diff --git a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalAutomotiveVehicleV2_0TargetTest.cpp b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalAutomotiveVehicleV2_0TargetTest.cpp
index 7f1d4d1..4ac0aa5 100644
--- a/automotive/vehicle/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalAutomotiveVehicleV2_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/automotive/vehicle/2.0/vts/functional/VtsHalAutomotiveVehicleV2_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@
     ASSERT_NE(StatusCode::OK, mVehicle->subscribe(cb, options));
 }
 
+GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(VehicleHalHidlTest);
 INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
         PerInstance, VehicleHalHidlTest,
         testing::ValuesIn(android::hardware::getAllHalInstanceNames(IVehicle::descriptor)),
diff --git a/biometrics/fingerprint/aidl/default/tests/WorkerThreadTest.cpp b/biometrics/fingerprint/aidl/default/tests/WorkerThreadTest.cpp
index 8443336..b2417bd 100644
--- a/biometrics/fingerprint/aidl/default/tests/WorkerThreadTest.cpp
+++ b/biometrics/fingerprint/aidl/default/tests/WorkerThreadTest.cpp
@@ -73,24 +73,29 @@
     constexpr int NUM_TASKS = 10000;
     WorkerThread worker(NUM_TASKS);
 
+    std::mutex mut;
+    std::condition_variable cv;
+    bool finished = false;
     std::vector<int> results;
+
     for (int i = 0; i < NUM_TASKS; ++i) {
-        worker.schedule(Callable::from([&results, i] {
+        worker.schedule(Callable::from([&mut, &results, i] {
             // Delay tasks differently to provoke races.
             std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::nanoseconds(100 - i % 100));
-            // Unguarded write to results to provoke races.
+            auto lock = std::lock_guard(mut);
             results.push_back(i);
         }));
     }
 
-    std::promise<void> promise;
-    auto future = promise.get_future();
-
     // Schedule a special task to signal when all of the tasks are finished.
-    worker.schedule(
-            Callable::from([promise = std::move(promise)]() mutable { promise.set_value(); }));
-    future.wait();
+    worker.schedule(Callable::from([&mut, &cv, &finished] {
+        auto lock = std::lock_guard(mut);
+        finished = true;
+        cv.notify_one();
+    }));
 
+    auto lock = std::unique_lock(mut);
+    cv.wait(lock, [&finished] { return finished; });
     ASSERT_EQ(results.size(), NUM_TASKS);
     EXPECT_TRUE(std::is_sorted(results.begin(), results.end()));
 }
diff --git a/camera/metadata/3.5/types.hal b/camera/metadata/3.5/types.hal
index 99d6115..d32bc91 100644
--- a/camera/metadata/3.5/types.hal
+++ b/camera/metadata/3.5/types.hal
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
 
     ANDROID_CONTROL_END_3_5,
 
-    /** android.scaler.availableRotateAndCropModes [static, byte[], hidden]
+    /** android.scaler.availableRotateAndCropModes [static, byte[], public]
      *
      * <p>List of rotate-and-crop modes for ANDROID_SCALER_ROTATE_AND_CROP that are supported by this camera device.</p>
      *
@@ -81,7 +81,7 @@
      */
     ANDROID_SCALER_AVAILABLE_ROTATE_AND_CROP_MODES = android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.4::CameraMetadataTag:ANDROID_SCALER_END_3_4,
 
-    /** android.scaler.rotateAndCrop [dynamic, enum, hidden]
+    /** android.scaler.rotateAndCrop [dynamic, enum, public]
      *
      * <p>Whether a rotation-and-crop operation is applied to processed
      * outputs from the camera.</p>
diff --git a/camera/metadata/3.6/types.hal b/camera/metadata/3.6/types.hal
index 97cac7c..185687c 100644
--- a/camera/metadata/3.6/types.hal
+++ b/camera/metadata/3.6/types.hal
@@ -348,6 +348,14 @@
     ANDROID_SCALER_MULTI_RESOLUTION_STREAM_SUPPORTED_TRUE,
 };
 
+/** android.sensor.testPatternMode enumeration values added since v3.2
+ * @see ANDROID_SENSOR_TEST_PATTERN_MODE
+ */
+enum CameraMetadataEnumAndroidSensorTestPatternMode :
+        @3.2::CameraMetadataEnumAndroidSensorTestPatternMode {
+    ANDROID_SENSOR_TEST_PATTERN_MODE_BLACK,
+};
+
 /** android.sensor.pixelMode enumeration values
  * @see ANDROID_SENSOR_PIXEL_MODE
  */
diff --git a/current.txt b/current.txt
index 3102972..fb1999b 100644
--- a/current.txt
+++ b/current.txt
@@ -767,6 +767,7 @@
 98592d193a717066facf91428426e5abe211e3bd718bc372e29fb944ddbe6e7c android.hardware.wifi.supplicant@1.3::types
 
 # ABI preserving changes to HALs during Android S
+159a0069336035852e9eca6354b86b7990680d1b239f23ef2f631b01807c4cb9 android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.5::types
 e042522daa4b5f7fd4a0a19bcdadb93c79a1b04c09ef2c9813a3a8941032f3f5 android.hardware.contexthub@1.0::IContexthub
 c2f64133b83ede65c9939ef97ab5bd867b73faf3dba0e7e69f77c3c43d9e487e android.hardware.contexthub@1.0::IContexthubCallback
 bda492ec4021d13869de72bd6f8c15c5837b78d6136b8d538efec5320573a5ec android.hardware.gnss@1.0::IGnssMeasurementCallback
@@ -825,6 +826,9 @@
 b4cbc1f2d38787f2ad069a8e4d10c0896287531a2596f0de0283e390b0ecf05d android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IVirtualizerEffect
 2b5681e1ea6a2db0dc1e84edb96d3de2f7daf306046543e7956be76dcb8f20fb android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::IVisualizerEffect
 fa1e2d78e66fd662de93cb479ffd55947fe54f51cb53915814b3d3e3036c86a5 android.hardware.audio.effect@7.0::types
+e3865e74cb1a6e6afd38c7aa84115cb109ce47b972132de5242bc3838d2771f6 android.hardware.automotive.vehicle@2.0::types
+b3caf524c46a47d67e6453a34419e1881942d059e146cda740502670e9a752c3 android.hardware.automotive.vehicle@2.0::IVehicle
+7ce8728b27600e840cacf0a832f6942819fe535f9d3797ae052d5eef5065921c android.hardware.automotive.vehicle@2.0::IVehicleCallback
 b525e91d886379c13588f4975bb04d625d46e1f41b4453792c4b2db1e7ff4340 android.hardware.biometrics.fingerprint@2.3::IBiometricsFingerprint
 4baf8e0eca4aa896cc9ceb7bb676aaf4fa21372ef8b49eed68eced1221c3dc0d android.hardware.bluetooth.audio@2.1::IBluetoothAudioProvider
 d417a9212c8f96e3a06a2f221c8c5756c765355b2b81de2b2a65d4c9eee85401 android.hardware.bluetooth.audio@2.1::IBluetoothAudioProvidersFactory
@@ -834,7 +838,7 @@
 3be6faa3d11ad9c7ec01a1a0a009cf11cb65d701d109dab37613ce9cfb3cdd60 android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::ICameraDeviceSession
 3740ec773b2eb8fa6bd8c6e879eedb56c4e4306b88f1c20fa51103d791d871b1 android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::ICameraInjectionSession
 21f023685571daf46148097d98b89cea353f07e3ed83b2ed5685b23bd136c3ee android.hardware.camera.device@3.7::types
-f655c93132d223369ff6ddc621cb721f82dde6cc85ab9df2cbde6cb24cf2c885 android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.6::types
+e932e7ef95210142e1fd3a4504e1d19bdb1acc988450f1ced543f3401f67855a android.hardware.camera.metadata@3.6::types
 98ff825a7d37e5ab983502d13cec1f2e5a9cac9b674b6ff1a52bcf540f4e315e android.hardware.camera.provider@2.7::ICameraProvider
 51fd14005859b16be55872660c34f5d423c77a2abcc5d4bdd5a537c40f32516b android.hardware.camera.provider@2.7::types
 3500d3c4e2d49eeed2f3239330a166beb2db2d5071b84d9c738b048c2d54a3d9 android.hardware.contexthub@1.2::IContexthub
diff --git a/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp b/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
index 9d8562d..5964f81 100644
--- a/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
+++ b/gnss/aidl/vts/gnss_hal_test_cases.cpp
@@ -311,27 +311,42 @@
     EXPECT_TRUE(gnssPowerIndicationCallback->gnss_power_stats_cbq_.retrieve(
             gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_gnss_power_stats_, kTimeoutSec));
     EXPECT_EQ(gnssPowerIndicationCallback->gnss_power_stats_cbq_.calledCount(), 2);
+
     auto powerStats2 = gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_gnss_power_stats_;
 
-    // Elapsed realtime must increase
-    EXPECT_GT(powerStats2.elapsedRealtime.timestampNs, powerStats1.elapsedRealtime.timestampNs);
+    if ((gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_capabilities_ &
+         (int)GnssPowerIndicationCallback::CAPABILITY_TOTAL)) {
+        // Elapsed realtime must increase
+        EXPECT_GT(powerStats2.elapsedRealtime.timestampNs, powerStats1.elapsedRealtime.timestampNs);
 
-    // Total energy must increase
-    EXPECT_GT(powerStats2.totalEnergyMilliJoule, powerStats1.totalEnergyMilliJoule);
+        // Total energy must increase
+        EXPECT_GT(powerStats2.totalEnergyMilliJoule, powerStats1.totalEnergyMilliJoule);
+    }
 
     // At least oone of singleband and multiband acquisition energy must increase
     bool singlebandAcqEnergyIncreased = powerStats2.singlebandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule >
                                         powerStats1.singlebandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule;
     bool multibandAcqEnergyIncreased = powerStats2.multibandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule >
                                        powerStats1.multibandAcquisitionModeEnergyMilliJoule;
-    EXPECT_TRUE(singlebandAcqEnergyIncreased || multibandAcqEnergyIncreased);
+
+    if ((gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_capabilities_ &
+         (int)GnssPowerIndicationCallback::CAPABILITY_SINGLEBAND_ACQUISITION) ||
+        (gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_capabilities_ &
+         (int)GnssPowerIndicationCallback::CAPABILITY_MULTIBAND_ACQUISITION)) {
+        EXPECT_TRUE(singlebandAcqEnergyIncreased || multibandAcqEnergyIncreased);
+    }
 
     // At least one of singleband and multiband tracking energy must increase
     bool singlebandTrackingEnergyIncreased = powerStats2.singlebandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule >
                                              powerStats1.singlebandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule;
     bool multibandTrackingEnergyIncreased = powerStats2.multibandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule >
                                             powerStats1.multibandTrackingModeEnergyMilliJoule;
-    EXPECT_TRUE(singlebandTrackingEnergyIncreased || multibandTrackingEnergyIncreased);
+    if ((gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_capabilities_ &
+         (int)GnssPowerIndicationCallback::CAPABILITY_SINGLEBAND_TRACKING) ||
+        (gnssPowerIndicationCallback->last_capabilities_ &
+         (int)GnssPowerIndicationCallback::CAPABILITY_MULTIBAND_TRACKING)) {
+        EXPECT_TRUE(singlebandTrackingEnergyIncreased || multibandTrackingEnergyIncreased);
+    }
 
     // Clean up
     StopAndClearLocations();
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.1/vts/OWNERS b/graphics/composer/2.1/vts/OWNERS
index 0b42d2e..ea06752 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.1/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.1/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # Graphics team
+adyabr@google.com
 lpy@google.com
-vhau@google.com
 
 # VTS team
 yim@google.com
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
index 7d0a83b..2f0429c 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.4/vts/functional/VtsHalGraphicsComposerV2_4TargetTest.cpp
@@ -561,17 +561,28 @@
             setActiveConfig(display, config1);
             sendRefreshFrame(display, nullptr);
 
-            int32_t vsyncPeriod1 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+            const auto vsyncPeriod1 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
                     display.get(), config1,
                     IComposerClient::IComposerClient::Attribute::VSYNC_PERIOD);
-            int32_t vsyncPeriod2 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+            const auto configGroup1 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+                    display.get(), config1,
+                    IComposerClient::IComposerClient::Attribute::CONFIG_GROUP);
+            const auto vsyncPeriod2 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
                     display.get(), config2,
                     IComposerClient::IComposerClient::Attribute::VSYNC_PERIOD);
+            const auto configGroup2 = mComposerClient->getDisplayAttribute_2_4(
+                    display.get(), config2,
+                    IComposerClient::IComposerClient::Attribute::CONFIG_GROUP);
 
             if (vsyncPeriod1 == vsyncPeriod2) {
                 return;  // continue
             }
 
+            // We don't allow delayed change when changing config groups
+            if (params.delayForChange > 0 && configGroup1 != configGroup2) {
+                return;  // continue
+            }
+
             VsyncPeriodChangeTimeline timeline;
             IComposerClient::VsyncPeriodChangeConstraints constraints = {
                     .desiredTimeNanos = systemTime() + params.delayForChange,
diff --git a/identity/TEST_MAPPING b/identity/TEST_MAPPING
index f35f4b7..85cf91f 100644
--- a/identity/TEST_MAPPING
+++ b/identity/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
     },
     {
       "name": "android.hardware.identity-support-lib-test"
+    },
+    {
+      "name": "libeic_test"
     }
   ]
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp b/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp
index 7c68aee..28c4893 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/Android.bp
@@ -114,6 +114,43 @@
     ],
 }
 
+cc_test {
+    name: "libeic_test",
+    srcs: [
+        "EicTests.cpp",
+        "FakeSecureHardwareProxy.cpp",
+    ],
+    cflags: [
+        "-Wall",
+        "-Wextra",
+        "-g",
+        "-DEIC_DEBUG",
+    ],
+    local_include_dirs: [
+         "common",
+    ],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "liblog",
+        "libcrypto",
+        "libkeymaster_messages",
+    ],
+    static_libs: [
+        "libbase",
+        "libcppbor_external",
+        "libcppcose_rkp",
+        "libutils",
+        "libsoft_attestation_cert",
+        "libkeymaster_portable",
+        "libsoft_attestation_cert",
+        "libpuresoftkeymasterdevice",
+        "android.hardware.identity-support-lib",
+        "android.hardware.identity-libeic-library",
+    ],
+    test_suites: [
+        "general-tests",
+    ],
+}
+
 prebuilt_etc {
     name: "android.hardware.identity_credential.xml",
     sub_dir: "permissions",
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/EicTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/EicTests.cpp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a28080d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/EicTests.cpp
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <gtest/gtest.h>
+#include <optional>
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
+#include "FakeSecureHardwareProxy.h"
+
+// Most of libeic is tested as part of VTS since there's almost a 1:1 mapping between
+// the HAL and libeic interfaces. This test suite is mainly for the few things which
+// doesn't map directly.
+//
+
+using std::optional;
+using std::string;
+using std::vector;
+
+using android::hardware::identity::AccessCheckResult;
+using android::hardware::identity::FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy;
+using android::hardware::identity::FakeSecureHardwareProvisioningProxy;
+
+TEST(EicTest, AccessControlIsEnforced) {
+    // First provision the credential...
+    //
+    FakeSecureHardwareProvisioningProxy provisioningProxy;
+    bool isTestCredential = false;
+    provisioningProxy.initialize(isTestCredential);
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> credKey =
+            provisioningProxy.createCredentialKey({0x01, 0x02}, {0x03, 0x04});
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credKey.has_value());
+    string docType = "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL";
+    ASSERT_TRUE(provisioningProxy.startPersonalization(0, {1}, docType, 125));
+
+    vector<int> acpIds = {};
+    string nameSpace = "org.iso.18013.5.1";
+    string name = "NonAccessibleElement";
+    vector<uint8_t> content = {0x63, 0x46, 0x6f, 0x6f};  // "Foo" tstr
+    ASSERT_TRUE(provisioningProxy.beginAddEntry(acpIds, nameSpace, name, content.size()));
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> encContent =
+            provisioningProxy.addEntryValue(acpIds, nameSpace, name, content);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(encContent.has_value());
+    ASSERT_EQ(encContent->size(), content.size() + 28);
+
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> signatureOfToBeSigned = provisioningProxy.finishAddingEntries();
+    ASSERT_TRUE(signatureOfToBeSigned.has_value());
+
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> credData = provisioningProxy.finishGetCredentialData(docType);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credData.has_value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(provisioningProxy.shutdown());
+
+    // Then present data from it...
+    //
+    FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy presentationProxy;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(presentationProxy.initialize(isTestCredential, docType, credData.value()));
+    AccessCheckResult res =
+            presentationProxy.startRetrieveEntryValue(nameSpace, name, 1, content.size(), acpIds);
+    ASSERT_EQ(res, AccessCheckResult::kNoAccessControlProfiles);
+
+    // Ensure that we can't get the data out if startRetrieveEntryValue() returned
+    // something other than kOk... See b/190757775 for details.
+    //
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> decContent =
+            presentationProxy.retrieveEntryValue(encContent.value(), nameSpace, name, acpIds);
+    ASSERT_FALSE(decContent.has_value());
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char** argv) {
+    ::testing::InitGoogleTest(&argc, argv);
+    return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
+}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
index 9e033b3..3d13766 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
@@ -633,6 +633,8 @@
 
     // We'll need to calc and store a digest of additionalData to check that it's the same
     // additionalData being passed in for every eicPresentationRetrieveEntryValue() call...
+    //
+    ctx->accessCheckOk = false;
     if (!eicCborCalcEntryAdditionalData(accessControlProfileIds, numAccessControlProfileIds,
                                         nameSpace, name, additionalDataCbor,
                                         additionalDataCborBufSize, &additionalDataCborSize,
@@ -680,6 +682,7 @@
 
     if (result == EIC_ACCESS_CHECK_RESULT_OK) {
         eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cbor, name);
+        ctx->accessCheckOk = true;
     }
     return result;
 }
@@ -702,10 +705,15 @@
                                         calculatedSha256)) {
         return false;
     }
+
     if (eicCryptoMemCmp(calculatedSha256, ctx->additionalDataSha256, EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0) {
         eicDebug("SHA-256 mismatch of additionalData");
         return false;
     }
+    if (!ctx->accessCheckOk) {
+        eicDebug("Attempting to retrieve a value for which access is not granted");
+        return false;
+    }
 
     if (!eicOpsDecryptAes128Gcm(ctx->storageKey, encryptedContent, encryptedContentSize,
                                 additionalDataCbor, additionalDataCborSize, content)) {
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
index 7cad068..c888049 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
@@ -70,6 +70,10 @@
     // Set to true initialized as a test credential.
     bool testCredential;
 
+    // Set to true if the evaluation of access control checks in
+    // eicPresentationStartRetrieveEntryValue() resulted EIC_ACCESS_CHECK_RESULT_OK
+    bool accessCheckOk;
+
     // These are bitmasks indicating which of the possible 32 access control profiles are
     // authorized. They are built up by eicPresentationValidateAccessControlProfile().
     //
diff --git a/input/classifier/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp b/input/classifier/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
index e170f4a..58945d3 100644
--- a/input/classifier/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
+++ b/input/classifier/1.0/vts/functional/Android.bp
@@ -26,7 +26,10 @@
 cc_test {
     name: "VtsHalInputClassifierV1_0TargetTest",
     defaults: ["VtsHalTargetTestDefaults"],
-    srcs: ["VtsHalInputClassifierV1_0TargetTest.cpp"],
+    srcs: [
+        ":inputconstants_aidl",
+        "VtsHalInputClassifierV1_0TargetTest.cpp",
+    ],
     header_libs: ["jni_headers"],
     static_libs: [
         "android.hardware.input.classifier@1.0",
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
index bc294bd..342b3e2 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
     ASN1_INTEGER_SET* padding;
     ASN1_INTEGER* ec_curve;
     ASN1_INTEGER* rsa_public_exponent;
+    ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
     ASN1_INTEGER* active_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* origination_expire_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* usage_expire_date_time;
@@ -78,56 +79,84 @@
     ASN1_INTEGER* user_auth_type;
     ASN1_INTEGER* auth_timeout;
     ASN1_NULL* allow_while_on_body;
+    ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
+    ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
+    ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
     ASN1_NULL* all_applications;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING* application_id;
     ASN1_INTEGER* creation_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* origin;
-    ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
     KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust;
     ASN1_INTEGER* os_version;
     ASN1_INTEGER* os_patchlevel;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_application_id;
-    ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
-    ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
-    ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_brand;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_device;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_product;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_serial;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_imei;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_meid;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_manufacturer;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_model;
     ASN1_INTEGER* vendor_patchlevel;
     ASN1_INTEGER* boot_patchlevel;
 } KM_AUTH_LIST;
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_AUTH_LIST) = {
-    ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, purpose, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PURPOSE.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, algorithm, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ALGORITHM.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, key_size, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_KEY_SIZE.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, digest, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_DIGEST.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, padding, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PADDING.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, ec_curve, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_EC_CURVE.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rsa_public_exponent, ASN1_INTEGER,
-                 TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
-                 TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
-                 TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, no_auth_required, ASN1_NULL, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, user_auth_type, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, auth_timeout, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, allow_while_on_body, ASN1_NULL, TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_user_presence_required, ASN1_NULL,
-                 TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_confirmation_required, ASN1_NULL,
-                 TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, unlocked_device_required, ASN1_NULL,
-                 TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, creation_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origin, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ORIGIN.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
-    ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
-                 TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, purpose, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PURPOSE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, algorithm, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ALGORITHM.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, key_size, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_KEY_SIZE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, digest, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_DIGEST.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, padding, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_PADDING.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, ec_curve, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_EC_CURVE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rsa_public_exponent, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                     TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL,
+                     TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
+
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                     TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                     TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, no_auth_required, ASN1_NULL, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, user_auth_type, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, auth_timeout, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, allow_while_on_body, ASN1_NULL,
+                     TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_user_presence_required, ASN1_NULL,
+                     TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, trusted_confirmation_required, ASN1_NULL,
+                     TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, unlocked_device_required, ASN1_NULL,
+                     TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, creation_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                     TAG_CREATION_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origin, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ORIGIN.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_brand, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_device, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_product, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_serial, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_imei, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_meid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_manufacturer, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_model, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                     TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_AUTH_LIST);
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_AUTH_LIST);
 
@@ -259,6 +288,14 @@
     copyAuthTag(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_brand, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_device, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_product, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_serial, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_imei, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_meid, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_manufacturer, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_model, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->trusted_user_presence_required, TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
diff --git a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
index 9e37ed0..01c502c 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.0/vts/functional/keymaster_hidl_hal_test.cpp
@@ -96,6 +96,18 @@
     return count > 0;
 }
 
+// If the given property is available, add it to the tag set under the given tag ID.
+template <Tag tag>
+void add_tag_from_prop(AuthorizationSetBuilder* tags, TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+                       const char* prop) {
+    char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+    int len = property_get(prop, value, /* default = */ "");
+    if (len > 0) {
+        tags->Authorization(ttag, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(value),
+                            static_cast<size_t>(len));
+    }
+}
+
 constexpr char hex_value[256] = {0, 0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,  //
                                  0, 0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,  //
                                  0, 0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0,  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,  //
@@ -4409,6 +4421,95 @@
 }
 
 /*
+ * AttestationTest.EcAttestationID
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to EC keys with correct attestation ID fields works and generates the
+ * expected output.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestationTest, EcAttestationID) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
+
+    // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+    auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+                      "ro.product.manufacturer");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo"));
+        // Include one of the (valid) attestation ID tags.
+        builder.push_back(tag);
+        hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+        auto result = AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain);
+        if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+        EXPECT_GE(cert_chain.size(), 2U);
+
+        std::vector<KeyParameter> expected_hw_enforced = key_characteristics_.hardwareEnforced;
+        expected_hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record(
+                "challenge", "foo", key_characteristics_.softwareEnforced,
+                hidl_vec<KeyParameter>(expected_hw_enforced), SecLevel(), cert_chain[0]));
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * AttestationTest.EcAttestationMismatchID
+ *
+ * Verifies that attesting to EC keys with incorrect attestation ID fields fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(AttestationTest, EcAttestationMismatchID) {
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                 .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                 .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)));
+
+    // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+    std::string invalid = "completely-invalid";
+    auto invalid_tags =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, invalid.data(),
+                                   invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, invalid.data(), invalid.size());
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : invalid_tags) {
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, HidlBuf("challenge"))
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, HidlBuf("foo"));
+        // Include one of the invalid attestation ID tags.
+        builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+        hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+        auto result = AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG)
+                << "result: " << static_cast<int32_t>(result);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
  * AttestationTest.EcAttestationRequiresAttestationAppId
  *
  * Verifies that attesting to EC keys requires app ID
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp b/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp
index 207a7e8..15230d5 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -79,6 +79,8 @@
     ASN1_INTEGER_SET* padding;
     ASN1_INTEGER* ec_curve;
     ASN1_INTEGER* rsa_public_exponent;
+    ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
+    ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
     ASN1_INTEGER* active_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* origination_expire_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* usage_expire_date_time;
@@ -86,21 +88,27 @@
     ASN1_INTEGER* user_auth_type;
     ASN1_INTEGER* auth_timeout;
     ASN1_NULL* allow_while_on_body;
+    ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
+    ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
+    ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
     ASN1_NULL* all_applications;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING* application_id;
     ASN1_INTEGER* creation_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* origin;
-    ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
     KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust;
     ASN1_INTEGER* os_version;
     ASN1_INTEGER* os_patchlevel;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_application_id;
-    ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
-    ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
-    ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_brand;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_device;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_product;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_serial;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_imei;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_meid;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_manufacturer;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_model;
     ASN1_INTEGER* vendor_patchlevel;
     ASN1_INTEGER* boot_patchlevel;
-    ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
     ASN1_NULL* device_unique_attestation;
     ASN1_NULL* identity_credential_key;
 } KM_AUTH_LIST;
@@ -116,6 +124,7 @@
                      TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL,
                      TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
                      TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
@@ -138,12 +147,27 @@
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_brand, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_device, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_product, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_serial, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_imei, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_meid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_manufacturer, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_model, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER,
                      TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
-                     TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, device_unique_attestation, ASN1_NULL,
                      TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, identity_credential_key, ASN1_NULL,
@@ -279,6 +303,14 @@
     copyAuthTag(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_brand, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_device, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_product, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_serial, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_imei, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_meid, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_manufacturer, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_model, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->trusted_user_presence_required, TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h b/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h
index 40eb142..e8db56a 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/support/include/keymasterV4_1/keymaster_tags.h
@@ -53,6 +53,14 @@
 using V4_0::TAG_ASSOCIATED_DATA;
 using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID;
 using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT;
+using V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL;
 using V4_0::TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT;
 using V4_0::TAG_BLOB_USAGE_REQUIREMENTS;
 using V4_0::TAG_BLOCK_MODE;
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
index 0639da8..4a57f44 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 
 #define LOG_TAG "keymaster_hidl_hal_test"
 #include <cutils/log.h>
+#include <vector>
 
 #include "Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h"
 
@@ -26,6 +27,8 @@
 #include <keymasterV4_1/attestation_record.h>
 #include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
 
+using android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test::add_tag_from_prop;
+
 // Not to dump the attestation by default. Can enable by specify the parameter
 // "--dump_attestations" on lunching VTS
 static bool dumpAttestations = false;
@@ -172,10 +175,42 @@
     attestation.software_enforced.Sort();
     attestation.hardware_enforced.Sort();
 
-    EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_sw_enforced), filter_tags(attestation.software_enforced))
-            << DIFFERENCE(expected_sw_enforced, attestation.software_enforced);
-    EXPECT_EQ(filter_tags(expected_hw_enforced), filter_tags(attestation.hardware_enforced))
-            << DIFFERENCE(expected_hw_enforced, attestation.hardware_enforced);
+    expected_sw_enforced = filter_tags(expected_sw_enforced);
+    expected_hw_enforced = filter_tags(expected_hw_enforced);
+    AuthorizationSet attestation_sw_enforced = filter_tags(attestation.software_enforced);
+    AuthorizationSet attestation_hw_enforced = filter_tags(attestation.hardware_enforced);
+
+    EXPECT_EQ(expected_sw_enforced, attestation_sw_enforced)
+            << DIFFERENCE(expected_sw_enforced, attestation_sw_enforced);
+    EXPECT_EQ(expected_hw_enforced, attestation_hw_enforced)
+            << DIFFERENCE(expected_hw_enforced, attestation_hw_enforced);
+}
+
+X509_Ptr parse_cert_blob(const std::vector<uint8_t>& blob) {
+    const uint8_t* p = blob.data();
+    return X509_Ptr(d2i_X509(nullptr /* allocate new */, &p, blob.size()));
+}
+
+bool check_certificate_chain_signatures(const hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>>& cert_chain) {
+    // TODO: Check that root is self-signed once b/187803288 is resolved.
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < cert_chain.size() - 1; ++i) {
+        X509_Ptr key_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain[i]));
+        X509_Ptr signing_cert(parse_cert_blob(cert_chain[i + 1]));
+
+        if (!key_cert.get() || !signing_cert.get()) {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        EVP_PKEY_Ptr signing_pubkey(X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert.get()));
+        if (!signing_pubkey.get()) {
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        if (!X509_verify(key_cert.get(), signing_pubkey.get())) {
+            return false;
+        }
+    }
+    return true;
 }
 
 }  // namespace
@@ -243,6 +278,7 @@
 
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
     EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
+    EXPECT_TRUE(check_certificate_chain_signatures(cert_chain));
     if (dumpAttestations) {
       for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
     }
@@ -289,6 +325,7 @@
 
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
     EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
+    EXPECT_TRUE(check_certificate_chain_signatures(cert_chain));
     if (dumpAttestations) {
       for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
     }
@@ -312,6 +349,106 @@
             SecLevel());
 }
 
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID) {
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                         .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                         .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                         .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                         .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
+
+    // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+    auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+                      "ro.product.manufacturer");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+        HidlBuf challenge("challenge");
+        HidlBuf app_id("foo");
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id);
+        builder.push_back(tag);
+        ErrorCode result = convert(AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain));
+
+        // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+        if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+        EXPECT_EQ(2U, cert_chain.size());
+        if (dumpAttestations) {
+            for (auto cert_ : cert_chain) dumpContent(bin2hex(cert_));
+        }
+        auto [err, attestation] = parse_attestation_record(cert_chain[0]);
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, err);
+
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                        .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                        .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+                        .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+        hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+        check_attestation_record(
+                attestation, challenge,
+                /* sw_enforced */
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id),
+                hw_enforced, SecLevel());
+    }
+}
+
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID) {
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, convert(GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                         .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                         .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                                         .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                         .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID))));
+
+    // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+    std::string invalid = "completely-invalid";
+    auto attestation_id_tags =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, invalid.data(), invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, invalid.data(),
+                                   invalid.size())
+                    .Authorization(V4_0::TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, invalid.data(), invalid.size());
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        hidl_vec<hidl_vec<uint8_t>> cert_chain;
+        HidlBuf challenge("challenge");
+        HidlBuf app_id("foo");
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE, challenge)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, app_id);
+        builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+        ErrorCode result = convert(AttestKey(builder, &cert_chain));
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG)
+                << "result: " << static_cast<int32_t>(result);
+    }
+}
+
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMASTER_4_1_HIDL_TEST(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest);
 
 }  // namespace test
diff --git a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h
index f8c1fad..670ccfb 100644
--- a/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h
+++ b/keymaster/4.1/vts/functional/Keymaster4_1HidlTest.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 
 #include <android/hardware/keymaster/4.1/IKeymasterDevice.h>
 
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
+
 #include <KeymasterHidlTest.h>
 #include <keymasterV4_1/authorization_set.h>
 
@@ -159,3 +161,17 @@
                              android::hardware::PrintInstanceNameToString)
 
 }  // namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_1::test
+
+namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test {
+
+// If the given property is available, add it to the tag set under the given tag ID.
+template <Tag tag>
+void add_tag_from_prop(AuthorizationSetBuilder* tags, TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+                       const char* prop) {
+    std::string prop_value = ::android::base::GetProperty(prop, /* default= */ "");
+    if (!prop_value.empty()) {
+        tags->Authorization(ttag, prop_value.data(), prop_value.size());
+    }
+}
+
+}  // namespace android::hardware::keymaster::V4_0::test
diff --git a/power/aidl/vts/VtsHalPowerTargetTest.cpp b/power/aidl/vts/VtsHalPowerTargetTest.cpp
index 5bb088a..ffab66c 100644
--- a/power/aidl/vts/VtsHalPowerTargetTest.cpp
+++ b/power/aidl/vts/VtsHalPowerTargetTest.cpp
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <android/binder_ibinder.h>
 #include <android/binder_manager.h>
 #include <android/binder_process.h>
+#include <android/binder_status.h>
 
 #include <unistd.h>
 
@@ -82,6 +83,11 @@
         DurationWrapper(1000000000L, 4L),
 };
 
+inline bool isUnknownOrUnsupported(const ndk::ScopedAStatus& status) {
+    return status.getStatus() == STATUS_UNKNOWN_TRANSACTION ||
+           status.getExceptionCode() == EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION;
+}
+
 class PowerAidl : public testing::TestWithParam<std::string> {
   public:
     virtual void SetUp() override {
@@ -147,7 +153,7 @@
     int64_t rate = -1;
     auto status = power->getHintSessionPreferredRate(&rate);
     if (!status.isOk()) {
-        ASSERT_EQ(EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.getExceptionCode());
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status));
         return;
     }
 
@@ -159,7 +165,7 @@
     std::shared_ptr<IPowerHintSession> session;
     auto status = power->createHintSession(getpid(), getuid(), kSelfTids, 16666666L, &session);
     if (!status.isOk()) {
-        ASSERT_EQ(EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.getExceptionCode());
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status));
         return;
     }
     ASSERT_NE(nullptr, session);
@@ -173,10 +179,9 @@
     std::shared_ptr<IPowerHintSession> session;
     auto status = power->createHintSession(getpid(), getuid(), kEmptyTids, 16666666L, &session);
     ASSERT_FALSE(status.isOk());
-    if (EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION == status.getExceptionCode()) {
+    if (isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) {
         return;
     }
-    // Test with empty tid list
     ASSERT_EQ(EX_ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT, status.getExceptionCode());
 }
 
@@ -184,7 +189,7 @@
     std::shared_ptr<IPowerHintSession> session;
     auto status = power->createHintSession(getpid(), getuid(), kSelfTids, 16666666L, &session);
     if (!status.isOk()) {
-        ASSERT_EQ(EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.getExceptionCode());
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status));
         return;
     }
     ASSERT_NE(nullptr, session);
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
index f93dbba..fd6bf65 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
@@ -159,18 +159,17 @@
      *     purpose                    [1] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
      *     algorithm                  [2] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
      *     keySize                    [3] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-     *     blockMode                  [4] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
      *     digest                     [5] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
      *     padding                    [6] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-     *     callerNonce                [7] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
-     *     minMacLength               [8] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
      *     ecCurve                    [10] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
      *     rsaPublicExponent          [200] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     mgfDigest                  [203] EXPLICIT SET OF INTEGER OPTIONAL,
      *     rollbackResistance         [303] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
+     *     earlyBootOnly              [305] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
      *     activeDateTime             [400] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
      *     originationExpireDateTime  [401] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
      *     usageExpireDateTime        [402] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
-     *     userSecureId               [502] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     usageCountLimit            [405] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
      *     noAuthRequired             [503] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
      *     userAuthType               [504] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
      *     authTimeout                [505] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
@@ -194,6 +193,7 @@
      *     attestationIdModel         [717] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING OPTIONAL,
      *     vendorPatchLevel           [718] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
      *     bootPatchLevel             [719] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+     *     deviceUniqueAttestation    [720] EXPLICIT NULL OPTIONAL,
      * }
      */
     Certificate[] certificateChain;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
index 4ff4574..58e02b3 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -831,14 +831,24 @@
     /**
      * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attested key generation/import
      * operations.  It indicates that attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather
-     * than a batch key.  When a device-unique key is used, only the attestation certificate is
-     * returned; no additional chained certificates are provided.  It's up to the caller to
-     * recognize the device-unique signing key.  Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices may
-     * support device-unique attestations.  SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must
-     * return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
+     * than a batch key.  When a device-unique key is used, the returned chain should contain two
+     * certificates:
+     *    * The attestation certificate, containing the attestation extension, as described in
+            KeyCreationResult.aidl.
+     *    * A self-signed root certificate, signed by the device-unique key.
+     * No additional chained certificates are provided. Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX
+     * IKeyMintDevices may support device-unique attestations.  SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT
+     * IKeyMintDevices must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive
+     * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
      * SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices need not support DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, and
      * return ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS if they do not support it.
      *
+     * The caller needs to obtain the device-unique keys out-of-band and compare them against the
+     * key used to sign the self-signed root certificate.
+     * To ease this process, the IKeyMintDevice implementation should include, both in the subject
+     * and issuer fields of the self-signed root, the unique identifier of the device. Using the
+     * unique identifier will make it straightforward for the caller to link a device to its key.
+     *
      * IKeyMintDevice implementations that support device-unique attestation MUST add the
      * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION tag to device-unique attestations.
      */
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
index ae2becd..a312723 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
@@ -556,7 +556,7 @@
                                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(curve)
                                                      .AttestKey()
                                                      .SetDefaultValidity(),
-                                             {} /* attestation siging key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+                                             {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
                                              &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
 
         ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
@@ -640,7 +640,7 @@
             ErrorCode::OK,
             GenerateKey(
                     AuthorizationSetBuilder().EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256).SetDefaultValidity(),
-                    {} /* attestation siging key */, &non_attest_key.keyBlob,
+                    {} /* attestation signing key */, &non_attest_key.keyBlob,
                     &non_attest_key_characteristics, &non_attest_key_cert_chain));
 
     ASSERT_GT(non_attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
@@ -662,6 +662,124 @@
                           &attested_key_cert_chain));
 }
 
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, EcdsaAttestationID) {
+    // Create attestation key.
+    AttestationKey attest_key;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+    vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                 .AttestKey()
+                                                 .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                         {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+                                         &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+    attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+    ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
+    EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+    // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+    auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+                      "ro.product.manufacturer");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << tag);
+        // Use attestation key to sign an ECDSA key, but include an attestation ID field.
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                  .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                                  .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                                  .SetDefaultValidity();
+        builder.push_back(tag);
+        vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+        vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+        auto result = GenerateKey(builder, attest_key, &attested_key_blob,
+                                  &attested_key_characteristics, &attested_key_cert_chain);
+        if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        ASSERT_EQ(result, ErrorCode::OK);
+
+        CheckedDeleteKey(&attested_key_blob);
+
+        AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = HwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+        AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(attested_key_characteristics);
+
+        // The attested key characteristics will not contain APPLICATION_ID_* fields (their
+        // spec definitions all have "Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics"), but the
+        // attestation extension should contain them, so make sure the extra tag is added.
+        hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+
+        EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
+                                              SecLevel(),
+                                              attested_key_cert_chain[0].encodedCertificate));
+    }
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+}
+
+TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, EcdsaAttestationMismatchID) {
+    // Create attestation key.
+    AttestationKey attest_key;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
+    vector<Certificate> attest_key_cert_chain;
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                 .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                 .AttestKey()
+                                                 .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                         {} /* attestation signing key */, &attest_key.keyBlob,
+                                         &attest_key_characteristics, &attest_key_cert_chain));
+    attest_key.issuerSubjectName = make_name_from_str("Android Keystore Key");
+    ASSERT_GT(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 0);
+    EXPECT_EQ(attest_key_cert_chain.size(), 1);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(IsSelfSigned(attest_key_cert_chain));
+
+    // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+    auto attestation_id_tags =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "bogus-brand")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "devious-device")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "punctured-product")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "suspicious-serial")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, "invalid-imei")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, "mismatching-meid")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, "malformed-manufacturer")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "malicious-model");
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << invalid_tag);
+
+        // Use attestation key to sign an ECDSA key, but include an invalid
+        // attestation ID field.
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                  .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                                  .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                                  .SetDefaultValidity();
+        builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+        vector<uint8_t> attested_key_blob;
+        vector<KeyCharacteristics> attested_key_characteristics;
+        vector<Certificate> attested_key_cert_chain;
+        auto result = GenerateKey(builder, attest_key, &attested_key_blob,
+                                  &attested_key_characteristics, &attested_key_cert_chain);
+
+        ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG)
+                << "result = " << result;
+    }
+    CheckedDeleteKey(&attest_key.keyBlob);
+}
+
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AttestKeyTest);
 
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
index b0f056a..a3ed3ad 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.cpp
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
   protected:
     void CheckUniqueAttestationResults(const vector<uint8_t>& key_blob,
                                        const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& key_characteristics,
-                                       const AuthorizationSet& hw_enforced, int key_size) {
+                                       const AuthorizationSet& hw_enforced) {
         ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
 
         if (KeyMintAidlTestBase::dump_Attestations) {
@@ -40,10 +40,11 @@
 
         AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
 
-        EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size)) << "Key size missing";
-
+        // The device-unique attestation chain should contain exactly two certificates:
+        // * The leaf with the attestation extension.
+        // * A self-signed root, signed using the device-unique key.
+        ASSERT_EQ(cert_chain_.size(), 2);
         EXPECT_TRUE(ChainSignaturesAreValid(cert_chain_));
-        ASSERT_GT(cert_chain_.size(), 0);
 
         AuthorizationSet sw_enforced = SwEnforcedAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
         EXPECT_TRUE(verify_attestation_record("challenge", "foo", sw_enforced, hw_enforced,
@@ -133,17 +134,32 @@
 
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
 
-    AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                           .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
-                                           .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                           .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
-                                           .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
-                                           .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
-                                           .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
-                                           .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
-                                           .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+    AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                    .RsaSigningKey(2048, 65537)
+                    .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                    .Padding(PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+                    .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
 
-    CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced, key_size);
+    // Any patchlevels attached to the key should also be present in the attestation extension.
+    AuthorizationSet auths;
+    for (const auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+        auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+    }
+    auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+    if (vendor_pl) {
+        hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, *vendor_pl);
+    }
+    auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+    if (boot_pl) {
+        hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, *boot_pl);
+    }
+
+    CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -157,11 +173,10 @@
 
     vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
     vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
-    int key_size = 256;
 
     auto result = GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
                                       .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(256)
+                                      .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
                                       .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
                                       .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
                                       .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
@@ -173,17 +188,137 @@
     if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
     ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
 
-    AuthorizationSet hw_enforced = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                                           .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
-                                           .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                                           .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
-                                           .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
-                                           .Authorization(TAG_EC_CURVE, EcCurve::P_256)
-                                           .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
-                                           .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
-                                           .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+    AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                    .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                    .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+                    .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+                    .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+    // Any patchlevels attached to the key should also be present in the attestation extension.
+    AuthorizationSet auths;
+    for (const auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+        auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+    }
+    auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+    if (vendor_pl) {
+        hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, *vendor_pl);
+    }
+    auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+    if (boot_pl) {
+        hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, *boot_pl);
+    }
 
-    CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced, key_size);
+    CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced);
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID
+ *
+ * Verifies that device unique attestation can include IDs that do match the
+ * local device.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationID) {
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    // Collection of valid attestation ID tags.
+    auto attestation_id_tags = AuthorizationSetBuilder();
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "ro.product.brand");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "ro.product.device");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "ro.product.name");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "ro.serial");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER,
+                      "ro.product.manufacturer");
+    add_tag_from_prop(&attestation_id_tags, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "ro.product.model");
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << tag);
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                  .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+                                                  .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                                  .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION);
+        builder.push_back(tag);
+        auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+        // It is optional for Strong box to support DeviceUniqueAttestation.
+        if (result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS) return;
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result);
+
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder hw_enforced =
+                AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                        .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                        .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                        .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED)
+                        .Authorization(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version())
+                        .Authorization(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patch_level());
+        // Expect the specified tag to be present in the attestation extension.
+        hw_enforced.push_back(tag);
+        // Any patchlevels attached to the key should also be present in the attestation extension.
+        AuthorizationSet auths;
+        for (const auto& entry : key_characteristics) {
+            auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+        }
+        auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+        if (vendor_pl) {
+            hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, *vendor_pl);
+        }
+        auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+        if (boot_pl) {
+            hw_enforced.Authorization(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, *boot_pl);
+        }
+        CheckUniqueAttestationResults(key_blob, key_characteristics, hw_enforced);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * DeviceUniqueAttestationTest.EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID
+ *
+ * Verifies that device unique attestation rejects attempts to attest to IDs that
+ * don't match the local device.
+ */
+TEST_P(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest, EcdsaDeviceUniqueAttestationMismatchID) {
+    if (SecLevel() != SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) return;
+
+    // Collection of invalid attestation ID tags.
+    auto attestation_id_tags =
+            AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, "bogus-brand")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, "devious-device")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, "punctured-product")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, "suspicious-serial")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, "invalid-imei")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, "mismatching-meid")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, "malformed-manufacturer")
+                    .Authorization(TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, "malicious-model");
+    vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+    vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+
+    for (const KeyParameter& invalid_tag : attestation_id_tags) {
+        SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message() << "+tag-" << invalid_tag);
+        AuthorizationSetBuilder builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                  .EcdsaSigningKey(EcCurve::P_256)
+                                                  .Digest(Digest::SHA_2_256)
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID)
+                                                  .AttestationChallenge("challenge")
+                                                  .AttestationApplicationId("foo")
+                                                  .Authorization(TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION);
+        // Add the tag that doesn't match the local device's real ID.
+        builder.push_back(invalid_tag);
+        auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+
+        ASSERT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS || result == ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG);
+    }
 }
 
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(DeviceUniqueAttestationTest);
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
index 4d31fa4..82f192a 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 
 #include <aidl/Gtest.h>
 #include <aidl/Vintf.h>
+#include <android-base/properties.h>
 #include <binder/IServiceManager.h>
 #include <binder/ProcessState.h>
 #include <gtest/gtest.h>
@@ -313,6 +314,16 @@
     long challenge_;
 };
 
+// If the given property is available, add it to the tag set under the given tag ID.
+template <Tag tag>
+void add_tag_from_prop(AuthorizationSetBuilder* tags, TypedTag<TagType::BYTES, tag> ttag,
+                       const char* prop) {
+    std::string prop_value = ::android::base::GetProperty(prop, /* default= */ "");
+    if (!prop_value.empty()) {
+        tags->Authorization(ttag, prop_value.data(), prop_value.size());
+    }
+}
+
 vector<uint8_t> build_serial_blob(const uint64_t serial_int);
 void verify_subject(const X509* cert, const string& subject, bool self_signed);
 void verify_serial(X509* cert, const uint64_t expected_serial);
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp b/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
index a48f770..2462228 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/attestation_record.cpp
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@
 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST);
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST);
 
+// Fields ordered in tag order.
 typedef struct km_auth_list {
     ASN1_INTEGER_SET* purpose;
     ASN1_INTEGER* algorithm;
@@ -72,32 +73,38 @@
     ASN1_INTEGER_SET* padding;
     ASN1_INTEGER* ec_curve;
     ASN1_INTEGER* rsa_public_exponent;
+    ASN1_INTEGER_SET* mgf_digest;
+    ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
+    ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
     ASN1_INTEGER* active_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* origination_expire_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* usage_expire_date_time;
+    ASN1_INTEGER* usage_count_limit;
     ASN1_NULL* no_auth_required;
     ASN1_INTEGER* user_auth_type;
     ASN1_INTEGER* auth_timeout;
     ASN1_NULL* allow_while_on_body;
-    ASN1_NULL* all_applications;
-    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* application_id;
+    ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
+    ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
+    ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
     ASN1_INTEGER* creation_date_time;
     ASN1_INTEGER* origin;
-    ASN1_NULL* rollback_resistance;
     KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST* root_of_trust;
     ASN1_INTEGER* os_version;
     ASN1_INTEGER* os_patchlevel;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_application_id;
-    ASN1_NULL* trusted_user_presence_required;
-    ASN1_NULL* trusted_confirmation_required;
-    ASN1_NULL* unlocked_device_required;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_brand;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_device;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_product;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_serial;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_imei;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_meid;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_manufacturer;
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_id_model;
     ASN1_INTEGER* vendor_patchlevel;
     ASN1_INTEGER* boot_patchlevel;
-    ASN1_NULL* early_boot_only;
     ASN1_NULL* device_unique_attestation;
-    ASN1_NULL* storage_key;
     ASN1_NULL* identity_credential;
-    ASN1_INTEGER* usage_count_limit;
 } KM_AUTH_LIST;
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_AUTH_LIST) = {
@@ -109,13 +116,18 @@
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, ec_curve, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_EC_CURVE.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rsa_public_exponent, ASN1_INTEGER,
                      TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_SET_OF_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, mgf_digest, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                            TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, rollback_resistance, ASN1_NULL,
                      TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, active_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, origination_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
                      TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_expire_date_time, ASN1_INTEGER,
                      TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_count_limit, ASN1_INTEGER,
+                     TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, no_auth_required, ASN1_NULL, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, user_auth_type, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, auth_timeout, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT.maskedTag()),
@@ -133,19 +145,31 @@
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, root_of_trust, KM_ROOT_OF_TRUST, TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_version, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_VERSION.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, os_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_brand, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_device, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_product, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_serial, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_imei, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_meid, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_manufacturer, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER.maskedTag()),
+        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_id_model, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+                     TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, vendor_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER,
                      TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, boot_patchlevel, ASN1_INTEGER, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL.maskedTag()),
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, attestation_application_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
-                     TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID.maskedTag()),
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, early_boot_only, ASN1_NULL, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, device_unique_attestation, ASN1_NULL,
                      TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.maskedTag()),
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, storage_key, ASN1_NULL, TAG_STORAGE_KEY.maskedTag()),
         ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, identity_credential, ASN1_NULL,
                      TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY.maskedTag()),
-        ASN1_EXP_OPT(KM_AUTH_LIST, usage_count_limit, ASN1_INTEGER,
-                     TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT.maskedTag()),
 } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KM_AUTH_LIST);
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KM_AUTH_LIST);
 
@@ -155,9 +179,9 @@
     ASN1_INTEGER* keymint_version;
     ASN1_ENUMERATED* keymint_security_level;
     ASN1_OCTET_STRING* attestation_challenge;
+    ASN1_INTEGER* unique_id;
     KM_AUTH_LIST* software_enforced;
     KM_AUTH_LIST* tee_enforced;
-    ASN1_INTEGER* unique_id;
 } KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION;
 
 ASN1_SEQUENCE(KM_KEY_DESCRIPTION) = {
@@ -253,41 +277,52 @@
 }
 
 // Extract the values from the specified ASN.1 record and place them in auth_list.
+// Does nothing with root-of-trust field.
 static ErrorCode extract_auth_list(const KM_AUTH_LIST* record, AuthorizationSet* auth_list) {
     if (!record) return ErrorCode::OK;
 
-    copyAuthTag(record->active_date_time, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->algorithm, TAG_ALGORITHM, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->application_id, TAG_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->auth_timeout, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->creation_date_time, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->digest, TAG_DIGEST, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->ec_curve, TAG_EC_CURVE, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->key_size, TAG_KEY_SIZE, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->no_auth_required, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->origin, TAG_ORIGIN, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->origination_expire_date_time, TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->os_patchlevel, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->os_version, TAG_OS_VERSION, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->padding, TAG_PADDING, auth_list);
+    // Fields ordered in tag order.
     copyAuthTag(record->purpose, TAG_PURPOSE, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->rollback_resistance, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->algorithm, TAG_ALGORITHM, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->key_size, TAG_KEY_SIZE, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->digest, TAG_DIGEST, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->padding, TAG_PADDING, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->ec_curve, TAG_EC_CURVE, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->rsa_public_exponent, TAG_RSA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->mgf_digest, TAG_RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->rollback_resistance, TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->early_boot_only, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->active_date_time, TAG_ACTIVE_DATETIME, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->origination_expire_date_time, TAG_ORIGINATION_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->usage_expire_date_time, TAG_USAGE_EXPIRE_DATETIME, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->usage_count_limit, TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->no_auth_required, TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->user_auth_type, TAG_USER_AUTH_TYPE, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->auth_timeout, TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->allow_while_on_body, TAG_ALLOW_WHILE_ON_BODY, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->trusted_user_presence_required, TAG_TRUSTED_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED,
                 auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->trusted_confirmation_required, TAG_TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED,
                 auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->unlocked_device_required, TAG_UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->early_boot_only, TAG_EARLY_BOOT_ONLY, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->creation_date_time, TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->origin, TAG_ORIGIN, auth_list);
+    // root_of_trust dealt with separately
+    copyAuthTag(record->os_version, TAG_OS_VERSION, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->os_patchlevel, TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_application_id, TAG_ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_brand, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_device, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_product, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_serial, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_imei, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_meid, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MEID, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_manufacturer, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->attestation_id_model, TAG_ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->vendor_patchlevel, TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
+    copyAuthTag(record->boot_patchlevel, TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->device_unique_attestation, TAG_DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->storage_key, TAG_STORAGE_KEY, auth_list);
     copyAuthTag(record->identity_credential, TAG_IDENTITY_CREDENTIAL_KEY, auth_list);
-    copyAuthTag(record->usage_count_limit, TAG_USAGE_COUNT_LIMIT, auth_list);
 
     return ErrorCode::OK;
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
index 2dbdfa8..1e0733f 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
@@ -32,10 +32,11 @@
 
 constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.build.version.security_patch";
 constexpr char kVendorPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.vendor.build.security_patch";
-constexpr char kPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-[0-9]{2}$";
+constexpr char kPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-([0-9]{2})$";
 constexpr size_t kYearMatch = 1;
 constexpr size_t kMonthMatch = 2;
-constexpr size_t kPatchlevelMatchCount = kMonthMatch + 1;
+constexpr size_t kDayMatch = 3;
+constexpr size_t kPatchlevelMatchCount = kDayMatch + 1;
 
 uint32_t match_to_uint32(const char* expression, const regmatch_t& match) {
     if (match.rm_so == -1) return 0;
@@ -53,8 +54,6 @@
     return prop_value;
 }
 
-}  // anonymous namespace
-
 uint32_t getOsVersion(const char* version_str) {
     regex_t regex;
     if (regcomp(&regex, kPlatformVersionRegex, REG_EXTENDED)) {
@@ -76,12 +75,9 @@
     return (major * 100 + minor) * 100 + subminor;
 }
 
-uint32_t getOsVersion() {
-    std::string version = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformVersionProp);
-    return getOsVersion(version.c_str());
-}
+enum class PatchlevelOutput { kYearMonthDay, kYearMonth };
 
-uint32_t getPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str) {
+uint32_t getPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str, PatchlevelOutput detail) {
     regex_t regex;
     if (regcomp(&regex, kPatchlevelRegex, REG_EXTENDED) != 0) {
         return 0;
@@ -100,17 +96,35 @@
     if (month < 1 || month > 12) {
         return 0;
     }
-    return year * 100 + month;
+
+    switch (detail) {
+        case PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonthDay: {
+            uint32_t day = match_to_uint32(patchlevel_str, matches[kDayMatch]);
+            if (day < 1 || day > 31) {
+                return 0;
+            }
+            return year * 10000 + month * 100 + day;
+        }
+        case PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonth:
+            return year * 100 + month;
+    }
+}
+
+}  // anonymous namespace
+
+uint32_t getOsVersion() {
+    std::string version = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformVersionProp);
+    return getOsVersion(version.c_str());
 }
 
 uint32_t getOsPatchlevel() {
     std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformPatchlevelProp);
-    return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
+    return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str(), PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonth);
 }
 
 uint32_t getVendorPatchlevel() {
     std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kVendorPatchlevelProp);
-    return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
+    return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str(), PatchlevelOutput::kYearMonthDay);
 }
 
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp b/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
index 31f4854..bf332d5 100644
--- a/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
+++ b/security/secureclock/aidl/vts/functional/SecureClockAidlTest.cpp
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result1.error);
     EXPECT_EQ(1U, result1.token.challenge);
     EXPECT_GT(result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+    EXPECT_EQ(32U, result1.token.mac.size());
 
     unsigned long time_to_sleep = 200;
     sleep_ms(time_to_sleep);
@@ -123,6 +124,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result2.error);
     EXPECT_EQ(2U, result2.token.challenge);
     EXPECT_GT(result2.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+    EXPECT_EQ(32U, result2.token.mac.size());
 
     auto host_time_delta = result2_time - result1_time;
 
@@ -153,6 +155,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result1.error);
     EXPECT_EQ(0U, result1.token.challenge);
     EXPECT_GT(result1.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+    EXPECT_EQ(32U, result1.token.mac.size());
 
     unsigned long time_to_sleep = 200;
     sleep_ms(time_to_sleep);
@@ -162,6 +165,7 @@
     EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, result2.error);
     EXPECT_EQ(1U, result2.token.challenge);
     EXPECT_GT(result2.token.timestamp.milliSeconds, 0U);
+    EXPECT_EQ(32U, result2.token.mac.size());
 
     auto host_time_delta = result2_time - result1_time;
 
diff --git a/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp b/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp
index 8426120..919f882 100644
--- a/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp
+++ b/security/sharedsecret/aidl/vts/functional/SharedSecretAidlTest.cpp
@@ -48,6 +48,9 @@
         SharedSecretParameters params;
         auto error = GetReturnErrorCode(sharedSecret->getSharedSecretParameters(&params));
         EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, error);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(params.seed.size() == 0 || params.seed.size() == 32);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(params.nonce.size() == 32);
+
         GetParamsResult result;
         result.tie() = std::tie(error, params);
         return result;
@@ -234,6 +237,45 @@
     }
 }
 
+TEST_F(SharedSecretAidlTest, ComputeSharedSecretShortNonce) {
+    auto sharedSecrets = allSharedSecrets();
+    if (sharedSecrets.empty()) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping the test as no shared secret service is found.";
+    }
+    auto fixup_hmac = finally([&]() { computeAllSharedSecrets(getAllSharedSecretParameters()); });
+
+    auto params = getAllSharedSecretParameters();
+    ASSERT_EQ(sharedSecrets.size(), params.size())
+            << "One or more shared secret services failed to provide parameters.";
+
+    // All should be well in the normal case
+    auto responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+
+    ASSERT_GT(responses.size(), 0U);
+    vector<uint8_t> correct_response = responses[0].sharing_check;
+    verifyResponses(correct_response, responses);
+
+    // Pick a random param and shorten that nonce by one.
+    size_t param_to_tweak = rand() % params.size();
+    auto& to_tweak = params[param_to_tweak].nonce;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(to_tweak.size() == 32);
+    to_tweak.resize(31);
+
+    responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < responses.size(); ++i) {
+        if (i == param_to_tweak) {
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, responses[i].error)
+                    << "Shared secret service that provided tweaked param should fail to compute "
+                       "shared secret";
+        } else {
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, responses[i].error) << "Others should succeed";
+            EXPECT_NE(correct_response, responses[i].sharing_check)
+                    << "Others should calculate a different shared secret, due to the tweaked "
+                       "nonce.";
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 TEST_F(SharedSecretAidlTest, ComputeSharedSecretCorruptSeed) {
     auto sharedSecrets = allSharedSecrets();
     if (sharedSecrets.empty()) {
@@ -275,6 +317,45 @@
         }
     }
 }
+
+TEST_F(SharedSecretAidlTest, ComputeSharedSecretShortSeed) {
+    auto sharedSecrets = allSharedSecrets();
+    if (sharedSecrets.empty()) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Skipping the test as no shared secret service is found.";
+    }
+    auto fixup_hmac = finally([&]() { computeAllSharedSecrets(getAllSharedSecretParameters()); });
+    auto params = getAllSharedSecretParameters();
+    ASSERT_EQ(sharedSecrets.size(), params.size())
+            << "One or more shared secret service failed to provide parameters.";
+
+    // All should be well in the normal case
+    auto responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+
+    ASSERT_GT(responses.size(), 0U);
+    vector<uint8_t> correct_response = responses[0].sharing_check;
+    verifyResponses(correct_response, responses);
+
+    // Pick a random param and modify the seed to be of (invalid) length 31.
+    auto param_to_tweak = rand() % params.size();
+    auto& to_tweak = params[param_to_tweak].seed;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(to_tweak.size() == 32 || to_tweak.size() == 0);
+    to_tweak.resize(31);
+
+    responses = computeAllSharedSecrets(params);
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < responses.size(); ++i) {
+        if (i == param_to_tweak) {
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT, responses[i].error)
+                    << "Shared secret service that provided tweaked param should fail to compute "
+                       "shared secret";
+        } else {
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, responses[i].error) << "Others should succeed";
+            EXPECT_NE(correct_response, responses[i].sharing_check)
+                    << "Others should calculate a different shared secret, due to the tweaked "
+                       "nonce.";
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::sharedsecret::test
 
 int main(int argc, char** argv) {
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorManagerTargetTest.cpp b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorManagerTargetTest.cpp
index 9789188..44fa3be 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorManagerTargetTest.cpp
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorManagerTargetTest.cpp
@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@
     std::vector<int32_t> vibratorIds;
 };
 
+inline bool isUnknownOrUnsupported(Status status) {
+    return status.exceptionCode() == Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION ||
+           status.transactionError() == android::UNKNOWN_TRANSACTION;
+}
+
 TEST_P(VibratorAidl, ValidateExistingVibrators) {
     sp<IVibrator> vibrator;
     for (auto& id : vibratorIds) {
@@ -101,8 +106,8 @@
 
 TEST_P(VibratorAidl, PrepareSyncedNotSupported) {
     if (!(capabilities & IVibratorManager::CAP_SYNC)) {
-        EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION,
-                  manager->prepareSynced(vibratorIds).exceptionCode());
+        Status status = manager->prepareSynced(vibratorIds);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
 }
 
@@ -116,8 +121,8 @@
         for (auto& id : vibratorIds) {
             EXPECT_TRUE(manager->getVibrator(id, &vibrator).isOk());
             ASSERT_NE(vibrator, nullptr);
-            EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION,
-                      vibrator->on(durationMs, nullptr).exceptionCode());
+            Status status = vibrator->on(durationMs, nullptr);
+            EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
         }
         EXPECT_TRUE(manager->cancelSynced().isOk());
     }
@@ -134,7 +139,7 @@
             ASSERT_NE(vibrator, nullptr);
             int32_t lengthMs = 0;
             Status status = vibrator->perform(kEffects[0], kEffectStrengths[0], nullptr, &lengthMs);
-            EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.exceptionCode());
+            EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
         }
         EXPECT_TRUE(manager->cancelSynced().isOk());
     }
@@ -157,7 +162,7 @@
             EXPECT_TRUE(manager->getVibrator(id, &vibrator).isOk());
             ASSERT_NE(vibrator, nullptr);
             Status status = vibrator->compose(composite, nullptr);
-            EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.exceptionCode());
+            EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
         }
         EXPECT_TRUE(manager->cancelSynced().isOk());
     }
@@ -191,8 +196,8 @@
 
 TEST_P(VibratorAidl, TriggerSyncNotSupported) {
     if (!(capabilities & IVibratorManager::CAP_SYNC)) {
-        EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION,
-                  manager->triggerSynced(nullptr).exceptionCode());
+        Status status = manager->triggerSynced(nullptr);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
 }
 
@@ -201,8 +206,8 @@
     if (!(capabilities & IVibratorManager::CAP_TRIGGER_CALLBACK)) {
         sp<CompletionCallback> callback = new CompletionCallback([] {});
         EXPECT_TRUE(manager->prepareSynced(vibratorIds).isOk());
-        EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION,
-                  manager->triggerSynced(callback).exceptionCode());
+        Status status = manager->triggerSynced(callback);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
 }
 
diff --git a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
index 713ec75..4d49a12 100644
--- a/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
+++ b/vibrator/aidl/vts/VtsHalVibratorTargetTest.cpp
@@ -112,6 +112,11 @@
     int32_t capabilities;
 };
 
+inline bool isUnknownOrUnsupported(Status status) {
+    return status.exceptionCode() == Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION ||
+           status.transactionError() == android::UNKNOWN_TRANSACTION;
+}
+
 static float getResonantFrequencyHz(sp<IVibrator> vibrator, int32_t capabilities) {
     float resonantFrequencyHz;
     Status status = vibrator->getResonantFrequency(&resonantFrequencyHz);
@@ -119,7 +124,7 @@
         EXPECT_GT(resonantFrequencyHz, 0);
         EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_NONE);
     } else {
-        EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
     return resonantFrequencyHz;
 }
@@ -131,7 +136,7 @@
         EXPECT_GT(freqResolutionHz, 0);
         EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_NONE);
     } else {
-        EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
     return freqResolutionHz;
 }
@@ -147,7 +152,7 @@
         EXPECT_GT(freqMinimumHz, 0);
         EXPECT_LE(freqMinimumHz, resonantFrequencyHz);
     } else {
-        EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
     return freqMinimumHz;
 }
@@ -158,7 +163,7 @@
     if (capabilities & IVibrator::CAP_FREQUENCY_CONTROL) {
         EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_NONE);
     } else {
-        EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
 
     float freqMaximumHz =
@@ -219,7 +224,8 @@
 TEST_P(VibratorAidl, OnCallbackNotSupported) {
     if (!(capabilities & IVibrator::CAP_ON_CALLBACK)) {
         sp<CompletionCallback> callback = new CompletionCallback([] {});
-        EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, vibrator->on(250, callback).exceptionCode());
+        Status status = vibrator->on(250, callback);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
 }
 
@@ -240,8 +246,8 @@
                 EXPECT_GT(lengthMs, 0);
                 usleep(lengthMs * 1000);
             } else {
-                EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION)
-                    << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
+                EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status))
+                        << status << " " << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
             }
         }
     }
@@ -270,7 +276,7 @@
                 EXPECT_TRUE(status.isOk());
                 EXPECT_GT(lengthMs, 0);
             } else {
-                EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+                EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
             }
 
             if (!status.isOk())
@@ -293,7 +299,7 @@
             sp<CompletionCallback> callback = new CompletionCallback([] {});
             int lengthMs;
             Status status = vibrator->perform(effect, strength, callback, &lengthMs);
-            EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.exceptionCode());
+            EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
         }
     }
 }
@@ -311,8 +317,8 @@
         for (EffectStrength strength : kInvalidEffectStrengths) {
             int32_t lengthMs;
             Status status = vibrator->perform(effect, strength, nullptr /*callback*/, &lengthMs);
-            EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION)
-                << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
+            EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status))
+                    << status << " " << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
         }
     }
 }
@@ -338,7 +344,8 @@
 
 TEST_P(VibratorAidl, AmplitudeReturnsUnsupportedMatchingCapabilities) {
     if ((capabilities & IVibrator::CAP_AMPLITUDE_CONTROL) == 0) {
-        EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, vibrator->setAmplitude(1).exceptionCode());
+        Status status = vibrator->setAmplitude(1);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
 }
 
@@ -362,7 +369,7 @@
         if (supportsExternalAmplitudeControl) {
             EXPECT_TRUE(amplitudeStatus.isOk());
         } else {
-            EXPECT_EQ(amplitudeStatus.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+            EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(amplitudeStatus)) << amplitudeStatus;
         }
         EXPECT_TRUE(vibrator->setExternalControl(false).isOk());
     } else {
@@ -372,8 +379,8 @@
 
 TEST_P(VibratorAidl, ExternalControlUnsupportedMatchingCapabilities) {
     if ((capabilities & IVibrator::CAP_EXTERNAL_CONTROL) == 0) {
-        EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION,
-                  vibrator->setExternalControl(true).exceptionCode());
+        Status status = vibrator->setExternalControl(true);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
 }
 
@@ -410,7 +417,7 @@
             if (isPrimitiveSupported) {
                 EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_NONE, status.exceptionCode());
             } else {
-                EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.exceptionCode());
+                EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
             }
         }
     }
@@ -473,8 +480,8 @@
                 effect.primitive = primitive;
                 effect.scale = 1.0f;
             }
-            EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION,
-                      vibrator->compose(composite, nullptr).exceptionCode());
+            Status status = vibrator->compose(composite, nullptr);
+            EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
             vibrator->off();
         }
     }
@@ -618,8 +625,8 @@
                     EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_NONE, status.exceptionCode())
                         << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
                 } else {
-                    EXPECT_EQ(Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION, status.exceptionCode())
-                        << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
+                    EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status))
+                            << status << " " << toString(effect) << " " << toString(strength);
                 }
             }
         }
@@ -639,7 +646,7 @@
         ASSERT_GT(qFactor, 0);
         EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_NONE);
     } else {
-        EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
 }
 
@@ -668,7 +675,7 @@
             ASSERT_LE(e, 1.0);
         }
     } else {
-        EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
 }
 
@@ -690,7 +697,7 @@
         ASSERT_NE(maxSize, 0);
         EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_NONE);
     } else {
-        EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
 }
 
@@ -703,7 +710,7 @@
         ASSERT_TRUE(isDefaultNoneSupported);
         EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_NONE);
     } else {
-        EXPECT_EQ(status.exceptionCode(), Status::EX_UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(isUnknownOrUnsupported(status)) << status;
     }
 }
 
diff --git a/wifi/1.0/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/1.0/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.0/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.0/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/1.1/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/1.1/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.1/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.1/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/1.2/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/1.2/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.2/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.2/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/1.3/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/1.3/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.3/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.3/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/1.4/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/1.4/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.4/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.4/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/1.5/default/OWNERS b/wifi/1.5/default/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.5/default/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.5/default/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/1.5/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/1.5/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/1.5/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/1.5/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/hostapd/1.0/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/hostapd/1.0/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/hostapd/1.0/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/hostapd/1.0/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/hostapd/1.1/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/hostapd/1.1/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/hostapd/1.1/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/hostapd/1.1/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/hostapd/1.2/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/hostapd/1.2/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/hostapd/1.2/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/hostapd/1.2/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/hostapd/1.3/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/hostapd/1.3/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/hostapd/1.3/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/hostapd/1.3/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/supplicant/1.2/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/supplicant/1.2/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/supplicant/1.2/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/supplicant/1.2/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/supplicant/1.3/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/supplicant/1.3/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/supplicant/1.3/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/supplicant/1.3/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com
diff --git a/wifi/supplicant/1.4/vts/OWNERS b/wifi/supplicant/1.4/vts/OWNERS
index e7b2fc5..cf81c79 100644
--- a/wifi/supplicant/1.4/vts/OWNERS
+++ b/wifi/supplicant/1.4/vts/OWNERS
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-kumaranand@google.com
+arabawy@google.com
 etancohen@google.com