Merge "Adds VTS test for getAllowedNetworkTypesBitmap" into sc-dev
diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalAutomotiveVehicleV2_0TargetTest.cpp b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalAutomotiveVehicleV2_0TargetTest.cpp
index 7f1d4d1..4ac0aa5 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalAutomotiveVehicleV2_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalAutomotiveVehicleV2_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@
ASSERT_NE(StatusCode::OK, mVehicle->subscribe(cb, options));
}
+GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(VehicleHalHidlTest);
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
PerInstance, VehicleHalHidlTest,
testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(IVehicle::descriptor)),
diff --git a/biometrics/fingerprint/aidl/default/tests/WorkerThreadTest.cpp b/biometrics/fingerprint/aidl/default/tests/WorkerThreadTest.cpp
index 8443336..b2417bd 100644
--- a/biometrics/fingerprint/aidl/default/tests/WorkerThreadTest.cpp
+++ b/biometrics/fingerprint/aidl/default/tests/WorkerThreadTest.cpp
@@ -73,24 +73,29 @@
constexpr int NUM_TASKS = 10000;
WorkerThread worker(NUM_TASKS);
+ std::mutex mut;
+ std::condition_variable cv;
+ bool finished = false;
std::vector<int> results;
+
for (int i = 0; i < NUM_TASKS; ++i) {
- worker.schedule(Callable::from([&results, i] {
+ worker.schedule(Callable::from([&mut, &results, i] {
// Delay tasks differently to provoke races.
std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::nanoseconds(100 - i % 100));
- // Unguarded write to results to provoke races.
+ auto lock = std::lock_guard(mut);
results.push_back(i);
}));
}
- std::promise<void> promise;
- auto future = promise.get_future();
-
// Schedule a special task to signal when all of the tasks are finished.
- worker.schedule(
- Callable::from([promise = std::move(promise)]() mutable { promise.set_value(); }));
- future.wait();
+ worker.schedule(Callable::from([&mut, &cv, &finished] {
+ auto lock = std::lock_guard(mut);
+ finished = true;
+ cv.notify_one();
+ }));
+ auto lock = std::unique_lock(mut);
+ cv.wait(lock, [&finished] { return finished; });
ASSERT_EQ(results.size(), NUM_TASKS);
EXPECT_TRUE(std::is_sorted(results.begin(), results.end()));
}
diff --git a/camera/metadata/3.5/types.hal b/camera/metadata/3.5/types.hal
index 99d6115..d32bc91 100644
--- a/camera/metadata/3.5/types.hal
+++ b/camera/metadata/3.5/types.hal
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
ANDROID_CONTROL_END_3_5,
- /** android.scaler.availableRotateAndCropModes [static, byte[], hidden]
+ /** android.scaler.availableRotateAndCropModes [static, byte[], public]
*
* <p>List of rotate-and-crop modes for ANDROID_SCALER_ROTATE_AND_CROP that are supported by this camera device.</p>
*
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
*/
ANDROID_SCALER_AVAILABLE_ROTATE_AND_CROP_MODES = android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.4::CameraMetadataTag:ANDROID_SCALER_END_3_4,
- /** android.scaler.rotateAndCrop [dynamic, enum, hidden]
+ /** android.scaler.rotateAndCrop [dynamic, enum, public]
*
* <p>Whether a rotation-and-crop operation is applied to processed
* outputs from the camera.</p>
diff --git a/camera/metadata/3.6/types.hal b/camera/metadata/3.6/types.hal
index 97cac7c..185687c 100644
--- a/camera/metadata/3.6/types.hal
+++ b/camera/metadata/3.6/types.hal
@@ -348,6 +348,14 @@
ANDROID_SCALER_MULTI_RESOLUTION_STREAM_SUPPORTED_TRUE,
};
+/** android.sensor.testPatternMode enumeration values added since v3.2
+ * @see ANDROID_SENSOR_TEST_PATTERN_MODE
+ */
+enum CameraMetadataEnumAndroidSensorTestPatternMode :
+ @3.2::CameraMetadataEnumAndroidSensorTestPatternMode {
+ ANDROID_SENSOR_TEST_PATTERN_MODE_BLACK,
+};
+
/** android.sensor.pixelMode enumeration values
* @see ANDROID_SENSOR_PIXEL_MODE
*/
diff --git a/current.txt b/current.txt
index 3102972..fb1999b 100644
--- a/current.txt
+++ b/current.txt
@@ -767,6 +767,7 @@
98592d193a717066facf91428426e5abe211e3bd718bc372e29fb944ddbe6e7c android.hardware.wifi.supplicant@1.3::types
# ABI preserving changes to HALs during Android S
+159a0069336035852e9eca6354b86b7990680d1b239f23ef2f631b01807c4cb9 android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.5::types
e042522daa4b5f7fd4a0a19bcdadb93c79a1b04c09ef2c9813a3a8941032f3f5 android.hardware.contexthub@1.0::IContexthub
c2f64133b83ede65c9939ef97ab5bd867b73faf3dba0e7e69f77c3c43d9e487e android.hardware.contexthub@1.0::IContexthubCallback
bda492ec4021d13869de72bd6f8c15c5837b78d6136b8d538efec5320573a5ec android.hardware.gnss@1.0::IGnssMeasurementCallback
@@ -825,6 +826,9 @@
b4cbc1f2d38787f2ad069a8e4d10c0896287531a2596f0de0283e390b0ecf05d android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IVirtualizerEffect
2b5681e1ea6a2db0dc1e84edb96d3de2f7daf306046543e7956be76dcb8f20fb android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IVisualizerEffect
fa1e2d78e66fd662de93cb479ffd55947fe54f51cb53915814b3d3e3036c86a5 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::types
+e3865e74cb1a6e6afd38c7aa84115cb109ce47b972132de5242bc3838d2771f6 android.hardware.automotive.vehicle@2.0::types
+b3caf524c46a47d67e6453a34419e1881942d059e146cda740502670e9a752c3 android.hardware.automotive.vehicle@2.0::IVehicle
+7ce8728b27600e840cacf0a832f6942819fe535f9d3797ae052d5eef5065921c android.hardware.automotive.vehicle@2.0::IVehicleCallback
b525e91d886379c13588f4975bb04d625d46e1f41b4453792c4b2db1e7ff4340 android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint@2.3::IBiometricsFingerprint
4baf8e0eca4aa896cc9ceb7bb676aaf4fa21372ef8b49eed68eced1221c3dc0d android.hardware.bluetooth.audio@2.1::IBluetoothAudioProvider
d417a9212c8f96e3a06a2f221c8c5756c765355b2b81de2b2a65d4c9eee85401 android.hardware.bluetooth.audio@2.1::IBluetoothAudioProvidersFactory
@@ -834,7 +838,7 @@
3be6faa3d11ad9c7ec01a1a0a009cf11cb65d701d109dab37613ce9cfb3cdd60 android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::ICameraDeviceSession
3740ec773b2eb8fa6bd8c6e879eedb56c4e4306b88f1c20fa51103d791d871b1 android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::ICameraInjectionSession
21f023685571daf46148097d98b89cea353f07e3ed83b2ed5685b23bd136c3ee android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::types
-f655c93132d223369ff6ddc621cb721f82dde6cc85ab9df2cbde6cb24cf2c885 android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.6::types
+e932e7ef95210142e1fd3a4504e1d19bdb1acc988450f1ced543f3401f67855a android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.6::types
98ff825a7d37e5ab983502d13cec1f2e5a9cac9b674b6ff1a52bcf540f4e315e android.hardware.camera.provider@2.7::ICameraProvider
51fd14005859b16be55872660c34f5d423c77a2abcc5d4bdd5a537c40f32516b android.hardware.camera.provider@2.7::types
3500d3c4e2d49eeed2f3239330a166beb2db2d5071b84d9c738b048c2d54a3d9 android.hardware.contexthub@1.2::IContexthub
diff --git a/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp b/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
index 9d8562d..5964f81 100644
--- a/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
+++ b/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
@@ -311,27 +311,42 @@
EXPECT_TRUE(gnssPowerIndicationCallback->gnss_power_stats_cbq_.retrieve(
gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_gnss_power_stats_, kTimeoutSec));
EXPECT_EQ(gnssPowerIndicationCallback->gnss_power_stats_cbq_.calledCount(), 2);
+
auto powerStats2 = gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_gnss_power_stats_;
- // Elapsed realtime must increase
- EXPECT_GT(powerStats2.elapsedRealtime.timestampNs, powerStats1.elapsedRealtime.timestampNs);
+ if ((gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_capabilities_ &
+ (int)GnssPowerIndicationCallback::CAPABILITY_TOTAL)) {
+ // Elapsed realtime must increase
+ EXPECT_GT(powerStats2.elapsedRealtime.timestampNs, powerStats1.elapsedRealtime.timestampNs);
- // Total energy must increase
- EXPECT_GT(powerStats2.totalEnergyMilliJoule, powerStats1.totalEnergyMilliJoule);
+ // Total energy must increase
+ EXPECT_GT(powerStats2.totalEnergyMilliJoule, powerStats1.totalEnergyMilliJoule);
+ }
// At least oone of singleband and multiband acquisition energy must increase
bool singlebandAcqEnergyIncreased = powerStats2.singlebandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule >
powerStats1.singlebandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule;
bool multibandAcqEnergyIncreased = powerStats2.multibandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule >
powerStats1.multibandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule;
- EXPECT_TRUE(singlebandAcqEnergyIncreased || multibandAcqEnergyIncreased);
+
+ if ((gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_capabilities_ &
+ (int)GnssPowerIndicationCallback::CAPABILITY_SINGLEBAND_ACQUISITION) ||
+ (gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_capabilities_ &
+ (int)GnssPowerIndicationCallback::CAPABILITY_MULTIBAND_ACQUISITION)) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(singlebandAcqEnergyIncreased || multibandAcqEnergyIncreased);
+ }
// At least one of singleband and multiband tracking energy must increase
bool singlebandTrackingEnergyIncreased = powerStats2.singlebandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule >
powerStats1.singlebandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule;
bool multibandTrackingEnergyIncreased = powerStats2.multibandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule >
powerStats1.multibandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule;
- EXPECT_TRUE(singlebandTrackingEnergyIncreased || multibandTrackingEnergyIncreased);
+ if ((gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_capabilities_ &
+ (int)GnssPowerIndicationCallback::CAPABILITY_SINGLEBAND_TRACKING) ||
+ (gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_capabilities_ &
+ (int)GnssPowerIndicationCallback::CAPABILITY_MULTIBAND_TRACKING)) {
+ EXPECT_TRUE(singlebandTrackingEnergyIncreased || multibandTrackingEnergyIncreased);
+ }
// Clean up
StopAndClearLocations();
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.1/vts/OWNERS b/graphics/composer/2.1/vts/OWNERS
index 0b42d2e..ea06752 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.1/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.1/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
# Graphics team
+adyabr@google.com
lpy@google.com
-vhau@google.com
# VTS team
yim@google.com
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
index 7d0a83b..2f0429c 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
@@ -561,17 +561,28 @@
setActiveConfig(display, config1);
sendRefreshFrame(display, nullptr);
- int32_t vsyncPeriod1 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+ const auto vsyncPeriod1 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
display.get(), config1,
IComposerClient::IComposerClient::Attribute::VSYNC_PERIOD);
- int32_t vsyncPeriod2 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+ const auto configGroup1 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+ display.get(), config1,
+ IComposerClient::IComposerClient::Attribute::CONFIG_GROUP);
+ const auto vsyncPeriod2 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
display.get(), config2,
IComposerClient::IComposerClient::Attribute::VSYNC_PERIOD);
+ const auto configGroup2 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+ display.get(), config2,
+ IComposerClient::IComposerClient::Attribute::CONFIG_GROUP);
if (vsyncPeriod1 == vsyncPeriod2) {
return; // continue
}
+ // We don't allow delayed change when changing config groups
+ if (params.delayForChange > 0 && configGroup1 != configGroup2) {
+ return; // continue
+ }
+
VsyncPeriodChangeTimeline timeline;
IComposerClient::VsyncPeriodChangeConstraints constraints = {
.desiredTimeNanos = systemTime() + params.delayForChange,
diff --git a/identity/TEST_MAPPING b/identity/TEST_MAPPING
index f35f4b7..85cf91f 100644
--- a/identity/TEST_MAPPING
+++ b/identity/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
},
{
"name": "android.hardware.identity-support-lib-test"
+ },
+ {
+ "name": "libeic_test"
}
]
}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp b/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp
index 7c68aee..28c4893 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp
@@ -114,6 +114,43 @@
],
}
+cc_test {
+ name: "libeic_test",
+ srcs: [
+ "EicTests.cpp",
+ "FakeSecureHardwareProxy.cpp",
+ ],
+ cflags: [
+ "-Wall",
+ "-Wextra",
+ "-g",
+ "-DEIC_DEBUG",
+ ],
+ local_include_dirs: [
+ "common",
+ ],
+ shared_libs: [
+ "liblog",
+ "libcrypto",
+ "libkeymaster_messages",
+ ],
+ static_libs: [
+ "libbase",
+ "libcppbor_external",
+ "libcppcose_rkp",
+ "libutils",
+ "libsoft_attestation_cert",
+ "libkeymaster_portable",
+ "libsoft_attestation_cert",
+ "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
+ "android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
+ "android.hardware.identity-libeic-library",
+ ],
+ test_suites: [
+ "general-tests",
+ ],
+}
+
prebuilt_etc {
name: "android.hardware.identity_credential.xml",
sub_dir: "permissions",
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/EicTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/EicTests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a28080d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/EicTests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <optional>
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include "FakeSecureHardwareProxy.h"
+
+// Most of libeic is tested as part of VTS since there's almost a 1:1 mapping between
+// the HAL and libeic interfaces. This test suite is mainly for the few things which
+// doesn't map directly.
+//
+
+using std::optional;
+using std::string;
+using std::vector;
+
+using android::hardware::identity::AccessCheckResult;
+using android::hardware::identity::FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy;
+using android::hardware::identity::FakeSecureHardwareProvisioningProxy;
+
+TEST(EicTest, AccessControlIsEnforced) {
+ // First provision the credential...
+ //
+ FakeSecureHardwareProvisioningProxy provisioningProxy;
+ bool isTestCredential = false;
+ provisioningProxy.initialize(isTestCredential);
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> credKey =
+ provisioningProxy.createCredentialKey({0x01, 0x02}, {0x03, 0x04});
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credKey.has_value());
+ string docType = "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL";
+ ASSERT_TRUE(provisioningProxy.startPersonalization(0, {1}, docType, 125));
+
+ vector<int> acpIds = {};
+ string nameSpace = "org.iso.18013.5.1";
+ string name = "NonAccessibleElement";
+ vector<uint8_t> content = {0x63, 0x46, 0x6f, 0x6f}; // "Foo" tstr
+ ASSERT_TRUE(provisioningProxy.beginAddEntry(acpIds, nameSpace, name, content.size()));
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> encContent =
+ provisioningProxy.addEntryValue(acpIds, nameSpace, name, content);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(encContent.has_value());
+ ASSERT_EQ(encContent->size(), content.size() + 28);
+
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> signatureOfToBeSigned = provisioningProxy.finishAddingEntries();
+ ASSERT_TRUE(signatureOfToBeSigned.has_value());
+
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> credData = provisioningProxy.finishGetCredentialData(docType);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credData.has_value());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(provisioningProxy.shutdown());
+
+ // Then present data from it...
+ //
+ FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy presentationProxy;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(presentationProxy.initialize(isTestCredential, docType, credData.value()));
+ AccessCheckResult res =
+ presentationProxy.startRetrieveEntryValue(nameSpace, name, 1, content.size(), acpIds);
+ ASSERT_EQ(res, AccessCheckResult::kNoAccessControlProfiles);
+
+ // Ensure that we can't get the data out if startRetrieveEntryValue() returned
+ // something other than kOk... See b/190757775 for details.
+ //
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> decContent =
+ presentationProxy.retrieveEntryValue(encContent.value(), nameSpace, name, acpIds);
+ ASSERT_FALSE(decContent.has_value());
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char** argv) {
+ ::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
+ return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
index 9e033b3..3d13766 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
@@ -633,6 +633,8 @@
// We'll need to calc and store a digest of additionalData to check that it's the same
// additionalData being passed in for every eicPresentationRetrieveEntryValue() call...
+ //
+ ctx->accessCheckOk = false;
if (!eicCborCalcEntryAdditionalData(accessControlProfileIds, numAccessControlProfileIds,
nameSpace, name, additionalDataCbor,
additionalDataCborBufSize, &additionalDataCborSize,
@@ -680,6 +682,7 @@
if (result == EIC_ACCESS_CHECK_RESULT_OK) {
eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cbor, name);
+ ctx->accessCheckOk = true;
}
return result;
}
@@ -702,10 +705,15 @@
calculatedSha256)) {
return false;
}
+
if (eicCryptoMemCmp(calculatedSha256, ctx->additionalDataSha256, EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0) {
eicDebug("SHA-256 mismatch of additionalData");
return false;
}
+ if (!ctx->accessCheckOk) {
+ eicDebug("Attempting to retrieve a value for which access is not granted");
+ return false;
+ }
if (!eicOpsDecryptAes128Gcm(ctx->storageKey, encryptedContent, encryptedContentSize,
additionalDataCbor, additionalDataCborSize, content)) {
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
index 7cad068..c888049 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@
// Set to true initialized as a test credential.
bool testCredential;
+ // Set to true if the evaluation of access control checks in
+ // eicPresentationStartRetrieveEntryValue() resulted EIC_ACCESS_CHECK_RESULT_OK
+ bool accessCheckOk;
+
// These are bitmasks indicating which of the possible 32 access control profiles are
// authorized. They are built up by eicPresentationValidateAccessControlProfile().
//
diff --git a/input/classifier/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/input/classifier/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
index e170f4a..58945d3 100644
--- a/input/classifier/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/input/classifier/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -26,7 +26,10 @@
cc_test {
name: "VtsHalInputClassifierV1_0TargetTest",
defaults: ["VtsHalTargetTestDefaults"],
- srcs: ["VtsHalInputClassifierV1_0TargetTest.cpp"],
+ srcs: [
+ ":inputconstants_aidl",
+ "VtsHalInputClassifierV1_0TargetTest.cpp",
+ ],
header_libs: ["jni_headers"],
static_libs: [
"android.hardware.input.classifier@1.0",
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
index bc294bd..342b3e2 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
ASN1_INTEGER_SET* padding;
ASN1_INTEGER* ec_curve;
ASN1_INTEGER* rsa_public_exponent;
+ ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
ASN1_INTEGER* active_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* origination_expire_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* usage_expire_date_time;
@@ -78,56 +79,84 @@
ASN1_INTEGER* user_auth_type;
ASN1_INTEGER* auth_timeout;
ASN1_NULL* allow_while_on_body;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
ASN1_NULL* all_applications;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* application_id;
ASN1_INTEGER* creation_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* origin;
- ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust;
ASN1_INTEGER* os_version;
ASN1_INTEGER* os_patchlevel;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_application_id;
- ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
- ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
- ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_brand;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_device;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_product;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_serial;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_imei;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_meid;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_manufacturer;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_model;
ASN1_INTEGER* vendor_patchlevel;
ASN1_INTEGER* boot_patchlevel;
} KM_AUTH_LIST;
ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_AUTH_LIST) = {
- ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, purpose, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PURPOSE.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, algorithm, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ALGORITHM.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, key_size, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_KEY_SIZE.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, digest, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_DIGEST.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, padding, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PADDING.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, ec_curve, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_EC_CURVE.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rsa_public_exponent, ASN1_INTEGER,
- TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
- TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
- TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, no_auth_required, ASN1_NULL, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, user_auth_type, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, auth_timeout, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, allow_while_on_body, ASN1_NULL, TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_user_presence_required, ASN1_NULL,
- TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_confirmation_required, ASN1_NULL,
- TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, unlocked_device_required, ASN1_NULL,
- TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, creation_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origin, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ORIGIN.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
- TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, purpose, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PURPOSE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, algorithm, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ALGORITHM.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, key_size, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_KEY_SIZE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, digest, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_DIGEST.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, padding, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PADDING.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, ec_curve, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_EC_CURVE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rsa_public_exponent, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
+
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, no_auth_required, ASN1_NULL, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, user_auth_type, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, auth_timeout, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, allow_while_on_body, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_user_presence_required, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_confirmation_required, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, unlocked_device_required, ASN1_NULL,
+ TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, creation_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_CREATION_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origin, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ORIGIN.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_brand, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_device, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_product, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_serial, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_imei, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_meid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_manufacturer, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_model, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_AUTH_LIST);
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_AUTH_LIST);
@@ -259,6 +288,14 @@
copyAuthTag(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_brand, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_device, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_product, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_serial, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_imei, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_meid, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_manufacturer, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_model, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->trusted_user_presence_required, TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
index 9e37ed0..01c502c 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
@@ -96,6 +96,18 @@
return count > 0;
}
+// If the given property is available, add it to the tag set under the given tag ID.
+template <Tag tag>
+void add_tag_from_prop(AuthorizationSetBuilder* tags, TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+ const char* prop) {
+ char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+ int len = property_get(prop, value, /* default = */ "");
+ if (len > 0) {
+ tags->Authorization(ttag, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(value),
+ static_cast<size_t>(len));
+ }
+}
+
constexpr char hex_value[256] = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, //
@@ -4409,6 +4421,95 @@
}
/*
+ * AttestationTest.EcAttestationID
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to EC keys with correct attestation ID fields works and generates the
+ * expected output.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestationTest, EcAttestationID) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
+
+ // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+ auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+ "ro.product.manufacturer");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo"));
+ // Include one of the (valid) attestation ID tags.
+ builder.push_back(tag);
+ hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+ auto result = AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain);
+ if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+ EXPECT_GE(cert_chain.size(), 2U);
+
+ std::vector<KeyParameter> expected_hw_enforced = key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced;
+ expected_hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(
+ "challenge", "foo", key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced,
+ hidl_vec<KeyParameter>(expected_hw_enforced), SecLevel(), cert_chain[0]));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * AttestationTest.EcAttestationMismatchID
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to EC keys with incorrect attestation ID fields fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestationTest, EcAttestationMismatchID) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
+
+ // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+ std::string invalid = "completely-invalid";
+ auto invalid_tags =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, invalid.data(),
+ invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, invalid.data(), invalid.size());
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : invalid_tags) {
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo"));
+ // Include one of the invalid attestation ID tags.
+ builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+ hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+ auto result = AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG)
+ << "result: " << static_cast<int32_t>(result);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* AttestationTest.EcAttestationRequiresAttestationAppId
*
* Verifies that attesting to EC keys requires app ID
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp b/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp
index 207a7e8..15230d5 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@
ASN1_INTEGER_SET* padding;
ASN1_INTEGER* ec_curve;
ASN1_INTEGER* rsa_public_exponent;
+ ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
+ ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
ASN1_INTEGER* active_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* origination_expire_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* usage_expire_date_time;
@@ -86,21 +88,27 @@
ASN1_INTEGER* user_auth_type;
ASN1_INTEGER* auth_timeout;
ASN1_NULL* allow_while_on_body;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
ASN1_NULL* all_applications;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* application_id;
ASN1_INTEGER* creation_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* origin;
- ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust;
ASN1_INTEGER* os_version;
ASN1_INTEGER* os_patchlevel;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_application_id;
- ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
- ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
- ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_brand;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_device;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_product;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_serial;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_imei;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_meid;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_manufacturer;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_model;
ASN1_INTEGER* vendor_patchlevel;
ASN1_INTEGER* boot_patchlevel;
- ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
ASN1_NULL* device_unique_attestation;
ASN1_NULL* identity_credential_key;
} KM_AUTH_LIST;
@@ -116,6 +124,7 @@
TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL,
TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
@@ -138,12 +147,27 @@
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_brand, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_device, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_product, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_serial, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_imei, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_meid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_manufacturer, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_model, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER,
TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
- TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, device_unique_attestation, ASN1_NULL,
TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, identity_credential_key, ASN1_NULL,
@@ -279,6 +303,14 @@
copyAuthTag(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_brand, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_device, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_product, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_serial, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_imei, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_meid, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_manufacturer, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_model, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->trusted_user_presence_required, TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h b/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h
index 40eb142..e8db56a 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h
@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@
using V4_0::TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA;
using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID;
using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL;
using V4_0::TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT;
using V4_0::TAG_BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS;
using V4_0::TAG_BLOCK_MODE;
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
index 0639da8..4a57f44 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#define LOG_TAG "keymaster_hidl_hal_test"
#include <cutils/log.h>
+#include <vector>
#include "Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h"
@@ -26,6 +27,8 @@
#include <keymasterV4_1/attestation_record.h>
#include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
+using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test::add_tag_from_prop;
+
// Not to dump the attestation by default. Can enable by specify the parameter
// "--dump_attestations" on lunching VTS
static bool dumpAttestations = false;
@@ -172,10 +175,42 @@
attestation.software_enforced.Sort();
attestation.hardware_enforced.Sort();
- EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filter_tags(attestation.software_enforced))
- << DIFFERENCE(expected_sw_enforced, attestation.software_enforced);
- EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_hw_enforced), filter_tags(attestation.hardware_enforced))
- << DIFFERENCE(expected_hw_enforced, attestation.hardware_enforced);
+ expected_sw_enforced = filter_tags(expected_sw_enforced);
+ expected_hw_enforced = filter_tags(expected_hw_enforced);
+ AuthorizationSet attestation_sw_enforced = filter_tags(attestation.software_enforced);
+ AuthorizationSet attestation_hw_enforced = filter_tags(attestation.hardware_enforced);
+
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_sw_enforced, attestation_sw_enforced)
+ << DIFFERENCE(expected_sw_enforced, attestation_sw_enforced);
+ EXPECT_EQ(expected_hw_enforced, attestation_hw_enforced)
+ << DIFFERENCE(expected_hw_enforced, attestation_hw_enforced);
+}
+
+X509_Ptr parse_cert_blob(const std::vector<uint8_t>& blob) {
+ const uint8_t* p = blob.data();
+ return X509_Ptr(d2i_X509(nullptr /* allocate new */, &p, blob.size()));
+}
+
+bool check_certificate_chain_signatures(const hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>& cert_chain) {
+ // TODO: Check that root is self-signed once b/187803288 is resolved.
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < cert_chain.size() - 1; ++i) {
+ X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain[i]));
+ X509_Ptr signing_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain[i + 1]));
+
+ if (!key_cert.get() || !signing_cert.get()) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert.get()));
+ if (!signing_pubkey.get()) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get())) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ return true;
}
} // namespace
@@ -243,6 +278,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(check_certificate_chain_signatures(cert_chain));
if (dumpAttestations) {
for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
}
@@ -289,6 +325,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(check_certificate_chain_signatures(cert_chain));
if (dumpAttestations) {
for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
}
@@ -312,6 +349,106 @@
SecLevel());
}
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
+
+ // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+ auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+ "ro.product.manufacturer");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+ HidlBuf challenge("challenge");
+ HidlBuf app_id("foo");
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id);
+ builder.push_back(tag);
+ ErrorCode result = convert(AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain));
+
+ // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+ if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+ EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
+ if (dumpAttestations) {
+ for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
+ }
+ auto [err, attestation] = parse_attestation_record(cert_chain[0]);
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, err);
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+ hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+ check_attestation_record(
+ attestation, challenge,
+ /* sw_enforced */
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id),
+ hw_enforced, SecLevel());
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
+
+ // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+ std::string invalid = "completely-invalid";
+ auto attestation_id_tags =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, invalid.data(),
+ invalid.size())
+ .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, invalid.data(), invalid.size());
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+ HidlBuf challenge("challenge");
+ HidlBuf app_id("foo");
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id);
+ builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+ ErrorCode result = convert(AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain));
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG)
+ << "result: " << static_cast<int32_t>(result);
+ }
+}
+
INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_4_1_HIDL_TEST(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest);
} // namespace test
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h
index f8c1fad..670ccfb 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
#include <android/hardware/keymaster/4.1/IKeymasterDevice.h>
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
+
#include <KeymasterHidlTest.h>
#include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
@@ -159,3 +161,17 @@
android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString)
} // namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1::test
+
+namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test {
+
+// If the given property is available, add it to the tag set under the given tag ID.
+template <Tag tag>
+void add_tag_from_prop(AuthorizationSetBuilder* tags, TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+ const char* prop) {
+ std::string prop_value = ::android::base::GetProperty(prop, /* default= */ "");
+ if (!prop_value.empty()) {
+ tags->Authorization(ttag, prop_value.data(), prop_value.size());
+ }
+}
+
+} // namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test
diff --git a/power/aidl/vts/VtsHalPowerTargetTest.cpp b/power/aidl/vts/VtsHalPowerTargetTest.cpp
index 5bb088a..ffab66c 100644
--- a/power/aidl/vts/VtsHalPowerTargetTest.cpp
+++ b/power/aidl/vts/VtsHalPowerTargetTest.cpp
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <android/binder_ibinder.h>
#include <android/binder_manager.h>
#include <android/binder_process.h>
+#include <android/binder_status.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -82,6 +83,11 @@
DurationWrapper(1000000000L, 4L),
};
+inline bool isUnknownOrUnsupported(const ndk::ScopedAStatus& status) {
+ return status.getStatus() == STATUS_UNKNOWN_TRANSACTION ||
+ status.getExceptionCode() == EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION;
+}
+
class PowerAidl : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
public:
virtual void SetUp() override {
@@ -147,7 +153,7 @@
int64_t rate = -1;
auto status = power->getHintSessionPreferredRate(&rate);
if (!status.isOk()) {
- ASSERT_EQ(EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.getExceptionCode());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status));
return;
}
@@ -159,7 +165,7 @@
std::shared_ptr<IPowerHintSession> session;
auto status = power->createHintSession(getpid(), getuid(), kSelfTids, 16666666L, &session);
if (!status.isOk()) {
- ASSERT_EQ(EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.getExceptionCode());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status));
return;
}
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, session);
@@ -173,10 +179,9 @@
std::shared_ptr<IPowerHintSession> session;
auto status = power->createHintSession(getpid(), getuid(), kEmptyTids, 16666666L, &session);
ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
- if (EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION == status.getExceptionCode()) {
+ if (isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) {
return;
}
- // Test with empty tid list
ASSERT_EQ(EX_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT, status.getExceptionCode());
}
@@ -184,7 +189,7 @@
std::shared_ptr<IPowerHintSession> session;
auto status = power->createHintSession(getpid(), getuid(), kSelfTids, 16666666L, &session);
if (!status.isOk()) {
- ASSERT_EQ(EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.getExceptionCode());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status));
return;
}
ASSERT_NE(nullptr, session);
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
index f93dbba..fd6bf65 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
@@ -159,18 +159,17 @@
* purpose [1] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* algorithm [2] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* keySize [3] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
- * blockMode [4] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* digest [5] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* padding [6] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
- * callerNonce [7] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
- * minMacLength [8] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* ecCurve [10] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* rsaPublicExponent [200] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * mgfDigest [203] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* rollbackResistance [303] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+ * earlyBootOnly [305] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
* activeDateTime [400] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* originationExpireDateTime [401] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* usageExpireDateTime [402] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
- * userSecureId [502] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * usageCountLimit [405] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* noAuthRequired [503] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
* userAuthType [504] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* authTimeout [505] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
@@ -194,6 +193,7 @@
* attestationIdModel [717] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
* vendorPatchLevel [718] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* bootPatchLevel [719] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+ * deviceUniqueAttestation [720] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
* }
*/
Certificate[] certificateChain;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
index 4ff4574..58e02b3 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -831,14 +831,24 @@
/**
* DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attested key generation/import
* operations. It indicates that attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather
- * than a batch key. When a device-unique key is used, only the attestation certificate is
- * returned; no additional chained certificates are provided. It's up to the caller to
- * recognize the device-unique signing key. Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices may
- * support device-unique attestations. SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must
- * return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
+ * than a batch key. When a device-unique key is used, the returned chain should contain two
+ * certificates:
+ * * The attestation certificate, containing the attestation extension, as described in
+ KeyCreationResult.aidl.
+ * * A self-signed root certificate, signed by the device-unique key.
+ * No additional chained certificates are provided. Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX
+ * IKeyMintDevices may support device-unique attestations. SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT
+ * IKeyMintDevices must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive
+ * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
* SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices need not support DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, and
* return ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS if they do not support it.
*
+ * The caller needs to obtain the device-unique keys out-of-band and compare them against the
+ * key used to sign the self-signed root certificate.
+ * To ease this process, the IKeyMintDevice implementation should include, both in the subject
+ * and issuer fields of the self-signed root, the unique identifier of the device. Using the
+ * unique identifier will make it straightforward for the caller to link a device to its key.
+ *
* IKeyMintDevice implementations that support device-unique attestation MUST add the
* DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION tag to device-unique attestations.
*/
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
index ae2becd..a312723 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@
.EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
.AttestKey()
.SetDefaultValidity(),
- {} /* attestation siging key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+ {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
&attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@
ErrorCode::OK,
GenerateKey(
AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256).SetDefaultValidity(),
- {} /* attestation siging key */, &non_attest_key.keyBlob,
+ {} /* attestation signing key */, &non_attest_key.keyBlob,
&non_attest_key_characteristics, &non_attest_key_cert_chain));
ASSERT_GT(non_attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
@@ -662,6 +662,124 @@
&attested_key_cert_chain));
}
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, EcdsaAttestationID) {
+ // Create attestation key.
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+ &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+ ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+ // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+ auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+ "ro.product.manufacturer");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << tag);
+ // Use attestation key to sign an ECDSA key, but include an attestation ID field.
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ builder.push_back(tag);
+ vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+ auto result = GenerateKey(builder, attest_key, &attested_key_blob,
+ &attested_key_characteristics, &attested_key_cert_chain);
+ if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) {
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+
+ AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+ AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+
+ // The attested key characteristics will not contain APPLICATION_ID_* fields (their
+ // spec definitions all have "Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics"), but the
+ // attestation extension should contain them, so make sure the extra tag is added.
+ hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+ SecLevel(),
+ attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+ }
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+}
+
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, EcdsaAttestationMismatchID) {
+ // Create attestation key.
+ AttestationKey attest_key;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .AttestKey()
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+ &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+ attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+ ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
+ EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+ // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+ auto attestation_id_tags =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "bogus-brand")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "devious-device")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "punctured-product")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "suspicious-serial")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, "invalid-imei")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, "mismatching-meid")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, "malformed-manufacturer")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "malicious-model");
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << invalid_tag);
+
+ // Use attestation key to sign an ECDSA key, but include an invalid
+ // attestation ID field.
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+ vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+ vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+ auto result = GenerateKey(builder, attest_key, &attested_key_blob,
+ &attested_key_characteristics, &attested_key_cert_chain);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG)
+ << "result = " << result;
+ }
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+}
+
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AttestKeyTest);
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
index b0f056a..a3ed3ad 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
protected:
void CheckUniqueAttestationResults(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics,
- const AuthorizationSet& hw_enforced, int key_size) {
+ const AuthorizationSet& hw_enforced) {
ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
if (KeyMintAidlTestBase::dump_Attestations) {
@@ -40,10 +40,11 @@
AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
- EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size)) << "Key size missing";
-
+ // The device-unique attestation chain should contain exactly two certificates:
+ // * The leaf with the attestation extension.
+ // * A self-signed root, signed using the device-unique key.
+ ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 2);
EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
- ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
@@ -133,17 +134,32 @@
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
- AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
- .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
- .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
- .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
- .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
- .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
- CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced, key_size);
+ // Any patchlevels attached to the key should also be present in the attestation extension.
+ AuthorizationSet auths;
+ for (const auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+ auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+ auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (vendor_pl) {
+ hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, *vendor_pl);
+ }
+ auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (boot_pl) {
+ hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, *boot_pl);
+ }
+
+ CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced);
}
/*
@@ -157,11 +173,10 @@
vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
- int key_size = 256;
auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
.Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
.Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
.AttestationChallenge("challenge")
@@ -173,17 +188,137 @@
if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
- AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
- .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
- .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
- .Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
- .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
- .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
- .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+ // Any patchlevels attached to the key should also be present in the attestation extension.
+ AuthorizationSet auths;
+ for (const auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+ auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+ auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (vendor_pl) {
+ hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, *vendor_pl);
+ }
+ auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (boot_pl) {
+ hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, *boot_pl);
+ }
- CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced, key_size);
+ CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID
+ *
+ * Verifies that device unique attestation can include IDs that do match the
+ * local device.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+ auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+ "ro.product.manufacturer");
+ add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << tag);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+ .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION);
+ builder.push_back(tag);
+ auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+ // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+ if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+ .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+ .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+ // Expect the specified tag to be present in the attestation extension.
+ hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+ // Any patchlevels attached to the key should also be present in the attestation extension.
+ AuthorizationSet auths;
+ for (const auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+ auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+ auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (vendor_pl) {
+ hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, *vendor_pl);
+ }
+ auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+ if (boot_pl) {
+ hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, *boot_pl);
+ }
+ CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced);
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID
+ *
+ * Verifies that device unique attestation rejects attempts to attest to IDs that
+ * don't match the local device.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID) {
+ if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+ // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+ auto attestation_id_tags =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "bogus-brand")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "devious-device")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "punctured-product")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "suspicious-serial")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, "invalid-imei")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, "mismatching-meid")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, "malformed-manufacturer")
+ .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "malicious-model");
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+ for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << invalid_tag);
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+ .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+ .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+ .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+ .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+ .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION);
+ // Add the tag that doesn't match the local device's real ID.
+ builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+ auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG);
+ }
}
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest);
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
index 4d31fa4..82f192a 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#include <aidl/Gtest.h>
#include <aidl/Vintf.h>
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
#include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
#include <binder/ProcessState.h>
#include <gtest/gtest.h>
@@ -313,6 +314,16 @@
long challenge_;
};
+// If the given property is available, add it to the tag set under the given tag ID.
+template <Tag tag>
+void add_tag_from_prop(AuthorizationSetBuilder* tags, TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+ const char* prop) {
+ std::string prop_value = ::android::base::GetProperty(prop, /* default= */ "");
+ if (!prop_value.empty()) {
+ tags->Authorization(ttag, prop_value.data(), prop_value.size());
+ }
+}
+
vector<uint8_t> build_serial_blob(const uint64_t serial_int);
void verify_subject(const X509* cert, const string& subject, bool self_signed);
void verify_serial(X509* cert, const uint64_t expected_serial);
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp b/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
index a48f770..2462228 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST);
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST);
+// Fields ordered in tag order.
typedef struct km_auth_list {
ASN1_INTEGER_SET* purpose;
ASN1_INTEGER* algorithm;
@@ -72,32 +73,38 @@
ASN1_INTEGER_SET* padding;
ASN1_INTEGER* ec_curve;
ASN1_INTEGER* rsa_public_exponent;
+ ASN1_INTEGER_SET* mgf_digest;
+ ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
+ ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
ASN1_INTEGER* active_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* origination_expire_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* usage_expire_date_time;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* usage_count_limit;
ASN1_NULL* no_auth_required;
ASN1_INTEGER* user_auth_type;
ASN1_INTEGER* auth_timeout;
ASN1_NULL* allow_while_on_body;
- ASN1_NULL* all_applications;
- ASN1_OCTET_STRING* application_id;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
+ ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
ASN1_INTEGER* creation_date_time;
ASN1_INTEGER* origin;
- ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust;
ASN1_INTEGER* os_version;
ASN1_INTEGER* os_patchlevel;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_application_id;
- ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
- ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
- ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_brand;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_device;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_product;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_serial;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_imei;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_meid;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_manufacturer;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_model;
ASN1_INTEGER* vendor_patchlevel;
ASN1_INTEGER* boot_patchlevel;
- ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
ASN1_NULL* device_unique_attestation;
- ASN1_NULL* storage_key;
ASN1_NULL* identity_credential;
- ASN1_INTEGER* usage_count_limit;
} KM_AUTH_LIST;
ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_AUTH_LIST) = {
@@ -109,13 +116,18 @@
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, ec_curve, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_EC_CURVE.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rsa_public_exponent, ASN1_INTEGER,
TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, mgf_digest, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL,
TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_count_limit, ASN1_INTEGER,
+ TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, no_auth_required, ASN1_NULL, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, user_auth_type, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, auth_timeout, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT.maskedTag()),
@@ -133,19 +145,31 @@
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_brand, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_device, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_product, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_serial, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_imei, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_meid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_manufacturer, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER.maskedTag()),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_model, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+ TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER,
TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
- TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, device_unique_attestation, ASN1_NULL,
TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, storage_key, ASN1_NULL, TAG_STORAGE_KEY.maskedTag()),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, identity_credential, ASN1_NULL,
TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY.maskedTag()),
- ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_count_limit, ASN1_INTEGER,
- TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT.maskedTag()),
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_AUTH_LIST);
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_AUTH_LIST);
@@ -155,9 +179,9 @@
ASN1_INTEGER* keymint_version;
ASN1_ENUMERATED* keymint_security_level;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_challenge;
+ ASN1_INTEGER* unique_id;
KM_AUTH_LIST* software_enforced;
KM_AUTH_LIST* tee_enforced;
- ASN1_INTEGER* unique_id;
} KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION;
ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION) = {
@@ -253,41 +277,52 @@
}
// Extract the values from the specified ASN.1 record and place them in auth_list.
+// Does nothing with root-of-trust field.
static ErrorCode extract_auth_list(const KM_AUTH_LIST* record, AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
if (!record) return ErrorCode::OK;
- copyAuthTag(record->active_date_time, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->algorithm, TAG_ALGORITHM, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->application_id, TAG_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->auth_timeout, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->creation_date_time, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->digest, TAG_DIGEST, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->ec_curve, TAG_EC_CURVE, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->key_size, TAG_KEY_SIZE, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->no_auth_required, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->origin, TAG_ORIGIN, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->origination_expire_date_time, TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->os_patchlevel, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->os_version, TAG_OS_VERSION, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->padding, TAG_PADDING, auth_list);
+ // Fields ordered in tag order.
copyAuthTag(record->purpose, TAG_PURPOSE, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->rollback_resistance, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->algorithm, TAG_ALGORITHM, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->key_size, TAG_KEY_SIZE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->digest, TAG_DIGEST, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->padding, TAG_PADDING, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->ec_curve, TAG_EC_CURVE, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->rsa_public_exponent, TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->mgf_digest, TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->rollback_resistance, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->early_boot_only, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->active_date_time, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->origination_expire_date_time, TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->usage_count_limit, TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->no_auth_required, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->auth_timeout, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->allow_while_on_body, TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->trusted_user_presence_required, TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->trusted_confirmation_required, TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED,
auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->unlocked_device_required, TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->early_boot_only, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->creation_date_time, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->origin, TAG_ORIGIN, auth_list);
+ // root_of_trust dealt with separately
+ copyAuthTag(record->os_version, TAG_OS_VERSION, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->os_patchlevel, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_brand, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_device, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_product, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_serial, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_imei, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_meid, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_manufacturer, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_model, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+ copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->device_unique_attestation, TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->storage_key, TAG_STORAGE_KEY, auth_list);
copyAuthTag(record->identity_credential, TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY, auth_list);
- copyAuthTag(record->usage_count_limit, TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, auth_list);
return ErrorCode::OK;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
index 2dbdfa8..1e0733f 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
@@ -32,10 +32,11 @@
constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.build.version.security_patch";
constexpr char kVendorPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.vendor.build.security_patch";
-constexpr char kPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-[0-9]{2}$";
+constexpr char kPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})$";
constexpr size_t kYearMatch = 1;
constexpr size_t kMonthMatch = 2;
-constexpr size_t kPatchlevelMatchCount = kMonthMatch + 1;
+constexpr size_t kDayMatch = 3;
+constexpr size_t kPatchlevelMatchCount = kDayMatch + 1;
uint32_t match_to_uint32(const char* expression, const regmatch_t& match) {
if (match.rm_so == -1) return 0;
@@ -53,8 +54,6 @@
return prop_value;
}
-} // anonymous namespace
-
uint32_t getOsVersion(const char* version_str) {
regex_t regex;
if (regcomp(®ex, kPlatformVersionRegex, REG_EXTENDED)) {
@@ -76,12 +75,9 @@
return (major * 100 + minor) * 100 + subminor;
}
-uint32_t getOsVersion() {
- std::string version = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformVersionProp);
- return getOsVersion(version.c_str());
-}
+enum class PatchlevelOutput { kYearMonthDay, kYearMonth };
-uint32_t getPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str) {
+uint32_t getPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str, PatchlevelOutput detail) {
regex_t regex;
if (regcomp(®ex, kPatchlevelRegex, REG_EXTENDED) != 0) {
return 0;
@@ -100,17 +96,35 @@
if (month < 1 || month > 12) {
return 0;
}
- return year * 100 + month;
+
+ switch (detail) {
+ case PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonthDay: {
+ uint32_t day = match_to_uint32(patchlevel_str, matches[kDayMatch]);
+ if (day < 1 || day > 31) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return year * 10000 + month * 100 + day;
+ }
+ case PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonth:
+ return year * 100 + month;
+ }
+}
+
+} // anonymous namespace
+
+uint32_t getOsVersion() {
+ std::string version = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformVersionProp);
+ return getOsVersion(version.c_str());
}
uint32_t getOsPatchlevel() {
std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformPatchlevelProp);
- return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
+ return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str(), PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonth);
}
uint32_t getVendorPatchlevel() {
std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kVendorPatchlevelProp);
- return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
+ return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str(), PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonthDay);
}
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp b/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
index 31f4854..bf332d5 100644
--- a/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
+++ b/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result1.error);
EXPECT_EQ(1U, result1.token.challenge);
EXPECT_GT(result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+ EXPECT_EQ(32U, result1.token.mac.size());
unsigned long time_to_sleep = 200;
sleep_ms(time_to_sleep);
@@ -123,6 +124,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result2.error);
EXPECT_EQ(2U, result2.token.challenge);
EXPECT_GT(result2.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+ EXPECT_EQ(32U, result2.token.mac.size());
auto host_time_delta = result2_time - result1_time;
@@ -153,6 +155,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result1.error);
EXPECT_EQ(0U, result1.token.challenge);
EXPECT_GT(result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+ EXPECT_EQ(32U, result1.token.mac.size());
unsigned long time_to_sleep = 200;
sleep_ms(time_to_sleep);
@@ -162,6 +165,7 @@
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result2.error);
EXPECT_EQ(1U, result2.token.challenge);
EXPECT_GT(result2.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+ EXPECT_EQ(32U, result2.token.mac.size());
auto host_time_delta = result2_time - result1_time;
diff --git a/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp b/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp
index 8426120..919f882 100644
--- a/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp
+++ b/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@
SharedSecretParameters params;
auto error = GetReturnErrorCode(sharedSecret->getSharedSecretParameters(¶ms));
EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(params.seed.size() == 0 || params.seed.size() == 32);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(params.nonce.size() == 32);
+
GetParamsResult result;
result.tie() = std::tie(error, params);
return result;
@@ -234,6 +237,45 @@
}
}
+TEST_F(SharedSecretAidlTest, ComputeSharedSecretShortNonce) {
+ auto sharedSecrets = allSharedSecrets();
+ if (sharedSecrets.empty()) {
+ GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping the test as no shared secret service is found.";
+ }
+ auto fixup_hmac = finally([&]() { computeAllSharedSecrets(getAllSharedSecretParameters()); });
+
+ auto params = getAllSharedSecretParameters();
+ ASSERT_EQ(sharedSecrets.size(), params.size())
+ << "One or more shared secret services failed to provide parameters.";
+
+ // All should be well in the normal case
+ auto responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+
+ ASSERT_GT(responses.size(), 0U);
+ vector<uint8_t> correct_response = responses[0].sharing_check;
+ verifyResponses(correct_response, responses);
+
+ // Pick a random param and shorten that nonce by one.
+ size_t param_to_tweak = rand() % params.size();
+ auto& to_tweak = params[param_to_tweak].nonce;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(to_tweak.size() == 32);
+ to_tweak.resize(31);
+
+ responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < responses.size(); ++i) {
+ if (i == param_to_tweak) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, responses[i].error)
+ << "Shared secret service that provided tweaked param should fail to compute "
+ "shared secret";
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, responses[i].error) << "Others should succeed";
+ EXPECT_NE(correct_response, responses[i].sharing_check)
+ << "Others should calculate a different shared secret, due to the tweaked "
+ "nonce.";
+ }
+ }
+}
+
TEST_F(SharedSecretAidlTest, ComputeSharedSecretCorruptSeed) {
auto sharedSecrets = allSharedSecrets();
if (sharedSecrets.empty()) {
@@ -275,6 +317,45 @@
}
}
}
+
+TEST_F(SharedSecretAidlTest, ComputeSharedSecretShortSeed) {
+ auto sharedSecrets = allSharedSecrets();
+ if (sharedSecrets.empty()) {
+ GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping the test as no shared secret service is found.";
+ }
+ auto fixup_hmac = finally([&]() { computeAllSharedSecrets(getAllSharedSecretParameters()); });
+ auto params = getAllSharedSecretParameters();
+ ASSERT_EQ(sharedSecrets.size(), params.size())
+ << "One or more shared secret service failed to provide parameters.";
+
+ // All should be well in the normal case
+ auto responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+
+ ASSERT_GT(responses.size(), 0U);
+ vector<uint8_t> correct_response = responses[0].sharing_check;
+ verifyResponses(correct_response, responses);
+
+ // Pick a random param and modify the seed to be of (invalid) length 31.
+ auto param_to_tweak = rand() % params.size();
+ auto& to_tweak = params[param_to_tweak].seed;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(to_tweak.size() == 32 || to_tweak.size() == 0);
+ to_tweak.resize(31);
+
+ responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < responses.size(); ++i) {
+ if (i == param_to_tweak) {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, responses[i].error)
+ << "Shared secret service that provided tweaked param should fail to compute "
+ "shared secret";
+ } else {
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, responses[i].error) << "Others should succeed";
+ EXPECT_NE(correct_response, responses[i].sharing_check)
+ << "Others should calculate a different shared secret, due to the tweaked "
+ "nonce.";
+ }
+ }
+}
+
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::sharedsecret::test
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorManagerTargetTest.cpp b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorManagerTargetTest.cpp
index 9789188..44fa3be 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorManagerTargetTest.cpp
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorManagerTargetTest.cpp
@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@
std::vector<int32_t> vibratorIds;
};
+inline bool isUnknownOrUnsupported(Status status) {
+ return status.exceptionCode() == Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION ||
+ status.transactionError() == android::UNKNOWN_TRANSACTION;
+}
+
TEST_P(VibratorAidl, ValidateExistingVibrators) {
sp<IVibrator> vibrator;
for (auto& id : vibratorIds) {
@@ -101,8 +106,8 @@
TEST_P(VibratorAidl, PrepareSyncedNotSupported) {
if (!(capabilities & IVibratorManager::CAP_SYNC)) {
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION,
- manager->prepareSynced(vibratorIds).exceptionCode());
+ Status status = manager->prepareSynced(vibratorIds);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
}
@@ -116,8 +121,8 @@
for (auto& id : vibratorIds) {
EXPECT_TRUE(manager->getVibrator(id, &vibrator).isOk());
ASSERT_NE(vibrator, nullptr);
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION,
- vibrator->on(durationMs, nullptr).exceptionCode());
+ Status status = vibrator->on(durationMs, nullptr);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
EXPECT_TRUE(manager->cancelSynced().isOk());
}
@@ -134,7 +139,7 @@
ASSERT_NE(vibrator, nullptr);
int32_t lengthMs = 0;
Status status = vibrator->perform(kEffects[0], kEffectStrengths[0], nullptr, &lengthMs);
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.exceptionCode());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
EXPECT_TRUE(manager->cancelSynced().isOk());
}
@@ -157,7 +162,7 @@
EXPECT_TRUE(manager->getVibrator(id, &vibrator).isOk());
ASSERT_NE(vibrator, nullptr);
Status status = vibrator->compose(composite, nullptr);
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.exceptionCode());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
EXPECT_TRUE(manager->cancelSynced().isOk());
}
@@ -191,8 +196,8 @@
TEST_P(VibratorAidl, TriggerSyncNotSupported) {
if (!(capabilities & IVibratorManager::CAP_SYNC)) {
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION,
- manager->triggerSynced(nullptr).exceptionCode());
+ Status status = manager->triggerSynced(nullptr);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
}
@@ -201,8 +206,8 @@
if (!(capabilities & IVibratorManager::CAP_TRIGGER_CALLBACK)) {
sp<CompletionCallback> callback = new CompletionCallback([] {});
EXPECT_TRUE(manager->prepareSynced(vibratorIds).isOk());
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION,
- manager->triggerSynced(callback).exceptionCode());
+ Status status = manager->triggerSynced(callback);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
}
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
index 713ec75..4d49a12 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
@@ -112,6 +112,11 @@
int32_t capabilities;
};
+inline bool isUnknownOrUnsupported(Status status) {
+ return status.exceptionCode() == Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION ||
+ status.transactionError() == android::UNKNOWN_TRANSACTION;
+}
+
static float getResonantFrequencyHz(sp<IVibrator> vibrator, int32_t capabilities) {
float resonantFrequencyHz;
Status status = vibrator->getResonantFrequency(&resonantFrequencyHz);
@@ -119,7 +124,7 @@
EXPECT_GT(resonantFrequencyHz, 0);
EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_NONE);
} else {
- EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
return resonantFrequencyHz;
}
@@ -131,7 +136,7 @@
EXPECT_GT(freqResolutionHz, 0);
EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_NONE);
} else {
- EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
return freqResolutionHz;
}
@@ -147,7 +152,7 @@
EXPECT_GT(freqMinimumHz, 0);
EXPECT_LE(freqMinimumHz, resonantFrequencyHz);
} else {
- EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
return freqMinimumHz;
}
@@ -158,7 +163,7 @@
if (capabilities & IVibrator::CAP_FREQUENCY_CONTROL) {
EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_NONE);
} else {
- EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
float freqMaximumHz =
@@ -219,7 +224,8 @@
TEST_P(VibratorAidl, OnCallbackNotSupported) {
if (!(capabilities & IVibrator::CAP_ON_CALLBACK)) {
sp<CompletionCallback> callback = new CompletionCallback([] {});
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, vibrator->on(250, callback).exceptionCode());
+ Status status = vibrator->on(250, callback);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
}
@@ -240,8 +246,8 @@
EXPECT_GT(lengthMs, 0);
usleep(lengthMs * 1000);
} else {
- EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION)
- << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status))
+ << status << " " << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
}
}
}
@@ -270,7 +276,7 @@
EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());
EXPECT_GT(lengthMs, 0);
} else {
- EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
if (!status.isOk())
@@ -293,7 +299,7 @@
sp<CompletionCallback> callback = new CompletionCallback([] {});
int lengthMs;
Status status = vibrator->perform(effect, strength, callback, &lengthMs);
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.exceptionCode());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
}
}
@@ -311,8 +317,8 @@
for (EffectStrength strength : kInvalidEffectStrengths) {
int32_t lengthMs;
Status status = vibrator->perform(effect, strength, nullptr /*callback*/, &lengthMs);
- EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION)
- << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status))
+ << status << " " << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
}
}
}
@@ -338,7 +344,8 @@
TEST_P(VibratorAidl, AmplitudeReturnsUnsupportedMatchingCapabilities) {
if ((capabilities & IVibrator::CAP_AMPLITUDE_CONTROL) == 0) {
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, vibrator->setAmplitude(1).exceptionCode());
+ Status status = vibrator->setAmplitude(1);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
}
@@ -362,7 +369,7 @@
if (supportsExternalAmplitudeControl) {
EXPECT_TRUE(amplitudeStatus.isOk());
} else {
- EXPECT_EQ(amplitudeStatus.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(amplitudeStatus)) << amplitudeStatus;
}
EXPECT_TRUE(vibrator->setExternalControl(false).isOk());
} else {
@@ -372,8 +379,8 @@
TEST_P(VibratorAidl, ExternalControlUnsupportedMatchingCapabilities) {
if ((capabilities & IVibrator::CAP_EXTERNAL_CONTROL) == 0) {
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION,
- vibrator->setExternalControl(true).exceptionCode());
+ Status status = vibrator->setExternalControl(true);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
}
@@ -410,7 +417,7 @@
if (isPrimitiveSupported) {
EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_NONE, status.exceptionCode());
} else {
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.exceptionCode());
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
}
}
@@ -473,8 +480,8 @@
effect.primitive = primitive;
effect.scale = 1.0f;
}
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION,
- vibrator->compose(composite, nullptr).exceptionCode());
+ Status status = vibrator->compose(composite, nullptr);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
vibrator->off();
}
}
@@ -618,8 +625,8 @@
EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_NONE, status.exceptionCode())
<< toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
} else {
- EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.exceptionCode())
- << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status))
+ << status << " " << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
}
}
}
@@ -639,7 +646,7 @@
ASSERT_GT(qFactor, 0);
EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_NONE);
} else {
- EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
}
@@ -668,7 +675,7 @@
ASSERT_LE(e, 1.0);
}
} else {
- EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
}
@@ -690,7 +697,7 @@
ASSERT_NE(maxSize, 0);
EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_NONE);
} else {
- EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
}
@@ -703,7 +710,7 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(isDefaultNoneSupported);
EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_NONE);
} else {
- EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
}
}
diff --git a/wifi/1.0/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/1.0/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.0/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.0/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/1.1/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/1.1/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.1/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.1/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/1.2/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/1.2/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.2/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.2/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/1.3/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/1.3/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.3/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.3/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/1.4/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/1.4/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.4/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.4/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/1.5/default/OWNERS b/wifi/1.5/default/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.5/default/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.5/default/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/1.5/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/1.5/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.5/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.5/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/hostapd/1.0/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/hostapd/1.0/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/hostapd/1.0/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/hostapd/1.0/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/hostapd/1.1/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/hostapd/1.1/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/hostapd/1.1/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/hostapd/1.1/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/hostapd/1.2/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/hostapd/1.2/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/hostapd/1.2/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/hostapd/1.2/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/hostapd/1.3/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/hostapd/1.3/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/hostapd/1.3/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/hostapd/1.3/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/supplicant/1.2/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/supplicant/1.2/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/supplicant/1.2/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/supplicant/1.2/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/supplicant/1.3/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/supplicant/1.3/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/supplicant/1.3/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/supplicant/1.3/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/supplicant/1.4/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/supplicant/1.4/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/supplicant/1.4/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/supplicant/1.4/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
etancohen@google.com