3 : -8,                        // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                 3 : AlgorithmEdDSA,            // Algorithm
      *                 -1 : 6,                        // Curve : Ed25519
      *                 -2 : bstr                      // Ed25519 public key
      *            }
      *
+     *            SignatureKeyP256 = {
+     *                 1 : 2,                         // Key type : EC2
+     *                 3 : AlgorithmES256,            // Algorithm
+     *                 -1 : 1,                        // Curve: P256
+     *                 -2 : bstr,                     // X coordinate
+     *                 -3 : bstr                      // Y coordinate
+     *            }
+     *
      *            SignatureKeySignatureInput = [
      *                context: "Signature1",
      *                body_protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                    1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,     // Algorithm
      *                },
      *                external_aad: bstr .size 0,
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKey
+     *                payload: bstr .cbor SignatureKeyEd25519 /
+     *                         bstr .cbor SignatureKeyP256
      *            ]
      *
      *            SignedEek = [                       // COSE_Sign1
      *                protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                    1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  // Algorithm
      *                },
-     *                unprotected: { },
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor Eek,
-     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
+     *                unprotected: {},
+     *                payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256,
+     *                signature: bstr PureEd25519(.cbor EekSignatureInput) /
+     *                           bstr ECDSA(.cbor EekSignatureInput)
      *            ]
      *
-     *            Eek = {                             // COSE_Key
-     *                1 : 1,                          // Key type : Octet Key Pair
-     *                2 : bstr                        // KID : EEK ID
-     *                3 : -25,                        // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
-     *                -1 : 4,                         // Curve : X25519
-     *                -2 : bstr                       // X25519 public key
+     *            EekX25519 = {            // COSE_Key
+     *                1 : 1,               // Key type : Octet Key Pair
+     *                2 : bstr             // KID : EEK ID
+     *                3 : -25,             // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
+     *                -1 : 4,              // Curve : X25519
+     *                -2 : bstr            // Ed25519 public key
+     *            }
+     *
+     *            EekP256 = {              // COSE_Key
+     *                1 : 2,               // Key type : EC2
+     *                2 : bstr             // KID : EEK ID
+     *                3 : -25,             // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
+     *                -1 : 1,              // Curve : P256
+     *                -2 : bstr            // Sender X coordinate
+     *                -3 : bstr            // Sender Y coordinate
      *            }
      *
      *            EekSignatureInput = [
      *                context: "Signature1",
      *                body_protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *                    1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *                    1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,     // Algorithm
      *                },
      *                external_aad: bstr .size 0,
-     *                payload: bstr .cbor Eek
+     *                payload: bstr .cbor EekX25519 / .cbor EekP256
      *            ]
      *
+     *            AlgorithmES256 = -7
+     *            AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
+     *
      *        If the contents of endpointEncryptionKey do not match the SignedEek structure above,
      *        the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
      *
@@ -221,7 +249,7 @@
      *        in the chain, which implies that it must not attempt to validate the signature.
      *
      *        If testMode is false, the method must validate the chain signatures, and must verify
-     *        that the public key in the root certificate is in its pre-configured set of
+     *        that the public key in the root certifictate is in its pre-configured set of
      *        authorized EEK root keys. If the public key is not in the database, or if signature
      *        verification fails, the method must return STATUS_INVALID_EEK.
      *
@@ -229,8 +257,13 @@
      *        by the secure area. See the description of the 'signature' output parameter for
      *        details.
      *
-     * @param out keysToSignMac contains the MAC of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest
-     *        structure. Specifically, it contains:
+     * @param out DeviceInfo contains the VerifiedDeviceInfo portion of the DeviceInfo array in
+     *        CertificateRequest. The structure is described within the DeviceInfo.aidl file.
+     *
+     * @param out ProtectedData contains the encrypted BCC and the ephemeral MAC key used to
+     *        authenticate the keysToSign (see keysToSignMac output argument).
+     *
+     * @return The of KeysToSign in the CertificateRequest structure. Specifically, it contains:
      *
      *            HMAC-256(EK_mac, .cbor KeysToMacStructure)
      *
@@ -241,11 +274,11 @@
      *                protected : bstr .cbor {
      *                    1 : 5,                           // Algorithm : HMAC-256
      *                },
-     *                unprotected : { },
+     *                unprotected : {},
      *                // Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
      *                payload: bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ],
      *                tag: bstr
-     *           ]
+     *            ]
      *
      *            KeysToMacStructure = [
      *                context : "MAC0",
@@ -254,9 +287,6 @@
      *                // Payload is PublicKeys from keysToSign argument, in provided order.
      *                payload : bstr .cbor [ * PublicKey ]
      *            ]
-     *
-     * @param out ProtectedData contains the encrypted BCC and the ephemeral MAC key used to
-     *        authenticate the keysToSign (see keysToSignMac output argument).
      */
     byte[] generateCertificateRequest(in boolean testMode, in MacedPublicKey[] keysToSign,
             in byte[] endpointEncryptionCertChain, in byte[] challenge, out DeviceInfo deviceInfo,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl
index 25fdee3..f0df048 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCharacteristics.aidl
@@ -32,6 +32,17 @@
  */
 @VintfStability
 parcelable KeyCharacteristics {
+    /**
+     * The security level enforcing this collection of key properties.
+     */
     SecurityLevel securityLevel = SecurityLevel.SOFTWARE;
+
+    /**
+     * `authorizations` is a list of key properties that are enforced at this security level.
+     * A key can have different properties enforced by components of different security levels.
+     * For example, some properties are provided by the operating system, which has a
+     * different security level to the IKeyMintDevice.
+     * See the `keyCharacteristics` field in `KeyCreationResult` for more details.
+     */
     KeyParameter[] authorizations;
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
index c2e21b6..fd6bf65 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
      * There are a few variations in what is contained in `certificateChain`, depending on whether
      * the caller requested attestation, whether they provided an attestation key (via the
      * `attestationKey` parameter of `generateKey()`, `importKey()` or `importWrappedKey()`), and in
-     * the non-attestaion case, whether the key can self-sign.
+     * the non-attestation case, whether the key can self-sign.
      *
      * 1.  Asymmetric key attestation with factory key.  If Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is provided
      *     and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generate/import call is null, the returned
@@ -66,10 +66,11 @@
      *     provisioned attestation key, and the full certificate chain for that factory-provisioned
      *     attestation key.  Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID must also be provided when the
      *     ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is provided, otherwise ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING will be
-     *     returned.
+     *     returned.  KeyMint implementations are not required to support factory-provisioned
+     *     attestation keys.
      *
      * 2.  Asymmetric key attestation with caller-provided key.  If Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is
-     *     provided and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generat/import call is non-null and
+     *     provided and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generate/import call is non-null and
      *     contains the key blob of a key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the returned certificate
      *     chain must contain only an attestation certificate signed with the specified key.  The
      *     caller must know the certificate chain for the provided key.  Tag::
@@ -90,6 +91,110 @@
      * 5.  Symmetric key.  If the generated/imported key is symmetric, the certificate chain must
      *     return empty, any Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE or Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID inputs,
      *     if provided, are ignored.
+     *
+     * In all cases except the symmetric key, the contents of certificate chain must be DER-encoded
+     * X.509 certificates ordered such that each certificate is signed by the subsequent one, up to
+     * the root which must be self-signed (or contain a fake signature in the case of case 4 above).
+     * The first certificate in the chain signs the public key info of the newly-generated or
+     * newly-imported key pair.  In the attestation cases (1 and 2 above), the first certificate
+     * must also satisfy some other requirements:
+     *
+     * o It must have the serial number provided in Tag::CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, or default to 1 if the
+     *   tag is not provided.
+     *
+     * o It must have the subject provided in Tag::CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, or default to CN="Android
+     *   Keystore Key", if the tag is not provided.
+     *
+     * o It must contain the notBefore and notAfter date-times specified in
+     *   Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE and Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER, respectively.
+     *
+     * o It must contain a Key Usage extension with:
+     *
+     *    - the digitalSignature bit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+     *    - the dataEncipherment bit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::DECRYPT,
+     *    - the keyEncipherment bit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY,
+     *    - the keyAgreement bit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY, and
+     *    - the keyCertSignBit set iff the attested key has KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY.
+     *
+     * o it must contain a KeyDescription attestation extension with OID 1.3.6.1.4.1.11129.2.1.17.
+     *
+     * The KeyDescription content is defined by the following ASN.1 schema, which is mostly a
+     * straightforward translation of the KeyMint tag/value parameter lists to ASN.1.
+     *
+     * KeyDescription ::= SEQUENCE {
+     *     attestationVersion         INTEGER, # Value 100
+     *     attestationSecurityLevel   SecurityLevel, # See below
+     *     keyMintVersion             INTEGER, # Value 100
+     *     keymintSecurityLevel       SecurityLevel, # See below
+     *     attestationChallenge       OCTET_STRING, # Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE from attestParams
+     *     uniqueId                   OCTET_STRING, # Empty unless key has Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID
+     *     softwareEnforced           AuthorizationList, # See below
+     *     hardwareEnforced           AuthorizationList, # See below
+     * }
+     *
+     * SecurityLevel ::= ENUMERATED {
+     *     Software                   (0),
+     *     TrustedEnvironment         (1),
+     *     StrongBox                  (2),
+     * }
+     *
+     * RootOfTrust ::= SEQUENCE {
+     *     verifiedBootKey            OCTET_STRING,
+     *     deviceLocked               BOOLEAN,
+     *     verifiedBootState          VerifiedBootState,
+     *     # verifiedBootHash must contain 32-byte value that represents the state of all binaries
+     *     # or other components validated by verified boot.  Updating any verified binary or
+     *     # component must cause this value to change.
+     *     verifiedBootHash           OCTET_STRING,
+     * }
+     *
+     * VerifiedBootState ::= ENUMERATED {
+     *     Verified                   (0),
+     *     SelfSigned                 (1),
+     *     Unverified                 (2),
+     *     Failed                     (3),
+     * }
+     *
+     * AuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE {
+     *     purpose                    [1] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     algorithm                  [2] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     keySize                    [3] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     digest                     [5] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     padding                    [6] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     ecCurve                    [10] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     rsaPublicExponent          [200] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     mgfDigest                  [203] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     rollbackResistance         [303] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+     *     earlyBootOnly              [305] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+     *     activeDateTime             [400] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     originationExpireDateTime  [401] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     usageExpireDateTime        [402] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     usageCountLimit            [405] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     noAuthRequired             [503] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+     *     userAuthType               [504] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     authTimeout                [505] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     allowWhileOnBody           [506] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+     *     trustedUserPresenceReq     [507] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+     *     trustedConfirmationReq     [508] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+     *     unlockedDeviceReq          [509] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+     *     creationDateTime           [701] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     origin                     [702] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     rootOfTrust                [704] EXPLICIT RootOfTrust OPTIONAL,
+     *     osVersion                  [705] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     osPatchLevel               [706] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     attestationApplicationId   [709] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+     *     attestationIdBrand         [710] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+     *     attestationIdDevice        [711] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+     *     attestationIdProduct       [712] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+     *     attestationIdSerial        [713] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+     *     attestationIdImei          [714] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+     *     attestationIdMeid          [715] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+     *     attestationIdManufacturer  [716] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+     *     attestationIdModel         [717] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+     *     vendorPatchLevel           [718] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     bootPatchLevel             [719] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     deviceUniqueAttestation    [720] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+     * }
      */
     Certificate[] certificateChain;
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl
index 8da7578..b82dee6 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyMintHardwareInfo.aidl
@@ -29,7 +29,6 @@
      * Implementation version of the keymint hardware.  The version number is implementation
      * defined, and not necessarily globally meaningful.  The version is used to distinguish
      * between different versions of a given implementation.
-     * TODO(seleneh) add the version related info to the code.
      */
     int versionNumber;
 
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
index f896125..5840c6b 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
  * The origin of a key (or pair), i.e. where it was generated.  Note that ORIGIN can be found in
  * either the hardware-enforced or software-enforced list for a key, indicating whether the key is
  * hardware or software-based.  Specifically, a key with GENERATED in the hardware-enforced list
- * must be guaranteed never to have existed outide the secure hardware.
+ * must be guaranteed never to have existed outside the secure hardware.
  * @hide
  */
 @VintfStability
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyParameterValue.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyParameterValue.aidl
index 59016f2..924f402 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyParameterValue.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyParameterValue.aidl
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
     boolean boolValue; // Always true, if present.
     int integer;
     long longInteger;
-    long dateTime;
+    long dateTime; // In milliseconds from epoch
 
     byte[] blob;
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
index c874fc3..e141e55 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@
 @VintfStability
 @Backing(type="int")
 enum KeyPurpose {
-    /* Usable with RSA, EC and AES keys. */
+    /* Usable with RSA, 3DES and AES keys. */
     ENCRYPT = 0,
 
-    /* Usable with RSA, EC and AES keys. */
+    /* Usable with RSA, 3DES and AES keys. */
     DECRYPT = 1,
 
     /* Usable with RSA, EC and HMAC keys. */
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
     VERIFY = 3,
 
     /* 4 is reserved */
+
     /* Usable with wrapping keys. */
     WRAP_KEY = 5,
 
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl
index fbb373b..e71a9c9 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/PaddingMode.aidl
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@
 package android.hardware.security.keymint;
 
 /**
- * TODO(seleneh) update the description.
- *
  * Padding modes that may be applied to plaintext for encryption operations.  This list includes
  * padding modes for both symmetric and asymmetric algorithms.  Note that implementations should not
  * provide all possible combinations of algorithm and padding, only the
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
index 5199062..31dbb28 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
@@ -40,11 +40,7 @@
      *                     1 : -25         // Algorithm : ECDH-ES + HKDF-256
      *                 },
      *                 unprotected : {
-     *                     -1 : {          // COSE_Key
-     *                         1 : 1,      // Key type : Octet Key Pair
-     *                         -1 : 4,     // Curve : X25519
-     *                         -2 : bstr   // Sender X25519 public key
-     *                     }
+     *                     -1 : PubKeyX25519 / PubKeyEcdhP256  // Of the sender
      *                     4 : bstr,       // KID : EEK ID
      *                 },
      *                 ciphertext : nil
@@ -67,7 +63,7 @@
      *             other : bstr            // EEK pubkey
      *         ],
      *         SuppPubInfo : [
-     *             128,                    // Output key length
+     *             256,                    // Output key length
      *             protected : bstr .size 0
      *         ]
      *     ]
@@ -75,34 +71,51 @@
      *     ProtectedDataPayload [
      *         SignedMac,
      *         Bcc,
+     *         ? AdditionalDKSignatures,
+     *     ]
+     *     AdditionalDKSignatures = {
+     *         + SignerName => DKCertChain
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     SignerName = tstr
+     *
+     *     DKCertChain = [
+     *         2* Certificate                      // Root -> Leaf.  Root is the vendor
+     *                                             // self-signed cert, leaf contains DK_pub
      *     ]
      *
-     *     SignedMac = [                       // COSE_Sign1
-     *         bstr .cbor {                    // Protected params
-     *             1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *     Certificate = COSE_Sign1 of a public key
+     *
+     *     SignedMac = [                                  // COSE_Sign1
+     *         bstr .cbor {                               // Protected params
+     *             1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,   // Algorithm
      *         },
-     *         { },                            // Unprotected params
+     *         {},                   // Unprotected params
      *         bstr .size 32,                  // MAC key
-     *         bstr PureEd25519(DK_priv, .cbor SignedMac_structure)
+     *         bstr PureEd25519(KM_priv, .cbor SignedMac_structure) /
+     *              ECDSA(KM_priv, bstr .cbor SignedMac_structure)
      *     ]
      *
      *     SignedMac_structure = [
      *         "Signature1",
-     *         bstr .cbor {                    // Protected params
-     *             1 : -8,                     // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *         bstr .cbor {                               // Protected params
+     *             1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,   // Algorithm
      *         },
      *         bstr .cbor SignedMacAad
-     *         bstr .size 32                   // MAC key
+     *         bstr .size 32                              // MAC key
      *     ]
      *
      *     SignedMacAad = [
      *         challenge : bstr,
-     *         DeviceInfo
+     *         VerifiedDeviceInfo,
+     *         tag: bstr                 // This is the tag from COSE_Mac0 of
+     *                                   // KeysToCertify, to tie the key set to
+     *                                   // the signature.
      *     ]
      *
      *     Bcc = [
-     *         PubKey,                        // DK_pub
-     *         + BccEntry,                    // Root -> leaf (KM_pub)
+     *         PubKeyEd25519 / PubKeyECDSA256, // DK_pub
+     *         + BccEntry,                     // Root -> leaf (KM_pub)
      *     ]
      *
      *     BccPayload = {                     // CWT
@@ -120,44 +133,38 @@
      *         ? -4670549 : bstr,             // Authority Hash
      *         ? -4670550 : bstr,             // Authority Descriptor
      *         ? -4670551 : bstr,             // Mode
-     *         -4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKey   // Subject Public Key
+     *         -4670552 : bstr .cbor PubKeyEd25519 /
+     *                    bstr .cbor PubKeyECDSA256   // Subject Public Key
      *         -4670553 : bstr                // Key Usage
      *     }
      *
-     *     BccEntry = [                       // COSE_Sign1
-     *         protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *             1 : -8,                    // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *     BccEntry = [                                  // COSE_Sign1 (untagged)
+     *         protected : bstr .cbor {
+     *             1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  // Algorithm
      *         },
-     *         unprotected: { },
+     *         unprotected: {},
      *         payload: bstr .cbor BccPayload,
-     *         // First entry in the chain is signed by DK_pub, the others are each signed by their
-     *         // immediate predecessor.  See RFC 8032 for signature representation.
-     *         signature: bstr .cbor PureEd25519(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput)
+     *         signature: bstr .cbor PureEd25519(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput) /
+     *                    bstr .cbor ECDSA(SigningKey, bstr .cbor BccEntryInput)
+     *         // See RFC 8032 for details of how to encode the signature value for Ed25519.
      *     ]
      *
-     *     PubKey = {                         // COSE_Key
-     *         1 : 1,                         // Key type : octet key pair
-     *         3 : -8,                        // Algorithm : EdDSA
-     *         4 : 2,                         // Ops: Verify
-     *         -1 : 6,                        // Curve : Ed25519
-     *         -2 : bstr                      // X coordinate, little-endian
-     *     }
-     *
      *     BccEntryInput = [
      *         context: "Signature1",
      *         protected: bstr .cbor {
-     *             1 : -8,                    // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *             1 : AlgorithmEdDSA / AlgorithmES256,  // Algorithm
      *         },
      *         external_aad: bstr .size 0,
      *         payload: bstr .cbor BccPayload
      *     ]
      *
-     *     DeviceInfo = {
+     *     VerifiedDeviceInfo = {
      *         ? "brand" : tstr,
      *         ? "manufacturer" : tstr,
      *         ? "product" : tstr,
      *         ? "model" : tstr,
      *         ? "board" : tstr,
+     *         ? "device" : tstr,
      *         ? "vb_state" : "green" / "yellow" / "orange",
      *         ? "bootloader_state" : "locked" / "unlocked",
      *         ? "os_version" : tstr,
@@ -165,6 +172,39 @@
      *         ? "boot_patch_level" : uint,          // YYYYMMDD
      *         ? "vendor_patch_level" : uint,        // YYYYMMDD
      *     }
+     *
+     *     PubKeyX25519 = {                 // COSE_Key
+     *          1 : 1,                      // Key type : Octet Key Pair
+     *         -1 : 4,                      // Curve : X25519
+     *         -2 : bstr                    // Sender X25519 public key
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     PubKeyEd25519 = {                // COSE_Key
+     *         1 : 1,                         // Key type : octet key pair
+     *         3 : AlgorithmEdDSA,            // Algorithm : EdDSA
+     *         4 : 2,                         // Ops: Verify
+     *         -1 : 6,                        // Curve : Ed25519
+     *         -2 : bstr                      // X coordinate, little-endian
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     PubKeyEcdhP256 = {              // COSE_Key
+     *          1 : 2,      // Key type : EC2
+     *          -1 : 1,     // Curve : P256
+     *          -2 : bstr   // Sender X coordinate
+     *          -3 : bstr   // Sender Y coordinate
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     PubKeyECDSA256 = {                 // COSE_Key
+     *         1 : 2,                         // Key type : EC2
+     *         3 : AlgorithmES256,            // Algorithm : ECDSA w/ SHA-256
+     *         4 : 2,                         // Ops: Verify
+     *         -1 : 1,                        // Curve: P256
+     *         -2 : bstr,                     // X coordinate
+     *         -3 : bstr                      // Y coordinate
+     *     }
+     *
+     *     AlgorithmES256 = -7
+     *     AlgorithmEdDSA = -8
      */
     byte[] protectedData;
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/RpcHardwareInfo.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/RpcHardwareInfo.aidl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d297f87
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/RpcHardwareInfo.aidl
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+package android.hardware.security.keymint;
+
+/**
+ * RpcHardwareInfo is the hardware information returned by calling RemotelyProvisionedComponent
+ * getHardwareInfo()
+ * @hide
+ */
+@VintfStability
+@RustDerive(Clone=true, Eq=true, PartialEq=true, Ord=true, PartialOrd=true, Hash=true)
+parcelable RpcHardwareInfo {
+    const int CURVE_NONE = 0;
+    const int CURVE_P256 = 1;
+    const int CURVE_25519 = 2;
+
+    /**
+     * Implementation version of the remotely provisioned component hardware.  The version number is
+     * implementation defined, and not necessarily globally meaningful.  The version is used to
+     * distinguish between different versions of a given implementation.
+     */
+    int versionNumber;
+
+    /**
+     * rpcAuthorName is the name of the author of the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent implementation
+     * (organization name, not individual). This name is implementation defined, so it can be used
+     * to distinguish between different implementations from the same author.
+     */
+    @utf8InCpp String rpcAuthorName;
+
+    /**
+     * supportedEekCurve returns an int representing which curve is supported for validating
+     * signatures over the Endpoint Encryption Key certificate chain and for using the corresponding
+     * signed encryption key in ECDH. Only one curve should be supported, with preference for 25519
+     * if it's available. These values are defined as constants above.
+     *
+     * CURVE_NONE is made the default to help ensure that an implementor doesn't accidentally forget
+     * to provide the correct information here, as the VTS tests will check to make certain that
+     * a passing implementation does not provide CURVE_NONE.
+     */
+    int supportedEekCurve = CURVE_NONE;
+}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
index cde1fc0..972ce2e 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -18,10 +18,6 @@
 
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.TagType;
 
-// TODO(seleneh) : note aidl currently does not support double nested enum definitions such as
-// ROOT_OF_TRUST = TagType:BYTES | 704.  So we are forced to write definations as
-// ROOT_OF_TRUST = (9 << 28) for now.  Will need to flip this back later when aidl support is added.
-
 /**
  * Tag specifies various kinds of tags that can be set in KeyParameter to identify what kind of
  * data are stored in KeyParameter.
@@ -33,7 +29,7 @@
     /**
      * Tag::INVALID should never be set.  It means you hit an error.
      */
-    INVALID = (0 << 28) | 0,
+    INVALID = 0,
 
     /**
      * Tag::PURPOSE specifies the set of purposes for which the key may be used.  Possible values
@@ -47,7 +43,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    PURPOSE = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 1,
+    PURPOSE = TagType.ENUM_REP | 1,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ALGORITHM specifies the cryptographic algorithm with which the key is used.  This tag
@@ -56,10 +52,10 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ALGORITHM = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 2,
+    ALGORITHM = TagType.ENUM | 2,
 
     /**
-     * Tag::KEY_SIZE pecifies the size, in bits, of the key, measuring in the normal way for the
+     * Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size, in bits, of the key, measuring in the normal way for the
      * key's algorithm.  For example, for RSA keys, Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size of the public
      * modulus.  For AES keys it specifies the length of the secret key material.  For 3DES keys it
      * specifies the length of the key material, not counting parity bits (though parity bits must
@@ -68,20 +64,20 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    KEY_SIZE = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 3,
+    KEY_SIZE = TagType.UINT | 3,
 
     /**
      * Tag::BLOCK_MODE specifies the block cipher mode(s) with which the key may be used.  This tag
      * is only relevant to AES and 3DES keys.  Possible values are defined by the BlockMode enum.
      *
      * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import.  For AES and 3DES operations the caller
-     * must specify a Tag::BLOCK_MODE in the additionalParams argument of begin().  If the mode is
-     * missing or the specified mode is not in the modes specified for the key during
-     * generation/import, the operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE.
+     * must specify a Tag::BLOCK_MODE in the params argument of begin().  If the mode is missing or
+     * the specified mode is not in the modes specified for the key during generation/import, the
+     * operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    BLOCK_MODE = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 4,
+    BLOCK_MODE = TagType.ENUM_REP | 4,
 
     /**
      * Tag::DIGEST specifies the digest algorithms that may be used with the key to perform signing
@@ -89,13 +85,13 @@
      * values are defined by the Digest enum.
      *
      * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import.  For signing and verification operations,
-     * the caller must specify a digest in the additionalParams argument of begin().  If the digest
-     * is missing or the specified digest is not in the digests associated with the key, the
-     * operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
+     * the caller must specify a digest in the params argument of begin().  If the digest is missing
+     * or the specified digest is not in the digests associated with the key, the operation must
+     * fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    DIGEST = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 5,
+    DIGEST = TagType.ENUM_REP | 5,
 
     /**
      * Tag::PADDING specifies the padding modes that may be used with the key.  This tag is relevant
@@ -123,7 +119,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    PADDING = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 6,
+    PADDING = TagType.ENUM_REP | 6,
 
     /**
      * Tag::CALLER_NONCE specifies that the caller can provide a nonce for nonce-requiring
@@ -136,7 +132,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    CALLER_NONCE = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 7,
+    CALLER_NONCE = TagType.BOOL | 7,
 
     /**
      * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH specifies the minimum length of MAC that can be requested or verified
@@ -145,22 +141,21 @@
      * This value is the minimum MAC length, in bits.  It must be a multiple of 8 bits.  For HMAC
      * keys, the value must be least 64 and no more than 512.  For GCM keys, the value must be at
      * least 96 and no more than 128.  If the provided value violates these requirements,
-     * generateKey() or importKey() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+     * generateKey() or importKey() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    MIN_MAC_LENGTH = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 8,
+    MIN_MAC_LENGTH = TagType.UINT | 8,
 
     // Tag 9 reserved
 
     /**
-     * Tag::EC_CURVE specifies the elliptic curve.  EC key generation requests may have
-     * Tag:EC_CURVE, Tag::KEY_SIZE, or both.  If both are provided and the size and curve do not
-     * match, IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+     * Tag::EC_CURVE specifies the elliptic curve.  Possible values are defined in the EcCurve
+     * enumeration.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    EC_CURVE = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 10,
+    EC_CURVE = TagType.ENUM | 10,
 
     /**
      * Tag::RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT specifies the value of the public exponent for an RSA key pair.
@@ -174,7 +169,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = (5 << 28) /* TagType:ULONG */ | 200,
+    RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = TagType.ULONG | 200,
 
     // Tag 201 reserved
 
@@ -185,40 +180,22 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 202,
+    INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = TagType.BOOL | 202,
 
     /**
-     * Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST specifies the MGF1 digest algorithms that may be used with
-     * RSA encryption/decryption with OAEP padding. If the key characteristics supports OAEP
-     * and this tag is absent then SHA1 digest is selected by default for MGF1.
+     * Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST specifies the MGF1 digest algorithms that may be used with RSA
+     * encryption/decryption with OAEP padding.  Possible values are defined by the Digest enum.
      *
-     * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import.  If this tag is present in the key
-     * characteristics with one or more values from @4.0::Digest, then for RSA cipher
-     * operations with OAEP Padding, the caller must specify a digest in the additionalParams
-     * argument of begin operation. If this tag is missing or the specified digest is not in
-     * the digests associated with the key then begin operation must fail with
-     * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST.
+     * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import.  RSA cipher operations with OAEP padding
+     * must specify an MGF1 digest in the params argument of begin(). If this tag is missing or the
+     * specified digest is not in the MGF1 digests associated with the key then begin operation must
+     * fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST = (2 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM_REP */ | 203,
+    RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST = TagType.ENUM_REP | 203,
 
-    /**
-     * TODO(seleneh) this tag needs to be deleted from all codes.
-     *
-     * Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS specifies the necessary system environment conditions for the
-     * generated key to be used.  Possible values are defined by the KeyBlobUsageRequirements enum.
-     *
-     * This tag is specified by the caller during key generation or import to require that the key
-     * is usable in the specified condition.  If the caller specifies Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS
-     * with value KeyBlobUsageRequirements::STANDALONE the IKeyMintDevice must return a key blob
-     * that can be used without file system support.  This is critical for devices with encrypted
-     * disks, where the file system may not be available until after a KeyMint key is used to
-     * decrypt the disk.
-     *
-     * Must be hardware-enforced.
-     */
-    BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 301,
+    // Tag 301 reserved
 
     /**
      * Tag::BOOTLOADER_ONLY specifies only the bootloader can use the key.
@@ -228,7 +205,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    BOOTLOADER_ONLY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 302,
+    BOOTLOADER_ONLY = TagType.BOOL | 302,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE specifies that the key has rollback resistance, meaning that when
@@ -241,21 +218,21 @@
      * ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE.  IKeyMintDevice implementations are not
      * required to support rollback resistance.
      *
-     * Must be hardwared-enforced.
+     * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 303,
+    ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = TagType.BOOL | 303,
 
     // Reserved for future use.
-    HARDWARE_TYPE = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 304,
+    HARDWARE_TYPE = TagType.ENUM | 304,
 
     /**
      * Keys tagged with EARLY_BOOT_ONLY may only be used during early boot, until
      * IKeyMintDevice::earlyBootEnded() is called.  Early boot keys may be created after
-     * early boot.  Early boot keys may not be imprted at all, if Tag::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY is
+     * early boot.  Early boot keys may not be imported at all, if Tag::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY is
      * provided to IKeyMintDevice::importKey, the import must fail with
-     * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+     * ErrorCode::EARLY_BOOT_ENDED.
      */
-    EARLY_BOOT_ONLY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 305,
+    EARLY_BOOT_ONLY = TagType.BOOL | 305,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ACTIVE_DATETIME specifies the date and time at which the key becomes active, in
@@ -264,7 +241,7 @@
      *
      * Need not be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ACTIVE_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 400,
+    ACTIVE_DATETIME = TagType.DATE | 400,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME specifies the date and time at which the key expires for
@@ -276,7 +253,7 @@
      *
      * Need not be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 401,
+    ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME = TagType.DATE | 401,
 
     /**
      * Tag::USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME specifies the date and time at which the key expires for
@@ -288,13 +265,9 @@
      *
      * Need not be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 402,
+    USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME = TagType.DATE | 402,
 
     /**
-     * TODO(seleneh) this tag need to be deleted.
-     *
-     * TODO(seleneh) this tag need to be deleted.
-     *
      * Tag::MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS specifies the minimum amount of time that elapses between
      * allowed operations using a key.  This can be used to rate-limit uses of keys in contexts
      * where unlimited use may enable brute force attacks.
@@ -307,13 +280,15 @@
      * with ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED.  This implies that the IKeyMintDevice must keep a
      * table of use counters for keys with this tag.  Because memory is often limited, this table
      * may have a fixed maximum size and KeyMint may fail operations that attempt to use keys with
-     * this tag when the table is full.  The table must acommodate at least 8 in-use keys and
+     * this tag when the table is full.  The table must accommodate at least 8 in-use keys and
      * aggressively reuse table slots when key minimum-usage intervals expire.  If an operation
      * fails because the table is full, KeyMint returns ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
+     *
+     * TODO(b/191458710): find out if this tag is still supported.
      */
-    MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 403,
+    MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS = TagType.UINT | 403,
 
     /**
      * Tag::MAX_USES_PER_BOOT specifies the maximum number of times that a key may be used between
@@ -327,13 +302,13 @@
      * device is restarted.  This implies that the IKeyMintDevice must keep a table of use
      * counters for keys with this tag.  Because KeyMint memory is often limited, this table can
      * have a fixed maximum size and KeyMint can fail operations that attempt to use keys with
-     * this tag when the table is full.  The table needs to acommodate at least 8 keys.  If an
+     * this tag when the table is full.  The table needs to accommodate at least 8 keys.  If an
      * operation fails because the table is full, IKeyMintDevice must
      * ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 404,
+    MAX_USES_PER_BOOT = TagType.UINT | 404,
 
     /**
      * Tag::USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT specifies the number of times that a key may be used. This can be
@@ -362,14 +337,14 @@
      * record. This tag must have the same SecurityLevel as the tag that is added to the key
      * characteristics.
      */
-    USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT = (3 << 28) | 405, /* TagType:UINT */
+    USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT = TagType.UINT | 405,
 
     /**
      * Tag::USER_ID specifies the ID of the Android user that is permitted to use the key.
      *
      * Must not be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    USER_ID = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 501,
+    USER_ID = TagType.UINT | 501,
 
     /**
      * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID specifies that a key may only be used under a particular secure user
@@ -386,14 +361,14 @@
      * key, and may only be used if the difference between the current time when begin() is called
      * and the timestamp in the HardwareAuthToken is less than the value in Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT * 1000
      * (the multiplier is because Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT is in seconds, but the HardwareAuthToken
-     * timestamp is in milliseconds).  Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must returrn
+     * timestamp is in milliseconds).  Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must return
      * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
      *
      * If Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT is not present, then the key is an "auth-per-operation" key.  In this
      * case, begin() must not require a HardwareAuthToken with appropriate contents.  Instead,
      * update() and finish() must receive a HardwareAuthToken with Tag::USER_SECURE_ID value in
      * userId or authenticatorId fields, and the current operation's operation handle in the
-     * challenge field.  Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must returrn
+     * challenge field.  Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must return
      * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
      *
      * This tag is repeatable.  If repeated, and any one of the values matches the HardwareAuthToken
@@ -402,7 +377,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    USER_SECURE_ID = (10 << 28) /* TagType:ULONG_REP */ | 502,
+    USER_SECURE_ID = TagType.ULONG_REP | 502,
 
     /**
      * Tag::NO_AUTH_REQUIRED specifies that no authentication is required to use this key.  This tag
@@ -410,7 +385,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 503,
+    NO_AUTH_REQUIRED = TagType.BOOL | 503,
 
     /**
      * Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE specifies the types of user authenticators that may be used to authorize
@@ -429,12 +404,12 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    USER_AUTH_TYPE = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 504,
+    USER_AUTH_TYPE = TagType.ENUM | 504,
 
     /**
      * Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT specifies the time in seconds for which the key is authorized for use,
      * after user authentication.  If
-     * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID is present and this tag is not, then the key requies authentication for
+     * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID is present and this tag is not, then the key requires authentication for
      * every usage (see begin() for the details of the authentication-per-operation flow).
      *
      * The value is a 32-bit integer specifying the time in seconds after a successful
@@ -443,7 +418,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    AUTH_TIMEOUT = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 505,
+    AUTH_TIMEOUT = TagType.UINT | 505,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY specifies that the key may be used after authentication timeout if
@@ -451,7 +426,7 @@
      *
      * Cannot be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 506,
+    ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY = TagType.BOOL | 506,
 
     /**
      * TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED is an optional feature that specifies that this key must be
@@ -498,13 +473,13 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 507,
+    TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED = TagType.BOOL | 507,
 
     /**
      * Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED is only applicable to keys with KeyPurpose SIGN, and
      *  specifies that this key must not be usable unless the user provides confirmation of the data
      *  to be signed.  Confirmation is proven to keyMint via an approval token.  See
-     *  CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, as well as the ConfirmatinUI HAL.
+     *  CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, as well as the ConfirmationUI HAL.
      *
      * If an attempt to use a key with this tag does not have a cryptographically valid
      * CONFIRMATION_TOKEN provided to finish() or if the data provided to update()/finish() does not
@@ -512,7 +487,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 508,
+    TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED = TagType.BOOL | 508,
 
     /**
      * Tag::UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED specifies that the key may only be used when the device is
@@ -520,13 +495,13 @@
      *
      * Must be software-enforced.
      */
-    UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 509,
+    UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED = TagType.BOOL | 509,
 
     /**
      * Tag::APPLICATION_ID.  When provided to generateKey or importKey, this tag specifies data
      * that is necessary during all uses of the key.  In particular, calls to exportKey() and
      * getKeyCharacteristics() must provide the same value to the clientId parameter, and calls to
-     * begin must provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set.  If
+     * begin() must provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set.  If
      * the correct data is not provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
      *
      * The content of this tag must be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
@@ -536,7 +511,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    APPLICATION_ID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 601,
+    APPLICATION_ID = TagType.BYTES | 601,
 
     /*
      * Semantically unenforceable tags, either because they have no specific meaning or because
@@ -550,23 +525,22 @@
      * provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set.  If the correct
      * data is not provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
      *
-     * The content of this tag msut be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
+     * The content of this tag must be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
      * possible for an adversary who has access to all of the secure world secrets but does not have
      * access to the tag content to decrypt the key without brute-forcing the tag content, which
      * applications can prevent by specifying sufficiently high-entropy content.
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    APPLICATION_DATA = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 700,
+    APPLICATION_DATA = TagType.BYTES | 700,
 
     /**
      * Tag::CREATION_DATETIME specifies the date and time the key was created, in milliseconds since
-     * January 1, 1970.  This tag is optional and informational only.
+     * January 1, 1970.  This tag is optional and informational only, and not enforced by anything.
      *
-     * Tag::CREATED is informational only, and not enforced by anything.  Must be in the
-     * software-enforced list, if provided.
+     * Must be in the software-enforced list, if provided.
      */
-    CREATION_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 701,
+    CREATION_DATETIME = TagType.DATE | 701,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ORIGIN specifies where the key was created, if known.  This tag must not be specified
@@ -575,7 +549,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ORIGIN = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 702,
+    ORIGIN = TagType.ENUM | 702,
 
     // 703 is unused.
 
@@ -587,7 +561,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ROOT_OF_TRUST = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 704,
+    ROOT_OF_TRUST = TagType.BYTES | 704,
 
     /**
      * Tag::OS_VERSION specifies the system OS version with which the key may be used.  This tag is
@@ -610,7 +584,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    OS_VERSION = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 705,
+    OS_VERSION = TagType.UINT | 705,
 
     /**
      * Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL specifies the system security patch level with which the key may be used.
@@ -631,7 +605,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    OS_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 706,
+    OS_PATCHLEVEL = TagType.UINT | 706,
 
     /**
      * Tag::UNIQUE_ID specifies a unique, time-based identifier.  This tag is never provided to or
@@ -650,10 +624,11 @@
      *      Tag::CREATION_DATETIME by 2592000000, dropping any remainder.  T changes every 30 days
      *      (2592000000 = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000).
      *
-     *    C is the value of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID that is provided to attestKey().
+     *    C is the value of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID that is provided to attested key
+     *      generation/import operations.
      *
-     *    R is 1 if Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION was provided to attestKey or 0 if the tag was not
-     *      provided.
+     *    R is 1 if Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION was provided to attested key generation/import or 0
+     *      if the tag was not provided.
      *
      *    HBK is a unique hardware-bound secret known to the secure environment and never revealed
      *    by it.  The secret must contain at least 128 bits of entropy and be unique to the
@@ -665,20 +640,20 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    UNIQUE_ID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 707,
+    UNIQUE_ID = TagType.BYTES | 707,
 
     /**
-     * Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is used to deliver a "challenge" value to the attestKey() method,
-     * which must place the value in the KeyDescription SEQUENCE of the attestation extension.  See
-     * attestKey().
+     * Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is used to deliver a "challenge" value to the attested key
+     * generation/import methods, which must place the value in the KeyDescription SEQUENCE of the
+     * attestation extension.
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 708,
+    ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE = TagType.BYTES | 708,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID identifies the set of applications which may use a key, used
-     * only with attestKey().
+     * only with attested key generation/import operations.
      *
      * The content of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID is a DER-encoded ASN.1 structure, with the
      * following schema:
@@ -700,12 +675,12 @@
      *
      * Cannot be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 709,
+    ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID = TagType.BYTES | 709,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND provides the device's brand name, as returned by Build.BRAND in
-     * Android, to attestKey().  This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
-     * device's identifiers.
+     * Android, to attested key generation/import operations.  This field must be set only when
+     * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
      *
      * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
      * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -713,12 +688,12 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 710,
+    ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND = TagType.BYTES | 710,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE provides the device's device name, as returned by Build.DEVICE in
-     * Android, to attestKey().  This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
-     * device's identifiers.
+     * Android, to attested key generation/import operations.  This field must be set only when
+     * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
      *
      * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
      * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -726,12 +701,12 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 711,
+    ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE = TagType.BYTES | 711,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT provides the device's product name, as returned by Build.PRODUCT
-     * in Android, to attestKey().  This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
-     * device's identifiers.
+     * in Android, to attested key generation/import operations.  This field must be set only when
+     * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
      *
      * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
      * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -739,7 +714,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 712,
+    ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT = TagType.BYTES | 712,
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL the device's serial number.  This field must be set only when
@@ -751,48 +726,11 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 713,
+    ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL = TagType.BYTES | 713,
 
     /**
-     * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI provides the IMEIs for all radios on the device to attestKey().
-     * This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
-     *
-     * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
-     * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
-     * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
-     *
-     * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
-     */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 714,
-
-    /**
-     * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID provides the MEIDs for all radios on the device to attestKey().
-     * This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
-     *
-     * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
-     * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
-     * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
-     *
-     * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
-     */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_MEID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 715,
-
-    /**
-     * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER provides the device's manufacturer name, as returned by
-     * Build.MANUFACTURER in Android, to attstKey().  This field must be set only when requesting
-     * attestation of the device's identifiers.
-     *
-     * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
-     * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
-     * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
-     *
-     * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
-     */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 716,
-
-    /**
-     * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL provides the device's model name, as returned by Build.MODEL in
-     * Android, to attestKey().  This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+     * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI provides the IMEIs for all radios on the device to attested key
+     * generation/import operations.  This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
      * device's identifiers.
      *
      * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
@@ -801,7 +739,46 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 717,
+    ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI = TagType.BYTES | 714,
+
+    /**
+     * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID provides the MEIDs for all radios on the device to attested key
+     * generation/import operations.  This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+     * device's identifiers.
+     *
+     * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+     * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+     * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+     *
+     * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+     */
+    ATTESTATION_ID_MEID = TagType.BYTES | 715,
+
+    /**
+     * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER provides the device's manufacturer name, as returned by
+     * Build.MANUFACTURER in Android, to attested key generation/import operations.  This field must
+     * be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
+     *
+     * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+     * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+     * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+     *
+     * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+     */
+    ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER = TagType.BYTES | 716,
+
+    /**
+     * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL provides the device's model name, as returned by Build.MODEL in
+     * Android, to attested key generation/import operations.  This field must be set only when
+     * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
+     *
+     * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
+     * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
+     * includes this tag must fail with ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS.
+     *
+     * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
+     */
+    ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL = TagType.BYTES | 717,
 
     /**
      * Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL specifies the vendor image security patch level with which the key may
@@ -823,7 +800,7 @@
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 718,
+    VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL = TagType.UINT | 718,
 
     /**
      * Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL specifies the boot image (kernel) security patch level with which the
@@ -839,27 +816,37 @@
      * the value would be 20180605.  If the day is not known, 00 may be substituted.
      *
      * During each boot, the bootloader must provide the patch level of the boot image to the secure
-     * envirionment (mechanism is implementation-defined).
+     * environment (mechanism is implementation-defined).
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
-    BOOT_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 719,
+    BOOT_PATCHLEVEL = TagType.UINT | 719,
 
     /**
-     * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attestKey().  It indicates that
-     * attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather than a batch key.  When a
-     * device-unique key is used, only the attestation certificate is returned; no additional
-     * chained certificates are provided.  It's up to the caller to recognize the device-unique
-     * signing key.  Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices may support device-unique
-     * attestations.  SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must return
-     * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
+     * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attested key generation/import
+     * operations.  It indicates that attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather
+     * than a batch key.  When a device-unique key is used, the returned chain should contain two
+     * certificates:
+     *    * The attestation certificate, containing the attestation extension, as described in
+            KeyCreationResult.aidl.
+     *    * A self-signed root certificate, signed by the device-unique key.
+     * No additional chained certificates are provided. Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX
+     * IKeyMintDevices may support device-unique attestations.  SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT
+     * IKeyMintDevices must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive
+     * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
      * SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices need not support DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, and
      * return ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS if they do not support it.
      *
+     * The caller needs to obtain the device-unique keys out-of-band and compare them against the
+     * key used to sign the self-signed root certificate.
+     * To ease this process, the IKeyMintDevice implementation should include, both in the subject
+     * and issuer fields of the self-signed root, the unique identifier of the device. Using the
+     * unique identifier will make it straightforward for the caller to link a device to its key.
+     *
      * IKeyMintDevice implementations that support device-unique attestation MUST add the
      * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION tag to device-unique attestations.
      */
-    DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 720,
+    DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION = TagType.BOOL | 720,
 
     /**
      * IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY is never used by IKeyMintDevice, is not a valid argument to key
@@ -867,7 +854,7 @@
      * attestation.  It is used in attestations produced by the IIdentityCredential HAL when that
      * HAL attests to Credential Keys.  IIdentityCredential produces KeyMint-style attestations.
      */
-    IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 721,
+    IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY = TagType.BOOL | 721,
 
     /**
      * To prevent keys from being compromised if an attacker acquires read access to system / kernel
@@ -884,12 +871,13 @@
      * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION is returned when a key with Tag::STORAGE_KEY is provided to
      * begin().
      */
-    STORAGE_KEY = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 722,
+    STORAGE_KEY = TagType.BOOL | 722,
 
     /**
+     * OBSOLETE: Do not use. See IKeyMintOperation.updateAad instead.
      * TODO: Delete when keystore1 is deleted.
      */
-    ASSOCIATED_DATA = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1000,
+    ASSOCIATED_DATA = TagType.BYTES | 1000,
 
     /**
      * Tag::NONCE is used to provide or return a nonce or Initialization Vector (IV) for AES-GCM,
@@ -904,7 +892,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    NONCE = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1001,
+    NONCE = TagType.BYTES | 1001,
 
     /**
      * Tag::MAC_LENGTH provides the requested length of a MAC or GCM authentication tag, in bits.
@@ -915,7 +903,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    MAC_LENGTH = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 1003,
+    MAC_LENGTH = TagType.UINT | 1003,
 
     /**
      * Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION specifies whether the device has been factory reset since the
@@ -923,7 +911,7 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 1004,
+    RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION = TagType.BOOL | 1004,
 
     /**
      * Tag::CONFIRMATION_TOKEN is used to deliver a cryptographic token proving that the user
@@ -932,38 +920,39 @@
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
-    CONFIRMATION_TOKEN = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1005,
+    CONFIRMATION_TOKEN = TagType.BYTES | 1005,
 
     /**
-     * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SERIAL specifies the serial number to be assigned to the
-     * attestation certificate to be generated for the given key.  This parameter should only
-     * be passed to keyMint in the attestation parameters during generateKey() and importKey().
+     * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SERIAL specifies the serial number to be assigned to the attestation
+     * certificate to be generated for the given key.  This parameter should only be passed to
+     * keyMint in the attestation parameters during generateKey() and importKey().  If not provided,
+     * the serial shall default to 1.
      */
-    CERTIFICATE_SERIAL = (8 << 28) /* TagType:BIGNUM */ | 1006,
+    CERTIFICATE_SERIAL = TagType.BIGNUM | 1006,
 
     /**
-     * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT the certificate subject. The value is a DER encoded X509 NAME.
-     * This value is used when generating a self signed certificates. This tag may be specified
+     * Tag::CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT the certificate subject.  The value is a DER encoded X509 NAME.
+     * This value is used when generating a self signed certificates.  This tag may be specified
      * during generateKey and importKey. If not provided the subject name shall default to
-     * <TODO default subject here>.
+     * CN="Android Keystore Key".
      */
-    CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 1007,
+    CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT = TagType.BYTES | 1007,
 
     /**
      * Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE the beginning of the validity of the certificate in UNIX epoch
-     * time in seconds. This value is used when generating attestation or self signed certificates.
-     * ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_BEFORE must be returned if this tag is not provided if this tag is
-     * not provided to generateKey or importKey.
+     * time in milliseconds.  This value is used when generating attestation or self signed
+     * certificates.  ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_BEFORE must be returned if this tag is not provided if
+     * this tag is not provided to generateKey or importKey.
      */
-    CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 1008,
+    CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE = TagType.DATE | 1008,
 
     /**
-     * Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER the end of the validity of the certificate in UNIX epoch
-     * time in seconds. This value is used when generating attestation or self signed certificates.
-     * ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_AFTER must be returned if this tag is not provided to generateKey
-     * or importKey.
+     * Tag::CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER the end of the validity of the certificate in UNIX epoch time in
+     * milliseconds.  This value is used when generating attestation or self signed certificates.
+     * ErrorCode::MISSING_NOT_AFTER must be returned if this tag is not provided to generateKey or
+     * importKey.
      */
-    CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 1009,
+    CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER = TagType.DATE | 1009,
 
     /**
      * Tag::MAX_BOOT_LEVEL specifies a maximum boot level at which a key should function.
@@ -974,5 +963,5 @@
      *
      * Cannot be hardware enforced in this version.
      */
-    MAX_BOOT_LEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 1010,
+    MAX_BOOT_LEVEL = TagType.UINT | 1010,
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/TagType.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/TagType.aidl
index 1ba6ede..d46e504 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/TagType.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/TagType.aidl
@@ -39,7 +39,21 @@
     DATE = 6 << 28,
     /** Boolean.  If a tag with this type is present, the value is "true".  If absent, "false". */
     BOOL = 7 << 28,
-    /** Byte string containing an arbitrary-length integer, big-endian ordering. */
+    /**
+     * Byte string containing an arbitrary-length integer, in a two's-complement big-endian
+     * ordering.  The byte array contains the minimum number of bytes needed to represent the
+     * integer, including at least one sign bit (so zero encodes as the single byte 0x00.  This
+     * matches the encoding of both java.math.BigInteger.toByteArray() and contents octets for an
+     * ASN.1 INTEGER value (X.690 section 8.3).  Examples:
+     * - value 65536 encodes as 0x01 0x00 0x00
+     * - value 65535 encodes as 0x00 0xFF 0xFF
+     * - value   255 encodes as 0x00 0xFF
+     * - value     1 encodes as 0x01
+     * - value     0 encodes as 0x00
+     * - value    -1 encodes as 0xFF
+     * - value  -255 encodes as 0xFF 0x01
+     * - value  -256 encodes as 0xFF 0x00
+     */
     BIGNUM = 8 << 28,
     /** Byte string */
     BYTES = 9 << 28,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
index ebdc9b7..230534c 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/Android.bp
@@ -33,7 +33,6 @@
         "libkeymint",
         "liblog",
         "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
-        "libremote_provisioner",
         "libutils",
     ],
     srcs: [
@@ -51,28 +50,3 @@
     vendor: true,
     src: "android.hardware.hardware_keystore.xml",
 }
-
-cc_library {
-    name: "libremote_provisioner",
-    vendor_available: true,
-    static_libs: [
-        "libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
-    ],
-    shared_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
-        "libbinder_ndk",
-        "libcppbor_external",
-        "libcppcose",
-        "libcrypto",
-        "libkeymaster_portable",
-        "libkeymint",
-        "liblog",
-        "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
-    ],
-    export_include_dirs: [
-        ".",
-    ],
-    srcs: [
-        "RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp",
-    ],
-}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 5b02729..0000000
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,464 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h"
-
-#include <assert.h>
-#include <variant>
-
-#include <cppbor.h>
-#include <cppbor_parse.h>
-
-#include <KeyMintUtils.h>
-#include <cppcose/cppcose.h>
-#include <keymaster/keymaster_configuration.h>
-#include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/ec.h>
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/x509.h>
-
-namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint {
-
-using ::std::string;
-using ::std::tuple;
-using ::std::unique_ptr;
-using ::std::variant;
-using ::std::vector;
-using bytevec = ::std::vector<uint8_t>;
-
-using namespace cppcose;
-using namespace keymaster;
-
-namespace {
-
-// Hard-coded set of acceptable public keys that can act as roots of EEK chains.
-inline const vector<bytevec> kAuthorizedEekRoots = {
-        // TODO(drysdale): replace this random value with real root pubkey(s).
-        {0x5c, 0xea, 0x4b, 0xd2, 0x31, 0x27, 0x15, 0x5e, 0x62, 0x94, 0x70,
-         0x53, 0x94, 0x43, 0x0f, 0x9a, 0x89, 0xd5, 0xc5, 0x0f, 0x82, 0x9b,
-         0xcd, 0x10, 0xe0, 0x79, 0xef, 0xf3, 0xfa, 0x40, 0xeb, 0x0a},
-};
-
-constexpr auto STATUS_FAILED = RemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_FAILED;
-constexpr auto STATUS_INVALID_EEK = RemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_EEK;
-constexpr auto STATUS_INVALID_MAC = RemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_INVALID_MAC;
-constexpr uint32_t kAffinePointLength = 32;
-struct AStatusDeleter {
-    void operator()(AStatus* p) { AStatus_delete(p); }
-};
-
-// TODO(swillden): Remove the dependency on AStatus stuff.  The COSE lib should use something like
-// StatusOr, but it shouldn't depend on AStatus.
-class Status {
-  public:
-    Status() {}
-    Status(int32_t errCode, const std::string& errMsg)
-        : status_(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(errCode, errMsg.c_str())) {}
-    explicit Status(const std::string& errMsg)
-        : status_(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(STATUS_FAILED, errMsg.c_str())) {}
-    Status(AStatus* status) : status_(status) {}
-    Status(Status&&) = default;
-    Status(const Status&) = delete;
-
-    operator ::ndk::ScopedAStatus() && { return ndk::ScopedAStatus(status_.release()); }
-
-    bool isOk() { return !status_; }
-
-    // Don't call getMessage() unless isOk() returns false;
-    const char* getMessage() const { return AStatus_getMessage(status_.get()); }
-
-  private:
-    std::unique_ptr<AStatus, AStatusDeleter> status_;
-};
-
-template <typename T>
-class StatusOr {
-  public:
-    StatusOr(AStatus* status) : status_(status) {}
-    StatusOr(Status status) : status_(std::move(status)) {}
-    StatusOr(T val) : value_(std::move(val)) {}
-
-    bool isOk() { return status_.isOk(); }
-
-    T* operator->() & {
-        assert(isOk());
-        return &value_.value();
-    }
-    T& operator*() & {
-        assert(isOk());
-        return value_.value();
-    }
-    T&& operator*() && {
-        assert(isOk());
-        return std::move(value_).value();
-    }
-
-    const char* getMessage() const {
-        assert(!isOk());
-        return status_.getMessage();
-    }
-
-    Status moveError() {
-        assert(!isOk());
-        return std::move(status_);
-    }
-
-    T moveValue() { return std::move(value_).value(); }
-
-  private:
-    Status status_;
-    std::optional<T> value_;
-};
-
-StatusOr<std::pair<bytevec /* EEK pub */, bytevec /* EEK ID */>> validateAndExtractEekPubAndId(
-        bool testMode, const bytevec& endpointEncryptionCertChain) {
-    auto [item, newPos, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(endpointEncryptionCertChain);
-
-    if (!item || !item->asArray()) {
-        return Status("Error parsing EEK chain" + errMsg);
-    }
-
-    const cppbor::Array* certArr = item->asArray();
-    bytevec lastPubKey;
-    for (int i = 0; i < certArr->size(); ++i) {
-        auto cosePubKey = verifyAndParseCoseSign1(testMode, certArr->get(i)->asArray(),
-                                                  std::move(lastPubKey), bytevec{} /* AAD */);
-        if (!cosePubKey) {
-            return Status(STATUS_INVALID_EEK,
-                          "Failed to validate EEK chain: " + cosePubKey.moveMessage());
-        }
-        lastPubKey = *std::move(cosePubKey);
-
-        // In prod mode the first pubkey should match a well-known Google public key.
-        if (!testMode && i == 0 &&
-            std::find(kAuthorizedEekRoots.begin(), kAuthorizedEekRoots.end(), lastPubKey) ==
-                    kAuthorizedEekRoots.end()) {
-            return Status(STATUS_INVALID_EEK, "Unrecognized root of EEK chain");
-        }
-    }
-
-    auto eek = CoseKey::parseX25519(lastPubKey, true /* requireKid */);
-    if (!eek) return Status(STATUS_INVALID_EEK, "Failed to get EEK: " + eek.moveMessage());
-
-    return std::make_pair(eek->getBstrValue(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X).value(),
-                          eek->getBstrValue(CoseKey::KEY_ID).value());
-}
-
-StatusOr<bytevec /* pubkeys */> validateAndExtractPubkeys(bool testMode,
-                                                          const vector<MacedPublicKey>& keysToSign,
-                                                          const bytevec& macKey) {
-    auto pubKeysToMac = cppbor::Array();
-    for (auto& keyToSign : keysToSign) {
-        auto [macedKeyItem, _, coseMacErrMsg] = cppbor::parse(keyToSign.macedKey);
-        if (!macedKeyItem || !macedKeyItem->asArray() ||
-            macedKeyItem->asArray()->size() != kCoseMac0EntryCount) {
-            return Status("Invalid COSE_Mac0 structure");
-        }
-
-        auto protectedParms = macedKeyItem->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
-        auto unprotectedParms = macedKeyItem->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
-        auto payload = macedKeyItem->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
-        auto tag = macedKeyItem->asArray()->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
-        if (!protectedParms || !unprotectedParms || !payload || !tag) {
-            return Status("Invalid COSE_Mac0 contents");
-        }
-
-        auto [protectedMap, __, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedParms);
-        if (!protectedMap || !protectedMap->asMap()) {
-            return Status("Invalid Mac0 protected: " + errMsg);
-        }
-        auto& algo = protectedMap->asMap()->get(ALGORITHM);
-        if (!algo || !algo->asInt() || algo->asInt()->value() != HMAC_256) {
-            return Status("Unsupported Mac0 algorithm");
-        }
-
-        auto pubKey = CoseKey::parse(payload->value(), EC2, ES256, P256);
-        if (!pubKey) return Status(pubKey.moveMessage());
-
-        bool testKey = static_cast<bool>(pubKey->getMap().get(CoseKey::TEST_KEY));
-        if (testMode && !testKey) {
-            return Status(BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_PRODUCTION_KEY_IN_TEST_REQUEST,
-                          "Production key in test request");
-        } else if (!testMode && testKey) {
-            return Status(BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent::STATUS_TEST_KEY_IN_PRODUCTION_REQUEST,
-                          "Test key in production request");
-        }
-
-        auto macTag = generateCoseMac0Mac(macKey, {} /* external_aad */, payload->value());
-        if (!macTag) return Status(STATUS_INVALID_MAC, macTag.moveMessage());
-        if (macTag->size() != tag->value().size() ||
-            CRYPTO_memcmp(macTag->data(), tag->value().data(), macTag->size()) != 0) {
-            return Status(STATUS_INVALID_MAC, "MAC tag mismatch");
-        }
-
-        pubKeysToMac.add(pubKey->moveMap());
-    }
-
-    return pubKeysToMac.encode();
-}
-
-StatusOr<std::pair<bytevec, bytevec>> buildCosePublicKeyFromKmCert(
-        const keymaster_blob_t* km_cert) {
-    if (km_cert == nullptr) {
-        return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "km_cert is a nullptr");
-    }
-    const uint8_t* temp = km_cert->data;
-    X509* cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &temp, km_cert->data_length);
-    if (cert == nullptr) {
-        return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "d2i_X509 returned null when attempting to get the cert.");
-    }
-    EVP_PKEY* pubKey = X509_get_pubkey(cert);
-    if (pubKey == nullptr) {
-        return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "Boringssl failed to get the public key from the cert");
-    }
-    EC_KEY* ecKey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pubKey);
-    if (ecKey == nullptr) {
-        return Status(STATUS_FAILED,
-                      "The key in the certificate returned from GenerateKey is not "
-                      "an EC key.");
-    }
-    const EC_POINT* jacobian_coords = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecKey);
-    BIGNUM x;
-    BIGNUM y;
-    BN_CTX* ctx = BN_CTX_new();
-    if (ctx == nullptr) {
-        return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "Memory allocation failure for BN_CTX");
-    }
-    if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(EC_KEY_get0_group(ecKey), jacobian_coords, &x, &y,
-                                             ctx)) {
-        return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "Failed to get affine coordinates");
-    }
-    bytevec x_bytestring(kAffinePointLength);
-    bytevec y_bytestring(kAffinePointLength);
-    if (BN_bn2binpad(&x, x_bytestring.data(), kAffinePointLength) != kAffinePointLength) {
-        return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "Wrote incorrect number of bytes for x coordinate");
-    }
-    if (BN_bn2binpad(&y, y_bytestring.data(), kAffinePointLength) != kAffinePointLength) {
-        return Status(STATUS_FAILED, "Wrote incorrect number of bytes for y coordinate");
-    }
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-    return std::make_pair(x_bytestring, y_bytestring);
-}
-
-cppbor::Array buildCertReqRecipients(const bytevec& pubkey, const bytevec& kid) {
-    return cppbor::Array()                   // Array of recipients
-            .add(cppbor::Array()             // Recipient
-                         .add(cppbor::Map()  // Protected
-                                      .add(ALGORITHM, ECDH_ES_HKDF_256)
-                                      .canonicalize()
-                                      .encode())
-                         .add(cppbor::Map()  // Unprotected
-                                      .add(COSE_KEY, cppbor::Map()
-                                                             .add(CoseKey::KEY_TYPE, OCTET_KEY_PAIR)
-                                                             .add(CoseKey::CURVE, cppcose::X25519)
-                                                             .add(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X, pubkey)
-                                                             .canonicalize())
-                                      .add(KEY_ID, kid)
-                                      .canonicalize())
-                         .add(cppbor::Null()));  // No ciphertext
-}
-
-static keymaster_key_param_t kKeyMintEcdsaP256Params[] = {
-        Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KM_PURPOSE_ATTEST_KEY),
-        Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, KM_ALGORITHM_EC), Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256),
-        Authorization(TAG_DIGEST, KM_DIGEST_SHA_2_256),
-        Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, KM_EC_CURVE_P_256), Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
-        // The certificate generated by KM will be discarded, these values don't matter.
-        Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_BEFORE, 0), Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_NOT_AFTER, 0)};
-
-}  // namespace
-
-RemotelyProvisionedComponent::RemotelyProvisionedComponent(
-        std::shared_ptr<keymint::AndroidKeyMintDevice> keymint) {
-    std::tie(devicePrivKey_, bcc_) = generateBcc();
-    impl_ = keymint->getKeymasterImpl();
-}
-
-RemotelyProvisionedComponent::~RemotelyProvisionedComponent() {}
-
-ScopedAStatus RemotelyProvisionedComponent::generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(bool testMode,
-                                                                     MacedPublicKey* macedPublicKey,
-                                                                     bytevec* privateKeyHandle) {
-    // TODO(jbires): The following should move from ->GenerateKey to ->GenerateRKPKey and everything
-    //              after the GenerateKey call should basically be moved into that new function call
-    //              as well once the issue with libcppbor in system/keymaster is sorted out
-    GenerateKeyRequest request(impl_->message_version());
-    request.key_description.Reinitialize(kKeyMintEcdsaP256Params,
-                                         array_length(kKeyMintEcdsaP256Params));
-    GenerateKeyResponse response(impl_->message_version());
-    impl_->GenerateKey(request, &response);
-    if (response.error != KM_ERROR_OK) {
-        return km_utils::kmError2ScopedAStatus(response.error);
-    }
-
-    if (response.certificate_chain.entry_count != 1) {
-        // Error: Need the single non-signed certificate with the public key in it.
-        return Status(STATUS_FAILED,
-                      "Expected to receive a single certificate from GenerateKey. Instead got: " +
-                              std::to_string(response.certificate_chain.entry_count));
-    }
-    auto affineCoords = buildCosePublicKeyFromKmCert(response.certificate_chain.begin());
-    if (!affineCoords.isOk()) return affineCoords.moveError();
-    cppbor::Map cosePublicKeyMap = cppbor::Map()
-                                           .add(CoseKey::KEY_TYPE, EC2)
-                                           .add(CoseKey::ALGORITHM, ES256)
-                                           .add(CoseKey::CURVE, cppcose::P256)
-                                           .add(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X, affineCoords->first)
-                                           .add(CoseKey::PUBKEY_Y, affineCoords->second);
-    if (testMode) {
-        cosePublicKeyMap.add(CoseKey::TEST_KEY, cppbor::Null());
-    }
-
-    bytevec cosePublicKey = cosePublicKeyMap.canonicalize().encode();
-
-    auto macedKey = constructCoseMac0(testMode ? remote_prov::kTestMacKey : macKey_,
-                                      {} /* externalAad */, cosePublicKey);
-    if (!macedKey) return Status(macedKey.moveMessage());
-
-    macedPublicKey->macedKey = macedKey->encode();
-    *privateKeyHandle = km_utils::kmBlob2vector(response.key_blob);
-    return ScopedAStatus::ok();
-}
-
-ScopedAStatus RemotelyProvisionedComponent::generateCertificateRequest(
-        bool testMode, const vector<MacedPublicKey>& keysToSign,
-        const bytevec& endpointEncCertChain, const bytevec& challenge, DeviceInfo* deviceInfo,
-        ProtectedData* protectedData, bytevec* keysToSignMac) {
-    auto pubKeysToSign = validateAndExtractPubkeys(testMode, keysToSign,
-                                                   testMode ? remote_prov::kTestMacKey : macKey_);
-    if (!pubKeysToSign.isOk()) return pubKeysToSign.moveError();
-
-    bytevec ephemeralMacKey = remote_prov::randomBytes(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-
-    auto pubKeysToSignMac = generateCoseMac0Mac(ephemeralMacKey, bytevec{}, *pubKeysToSign);
-    if (!pubKeysToSignMac) return Status(pubKeysToSignMac.moveMessage());
-    *keysToSignMac = *std::move(pubKeysToSignMac);
-
-    bytevec devicePrivKey;
-    cppbor::Array bcc;
-    if (testMode) {
-        std::tie(devicePrivKey, bcc) = generateBcc();
-    } else {
-        devicePrivKey = devicePrivKey_;
-        bcc = bcc_.clone();
-    }
-
-    std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> deviceInfoMap = createDeviceInfo();
-    deviceInfo->deviceInfo = deviceInfoMap->encode();
-    auto signedMac = constructCoseSign1(devicePrivKey /* Signing key */,  //
-                                        ephemeralMacKey /* Payload */,
-                                        cppbor::Array() /* AAD */
-                                                .add(challenge)
-                                                .add(std::move(deviceInfoMap))
-                                                .encode());
-    if (!signedMac) return Status(signedMac.moveMessage());
-
-    bytevec ephemeralPrivKey(X25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN);
-    bytevec ephemeralPubKey(X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN);
-    X25519_keypair(ephemeralPubKey.data(), ephemeralPrivKey.data());
-
-    auto eek = validateAndExtractEekPubAndId(testMode, endpointEncCertChain);
-    if (!eek.isOk()) return eek.moveError();
-
-    auto sessionKey = x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(ephemeralPubKey, ephemeralPrivKey, eek->first,
-                                            true /* senderIsA */);
-    if (!sessionKey) return Status(sessionKey.moveMessage());
-
-    auto coseEncrypted =
-            constructCoseEncrypt(*sessionKey, remote_prov::randomBytes(kAesGcmNonceLength),
-                                 cppbor::Array()  // payload
-                                         .add(signedMac.moveValue())
-                                         .add(std::move(bcc))
-                                         .encode(),
-                                 {},  // aad
-                                 buildCertReqRecipients(ephemeralPubKey, eek->second));
-
-    if (!coseEncrypted) return Status(coseEncrypted.moveMessage());
-    protectedData->protectedData = coseEncrypted->encode();
-
-    return ScopedAStatus::ok();
-}
-
-bytevec RemotelyProvisionedComponent::deriveBytesFromHbk(const string& context,
-                                                         size_t numBytes) const {
-    bytevec fakeHbk(32, 0);
-    bytevec result(numBytes);
-
-    // TODO(swillden): Figure out if HKDF can fail.  It doesn't seem like it should be able to,
-    // but the function does return an error code.
-    HKDF(result.data(), numBytes,               //
-         EVP_sha256(),                          //
-         fakeHbk.data(), fakeHbk.size(),        //
-         nullptr /* salt */, 0 /* salt len */,  //
-         reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(context.data()), context.size());
-
-    return result;
-}
-
-std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> RemotelyProvisionedComponent::createDeviceInfo() const {
-    auto result = std::make_unique<cppbor::Map>(cppbor::Map());
-
-    // The following placeholders show how the DeviceInfo map would be populated.
-    // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("brand"), cppbor::Tstr("Google"));
-    // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("manufacturer"), cppbor::Tstr("Google"));
-    // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("product"), cppbor::Tstr("Fake"));
-    // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("model"), cppbor::Tstr("Imaginary"));
-    // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("board"), cppbor::Tstr("Chess"));
-    // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("vb_state"), cppbor::Tstr("orange"));
-    // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("bootloader_state"), cppbor::Tstr("unlocked"));
-    // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("os_version"), cppbor::Tstr("SC"));
-    // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("system_patch_level"), cppbor::Uint(20210331));
-    // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("boot_patch_level"), cppbor::Uint(20210331));
-    // result->add(cppbor::Tstr("vendor_patch_level"), cppbor::Uint(20210331));
-
-    result->canonicalize();
-    return result;
-}
-
-std::pair<bytevec /* privKey */, cppbor::Array /* BCC */>
-RemotelyProvisionedComponent::generateBcc() {
-    bytevec privKey(ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN);
-    bytevec pubKey(ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN);
-
-    ED25519_keypair(pubKey.data(), privKey.data());
-
-    auto coseKey = cppbor::Map()
-                           .add(CoseKey::KEY_TYPE, OCTET_KEY_PAIR)
-                           .add(CoseKey::ALGORITHM, EDDSA)
-                           .add(CoseKey::CURVE, ED25519)
-                           .add(CoseKey::KEY_OPS, VERIFY)
-                           .add(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X, pubKey)
-                           .canonicalize()
-                           .encode();
-    auto sign1Payload = cppbor::Map()
-                                .add(1 /* Issuer */, "Issuer")
-                                .add(2 /* Subject */, "Subject")
-                                .add(-4670552 /* Subject Pub Key */, coseKey)
-                                .add(-4670553 /* Key Usage (little-endian order) */,
-                                     std::vector<uint8_t>{0x20} /* keyCertSign = 1<<5 */)
-                                .canonicalize()
-                                .encode();
-    auto coseSign1 = constructCoseSign1(privKey,       /* signing key */
-                                        cppbor::Map(), /* extra protected */
-                                        sign1Payload, {} /* AAD */);
-    assert(coseSign1);
-
-    return {privKey, cppbor::Array().add(coseKey).add(coseSign1.moveValue())};
-}
-
-}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h b/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 8185e26..0000000
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#pragma once
-
-#include <AndroidKeyMintDevice.h>
-#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
-#include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.h>
-#include <cppbor.h>
-#include <keymaster/UniquePtr.h>
-#include <keymaster/android_keymaster.h>
-
-namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint {
-
-using ::ndk::ScopedAStatus;
-
-class RemotelyProvisionedComponent : public BnRemotelyProvisionedComponent {
-  public:
-    explicit RemotelyProvisionedComponent(std::shared_ptr<keymint::AndroidKeyMintDevice> keymint);
-    virtual ~RemotelyProvisionedComponent();
-
-    ScopedAStatus generateEcdsaP256KeyPair(bool testMode, MacedPublicKey* macedPublicKey,
-                                           std::vector<uint8_t>* privateKeyHandle) override;
-
-    ScopedAStatus generateCertificateRequest(bool testMode,
-                                             const std::vector<MacedPublicKey>& keysToSign,
-                                             const std::vector<uint8_t>& endpointEncCertChain,
-                                             const std::vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
-                                             DeviceInfo* deviceInfo, ProtectedData* protectedData,
-                                             std::vector<uint8_t>* keysToSignMac) override;
-
-  private:
-    // TODO(swillden): Move these into an appropriate Context class.
-    std::vector<uint8_t> deriveBytesFromHbk(const std::string& context, size_t numBytes) const;
-    std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> createDeviceInfo() const;
-    std::pair<std::vector<uint8_t>, cppbor::Array> generateBcc();
-
-    std::vector<uint8_t> macKey_ = deriveBytesFromHbk("Key to MAC public keys", 32);
-    std::vector<uint8_t> devicePrivKey_;
-    cppbor::Array bcc_;
-    std::shared_ptr<::keymaster::AndroidKeymaster> impl_;
-};
-
-}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
index bcebbaf..8092e34 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/default/service.cpp
@@ -21,14 +21,13 @@
 #include <android/binder_process.h>
 
 #include <AndroidKeyMintDevice.h>
+#include <AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice.h>
 #include <AndroidSecureClock.h>
 #include <AndroidSharedSecret.h>
 #include <keymaster/soft_keymaster_logger.h>
 
-#include "RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h"
-
 using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::AndroidKeyMintDevice;
-using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::RemotelyProvisionedComponent;
+using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice;
 using aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::SecurityLevel;
 using aidl::android::hardware::security::secureclock::AndroidSecureClock;
 using aidl::android::hardware::security::sharedsecret::AndroidSharedSecret;
@@ -56,7 +55,7 @@
     // Add Shared Secret Service
     addService<AndroidSharedSecret>(keyMint);
     // Add Remotely Provisioned Component Service
-    addService<RemotelyProvisionedComponent>(keyMint);
+    addService<AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice>(keyMint);
     ABinderProcess_joinThreadPool();
     return EXIT_FAILURE;  // should not reach
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
index 6c7309e..ff08ce6 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -31,20 +31,21 @@
     ],
     srcs: [
         "AttestKeyTest.cpp",
+        "DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp",
         "KeyMintTest.cpp",
     ],
     shared_libs: [
         "libbinder_ndk",
         "libcrypto",
-        "libkeymint",
-        "libkeymint_support",
     ],
     static_libs: [
         "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
         "android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk_platform",
         "libcppbor_external",
-        "libcppcose",
+        "libcppcose_rkp",
+        "libkeymint",
         "libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
+        "libkeymint_support",
         "libkeymint_vts_test_utils",
     ],
     test_suites: [
@@ -68,16 +69,16 @@
     shared_libs: [
         "libbinder_ndk",
         "libcrypto",
-        "libkeymint",
-        "libkeymint_support",
     ],
     static_libs: [
         "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
         "android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk_platform",
         "libcppbor_external",
-        "libcppcose",
+        "libcppcose_rkp",
         "libgmock_ndk",
+        "libkeymint",
         "libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
+        "libkeymint_support",
     ],
 }
 
@@ -92,21 +93,20 @@
     ],
     shared_libs: [
         "libbinder_ndk",
-        "libcppbor_external",
         "libcrypto",
-        "libkeymaster_portable",
-        "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
     ],
     static_libs: [
         "android.hardware.security.keymint-V1-ndk_platform",
         "android.hardware.security.secureclock-V1-ndk_platform",
-        "libcppcose",
+        "libcppbor_external",
+        "libcppcose_rkp",
         "libgmock_ndk",
+        "libkeymaster_portable",
         "libkeymint",
         "libkeymint_support",
         "libkeymint_remote_prov_support",
         "libkeymint_vts_test_utils",
-        "libremote_provisioner",
+        "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
     ],
     test_suites: [
         "general-tests",
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
index daa3e18..a312723 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
@@ -35,10 +35,16 @@
 
 using AttestKeyTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
 
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.AllRsaSizes
+ *
+ * This test creates self signed RSA attestation keys of various sizes, and verify they can be
+ * used to sign other RSA and EC keys.
+ */
 TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AllRsaSizes) {
     for (auto size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
         /*
-         * Create attestaton key.
+         * Create attestation key.
          */
         AttestationKey attest_key;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
@@ -50,11 +56,12 @@
                                              {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
                                              &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
 
+        ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
         EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
         EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain)) << "Failed on size " << size;
 
         /*
-         * Use attestation key to sign RSA key
+         * Use attestation key to sign RSA signing key
          */
         attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
         vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
@@ -81,29 +88,77 @@
         EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
 
         // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
-        if (attest_key_cert_chain.size() > 0) {
-            attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
-        }
+        attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
         EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+        EXPECT_EQ(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 2);
 
         /*
-         * Use attestation key to sign EC key
+         * Use attestation key to sign RSA decryption key
          */
+        attested_key_characteristics.resize(0);
+        attested_key_cert_chain.resize(0);
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                      .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("foo2")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("bar2")
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+                              &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+
+        hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo2", "bar2", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                              attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+        // Attestation by itself is not valid (last entry is not self-signed).
+        EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+        attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+        EXPECT_EQ(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 2);
+
+        /*
+         * Use attestation key to sign EC key. Specify a CREATION_DATETIME for this one.
+         */
+        attested_key_characteristics.resize(0);
+        attested_key_cert_chain.resize(0);
+        uint64_t timestamp = 1619621648000;
         EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
                   GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                       .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                       .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
                                       .AttestationChallenge("foo")
                                       .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, timestamp)
                                       .SetDefaultValidity(),
                               attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
                               &attested_key_cert_chain));
 
+        // The returned key characteristics will include CREATION_DATETIME (checked below)
+        // in SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE; this will be stripped out in the CheckCharacteristics()
+        // call below, to match what getKeyCharacteristics() returns (which doesn't include
+        // any SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE characteristics).
+        CheckCharacteristics(attested_key_blob, attested_key_characteristics);
+
         CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
         CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
 
         hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
         sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+
+        // The client-specified CREATION_DATETIME should be in sw_enforced.
+        // Its presence will also trigger verify_attestation_record() to check that it
+        // is in the attestation extension with a matching value.
+        EXPECT_TRUE(sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, timestamp))
+                << "expected CREATION_TIMESTAMP in sw_enforced:" << sw_enforced
+                << " not in hw_enforced:" << hw_enforced;
         EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
                                               attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
 
@@ -111,9 +166,7 @@
         EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
 
         // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
-        if (attest_key_cert_chain.size() > 0) {
-            attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
-        }
+        attested_key_cert_chain.push_back(attest_key_cert_chain[0]);
         EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
 
         // Bail early if anything failed.
@@ -121,10 +174,380 @@
     }
 }
 
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.RsaAttestedAttestKeys
+ *
+ * This test creates an RSA attestation key signed by factory keys, and varifies it can be
+ * used to sign other RSA and EC keys.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, RsaAttestedAttestKeys) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+    // An X.509 certificate serial number SHOULD be >0, but this is not policed. Check
+    // that a zero value doesn't cause problems.
+    uint64_t serial_int = 0;
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+    /*
+     * Create attestation key.
+     */
+    AttestationKey attest_key;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+    vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                  .AttestKey()
+                                  .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                  .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                  .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                          {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+                          &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+    EXPECT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+    verify_subject_and_serial(attest_key_cert_chain[0], serial_int, subject, false);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+    AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attest_key_characteristics);
+    AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attest_key_characteristics);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id,  //
+                                          sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                          attest_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+    /*
+     * Use attestation key to sign RSA key
+     */
+    attest_key.issuerSubjectName = subject_der;
+    vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+    vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+
+    auto subject2 = "cert subject";
+    vector<uint8_t> subject_der2(make_name_from_str(subject2));
+
+    uint64_t serial_int2 = 255;
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob2(build_serial_blob(serial_int2));
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                  .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+                                  .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob2)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der2)
+                                  .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                          attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+                          &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+
+    AuthorizationSet hw_enforced2 = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+    AuthorizationSet sw_enforced2 = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced2, hw_enforced2, SecLevel(),
+                                          attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+    // Attestation by itself is not valid (last entry is not self-signed).
+    EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+    // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+    attested_key_cert_chain.insert(attested_key_cert_chain.end(), attest_key_cert_chain.begin(),
+                                   attest_key_cert_chain.end());
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(attested_key_cert_chain));
+    EXPECT_GT(attested_key_cert_chain.size(), 2);
+    verify_subject_and_serial(attested_key_cert_chain[0], serial_int2, subject2, false);
+}
+
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.RsaAttestKeyChaining
+ *
+ * This test creates a chain of multiple RSA attest keys, each used to sign the next attest key,
+ * with the last attest key signed by the factory chain.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, RsaAttestKeyChaining) {
+    const int chain_size = 6;
+    vector<vector<uint8_t>> key_blob_list(chain_size);
+    vector<vector<Certificate>> cert_chain_list(chain_size);
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+        string sub = "attest key chaining ";
+        char index = '1' + i;
+        string subject = sub + index;
+        vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+        uint64_t serial_int = 7000 + i;
+        vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+        AttestationKey attest_key;
+        optional<AttestationKey> attest_key_opt;
+
+        if (i > 0) {
+            attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str(sub + (char)(index - 1));
+            attest_key.keyBlob = key_blob_list[i - 1];
+            attest_key_opt = attest_key;
+        }
+
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                      .AttestKey()
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              attest_key_opt, &key_blob_list[i], &attested_key_characteristics,
+                              &cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                              cert_chain_list[i][0].encodedCertificate));
+
+        if (i > 0) {
+            /*
+             * The first key is attestated with factory chain, but all the rest of the keys are
+             * not supposed to be returned in attestation certificate chains.
+             */
+            EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+            // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+            cert_chain_list[i].insert(cert_chain_list[i].end(),        //
+                                      cert_chain_list[i - 1].begin(),  //
+                                      cert_chain_list[i - 1].end());
+        }
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+        EXPECT_GT(cert_chain_list[i].size(), i + 1);
+        verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_list[i][0], serial_int, subject, false);
+    }
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob_list[i]);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.EcAttestKeyChaining
+ *
+ * This test creates a chain of multiple Ec attest keys, each used to sign the next attest key,
+ * with the last attest key signed by the factory chain.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, EcAttestKeyChaining) {
+    const int chain_size = 6;
+    vector<vector<uint8_t>> key_blob_list(chain_size);
+    vector<vector<Certificate>> cert_chain_list(chain_size);
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+        string sub = "Ec attest key chaining ";
+        char index = '1' + i;
+        string subject = sub + index;
+        vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+        uint64_t serial_int = 800000 + i;
+        vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+        AttestationKey attest_key;
+        optional<AttestationKey> attest_key_opt;
+
+        if (i > 0) {
+            attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str(sub + (char)(index - 1));
+            attest_key.keyBlob = key_blob_list[i - 1];
+            attest_key_opt = attest_key;
+        }
+
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                      .AttestKey()
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              attest_key_opt, &key_blob_list[i], &attested_key_characteristics,
+                              &cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                              cert_chain_list[i][0].encodedCertificate));
+
+        if (i > 0) {
+            /*
+             * The first key is attestated with factory chain, but all the rest of the keys are
+             * not supposed to be returned in attestation certificate chains.
+             */
+            EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+            // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+            cert_chain_list[i].insert(cert_chain_list[i].end(),        //
+                                      cert_chain_list[i - 1].begin(),  //
+                                      cert_chain_list[i - 1].end());
+        }
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+        EXPECT_GT(cert_chain_list[i].size(), i + 1);
+        verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_list[i][0], serial_int, subject, false);
+    }
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob_list[i]);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * AttestKeyTest.AlternateAttestKeyChaining
+ *
+ * This test creates a chain of multiple attest keys, in the order Ec - RSA - Ec - RSA ....
+ * Each attest key is used to sign the next attest key, with the last attest key signed by
+ * the factory chain. This is to verify different algorithms of attest keys can
+ * cross sign each other and be chained together.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AlternateAttestKeyChaining) {
+    const int chain_size = 6;
+    vector<vector<uint8_t>> key_blob_list(chain_size);
+    vector<vector<Certificate>> cert_chain_list(chain_size);
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+        string sub = "Alt attest key chaining ";
+        char index = '1' + i;
+        string subject = sub + index;
+        vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+        uint64_t serial_int = 90000000 + i;
+        vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+        AttestationKey attest_key;
+        optional<AttestationKey> attest_key_opt;
+
+        if (i > 0) {
+            attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str(sub + (char)(index - 1));
+            attest_key.keyBlob = key_blob_list[i - 1];
+            attest_key_opt = attest_key;
+        }
+
+        if ((i & 0x1) == 1) {
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                      GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                          .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                          .AttestKey()
+                                          .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+                                          .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                          .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                          .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                          .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                          .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                  attest_key_opt, &key_blob_list[i], &attested_key_characteristics,
+                                  &cert_chain_list[i]));
+        } else {
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                      GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                          .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                          .AttestKey()
+                                          .AttestationChallenge("foo")
+                                          .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                          .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                          .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                          .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                          .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                  attest_key_opt, &key_blob_list[i], &attested_key_characteristics,
+                                  &cert_chain_list[i]));
+        }
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("foo", "bar", sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                              cert_chain_list[i][0].encodedCertificate));
+
+        if (i > 0) {
+            /*
+             * The first key is attestated with factory chain, but all the rest of the keys are
+             * not supposed to be returned in attestation certificate chains.
+             */
+            EXPECT_FALSE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+
+            // Appending the attest_key chain to the attested_key_chain should yield a valid chain.
+            cert_chain_list[i].insert(cert_chain_list[i].end(),        //
+                                      cert_chain_list[i - 1].begin(),  //
+                                      cert_chain_list[i - 1].end());
+        }
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_list[i]));
+        EXPECT_GT(cert_chain_list[i].size(), i + 1);
+        verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_list[i][0], serial_int, subject, false);
+    }
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < chain_size; i++) {
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob_list[i]);
+    }
+}
+
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, MissingChallenge) {
+    for (auto size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+        /*
+         * Create attestation key.
+         */
+        AttestationKey attest_key;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+        vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .RsaSigningKey(size, 65537)
+                                                     .AttestKey()
+                                                     .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                             {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+                                             &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+        EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain)) << "Failed on size " << size;
+
+        /*
+         * Use attestation key to sign RSA / ECDSA key but forget to provide a challenge
+         */
+        attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+        vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+        vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+                              &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE_MISSING,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("bar")
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              attest_key, &attested_key_blob, &attested_key_characteristics,
+                              &attested_key_cert_chain));
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+    }
+}
+
 TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AllEcCurves) {
     for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
         /*
-         * Create attestaton key.
+         * Create attestation key.
          */
         AttestationKey attest_key;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
@@ -133,9 +556,10 @@
                                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
                                                      .AttestKey()
                                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
-                                             {} /* attestation siging key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+                                             {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
                                              &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
 
+        ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
         EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
         EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain)) << "Failed on curve " << curve;
 
@@ -208,7 +632,7 @@
 }
 
 TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AttestWithNonAttestKey) {
-    // Create non-attestaton key.
+    // Create non-attestation key.
     AttestationKey non_attest_key;
     vector<KeyCharacteristics> non_attest_key_characteristics;
     vector<Certificate> non_attest_key_cert_chain;
@@ -216,9 +640,10 @@
             ErrorCode::OK,
             GenerateKey(
                     AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256).SetDefaultValidity(),
-                    {} /* attestation siging key */, &non_attest_key.keyBlob,
+                    {} /* attestation signing key */, &non_attest_key.keyBlob,
                     &non_attest_key_characteristics, &non_attest_key_cert_chain));
 
+    ASSERT_GT(non_attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
     EXPECT_EQ(non_attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
     EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(non_attest_key_cert_chain));
 
@@ -237,6 +662,124 @@
                           &attested_key_cert_chain));
 }
 
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, EcdsaAttestationID) {
+    // Create attestation key.
+    AttestationKey attest_key;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+    vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                 .AttestKey()
+                                                 .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                         {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+                                         &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+    attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+    ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
+    EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+    // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+    auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+                      "ro.product.manufacturer");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << tag);
+        // Use attestation key to sign an ECDSA key, but include an attestation ID field.
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                  .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                                  .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                                  .SetDefaultValidity();
+        builder.push_back(tag);
+        vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+        vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+        auto result = GenerateKey(builder, attest_key, &attested_key_blob,
+                                  &attested_key_characteristics, &attested_key_cert_chain);
+        if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+
+        // The attested key characteristics will not contain APPLICATION_ID_* fields (their
+        // spec definitions all have "Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics"), but the
+        // attestation extension should contain them, so make sure the extra tag is added.
+        hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+                                              SecLevel(),
+                                              attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+    }
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+}
+
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, EcdsaAttestationMismatchID) {
+    // Create attestation key.
+    AttestationKey attest_key;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+    vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                 .AttestKey()
+                                                 .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                         {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+                                         &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+    attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+    ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
+    EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+    // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+    auto attestation_id_tags =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "bogus-brand")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "devious-device")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "punctured-product")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "suspicious-serial")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, "invalid-imei")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, "mismatching-meid")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, "malformed-manufacturer")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "malicious-model");
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << invalid_tag);
+
+        // Use attestation key to sign an ECDSA key, but include an invalid
+        // attestation ID field.
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                  .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                                  .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                                  .SetDefaultValidity();
+        builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+        vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+        vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+        auto result = GenerateKey(builder, attest_key, &attested_key_blob,
+                                  &attested_key_characteristics, &attested_key_cert_chain);
+
+        ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG)
+                << "result = " << result;
+    }
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+}
+
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AttestKeyTest);
 
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a3ed3ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,326 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2021 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#define LOG_TAG "keymint_1_attest_key_test"
+
+#include <cutils/log.h>
+#include <cutils/properties.h>
+#include <keymint_support/key_param_output.h>
+#include <keymint_support/openssl_utils.h>
+
+#include "KeyMintAidlTestBase.h"
+
+namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test {
+
+class DeviceUniqueAttestationTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
+  protected:
+    void CheckUniqueAttestationResults(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+                                       const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics,
+                                       const AuthorizationSet& hw_enforced) {
+        ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+
+        if (KeyMintAidlTestBase::dump_Attestations) {
+            std::cout << bin2hex(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate) << std::endl;
+        }
+
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        // The device-unique attestation chain should contain exactly two certificates:
+        // * The leaf with the attestation extension.
+        // * A self-signed root, signed using the device-unique key.
+        ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 2);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+                                              SecLevel(), cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+    }
+};
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.RsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented
+ *
+ * Verifies that non strongbox implementations do not implement Rsa device unique
+ * attestation.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, RsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented) {
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    // Check RSA implementation
+    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                      .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT || result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented
+ *
+ * Verifies that non strongbox implementations do not implement Ecdsa device unique
+ * attestation.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaNonStrongBoxUnimplemented) {
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    // Check Ecdsa implementation
+    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT || result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.RsaDeviceUniqueAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that strongbox implementations of Rsa implements device unique
+ * attestation correctly, if implemented.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, RsaDeviceUniqueAttestation) {
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    int key_size = 2048;
+
+    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                      .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+    // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+    if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+
+    AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                    .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                    .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                    .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+                    .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+
+    // Any patchlevels attached to the key should also be present in the attestation extension.
+    AuthorizationSet auths;
+    for (const auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+        auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+    }
+    auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+    if (vendor_pl) {
+        hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, *vendor_pl);
+    }
+    auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+    if (boot_pl) {
+        hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, *boot_pl);
+    }
+
+    CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that strongbox implementations of Rsa implements device unique
+ * attestation correctly, if implemented.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestation) {
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+    // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+    if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+
+    AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                    .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                    .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+                    .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+    // Any patchlevels attached to the key should also be present in the attestation extension.
+    AuthorizationSet auths;
+    for (const auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+        auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+    }
+    auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+    if (vendor_pl) {
+        hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, *vendor_pl);
+    }
+    auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+    if (boot_pl) {
+        hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, *boot_pl);
+    }
+
+    CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID
+ *
+ * Verifies that device unique attestation can include IDs that do match the
+ * local device.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID) {
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+    auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+                      "ro.product.manufacturer");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << tag);
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                  .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+                                                  .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                                  .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION);
+        builder.push_back(tag);
+        auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+        // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+        if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                        .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                        .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+                        .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+        // Expect the specified tag to be present in the attestation extension.
+        hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+        // Any patchlevels attached to the key should also be present in the attestation extension.
+        AuthorizationSet auths;
+        for (const auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+            auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+        }
+        auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+        if (vendor_pl) {
+            hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, *vendor_pl);
+        }
+        auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+        if (boot_pl) {
+            hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, *boot_pl);
+        }
+        CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID
+ *
+ * Verifies that device unique attestation rejects attempts to attest to IDs that
+ * don't match the local device.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID) {
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+    auto attestation_id_tags =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "bogus-brand")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "devious-device")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "punctured-product")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "suspicious-serial")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, "invalid-imei")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, "mismatching-meid")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, "malformed-manufacturer")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "malicious-model");
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << invalid_tag);
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                  .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+                                                  .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                                  .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION);
+        // Add the tag that doesn't match the local device's real ID.
+        builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+        auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+        ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG);
+    }
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest);
+
+}  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
index 3da0484..5359b3b 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -23,12 +23,12 @@
 #include <android-base/logging.h>
 #include <android/binder_manager.h>
 #include <cppbor_parse.h>
-#include <cppcose/cppcose.h>
 #include <cutils/properties.h>
 #include <gmock/gmock.h>
 #include <openssl/mem.h>
 #include <remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h>
 
+#include <keymaster/cppcose/cppcose.h>
 #include <keymint_support/attestation_record.h>
 #include <keymint_support/key_param_output.h>
 #include <keymint_support/keymint_utils.h>
@@ -44,7 +44,9 @@
 using ::testing::AssertionFailure;
 using ::testing::AssertionResult;
 using ::testing::AssertionSuccess;
+using ::testing::ElementsAreArray;
 using ::testing::MatchesRegex;
+using ::testing::Not;
 
 ::std::ostream& operator<<(::std::ostream& os, const AuthorizationSet& set) {
     if (set.size() == 0)
@@ -59,6 +61,14 @@
 namespace test {
 
 namespace {
+
+// Invalid value for a patchlevel (which is of form YYYYMMDD).
+const uint32_t kInvalidPatchlevel = 99998877;
+
+// Overhead for PKCS#1 v1.5 signature padding of undigested messages.  Digested messages have
+// additional overhead, for the digest algorithmIdentifier required by PKCS#1.
+const size_t kPkcs1UndigestedSignaturePaddingOverhead = 11;
+
 typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase::KeyData KeyData;
 // Predicate for testing basic characteristics validity in generation or import.
 bool KeyCharacteristicsBasicallyValid(SecurityLevel secLevel,
@@ -119,9 +129,7 @@
 // Attestations don't contain everything in key authorization lists, so we need to filter the key
 // lists to produce the lists that we expect to match the attestations.
 auto kTagsToFilter = {
-        Tag::BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS,  //
-        Tag::CREATION_DATETIME,        //
-        Tag::EC_CURVE,
+        Tag::CREATION_DATETIME,
         Tag::HARDWARE_TYPE,
         Tag::INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID,
 };
@@ -136,6 +144,15 @@
     return filtered;
 }
 
+// Remove any SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE entries from a list of key characteristics.
+void strip_keystore_tags(vector<KeyCharacteristics>* characteristics) {
+    characteristics->erase(std::remove_if(characteristics->begin(), characteristics->end(),
+                                          [](const auto& entry) {
+                                              return entry.securityLevel == SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE;
+                                          }),
+                           characteristics->end());
+}
+
 string x509NameToStr(X509_NAME* name) {
     char* s = X509_NAME_oneline(name, nullptr, 0);
     string retval(s);
@@ -148,6 +165,28 @@
 bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::arm_deleteAllKeys = false;
 bool KeyMintAidlTestBase::dump_Attestations = false;
 
+uint32_t KeyMintAidlTestBase::boot_patch_level(
+        const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics) {
+    // The boot patchlevel is not available as a property, but should be present
+    // in the key characteristics of any created key.
+    AuthorizationSet allAuths;
+    for (auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+        allAuths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+    }
+    auto patchlevel = allAuths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+    if (patchlevel.has_value()) {
+        return patchlevel.value();
+    } else {
+        // No boot patchlevel is available. Return a value that won't match anything
+        // and so will trigger test failures.
+        return kInvalidPatchlevel;
+    }
+}
+
+uint32_t KeyMintAidlTestBase::boot_patch_level() {
+    return boot_patch_level(key_characteristics_);
+}
+
 ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result) {
     if (result.isOk()) return ErrorCode::OK;
 
@@ -168,9 +207,11 @@
     securityLevel_ = info.securityLevel;
     name_.assign(info.keyMintName.begin(), info.keyMintName.end());
     author_.assign(info.keyMintAuthorName.begin(), info.keyMintAuthorName.end());
+    timestamp_token_required_ = info.timestampTokenRequired;
 
     os_version_ = getOsVersion();
     os_patch_level_ = getOsPatchlevel();
+    vendor_patch_level_ = getVendorPatchlevel();
 }
 
 void KeyMintAidlTestBase::SetUp() {
@@ -273,7 +314,8 @@
 ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapping_key,
                                                 const AuthorizationSet& wrapping_key_desc,
                                                 string masking_key,
-                                                const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params) {
+                                                const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params,
+                                                int64_t password_sid, int64_t biometric_sid) {
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(wrapping_key_desc, KeyFormat::PKCS8, wrapping_key));
 
     key_characteristics_.clear();
@@ -282,8 +324,7 @@
     Status result = keymint_->importWrappedKey(
             vector<uint8_t>(wrapped_key.begin(), wrapped_key.end()), key_blob_,
             vector<uint8_t>(masking_key.begin(), masking_key.end()),
-            unwrapping_params.vector_data(), 0 /* passwordSid */, 0 /* biometricSid */,
-            &creationResult);
+            unwrapping_params.vector_data(), password_sid, biometric_sid, &creationResult);
 
     if (result.isOk()) {
         EXPECT_PRED2(KeyCharacteristicsBasicallyValid, SecLevel(),
@@ -312,6 +353,65 @@
     return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
 }
 
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GetCharacteristics(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+                                                  const vector<uint8_t>& app_id,
+                                                  const vector<uint8_t>& app_data,
+                                                  vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics) {
+    Status result =
+            keymint_->getKeyCharacteristics(key_blob, app_id, app_data, key_characteristics);
+    return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::GetCharacteristics(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+                                                  vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics) {
+    vector<uint8_t> empty_app_id, empty_app_data;
+    return GetCharacteristics(key_blob, empty_app_id, empty_app_data, key_characteristics);
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckCharacteristics(
+        const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+        const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& generate_characteristics) {
+    // Any key characteristics that were in SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE when returned from
+    // generateKey() should be excluded, as KeyMint will have no record of them.
+    // This applies to CREATION_DATETIME in particular.
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> expected_characteristics(generate_characteristics);
+    strip_keystore_tags(&expected_characteristics);
+
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> retrieved;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GetCharacteristics(key_blob, &retrieved));
+    EXPECT_EQ(expected_characteristics, retrieved);
+}
+
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckAppIdCharacteristics(
+        const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, std::string_view app_id_string,
+        std::string_view app_data_string,
+        const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& generate_characteristics) {
+    // Exclude any SecurityLevel::KEYSTORE characteristics for comparisons.
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> expected_characteristics(generate_characteristics);
+    strip_keystore_tags(&expected_characteristics);
+
+    vector<uint8_t> app_id(app_id_string.begin(), app_id_string.end());
+    vector<uint8_t> app_data(app_data_string.begin(), app_data_string.end());
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> retrieved;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GetCharacteristics(key_blob, app_id, app_data, &retrieved));
+    EXPECT_EQ(expected_characteristics, retrieved);
+
+    // Check that key characteristics can't be retrieved if the app ID or app data is missing.
+    vector<uint8_t> empty;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> not_retrieved;
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              GetCharacteristics(key_blob, empty, app_data, &not_retrieved));
+    EXPECT_EQ(not_retrieved.size(), 0);
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              GetCharacteristics(key_blob, app_id, empty, &not_retrieved));
+    EXPECT_EQ(not_retrieved.size(), 0);
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
+              GetCharacteristics(key_blob, empty, empty, &not_retrieved));
+    EXPECT_EQ(not_retrieved.size(), 0);
+}
+
 ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::DeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob) {
     Status result = keymint_->deleteKey(*key_blob);
     if (!keep_key_blob) {
@@ -332,6 +432,11 @@
     return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
 }
 
+ErrorCode KeyMintAidlTestBase::DestroyAttestationIds() {
+    Status result = keymint_->destroyAttestationIds();
+    return GetReturnErrorCode(result);
+}
+
 void KeyMintAidlTestBase::CheckedDeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob) {
     ErrorCode result = DeleteKey(key_blob, keep_key_blob);
     EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::OK || result == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED) << result << endl;
@@ -348,7 +453,7 @@
     SCOPED_TRACE("Begin");
     Status result;
     BeginResult out;
-    result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), HardwareAuthToken(), &out);
+    result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), std::nullopt, &out);
 
     if (result.isOk()) {
         *out_params = out.params;
@@ -366,7 +471,7 @@
     Status result;
     BeginResult out;
 
-    result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), HardwareAuthToken(), &out);
+    result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob, in_params.vector_data(), std::nullopt, &out);
 
     if (result.isOk()) {
         *out_params = out.params;
@@ -584,6 +689,205 @@
     VerifyMessage(key_blob_, message, signature, params);
 }
 
+void KeyMintAidlTestBase::LocalVerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
+                                             const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+    SCOPED_TRACE("LocalVerifyMessage");
+
+    // Retrieve the public key from the leaf certificate.
+    ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+    X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(key_cert.get());
+    EVP_PKEY_Ptr pub_key(X509_get_pubkey(key_cert.get()));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(pub_key.get());
+
+    Digest digest = params.GetTagValue(TAG_DIGEST).value();
+    PaddingMode padding = PaddingMode::NONE;
+    auto tag = params.GetTagValue(TAG_PADDING);
+    if (tag.has_value()) {
+        padding = tag.value();
+    }
+
+    if (digest == Digest::NONE) {
+        switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pub_key.get())) {
+            case EVP_PKEY_EC: {
+                vector<uint8_t> data((EVP_PKEY_bits(pub_key.get()) + 7) / 8);
+                size_t data_size = std::min(data.size(), message.size());
+                memcpy(data.data(), message.data(), data_size);
+                EC_KEY_Ptr ecdsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pub_key.get()));
+                ASSERT_TRUE(ecdsa.get());
+                ASSERT_EQ(1,
+                          ECDSA_verify(0, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(data.data()), data_size,
+                                       reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.data()),
+                                       signature.size(), ecdsa.get()));
+                break;
+            }
+            case EVP_PKEY_RSA: {
+                vector<uint8_t> data(EVP_PKEY_size(pub_key.get()));
+                size_t data_size = std::min(data.size(), message.size());
+                memcpy(data.data(), message.data(), data_size);
+
+                RSA_Ptr rsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(const_cast<EVP_PKEY*>(pub_key.get())));
+                ASSERT_TRUE(rsa.get());
+
+                size_t key_len = RSA_size(rsa.get());
+                int openssl_padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+                switch (padding) {
+                    case PaddingMode::NONE:
+                        ASSERT_TRUE(data_size <= key_len);
+                        ASSERT_EQ(key_len, signature.size());
+                        openssl_padding = RSA_NO_PADDING;
+                        break;
+                    case PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN:
+                        ASSERT_TRUE(data_size + kPkcs1UndigestedSignaturePaddingOverhead <=
+                                    key_len);
+                        openssl_padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
+                        break;
+                    default:
+                        ADD_FAILURE() << "Unsupported RSA padding mode " << padding;
+                }
+
+                vector<uint8_t> decrypted_data(key_len);
+                int bytes_decrypted = RSA_public_decrypt(
+                        signature.size(), reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.data()),
+                        decrypted_data.data(), rsa.get(), openssl_padding);
+                ASSERT_GE(bytes_decrypted, 0);
+
+                const uint8_t* compare_pos = decrypted_data.data();
+                size_t bytes_to_compare = bytes_decrypted;
+                uint8_t zero_check_result = 0;
+                if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && data_size < bytes_to_compare) {
+                    // If the data is short, for "unpadded" signing we zero-pad to the left.  So
+                    // during verification we should have zeros on the left of the decrypted data.
+                    // Do a constant-time check.
+                    const uint8_t* zero_end = compare_pos + bytes_to_compare - data_size;
+                    while (compare_pos < zero_end) zero_check_result |= *compare_pos++;
+                    ASSERT_EQ(0, zero_check_result);
+                    bytes_to_compare = data_size;
+                }
+                ASSERT_EQ(0, memcmp(compare_pos, data.data(), bytes_to_compare));
+                break;
+            }
+            default:
+                ADD_FAILURE() << "Unknown public key type";
+        }
+    } else {
+        EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
+        EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
+        EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
+        const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
+        ASSERT_NE(md, nullptr);
+        ASSERT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md, nullptr, pub_key.get()));
+
+        if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_PSS) {
+            EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING), 0);
+            EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx, EVP_MD_size(md)), 0);
+        }
+
+        ASSERT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx,
+                                            reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(message.data()),
+                                            message.size()));
+        ASSERT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&digest_ctx,
+                                           reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(signature.data()),
+                                           signature.size()));
+        EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
+    }
+}
+
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::LocalRsaEncryptMessage(const string& message,
+                                                   const AuthorizationSet& params) {
+    SCOPED_TRACE("LocalRsaEncryptMessage");
+
+    // Retrieve the public key from the leaf certificate.
+    if (cert_chain_.empty()) {
+        ADD_FAILURE() << "No public key available";
+        return "Failure";
+    }
+    X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+    EVP_PKEY_Ptr pub_key(X509_get_pubkey(key_cert.get()));
+    RSA_Ptr rsa(EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(const_cast<EVP_PKEY*>(pub_key.get())));
+
+    // Retrieve relevant tags.
+    Digest digest = Digest::NONE;
+    Digest mgf_digest = Digest::NONE;
+    PaddingMode padding = PaddingMode::NONE;
+
+    auto digest_tag = params.GetTagValue(TAG_DIGEST);
+    if (digest_tag.has_value()) digest = digest_tag.value();
+    auto pad_tag = params.GetTagValue(TAG_PADDING);
+    if (pad_tag.has_value()) padding = pad_tag.value();
+    auto mgf_tag = params.GetTagValue(TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST);
+    if (mgf_tag.has_value()) mgf_digest = mgf_tag.value();
+
+    const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
+    const EVP_MD* mgf_md = openssl_digest(mgf_digest);
+
+    // Set up encryption context.
+    EVP_PKEY_CTX_Ptr ctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub_key.get(), /* engine= */ nullptr));
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ctx.get()) <= 0) {
+        ADD_FAILURE() << "Encryption init failed: " << ERR_peek_last_error();
+        return "Failure";
+    }
+
+    int rc = -1;
+    switch (padding) {
+        case PaddingMode::NONE:
+            rc = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx.get(), RSA_NO_PADDING);
+            break;
+        case PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT:
+            rc = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx.get(), RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
+            break;
+        case PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP:
+            rc = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(ctx.get(), RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+            break;
+        default:
+            break;
+    }
+    if (rc <= 0) {
+        ADD_FAILURE() << "Set padding failed: " << ERR_peek_last_error();
+        return "Failure";
+    }
+    if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP) {
+        if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx.get(), md)) {
+            ADD_FAILURE() << "Set digest failed: " << ERR_peek_last_error();
+            return "Failure";
+        }
+        if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx.get(), mgf_md)) {
+            ADD_FAILURE() << "Set MGF digest failed: " << ERR_peek_last_error();
+            return "Failure";
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Determine output size.
+    size_t outlen;
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx.get(), nullptr /* out */, &outlen,
+                         reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(message.data()), message.size()) <= 0) {
+        ADD_FAILURE() << "Determine output size failed: " << ERR_peek_last_error();
+        return "Failure";
+    }
+
+    // Left-zero-pad the input if necessary.
+    const uint8_t* to_encrypt = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(message.data());
+    size_t to_encrypt_len = message.size();
+
+    std::unique_ptr<string> zero_padded_message;
+    if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && to_encrypt_len < outlen) {
+        zero_padded_message.reset(new string(outlen, '\0'));
+        memcpy(zero_padded_message->data() + (outlen - to_encrypt_len), message.data(),
+               message.size());
+        to_encrypt = reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(zero_padded_message->data());
+        to_encrypt_len = outlen;
+    }
+
+    // Do the encryption.
+    string output(outlen, '\0');
+    if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(ctx.get(), reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(output.data()), &outlen, to_encrypt,
+                         to_encrypt_len) <= 0) {
+        ADD_FAILURE() << "Encryption failed: " << ERR_peek_last_error();
+        return "Failure";
+    }
+    return output;
+}
+
 string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
                                            const AuthorizationSet& in_params,
                                            AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
@@ -654,6 +958,18 @@
     return ciphertext;
 }
 
+string KeyMintAidlTestBase::EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode,
+                                           PaddingMode padding, uint8_t mac_length_bits) {
+    SCOPED_TRACE("EncryptMessage");
+    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                          .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                          .Padding(padding)
+                          .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, mac_length_bits);
+    AuthorizationSet out_params;
+    string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params, &out_params);
+    return ciphertext;
+}
+
 string KeyMintAidlTestBase::DecryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
                                            const string& ciphertext,
                                            const AuthorizationSet& params) {
@@ -706,16 +1022,7 @@
             }
             break;
         case Algorithm::EC:
-            switch (SecLevel()) {
-                case SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE:
-                case SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT:
-                    return {224, 256, 384, 521};
-                case SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX:
-                    return {256};
-                default:
-                    ADD_FAILURE() << "Invalid security level " << uint32_t(SecLevel());
-                    break;
-            }
+            ADD_FAILURE() << "EC keys must be specified by curve not size";
             break;
         case Algorithm::AES:
             return {128, 256};
@@ -744,6 +1051,15 @@
                 return {224, 384, 521};
             case Algorithm::AES:
                 return {192};
+            case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+                return {56};
+            default:
+                return {};
+        }
+    } else {
+        switch (algorithm) {
+            case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+                return {56};
             default:
                 return {};
         }
@@ -751,6 +1067,68 @@
     return {};
 }
 
+vector<BlockMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidBlockModes(Algorithm algorithm) {
+    switch (algorithm) {
+        case Algorithm::AES:
+            return {
+                    BlockMode::CBC,
+                    BlockMode::CTR,
+                    BlockMode::ECB,
+                    BlockMode::GCM,
+            };
+        case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+            return {
+                    BlockMode::CBC,
+                    BlockMode::ECB,
+            };
+        default:
+            return {};
+    }
+}
+
+vector<PaddingMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm,
+                                                           BlockMode blockMode) {
+    switch (algorithm) {
+        case Algorithm::AES:
+            switch (blockMode) {
+                case BlockMode::CBC:
+                case BlockMode::ECB:
+                    return {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+                case BlockMode::CTR:
+                case BlockMode::GCM:
+                    return {PaddingMode::NONE};
+                default:
+                    return {};
+            };
+        case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+            switch (blockMode) {
+                case BlockMode::CBC:
+                case BlockMode::ECB:
+                    return {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+                default:
+                    return {};
+            };
+        default:
+            return {};
+    }
+}
+
+vector<PaddingMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm,
+                                                             BlockMode blockMode) {
+    switch (algorithm) {
+        case Algorithm::AES:
+            switch (blockMode) {
+                case BlockMode::CTR:
+                case BlockMode::GCM:
+                    return {PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+                default:
+                    return {};
+            };
+        default:
+            return {};
+    }
+}
+
 vector<EcCurve> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidCurves() {
     if (securityLevel_ == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
         return {EcCurve::P_256};
@@ -760,9 +1138,11 @@
 }
 
 vector<EcCurve> KeyMintAidlTestBase::InvalidCurves() {
-    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT) return {};
-    CHECK(SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX);
-    return {EcCurve::P_224, EcCurve::P_384, EcCurve::P_521};
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        return {EcCurve::P_224, EcCurve::P_384, EcCurve::P_521};
+    } else {
+        return {};
+    }
 }
 
 vector<Digest> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidDigests(bool withNone, bool withMD5) {
@@ -845,6 +1225,74 @@
     return result;
 }
 
+void verify_serial(X509* cert, const uint64_t expected_serial) {
+    BIGNUM_Ptr ser(BN_new());
+    EXPECT_TRUE(ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(X509_get_serialNumber(cert), ser.get()));
+
+    uint64_t serial;
+    EXPECT_TRUE(BN_get_u64(ser.get(), &serial));
+    EXPECT_EQ(serial, expected_serial);
+}
+
+// Please set self_signed to true for fake certificates or self signed
+// certificates
+void verify_subject(const X509* cert,       //
+                    const string& subject,  //
+                    bool self_signed) {
+    char* cert_issuer =  //
+            X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), nullptr, 0);
+
+    char* cert_subj = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), nullptr, 0);
+
+    string expected_subject("/CN=");
+    if (subject.empty()) {
+        expected_subject.append("Android Keystore Key");
+    } else {
+        expected_subject.append(subject);
+    }
+
+    EXPECT_STREQ(expected_subject.c_str(), cert_subj) << "Cert has wrong subject." << cert_subj;
+
+    if (self_signed) {
+        EXPECT_STREQ(cert_issuer, cert_subj)
+                << "Cert issuer and subject mismatch for self signed certificate.";
+    }
+
+    OPENSSL_free(cert_subj);
+    OPENSSL_free(cert_issuer);
+}
+
+vector<uint8_t> build_serial_blob(const uint64_t serial_int) {
+    BIGNUM_Ptr serial(BN_new());
+    EXPECT_TRUE(BN_set_u64(serial.get(), serial_int));
+
+    int len = BN_num_bytes(serial.get());
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(len);
+    if (BN_bn2bin(serial.get(), serial_blob.data()) != len) {
+        return {};
+    }
+
+    if (serial_blob.empty() || serial_blob[0] & 0x80) {
+        // An empty blob is OpenSSL's encoding of the zero value; we need single zero byte.
+        // Top bit being set indicates a negative number in two's complement, but our input
+        // was positive.
+        // In either case, prepend a zero byte.
+        serial_blob.insert(serial_blob.begin(), 0x00);
+    }
+
+    return serial_blob;
+}
+
+void verify_subject_and_serial(const Certificate& certificate,  //
+                               const uint64_t expected_serial,  //
+                               const string& subject, bool self_signed) {
+    X509_Ptr cert(parse_cert_blob(certificate.encodedCertificate));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(!!cert.get());
+
+    verify_serial(cert.get(), expected_serial);
+    verify_subject(cert.get(), subject, self_signed);
+}
+
 bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge,                //
                                const string& app_id,                   //
                                AuthorizationSet expected_sw_enforced,  //
@@ -862,9 +1310,9 @@
     AuthorizationSet att_sw_enforced;
     AuthorizationSet att_hw_enforced;
     uint32_t att_attestation_version;
-    uint32_t att_keymaster_version;
+    uint32_t att_keymint_version;
     SecurityLevel att_attestation_security_level;
-    SecurityLevel att_keymaster_security_level;
+    SecurityLevel att_keymint_security_level;
     vector<uint8_t> att_challenge;
     vector<uint8_t> att_unique_id;
     vector<uint8_t> att_app_id;
@@ -873,8 +1321,8 @@
                                           attest_rec->length,               //
                                           &att_attestation_version,         //
                                           &att_attestation_security_level,  //
-                                          &att_keymaster_version,           //
-                                          &att_keymaster_security_level,    //
+                                          &att_keymint_version,             //
+                                          &att_keymint_security_level,      //
                                           &att_challenge,                   //
                                           &att_sw_enforced,                 //
                                           &att_hw_enforced,                 //
@@ -882,21 +1330,25 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
     if (error != ErrorCode::OK) return false;
 
-    EXPECT_GE(att_attestation_version, 3U);
+    EXPECT_EQ(att_attestation_version, 100U);
+    vector<uint8_t> appId(app_id.begin(), app_id.end());
 
-    expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID,
-                                   vector<uint8_t>(app_id.begin(), app_id.end()));
+    // check challenge and app id only if we expects a non-fake certificate
+    if (challenge.length() > 0) {
+        EXPECT_EQ(challenge.length(), att_challenge.size());
+        EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(challenge.data(), att_challenge.data(), challenge.length()));
 
-    EXPECT_GE(att_keymaster_version, 4U);
-    EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymaster_security_level);
+        expected_sw_enforced.push_back(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, appId);
+    }
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(att_keymint_version, 100U);
+    EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_keymint_security_level);
     EXPECT_EQ(security_level, att_attestation_security_level);
 
-    EXPECT_EQ(challenge.length(), att_challenge.size());
-    EXPECT_EQ(0, memcmp(challenge.data(), att_challenge.data(), challenge.length()));
 
     char property_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = {};
     // TODO(b/136282179): When running under VTS-on-GSI the TEE-backed
-    // keymaster implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD
+    // keymint implementation will report YYYYMM dates instead of YYYYMMDD
     // for the BOOT_PATCH_LEVEL.
     if (avb_verification_enabled()) {
         for (int i = 0; i < att_hw_enforced.size(); i++) {
@@ -935,13 +1387,6 @@
         EXPECT_TRUE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED));
     }
 
-    // Alternatively this checks the opposite - a false boolean tag (one that isn't provided in
-    // the authorization list during key generation) isn't being attested to in the certificate.
-    EXPECT_FALSE(expected_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-    EXPECT_FALSE(att_sw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-    EXPECT_FALSE(expected_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-    EXPECT_FALSE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED));
-
     if (att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)) {
         // For ECDSA keys, either an EC_CURVE or a KEY_SIZE can be specified, but one must be.
         EXPECT_TRUE(att_hw_enforced.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE) ||
@@ -1007,9 +1452,7 @@
 
     att_sw_enforced.Sort();
     expected_sw_enforced.Sort();
-    auto a = filtered_tags(expected_sw_enforced);
-    auto b = filtered_tags(att_sw_enforced);
-    EXPECT_EQ(a, b);
+    EXPECT_EQ(filtered_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filtered_tags(att_sw_enforced));
 
     att_hw_enforced.Sort();
     expected_hw_enforced.Sort();
@@ -1078,17 +1521,10 @@
         string cert_issuer = x509NameToStr(X509_get_issuer_name(key_cert.get()));
         string signer_subj = x509NameToStr(X509_get_subject_name(signing_cert.get()));
         if (cert_issuer != signer_subj) {
-            return AssertionFailure() << "Cert " << i << " has wrong issuer.\n" << cert_data.str();
-        }
-
-        if (i == 0) {
-            string cert_sub = x509NameToStr(X509_get_subject_name(key_cert.get()));
-            if ("/CN=Android Keystore Key" != cert_sub) {
-                return AssertionFailure()
-                       << "Leaf cert has wrong subject, should be CN=Android Keystore Key, was "
-                       << cert_sub << '\n'
-                       << cert_data.str();
-            }
+            return AssertionFailure() << "Cert " << i << " has wrong issuer.\n"
+                                      << " Signer subject is " << signer_subj
+                                      << " Issuer subject is " << cert_issuer << endl
+                                      << cert_data.str();
         }
     }
 
@@ -1190,14 +1626,17 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(extractedTag.size(), 32U);
 
     // Compare with tag generated with kTestMacKey.  Should only match in test mode
-    auto testTag = cppcose::generateCoseMac0Mac(remote_prov::kTestMacKey, {} /* external_aad */,
-                                                payload->value());
+    auto macFunction = [](const cppcose::bytevec& input) {
+        return cppcose::generateHmacSha256(remote_prov::kTestMacKey, input);
+    };
+    auto testTag =
+            cppcose::generateCoseMac0Mac(macFunction, {} /* external_aad */, payload->value());
     ASSERT_TRUE(testTag) << "Tag calculation failed: " << testTag.message();
 
     if (testMode) {
-        EXPECT_EQ(*testTag, extractedTag);
+        EXPECT_THAT(*testTag, ElementsAreArray(extractedTag));
     } else {
-        EXPECT_NE(*testTag, extractedTag);
+        EXPECT_THAT(*testTag, Not(ElementsAreArray(extractedTag)));
     }
     if (payload_value != nullptr) {
         *payload_value = payload->value();
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
index da174ce..d592d36 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -16,8 +16,12 @@
 
 #pragma once
 
+#include <functional>
+#include <string_view>
+
 #include <aidl/Gtest.h>
 #include <aidl/Vintf.h>
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
 #include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
 #include <binder/ProcessState.h>
 #include <gtest/gtest.h>
@@ -71,6 +75,9 @@
     IKeyMintDevice& keyMint() { return *keymint_; }
     uint32_t os_version() { return os_version_; }
     uint32_t os_patch_level() { return os_patch_level_; }
+    uint32_t vendor_patch_level() { return vendor_patch_level_; }
+    uint32_t boot_patch_level(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics);
+    uint32_t boot_patch_level();
 
     ErrorCode GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result);
 
@@ -94,13 +101,34 @@
 
     ErrorCode ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapping_key,
                                const AuthorizationSet& wrapping_key_desc, string masking_key,
-                               const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params);
+                               const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params, int64_t password_sid,
+                               int64_t biometric_sid);
+    ErrorCode ImportWrappedKey(string wrapped_key, string wrapping_key,
+                               const AuthorizationSet& wrapping_key_desc, string masking_key,
+                               const AuthorizationSet& unwrapping_params) {
+        return ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, masking_key,
+                                unwrapping_params, 0 /* password_sid */, 0 /* biometric_sid */);
+    }
+
+    ErrorCode GetCharacteristics(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const vector<uint8_t>& app_id,
+                                 const vector<uint8_t>& app_data,
+                                 vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics);
+    ErrorCode GetCharacteristics(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+                                 vector<KeyCharacteristics>* key_characteristics);
+
+    void CheckCharacteristics(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
+                              const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& generate_characteristics);
+    void CheckAppIdCharacteristics(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, std::string_view app_id_string,
+                                   std::string_view app_data_string,
+                                   const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& generate_characteristics);
 
     ErrorCode DeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob = false);
     ErrorCode DeleteKey(bool keep_key_blob = false);
 
     ErrorCode DeleteAllKeys();
 
+    ErrorCode DestroyAttestationIds();
+
     void CheckedDeleteKey(vector<uint8_t>* key_blob, bool keep_key_blob = false);
     void CheckedDeleteKey();
 
@@ -152,7 +180,10 @@
                        const string& signature, const AuthorizationSet& params);
     void VerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
                        const AuthorizationSet& params);
+    void LocalVerifyMessage(const string& message, const string& signature,
+                            const AuthorizationSet& params);
 
+    string LocalRsaEncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params);
     string EncryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& message,
                           const AuthorizationSet& in_params, AuthorizationSet* out_params);
     string EncryptMessage(const string& message, const AuthorizationSet& params,
@@ -165,6 +196,8 @@
                           const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in);
     string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding,
                           uint8_t mac_length_bits, const vector<uint8_t>& iv_in);
+    string EncryptMessage(const string& message, BlockMode block_mode, PaddingMode padding,
+                          uint8_t mac_length_bits);
 
     string DecryptMessage(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob, const string& ciphertext,
                           const AuthorizationSet& params);
@@ -177,50 +210,58 @@
     template <typename TagType>
     std::tuple<KeyData /* aesKey */, KeyData /* hmacKey */, KeyData /* rsaKey */,
                KeyData /* ecdsaKey */>
-    CreateTestKeys(TagType tagToTest, ErrorCode expectedReturn) {
+    CreateTestKeys(
+            TagType tagToTest, ErrorCode expectedReturn,
+            std::function<void(AuthorizationSetBuilder*)> tagModifier =
+                    [](AuthorizationSetBuilder*) {}) {
         /* AES */
         KeyData aesKeyData;
-        ErrorCode errorCode = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                  .AesEncryptionKey(128)
-                                                  .Authorization(tagToTest)
-                                                  .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
-                                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
-                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
-                                          &aesKeyData.blob, &aesKeyData.characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder aesBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+                                                     .Authorization(tagToTest)
+                                                     .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+                                                     .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                                     .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED);
+        tagModifier(&aesBuilder);
+        ErrorCode errorCode =
+                GenerateKey(aesBuilder, &aesKeyData.blob, &aesKeyData.characteristics);
         EXPECT_EQ(expectedReturn, errorCode);
 
         /* HMAC */
         KeyData hmacKeyData;
-        errorCode = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                        .HmacKey(128)
-                                        .Authorization(tagToTest)
-                                        .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
-                                        .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
-                                        .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED),
-                                &hmacKeyData.blob, &hmacKeyData.characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder hmacBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                      .HmacKey(128)
+                                                      .Authorization(tagToTest)
+                                                      .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                      .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)
+                                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED);
+        tagModifier(&hmacBuilder);
+        errorCode = GenerateKey(hmacBuilder, &hmacKeyData.blob, &hmacKeyData.characteristics);
         EXPECT_EQ(expectedReturn, errorCode);
 
         /* RSA */
         KeyData rsaKeyData;
-        errorCode = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                        .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
-                                        .Authorization(tagToTest)
-                                        .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                        .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
-                                        .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                        .SetDefaultValidity(),
-                                &rsaKeyData.blob, &rsaKeyData.characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder rsaBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                                     .Authorization(tagToTest)
+                                                     .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                     .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                                     .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                     .SetDefaultValidity();
+        tagModifier(&rsaBuilder);
+        errorCode = GenerateKey(rsaBuilder, &rsaKeyData.blob, &rsaKeyData.characteristics);
         EXPECT_EQ(expectedReturn, errorCode);
 
         /* ECDSA */
         KeyData ecdsaKeyData;
-        errorCode = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                        .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
-                                        .Authorization(tagToTest)
-                                        .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
-                                        .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                        .SetDefaultValidity(),
-                                &ecdsaKeyData.blob, &ecdsaKeyData.characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder ecdsaBuilder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                       .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                       .Authorization(tagToTest)
+                                                       .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                       .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                       .SetDefaultValidity();
+        tagModifier(&ecdsaBuilder);
+        errorCode = GenerateKey(ecdsaBuilder, &ecdsaKeyData.blob, &ecdsaKeyData.characteristics);
         EXPECT_EQ(expectedReturn, errorCode);
         return {aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData};
     }
@@ -230,6 +271,10 @@
     vector<uint32_t> ValidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
     vector<uint32_t> InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
 
+    vector<BlockMode> ValidBlockModes(Algorithm algorithm);
+    vector<PaddingMode> ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm, BlockMode blockMode);
+    vector<PaddingMode> InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm, BlockMode blockMode);
+
     vector<EcCurve> ValidCurves();
     vector<EcCurve> InvalidCurves();
 
@@ -262,6 +307,8 @@
     std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> keymint_;
     uint32_t os_version_;
     uint32_t os_patch_level_;
+    uint32_t vendor_patch_level_;
+    bool timestamp_token_required_;
 
     SecurityLevel securityLevel_;
     string name_;
@@ -269,12 +316,30 @@
     long challenge_;
 };
 
+// If the given property is available, add it to the tag set under the given tag ID.
+template <Tag tag>
+void add_tag_from_prop(AuthorizationSetBuilder* tags, TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+                       const char* prop) {
+    std::string prop_value = ::android::base::GetProperty(prop, /* default= */ "");
+    if (!prop_value.empty()) {
+        tags->Authorization(ttag, prop_value.data(), prop_value.size());
+    }
+}
+
+vector<uint8_t> build_serial_blob(const uint64_t serial_int);
+void verify_subject(const X509* cert, const string& subject, bool self_signed);
+void verify_serial(X509* cert, const uint64_t expected_serial);
+void verify_subject_and_serial(const Certificate& certificate,  //
+                               const uint64_t expected_serial,  //
+                               const string& subject, bool self_signed);
+
 bool verify_attestation_record(const string& challenge,                //
                                const string& app_id,                   //
                                AuthorizationSet expected_sw_enforced,  //
                                AuthorizationSet expected_hw_enforced,  //
                                SecurityLevel security_level,
                                const vector<uint8_t>& attestation_cert);
+
 string bin2hex(const vector<uint8_t>& data);
 X509_Ptr parse_cert_blob(const vector<uint8_t>& blob);
 vector<uint8_t> make_name_from_str(const string& name);
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index 2d28845..d41d270 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #include <cutils/log.h>
 
 #include <signal.h>
+
+#include <algorithm>
 #include <iostream>
 
 #include <openssl/ec.h>
@@ -67,6 +69,8 @@
 
 namespace {
 
+bool check_patchLevels = false;
+
 template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
 bool contains(const vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag,
               ValueT expected_value) {
@@ -113,109 +117,296 @@
     return b;
 }
 
-string rsa_key =
-        hex2str("30820275020100300d06092a864886f70d01010105000482025f3082025b"
-                "02010002818100c6095409047d8634812d5a218176e45c41d60a75b13901"
-                "f234226cffe776521c5a77b9e389417b71c0b6a44d13afe4e4a2805d46c9"
-                "da2935adb1ff0c1f24ea06e62b20d776430a4d435157233c6f916783c30e"
-                "310fcbd89b85c2d56771169785ac12bca244abda72bfb19fc44d27c81e1d"
-                "92de284f4061edfd99280745ea6d2502030100010281801be0f04d9cae37"
-                "18691f035338308e91564b55899ffb5084d2460e6630257e05b3ceab0297"
-                "2dfabcd6ce5f6ee2589eb67911ed0fac16e43a444b8c861e544a05933657"
-                "72f8baf6b22fc9e3c5f1024b063ac080a7b2234cf8aee8f6c47bbf4fd3ac"
-                "e7240290bef16c0b3f7f3cdd64ce3ab5912cf6e32f39ab188358afcccd80"
-                "81024100e4b49ef50f765d3b24dde01aceaaf130f2c76670a91a61ae08af"
-                "497b4a82be6dee8fcdd5e3f7ba1cfb1f0c926b88f88c92bfab137fba2285"
-                "227b83c342ff7c55024100ddabb5839c4c7f6bf3d4183231f005b31aa58a"
-                "ffdda5c79e4cce217f6bc930dbe563d480706c24e9ebfcab28a6cdefd324"
-                "b77e1bf7251b709092c24ff501fd91024023d4340eda3445d8cd26c14411"
-                "da6fdca63c1ccd4b80a98ad52b78cc8ad8beb2842c1d280405bc2f6c1bea"
-                "214a1d742ab996b35b63a82a5e470fa88dbf823cdd02401b7b57449ad30d"
-                "1518249a5f56bb98294d4b6ac12ffc86940497a5a5837a6cf946262b4945"
-                "26d328c11e1126380fde04c24f916dec250892db09a6d77cdba351024077"
-                "62cd8f4d050da56bd591adb515d24d7ccd32cca0d05f866d583514bd7324"
-                "d5f33645e8ed8b4a1cb3cc4a1d67987399f2a09f5b3fb68c88d5e5d90ac3"
-                "3492d6");
+string rsa_key = hex2str(
+        // RFC 5208 s5
+        "30820275"            // SEQUENCE length 0x275 (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+        "020100"              // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+        "300d"                // SEQUENCE length 0x0d (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+        "0609"                // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 9 (algorithm)
+        "2a864886f70d010101"  // 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (rsaEncryption)
+        "0500"                // NULL (parameters)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+        "0482025f"  // OCTET STRING length 0x25f (privateKey) holding...
+        // RFC 8017 A.1.2
+        "3082025b"  // SEQUENCE length 0x25b (RSAPrivateKey) {
+        "020100"    // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+        "028181"    // INTEGER length 0x81 value (modulus) ...
+        "00c6095409047d8634812d5a218176e4"
+        "5c41d60a75b13901f234226cffe77652"
+        "1c5a77b9e389417b71c0b6a44d13afe4"
+        "e4a2805d46c9da2935adb1ff0c1f24ea"
+        "06e62b20d776430a4d435157233c6f91"
+        "6783c30e310fcbd89b85c2d567711697"
+        "85ac12bca244abda72bfb19fc44d27c8"
+        "1e1d92de284f4061edfd99280745ea6d"
+        "25"
+        "0203010001"  // INTEGER length 3 value 0x10001 (publicExponent)
+        "028180"      // INTEGER length 0x80 (privateExponent) value...
+        "1be0f04d9cae3718691f035338308e91"
+        "564b55899ffb5084d2460e6630257e05"
+        "b3ceab02972dfabcd6ce5f6ee2589eb6"
+        "7911ed0fac16e43a444b8c861e544a05"
+        "93365772f8baf6b22fc9e3c5f1024b06"
+        "3ac080a7b2234cf8aee8f6c47bbf4fd3"
+        "ace7240290bef16c0b3f7f3cdd64ce3a"
+        "b5912cf6e32f39ab188358afcccd8081"
+        "0241"  // INTEGER length 0x41 (prime1)
+        "00e4b49ef50f765d3b24dde01aceaaf1"
+        "30f2c76670a91a61ae08af497b4a82be"
+        "6dee8fcdd5e3f7ba1cfb1f0c926b88f8"
+        "8c92bfab137fba2285227b83c342ff7c"
+        "55"
+        "0241"  // INTEGER length 0x41 (prime2)
+        "00ddabb5839c4c7f6bf3d4183231f005"
+        "b31aa58affdda5c79e4cce217f6bc930"
+        "dbe563d480706c24e9ebfcab28a6cdef"
+        "d324b77e1bf7251b709092c24ff501fd"
+        "91"
+        "0240"  // INTEGER length 0x40 (exponent1)
+        "23d4340eda3445d8cd26c14411da6fdc"
+        "a63c1ccd4b80a98ad52b78cc8ad8beb2"
+        "842c1d280405bc2f6c1bea214a1d742a"
+        "b996b35b63a82a5e470fa88dbf823cdd"
+        "0240"  // INTEGER length 0x40 (exponent2)
+        "1b7b57449ad30d1518249a5f56bb9829"
+        "4d4b6ac12ffc86940497a5a5837a6cf9"
+        "46262b494526d328c11e1126380fde04"
+        "c24f916dec250892db09a6d77cdba351"
+        "0240"  // INTEGER length 0x40 (coefficient)
+        "7762cd8f4d050da56bd591adb515d24d"
+        "7ccd32cca0d05f866d583514bd7324d5"
+        "f33645e8ed8b4a1cb3cc4a1d67987399"
+        "f2a09f5b3fb68c88d5e5d90ac33492d6"
+        // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKey)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
 
 /*
  * DER-encoded PKCS#8 format RSA key. Generated using:
  *
  * openssl genrsa 2048 | openssl pkcs8 -topk8 -nocrypt -outform der | hexdump -e '30/1  "%02X" "\n"'
  */
-string rsa_2048_key =
-        hex2str("308204BD020100300D06092A864886F70D0101010500048204A7308204A3"
-                "0201000282010100BEBC342B56D443B1299F9A6A7056E80A897E318476A5"
-                "A18029E63B2ED739A61791D339F58DC763D9D14911F2EDEC383DEE11F631"
-                "9B44510E7A3ECD9B79B97382E49500ACF8117DC89CAF0E621F77756554A2"
-                "FD4664BFE7AB8B59AB48340DBFA27B93B5A81F6ECDEB02D0759307128DF3"
-                "E3BAD4055C8B840216DFAA5700670E6C5126F0962FCB70FF308F25049164"
-                "CCF76CC2DA66A7DD9A81A714C2809D69186133D29D84568E892B6FFBF319"
-                "9BDB14383EE224407F190358F111A949552ABA6714227D1BD7F6B20DD0CB"
-                "88F9467B719339F33BFF35B3870B3F62204E4286B0948EA348B524544B5F"
-                "9838F29EE643B079EEF8A713B220D7806924CDF7295070C5020301000102"
-                "82010069F377F35F2F584EF075353CCD1CA99738DB3DBC7C7FF35F9366CE"
-                "176DFD1B135AB10030344ABF5FBECF1D4659FDEF1C0FC430834BE1BE3911"
-                "951377BB3D563A2EA9CA8F4AD9C48A8CE6FD516A735C662686C7B4B3C09A"
-                "7B8354133E6F93F790D59EAEB92E84C9A4339302CCE28FDF04CCCAFA7DE3"
-                "F3A827D4F6F7D38E68B0EC6AB706645BF074A4E4090D06FB163124365FD5"
-                "EE7A20D350E9958CC30D91326E1B292E9EF5DB408EC42DAF737D20149704"
-                "D0A678A0FB5B5446863B099228A352D604BA8091A164D01D5AB05397C71E"
-                "AD20BE2A08FC528FE442817809C787FEE4AB97F97B9130D022153EDC6EB6"
-                "CBE7B0F8E3473F2E901209B5DB10F93604DB0102818100E83C0998214941"
-                "EA4F9293F1B77E2E99E6CF305FAF358238E126124FEAF2EB9724B2EA7B78"
-                "E6032343821A80E55D1D88FB12D220C3F41A56142FEC85796D1917F1E8C7"
-                "74F142B67D3D6E7B7E6B4383E94DB5929089DBB346D5BDAB40CC2D96EE04"
-                "09475E175C63BF78CFD744136740838127EA723FF3FE7FA368C1311B4A4E"
-                "0502818100D240FCC0F5D7715CDE21CB2DC86EA146132EA3B06F61FF2AF5"
-                "4BF38473F59DADCCE32B5F4CC32DD0BA6F509347B4B5B1B58C39F95E4798"
-                "CCBB43E83D0119ACF532F359CA743C85199F0286610E200997D731291717"
-                "9AC9B67558773212EC961E8BCE7A3CC809BC5486A96E4B0E6AF394D94E06"
-                "6A0900B7B70E82A44FB30053C102818100AD15DA1CBD6A492B66851BA8C3"
-                "16D38AB700E2CFDDD926A658003513C54BAA152B30021D667D20078F500F"
-                "8AD3E7F3945D74A891ED1A28EAD0FEEAEC8C14A8E834CF46A13D1378C99D"
-                "18940823CFDD27EC5810D59339E0C34198AC638E09C87CBB1B634A9864AE"
-                "9F4D5EB2D53514F67B4CAEC048C8AB849A02E397618F3271350281801FA2"
-                "C1A5331880A92D8F3E281C617108BF38244F16E352E69ED417C7153F9EC3"
-                "18F211839C643DCF8B4DD67CE2AC312E95178D5D952F06B1BF779F491692"
-                "4B70F582A23F11304E02A5E7565AE22A35E74FECC8B6FDC93F92A1A37703"
-                "E4CF0E63783BD02EB716A7ECBBFA606B10B74D01579522E7EF84D91FC522"
-                "292108D902C1028180796FE3825F9DCC85DF22D58690065D93898ACD65C0"
-                "87BEA8DA3A63BF4549B795E2CD0E3BE08CDEBD9FCF1720D9CDC5070D74F4"
-                "0DED8E1102C52152A31B6165F83A6722AECFCC35A493D7634664B888A08D"
-                "3EB034F12EA28BFEE346E205D334827F778B16ED40872BD29FCB36536B6E"
-                "93FFB06778696B4A9D81BB0A9423E63DE5");
+string rsa_2048_key = hex2str(
+        // RFC 5208 s5
+        "308204BD"            // SEQUENCE length 0x4bd (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+        "020100"              // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+        "300D"                // SEQUENCE length 0x0d (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+        "0609"                // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 9 (algorithm)
+        "2A864886F70D010101"  // 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (rsaEncryption)
+        "0500"                // NULL (parameters)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+        "048204A7"  // OCTET STRING length 0x25f (privateKey) holding...
+        // RFC 8017 A.1.2
+        "308204A3"  // SEQUENCE length 0x4a3 (RSAPrivateKey) {
+        "020100"    // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+        "02820101"  // INTEGER length 0x101 value (modulus) ...
+        "00BEBC342B56D443B1299F9A6A7056E8"
+        "0A897E318476A5A18029E63B2ED739A6"
+        "1791D339F58DC763D9D14911F2EDEC38"
+        "3DEE11F6319B44510E7A3ECD9B79B973"
+        "82E49500ACF8117DC89CAF0E621F7775"
+        "6554A2FD4664BFE7AB8B59AB48340DBF"
+        "A27B93B5A81F6ECDEB02D0759307128D"
+        "F3E3BAD4055C8B840216DFAA5700670E"
+        "6C5126F0962FCB70FF308F25049164CC"
+        "F76CC2DA66A7DD9A81A714C2809D6918"
+        "6133D29D84568E892B6FFBF3199BDB14"
+        "383EE224407F190358F111A949552ABA"
+        "6714227D1BD7F6B20DD0CB88F9467B71"
+        "9339F33BFF35B3870B3F62204E4286B0"
+        "948EA348B524544B5F9838F29EE643B0"
+        "79EEF8A713B220D7806924CDF7295070"
+        "C5"
+        "0203010001"  // INTEGER length 3 value 0x10001 (publicExponent)
+        "02820100"    // INTEGER length 0x100 (privateExponent) value...
+        "69F377F35F2F584EF075353CCD1CA997"
+        "38DB3DBC7C7FF35F9366CE176DFD1B13"
+        "5AB10030344ABF5FBECF1D4659FDEF1C"
+        "0FC430834BE1BE3911951377BB3D563A"
+        "2EA9CA8F4AD9C48A8CE6FD516A735C66"
+        "2686C7B4B3C09A7B8354133E6F93F790"
+        "D59EAEB92E84C9A4339302CCE28FDF04"
+        "CCCAFA7DE3F3A827D4F6F7D38E68B0EC"
+        "6AB706645BF074A4E4090D06FB163124"
+        "365FD5EE7A20D350E9958CC30D91326E"
+        "1B292E9EF5DB408EC42DAF737D201497"
+        "04D0A678A0FB5B5446863B099228A352"
+        "D604BA8091A164D01D5AB05397C71EAD"
+        "20BE2A08FC528FE442817809C787FEE4"
+        "AB97F97B9130D022153EDC6EB6CBE7B0"
+        "F8E3473F2E901209B5DB10F93604DB01"
+        "028181"  // INTEGER length 0x81 (prime1)
+        "00E83C0998214941EA4F9293F1B77E2E"
+        "99E6CF305FAF358238E126124FEAF2EB"
+        "9724B2EA7B78E6032343821A80E55D1D"
+        "88FB12D220C3F41A56142FEC85796D19"
+        "17F1E8C774F142B67D3D6E7B7E6B4383"
+        "E94DB5929089DBB346D5BDAB40CC2D96"
+        "EE0409475E175C63BF78CFD744136740"
+        "838127EA723FF3FE7FA368C1311B4A4E"
+        "05"
+        "028181"  // INTEGER length 0x81 (prime2)
+        "00D240FCC0F5D7715CDE21CB2DC86EA1"
+        "46132EA3B06F61FF2AF54BF38473F59D"
+        "ADCCE32B5F4CC32DD0BA6F509347B4B5"
+        "B1B58C39F95E4798CCBB43E83D0119AC"
+        "F532F359CA743C85199F0286610E2009"
+        "97D7312917179AC9B67558773212EC96"
+        "1E8BCE7A3CC809BC5486A96E4B0E6AF3"
+        "94D94E066A0900B7B70E82A44FB30053"
+        "C1"
+        "028181"  // INTEGER length 0x81 (exponent1)
+        "00AD15DA1CBD6A492B66851BA8C316D3"
+        "8AB700E2CFDDD926A658003513C54BAA"
+        "152B30021D667D20078F500F8AD3E7F3"
+        "945D74A891ED1A28EAD0FEEAEC8C14A8"
+        "E834CF46A13D1378C99D18940823CFDD"
+        "27EC5810D59339E0C34198AC638E09C8"
+        "7CBB1B634A9864AE9F4D5EB2D53514F6"
+        "7B4CAEC048C8AB849A02E397618F3271"
+        "35"
+        "028180"  // INTEGER length 0x80 (exponent2)
+        "1FA2C1A5331880A92D8F3E281C617108"
+        "BF38244F16E352E69ED417C7153F9EC3"
+        "18F211839C643DCF8B4DD67CE2AC312E"
+        "95178D5D952F06B1BF779F4916924B70"
+        "F582A23F11304E02A5E7565AE22A35E7"
+        "4FECC8B6FDC93F92A1A37703E4CF0E63"
+        "783BD02EB716A7ECBBFA606B10B74D01"
+        "579522E7EF84D91FC522292108D902C1"
+        "028180"  // INTEGER length 0x80 (coefficient)
+        "796FE3825F9DCC85DF22D58690065D93"
+        "898ACD65C087BEA8DA3A63BF4549B795"
+        "E2CD0E3BE08CDEBD9FCF1720D9CDC507"
+        "0D74F40DED8E1102C52152A31B6165F8"
+        "3A6722AECFCC35A493D7634664B888A0"
+        "8D3EB034F12EA28BFEE346E205D33482"
+        "7F778B16ED40872BD29FCB36536B6E93"
+        "FFB06778696B4A9D81BB0A9423E63DE5"
+        // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKey)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
 
-string ec_256_key =
-        hex2str("308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30"
-                "6b0201010420737c2ecd7b8d1940bf2930aa9b4ed3ff941eed09366bc032"
-                "99986481f3a4d859a14403420004bf85d7720d07c25461683bc648b4778a"
-                "9a14dd8a024e3bdd8c7ddd9ab2b528bbc7aa1b51f14ebbbb0bd0ce21bcc4"
-                "1c6eb00083cf3376d11fd44949e0b2183bfe");
+string ec_256_key = hex2str(
+        // RFC 5208 s5
+        "308187"            // SEQUENCE length 0x87 (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+        "020100"            // INTEGER length 1 value 0 (version)
+        "3013"              // SEQUENCE length 0x13 (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+        "0607"              // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 7 (algorithm)
+        "2a8648ce3d0201"    // 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (ecPublicKey)
+        "0608"              // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 8 (param)
+        "2a8648ce3d030107"  //  1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+        "046d"    // OCTET STRING length 0x6d (privateKey) holding...
+        "306b"    // SEQUENCE length 0x6b (ECPrivateKey)
+        "020101"  // INTEGER length 1 value 1 (version)
+        "0420"    // OCTET STRING length 0x20 (privateKey)
+        "737c2ecd7b8d1940bf2930aa9b4ed3ff"
+        "941eed09366bc03299986481f3a4d859"
+        "a144"  // TAG [1] len 0x44 (publicKey) {
+        "03420004bf85d7720d07c25461683bc6"
+        "48b4778a9a14dd8a024e3bdd8c7ddd9a"
+        "b2b528bbc7aa1b51f14ebbbb0bd0ce21"
+        "bcc41c6eb00083cf3376d11fd44949e0"
+        "b2183bfe"
+        // } end SEQUENCE (ECPrivateKey)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
 
-string ec_521_key =
-        hex2str("3081EE020100301006072A8648CE3D020106052B810400230481D63081D3"
-                "02010104420011458C586DB5DAA92AFAB03F4FE46AA9D9C3CE9A9B7A006A"
-                "8384BEC4C78E8E9D18D7D08B5BCFA0E53C75B064AD51C449BAE0258D54B9"
-                "4B1E885DED08ED4FB25CE9A1818903818600040149EC11C6DF0FA122C6A9"
-                "AFD9754A4FA9513A627CA329E349535A5629875A8ADFBE27DCB932C05198"
-                "6377108D054C28C6F39B6F2C9AF81802F9F326B842FF2E5F3C00AB7635CF"
-                "B36157FC0882D574A10D839C1A0C049DC5E0D775E2EE50671A208431BB45"
-                "E78E70BEFE930DB34818EE4D5C26259F5C6B8E28A652950F9F88D7B4B2C9"
-                "D9");
+string ec_521_key = hex2str(
+        // RFC 5208 s5
+        "3081EE"          // SEQUENCE length 0xee (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+        "020100"          // INTEGER length 1 value 0 (version)
+        "3010"            // SEQUENCE length 0x10 (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+        "0607"            // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 7 (algorithm)
+        "2A8648CE3D0201"  // 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (ecPublicKey)
+        "0605"            // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 5 (param)
+        "2B81040023"      //  1.3.132.0.35 (secp521r1)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+        "0481D6"  // OCTET STRING length 0xd6 (privateKey) holding...
+        "3081D3"  // SEQUENCE length 0xd3 (ECPrivateKey)
+        "020101"  // INTEGER length 1 value 1 (version)
+        "0442"    // OCTET STRING length 0x42 (privateKey)
+        "0011458C586DB5DAA92AFAB03F4FE46A"
+        "A9D9C3CE9A9B7A006A8384BEC4C78E8E"
+        "9D18D7D08B5BCFA0E53C75B064AD51C4"
+        "49BAE0258D54B94B1E885DED08ED4FB2"
+        "5CE9"
+        "A18189"  // TAG [1] len 0x89 (publicKey) {
+        "03818600040149EC11C6DF0FA122C6A9"
+        "AFD9754A4FA9513A627CA329E349535A"
+        "5629875A8ADFBE27DCB932C051986377"
+        "108D054C28C6F39B6F2C9AF81802F9F3"
+        "26B842FF2E5F3C00AB7635CFB36157FC"
+        "0882D574A10D839C1A0C049DC5E0D775"
+        "E2EE50671A208431BB45E78E70BEFE93"
+        "0DB34818EE4D5C26259F5C6B8E28A652"
+        "950F9F88D7B4B2C9D9"
+        // } end SEQUENCE (ECPrivateKey)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
 
-string ec_256_key_rfc5915 =
-        hex2str("308193020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107047930"
-                "770201010420782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8158cfa9c67b818b3"
-                "8e8d21c9fa750c1da00a06082a8648ce3d030107a14403420004e2cc561e"
-                "e701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c919d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf8e68c9"
-                "05464666f98dad4f01573ba81078b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c550682f");
+string ec_256_key_rfc5915 = hex2str(
+        // RFC 5208 s5
+        "308193"            // SEQUENCE length 0x93 (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+        "020100"            // INTEGER length 1 value 0 (version)
+        "3013"              // SEQUENCE length 0x13 (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+        "0607"              // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 7 (algorithm)
+        "2a8648ce3d0201"    // 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (ecPublicKey)
+        "0608"              // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 8 (param)
+        "2a8648ce3d030107"  //  1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+        "0479"  // OCTET STRING length 0x79 (privateKey) holding...
+        // RFC 5915 s3
+        "3077"    // SEQUENCE length 0x77 (ECPrivateKey)
+        "020101"  // INTEGER length 1 value 1 (version)
+        "0420"    // OCTET STRING length 0x42 (privateKey)
+        "782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8"
+        "158cfa9c67b818b38e8d21c9fa750c1d"
+        "a00a"              // TAG [0] length 0xa (parameters)
+        "0608"              // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 8
+        "2a8648ce3d030107"  // 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
+        // } end TAG [0]
+        "a144"  // TAG [1] length 0x44 (publicKey) {
+        "0342"  // BIT STRING length 0x42
+        "00"    // no pad bits
+        "04e2cc561ee701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c9"
+        "19d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf"
+        "8e68c905464666f98dad4f01573ba810"
+        "78b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c55068"
+        "2f"
+        // } end SEQUENCE (ECPrivateKey)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
 
-string ec_256_key_sec1 =
-        hex2str("308187020100301306072a8648ce3d020106082a8648ce3d030107046d30"
-                "6b0201010420782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8158cfa9c67b818b3"
-                "8e8d21c9fa750c1da14403420004e2cc561ee701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c919"
-                "d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf8e68c905464666f98dad4f01573ba8"
-                "1078b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c550682f");
+string ec_256_key_sec1 = hex2str(
+        // RFC 5208 s5
+        "308187"            // SEQUENCE length 0x87 (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+        "020100"            // INTEGER length 1 value 0 (version)
+        "3013"              // SEQUENCE length 0x13 (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+        "0607"              // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 7 (algorithm)
+        "2a8648ce3d0201"    // 1.2.840.10045.2.1 (ecPublicKey)
+        "0608"              // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 8 (param)
+        "2a8648ce3d030107"  // 1.2.840.10045.3.1.7 (secp256r1)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+        "046d"  // OCTET STRING length 0x6d (privateKey) holding...
+        // SEC1-v2 C.4
+        "306b"    // SEQUENCE length 0x6b (ECPrivateKey)
+        "020101"  // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (version)
+        "0420"    // OCTET STRING length 0x20 (privateKey)
+        "782370a8c8ce5537baadd04dcff079c8"
+        "158cfa9c67b818b38e8d21c9fa750c1d"
+        "a144"  // TAG [1] length 0x44 (publicKey) {
+        "0342"  // BIT STRING length 0x42
+        "00"    // no pad bits
+        "04e2cc561ee701da0ad0ef0d176bb0c9"
+        "19d42e79c393fdc1bd6c4010d85cf2cf"
+        "8e68c905464666f98dad4f01573ba810"
+        "78b3428570a439ba3229fbc026c55068"
+        "2f"
+        // } end TAG [1] (publicKey)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (PrivateKeyInfo)
+);
 
 struct RSA_Delete {
     void operator()(RSA* p) { RSA_free(p); }
@@ -291,37 +482,376 @@
 class NewKeyGenerationTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
   protected:
     void CheckBaseParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
-        // TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
-
-        AuthorizationSet auths;
-        for (auto& entry : keyCharacteristics) {
-            auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
-        }
-
-        EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+        AuthorizationSet auths = CheckCommonParams(keyCharacteristics);
         EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
-        EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
-
-        // Verify that App data and ROT are NOT included.
-        EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
-        EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
 
         // Check that some unexpected tags/values are NOT present.
         EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
         EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+    }
+
+    void CheckSymmetricParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
+        AuthorizationSet auths = CheckCommonParams(keyCharacteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+
+        EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
+    }
+
+    AuthorizationSet CheckCommonParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
+        // TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
+        AuthorizationSet auths;
+        for (auto& entry : keyCharacteristics) {
+            auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+        }
+        EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+
+        // Verify that App data, ROT and auth timeout are NOT included.
+        EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
+        EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
         EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 301U));
 
-        auto os_ver = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(os_ver);
-        EXPECT_EQ(*os_ver, os_version());
+        // None of the tests specify CREATION_DATETIME so check that the KeyMint implementation
+        // never adds it.
+        EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME));
 
+        // Check OS details match the original hardware info.
+        auto os_ver = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(os_ver);
+        EXPECT_EQ(*os_ver, os_version());
         auto os_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(os_pl);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(os_pl);
         EXPECT_EQ(*os_pl, os_patch_level());
+
+        if (check_patchLevels) {
+            // Should include vendor and boot patchlevels.
+            auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+            EXPECT_TRUE(vendor_pl);
+            EXPECT_EQ(*vendor_pl, vendor_patch_level());
+            auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+            EXPECT_TRUE(boot_pl);
+        }
+
+        return auths;
     }
 };
 
 /*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.Aes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required AES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Aes) {
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+        for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+            for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+                SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                             << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+                vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+                vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+                auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                       .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                       .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                       .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                       .SetDefaultValidity();
+                if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+                    builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+                }
+                ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+                EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+                CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+                CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+                AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+                EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES));
+                EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                        << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+                CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesInvalidSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesInvalidSize) {
+    for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+        for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+            for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+                SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                             << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+                vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+                vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+                auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                       .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                       .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                       .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                       .SetDefaultValidity();
+                if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+                    builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+                }
+                EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+                          GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+        for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+            vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+            vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+            // No key size specified
+            auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                   .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES)
+                                   .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                   .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                   .SetDefaultValidity();
+            if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+                builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+            }
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+                      GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesInvalidPadding
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid padding on AES keys gives a failure
+ * somewhere along the way.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesInvalidPadding) {
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+        for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+            for (auto padding_mode : InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+                SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                             << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+                auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                       .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                       .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                       .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                       .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                       .SetDefaultValidity();
+                if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+                    builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+                }
+
+                auto result = GenerateKey(builder);
+                if (result == ErrorCode::OK) {
+                    // Key creation was OK but has generated a key that cannot be used.
+                    auto params =
+                            AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(block_mode).Padding(padding_mode);
+                    if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+                        params.Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+                    }
+                    auto result = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params);
+                    EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE ||
+                                result == ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB)
+                            << "unexpected result: " << result;
+                } else {
+                    // The KeyMint implementation detected that the generated key
+                    // is unusable.
+                    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, result);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesGcmMissingMinMac
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesGcmMissingMinMac) {
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+        BlockMode block_mode = BlockMode::GCM;
+        for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+            SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                         << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+            vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+            vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+            // No MIN_MAC_LENGTH provided.
+            auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                   .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                   .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                   .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                   .SetDefaultValidity();
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+                      GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesGcmMinMacOutOfRange
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid min MAC size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesGcmMinMacOutOfRange) {
+    for (size_t min_mac_len : {88, 136}) {
+        for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+            BlockMode block_mode = BlockMode::GCM;
+            for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+                SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                             << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+                vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+                vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+                auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                       .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                       .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                       .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                       .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_len)
+                                       .SetDefaultValidity();
+                EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+                          GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required 3DES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDes) {
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+        for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+            for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+                SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                             << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+                vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+                vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+                ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                             .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                                             .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                                             .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                                             .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                             .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                                     &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+                EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+                CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+                CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+                AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+                EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES));
+                EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                        << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+                CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDesWithAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required 3DES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ *
+ * Request attestation, which doesn't help for symmetric keys (as there is no public key to
+ * put in a certificate) but which isn't an error.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDesWithAttestation) {
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+        for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+            for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+                SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                             << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+
+                auto challenge = "hello";
+                auto app_id = "foo";
+
+                vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+                vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+                ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                             .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                                             .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                                             .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                                             .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                             .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                                             .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                                             .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                                     &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+                EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+                CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+                CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+                AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+                EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES));
+                EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                        << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+                CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDesInvalidSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for 3-DES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDesInvalidSize) {
+    for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+        for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+            for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+                SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                             << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+                vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+                vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+                EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+                          GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                              .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                              .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                              .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                              .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                              .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                      &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Omitting the key size fails.
+    for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+        for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+            SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                         << "3DES-default-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+            vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+            vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+            ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+                      GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                          .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)
+                                          .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                          .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                          .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                          .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                  &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.Rsa
  *
  * Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes, and that the resulting keys
@@ -340,6 +870,7 @@
 
         ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
         CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
 
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
@@ -355,28 +886,38 @@
 /*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaWithAttestation
  *
- * Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes, and that the resulting keys
- * have correct characteristics.
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes with attestation, and that the
+ * resulting keys have correct characteristics.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithAttestation) {
-    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
-        auto challenge = "hello";
-        auto app_id = "foo";
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
 
+    auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+    uint64_t serial_int = 66;
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
         vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
-        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                     .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
-                                                     .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                                     .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
-                                                     .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
-                                                     .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
-                                                     .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                     .SetDefaultValidity(),
-                                             &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                      .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
 
         ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
         CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
 
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
@@ -385,6 +926,7 @@
                 << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
         EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
 
+        verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
         EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
         ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
 
@@ -443,6 +985,7 @@
 
         ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
         CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
 
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
@@ -470,6 +1013,195 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaEncryptionWithAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint attestation for RSA encryption keys with challenge and
+ * app id is also successful.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaEncryptionWithAttestation) {
+    auto key_size = 2048;
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    auto subject = "subj 2";
+    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+    uint64_t serial_int = 111166;
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .RsaEncryptionKey(key_size, 65537)
+                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                  .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                  .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                  .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                          &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+    ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+    AuthorizationSet auths;
+    for (auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+        auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+    }
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+
+    // Verify that App data and ROT are NOT included.
+    EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
+    EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
+
+    // Check that some unexpected tags/values are NOT present.
+    EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
+    EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
+
+    EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 301U));
+
+    auto os_ver = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(os_ver);
+    EXPECT_EQ(*os_ver, os_version());
+
+    AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+            << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+    EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
+
+    verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+    ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+
+    AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+    AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id,  //
+                                          sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                          cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaWithSelfSign
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to RSA key generation is successful, and returns
+ * self signed certificate if no challenge is provided.  And signing etc
+ * works as expected.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithSelfSign) {
+    auto subject = "cert subj subj subj subj subj subj 22222222222222222222";
+    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+    uint64_t serial_int = 0;
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                      .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+        CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
+
+        verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaWithAttestationMissAppId
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to RSA checks for missing app ID.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithAttestationMissAppId) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                  .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                  .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                          &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaWithAttestationAppIdIgnored
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to RSA ignores app id if challenge is missing.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaWithAttestationAppIdIgnored) {
+    auto key_size = 2048;
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+    uint64_t serial_int = 1;
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                  .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                  .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                          &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+    ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+    CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+    CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+    AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+            << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+    EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U));
+
+    verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+    ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
+
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+}
+
+/*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.LimitedUsageRsa
  *
  * Verifies that KeyMint can generate all required RSA key sizes with limited usage, and that the
@@ -489,6 +1221,7 @@
 
         ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
         CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
 
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
@@ -516,25 +1249,35 @@
  * resulting keys have correct characteristics and attestation.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, LimitedUsageRsaWithAttestation) {
-    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
-        auto challenge = "hello";
-        auto app_id = "foo";
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
 
+    auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+    uint64_t serial_int = 66;
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
         vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
-        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                     .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
-                                                     .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                                     .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
-                                                     .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
-                                                     .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
-                                                     .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                     .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 1)
-                                                     .SetDefaultValidity(),
-                                             &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .RsaSigningKey(key_size, 65537)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                      .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 1)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
 
         ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
         CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
 
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
@@ -554,6 +1297,7 @@
         // Check the usage count limit tag also appears in the attestation.
         EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
         ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+        verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
 
         AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
         AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
@@ -600,28 +1344,407 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.RsaMissingParams
+ *
+ * Verifies that omitting optional tags works.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, RsaMissingParams) {
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                  GenerateKey(
+                          AuthorizationSetBuilder().RsaKey(key_size, 65537).SetDefaultValidity()));
+        CheckedDeleteKey();
+    }
+}
+
+/*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.Ecdsa
  *
  * Verifies that keymint can generate all required EC key sizes, and that the resulting keys
  * have correct characteristics.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Ecdsa) {
-    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+    for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
         vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
         ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
                                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
         ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
         CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
 
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
         EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
-        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
-                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that for all Ecdsa key sizes, if challenge and app id is provided,
+ * an attestation will be generated.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestation) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+    uint64_t serial_int = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF;
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+    for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+        CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+        verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id,  //
+                                              sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                              cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestationTags
+ *
+ * Verifies that creation of an attested ECDSA key includes various tags in the
+ * attestation extension.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestationTags) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+    auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+    uint64_t serial_int = 0x1010;
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+    const AuthorizationSetBuilder base_builder =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                    .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                    .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                    .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                    .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                    .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+    // Various tags that map to fields in the attestation extension ASN.1 schema.
+    auto extra_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                              .Authorization(TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, 1619621648000)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, 1619621648000)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, 1619621999000)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 42)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 100000)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, 1619621648000);
+    for (const KeyParameter& tag : extra_tags) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "tag-" << tag);
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = base_builder;
+        builder.push_back(tag);
+        auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+        if (result == ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE &&
+            tag.tag == TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_TAG &&
+            (tag.tag == TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY || tag.tag == TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED)) {
+            // Optional tag not supported by this KeyMint implementation.
+            continue;
+        }
+        ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+        verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, /* self_signed = */ false);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        if (tag.tag != TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID) {
+            // Expect to find most of the extra tags in the key characteristics
+            // of the generated key (but not for ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID).
+            EXPECT_TRUE(hw_enforced.Contains(tag.tag) || sw_enforced.Contains(tag.tag))
+                    << tag << " not in hw:" << hw_enforced << " nor sw:" << sw_enforced;
+        }
+
+        // Verifying the attestation record will check for the specific tag because
+        // it's included in the authorizations.
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id, sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+                                              SecLevel(), cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+
+    // Device attestation IDs should be rejected for normal attestation requests; these fields
+    // are only used for device unique attestation.
+    auto invalid_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "brand")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "device")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "product")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "serial")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, "imei")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, "meid")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, "manufacturer")
+                                .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "model");
+    for (const KeyParameter& tag : invalid_tags) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "tag-" << tag);
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                        .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                        .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                        .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                        .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                        .SetDefaultValidity();
+        builder.push_back(tag);
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS,
+                  GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestationTagNoApplicationId
+ *
+ * Verifies that creation of an attested ECDSA key does not include APPLICATION_ID.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestationTagNoApplicationId) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto attest_app_id = "foo";
+    auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+    uint64_t serial_int = 0x1010;
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+    // Earlier versions of the attestation extension schema included a slot:
+    //     applicationId  [601] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
+    // This should never have been included, and should never be filled in.
+    // Generate an attested key that include APPLICATION_ID and APPLICATION_DATA,
+    // to confirm that this field never makes it into the attestation extension.
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                      .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                      .AttestationApplicationId(attest_app_id)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "client_id")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+    ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+    ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+
+    EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+    ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+    verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, /* self_signed = */ false);
+
+    AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+    AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, attest_app_id, sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+                                          SecLevel(), cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
+
+    // Check that the app id is not in the cert.
+    string app_id = "clientid";
+    std::vector<uint8_t> needle(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(app_id.data()),
+                                reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(app_id.data()) + app_id.size());
+    ASSERT_EQ(std::search(cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.begin(),
+                          cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.end(), needle.begin(), needle.end()),
+              cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate.end());
+
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaSelfSignAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that if no challenge is provided to an Ecdsa key generation, then
+ * the key will generate a self signed attestation.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaSelfSignAttestation) {
+    auto subject = "cert subj 2";
+    vector<uint8_t> subject_der(make_name_from_str(subject));
+
+    uint64_t serial_int = 0x123456FFF1234;
+    vector<uint8_t> serial_blob(build_serial_blob(serial_int));
+
+    for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL, serial_blob)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT, subject_der)
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                              &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+        CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        verify_subject_and_serial(cert_chain_[0], serial_int, subject, false);
+        ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAttestationRequireAppId
+ *
+ * Verifies that if attestation challenge is provided to Ecdsa key generation, then
+ * app id must also be provided or else it will fail.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAttestationRequireAppId) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID_MISSING,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                  .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                  .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                          &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaIgnoreAppId
+ *
+ * Verifies that if no challenge is provided to the Ecdsa key generation, then
+ * any appid will be ignored, and keymint will generate a self sign certificate.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaIgnoreAppId) {
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
+                                                     .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                     .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                                     .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                             &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+        CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 1);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AttestationApplicationIDLengthProperlyEncoded
+ *
+ * Verifies that the Attestation Application ID software enforced tag has a proper length encoding.
+ * Some implementations break strict encoding rules by encoding a length between 127 and 256 in one
+ * byte. Proper DER encoding specifies that for lengths greater than 127, one byte should be used
+ * to specify how many following bytes will be used to encode the length.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AttestationApplicationIDLengthProperlyEncoded) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    std::vector<uint32_t> app_id_lengths{143, 258};
+
+    for (uint32_t length : app_id_lengths) {
+        const string app_id(length, 'a');
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                     .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                     .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                                     .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                                     .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                             &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+        CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)) << "Curve P256 missing";
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
+        ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(challenge, app_id,  //
+                                              sw_enforced, hw_enforced, SecLevel(),
+                                              cert_chain_[0].encodedCertificate));
 
         CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
     }
@@ -634,11 +1757,11 @@
  * resulting keys have correct characteristics.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, LimitedUsageEcdsa) {
-    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+    for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
         vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
         ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
                                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                      .Authorization(TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, 1)
                                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
@@ -646,12 +1769,12 @@
 
         ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
         CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
 
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
         EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC));
-        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
-                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EC_CURVE, curve)) << "Curve " << curve << "missing";
 
         // Check the usage count limit tag appears in the authorizations.
         AuthorizationSet auths;
@@ -668,7 +1791,7 @@
 /*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaDefaultSize
  *
- * Verifies that failing to specify a key size for EC key generation returns
+ * Verifies that failing to specify a curve for EC key generation returns
  * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaDefaultSize) {
@@ -687,20 +1810,23 @@
  * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
  */
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaInvalidSize) {
-    for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
+    for (auto curve : InvalidCurves()) {
         vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
         ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                                       .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
+                                                                       .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
                                                                        .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                                        .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                                                &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
     }
 
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                                   .EcdsaSigningKey(190)
-                                                                   .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                                                   .SetDefaultValidity()));
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 190)
+                                  .SigningKey()
+                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -712,33 +1838,17 @@
 TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaMismatchKeySize) {
     if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
 
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT,
-              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(224)
-                                  .Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
-                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
+    auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 224)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                      .SetDefaultValidity());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT ||
+                result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
 }
 
 /*
- * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAllValidSizes
- *
- * Verifies that keymint supports all required EC key sizes.
- */
-TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, EcdsaAllValidSizes) {
-    auto valid_sizes = ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC);
-    for (size_t size : valid_sizes) {
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                     .EcdsaSigningKey(size)
-                                                     .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                                     .SetDefaultValidity()))
-                << "Failed to generate size: " << size;
-        CheckedDeleteKey();
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaInvalidCurves
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.EcdsaAllValidCurves
  *
  * Verifies that keymint does not support any curve designated as unsupported.
  */
@@ -778,6 +1888,43 @@
 
         ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
         CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
+
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.HmacNoAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that for Hmac key generation, no attestation will be generated even if challenge
+ * and app id are provided.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, HmacNoAttestation) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
+        vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+        constexpr size_t key_size = 128;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .HmacKey(key_size)
+                                                     .Digest(digest)
+                                                     .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                                     .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                                     .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128),
+                                             &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+        ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+        ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+        CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
 
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
         EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
@@ -808,6 +1955,7 @@
 
         ASSERT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
         CheckBaseParams(key_characteristics);
+        CheckCharacteristics(key_blob, key_characteristics);
 
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
         EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::HMAC));
@@ -854,6 +2002,16 @@
             CheckedDeleteKey();
         }
     }
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        // STRONGBOX devices must not support keys larger than 512 bits.
+        size_t key_size = 520;
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+                  GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                      .HmacKey(key_size)
+                                      .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                      .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)))
+                << "HMAC key size " << key_size << " unexpectedly valid";
+    }
 }
 
 /*
@@ -887,6 +2045,15 @@
             CheckedDeleteKey();
         }
     }
+
+    // Minimum MAC length must be no more than 512 bits.
+    size_t min_mac_length = 520;
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .HmacKey(128)
+                                  .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, min_mac_length)))
+            << "HMAC min mac length " << min_mac_length << " invalid.";
 }
 
 /*
@@ -922,6 +2089,47 @@
                                   .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
 }
 
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesNoAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that attestation parameters to AES keys are ignored and generateKey
+ * will succeed.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesNoAttestation) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+                                                 .EcbMode()
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)
+                                                 .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                                 .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)));
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDesNoAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting parameters to 3DES keys are ignored and generate key
+ * will be successful.  No attestation should be generated.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDesNoAttestation) {
+    auto challenge = "hello";
+    auto app_id = "foo";
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+                                                 .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                                 .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                                 .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)));
+    ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
+}
+
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(NewKeyGenerationTest);
 
 typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase SigningOperationsTest;
@@ -941,6 +2149,50 @@
     string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
     string signature = SignMessage(
             message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+    LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature,
+                       AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+}
+
+/*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests
+ *
+ * Verifies RSA signature/verification for all padding modes and digests.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests) {
+    auto authorizations = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                  .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                  .Digest(ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */))
+                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+                                  .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(authorizations));
+
+    string message(128, 'a');
+    string corrupt_message(message);
+    ++corrupt_message[corrupt_message.size() / 2];
+
+    for (auto padding :
+         {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN}) {
+        for (auto digest : ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
+            if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && digest != Digest::NONE) {
+                // Digesting only makes sense with padding.
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_PSS && digest == Digest::NONE) {
+                // PSS requires digesting.
+                continue;
+            }
+
+            string signature =
+                    SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
+            LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature,
+                               AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 /*
@@ -957,6 +2209,9 @@
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
                                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
+
+    CheckAppIdCharacteristics(key_blob_, "clientid", "appdata", key_characteristics_);
+
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
               Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
                     AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
@@ -1196,6 +2451,38 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaNonUniqueParams
+ *
+ * Verifies that an operation with multiple padding modes is rejected.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, RsaNonUniqueParams) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::SHA1)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+                                                 .SetDefaultValidity()));
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                              .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                              .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                              .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+
+    auto result = Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                  .Digest(Digest::SHA1)
+                                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN));
+    ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
+                    AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)));
+}
+
+/*
  * SigningOperationsTest.RsaUnsupportedPadding
  *
  * Verifies that RSA operations fail with the correct error (but key gen succeeds) when used
@@ -1212,6 +2499,20 @@
             ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
             Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN,
                   AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+    CheckedDeleteKey();
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(
+                      AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                              .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                              .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256 /* supported digest */)
+                              .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP) /* padding mode for encryption only */
+                              .SetDefaultValidity()));
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                              .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                              .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1235,7 +2536,7 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoDigest
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoPadding
  *
  * Verifies that RSA operations fail when no padding mode is specified.  PaddingMode::NONE is
  * supported in some cases (as validated in other tests), but a mode must be specified.
@@ -1316,27 +2617,35 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves
  *
- * Verifies that ECDSA operations succeed with all possible key sizes and hashes.
+ * Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
  */
-TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllSizesAndHashes) {
-    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::EC)) {
-        for (auto digest : ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */)) {
-            ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(key_size)
-                                                  .Digest(digest)
-                                                  .SetDefaultValidity());
-            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate ECDSA key with size " << key_size
-                                            << " and digest " << digest;
-            if (error != ErrorCode::OK) continue;
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves) {
+    auto digests = ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */);
 
-            string message(1024, 'a');
-            if (digest == Digest::NONE) message.resize(key_size / 8);
-            SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
-            CheckedDeleteKey();
+    string message = "1234567890";
+    string corrupt_message = "2234567890";
+    for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "Curve::" << curve);
+        ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                              .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                              .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
+                                              .Digest(digests)
+                                              .SetDefaultValidity());
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate key for EC curve " << curve;
+        if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
+            continue;
         }
+
+        for (auto digest : digests) {
+            SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "Digest::" << digest);
+            string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
+            LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
+        }
+
+        auto rc = DeleteKey();
+        ASSERT_TRUE(rc == ErrorCode::OK || rc == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
     }
 }
 
@@ -1372,7 +2681,7 @@
 TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaNoDigestHugeData) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
     string message(1 * 1024, 'a');
@@ -1387,11 +2696,14 @@
 TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcUseRequiresCorrectAppIdAppData) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
                                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
+
+    CheckAppIdCharacteristics(key_blob_, "clientid", "appdata", key_characteristics_);
+
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB,
               Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE)));
     AbortIfNeeded();
@@ -1414,6 +2726,23 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.EcdsaIncompatibleDigest
+ *
+ * Verifies that using an EC key requires compatible digest.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, EcdsaIncompatibleDigest) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::SHA1)
+                                                 .SetDefaultValidity()));
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
+              Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)));
+    AbortIfNeeded();
+}
+
+/*
  * SigningOperationsTest.AesEcbSign
  *
  * Verifies that attempts to use AES keys to sign fail in the correct way.
@@ -1474,6 +2803,26 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256InvalidMacLength
+ *
+ * Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC whose length is
+ * not a multiple of 8.
+ */
+TEST_P(SigningOperationsTest, HmacSha256InvalidMacLength) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .HmacKey(128)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 160)));
+    AuthorizationSet output_params;
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+                                                       AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                               .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                               .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 161),
+                                                       &output_params));
+}
+
+/*
  * SigningOperationsTest.HmacSha256TooSmallMacLength
  *
  * Verifies that HMAC fails in the correct way when asked to generate a MAC smaller than the
@@ -1571,207 +2920,6 @@
 typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase VerificationOperationsTest;
 
 /*
- * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
- *
- * Verifies that a simple RSA signature/verification sequence succeeds.
- */
-TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaSuccess) {
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
-                                                 .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
-                                                 .SetDefaultValidity()));
-    string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
-    string signature = SignMessage(
-            message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
-    VerifyMessage(message, signature,
-                  AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
-}
-
-/*
- * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
- *
- * Verifies RSA signature/verification for all padding modes and digests.
- */
-TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests) {
-    auto authorizations = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                  .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
-                                  .Digest(ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */))
-                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
-                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
-                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
-                                  .SetDefaultValidity();
-
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(authorizations));
-
-    string message(128, 'a');
-    string corrupt_message(message);
-    ++corrupt_message[corrupt_message.size() / 2];
-
-    for (auto padding :
-         {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN}) {
-        for (auto digest : ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */)) {
-            if (padding == PaddingMode::NONE && digest != Digest::NONE) {
-                // Digesting only makes sense with padding.
-                continue;
-            }
-
-            if (padding == PaddingMode::RSA_PSS && digest == Digest::NONE) {
-                // PSS requires digesting.
-                continue;
-            }
-
-            string signature =
-                    SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
-            VerifyMessage(message, signature,
-                          AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding));
-
-            /* TODO(seleneh) add exportkey tests back later when we have decided on
-             * the new api.
-                        if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
-                            // Verify with OpenSSL.
-                            vector<uint8_t> pubkey;
-                            ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey));
-
-                            const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
-                            EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr, &p, pubkey.size()));
-                            ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
-
-                            EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
-                            EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
-                            EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
-                            const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
-                            ASSERT_NE(md, nullptr);
-                            EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md,
-             nullptr, pkey.get()));
-
-                            switch (padding) {
-                                case PaddingMode::RSA_PSS:
-                                    EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pkey_ctx,
-               RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING), 0); EXPECT_GT(EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkey_ctx,
-               EVP_MD_size(md)), 0); break; case PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN:
-                                    // PKCS1 is the default; don't need to set anything.
-                                    break;
-                                default:
-                                    FAIL();
-                                    break;
-                            }
-
-                            EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(),
-               message.size())); EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&digest_ctx,
-                                                            reinterpret_cast<const
-               uint8_t*>(signature.data()), signature.size())); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
-                        }
-            */
-
-            // Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
-            string corrupt_signature(signature);
-            ++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
-
-            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
-                      Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
-                            AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
-            string result;
-            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result));
-
-            // Corrupt message shouldn't verify
-            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
-                      Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY,
-                            AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(padding)));
-            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result));
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
- *
- * Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
- */
-TEST_P(VerificationOperationsTest, EcdsaAllDigestsAndCurves) {
-    auto digests = ValidDigests(true /* withNone */, false /* withMD5 */);
-
-    string message = "1234567890";
-    string corrupt_message = "2234567890";
-    for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
-        ErrorCode error = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                              .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                              .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
-                                              .Digest(digests)
-                                              .SetDefaultValidity());
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error) << "Failed to generate key for EC curve " << curve;
-        if (error != ErrorCode::OK) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        for (auto digest : digests) {
-            string signature = SignMessage(message, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
-            VerifyMessage(message, signature, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest));
-
-            /* TODO(seleneh) add exportkey tests back later when we have decided on
-             * the new api.
-
-                        // Verify with OpenSSL
-                        if (digest != Digest::NONE) {
-                            vector<uint8_t> pubkey;
-                            ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ExportKey(KeyFormat::X509, &pubkey))
-                                    << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
-                            const uint8_t* p = pubkey.data();
-                            EVP_PKEY_Ptr pkey(d2i_PUBKEY(nullptr, &p, pubkey.size()));
-                            ASSERT_TRUE(pkey.get());
-
-                            EVP_MD_CTX digest_ctx;
-                            EVP_MD_CTX_init(&digest_ctx);
-                            EVP_PKEY_CTX* pkey_ctx;
-                            const EVP_MD* md = openssl_digest(digest);
-
-                            EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyInit(&digest_ctx, &pkey_ctx, md,
-             nullptr, pkey.get()))
-                                    << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
-                            EXPECT_EQ(1, EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(&digest_ctx, message.data(),
-               message.size()))
-                                    << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
-                            EXPECT_EQ(1,
-                                      EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(&digest_ctx,
-                                                            reinterpret_cast<const
-               uint8_t*>(signature.data()), signature.size()))
-                                    << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
-                            EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&digest_ctx);
-                        }
-            */
-            // Corrupt signature shouldn't verify.
-            string corrupt_signature(signature);
-            ++corrupt_signature[corrupt_signature.size() / 2];
-
-            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
-                      Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
-                    << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
-            string result;
-            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(message, corrupt_signature, &result))
-                    << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
-            // Corrupt message shouldn't verify
-            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
-                      Begin(KeyPurpose::VERIFY, AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest)))
-                    << curve << ' ' << digest;
-
-            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED, Finish(corrupt_message, signature, &result))
-                    << curve << ' ' << digest;
-        }
-
-        auto rc = DeleteKey();
-        ASSERT_TRUE(rc == ErrorCode::OK || rc == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
-    }
-}
-
-/*
  * VerificationOperationsTest.HmacSigningKeyCannotVerify
  *
  * Verifies HMAC signing and verification, but that a signing key cannot be used to verify.
@@ -1888,7 +3036,49 @@
     string message(1024 / 8, 'a');
     auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
     string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
-    VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+    LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.RsaSuccessWithoutParams
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using an RSA key pair without specifying parameters
+ * works correctly.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, RsaSuccessWithoutParams) {
+    uint32_t key_size;
+    string key;
+
+    if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
+        key_size = 2048;
+        key = rsa_2048_key;
+    } else {
+        key_size = 1024;
+        key = rsa_key;
+    }
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                               .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                               .SigningKey()
+                                               .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA)
+                                               .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                               .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+                                               .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                       KeyFormat::PKCS8, key));
+
+    // Key size and public exponent are determined from the imported key material.
+    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size);
+    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, 65537U);
+
+    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::RSA);
+    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
+    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
+    CheckOrigin();
+
+    string message(1024 / 8, 'a');
+    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS);
+    string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
+    LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1931,13 +3121,12 @@
 TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSuccess) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                                                .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                        KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
 
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
-    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
 
@@ -1946,7 +3135,7 @@
     string message(32, 'a');
     auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
     string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
-    VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+    LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1958,13 +3147,12 @@
 TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256RFC5915Success) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                                                .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                        KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key_rfc5915));
 
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
-    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
 
@@ -1973,7 +3161,7 @@
     string message(32, 'a');
     auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
     string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
-    VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+    LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1984,13 +3172,12 @@
 TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaP256SEC1Success) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                                                .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                        KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key_sec1));
 
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
-    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 256U);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256);
 
@@ -1999,7 +3186,7 @@
     string message(32, 'a');
     auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
     string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
-    VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
+    LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2011,13 +3198,12 @@
     if (SecLevel() == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(521)
+                                               .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_521)
                                                .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                                                .SetDefaultValidity(),
                                        KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_521_key));
 
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::EC);
-    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 521U);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_256);
     CheckCryptoParam(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_521);
     CheckOrigin();
@@ -2025,22 +3211,7 @@
     string message(32, 'a');
     auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256);
     string signature = SignMessage(message, params);
-    VerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
-}
-
-/*
- * ImportKeyTest.EcdsaSizeMismatch
- *
- * Verifies that importing an ECDSA key pair with a size that doesn't match the key fails in the
- * correct way.
- */
-TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, EcdsaSizeMismatch) {
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH,
-              ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                .EcdsaSigningKey(224 /* Doesn't match key */)
-                                .Digest(Digest::NONE)
-                                .SetDefaultValidity(),
-                        KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
+    LocalVerifyMessage(message, signature, params);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2086,7 +3257,113 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * ImportKeyTest.AesSuccess
+ * ImportKeyTest.AesFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an invalid AES key fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, AesFailure) {
+    string key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+    uint32_t bitlen = key.size() * 8;
+    for (uint32_t key_size : {bitlen - 1, bitlen + 1, bitlen - 8, bitlen + 8}) {
+        // Explicit key size doesn't match that of the provided key.
+        auto result = ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                    .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                    .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                    .EcbMode()
+                                    .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+                                KeyFormat::RAW, key);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH ||
+                    result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE)
+                << "unexpected result: " << result;
+    }
+
+    // Explicit key size matches that of the provided key, but it's not a valid size.
+    string long_key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+              ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                .AesEncryptionKey(long_key.size() * 8)
+                                .EcbMode()
+                                .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+                        KeyFormat::RAW, long_key));
+    string short_key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+              ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                .AesEncryptionKey(short_key.size() * 8)
+                                .EcbMode()
+                                .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+                        KeyFormat::RAW, short_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.TripleDesSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using a 3DES key works.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, TripleDesSuccess) {
+    string key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358");
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                               .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                               .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+                                               .EcbMode()
+                                               .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+                                       KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+
+    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES);
+    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 168U);
+    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB);
+    CheckOrigin();
+
+    string message = "Hello World!";
+    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+    string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+    string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+    EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.TripleDesFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an invalid 3DES key fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, TripleDesFailure) {
+    string key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358");
+    uint32_t bitlen = key.size() * 7;
+    for (uint32_t key_size : {bitlen - 1, bitlen + 1, bitlen - 8, bitlen + 8}) {
+        // Explicit key size doesn't match that of the provided key.
+        auto result = ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                    .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                    .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                    .EcbMode()
+                                    .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+                                KeyFormat::RAW, key);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::IMPORT_PARAMETER_MISMATCH ||
+                    result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE)
+                << "unexpected result: " << result;
+    }
+    // Explicit key size matches that of the provided key, but it's not a valid size.
+    string long_key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f735800");
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+              ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                .TripleDesEncryptionKey(long_key.size() * 7)
+                                .EcbMode()
+                                .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+                        KeyFormat::RAW, long_key));
+    string short_key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f73");
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+              ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                .TripleDesEncryptionKey(short_key.size() * 7)
+                                .EcbMode()
+                                .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+                        KeyFormat::RAW, short_key));
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.HmacKeySuccess
  *
  * Verifies that importing and using an HMAC key works.
  */
@@ -2112,57 +3389,230 @@
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(ImportKeyTest);
 
 auto wrapped_key = hex2str(
-        "3082017902010004820100934bf94e2aa28a3f83c9f79297250262fbe3276b5a1c91159bbfa3ef8957aac8"
-        "4b59b30b455a79c2973480823d8b3863c3deef4a8e243590268d80e18751a0e130f67ce6a1ace9f79b95e0"
-        "97474febc981195b1d13a69086c0863f66a7b7fdb48792227b1ac5e2489febdf087ab5486483033a6f001c"
-        "a5d1ec1e27f5c30f4cec2642074a39ae68aee552e196627a8e3d867e67a8c01b11e75f13cca0a97ab668b5"
-        "0cda07a8ecb7cd8e3dd7009c9636534f6f239cffe1fc8daa466f78b676c7119efb96bce4e69ca2a25d0b34"
-        "ed9c3ff999b801597d5220e307eaa5bee507fb94d1fa69f9e519b2de315bac92c36f2ea1fa1df4478c0dde"
-        "deae8c70e0233cd098040cd796b02c370f1fa4cc0124f1302e0201033029a1083106020100020101a20302"
-        "0120a30402020100a4053103020101a6053103020140bf83770205000420ccd540855f833a5e1480bfd2d3"
-        "6faf3aeee15df5beabe2691bc82dde2a7aa910041064c9f689c60ff6223ab6e6999e0eb6e5");
+        // IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+        "30820179"  // SEQUENCE length 0x179 (SecureKeyWrapper) {
+        "020100"    // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+        "04820100"  // OCTET STRING length 0x100 (encryptedTransportKey)
+        "934bf94e2aa28a3f83c9f79297250262"
+        "fbe3276b5a1c91159bbfa3ef8957aac8"
+        "4b59b30b455a79c2973480823d8b3863"
+        "c3deef4a8e243590268d80e18751a0e1"
+        "30f67ce6a1ace9f79b95e097474febc9"
+        "81195b1d13a69086c0863f66a7b7fdb4"
+        "8792227b1ac5e2489febdf087ab54864"
+        "83033a6f001ca5d1ec1e27f5c30f4cec"
+        "2642074a39ae68aee552e196627a8e3d"
+        "867e67a8c01b11e75f13cca0a97ab668"
+        "b50cda07a8ecb7cd8e3dd7009c963653"
+        "4f6f239cffe1fc8daa466f78b676c711"
+        "9efb96bce4e69ca2a25d0b34ed9c3ff9"
+        "99b801597d5220e307eaa5bee507fb94"
+        "d1fa69f9e519b2de315bac92c36f2ea1"
+        "fa1df4478c0ddedeae8c70e0233cd098"
+        "040c"  // OCTET STRING length 0x0c (initializationVector)
+        "d796b02c370f1fa4cc0124f1"
+        "302e"    // SEQUENCE length 0x2e (KeyDescription) {
+        "020103"  // INTEGER length 1 value 0x03 (keyFormat = RAW)
+        "3029"    // SEQUENCE length 0x29 (AuthorizationList) {
+        "a108"    // [1] context-specific constructed tag=1 length 0x08 { (purpose)
+        "3106"    // SET length 0x06
+        "020100"  // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (Encrypt)
+        "020101"  // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (Decrypt)
+        // } end SET
+        // } end [1]
+        "a203"    // [2] context-specific constructed tag=2 length 0x02 { (algorithm)
+        "020120"  // INTEGER length 1 value 0x20 (AES)
+        // } end [2]
+        "a304"      // [3] context-specific constructed tag=3 length 0x04 { (keySize)
+        "02020100"  // INTEGER length 2 value 0x100
+        // } end [3]
+        "a405"    // [4] context-specific constructed tag=4 length 0x05 { (blockMode)
+        "3103"    // SET length 0x03 {
+        "020101"  // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (ECB)
+        // } end SET
+        // } end [4]
+        "a605"    // [6] context-specific constructed tag=6 length 0x05 { (padding)
+        "3103"    // SET length 0x03 {
+        "020140"  // INTEGER length 1 value 0x40 (PKCS7)
+        // } end SET
+        // } end [5]
+        "bf837702"  // [503] context-specific constructed tag=503=0x1F7 length 0x02 {
+                    // (noAuthRequired)
+        "0500"      // NULL
+        // } end [503]
+        // } end SEQUENCE (AuthorizationList)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (KeyDescription)
+        "0420"  // OCTET STRING length 0x20 (encryptedKey)
+        "ccd540855f833a5e1480bfd2d36faf3a"
+        "eee15df5beabe2691bc82dde2a7aa910"
+        "0410"  // OCTET STRING length 0x10 (tag)
+        "64c9f689c60ff6223ab6e6999e0eb6e5"
+        // } SEQUENCE (SecureKeyWrapper)
+);
 
 auto wrapped_key_masked = hex2str(
-        "3082017902010004820100aad93ed5924f283b4bb5526fbe7a1412f9d9749ec30db9062b29e574a8546f33"
-        "c88732452f5b8e6a391ee76c39ed1712c61d8df6213dec1cffbc17a8c6d04c7b30893d8daa9b2015213e21"
-        "946821553207f8f9931c4caba23ed3bee28b36947e47f10e0a5c3dc51c988a628daad3e5e1f4005e79c2d5"
-        "a96c284b4b8d7e4948f331e5b85dd5a236f85579f3ea1d1b848487470bdb0ab4f81a12bee42c99fe0df4be"
-        "e3759453e69ad1d68a809ce06b949f7694a990429b2fe81e066ff43e56a21602db70757922a4bcc23ab89f"
-        "1e35da77586775f423e519c2ea394caf48a28d0c8020f1dcf6b3a68ec246f615ae96dae9a079b1f6eb9590"
-        "33c1af5c125fd94168040c6d9721d08589581ab49204a3302e0201033029a1083106020100020101a20302"
-        "0120a30402020100a4053103020101a6053103020140bf83770205000420a61c6e247e25b3e6e69aa78eb0"
-        "3c2d4ac20d1f99a9a024a76f35c8e2cab9b68d04102560c70109ae67c030f00b98b512a670");
+        // IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+        "30820179"  // SEQUENCE length 0x179 (SecureKeyWrapper) {
+        "020100"    // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+        "04820100"  // OCTET STRING length 0x100 (encryptedTransportKey)
+        "aad93ed5924f283b4bb5526fbe7a1412"
+        "f9d9749ec30db9062b29e574a8546f33"
+        "c88732452f5b8e6a391ee76c39ed1712"
+        "c61d8df6213dec1cffbc17a8c6d04c7b"
+        "30893d8daa9b2015213e219468215532"
+        "07f8f9931c4caba23ed3bee28b36947e"
+        "47f10e0a5c3dc51c988a628daad3e5e1"
+        "f4005e79c2d5a96c284b4b8d7e4948f3"
+        "31e5b85dd5a236f85579f3ea1d1b8484"
+        "87470bdb0ab4f81a12bee42c99fe0df4"
+        "bee3759453e69ad1d68a809ce06b949f"
+        "7694a990429b2fe81e066ff43e56a216"
+        "02db70757922a4bcc23ab89f1e35da77"
+        "586775f423e519c2ea394caf48a28d0c"
+        "8020f1dcf6b3a68ec246f615ae96dae9"
+        "a079b1f6eb959033c1af5c125fd94168"
+        "040c"  // OCTET STRING length 0x0c (initializationVector)
+        "6d9721d08589581ab49204a3"
+        "302e"    // SEQUENCE length 0x2e (KeyDescription) {
+        "020103"  // INTEGER length 1 value 0x03 (keyFormat = RAW)
+        "3029"    // SEQUENCE length 0x29 (AuthorizationList) {
+        "a108"    // [1] context-specific constructed tag=1 length 0x08 { (purpose)
+        "3106"    // SET length 0x06
+        "020100"  // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (Encrypt)
+        "020101"  // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (Decrypt)
+        // } end SET
+        // } end [1]
+        "a203"    // [2] context-specific constructed tag=2 length 0x02 { (algorithm)
+        "020120"  // INTEGER length 1 value 0x20 (AES)
+        // } end [2]
+        "a304"      // [3] context-specific constructed tag=3 length 0x04 { (keySize)
+        "02020100"  // INTEGER length 2 value 0x100
+        // } end [3]
+        "a405"    // [4] context-specific constructed tag=4 length 0x05 { (blockMode
+        "3103"    // SET length 0x03 {
+        "020101"  // INTEGER length 1 value 0x01 (ECB)
+        // } end SET
+        // } end [4]
+        "a605"    // [6] context-specific constructed tag=6 length 0x05 { (padding)
+        "3103"    // SET length 0x03 {
+        "020140"  // INTEGER length 1 value 0x40 (PKCS7)
+        // } end SET
+        // } end [5]
+        "bf837702"  // [503] context-specific constructed tag=503=0x1F7 length 0x02 {
+                    // (noAuthRequired)
+        "0500"      // NULL
+        // } end [503]
+        // } end SEQUENCE (AuthorizationList)
+        // } end SEQUENCE (KeyDescription)
+        "0420"  // OCTET STRING length 0x20 (encryptedKey)
+        "a61c6e247e25b3e6e69aa78eb03c2d4a"
+        "c20d1f99a9a024a76f35c8e2cab9b68d"
+        "0410"  // OCTET STRING length 0x10 (tag)
+        "2560c70109ae67c030f00b98b512a670"
+        // } SEQUENCE (SecureKeyWrapper)
+);
 
 auto wrapping_key = hex2str(
-        "308204be020100300d06092a864886f70d0101010500048204a8308204a40201000282010100aec367931d"
-        "8900ce56b0067f7d70e1fc653f3f34d194c1fed50018fb43db937b06e673a837313d56b1c725150a3fef86"
-        "acbddc41bb759c2854eae32d35841efb5c18d82bc90a1cb5c1d55adf245b02911f0b7cda88c421ff0ebafe"
-        "7c0d23be312d7bd5921ffaea1347c157406fef718f682643e4e5d33c6703d61c0cf7ac0bf4645c11f5c137"
-        "4c3886427411c449796792e0bef75dec858a2123c36753e02a95a96d7c454b504de385a642e0dfc3e60ac3"
-        "a7ee4991d0d48b0172a95f9536f02ba13cecccb92b727db5c27e5b2f5cec09600b286af5cf14c42024c61d"
-        "dfe71c2a8d7458f185234cb00e01d282f10f8fc6721d2aed3f4833cca2bd8fa62821dd5502030100010282"
-        "0100431447b6251908112b1ee76f99f3711a52b6630960046c2de70de188d833f8b8b91e4d785caeeeaf4f"
-        "0f74414e2cda40641f7fe24f14c67a88959bdb27766df9e710b630a03adc683b5d2c43080e52bee71e9eae"
-        "b6de297a5fea1072070d181c822bccff087d63c940ba8a45f670feb29fb4484d1c95e6d2579ba02aae0a00"
-        "900c3ebf490e3d2cd7ee8d0e20c536e4dc5a5097272888cddd7e91f228b1c4d7474c55b8fcd618c4a957bb"
-        "ddd5ad7407cc312d8d98a5caf7e08f4a0d6b45bb41c652659d5a5ba05b663737a8696281865ba20fbdd7f8"
-        "51e6c56e8cbe0ddbbf24dc03b2d2cb4c3d540fb0af52e034a2d06698b128e5f101e3b51a34f8d8b4f86181"
-        "02818100de392e18d682c829266cc3454e1d6166242f32d9a1d10577753e904ea7d08bff841be5bac82a16"
-        "4c5970007047b8c517db8f8f84e37bd5988561bdf503d4dc2bdb38f885434ae42c355f725c9a60f91f0788"
-        "e1f1a97223b524b5357fdf72e2f696bab7d78e32bf92ba8e1864eab1229e91346130748a6e3c124f9149d7"
-        "1c743502818100c95387c0f9d35f137b57d0d65c397c5e21cc251e47008ed62a542409c8b6b6ac7f8967b3"
-        "863ca645fcce49582a9aa17349db6c4a95affdae0dae612e1afac99ed39a2d934c880440aed8832f984316"
-        "3a47f27f392199dc1202f9a0f9bd08308007cb1e4e7f58309366a7de25f7c3c9b880677c068e1be936e812"
-        "88815252a8a102818057ff8ca1895080b2cae486ef0adfd791fb0235c0b8b36cd6c136e52e4085f4ea5a06"
-        "3212a4f105a3764743e53281988aba073f6e0027298e1c4378556e0efca0e14ece1af76ad0b030f27af6f0"
-        "ab35fb73a060d8b1a0e142fa2647e93b32e36d8282ae0a4de50ab7afe85500a16f43a64719d6e2b9439823"
-        "719cd08bcd03178102818100ba73b0bb28e3f81e9bd1c568713b101241acc607976c4ddccc90e65b6556ca"
-        "31516058f92b6e09f3b160ff0e374ec40d78ae4d4979fde6ac06a1a400c61dd31254186af30b22c10582a8"
-        "a43e34fe949c5f3b9755bae7baa7b7b7a6bd03b38cef55c86885fc6c1978b9cee7ef33da507c9df6b9277c"
-        "ff1e6aaa5d57aca528466102818100c931617c77829dfb1270502be9195c8f2830885f57dba869536811e6"
-        "864236d0c4736a0008a145af36b8357a7c3d139966d04c4e00934ea1aede3bb6b8ec841dc95e3f579751e2"
-        "bfdfe27ae778983f959356210723287b0affcc9f727044d48c373f1babde0724fa17a4fd4da0902c7c9b9b"
-        "f27ba61be6ad02dfddda8f4e6822");
+        // RFC 5208 s5
+        "308204be"            // SEQUENCE length 0x4be (PrivateKeyInfo) {
+        "020100"              // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+        "300d"                // SEQUENCE length 0x0d (AlgorithmIdentifier) {
+        "0609"                // OBJECT IDENTIFIER length 0x09 (algorithm)
+        "2a864886f70d010101"  // 1.2.840.113549.1.1.1 (RSAES-PKCS1-v1_5 encryption scheme)
+        "0500"                // NULL (parameters)
+        // } SEQUENCE (AlgorithmIdentifier)
+        "048204a8"  // OCTET STRING len 0x4a8 (privateKey), which contains...
+        // RFC 8017 A.1.2
+        "308204a4"                          // SEQUENCE len 0x4a4 (RSAPrivateKey) {
+        "020100"                            // INTEGER length 1 value 0x00 (version)
+        "02820101"                          // INTEGER length 0x0101 (modulus) value...
+        "00aec367931d8900ce56b0067f7d70e1"  // 0x10
+        "fc653f3f34d194c1fed50018fb43db93"  // 0x20
+        "7b06e673a837313d56b1c725150a3fef"  // 0x30
+        "86acbddc41bb759c2854eae32d35841e"  // 0x40
+        "fb5c18d82bc90a1cb5c1d55adf245b02"  // 0x50
+        "911f0b7cda88c421ff0ebafe7c0d23be"  // 0x60
+        "312d7bd5921ffaea1347c157406fef71"  // 0x70
+        "8f682643e4e5d33c6703d61c0cf7ac0b"  // 0x80
+        "f4645c11f5c1374c3886427411c44979"  // 0x90
+        "6792e0bef75dec858a2123c36753e02a"  // 0xa0
+        "95a96d7c454b504de385a642e0dfc3e6"  // 0xb0
+        "0ac3a7ee4991d0d48b0172a95f9536f0"  // 0xc0
+        "2ba13cecccb92b727db5c27e5b2f5cec"  // 0xd0
+        "09600b286af5cf14c42024c61ddfe71c"  // 0xe0
+        "2a8d7458f185234cb00e01d282f10f8f"  // 0xf0
+        "c6721d2aed3f4833cca2bd8fa62821dd"  // 0x100
+        "55"                                // 0x101
+        "0203010001"                        // INTEGER length 3 value 0x10001 (publicExponent)
+        "02820100"                          // INTEGER length 0x100 (privateExponent) value...
+        "431447b6251908112b1ee76f99f3711a"  // 0x10
+        "52b6630960046c2de70de188d833f8b8"  // 0x20
+        "b91e4d785caeeeaf4f0f74414e2cda40"  // 0x30
+        "641f7fe24f14c67a88959bdb27766df9"  // 0x40
+        "e710b630a03adc683b5d2c43080e52be"  // 0x50
+        "e71e9eaeb6de297a5fea1072070d181c"  // 0x60
+        "822bccff087d63c940ba8a45f670feb2"  // 0x70
+        "9fb4484d1c95e6d2579ba02aae0a0090"  // 0x80
+        "0c3ebf490e3d2cd7ee8d0e20c536e4dc"  // 0x90
+        "5a5097272888cddd7e91f228b1c4d747"  // 0xa0
+        "4c55b8fcd618c4a957bbddd5ad7407cc"  // 0xb0
+        "312d8d98a5caf7e08f4a0d6b45bb41c6"  // 0xc0
+        "52659d5a5ba05b663737a8696281865b"  // 0xd0
+        "a20fbdd7f851e6c56e8cbe0ddbbf24dc"  // 0xe0
+        "03b2d2cb4c3d540fb0af52e034a2d066"  // 0xf0
+        "98b128e5f101e3b51a34f8d8b4f86181"  // 0x100
+        "028181"                            // INTEGER length 0x81 (prime1) value...
+        "00de392e18d682c829266cc3454e1d61"  // 0x10
+        "66242f32d9a1d10577753e904ea7d08b"  // 0x20
+        "ff841be5bac82a164c5970007047b8c5"  // 0x30
+        "17db8f8f84e37bd5988561bdf503d4dc"  // 0x40
+        "2bdb38f885434ae42c355f725c9a60f9"  // 0x50
+        "1f0788e1f1a97223b524b5357fdf72e2"  // 0x60
+        "f696bab7d78e32bf92ba8e1864eab122"  // 0x70
+        "9e91346130748a6e3c124f9149d71c74"  // 0x80
+        "35"
+        "028181"                            // INTEGER length 0x81 (prime2) value...
+        "00c95387c0f9d35f137b57d0d65c397c"  // 0x10
+        "5e21cc251e47008ed62a542409c8b6b6"  // 0x20
+        "ac7f8967b3863ca645fcce49582a9aa1"  // 0x30
+        "7349db6c4a95affdae0dae612e1afac9"  // 0x40
+        "9ed39a2d934c880440aed8832f984316"  // 0x50
+        "3a47f27f392199dc1202f9a0f9bd0830"  // 0x60
+        "8007cb1e4e7f58309366a7de25f7c3c9"  // 0x70
+        "b880677c068e1be936e81288815252a8"  // 0x80
+        "a1"
+        "028180"                            // INTEGER length 0x80 (exponent1) value...
+        "57ff8ca1895080b2cae486ef0adfd791"  // 0x10
+        "fb0235c0b8b36cd6c136e52e4085f4ea"  // 0x20
+        "5a063212a4f105a3764743e53281988a"  // 0x30
+        "ba073f6e0027298e1c4378556e0efca0"  // 0x40
+        "e14ece1af76ad0b030f27af6f0ab35fb"  // 0x50
+        "73a060d8b1a0e142fa2647e93b32e36d"  // 0x60
+        "8282ae0a4de50ab7afe85500a16f43a6"  // 0x70
+        "4719d6e2b9439823719cd08bcd031781"  // 0x80
+        "028181"                            // INTEGER length 0x81 (exponent2) value...
+        "00ba73b0bb28e3f81e9bd1c568713b10"  // 0x10
+        "1241acc607976c4ddccc90e65b6556ca"  // 0x20
+        "31516058f92b6e09f3b160ff0e374ec4"  // 0x30
+        "0d78ae4d4979fde6ac06a1a400c61dd3"  // 0x40
+        "1254186af30b22c10582a8a43e34fe94"  // 0x50
+        "9c5f3b9755bae7baa7b7b7a6bd03b38c"  // 0x60
+        "ef55c86885fc6c1978b9cee7ef33da50"  // 0x70
+        "7c9df6b9277cff1e6aaa5d57aca52846"  // 0x80
+        "61"
+        "028181"                            // INTEGER length 0x81 (coefficient) value...
+        "00c931617c77829dfb1270502be9195c"  // 0x10
+        "8f2830885f57dba869536811e6864236"  // 0x20
+        "d0c4736a0008a145af36b8357a7c3d13"  // 0x30
+        "9966d04c4e00934ea1aede3bb6b8ec84"  // 0x40
+        "1dc95e3f579751e2bfdfe27ae778983f"  // 0x50
+        "959356210723287b0affcc9f727044d4"  // 0x60
+        "8c373f1babde0724fa17a4fd4da0902c"  // 0x70
+        "7c9b9bf27ba61be6ad02dfddda8f4e68"  // 0x80
+        "22"
+        // } SEQUENCE
+        // } SEQUENCE ()
+);
 
 string zero_masking_key =
         hex2str("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000");
@@ -2191,6 +3641,36 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
 }
 
+/*
+ * ImportWrappedKeyTest.SuccessSidsIgnored
+ *
+ * Verifies that password_sid and biometric_sid are ignored on import if the authorizations don't
+ * include Tag:USER_SECURE_ID.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, SuccessSidsIgnored) {
+    auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                     .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+                                     .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                     .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+                                     .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY)
+                                     .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+    int64_t password_sid = 42;
+    int64_t biometric_sid = 24;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+                               AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                       .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                       .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP),
+                               password_sid, biometric_sid));
+
+    string message = "Hello World!";
+    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+    string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+    string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+    EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
 TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, SuccessMasked) {
     auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                      .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
@@ -2237,6 +3717,36 @@
                                      .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
 }
 
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, WrongPaddingMode) {
+    auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                     .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+                                     .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                     .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+                                     .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY)
+                                     .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE,
+              ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+                               AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                       .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                       .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+}
+
+TEST_P(ImportWrappedKeyTest, WrongDigest) {
+    auto wrapping_key_desc = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                     .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+                                     .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_512)
+                                     .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+                                     .Authorization(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::WRAP_KEY)
+                                     .SetDefaultValidity();
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST,
+              ImportWrappedKey(wrapped_key, wrapping_key, wrapping_key_desc, zero_masking_key,
+                               AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                       .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                       .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)));
+}
+
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(ImportWrappedKeyTest);
 
 typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase EncryptionOperationsTest;
@@ -2244,31 +3754,35 @@
 /*
  * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingSuccess
  *
- * Verifies that raw RSA encryption works.
+ * Verifies that raw RSA decryption works.
  */
 TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingSuccess) {
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
-                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
-                                                 .SetDefaultValidity()));
+    for (uint64_t exponent : {3, 65537}) {
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                     .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, exponent)
+                                                     .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                                     .SetDefaultValidity()));
 
-    string message = string(2048 / 8, 'a');
-    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
-    string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
-    EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
+        string message = string(2048 / 8, 'a');
+        auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+        string ciphertext1 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
+        EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
 
-    string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
-    EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
+        string ciphertext2 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
+        EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
 
-    // Unpadded RSA is deterministic
-    EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+        // Unpadded RSA is deterministic
+        EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey();
+    }
 }
 
 /*
  * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingShortMessage
  *
- * Verifies that raw RSA encryption of short messages works.
+ * Verifies that raw RSA decryption of short messages works.
  */
 TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingShortMessage) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
@@ -2280,76 +3794,47 @@
     string message = "1";
     auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
 
-    string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+    string ciphertext = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
     EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext.size());
 
     string expected_plaintext = string(2048U / 8 - 1, 0) + message;
     string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
 
     EXPECT_EQ(expected_plaintext, plaintext);
-
-    // Degenerate case, encrypting a numeric 1 yields 0x00..01 as the ciphertext.
-    message = static_cast<char>(1);
-    ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
-    EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext.size());
-    EXPECT_EQ(ciphertext, string(2048U / 8 - 1, 0) + message);
 }
 
 /*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLong
- *
- * Verifies that raw RSA encryption of too-long messages fails in the expected way.
- */
-TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaNoPaddingTooLong) {
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
-                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
-                                                 .SetDefaultValidity()));
-
-    string message(2048 / 8 + 1, 'a');
-
-    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
-
-    string result;
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &result));
-}
-
-/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaNoPaddingTooLarge
- *
- * Verifies that raw RSA encryption of too-large (numerically) messages fails in the expected
- * way.
- */
-// TODO(seleneh) add RsaNoPaddingTooLarge test back after decided and implemented new
-// version of ExportKey inside generateKey
-
-/*
  * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepSuccess
  *
- * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations work, with all digests.
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP decryption operations work, with all digests.
  */
 TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepSuccess) {
     auto digests = ValidDigests(false /* withNone */, true /* withMD5 */);
 
     size_t key_size = 2048;  // Need largish key for SHA-512 test.
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .RsaEncryptionKey(key_size, 65537)
-                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
-                                                 .Digest(digests)
-                                                 .SetDefaultValidity()));
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK,
+              GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                  .RsaEncryptionKey(key_size, 65537)
+                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+                                  .Digest(digests)
+                                  .Authorization(TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, Digest::SHA1)
+                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
 
     string message = "Hello";
 
     for (auto digest : digests) {
-        auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(digest).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP);
-        string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "digest-" << digest);
+
+        auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                              .Digest(digest)
+                              .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
+                              .Authorization(TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, Digest::SHA1);
+        string ciphertext1 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
         if (HasNonfatalFailure()) std::cout << "-->" << digest << std::endl;
         EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext1.size());
 
-        string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+        string ciphertext2 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
         EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext2.size());
 
         // OAEP randomizes padding so every result should be different (with astronomically high
@@ -2379,7 +3864,7 @@
 /*
  * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
  *
- * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP decryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
  * without a digest.
  */
 TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepInvalidDigest) {
@@ -2389,16 +3874,33 @@
                                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
                                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
-    string message = "Hello World!";
 
     auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP).Digest(Digest::NONE);
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
 }
 
 /*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidPadding
  *
- * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to decrypt
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP decryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
+ * with a padding value that is only suitable for signing/verifying.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepInvalidPadding) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::NONE)
+                                                 .SetDefaultValidity()));
+
+    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PSS).Digest(Digest::NONE);
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepDecryptWithWrongDigest
+ *
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP decryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to decrypt
  * with a different digest than was used to encrypt.
  */
 TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepDecryptWithWrongDigest) {
@@ -2411,7 +3913,7 @@
                                                  .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_224, Digest::SHA_2_256)
                                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
     string message = "Hello World!";
-    string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(
+    string ciphertext = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(
             message,
             AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::SHA_2_224).Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP));
 
@@ -2424,34 +3926,9 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepTooLarge
- *
- * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to encrypt a
- * too-large message.
- */
-TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepTooLarge) {
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
-                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
-                                                 .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
-                                                 .SetDefaultValidity()));
-    constexpr size_t digest_size = 256 /* SHA_2_256 */ / 8;
-    constexpr size_t oaep_overhead = 2 * digest_size + 2;
-    string message(2048 / 8 - oaep_overhead + 1, 'a');
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                                .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
-                                                                .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)));
-    string result;
-    ErrorCode error = Finish(message, &result);
-    EXPECT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH || error == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
-    EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
-}
-
-/*
  * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepWithMGFDigestSuccess
  *
- * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations work, with all SHA 256 digests and all type of MGF1
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP decryption operations work, with all SHA 256 digests and all type of MGF1
  * digests.
  */
 TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepWithMGFDigestSuccess) {
@@ -2473,11 +3950,11 @@
                               .Authorization(TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, digest)
                               .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                               .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP);
-        string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+        string ciphertext1 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
         if (HasNonfatalFailure()) std::cout << "-->" << digest << std::endl;
         EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext1.size());
 
-        string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+        string ciphertext2 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
         EXPECT_EQ(key_size / 8, ciphertext2.size());
 
         // OAEP randomizes padding so every result should be different (with astronomically high
@@ -2507,7 +3984,7 @@
 /*
  * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepWithMGFIncompatibleDigest
  *
- * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
+ * Verifies that RSA-OAEP decryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to operate
  * with incompatible MGF digest.
  */
 TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaOaepWithMGFIncompatibleDigest) {
@@ -2525,7 +4002,7 @@
                           .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
                           .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                           .Authorization(TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, Digest::SHA_2_224);
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2549,7 +4026,7 @@
                           .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP)
                           .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                           .Authorization(TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, Digest::NONE);
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MGF_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MGF_DIGEST, Begin(KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, params));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2566,10 +4043,10 @@
 
     string message = "Hello World!";
     auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT);
-    string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+    string ciphertext1 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
     EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext1.size());
 
-    string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+    string ciphertext2 = LocalRsaEncryptMessage(message, params);
     EXPECT_EQ(2048U / 8, ciphertext2.size());
 
     // PKCS1 v1.5 randomizes padding so every result should be different.
@@ -2593,27 +4070,6 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaPkcs1TooLarge
- *
- * Verifies that RSA PKCS encryption fails in the correct way when the mssage is too large.
- */
-TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, RsaPkcs1TooLarge) {
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .RsaEncryptionKey(2048, 65537)
-                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT)
-                                                 .SetDefaultValidity()));
-    string message(2048 / 8 - 10, 'a');
-
-    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT);
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
-    string result;
-    ErrorCode error = Finish(message, &result);
-    EXPECT_TRUE(error == ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH || error == ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT);
-    EXPECT_EQ(0U, result.size());
-}
-
-/*
  * EncryptionOperationsTest.EcdsaEncrypt
  *
  * Verifies that attempting to use ECDSA keys to encrypt fails in the correct way.
@@ -2621,7 +4077,7 @@
 TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, EcdsaEncrypt) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                                  .Digest(Digest::NONE)
                                                  .SetDefaultValidity()));
     auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().Digest(Digest::NONE);
@@ -2680,7 +4136,49 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbRoundTripSuccess
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbUnknownTag
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES ECB operations ignore unknown tags.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbUnknownTag) {
+    int32_t unknown_tag_value = ((7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 150);
+    Tag unknown_tag = static_cast<Tag>(unknown_tag_value);
+    KeyParameter unknown_param;
+    unknown_param.tag = unknown_tag;
+
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                                 .Authorization(unknown_param),
+                                         &key_blob_, &key_characteristics));
+    ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+    // Unknown tags should not be returned in key characteristics.
+    AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+    AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+    EXPECT_EQ(hw_enforced.find(unknown_tag), -1);
+    EXPECT_EQ(sw_enforced.find(unknown_tag), -1);
+
+    // Encrypt without mentioning the unknown parameter.
+    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+    string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
+    string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+    EXPECT_EQ(message.size(), ciphertext.size());
+
+    // Decrypt including the unknown parameter.
+    auto decrypt_params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                  .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                  .Authorization(unknown_param);
+    string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, decrypt_params);
+    EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesWrongMode
  *
  * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized mode is specified.
  */
@@ -2690,11 +4188,8 @@
                                                  .AesEncryptionKey(128)
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
                                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
-
     ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
 
-    // Two-block message.
-    string message = "12345678901234567890123456789012";
     EXPECT_EQ(
             ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE,
             Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
@@ -2702,6 +4197,55 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesWrongPadding
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized padding is specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesWrongPadding) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+    ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(
+            ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE,
+            Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
+                  AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesInvalidParams
+ *
+ * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an duplicate parameters are specified.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesInvalidParams) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::CBC)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7)));
+    ASSERT_GT(key_blob_.size(), 0U);
+
+    auto result = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+                                                     .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+                                                     .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE ||
+                result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE);
+
+    result = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
+                                                .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                                .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7));
+    EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE ||
+                result == ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
+}
+
+/*
  * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesWrongPurpose
  *
  * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized purpose is
@@ -2742,25 +4286,30 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize
  *
  * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when provided an input that is not a
  * multiple of the block size and no padding is specified.
  */
-TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .AesEncryptionKey(128)
-                                                 .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB)
-                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
-    // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
-    string message(16 * 2 - 1, 'a');
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesEcbCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
+    for (BlockMode blockMode : {BlockMode::ECB, BlockMode::CBC}) {
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                     .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+                                                     .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, blockMode)
+                                                     .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+        // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
+        string message(16 * 2 - 1, 'a');
 
-    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
-    string ciphertext;
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &ciphertext));
-    EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
+        auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(blockMode).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+        AuthorizationSet out_params;
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params, &out_params));
+        string ciphertext;
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, &ciphertext));
+        EXPECT_EQ(0U, ciphertext.size());
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey();
+    }
 }
 
 /*
@@ -3080,7 +4629,7 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCbcRoundTripSuccess
  *
  * Verifies that keymint fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size nonce.
  */
@@ -3320,6 +4869,31 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmDifferentAutoNonces
+ *
+ * Verifies that encrypting the same data with KeyMint generated nonces produces different outputs.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, AesGcmDifferentAutoNonces) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .AesEncryptionKey(128)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::GCM)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128)));
+
+    string aad = "foobar";
+    string message = "123456789012345678901234567890123456";
+
+    string ciphertext1 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128);
+    string ciphertext2 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128);
+    string ciphertext3 = EncryptMessage(message, BlockMode::GCM, PaddingMode::NONE, 128);
+
+    ASSERT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext2);
+    ASSERT_NE(ciphertext1, ciphertext3);
+    ASSERT_NE(ciphertext2, ciphertext3);
+}
+
+/*
  * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesGcmTooShortTag
  *
  * Verifies that AES GCM mode fails correctly when a too-short tag length is specified.
@@ -3547,6 +5121,9 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Update(message, &ciphertext));
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG, UpdateAad("foo"));
 
+    // The failure should have already cancelled the operation.
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE, Abort());
+
     op_ = {};
 }
 
@@ -3746,11 +5323,8 @@
                                                  .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
                                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
-        auto inParams =
-                AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
-    }
+    auto inParams = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -3916,6 +5490,25 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesInvalidCallerIv
+ *
+ * Validates that keymint fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size IV.
+ */
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesInvalidCallerIv) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+                                                 .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_CALLER_NONCE)
+                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                          .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
+                          .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)
+                          .Authorization(TAG_NONCE, AidlBuf("abcdefg"));
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params));
+}
+
+/*
  * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCallerIv
  *
  * Validates that 3DES keys can allow caller-specified IVs, and use them correctly.
@@ -3953,7 +5546,7 @@
 /*
  * EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerNonceProhibited.
  *
- * Verifies that 3DES keys without TAG_CALLER_NONCE do not allow caller-specified IVS.
+ * Verifies that 3DES keys without TAG_CALLER_NONCE do not allow caller-specified IVs.
  */
 TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCallerNonceProhibited) {
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
@@ -4001,25 +5594,29 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.TripleDesEcbCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize
  *
  * Verifies that unpadded CBC operations reject inputs that are not a multiple of block size.
  */
-TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
-    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                                 .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
-                                                 .BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC)
-                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                                 .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
-    // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
-    string message = "123456789012345";
+TEST_P(EncryptionOperationsTest, TripleDesEcbCbcNoPaddingWrongInputSize) {
+    for (BlockMode blockMode : {BlockMode::ECB, BlockMode::CBC}) {
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                     .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+                                                     .BlockMode(blockMode)
+                                                     .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                     .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
+        // Message is slightly shorter than two blocks.
+        string message = "123456789012345";
 
-    auto begin_params =
-            AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::CBC).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
-    AuthorizationSet output_params;
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &output_params));
-    string ciphertext;
-    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, "", &ciphertext));
+        auto begin_params =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(blockMode).Padding(PaddingMode::NONE);
+        AuthorizationSet output_params;
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, begin_params, &output_params));
+        string ciphertext;
+        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, Finish(message, "", &ciphertext));
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey();
+    }
 }
 
 /*
@@ -4427,6 +6024,19 @@
 
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(UsageCountLimitTest);
 
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase GetHardwareInfoTest;
+
+TEST_P(GetHardwareInfoTest, GetHardwareInfo) {
+    // Retrieving hardware info should give the same result each time.
+    KeyMintHardwareInfo info;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint().getHardwareInfo(&info).isOk());
+    KeyMintHardwareInfo info2;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint().getHardwareInfo(&info2).isOk());
+    EXPECT_EQ(info, info2);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(GetHardwareInfoTest);
+
 typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase AddEntropyTest;
 
 /*
@@ -4458,6 +6068,16 @@
     EXPECT_TRUE(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf(string(2 * 1024, 'a'))).isOk());
 }
 
+/*
+ * AddEntropyTest.AddTooLargeEntropy
+ *
+ * Verifies that the addRngEntropy method rejects more than 2KiB  of data.
+ */
+TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddTooLargeEntropy) {
+    ErrorCode rc = GetReturnErrorCode(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf(string(2 * 1024 + 1, 'a'))));
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, rc);
+}
+
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AddEntropyTest);
 
 typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase KeyDeletionTest;
@@ -4569,6 +6189,28 @@
 
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(KeyDeletionTest);
 
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase KeyUpgradeTest;
+
+/**
+ * KeyUpgradeTest.UpgradeInvalidKey
+ *
+ * This test checks that the HAL excepts invalid key blobs..
+ */
+TEST_P(KeyUpgradeTest, UpgradeInvalidKey) {
+    AidlBuf key_blob = AidlBuf("just some garbage data which is not a valid key blob");
+
+    std::vector<uint8_t> new_blob;
+    Status result = keymint_->upgradeKey(key_blob,
+                                         AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_ID, "clientid")
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA, "appdata")
+                                                 .vector_data(),
+                                         &new_blob);
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB, GetReturnErrorCode(result));
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(KeyUpgradeTest);
+
 using UpgradeKeyTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
 
 /*
@@ -4637,7 +6279,7 @@
 typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase TransportLimitTest;
 
 /*
- * TransportLimitTest.FinishInput
+ * TransportLimitTest.LargeFinishInput
  *
  * Verifies that passing input data to finish succeeds as expected.
  */
@@ -4792,19 +6434,99 @@
 
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(KeyAgreementTest);
 
+using DestroyAttestationIdsTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
+
+// This is a problematic test, as it can render the device under test permanently unusable.
+// Re-enable and run at your own risk.
+TEST_P(DestroyAttestationIdsTest, DISABLED_DestroyTest) {
+    auto result = DestroyAttestationIds();
+    EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::OK || result == ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(DestroyAttestationIdsTest);
+
 using EarlyBootKeyTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
 
+/*
+ * EarlyBootKeyTest.CreateEarlyBootKeys
+ *
+ * Verifies that creating early boot keys succeeds, even at a later stage (after boot).
+ */
 TEST_P(EarlyBootKeyTest, CreateEarlyBootKeys) {
+    // Early boot keys can be created after early boot.
     auto [aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData] =
             CreateTestKeys(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, ErrorCode::OK);
 
+    for (const auto& keyData : {aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData}) {
+        ASSERT_GT(keyData.blob.size(), 0U);
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(keyData.characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)) << crypto_params;
+    }
     CheckedDeleteKey(&aesKeyData.blob);
     CheckedDeleteKey(&hmacKeyData.blob);
     CheckedDeleteKey(&rsaKeyData.blob);
     CheckedDeleteKey(&ecdsaKeyData.blob);
 }
 
-// This is a more comprenhensive test, but it can only be run on a machine which is still in early
+/*
+ * EarlyBootKeyTest.CreateAttestedEarlyBootKey
+ *
+ * Verifies that creating an early boot key with attestation succeeds.
+ */
+TEST_P(EarlyBootKeyTest, CreateAttestedEarlyBootKey) {
+    auto [aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData] = CreateTestKeys(
+            TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, ErrorCode::OK, [](AuthorizationSetBuilder* builder) {
+                builder->AttestationChallenge("challenge");
+                builder->AttestationApplicationId("app_id");
+            });
+
+    for (const auto& keyData : {aesKeyData, hmacKeyData, rsaKeyData, ecdsaKeyData}) {
+        ASSERT_GT(keyData.blob.size(), 0U);
+        AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(keyData.characteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)) << crypto_params;
+    }
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&aesKeyData.blob);
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&hmacKeyData.blob);
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&rsaKeyData.blob);
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&ecdsaKeyData.blob);
+}
+
+/*
+ * EarlyBootKeyTest.UseEarlyBootKeyFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that using early boot keys at a later stage fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(EarlyBootKeyTest, UseEarlyBootKeyFailure) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)
+                                                 .HmacKey(128)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 256)));
+    AuthorizationSet output_params;
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::EARLY_BOOT_ENDED, Begin(KeyPurpose::SIGN, key_blob_,
+                                                 AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                         .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                         .Authorization(TAG_MAC_LENGTH, 256),
+                                                 &output_params));
+}
+
+/*
+ * EarlyBootKeyTest.ImportEarlyBootKeyFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing early boot keys fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(EarlyBootKeyTest, ImportEarlyBootKeyFailure) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::EARLY_BOOT_ENDED, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                             .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                             .Authorization(TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY)
+                                                             .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                             .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                             .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                                     KeyFormat::PKCS8, ec_256_key));
+}
+
+// This is a more comprehensive test, but it can only be run on a machine which is still in early
 // boot stage, which no proper Android device is by the time we can run VTS.  To use this,
 // un-disable it and modify vold to remove the call to earlyBootEnded().  Running the test will end
 // early boot, so you'll have to reboot between runs.
@@ -4872,7 +6594,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, UseEcdsaKey(ecdsaKeyData.blob));
 
     ErrorCode rc = GetReturnErrorCode(
-            keyMint().deviceLocked(false /* passwordOnly */, {} /* verificationToken */));
+            keyMint().deviceLocked(false /* passwordOnly */, {} /* timestampToken */));
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, rc);
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED, UseAesKey(aesKeyData.blob));
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::DEVICE_LOCKED, UseHmacKey(hmacKeyData.blob));
@@ -4887,16 +6609,6 @@
 
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(UnlockedDeviceRequiredTest);
 
-using PerformOperationTest = KeyMintAidlTestBase;
-
-TEST_P(PerformOperationTest, RequireUnimplemented) {
-    vector<uint8_t> response;
-    auto result = keymint_->performOperation({} /* request */, &response);
-    ASSERT_EQ(GetReturnErrorCode(result), ErrorCode::UNIMPLEMENTED);
-}
-
-INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(PerformOperationTest);
-
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
 
 int main(int argc, char** argv) {
@@ -4921,6 +6633,10 @@
             } else {
                 std::cout << "NOT dumping attestations" << std::endl;
             }
+            // TODO(drysdale): Remove this flag when available KeyMint devices comply with spec
+            if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--check_patchLevels") {
+                aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test::check_patchLevels = true;
+            }
         }
     }
     return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
index 9e52b20..a177317 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/VtsRemotelyProvisionedComponentTests.cpp
@@ -16,13 +16,13 @@
 
 #define LOG_TAG "VtsRemotelyProvisionableComponentTests"
 
-#include <RemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
+#include <AndroidRemotelyProvisionedComponentDevice.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.h>
 #include <aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/SecurityLevel.h>
 #include <android/binder_manager.h>
 #include <cppbor_parse.h>
-#include <cppcose/cppcose.h>
 #include <gmock/gmock.h>
+#include <keymaster/cppcose/cppcose.h>
 #include <keymaster/keymaster_configuration.h>
 #include <keymint_support/authorization_set.h>
 #include <openssl/ec.h>
@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@
                                               cppbor::Array()  // SignedMacAad
                                                       .add(challenge_)
                                                       .add(std::move(deviceInfoMap))
+                                                      .add(keysToSignMac)
                                                       .encode());
         ASSERT_TRUE(macKey) << macKey.message();
 
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/performance/KeyMintBenchmark.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/performance/KeyMintBenchmark.cpp
index 6c795f5..54b6fdc 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/performance/KeyMintBenchmark.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/performance/KeyMintBenchmark.cpp
@@ -228,8 +228,7 @@
                     AuthorizationSet* out_params) {
         Status result;
         BeginResult out;
-        result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob_, in_params.vector_data(), HardwareAuthToken(),
-                                 &out);
+        result = keymint_->begin(purpose, key_blob_, in_params.vector_data(), std::nullopt, &out);
         if (result.isOk()) {
             *out_params = out.params;
             op_ = out.operation;
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/Android.bp b/security/keymint/support/Android.bp
index 4c4258b..718133a 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/Android.bp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/Android.bp
@@ -57,25 +57,8 @@
         "include",
     ],
     shared_libs: [
-        "libcppcose",
         "libcppbor_external",
+        "libcppcose_rkp",
         "libcrypto",
     ],
 }
-
-cc_library {
-    name: "libcppcose",
-    vendor_available: true,
-    host_supported: true,
-    srcs: [
-        "cppcose.cpp",
-    ],
-    export_include_dirs: [
-        "include",
-    ],
-    shared_libs: [
-        "libcppbor_external",
-        "libcrypto",
-        "liblog",
-    ],
-}
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp b/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
index a48f770..2462228 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST);
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST);
 
+// Fields ordered in tag order.
 typedef struct km_auth_list {
     ASN1_INTEGER_SET* purpose;
     ASN1_INTEGER* algorithm;
@@ -72,32 +73,38 @@
     ASN1_INTEGER_SET* padding;
     ASN1_INTEGER* ec_curve;
     ASN1_INTEGER* rsa_public_exponent;
+    ASN1_INTEGER_SET* mgf_digest;
+    ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
+    ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
     ASN1_INTEGER* active_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* origination_expire_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* usage_expire_date_time;
+    ASN1_INTEGER* usage_count_limit;
     ASN1_NULL* no_auth_required;
     ASN1_INTEGER* user_auth_type;
     ASN1_INTEGER* auth_timeout;
     ASN1_NULL* allow_while_on_body;
-    ASN1_NULL* all_applications;
-    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* application_id;
+    ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
+    ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
+    ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
     ASN1_INTEGER* creation_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* origin;
-    ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
     KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust;
     ASN1_INTEGER* os_version;
     ASN1_INTEGER* os_patchlevel;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_application_id;
-    ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
-    ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
-    ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_brand;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_device;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_product;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_serial;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_imei;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_meid;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_manufacturer;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_model;
     ASN1_INTEGER* vendor_patchlevel;
     ASN1_INTEGER* boot_patchlevel;
-    ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
     ASN1_NULL* device_unique_attestation;
-    ASN1_NULL* storage_key;
     ASN1_NULL* identity_credential;
-    ASN1_INTEGER* usage_count_limit;
 } KM_AUTH_LIST;
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_AUTH_LIST) = {
@@ -109,13 +116,18 @@
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, ec_curve, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_EC_CURVE.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rsa_public_exponent, ASN1_INTEGER,
                      TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, mgf_digest, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                            TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL,
                      TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
                      TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
                      TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_count_limit, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                     TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, no_auth_required, ASN1_NULL, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, user_auth_type, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, auth_timeout, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT.maskedTag()),
@@ -133,19 +145,31 @@
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_brand, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_device, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_product, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_serial, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_imei, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_meid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_manufacturer, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_model, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER,
                      TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
-                     TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, device_unique_attestation, ASN1_NULL,
                      TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.maskedTag()),
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, storage_key, ASN1_NULL, TAG_STORAGE_KEY.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, identity_credential, ASN1_NULL,
                      TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY.maskedTag()),
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_count_limit, ASN1_INTEGER,
-                     TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT.maskedTag()),
 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_AUTH_LIST);
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_AUTH_LIST);
 
@@ -155,9 +179,9 @@
     ASN1_INTEGER* keymint_version;
     ASN1_ENUMERATED* keymint_security_level;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_challenge;
+    ASN1_INTEGER* unique_id;
     KM_AUTH_LIST* software_enforced;
     KM_AUTH_LIST* tee_enforced;
-    ASN1_INTEGER* unique_id;
 } KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION;
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION) = {
@@ -253,41 +277,52 @@
 }
 
 // Extract the values from the specified ASN.1 record and place them in auth_list.
+// Does nothing with root-of-trust field.
 static ErrorCode extract_auth_list(const KM_AUTH_LIST* record, AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
     if (!record) return ErrorCode::OK;
 
-    copyAuthTag(record->active_date_time, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->algorithm, TAG_ALGORITHM, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->application_id, TAG_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->auth_timeout, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->creation_date_time, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->digest, TAG_DIGEST, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->ec_curve, TAG_EC_CURVE, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->key_size, TAG_KEY_SIZE, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->no_auth_required, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->origin, TAG_ORIGIN, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->origination_expire_date_time, TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->os_patchlevel, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->os_version, TAG_OS_VERSION, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->padding, TAG_PADDING, auth_list);
+    // Fields ordered in tag order.
     copyAuthTag(record->purpose, TAG_PURPOSE, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->rollback_resistance, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->algorithm, TAG_ALGORITHM, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->key_size, TAG_KEY_SIZE, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->digest, TAG_DIGEST, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->padding, TAG_PADDING, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->ec_curve, TAG_EC_CURVE, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->rsa_public_exponent, TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->mgf_digest, TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->rollback_resistance, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->early_boot_only, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->active_date_time, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->origination_expire_date_time, TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->usage_count_limit, TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->no_auth_required, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->auth_timeout, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->allow_while_on_body, TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->trusted_user_presence_required, TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
                 auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->trusted_confirmation_required, TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED,
                 auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->unlocked_device_required, TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->early_boot_only, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->creation_date_time, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->origin, TAG_ORIGIN, auth_list);
+    // root_of_trust dealt with separately
+    copyAuthTag(record->os_version, TAG_OS_VERSION, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->os_patchlevel, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_brand, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_device, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_product, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_serial, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_imei, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_meid, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_manufacturer, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_model, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->device_unique_attestation, TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->storage_key, TAG_STORAGE_KEY, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->identity_credential, TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->usage_count_limit, TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, auth_list);
 
     return ErrorCode::OK;
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/cppcose.cpp b/security/keymint/support/cppcose.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index bafb2b6..0000000
--- a/security/keymint/support/cppcose.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,467 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include <cppcose/cppcose.h>
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <iostream>
-
-#include <cppbor.h>
-#include <cppbor_parse.h>
-
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-
-namespace cppcose {
-
-namespace {
-
-ErrMsgOr<bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX>> aesGcmInitAndProcessAad(const bytevec& key,
-                                                                  const bytevec& nonce,
-                                                                  const bytevec& aad,
-                                                                  bool encrypt) {
-    if (key.size() != kAesGcmKeySize) return "Invalid key size";
-
-    bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_CIPHER_CTX> ctx(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new());
-    if (!ctx) return "Failed to allocate cipher context";
-
-    if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx.get(), EVP_aes_256_gcm(), nullptr /* engine */, key.data(),
-                           nonce.data(), encrypt ? 1 : 0)) {
-        return "Failed to initialize cipher";
-    }
-
-    int outlen;
-    if (!aad.empty() && !EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx.get(), nullptr /* out; null means AAD */, &outlen,
-                                          aad.data(), aad.size())) {
-        return "Failed to process AAD";
-    }
-
-    return std::move(ctx);
-}
-
-}  // namespace
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> generateCoseMac0Mac(const bytevec& macKey, const bytevec& externalAad,
-                                      const bytevec& payload) {
-    auto macStructure = cppbor::Array()
-                                .add("MAC0")
-                                .add(cppbor::Map().add(ALGORITHM, HMAC_256).canonicalize().encode())
-                                .add(externalAad)
-                                .add(payload)
-                                .encode();
-
-    bytevec macTag(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-    uint8_t* out = macTag.data();
-    unsigned int outLen;
-    out = HMAC(EVP_sha256(),                              //
-               macKey.data(), macKey.size(),              //
-               macStructure.data(), macStructure.size(),  //
-               out, &outLen);
-
-    assert(out != nullptr && outLen == macTag.size());
-    if (out == nullptr || outLen != macTag.size()) {
-        return "Error computing public key MAC";
-    }
-
-    return macTag;
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseMac0(const bytevec& macKey, const bytevec& externalAad,
-                                          const bytevec& payload) {
-    auto tag = generateCoseMac0Mac(macKey, externalAad, payload);
-    if (!tag) return tag.moveMessage();
-
-    return cppbor::Array()
-            .add(cppbor::Map().add(ALGORITHM, HMAC_256).canonicalize().encode())
-            .add(cppbor::Map() /* unprotected */)
-            .add(payload)
-            .add(tag.moveValue());
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* payload */> parseCoseMac0(const cppbor::Item* macItem) {
-    auto mac = macItem ? macItem->asArray() : nullptr;
-    if (!mac || mac->size() != kCoseMac0EntryCount) {
-        return "Invalid COSE_Mac0";
-    }
-
-    auto protectedParms = mac->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
-    auto unprotectedParms = mac->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
-    auto payload = mac->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
-    auto tag = mac->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
-    if (!protectedParms || !unprotectedParms || !payload || !tag) {
-        return "Invalid COSE_Mac0 contents";
-    }
-
-    return payload->value();
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* payload */> verifyAndParseCoseMac0(const cppbor::Item* macItem,
-                                                       const bytevec& macKey) {
-    auto mac = macItem ? macItem->asArray() : nullptr;
-    if (!mac || mac->size() != kCoseMac0EntryCount) {
-        return "Invalid COSE_Mac0";
-    }
-
-    auto protectedParms = mac->get(kCoseMac0ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
-    auto unprotectedParms = mac->get(kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
-    auto payload = mac->get(kCoseMac0Payload)->asBstr();
-    auto tag = mac->get(kCoseMac0Tag)->asBstr();
-    if (!protectedParms || !unprotectedParms || !payload || !tag) {
-        return "Invalid COSE_Mac0 contents";
-    }
-
-    auto [protectedMap, _, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedParms);
-    if (!protectedMap || !protectedMap->asMap()) {
-        return "Invalid Mac0 protected: " + errMsg;
-    }
-    auto& algo = protectedMap->asMap()->get(ALGORITHM);
-    if (!algo || !algo->asInt() || algo->asInt()->value() != HMAC_256) {
-        return "Unsupported Mac0 algorithm";
-    }
-
-    auto macTag = generateCoseMac0Mac(macKey, {} /* external_aad */, payload->value());
-    if (!macTag) return macTag.moveMessage();
-
-    if (macTag->size() != tag->value().size() ||
-        CRYPTO_memcmp(macTag->data(), tag->value().data(), macTag->size()) != 0) {
-        return "MAC tag mismatch";
-    }
-
-    return payload->value();
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> createCoseSign1Signature(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& protectedParams,
-                                           const bytevec& payload, const bytevec& aad) {
-    bytevec signatureInput = cppbor::Array()
-                                     .add("Signature1")  //
-                                     .add(protectedParams)
-                                     .add(aad)
-                                     .add(payload)
-                                     .encode();
-
-    if (key.size() != ED25519_PRIVATE_KEY_LEN) return "Invalid signing key";
-    bytevec signature(ED25519_SIGNATURE_LEN);
-    if (!ED25519_sign(signature.data(), signatureInput.data(), signatureInput.size(), key.data())) {
-        return "Signing failed";
-    }
-
-    return signature;
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseSign1(const bytevec& key, cppbor::Map protectedParams,
-                                           const bytevec& payload, const bytevec& aad) {
-    bytevec protParms = protectedParams.add(ALGORITHM, EDDSA).canonicalize().encode();
-    auto signature = createCoseSign1Signature(key, protParms, payload, aad);
-    if (!signature) return signature.moveMessage();
-
-    return cppbor::Array()
-            .add(protParms)
-            .add(cppbor::Map() /* unprotected parameters */)
-            .add(payload)
-            .add(*signature);
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseSign1(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& payload,
-                                           const bytevec& aad) {
-    return constructCoseSign1(key, {} /* protectedParams */, payload, aad);
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> verifyAndParseCoseSign1(bool ignoreSignature, const cppbor::Array* coseSign1,
-                                          const bytevec& signingCoseKey, const bytevec& aad) {
-    if (!coseSign1 || coseSign1->size() != kCoseSign1EntryCount) {
-        return "Invalid COSE_Sign1";
-    }
-
-    const cppbor::Bstr* protectedParams = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1ProtectedParams)->asBstr();
-    const cppbor::Map* unprotectedParams = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1UnprotectedParams)->asMap();
-    const cppbor::Bstr* payload = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1Payload)->asBstr();
-    const cppbor::Bstr* signature = coseSign1->get(kCoseSign1Signature)->asBstr();
-
-    if (!protectedParams || !unprotectedParams || !payload || !signature) {
-        return "Invalid COSE_Sign1";
-    }
-
-    auto [parsedProtParams, _, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(protectedParams);
-    if (!parsedProtParams) {
-        return errMsg + " when parsing protected params.";
-    }
-    if (!parsedProtParams->asMap()) {
-        return "Protected params must be a map";
-    }
-
-    auto& algorithm = parsedProtParams->asMap()->get(ALGORITHM);
-    if (!algorithm || !algorithm->asInt() || algorithm->asInt()->value() != EDDSA) {
-        return "Unsupported signature algorithm";
-    }
-
-    if (!ignoreSignature) {
-        bool selfSigned = signingCoseKey.empty();
-        auto key = CoseKey::parseEd25519(selfSigned ? payload->value() : signingCoseKey);
-        if (!key) return "Bad signing key: " + key.moveMessage();
-
-        bytevec signatureInput = cppbor::Array()
-                                         .add("Signature1")
-                                         .add(*protectedParams)
-                                         .add(aad)
-                                         .add(*payload)
-                                         .encode();
-
-        if (!ED25519_verify(signatureInput.data(), signatureInput.size(), signature->value().data(),
-                            key->getBstrValue(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X)->data())) {
-            return "Signature verification failed";
-        }
-    }
-
-    return payload->value();
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> createCoseEncryptCiphertext(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce,
-                                              const bytevec& protectedParams,
-                                              const bytevec& plaintextPayload, const bytevec& aad) {
-    auto ciphertext = aesGcmEncrypt(key, nonce,
-                                    cppbor::Array()                // Enc strucure as AAD
-                                            .add("Encrypt")        // Context
-                                            .add(protectedParams)  // Protected
-                                            .add(aad)              // External AAD
-                                            .encode(),
-                                    plaintextPayload);
-
-    if (!ciphertext) return ciphertext.moveMessage();
-    return ciphertext.moveValue();
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseEncrypt(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce,
-                                             const bytevec& plaintextPayload, const bytevec& aad,
-                                             cppbor::Array recipients) {
-    auto encryptProtectedHeader = cppbor::Map()  //
-                                          .add(ALGORITHM, AES_GCM_256)
-                                          .canonicalize()
-                                          .encode();
-
-    auto ciphertext =
-            createCoseEncryptCiphertext(key, nonce, encryptProtectedHeader, plaintextPayload, aad);
-    if (!ciphertext) return ciphertext.moveMessage();
-
-    return cppbor::Array()
-            .add(encryptProtectedHeader)                       // Protected
-            .add(cppbor::Map().add(IV, nonce).canonicalize())  // Unprotected
-            .add(*ciphertext)                                  // Payload
-            .add(std::move(recipients));
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<std::pair<bytevec /* pubkey */, bytevec /* key ID */>> getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(
-        const cppbor::Item* coseEncrypt) {
-    if (!coseEncrypt || !coseEncrypt->asArray() ||
-        coseEncrypt->asArray()->size() != kCoseEncryptEntryCount) {
-        return "Invalid COSE_Encrypt";
-    }
-
-    auto& recipients = coseEncrypt->asArray()->get(kCoseEncryptRecipients);
-    if (!recipients || !recipients->asArray() || recipients->asArray()->size() != 1) {
-        return "Invalid recipients list";
-    }
-
-    auto& recipient = recipients->asArray()->get(0);
-    if (!recipient || !recipient->asArray() || recipient->asArray()->size() != 3) {
-        return "Invalid COSE_recipient";
-    }
-
-    auto& ciphertext = recipient->asArray()->get(2);
-    if (!ciphertext->asSimple() || !ciphertext->asSimple()->asNull()) {
-        return "Unexpected value in recipients ciphertext field " +
-               cppbor::prettyPrint(ciphertext.get());
-    }
-
-    auto& protParms = recipient->asArray()->get(0);
-    if (!protParms || !protParms->asBstr()) return "Invalid protected params";
-    auto [parsedProtParms, _, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(protParms->asBstr());
-    if (!parsedProtParms) return "Failed to parse protected params: " + errMsg;
-    if (!parsedProtParms->asMap()) return "Invalid protected params";
-
-    auto& algorithm = parsedProtParms->asMap()->get(ALGORITHM);
-    if (!algorithm || !algorithm->asInt() || algorithm->asInt()->value() != ECDH_ES_HKDF_256) {
-        return "Invalid algorithm";
-    }
-
-    auto& unprotParms = recipient->asArray()->get(1);
-    if (!unprotParms || !unprotParms->asMap()) return "Invalid unprotected params";
-
-    auto& senderCoseKey = unprotParms->asMap()->get(COSE_KEY);
-    if (!senderCoseKey || !senderCoseKey->asMap()) return "Invalid sender COSE_Key";
-
-    auto& keyType = senderCoseKey->asMap()->get(CoseKey::KEY_TYPE);
-    if (!keyType || !keyType->asInt() || keyType->asInt()->value() != OCTET_KEY_PAIR) {
-        return "Invalid key type";
-    }
-
-    auto& curve = senderCoseKey->asMap()->get(CoseKey::CURVE);
-    if (!curve || !curve->asInt() || curve->asInt()->value() != X25519) {
-        return "Unsupported curve";
-    }
-
-    auto& pubkey = senderCoseKey->asMap()->get(CoseKey::PUBKEY_X);
-    if (!pubkey || !pubkey->asBstr() ||
-        pubkey->asBstr()->value().size() != X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN) {
-        return "Invalid X25519 public key";
-    }
-
-    auto& key_id = unprotParms->asMap()->get(KEY_ID);
-    if (key_id && key_id->asBstr()) {
-        return std::make_pair(pubkey->asBstr()->value(), key_id->asBstr()->value());
-    }
-
-    // If no key ID, just return an empty vector.
-    return std::make_pair(pubkey->asBstr()->value(), bytevec{});
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> decryptCoseEncrypt(const bytevec& key, const cppbor::Item* coseEncrypt,
-                                     const bytevec& external_aad) {
-    if (!coseEncrypt || !coseEncrypt->asArray() ||
-        coseEncrypt->asArray()->size() != kCoseEncryptEntryCount) {
-        return "Invalid COSE_Encrypt";
-    }
-
-    auto& protParms = coseEncrypt->asArray()->get(kCoseEncryptProtectedParams);
-    auto& unprotParms = coseEncrypt->asArray()->get(kCoseEncryptUnprotectedParams);
-    auto& ciphertext = coseEncrypt->asArray()->get(kCoseEncryptPayload);
-    auto& recipients = coseEncrypt->asArray()->get(kCoseEncryptRecipients);
-
-    if (!protParms || !protParms->asBstr() || !unprotParms || !ciphertext || !recipients) {
-        return "Invalid COSE_Encrypt";
-    }
-
-    auto [parsedProtParams, _, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(protParms->asBstr()->value());
-    if (!parsedProtParams) {
-        return errMsg + " when parsing protected params.";
-    }
-    if (!parsedProtParams->asMap()) {
-        return "Protected params must be a map";
-    }
-
-    auto& algorithm = parsedProtParams->asMap()->get(ALGORITHM);
-    if (!algorithm || !algorithm->asInt() || algorithm->asInt()->value() != AES_GCM_256) {
-        return "Unsupported encryption algorithm";
-    }
-
-    if (!unprotParms->asMap() || unprotParms->asMap()->size() != 1) {
-        return "Invalid unprotected params";
-    }
-
-    auto& nonce = unprotParms->asMap()->get(IV);
-    if (!nonce || !nonce->asBstr() || nonce->asBstr()->value().size() != kAesGcmNonceLength) {
-        return "Invalid nonce";
-    }
-
-    if (!ciphertext->asBstr()) return "Invalid ciphertext";
-
-    auto aad = cppbor::Array()                             // Enc strucure as AAD
-                       .add("Encrypt")                     // Context
-                       .add(protParms->asBstr()->value())  // Protected
-                       .add(external_aad)                  // External AAD
-                       .encode();
-
-    return aesGcmDecrypt(key, nonce->asBstr()->value(), aad, ciphertext->asBstr()->value());
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(const bytevec& pubKeyA, const bytevec& privKeyA,
-                                        const bytevec& pubKeyB, bool senderIsA) {
-    bytevec rawSharedKey(X25519_SHARED_KEY_LEN);
-    if (!::X25519(rawSharedKey.data(), privKeyA.data(), pubKeyB.data())) {
-        return "ECDH operation failed";
-    }
-
-    bytevec kdfContext = cppbor::Array()
-                                 .add(AES_GCM_256)
-                                 .add(cppbor::Array()  // Sender Info
-                                              .add(cppbor::Bstr("client"))
-                                              .add(bytevec{} /* nonce */)
-                                              .add(senderIsA ? pubKeyA : pubKeyB))
-                                 .add(cppbor::Array()  // Recipient Info
-                                              .add(cppbor::Bstr("server"))
-                                              .add(bytevec{} /* nonce */)
-                                              .add(senderIsA ? pubKeyB : pubKeyA))
-                                 .add(cppbor::Array()           // SuppPubInfo
-                                              .add(128)         // output key length
-                                              .add(bytevec{}))  // protected
-                                 .encode();
-
-    bytevec retval(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
-    bytevec salt{};
-    if (!HKDF(retval.data(), retval.size(),              //
-              EVP_sha256(),                              //
-              rawSharedKey.data(), rawSharedKey.size(),  //
-              salt.data(), salt.size(),                  //
-              kdfContext.data(), kdfContext.size())) {
-        return "ECDH HKDF failed";
-    }
-
-    return retval;
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> aesGcmEncrypt(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce, const bytevec& aad,
-                                const bytevec& plaintext) {
-    auto ctx = aesGcmInitAndProcessAad(key, nonce, aad, true /* encrypt */);
-    if (!ctx) return ctx.moveMessage();
-
-    bytevec ciphertext(plaintext.size() + kAesGcmTagSize);
-    int outlen;
-    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx->get(), ciphertext.data(), &outlen, plaintext.data(),
-                          plaintext.size())) {
-        return "Failed to encrypt plaintext";
-    }
-    assert(plaintext.size() == outlen);
-
-    if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx->get(), ciphertext.data() + outlen, &outlen)) {
-        return "Failed to finalize encryption";
-    }
-    assert(outlen == 0);
-
-    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx->get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, kAesGcmTagSize,
-                             ciphertext.data() + plaintext.size())) {
-        return "Failed to retrieve tag";
-    }
-
-    return ciphertext;
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> aesGcmDecrypt(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce, const bytevec& aad,
-                                const bytevec& ciphertextWithTag) {
-    auto ctx = aesGcmInitAndProcessAad(key, nonce, aad, false /* encrypt */);
-    if (!ctx) return ctx.moveMessage();
-
-    if (ciphertextWithTag.size() < kAesGcmTagSize) return "Missing tag";
-
-    bytevec plaintext(ciphertextWithTag.size() - kAesGcmTagSize);
-    int outlen;
-    if (!EVP_CipherUpdate(ctx->get(), plaintext.data(), &outlen, ciphertextWithTag.data(),
-                          ciphertextWithTag.size() - kAesGcmTagSize)) {
-        return "Failed to decrypt plaintext";
-    }
-    assert(plaintext.size() == outlen);
-
-    bytevec tag(ciphertextWithTag.end() - kAesGcmTagSize, ciphertextWithTag.end());
-    if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx->get(), EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, kAesGcmTagSize, tag.data())) {
-        return "Failed to set tag: " + std::to_string(ERR_peek_last_error());
-    }
-
-    if (!EVP_CipherFinal_ex(ctx->get(), nullptr, &outlen)) {
-        return "Failed to finalize encryption";
-    }
-    assert(outlen == 0);
-
-    return plaintext;
-}
-
-}  // namespace cppcose
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/include/cppcose/cppcose.h b/security/keymint/support/include/cppcose/cppcose.h
deleted file mode 100644
index a936bfd..0000000
--- a/security/keymint/support/include/cppcose/cppcose.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,288 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2020 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#pragma once
-
-#include <memory>
-#include <optional>
-#include <string>
-#include <vector>
-
-#include <cppbor.h>
-#include <cppbor_parse.h>
-
-#include <openssl/cipher.h>
-#include <openssl/curve25519.h>
-#include <openssl/digest.h>
-#include <openssl/hkdf.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/mem.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-
-namespace cppcose {
-
-using bytevec = std::vector<uint8_t>;
-
-constexpr int kCoseSign1EntryCount = 4;
-constexpr int kCoseSign1ProtectedParams = 0;
-constexpr int kCoseSign1UnprotectedParams = 1;
-constexpr int kCoseSign1Payload = 2;
-constexpr int kCoseSign1Signature = 3;
-
-constexpr int kCoseMac0EntryCount = 4;
-constexpr int kCoseMac0ProtectedParams = 0;
-constexpr int kCoseMac0UnprotectedParams = 1;
-constexpr int kCoseMac0Payload = 2;
-constexpr int kCoseMac0Tag = 3;
-
-constexpr int kCoseEncryptEntryCount = 4;
-constexpr int kCoseEncryptProtectedParams = 0;
-constexpr int kCoseEncryptUnprotectedParams = 1;
-constexpr int kCoseEncryptPayload = 2;
-constexpr int kCoseEncryptRecipients = 3;
-
-enum Label : int {
-    ALGORITHM = 1,
-    KEY_ID = 4,
-    IV = 5,
-    COSE_KEY = -1,
-};
-
-enum CoseKeyAlgorithm : int {
-    AES_GCM_256 = 3,
-    HMAC_256 = 5,
-    ES256 = -7,  // ECDSA with SHA-256
-    EDDSA = -8,
-    ECDH_ES_HKDF_256 = -25,
-};
-
-enum CoseKeyCurve : int { P256 = 1, X25519 = 4, ED25519 = 6 };
-enum CoseKeyType : int { OCTET_KEY_PAIR = 1, EC2 = 2, SYMMETRIC_KEY = 4 };
-enum CoseKeyOps : int { SIGN = 1, VERIFY = 2, ENCRYPT = 3, DECRYPT = 4 };
-
-constexpr int kAesGcmNonceLength = 12;
-constexpr int kAesGcmTagSize = 16;
-constexpr int kAesGcmKeySize = 32;
-
-template <typename T>
-class ErrMsgOr {
-  public:
-    ErrMsgOr(std::string errMsg) : errMsg_(std::move(errMsg)) {}
-    ErrMsgOr(const char* errMsg) : errMsg_(errMsg) {}
-    ErrMsgOr(T val) : value_(std::move(val)) {}
-
-    operator bool() const { return value_.has_value(); }
-
-    T* operator->() & {
-        assert(value_);
-        return &value_.value();
-    }
-    T& operator*() & {
-        assert(value_);
-        return value_.value();
-    };
-    T&& operator*() && {
-        assert(value_);
-        return std::move(value_).value();
-    };
-
-    const std::string& message() { return errMsg_; }
-    std::string moveMessage() { return std::move(errMsg_); }
-
-    T moveValue() {
-        assert(value_);
-        return std::move(value_).value();
-    }
-
-  private:
-    std::string errMsg_;
-    std::optional<T> value_;
-};
-
-class CoseKey {
-  public:
-    CoseKey() {}
-    CoseKey(const CoseKey&) = delete;
-    CoseKey(CoseKey&&) = default;
-
-    enum Label : int {
-        KEY_TYPE = 1,
-        KEY_ID = 2,
-        ALGORITHM = 3,
-        KEY_OPS = 4,
-        CURVE = -1,
-        PUBKEY_X = -2,
-        PUBKEY_Y = -3,
-        PRIVATE_KEY = -4,
-        TEST_KEY = -70000  // Application-defined
-    };
-
-    static ErrMsgOr<CoseKey> parse(const bytevec& coseKey) {
-        auto [parsedKey, _, errMsg] = cppbor::parse(coseKey);
-        if (!parsedKey) return errMsg + " when parsing key";
-        if (!parsedKey->asMap()) return "CoseKey must be a map";
-        return CoseKey(static_cast<cppbor::Map*>(parsedKey.release()));
-    }
-
-    static ErrMsgOr<CoseKey> parse(const bytevec& coseKey, CoseKeyType expectedKeyType,
-                                   CoseKeyAlgorithm expectedAlgorithm, CoseKeyCurve expectedCurve) {
-        auto key = parse(coseKey);
-        if (!key) return key;
-
-        if (!key->checkIntValue(CoseKey::KEY_TYPE, expectedKeyType) ||
-            !key->checkIntValue(CoseKey::ALGORITHM, expectedAlgorithm) ||
-            !key->checkIntValue(CoseKey::CURVE, expectedCurve)) {
-            return "Unexpected key type:";
-        }
-
-        return key;
-    }
-
-    static ErrMsgOr<CoseKey> parseEd25519(const bytevec& coseKey) {
-        auto key = parse(coseKey, OCTET_KEY_PAIR, EDDSA, ED25519);
-        if (!key) return key;
-
-        auto& pubkey = key->getMap().get(PUBKEY_X);
-        if (!pubkey || !pubkey->asBstr() ||
-            pubkey->asBstr()->value().size() != ED25519_PUBLIC_KEY_LEN) {
-            return "Invalid Ed25519 public key";
-        }
-
-        return key;
-    }
-
-    static ErrMsgOr<CoseKey> parseX25519(const bytevec& coseKey, bool requireKid) {
-        auto key = parse(coseKey, OCTET_KEY_PAIR, ECDH_ES_HKDF_256, X25519);
-        if (!key) return key;
-
-        auto& pubkey = key->getMap().get(PUBKEY_X);
-        if (!pubkey || !pubkey->asBstr() ||
-            pubkey->asBstr()->value().size() != X25519_PUBLIC_VALUE_LEN) {
-            return "Invalid X25519 public key";
-        }
-
-        auto& kid = key->getMap().get(KEY_ID);
-        if (requireKid && (!kid || !kid->asBstr())) {
-            return "Missing KID";
-        }
-
-        return key;
-    }
-
-    static ErrMsgOr<CoseKey> parseP256(const bytevec& coseKey) {
-        auto key = parse(coseKey, EC2, ES256, P256);
-        if (!key) return key;
-
-        auto& pubkey_x = key->getMap().get(PUBKEY_X);
-        auto& pubkey_y = key->getMap().get(PUBKEY_Y);
-        if (!pubkey_x || !pubkey_y || !pubkey_x->asBstr() || !pubkey_y->asBstr() ||
-            pubkey_x->asBstr()->value().size() != 32 || pubkey_y->asBstr()->value().size() != 32) {
-            return "Invalid P256 public key";
-        }
-
-        return key;
-    }
-
-    std::optional<int> getIntValue(Label label) {
-        const auto& value = key_->get(label);
-        if (!value || !value->asInt()) return {};
-        return value->asInt()->value();
-    }
-
-    std::optional<bytevec> getBstrValue(Label label) {
-        const auto& value = key_->get(label);
-        if (!value || !value->asBstr()) return {};
-        return value->asBstr()->value();
-    }
-
-    const cppbor::Map& getMap() const { return *key_; }
-    cppbor::Map&& moveMap() { return std::move(*key_); }
-
-    bool checkIntValue(Label label, int expectedValue) {
-        const auto& value = key_->get(label);
-        return value && value->asInt() && value->asInt()->value() == expectedValue;
-    }
-
-    void add(Label label, int value) { key_->add(label, value); }
-    void add(Label label, bytevec value) { key_->add(label, std::move(value)); }
-
-    bytevec encode() { return key_->canonicalize().encode(); }
-
-  private:
-    CoseKey(cppbor::Map* parsedKey) : key_(parsedKey) {}
-
-    // This is the full parsed key structure.
-    std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Map> key_;
-};
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> generateCoseMac0Mac(const bytevec& macKey, const bytevec& externalAad,
-                                      const bytevec& payload);
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseMac0(const bytevec& macKey, const bytevec& externalAad,
-                                          const bytevec& payload);
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* payload */> parseCoseMac0(const cppbor::Item* macItem);
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* payload */> verifyAndParseCoseMac0(const cppbor::Item* macItem,
-                                                       const bytevec& macKey);
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> createCoseSign1Signature(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& protectedParams,
-                                           const bytevec& payload, const bytevec& aad);
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseSign1(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& payload,
-                                           const bytevec& aad);
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseSign1(const bytevec& key, cppbor::Map extraProtectedFields,
-                                           const bytevec& payload, const bytevec& aad);
-/**
- * Verify and parse a COSE_Sign1 message, returning the payload.
- *
- * @param ignoreSignature indicates whether signature verification should be skipped.  If true, no
- *        verification of the signature will be done.
- *
- * @param coseSign1 is the COSE_Sign1 to verify and parse.
- *
- * @param signingCoseKey is a CBOR-encoded COSE_Key to use to verify the signature.  The bytevec may
- *        be empty, in which case the function assumes that coseSign1's payload is the COSE_Key to
- *        use, i.e. that coseSign1 is a self-signed "certificate".
- */
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* payload */> verifyAndParseCoseSign1(bool ignoreSignature,
-                                                        const cppbor::Array* coseSign1,
-                                                        const bytevec& signingCoseKey,
-                                                        const bytevec& aad);
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> createCoseEncryptCiphertext(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce,
-                                              const bytevec& protectedParams, const bytevec& aad);
-ErrMsgOr<cppbor::Array> constructCoseEncrypt(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce,
-                                             const bytevec& plaintextPayload, const bytevec& aad,
-                                             cppbor::Array recipients);
-ErrMsgOr<std::pair<bytevec /* pubkey */, bytevec /* key ID */>> getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(
-        const cppbor::Item* encryptItem);
-inline ErrMsgOr<std::pair<bytevec /* pubkey */, bytevec /* key ID */>>
-getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(const std::unique_ptr<cppbor::Item>& encryptItem) {
-    return getSenderPubKeyFromCoseEncrypt(encryptItem.get());
-}
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* plaintextPayload */> decryptCoseEncrypt(const bytevec& key,
-                                                            const cppbor::Item* encryptItem,
-                                                            const bytevec& aad);
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec> x25519_HKDF_DeriveKey(const bytevec& senderPubKey, const bytevec& senderPrivKey,
-                                        const bytevec& recipientPubKey, bool senderIsA);
-
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* ciphertextWithTag */> aesGcmEncrypt(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce,
-                                                        const bytevec& aad,
-                                                        const bytevec& plaintext);
-ErrMsgOr<bytevec /* plaintext */> aesGcmDecrypt(const bytevec& key, const bytevec& nonce,
-                                                const bytevec& aad,
-                                                const bytevec& ciphertextWithTag);
-
-}  // namespace cppcose
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_tags.h b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_tags.h
index ae21125..5b2a6f3 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_tags.h
+++ b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_tags.h
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@
         TAG_RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION_t, TAG_PURPOSE_t, TAG_ALGORITHM_t, TAG_BLOCK_MODE_t,
         TAG_DIGEST_t, TAG_PADDING_t, TAG_ORIGIN_t, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE_t, TAG_EC_CURVE_t,
         TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL_t, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL_t, TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED_t,
-        TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED_t>;
+        TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED_t, TAG_CERTIFICATE_SERIAL_t, TAG_CERTIFICATE_SUBJECT_t>;
 
 template <typename TypedTagType>
 struct TypedTag2ValueType;
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
index 53d5b96..e1ead21 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
+++ b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
@@ -38,5 +38,6 @@
 
 uint32_t getOsVersion();
 uint32_t getOsPatchlevel();
+uint32_t getVendorPatchlevel();
 
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/include/remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h b/security/keymint/support/include/remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h
index 5e205a2..e4261f3 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/include/remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h
+++ b/security/keymint/support/include/remote_prov/remote_prov_utils.h
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 
 #include <vector>
 
-#include <cppcose/cppcose.h>
+#include <keymaster/cppcose/cppcose.h>
 
 namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::remote_prov {
 
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
index e73d602..1e0733f 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
@@ -31,10 +31,12 @@
 constexpr size_t kPlatformVersionMatchCount = kSubminorVersionMatch + 1;
 
 constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.build.version.security_patch";
-constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-[0-9]{2}$";
+constexpr char kVendorPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.vendor.build.security_patch";
+constexpr char kPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})$";
 constexpr size_t kYearMatch = 1;
 constexpr size_t kMonthMatch = 2;
-constexpr size_t kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount = kMonthMatch + 1;
+constexpr size_t kDayMatch = 3;
+constexpr size_t kPatchlevelMatchCount = kDayMatch + 1;
 
 uint32_t match_to_uint32(const char* expression, const regmatch_t& match) {
     if (match.rm_so == -1) return 0;
@@ -52,8 +54,6 @@
     return prop_value;
 }
 
-}  // anonymous namespace
-
 uint32_t getOsVersion(const char* version_str) {
     regex_t regex;
     if (regcomp(&regex, kPlatformVersionRegex, REG_EXTENDED)) {
@@ -75,20 +75,16 @@
     return (major * 100 + minor) * 100 + subminor;
 }
 
-uint32_t getOsVersion() {
-    std::string version = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformVersionProp);
-    return getOsVersion(version.c_str());
-}
+enum class PatchlevelOutput { kYearMonthDay, kYearMonth };
 
-uint32_t getOsPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str) {
+uint32_t getPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str, PatchlevelOutput detail) {
     regex_t regex;
-    if (regcomp(&regex, kPlatformPatchlevelRegex, REG_EXTENDED) != 0) {
+    if (regcomp(&regex, kPatchlevelRegex, REG_EXTENDED) != 0) {
         return 0;
     }
 
-    regmatch_t matches[kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount];
-    int not_match =
-            regexec(&regex, patchlevel_str, kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount, matches, 0 /* flags */);
+    regmatch_t matches[kPatchlevelMatchCount];
+    int not_match = regexec(&regex, patchlevel_str, kPatchlevelMatchCount, matches, 0 /* flags */);
     regfree(&regex);
     if (not_match) {
         return 0;
@@ -100,12 +96,35 @@
     if (month < 1 || month > 12) {
         return 0;
     }
-    return year * 100 + month;
+
+    switch (detail) {
+        case PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonthDay: {
+            uint32_t day = match_to_uint32(patchlevel_str, matches[kDayMatch]);
+            if (day < 1 || day > 31) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+            return year * 10000 + month * 100 + day;
+        }
+        case PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonth:
+            return year * 100 + month;
+    }
+}
+
+}  // anonymous namespace
+
+uint32_t getOsVersion() {
+    std::string version = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformVersionProp);
+    return getOsVersion(version.c_str());
 }
 
 uint32_t getOsPatchlevel() {
     std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformPatchlevelProp);
-    return getOsPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
+    return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str(), PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonth);
+}
+
+uint32_t getVendorPatchlevel() {
+    std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kVendorPatchlevelProp);
+    return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str(), PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonthDay);
 }
 
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/secureclock/aidl/Android.bp b/security/secureclock/aidl/Android.bp
index c78be3b..6a2b753 100644
--- a/security/secureclock/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/security/secureclock/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -26,6 +26,10 @@
         },
         rust: {
             enabled: true,
+            apex_available: [
+                "//apex_available:platform",
+                "com.android.compos",
+            ],
         },
     },
 }
diff --git a/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl b/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
index 71b4278..fcf2ee8 100644
--- a/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
+++ b/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
@@ -39,20 +39,18 @@
      * 32-byte HMAC-SHA256 of the above values, computed as:
      *
      *    HMAC(H,
-     *         ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL || challenge || timestamp || securityLevel )
+     *         ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL || challenge || timestamp || 1 )
      *
      * where:
      *
-     *   ``ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL'' is a sting constant defined in ISecureClock.aidl.
+     *   ``ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL'' is a string constant defined in ISecureClock.aidl.
      *
      *   ``H'' is the shared HMAC key (see computeSharedHmac() in ISharedSecret).
      *
      *   ``||'' represents concatenation
      *
      * The representation of challenge and timestamp is as 64-bit unsigned integers in big-endian
-     * order. SecurityLevel is represented as a 32-bit unsigned integer in big-endian order as
-     * described in android.hardware.security.keymint.SecurityLevel. It represents the security
-     * level of the secure clock environment.
+     * order.  1, above, is a 32-bit unsigned integer, also big-endian.
      */
     byte[] mac;
 }
diff --git a/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp b/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
index 31f4854..bf332d5 100644
--- a/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
+++ b/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result1.error);
     EXPECT_EQ(1U, result1.token.challenge);
     EXPECT_GT(result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+    EXPECT_EQ(32U, result1.token.mac.size());
 
     unsigned long time_to_sleep = 200;
     sleep_ms(time_to_sleep);
@@ -123,6 +124,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result2.error);
     EXPECT_EQ(2U, result2.token.challenge);
     EXPECT_GT(result2.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+    EXPECT_EQ(32U, result2.token.mac.size());
 
     auto host_time_delta = result2_time - result1_time;
 
@@ -153,6 +155,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result1.error);
     EXPECT_EQ(0U, result1.token.challenge);
     EXPECT_GT(result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+    EXPECT_EQ(32U, result1.token.mac.size());
 
     unsigned long time_to_sleep = 200;
     sleep_ms(time_to_sleep);
@@ -162,6 +165,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result2.error);
     EXPECT_EQ(1U, result2.token.challenge);
     EXPECT_GT(result2.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+    EXPECT_EQ(32U, result2.token.mac.size());
 
     auto host_time_delta = result2_time - result1_time;
 
diff --git a/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp b/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp
index 8426120..919f882 100644
--- a/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp
+++ b/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@
         SharedSecretParameters params;
         auto error = GetReturnErrorCode(sharedSecret->getSharedSecretParameters(&params));
         EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(params.seed.size() == 0 || params.seed.size() == 32);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(params.nonce.size() == 32);
+
         GetParamsResult result;
         result.tie() = std::tie(error, params);
         return result;
@@ -234,6 +237,45 @@
     }
 }
 
+TEST_F(SharedSecretAidlTest, ComputeSharedSecretShortNonce) {
+    auto sharedSecrets = allSharedSecrets();
+    if (sharedSecrets.empty()) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping the test as no shared secret service is found.";
+    }
+    auto fixup_hmac = finally([&]() { computeAllSharedSecrets(getAllSharedSecretParameters()); });
+
+    auto params = getAllSharedSecretParameters();
+    ASSERT_EQ(sharedSecrets.size(), params.size())
+            << "One or more shared secret services failed to provide parameters.";
+
+    // All should be well in the normal case
+    auto responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+
+    ASSERT_GT(responses.size(), 0U);
+    vector<uint8_t> correct_response = responses[0].sharing_check;
+    verifyResponses(correct_response, responses);
+
+    // Pick a random param and shorten that nonce by one.
+    size_t param_to_tweak = rand() % params.size();
+    auto& to_tweak = params[param_to_tweak].nonce;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(to_tweak.size() == 32);
+    to_tweak.resize(31);
+
+    responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < responses.size(); ++i) {
+        if (i == param_to_tweak) {
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, responses[i].error)
+                    << "Shared secret service that provided tweaked param should fail to compute "
+                       "shared secret";
+        } else {
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, responses[i].error) << "Others should succeed";
+            EXPECT_NE(correct_response, responses[i].sharing_check)
+                    << "Others should calculate a different shared secret, due to the tweaked "
+                       "nonce.";
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 TEST_F(SharedSecretAidlTest, ComputeSharedSecretCorruptSeed) {
     auto sharedSecrets = allSharedSecrets();
     if (sharedSecrets.empty()) {
@@ -275,6 +317,45 @@
         }
     }
 }
+
+TEST_F(SharedSecretAidlTest, ComputeSharedSecretShortSeed) {
+    auto sharedSecrets = allSharedSecrets();
+    if (sharedSecrets.empty()) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping the test as no shared secret service is found.";
+    }
+    auto fixup_hmac = finally([&]() { computeAllSharedSecrets(getAllSharedSecretParameters()); });
+    auto params = getAllSharedSecretParameters();
+    ASSERT_EQ(sharedSecrets.size(), params.size())
+            << "One or more shared secret service failed to provide parameters.";
+
+    // All should be well in the normal case
+    auto responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+
+    ASSERT_GT(responses.size(), 0U);
+    vector<uint8_t> correct_response = responses[0].sharing_check;
+    verifyResponses(correct_response, responses);
+
+    // Pick a random param and modify the seed to be of (invalid) length 31.
+    auto param_to_tweak = rand() % params.size();
+    auto& to_tweak = params[param_to_tweak].seed;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(to_tweak.size() == 32 || to_tweak.size() == 0);
+    to_tweak.resize(31);
+
+    responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < responses.size(); ++i) {
+        if (i == param_to_tweak) {
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, responses[i].error)
+                    << "Shared secret service that provided tweaked param should fail to compute "
+                       "shared secret";
+        } else {
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, responses[i].error) << "Others should succeed";
+            EXPECT_NE(correct_response, responses[i].sharing_check)
+                    << "Others should calculate a different shared secret, due to the tweaked "
+                       "nonce.";
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::sharedsecret::test
 
 int main(int argc, char** argv) {
diff --git a/sensors/1.0/ISensors.hal b/sensors/1.0/ISensors.hal
index 8d41de2..0e172ef 100644
--- a/sensors/1.0/ISensors.hal
+++ b/sensors/1.0/ISensors.hal
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
      * Flush adds a FLUSH_COMPLETE metadata event to the end of the "batch mode"
      * FIFO for the specified sensor and flushes the FIFO.  If the FIFO is empty
      * or if the sensor doesn't support batching (FIFO size zero), return
-     * SUCCESS and add a trivial FLUSH_COMPLETE event added to the event stream.
+     * OK and add a trivial FLUSH_COMPLETE event added to the event stream.
      * This applies to all sensors other than one-shot sensors. If the sensor
      * is a one-shot sensor, flush must return BAD_VALUE and not generate any
      * flush complete metadata.  If the sensor is not active at the time flush()
diff --git a/sensors/1.0/types.hal b/sensors/1.0/types.hal
index cbbe92f..ac7be06 100644
--- a/sensors/1.0/types.hal
+++ b/sensors/1.0/types.hal
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@
 
     /**
      * High performance mode hint. Device is able to use up more power and take
-     * more reources to improve throughput and latency in high performance mode.
+     * more resources to improve throughput and latency in high performance mode.
      * One possible use case is virtual reality, when sensor latency need to be
      * carefully controlled.
      * int32_t: 1 or 0, denote if device is in/out of high performance mode,
diff --git a/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index 56bc9cf..1f579ba 100644
--- a/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/sensors/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalSensorsV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -190,7 +190,7 @@
     });
 }
 
-// Test if sensor list returned is valid
+// Test if sensor hal can switch to different operation modes
 TEST_P(SensorsHidlTest, SetOperationMode) {
     std::vector<SensorInfo> sensorList = getSensorsList();
 
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@
     ASSERT_EQ(Result::OK, S()->setOperationMode(OperationMode::NORMAL));
 }
 
-// Test if sensor list returned is valid
+// Test if sensor hal can receive injected events in loopback mode
 TEST_P(SensorsHidlTest, InjectSensorEventData) {
     std::vector<SensorInfo> sensorList = getSensorsList();
     std::vector<SensorInfo> sensorSupportInjection;
diff --git a/tetheroffload/control/1.1/ITetheringOffloadCallback.hal b/tetheroffload/control/1.1/ITetheringOffloadCallback.hal
index 7a7d56d..9c74641 100644
--- a/tetheroffload/control/1.1/ITetheringOffloadCallback.hal
+++ b/tetheroffload/control/1.1/ITetheringOffloadCallback.hal
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@
 interface ITetheringOffloadCallback extends @1.0::ITetheringOffloadCallback {
     /**
      * Called when an asynchronous event is generated by the hardware
-     * management process. Events which are common for 1.0 and 1.1 HAL
-     * MUST be fired on both 1.0 and 1.1 callback.
+     * management process. Implementations that report events via this callback
+     * should not invoke onEvent of 1.0 HAL.
      */
     oneway onEvent_1_1(OffloadCallbackEvent event);
 };
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp
index 2e27475..67f6bae 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/DescramblerTests.cpp
@@ -53,12 +53,15 @@
         return failure();
     }
 
-    auto status = mCas->setSessionPrivateData(sessionId, hidlPvtData);
-    if (status != android::hardware::cas::V1_0::Status::OK) {
-        ALOGW("[vts] Failed to set session private data");
-        mCas->closeSession(sessionId);
-        return failure();
+    if (hidlPvtData.size() > 0) {
+        auto status = mCas->setSessionPrivateData(sessionId, hidlPvtData);
+        if (status != android::hardware::cas::V1_0::Status::OK) {
+            ALOGW("[vts] Failed to set session private data");
+            mCas->closeSession(sessionId);
+            return failure();
+        }
     }
+
     return success();
 }
 
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index 4c92665..b39abe3 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -56,9 +56,6 @@
 }
 
 void TunerFilterHidlTest::testTimeFilter(TimeFilterConfig filterConf) {
-    if (!timeFilter.support) {
-        return;
-    }
     uint32_t demuxId;
     sp<IDemux> demux;
     DemuxCapabilities caps;
@@ -161,27 +158,36 @@
 
 void TunerRecordHidlTest::recordSingleFilterTest(FilterConfig filterConf,
                                                  FrontendConfig frontendConf, DvrConfig dvrConf) {
-    uint32_t feId;
     uint32_t demuxId;
     sp<IDemux> demux;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
+    mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
+
+    DvrConfig dvrSourceConfig;
+    if (mLnbId || record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        uint32_t feId;
+        mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+        if (mLnbId) {
+            ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setLnb(*mLnbId));
+        }
+        if (frontendConf.isSoftwareFe) {
+            mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[record.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
+        }
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+        mFrontendTests.setDvrTests(mDvrTests);
+    } else {
+        dvrSourceConfig = dvrMap[record.dvrSourceId];
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrSourceConfig.type, dvrSourceConfig.bufferSize));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrPlayback(dvrSourceConfig.settings));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrPlaybackMQDescriptor());
+    }
+
     uint32_t filterId;
     sp<IFilter> filter;
-
-    mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
-    if (mLnbId) {
-        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setLnb(*mLnbId));
-    }
-    if (frontendConf.isSoftwareFe) {
-        mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[record.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
-    }
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
     mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
-    mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
-    mFrontendTests.setDvrTests(mDvrTests);
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrConf.type, dvrConf.bufferSize));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrRecord(dvrConf.settings));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrRecordMQDescriptor());
@@ -195,17 +201,39 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.attachFilterToDvr(filter));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.startDvrRecord());
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.startFilter(filterId));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+    if (mLnbId || record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+    } else {
+        // Start DVR Source
+        mDvrTests.startPlaybackInputThread(dvrSourceConfig.playbackInputFile,
+                                           dvrSourceConfig.settings.playback());
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.startDvrPlayback());
+    }
+
     mDvrTests.testRecordOutput();
     mDvrTests.stopRecordThread();
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+    if (mLnbId || record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+    } else {
+        mDvrTests.stopPlaybackThread();
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.stopDvrPlayback());
+    }
+
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.stopFilter(filterId));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.stopDvrRecord());
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.detachFilterToDvr(filter));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(filterId));
     mDvrTests.closeDvrRecord();
+
+    if (mLnbId || record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+    } else {
+        mDvrTests.closeDvrPlayback();
+    }
+
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
 }
 
 void TunerRecordHidlTest::recordSingleFilterTestWithLnb(FilterConfig filterConf,
@@ -236,23 +264,34 @@
 void TunerRecordHidlTest::attachSingleFilterToRecordDvrTest(FilterConfig filterConf,
                                                             FrontendConfig frontendConf,
                                                             DvrConfig dvrConf) {
-    uint32_t feId;
     uint32_t demuxId;
     sp<IDemux> demux;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
+    mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
+
+    DvrConfig dvrSourceConfig;
+    if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        uint32_t feId;
+        mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+    } else {
+        dvrSourceConfig = dvrMap[record.dvrSourceId];
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrSourceConfig.type, dvrSourceConfig.bufferSize));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrPlayback(dvrSourceConfig.settings));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrPlaybackMQDescriptor());
+    }
+
     uint32_t filterId;
     sp<IFilter> filter;
-
-    mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
     mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
-    mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
+
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrConf.type, dvrConf.bufferSize));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrRecord(dvrConf.settings));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrRecordMQDescriptor());
+
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.openFilterInDemux(filterConf.type, filterConf.bufferSize));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.getNewlyOpenedFilterId(filterId));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.configFilter(filterConf.settings, filterId));
@@ -268,30 +307,43 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(filterId));
     mDvrTests.closeDvrRecord();
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+
+    if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+    }
 }
 
 void TunerDescramblerHidlTest::scrambledBroadcastTest(set<struct FilterConfig> mediaFilterConfs,
                                                       FrontendConfig frontendConf,
                                                       DescramblerConfig descConfig) {
-    uint32_t feId;
     uint32_t demuxId;
     sp<IDemux> demux;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
+
+    DvrConfig dvrSourceConfig;
+    if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        uint32_t feId;
+        mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+        if (frontendConf.isSoftwareFe) {
+            mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
+        }
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+        mFrontendTests.setDemux(demux);
+    } else {
+        dvrSourceConfig = dvrMap[descrambling.dvrSourceId];
+        mDvrTests.setDemux(demux);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.openDvrInDemux(dvrSourceConfig.type, dvrSourceConfig.bufferSize));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.configDvrPlayback(dvrSourceConfig.settings));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.getDvrPlaybackMQDescriptor());
+    }
+
     set<uint32_t> filterIds;
     uint32_t filterId;
     set<struct FilterConfig>::iterator config;
     set<uint32_t>::iterator id;
-
-    mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendConf.type, feId);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
-    if (frontendConf.isSoftwareFe) {
-        mFrontendTests.setSoftwareFrontendDvrConfig(dvrMap[descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId]);
-    }
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
     mFilterTests.setDemux(demux);
-    mFrontendTests.setDemux(demux);
     for (config = mediaFilterConfs.begin(); config != mediaFilterConfs.end(); config++) {
         ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.openFilterInDemux((*config).type, (*config).bufferSize));
         ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.getNewlyOpenedFilterId(filterId));
@@ -314,10 +366,26 @@
     for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
         ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.startFilter(*id));
     }
-    // tune test
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+    if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        // tune test
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.tuneFrontend(frontendConf, true /*testWithDemux*/));
+    } else {
+        // Start DVR Source
+        mDvrTests.startPlaybackInputThread(dvrSourceConfig.playbackInputFile,
+                                           dvrSourceConfig.settings.playback());
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.startDvrPlayback());
+    }
+
     ASSERT_TRUE(filterDataOutputTest());
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+
+    if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.stopTuneFrontend(true /*testWithDemux*/));
+    } else {
+        mDvrTests.stopPlaybackThread();
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDvrTests.stopDvrPlayback());
+    }
+
     for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
         ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.stopFilter(*id));
     }
@@ -328,27 +396,45 @@
     for (id = filterIds.begin(); id != filterIds.end(); id++) {
         ASSERT_TRUE(mFilterTests.closeFilter(*id));
     }
+
+    if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+    } else {
+        mDvrTests.closeDvrPlayback();
+    }
+
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
 }
 
 TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, TuneFrontend) {
     description("Tune one Frontend with specific setting and check Lock event");
+    if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        return;
+    }
     mFrontendTests.tuneTest(frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
 }
 
 TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, AutoScanFrontend) {
     description("Run an auto frontend scan with specific setting and check lock scanMessage");
+    if (!scan.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        return;
+    }
     mFrontendTests.scanTest(frontendMap[scan.frontendId], FrontendScanType::SCAN_AUTO);
 }
 
 TEST_P(TunerFrontendHidlTest, BlindScanFrontend) {
     description("Run an blind frontend scan with specific setting and check lock scanMessage");
+    if (!scan.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        return;
+    }
     mFrontendTests.scanTest(frontendMap[scan.frontendId], FrontendScanType::SCAN_BLIND);
 }
 
 TEST_P(TunerLnbHidlTest, SendDiseqcMessageToLnb) {
     description("Open and configure an Lnb with specific settings then send a diseqc msg to it.");
+    if (!lnbLive.support) {
+        return;
+    }
     if (lnbMap[lnbLive.lnbId].name.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
         vector<uint32_t> ids;
         ASSERT_TRUE(mLnbTests.getLnbIds(ids));
@@ -370,6 +456,9 @@
 
 TEST_P(TunerDemuxHidlTest, openDemux) {
     description("Open and close a Demux.");
+    if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        return;
+    }
     uint32_t feId;
     uint32_t demuxId;
     sp<IDemux> demux;
@@ -385,6 +474,9 @@
 
 TEST_P(TunerDemuxHidlTest, getAvSyncTime) {
     description("Get the A/V sync time from a PCR filter.");
+    if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        return;
+    }
     if (live.pcrFilterId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
         return;
     }
@@ -423,6 +515,9 @@
 
 TEST_P(TunerFilterHidlTest, StartFilterInDemux) {
     description("Open and start a filter in Demux.");
+    if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        return;
+    }
     // TODO use paramterized tests
     configSingleFilterInDemuxTest(filterMap[live.videoFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
 }
@@ -457,22 +552,34 @@
 
 TEST_P(TunerFilterHidlTest, testTimeFilter) {
     description("Open a timer filter in Demux and set time stamp.");
+    if (!timeFilter.support) {
+        return;
+    }
     // TODO use paramterized tests
     testTimeFilter(timeFilterMap[timeFilter.timeFilterId]);
 }
 
 TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, BroadcastDataFlowVideoFilterTest) {
     description("Test Video Filter functionality in Broadcast use case.");
+    if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        return;
+    }
     broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterMap[live.videoFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
 }
 
 TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, BroadcastDataFlowAudioFilterTest) {
     description("Test Audio Filter functionality in Broadcast use case.");
+    if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        return;
+    }
     broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterMap[live.audioFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
 }
 
 TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, BroadcastDataFlowSectionFilterTest) {
     description("Test Section Filter functionality in Broadcast use case.");
+    if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        return;
+    }
     if (live.sectionFilterId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
         return;
     }
@@ -481,6 +588,9 @@
 
 TEST_P(TunerBroadcastHidlTest, IonBufferTest) {
     description("Test the av filter data bufferring.");
+    if (!live.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        return;
+    }
     broadcastSingleFilterTest(filterMap[live.videoFilterId], frontendMap[live.frontendId]);
 }
 
@@ -501,6 +611,22 @@
     playbackSingleFilterTest(filterMap[playback.sectionFilterId], dvrMap[playback.dvrId]);
 }
 
+TEST_P(TunerPlaybackHidlTest, PlaybackDataFlowWithTsAudioFilterTest) {
+    description("Feed ts data from playback and configure Ts audio filter to get output");
+    if (!playback.support) {
+        return;
+    }
+    playbackSingleFilterTest(filterMap[playback.audioFilterId], dvrMap[playback.dvrId]);
+}
+
+TEST_P(TunerPlaybackHidlTest, PlaybackDataFlowWithTsVideoFilterTest) {
+    description("Feed ts data from playback and configure Ts video filter to get output");
+    if (!playback.support) {
+        return;
+    }
+    playbackSingleFilterTest(filterMap[playback.videoFilterId], dvrMap[playback.dvrId]);
+}
+
 TEST_P(TunerRecordHidlTest, AttachFiltersToRecordTest) {
     description("Attach a single filter to the record dvr test.");
     // TODO use paramterized tests
@@ -522,7 +648,7 @@
 
 TEST_P(TunerRecordHidlTest, LnbRecordDataFlowWithTsRecordFilterTest) {
     description("Feed ts data from Fe with Lnb to recording and test with ts record filter");
-    if (lnbRecord.support) {
+    if (!lnbRecord.support) {
         return;
     }
     recordSingleFilterTestWithLnb(filterMap[lnbRecord.recordFilterId],
@@ -532,27 +658,34 @@
 
 TEST_P(TunerDescramblerHidlTest, CreateDescrambler) {
     description("Create Descrambler");
-    if (descrambling.support) {
+    if (!descrambling.support) {
         return;
     }
-    uint32_t feId;
     uint32_t demuxId;
     sp<IDemux> demux;
-    mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendMap[descrambling.frontendId].type, feId);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.openDemux(demux, demuxId));
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+
+    if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        uint32_t feId;
+        mFrontendTests.getFrontendIdByType(frontendMap[descrambling.frontendId].type, feId);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(feId != INVALID_ID);
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.openFrontendById(feId));
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.setFrontendCallback());
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.setDemuxFrontendDataSource(feId));
+    }
+
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDescramblerTests.openDescrambler(demuxId));
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDescramblerTests.closeDescrambler());
     ASSERT_TRUE(mDemuxTests.closeDemux());
-    ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+
+    if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(mFrontendTests.closeFrontend());
+    }
 }
 
 TEST_P(TunerDescramblerHidlTest, ScrambledBroadcastDataFlowMediaFiltersTest) {
     description("Test ts audio filter in scrambled broadcast use case");
-    if (descrambling.support) {
+    if (!descrambling.support) {
         return;
     }
     set<FilterConfig> filterConfs;
diff --git a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
index 65f8615..8328e0c 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalTvTunerV1_0TestConfigurations.h
@@ -148,10 +148,32 @@
 };
 
 inline bool validateConnections() {
-    bool feIsValid = frontendMap.find(live.frontendId) != frontendMap.end() &&
-                     frontendMap.find(scan.frontendId) != frontendMap.end();
-    feIsValid &= record.support ? frontendMap.find(record.frontendId) != frontendMap.end() : true;
-    feIsValid &= descrambling.support
+    if ((!live.hasFrontendConnection || !scan.hasFrontendConnection) && !playback.support) {
+        ALOGW("[vts config] VTS must support either a DVR source or a Frontend source.");
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if (record.support && !record.hasFrontendConnection &&
+        record.dvrSourceId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
+        ALOGW("[vts config] Record must support either a DVR source or a Frontend source.");
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if (descrambling.support && !descrambling.hasFrontendConnection &&
+        descrambling.dvrSourceId.compare(emptyHardwareId) == 0) {
+        ALOGW("[vts config] Descrambling must support either a DVR source or a Frontend source.");
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    bool feIsValid = live.hasFrontendConnection
+                             ? frontendMap.find(live.frontendId) != frontendMap.end()
+                             : true;
+    feIsValid &= scan.hasFrontendConnection ? frontendMap.find(scan.frontendId) != frontendMap.end()
+                                            : true;
+    feIsValid &= record.support && record.hasFrontendConnection
+                         ? frontendMap.find(record.frontendId) != frontendMap.end()
+                         : true;
+    feIsValid &= (descrambling.support && descrambling.hasFrontendConnection)
                          ? frontendMap.find(descrambling.frontendId) != frontendMap.end()
                          : true;
     feIsValid &= lnbLive.support ? frontendMap.find(lnbLive.frontendId) != frontendMap.end() : true;
@@ -163,18 +185,28 @@
         return false;
     }
 
-    bool dvrIsValid = frontendMap[live.frontendId].isSoftwareFe
+    bool dvrIsValid = (live.hasFrontendConnection && frontendMap[live.frontendId].isSoftwareFe)
                               ? dvrMap.find(live.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end()
                               : true;
     dvrIsValid &= playback.support ? dvrMap.find(playback.dvrId) != dvrMap.end() : true;
     if (record.support) {
-        if (frontendMap[record.frontendId].isSoftwareFe) {
-            dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+        if (record.hasFrontendConnection) {
+            if (frontendMap[record.frontendId].isSoftwareFe) {
+                dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+            }
+        } else {
+            dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrSourceId) != dvrMap.end();
         }
         dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(record.dvrRecordId) != dvrMap.end();
     }
-    if (descrambling.support && frontendMap[descrambling.frontendId].isSoftwareFe) {
-        dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+    if (descrambling.support) {
+        if (descrambling.hasFrontendConnection) {
+            if (frontendMap[descrambling.frontendId].isSoftwareFe) {
+                dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId) != dvrMap.end();
+            }
+        } else {
+            dvrIsValid &= dvrMap.find(descrambling.dvrSourceId) != dvrMap.end();
+        }
     }
 
     if (!dvrIsValid) {
@@ -182,8 +214,10 @@
         return false;
     }
 
-    bool filterIsValid = filterMap.find(live.audioFilterId) != filterMap.end() &&
-                         filterMap.find(live.videoFilterId) != filterMap.end();
+    bool filterIsValid = (live.hasFrontendConnection)
+                                 ? filterMap.find(live.audioFilterId) != filterMap.end() &&
+                                           filterMap.find(live.videoFilterId) != filterMap.end()
+                                 : true;
     filterIsValid &= playback.support
                              ? (filterMap.find(playback.audioFilterId) != filterMap.end() &&
                                 filterMap.find(playback.videoFilterId) != filterMap.end())
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigReader.h b/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigReader.h
index 90499c4..e1f5695 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigReader.h
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/TunerTestingConfigReader.h
@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtConstellation;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtGuardInterval;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtHierarchy;
+using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtPlpMode;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtSettings;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtStandard;
 using android::hardware::tv::tuner::V1_0::FrontendDvbtTransmissionMode;
@@ -120,6 +121,7 @@
 };
 
 struct LiveBroadcastHardwareConnections {
+    bool hasFrontendConnection;
     string frontendId;
     string dvrSoftwareFeId;
     string audioFilterId;
@@ -130,6 +132,7 @@
 };
 
 struct ScanHardwareConnections {
+    bool hasFrontendConnection;
     string frontendId;
 };
 
@@ -145,19 +148,23 @@
 
 struct DvrRecordHardwareConnections {
     bool support;
+    bool hasFrontendConnection;
     string frontendId;
     string dvrRecordId;
     string dvrSoftwareFeId;
     string recordFilterId;
+    string dvrSourceId;
 };
 
 struct DescramblingHardwareConnections {
     bool support;
+    bool hasFrontendConnection;
     string frontendId;
     string dvrSoftwareFeId;
     string audioFilterId;
     string videoFilterId;
     string descramblerId;
+    string dvrSourceId;
     /* list string of extra filters; */
 };
 
@@ -362,8 +369,6 @@
                     int size = privateData.size();
                     descramblerMap[id].hidlPvtData.resize(size);
                     memcpy(descramblerMap[id].hidlPvtData.data(), privateData.data(), size);
-                } else {
-                    descramblerMap[id].hidlPvtData.resize(256);
                 }
             }
         }
@@ -395,7 +400,14 @@
     }
 
     static void connectLiveBroadcast(LiveBroadcastHardwareConnections& live) {
-        auto liveConfig = *getDataFlowConfiguration().getFirstClearLiveBroadcast();
+        auto dataFlow = getDataFlowConfiguration();
+        if (dataFlow.hasClearLiveBroadcast()) {
+            live.hasFrontendConnection = true;
+        } else {
+            live.hasFrontendConnection = false;
+            return;
+        }
+        auto liveConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstClearLiveBroadcast();
         live.frontendId = liveConfig.getFrontendConnection();
 
         live.audioFilterId = liveConfig.getAudioFilterConnection();
@@ -416,8 +428,15 @@
     }
 
     static void connectScan(ScanHardwareConnections& scan) {
-        auto scanConfig = getDataFlowConfiguration().getFirstScan();
-        scan.frontendId = scanConfig->getFrontendConnection();
+        auto dataFlow = getDataFlowConfiguration();
+        if (dataFlow.hasScan()) {
+            scan.hasFrontendConnection = true;
+        } else {
+            scan.hasFrontendConnection = false;
+            return;
+        }
+        auto scanConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstScan();
+        scan.frontendId = scanConfig.getFrontendConnection();
     }
 
     static void connectDvrPlayback(DvrPlaybackHardwareConnections& playback) {
@@ -425,6 +444,7 @@
         if (dataFlow.hasDvrPlayback()) {
             playback.support = true;
         } else {
+            playback.support = false;
             return;
         }
         auto playbackConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstDvrPlayback();
@@ -443,15 +463,23 @@
         if (dataFlow.hasDvrRecord()) {
             record.support = true;
         } else {
+            record.support = false;
             return;
         }
         auto recordConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstDvrRecord();
-        record.frontendId = recordConfig.getFrontendConnection();
         record.recordFilterId = recordConfig.getRecordFilterConnection();
         record.dvrRecordId = recordConfig.getDvrRecordConnection();
         if (recordConfig.hasDvrSoftwareFeConnection()) {
             record.dvrSoftwareFeId = recordConfig.getDvrSoftwareFeConnection();
         }
+        if (recordConfig.getHasFrontendConnection()) {
+            record.hasFrontendConnection = true;
+            record.dvrSourceId = emptyHardwareId;
+            record.frontendId = recordConfig.getFrontendConnection();
+        } else {
+            record.hasFrontendConnection = false;
+            record.dvrSourceId = recordConfig.getDvrSourceConnection();
+        }
     }
 
     static void connectDescrambling(DescramblingHardwareConnections& descrambling) {
@@ -459,16 +487,24 @@
         if (dataFlow.hasDescrambling()) {
             descrambling.support = true;
         } else {
+            descrambling.support = false;
             return;
         }
         auto descConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstDescrambling();
-        descrambling.frontendId = descConfig.getFrontendConnection();
         descrambling.descramblerId = descConfig.getDescramblerConnection();
         descrambling.audioFilterId = descConfig.getAudioFilterConnection();
         descrambling.videoFilterId = descConfig.getVideoFilterConnection();
         if (descConfig.hasDvrSoftwareFeConnection()) {
             descrambling.dvrSoftwareFeId = descConfig.getDvrSoftwareFeConnection();
         }
+        if (descConfig.getHasFrontendConnection()) {
+            descrambling.hasFrontendConnection = true;
+            descrambling.dvrSourceId = emptyHardwareId;
+            descrambling.frontendId = descConfig.getFrontendConnection();
+        } else {
+            descrambling.hasFrontendConnection = false;
+            descrambling.dvrSourceId = descConfig.getDvrSourceConnection();
+        }
     }
 
     static void connectLnbLive(LnbLiveHardwareConnections& lnbLive) {
@@ -476,6 +512,7 @@
         if (dataFlow.hasLnbLive()) {
             lnbLive.support = true;
         } else {
+            lnbLive.support = false;
             return;
         }
         auto lnbLiveConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstLnbLive();
@@ -495,6 +532,7 @@
         if (dataFlow.hasLnbRecord()) {
             lnbRecord.support = true;
         } else {
+            lnbRecord.support = false;
             return;
         }
         auto lnbRecordConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstLnbRecord();
@@ -514,6 +552,7 @@
         if (dataFlow.hasTimeFilter()) {
             timeFilter.support = true;
         } else {
+            timeFilter.support = false;
             return;
         }
         auto timeFilterConfig = *dataFlow.getFirstTimeFilter();
@@ -534,8 +573,26 @@
                 feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getTransmissionMode());
         dvbtSettings.bandwidth = static_cast<FrontendDvbtBandwidth>(
                 feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getBandwidth());
+        dvbtSettings.constellation = static_cast<FrontendDvbtConstellation>(
+                feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getConstellation());
+        dvbtSettings.hierarchy = static_cast<FrontendDvbtHierarchy>(
+                feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getHierarchy());
+        dvbtSettings.hpCoderate = static_cast<FrontendDvbtCoderate>(
+                feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getHpCoderate());
+        dvbtSettings.lpCoderate = static_cast<FrontendDvbtCoderate>(
+                feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getLpCoderate());
+        dvbtSettings.guardInterval = static_cast<FrontendDvbtGuardInterval>(
+                feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getGuardInterval());
         dvbtSettings.isHighPriority =
                 feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getIsHighPriority();
+        dvbtSettings.standard = static_cast<FrontendDvbtStandard>(
+                feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getStandard());
+        dvbtSettings.isMiso = feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getIsMiso();
+        dvbtSettings.plpMode = static_cast<FrontendDvbtPlpMode>(
+                feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getPlpMode());
+        dvbtSettings.plpId = feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getPlpId();
+        dvbtSettings.plpGroupId = feConfig.getFirstDvbtFrontendSettings_optional()->getPlpGroupId();
+
         return dvbtSettings;
     }
 
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt b/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt
index 4255a60..3476414 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/api/current.txt
@@ -48,12 +48,16 @@
     method @Nullable public String getAudioFilterConnection();
     method @Nullable public String getDescramblerConnection();
     method @Nullable public String getDvrSoftwareFeConnection();
+    method @Nullable public String getDvrSourceConnection();
     method @Nullable public String getFrontendConnection();
+    method @Nullable public boolean getHasFrontendConnection();
     method @Nullable public String getVideoFilterConnection();
     method public void setAudioFilterConnection(@Nullable String);
     method public void setDescramblerConnection(@Nullable String);
     method public void setDvrSoftwareFeConnection(@Nullable String);
+    method public void setDvrSourceConnection(@Nullable String);
     method public void setFrontendConnection(@Nullable String);
+    method public void setHasFrontendConnection(@Nullable boolean);
     method public void setVideoFilterConnection(@Nullable String);
   }
 
@@ -73,11 +77,15 @@
     ctor public DataFlowConfiguration.DvrRecord();
     method @Nullable public String getDvrRecordConnection();
     method @Nullable public String getDvrSoftwareFeConnection();
+    method @Nullable public String getDvrSourceConnection();
     method @Nullable public String getFrontendConnection();
+    method @Nullable public boolean getHasFrontendConnection();
     method @Nullable public String getRecordFilterConnection();
     method public void setDvrRecordConnection(@Nullable String);
     method public void setDvrSoftwareFeConnection(@Nullable String);
+    method public void setDvrSourceConnection(@Nullable String);
     method public void setFrontendConnection(@Nullable String);
+    method public void setHasFrontendConnection(@Nullable boolean);
     method public void setRecordFilterConnection(@Nullable String);
   }
 
@@ -152,10 +160,30 @@
   public class DvbtFrontendSettings {
     ctor public DvbtFrontendSettings();
     method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getBandwidth();
+    method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getConstellation();
+    method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getGuardInterval();
+    method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getHierarchy();
+    method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getHpCoderate();
     method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getIsHighPriority();
+    method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getIsMiso();
+    method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getLpCoderate();
+    method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getPlpGroupId();
+    method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getPlpId();
+    method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getPlpMode();
+    method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getStandard();
     method @Nullable public java.math.BigInteger getTransmissionMode();
     method public void setBandwidth(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+    method public void setConstellation(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+    method public void setGuardInterval(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+    method public void setHierarchy(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+    method public void setHpCoderate(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
     method public void setIsHighPriority(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+    method public void setIsMiso(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+    method public void setLpCoderate(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+    method public void setPlpGroupId(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+    method public void setPlpId(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+    method public void setPlpMode(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
+    method public void setStandard(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
     method public void setTransmissionMode(@Nullable java.math.BigInteger);
   }
 
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config.xml b/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config.xml
index 570171e..347e984 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config.xml
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/sample_tuner_vts_config.xml
@@ -54,7 +54,10 @@
         <frontends>
             <frontend id="FE_DEFAULT" type="DVBT" isSoftwareFrontend="true"
                       connectToCicamId="0" frequency="578000" endFrequency="800000">
-                <dvbtFrontendSettings bandwidth="8" transmissionMode="1" isHighPriority="1"/>
+                <dvbtFrontendSettings bandwidth="8" transmissionMode="1" isHighPriority="1"
+                                      constellation="1" hierarchy="1" hpCoderate="1" lpCoderate="1"
+                                      guardInterval="1" standard="1" isMiso="0" plpMode="1"
+                                      plpId="0" plpGroupId="0"/>
             </frontend>
             <frontend id="FE_DVBS_0" type="DVBS" isSoftwareFrontend="true"
                       connectToCicamId="0" frequency="578000" endFrequency="800000">
@@ -196,7 +199,8 @@
                             sectionFilterConnection="FILTER_TS_SECTION_0"
                             dvrSoftwareFeConnection="DVR_PLAYBACK_0"/>
         <scan frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"/>
-        <descrambling frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
+        <descrambling hasFrontendConnection="true"
+                      frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
                       descramblerConnection="DESCRAMBLER_0"
                       audioFilterConnection="FILTER_AUDIO_DEFAULT"
                       videoFilterConnection="FILTER_VIDEO_DEFAULT"
@@ -205,7 +209,8 @@
                      audioFilterConnection="FILTER_AUDIO_DEFAULT"
                      videoFilterConnection="FILTER_VIDEO_DEFAULT"
                      sectionFilterConnection="FILTER_TS_SECTION_0"/>
-        <dvrRecord frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
+        <dvrRecord hasFrontendConnection="true"
+                   frontendConnection="FE_DEFAULT"
                    recordFilterConnection="FILTER_TS_RECORD_0"
                    dvrRecordConnection="DVR_RECORD_0"
                    dvrSoftwareFeConnection="DVR_PLAYBACK_0"/>
diff --git a/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd b/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd
index 3fe93ff..7f31a11 100644
--- a/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd
+++ b/tv/tuner/config/tuner_testing_dynamic_configuration.xsd
@@ -52,8 +52,18 @@
 
     <xs:complexType name="dvbtFrontendSettings">
         <xs:attribute name="bandwidth" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
-        <xs:attribute name="transmissionMode" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+        <xs:attribute name="constellation" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+        <xs:attribute name="guardInterval" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+        <xs:attribute name="hierarchy" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+        <xs:attribute name="hpCoderate" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+        <xs:attribute name="lpCoderate" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
         <xs:attribute name="isHighPriority" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+        <xs:attribute name="isMiso" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+        <xs:attribute name="plpGroupId" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+        <xs:attribute name="plpId" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+        <xs:attribute name="plpMode" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+        <xs:attribute name="standard" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
+        <xs:attribute name="transmissionMode" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
     </xs:complexType>
     <xs:complexType name="dvbsFrontendSettings">
         <xs:attribute name="inputStreamId" type="xs:nonNegativeInteger" use="required"/>
@@ -534,7 +544,9 @@
     <!-- DATA FLOW CONFIGURATION SESSION -->
     <xs:complexType name="dataFlowConfiguration">
         <xs:sequence>
-            <xs:element name="clearLiveBroadcast" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1">
+            <!-- clearLiveBroadcast is only optional when there is no physical frontend. In this
+              case, the dvrPlayback config is required. -->
+            <xs:element name="clearLiveBroadcast" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
                 <xs:complexType>
                     <xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="required"/>
                     <xs:attribute name="audioFilterConnection" type="filterId" use="required"/>
@@ -546,20 +558,27 @@
                     <xs:attribute name="dvrSoftwareFeConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
                 </xs:complexType>
             </xs:element>
-            <xs:element name="scan" minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="1">
+            <!-- scan is only optional when there is no physical frontend. In this case, the
+              dvrPlayback config is required. -->
+            <xs:element name="scan" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
                 <xs:complexType>
                     <xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="required"/>
                 </xs:complexType>
             </xs:element>
             <xs:element name="descrambling" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
                 <xs:complexType>
+                    <!-- If there is a software or hardware frontend connection or not. If false,
+                      dvrSourceConnection config is required when testing dvrRecord.  -->
+                    <xs:attribute name="hasFrontendConnection" type="xs:boolean" use="required"/>
                     <xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="required"/>
                     <xs:attribute name="descramblerConnection" type="descramblerId" use="required"/>
                     <xs:attribute name="audioFilterConnection" type="filterId" use="required"/>
                     <xs:attribute name="videoFilterConnection" type="filterId" use="required"/>
                     <!-- TODO: b/182519645 allow the users to insert extra filters -->
-                    <!-- DVR is only required when the frontend is using the software input -->
+                    <!-- This DVR is only required when the frontend is using the software input -->
                     <xs:attribute name="dvrSoftwareFeConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
+                    <!-- This Dvr is only required when there's no frontend(sw or hw) connection -->
+                    <xs:attribute name="dvrSourceConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
                 </xs:complexType>
             </xs:element>
             <xs:element name="dvrPlayback" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
@@ -573,10 +592,15 @@
             </xs:element>
             <xs:element name="dvrRecord" minOccurs="0" maxOccurs="1">
                 <xs:complexType>
-                    <xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="required"/>
+                    <!-- If there is a software or hardware frontend connection or not. If false,
+                      dvrSourceConnection config is required when testing dvrRecord.  -->
+                    <xs:attribute name="hasFrontendConnection" type="xs:boolean" use="required"/>
+                    <xs:attribute name="frontendConnection" type="frontendId" use="optional"/>
                     <xs:attribute name="dvrRecordConnection" type="dvrId" use="required"/>
-                    <!-- DVR is only required when the frontend is using the software input -->
+                    <!-- This Dvr is only required when the frontend is using the software input -->
                     <xs:attribute name="dvrSoftwareFeConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
+                    <!-- This Dvr is only required when there's no frontend(sw or hw) connection -->
+                    <xs:attribute name="dvrSourceConnection" type="dvrId" use="optional"/>
                     <xs:attribute name="recordFilterConnection" type="filterId" use="required"/>
                 </xs:complexType>
             </xs:element>
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.vibrator/current/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl b/vibrator/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.vibrator/current/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
index 8cb259f..7431804 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.vibrator/current/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.vibrator/current/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
@@ -19,6 +19,6 @@
 @VintfStability
 parcelable CompositeEffect {
   int delayMs;
-  android.hardware.vibrator.CompositePrimitive primitive;
+  android.hardware.vibrator.CompositePrimitive primitive = android.hardware.vibrator.CompositePrimitive.NOOP;
   float scale;
 }
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl b/vibrator/aidl/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
index 406a899..5a990c0 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/android/hardware/vibrator/CompositeEffect.aidl
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 parcelable CompositeEffect {
     /* Period of silence preceding primitive. */
     int delayMs;
-    CompositePrimitive primitive;
+    CompositePrimitive primitive = CompositePrimitive.NOOP;
     /*
      * 0.0 (inclusive) - 1.0 (inclusive),
      * where 0.0 is minimum "feelable" amplitude.
diff --git a/wifi/supplicant/1.0/vts/functional/supplicant_sta_iface_hidl_test.cpp b/wifi/supplicant/1.0/vts/functional/supplicant_sta_iface_hidl_test.cpp
index e4fe52c..bdca32c 100644
--- a/wifi/supplicant/1.0/vts/functional/supplicant_sta_iface_hidl_test.cpp
+++ b/wifi/supplicant/1.0/vts/functional/supplicant_sta_iface_hidl_test.cpp
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
 
 #include "supplicant_hidl_call_util.h"
 #include "supplicant_hidl_test_utils.h"
+#include <cutils/properties.h>
 
 using ::android::sp;
 using ::android::hardware::hidl_array;
@@ -61,7 +62,7 @@
 constexpr uint32_t kTestRadioWorkFrequency = 2412;
 constexpr uint32_t kTestRadioWorkTimeout = 8;
 constexpr uint32_t kTestRadioWorkId = 16;
-constexpr int8_t kTestCountryCode[] = {'U', 'S'};
+int8_t kTestCountryCode[] = {'U', 'S'};
 constexpr uint8_t kTestWpsDeviceType[] = {[0 ... 7] = 0x01};
 constexpr uint16_t kTestWpsConfigMethods = 0xffff;
 }  // namespace
@@ -454,6 +455,10 @@
  * SetCountryCode.
  */
 TEST_P(SupplicantStaIfaceHidlTest, SetCountryCode) {
+    std::array<char, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX> buffer;
+    property_get("ro.boot.wificountrycode", buffer.data(), "US");
+    kTestCountryCode[0] = buffer.data()[0];
+    kTestCountryCode[1] = buffer.data()[1];
     sta_iface_->setCountryCode(
         kTestCountryCode, [](const SupplicantStatus& status) {
             EXPECT_EQ(SupplicantStatusCode::SUCCESS, status.code);