Merge "identity: Add support for ECDSA auth and don't require session encryption." am: 4c02ef2b4e
Original change: https://android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/hardware/interfaces/+/2241333
Change-Id: Ia055667f3967492be14a7bcf0f330d7399f18711
Signed-off-by: Automerger Merge Worker <android-build-automerger-merge-worker@system.gserviceaccount.com>
diff --git a/identity/aidl/Android.bp b/identity/aidl/Android.bp
index 2090473..6a25e62 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
"android.hardware.security.rkp-V3",
],
stability: "vintf",
- frozen: true,
+ frozen: false,
backend: {
java: {
platform_apis: true,
@@ -67,20 +67,20 @@
cc_defaults {
name: "identity_use_latest_hal_aidl_ndk_static",
static_libs: [
- "android.hardware.identity-V4-ndk",
+ "android.hardware.identity-V5-ndk",
],
}
cc_defaults {
name: "identity_use_latest_hal_aidl_ndk_shared",
shared_libs: [
- "android.hardware.identity-V4-ndk",
+ "android.hardware.identity-V5-ndk",
],
}
cc_defaults {
name: "identity_use_latest_hal_aidl_cpp_static",
static_libs: [
- "android.hardware.identity-V4-cpp",
+ "android.hardware.identity-V5-cpp",
],
}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index 5065641..4f2fe0b 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -51,4 +51,5 @@
byte[] deleteCredentialWithChallenge(in byte[] challenge);
byte[] proveOwnership(in byte[] challenge);
android.hardware.identity.IWritableIdentityCredential updateCredential();
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"}) void finishRetrievalWithSignature(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces, out byte[] ecdsaSignature);
}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index 82b0a83..abdb00b 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -194,7 +194,8 @@
* is permissible for this to be empty in which case the readerSignature parameter
* must also be empty. If this is not the case, the call fails with STATUS_FAILED.
*
- * If the SessionTranscript CBOR is not empty, the X and Y coordinates of the public
+ * If mdoc session encryption is used (e.g. createEphemeralKeyPair() has been called)
+ * and the SessionTranscript CBOR is not empty, the X and Y coordinates of the public
* part of the key-pair previously generated by createEphemeralKeyPair() must appear
* somewhere in the bytes of the CBOR. Each of these coordinates must appear encoded
* with the most significant bits first and use the exact amount of bits indicated by
@@ -239,8 +240,8 @@
* and remove the corresponding requests from the counts.
*/
void startRetrieval(in SecureAccessControlProfile[] accessControlProfiles,
- in HardwareAuthToken authToken, in byte[] itemsRequest, in byte[] signingKeyBlob,
- in byte[] sessionTranscript, in byte[] readerSignature, in int[] requestCounts);
+ in HardwareAuthToken authToken, in byte[] itemsRequest, in byte[] signingKeyBlob,
+ in byte[] sessionTranscript, in byte[] readerSignature, in int[] requestCounts);
/**
* Starts retrieving an entry, subject to access control requirements. Entries must be
@@ -271,8 +272,8 @@
* is given and this profile wasn't passed to startRetrieval() this call fails
* with STATUS_INVALID_DATA.
*/
- void startRetrieveEntryValue(in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name,
- in int entrySize, in int[] accessControlProfileIds);
+ void startRetrieveEntryValue(in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace,
+ in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize, in int[] accessControlProfileIds);
/**
* Retrieves an entry value, or part of one, if the entry value is larger than gcmChunkSize.
@@ -293,11 +294,13 @@
* returned data.
*
* If signingKeyBlob or the sessionTranscript parameter passed to startRetrieval() is
- * empty then the returned MAC will be empty.
+ * empty or if mdoc session encryption is not being used (e.g. if createEphemeralKeyPair()
+ * was not called) then the returned MAC will be empty.
*
- * @param out mac is empty if signingKeyBlob or the sessionTranscript passed to
- * startRetrieval() is empty. Otherwise it is a COSE_Mac0 with empty payload
- * and the detached content is set to DeviceAuthenticationBytes as defined below.
+ * @param out mac is empty if signingKeyBlob, or the sessionTranscript passed to
+ * startRetrieval() is empty, or if mdoc session encryption is not being used (e.g. if
+ * createEphemeralKeyPair() was not called). Otherwise it is a COSE_Mac0 with empty
+ * payload and the detached content is set to DeviceAuthenticationBytes as defined below.
* This code is produced by using the key agreement and key derivation function
* from the ciphersuite with the authentication private key and the reader
* ephemeral public key to compute a shared message authentication code (MAC)
@@ -407,13 +410,13 @@
*/
void setRequestedNamespaces(in RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
- /**
- * Sets the VerificationToken. This method must be called before startRetrieval() is
- * called. This token uses the same challenge as returned by createAuthChallenge().
- *
- * @param verificationToken
- * The verification token. This token is only valid if the timestamp field is non-zero.
- */
+ /**
+ * Sets the VerificationToken. This method must be called before startRetrieval() is
+ * called. This token uses the same challenge as returned by createAuthChallenge().
+ *
+ * @param verificationToken
+ * The verification token. This token is only valid if the timestamp field is non-zero.
+ */
void setVerificationToken(in VerificationToken verificationToken);
/**
@@ -485,4 +488,20 @@
* @return an IWritableIdentityCredential
*/
IWritableIdentityCredential updateCredential();
+
+ /**
+ * Like finishRetrieval() but also returns an ECDSA signature in addition to the MAC.
+ *
+ * See section 9.1.3.6 of ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 for details of how the signature is calculated.
+ *
+ * Unlike MACing, an ECDSA signature will be returned even if mdoc session encryption isn't
+ * being used.
+ *
+ * This method was introduced in API version 5.
+ *
+ * @param ecdsaSignature a COSE_Sign1 signature described above.
+ */
+ @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"})
+ void finishRetrievalWithSignature(
+ out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces, out byte[] ecdsaSignature);
}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IPresentationSession.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IPresentationSession.aidl
index b0449f0..0a06740 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IPresentationSession.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IPresentationSession.aidl
@@ -70,6 +70,17 @@
*
* This can be empty but if it's non-empty it must be valid CBOR.
*
+ * If mdoc session encryption is used (e.g. getEphemeralKeyPair() has been called)
+ * and the SessionTranscript CBOR is not empty, the X and Y coordinates of the public
+ * part of the key-pair previously generated by createEphemeralKeyPair() must appear
+ * somewhere in the bytes of the CBOR. Each of these coordinates must appear encoded
+ * with the most significant bits first and use the exact amount of bits indicated by
+ * the key size of the ephemeral keys. For example, if the ephemeral key is using the
+ * P-256 curve then the 32 bytes for the X coordinate encoded with the most significant
+ * bits first must appear somewhere in the CBOR and ditto for the 32 bytes for the Y
+ * coordinate. If this is not satisfied, the call fails with
+ * STATUS_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_FOUND.
+ *
* This method may only be called once per instance. If called more than once, STATUS_FAILED
* must be returned.
*
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.cpp
index 9b9a749..8551ab7 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.cpp
@@ -596,10 +596,10 @@
return eicPresentationStartRetrieveEntries(&ctx_);
}
-bool FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy::calcMacKey(
+bool FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy::prepareDeviceAuthentication(
const vector<uint8_t>& sessionTranscript, const vector<uint8_t>& readerEphemeralPublicKey,
const vector<uint8_t>& signingKeyBlob, const string& docType,
- unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues, size_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize) {
+ unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues, size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize) {
if (!validateId(__func__)) {
return false;
}
@@ -608,10 +608,10 @@
eicDebug("Unexpected size %zd of signingKeyBlob, expected 60", signingKeyBlob.size());
return false;
}
- return eicPresentationCalcMacKey(&ctx_, sessionTranscript.data(), sessionTranscript.size(),
- readerEphemeralPublicKey.data(), signingKeyBlob.data(),
- docType.c_str(), docType.size(), numNamespacesWithValues,
- expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
+ return eicPresentationPrepareDeviceAuthentication(
+ &ctx_, sessionTranscript.data(), sessionTranscript.size(),
+ readerEphemeralPublicKey.data(), readerEphemeralPublicKey.size(), signingKeyBlob.data(),
+ docType.c_str(), docType.size(), numNamespacesWithValues, expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
}
AccessCheckResult FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy::startRetrieveEntryValue(
@@ -673,6 +673,25 @@
return content;
}
+optional<pair<vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>>>
+FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy::finishRetrievalWithSignature() {
+ if (!validateId(__func__)) {
+ return std::nullopt;
+ }
+
+ vector<uint8_t> mac(32);
+ size_t macSize = 32;
+ vector<uint8_t> ecdsaSignature(EIC_ECDSA_P256_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
+ size_t ecdsaSignatureSize = EIC_ECDSA_P256_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
+ if (!eicPresentationFinishRetrievalWithSignature(&ctx_, mac.data(), &macSize,
+ ecdsaSignature.data(), &ecdsaSignatureSize)) {
+ return std::nullopt;
+ }
+ mac.resize(macSize);
+ ecdsaSignature.resize(ecdsaSignatureSize);
+ return std::make_pair(mac, ecdsaSignature);
+}
+
optional<vector<uint8_t>> FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy::finishRetrieval() {
if (!validateId(__func__)) {
return std::nullopt;
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.h b/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.h
index 2512074..b56ab93 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.h
@@ -175,11 +175,11 @@
const vector<uint8_t>& requestMessage, int coseSignAlg,
const vector<uint8_t>& readerSignatureOfToBeSigned) override;
- bool calcMacKey(const vector<uint8_t>& sessionTranscript,
- const vector<uint8_t>& readerEphemeralPublicKey,
- const vector<uint8_t>& signingKeyBlob, const string& docType,
- unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues,
- size_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize) override;
+ bool prepareDeviceAuthentication(const vector<uint8_t>& sessionTranscript,
+ const vector<uint8_t>& readerEphemeralPublicKey,
+ const vector<uint8_t>& signingKeyBlob, const string& docType,
+ unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues,
+ size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize) override;
AccessCheckResult startRetrieveEntryValue(
const string& nameSpace, const string& name, unsigned int newNamespaceNumEntries,
@@ -191,6 +191,8 @@
optional<vector<uint8_t>> finishRetrieval() override;
+ optional<pair<vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>>> finishRetrievalWithSignature() override;
+
optional<vector<uint8_t>> deleteCredential(const string& docType,
const vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
bool includeChallenge,
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.cpp
index ff80752..4c3b7b2 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.cpp
@@ -457,17 +457,16 @@
}
if (session_) {
- // If presenting in a session, the TA has already done this check.
-
+ // If presenting in a session, the TA has already done the check for (X, Y) as done
+ // below, see eicSessionSetSessionTranscript().
} else {
- // To prevent replay-attacks, we check that the public part of the ephemeral
- // key we previously created, is present in the DeviceEngagement part of
- // SessionTranscript as a COSE_Key, in uncompressed form.
+ // If mdoc session encryption is in use, check that the
+ // public part of the ephemeral key we previously created, is
+ // present in the DeviceEngagement part of SessionTranscript
+ // as a COSE_Key, in uncompressed form.
//
// We do this by just searching for the X and Y coordinates.
- //
- // Would be nice to move this check to the TA.
- if (sessionTranscript.size() > 0) {
+ if (sessionTranscript.size() > 0 && ephemeralPublicKey_.size() > 0) {
auto [getXYSuccess, ePubX, ePubY] = support::ecPublicKeyGetXandY(ephemeralPublicKey_);
if (!getXYSuccess) {
return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
@@ -608,33 +607,36 @@
// Finally, pass info so the HMAC key can be derived and the TA can start
// creating the DeviceNameSpaces CBOR...
if (!session_) {
- if (sessionTranscript_.size() > 0 && readerPublicKey_.size() > 0 &&
- signingKeyBlob.size() > 0) {
- // We expect the reader ephemeral public key to be same size and curve
- // as the ephemeral key we generated (e.g. P-256 key), otherwise ECDH
- // won't work. So its length should be 65 bytes and it should be
- // starting with 0x04.
- if (readerPublicKey_.size() != 65 || readerPublicKey_[0] != 0x04) {
- return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
- IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED,
- "Reader public key is not in expected format"));
+ if (sessionTranscript_.size() > 0 && signingKeyBlob.size() > 0) {
+ vector<uint8_t> eReaderKeyP256;
+ if (readerPublicKey_.size() > 0) {
+ // If set, we expect the reader ephemeral public key to be same size and curve
+ // as the ephemeral key we generated (e.g. P-256 key), otherwise ECDH won't
+ // work. So its length should be 65 bytes and it should be starting with 0x04.
+ if (readerPublicKey_.size() != 65 || readerPublicKey_[0] != 0x04) {
+ return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+ IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED,
+ "Reader public key is not in expected format"));
+ }
+ eReaderKeyP256 =
+ vector<uint8_t>(readerPublicKey_.begin() + 1, readerPublicKey_.end());
}
- vector<uint8_t> pubKeyP256(readerPublicKey_.begin() + 1, readerPublicKey_.end());
- if (!hwProxy_->calcMacKey(sessionTranscript_, pubKeyP256, signingKeyBlob, docType_,
- numNamespacesWithValues, expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_)) {
+ if (!hwProxy_->prepareDeviceAuthentication(
+ sessionTranscript_, eReaderKeyP256, signingKeyBlob, docType_,
+ numNamespacesWithValues, expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_)) {
return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED,
"Error starting retrieving entries"));
}
}
} else {
- if (session_->getSessionTranscript().size() > 0 &&
- session_->getReaderEphemeralPublicKey().size() > 0 && signingKeyBlob.size() > 0) {
+ if (session_->getSessionTranscript().size() > 0 && signingKeyBlob.size() > 0) {
// Don't actually pass the reader ephemeral public key in, the TA will get
// it from the session object.
//
- if (!hwProxy_->calcMacKey(sessionTranscript_, {}, signingKeyBlob, docType_,
- numNamespacesWithValues, expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_)) {
+ if (!hwProxy_->prepareDeviceAuthentication(sessionTranscript_, {}, signingKeyBlob,
+ docType_, numNamespacesWithValues,
+ expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_)) {
return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED,
"Error starting retrieving entries"));
@@ -924,8 +926,9 @@
return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
}
-ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::finishRetrieval(vector<uint8_t>* outMac,
- vector<uint8_t>* outDeviceNameSpaces) {
+ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::finishRetrievalWithSignature(
+ vector<uint8_t>* outMac, vector<uint8_t>* outDeviceNameSpaces,
+ vector<uint8_t>* outEcdsaSignature) {
ndk::ScopedAStatus status = ensureHwProxy();
if (!status.isOk()) {
return status;
@@ -948,17 +951,34 @@
.c_str()));
}
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> digestToBeMaced;
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> signatureToBeSigned;
+
+ // This relies on the fact that binder calls never pass a nullptr
+ // for out parameters. Hence if it's null here we know this was
+ // called from finishRetrieval() below.
+ if (outEcdsaSignature == nullptr) {
+ digestToBeMaced = hwProxy_->finishRetrieval();
+ if (!digestToBeMaced) {
+ return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+ IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
+ "Error generating digestToBeMaced"));
+ }
+ } else {
+ auto macAndSignature = hwProxy_->finishRetrievalWithSignature();
+ if (!macAndSignature) {
+ return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+ IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
+ "Error generating digestToBeMaced and signatureToBeSigned"));
+ }
+ digestToBeMaced = macAndSignature->first;
+ signatureToBeSigned = macAndSignature->second;
+ }
+
// If the TA calculated a MAC (it might not have), format it as a COSE_Mac0
//
- optional<vector<uint8_t>> mac;
- optional<vector<uint8_t>> digestToBeMaced = hwProxy_->finishRetrieval();
-
- // The MAC not being set means an error occurred.
- if (!digestToBeMaced) {
- return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
- IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA, "Error generating digestToBeMaced"));
- }
// Size 0 means that the MAC isn't set. If it's set, it has to be 32 bytes.
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> mac;
if (digestToBeMaced.value().size() != 0) {
if (digestToBeMaced.value().size() != 32) {
return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
@@ -967,12 +987,27 @@
}
mac = support::coseMacWithDigest(digestToBeMaced.value(), {} /* data */);
}
-
*outMac = mac.value_or(vector<uint8_t>({}));
+
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> signature;
+ if (signatureToBeSigned && signatureToBeSigned.value().size() != 0) {
+ signature = support::coseSignEcDsaWithSignature(signatureToBeSigned.value(), {}, // data
+ {}); // certificateChain
+ }
+ if (outEcdsaSignature != nullptr) {
+ *outEcdsaSignature = signature.value_or(vector<uint8_t>({}));
+ }
+
*outDeviceNameSpaces = encodedDeviceNameSpaces;
+
return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
}
+ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::finishRetrieval(vector<uint8_t>* outMac,
+ vector<uint8_t>* outDeviceNameSpaces) {
+ return finishRetrievalWithSignature(outMac, outDeviceNameSpaces, nullptr);
+}
+
ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::generateSigningKeyPair(
vector<uint8_t>* outSigningKeyBlob, Certificate* outSigningKeyCertificate) {
if (session_) {
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.h b/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.h
index 5929829..1e0cd64 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.h
@@ -92,6 +92,10 @@
ndk::ScopedAStatus updateCredential(
shared_ptr<IWritableIdentityCredential>* outWritableCredential) override;
+ ndk::ScopedAStatus finishRetrievalWithSignature(vector<uint8_t>* outMac,
+ vector<uint8_t>* outDeviceNameSpaces,
+ vector<uint8_t>* outEcdsaSignature) override;
+
private:
ndk::ScopedAStatus deleteCredentialCommon(const vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
bool includeChallenge,
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.cpp
index 2eb7f2e..cf5b066 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.cpp
@@ -54,19 +54,6 @@
}
id_ = id.value();
- optional<vector<uint8_t>> ephemeralKeyPriv = hwProxy_->getEphemeralKeyPair();
- if (!ephemeralKeyPriv) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error getting ephemeral private key for session";
- return IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED;
- }
- optional<vector<uint8_t>> ephemeralKeyPair =
- support::ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(ephemeralKeyPriv.value());
- if (!ephemeralKeyPair) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error creating ephemeral key-pair";
- return IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED;
- }
- ephemeralKeyPair_ = ephemeralKeyPair.value();
-
optional<uint64_t> authChallenge = hwProxy_->getAuthChallenge();
if (!authChallenge) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Error getting authChallenge for session";
@@ -78,6 +65,23 @@
}
ndk::ScopedAStatus PresentationSession::getEphemeralKeyPair(vector<uint8_t>* outKeyPair) {
+ if (ephemeralKeyPair_.size() == 0) {
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> ephemeralKeyPriv = hwProxy_->getEphemeralKeyPair();
+ if (!ephemeralKeyPriv) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Error getting ephemeral private key for session";
+ return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+ IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED,
+ "Error getting ephemeral private key for session"));
+ }
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> ephemeralKeyPair =
+ support::ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(ephemeralKeyPriv.value());
+ if (!ephemeralKeyPair) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Error creating ephemeral key-pair";
+ return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+ IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED, "Error creating ephemeral key-pair"));
+ }
+ ephemeralKeyPair_ = ephemeralKeyPair.value();
+ }
*outKeyPair = ephemeralKeyPair_;
return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.h b/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.h
index 4cb174a..b3d46f9 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.h
@@ -72,9 +72,11 @@
// Set by initialize()
uint64_t id_;
- vector<uint8_t> ephemeralKeyPair_;
uint64_t authChallenge_;
+ // Set by getEphemeralKeyPair()
+ vector<uint8_t> ephemeralKeyPair_;
+
// Set by setReaderEphemeralPublicKey()
vector<uint8_t> readerPublicKey_;
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/common/SecureHardwareProxy.h b/identity/aidl/default/common/SecureHardwareProxy.h
index 9f63ad8..6463318 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/common/SecureHardwareProxy.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/common/SecureHardwareProxy.h
@@ -194,11 +194,12 @@
const vector<uint8_t>& requestMessage, int coseSignAlg,
const vector<uint8_t>& readerSignatureOfToBeSigned) = 0;
- virtual bool calcMacKey(const vector<uint8_t>& sessionTranscript,
- const vector<uint8_t>& readerEphemeralPublicKey,
- const vector<uint8_t>& signingKeyBlob, const string& docType,
- unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues,
- size_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize) = 0;
+ virtual bool prepareDeviceAuthentication(const vector<uint8_t>& sessionTranscript,
+ const vector<uint8_t>& readerEphemeralPublicKey,
+ const vector<uint8_t>& signingKeyBlob,
+ const string& docType,
+ unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues,
+ size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize) = 0;
virtual AccessCheckResult startRetrieveEntryValue(
const string& nameSpace, const string& name, unsigned int newNamespaceNumEntries,
@@ -209,6 +210,7 @@
const vector<int32_t>& accessControlProfileIds) = 0;
virtual optional<vector<uint8_t>> finishRetrieval();
+ virtual optional<pair<vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>>> finishRetrievalWithSignature();
virtual optional<vector<uint8_t>> deleteCredential(const string& docType,
const vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/identity-default.xml b/identity/aidl/default/identity-default.xml
index cc0ddc7..d0d43af 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/identity-default.xml
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/identity-default.xml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
<manifest version="1.0" type="device">
<hal format="aidl">
<name>android.hardware.identity</name>
- <version>4</version>
+ <version>5</version>
<interface>
<name>IIdentityCredentialStore</name>
<instance>default</instance>
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
index 104a559..23fd0b3 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
@@ -557,87 +557,11 @@
return true;
}
-bool eicPresentationCalcMacKey(EicPresentation* ctx, const uint8_t* sessionTranscript,
- size_t sessionTranscriptSize,
- const uint8_t readerEphemeralPublicKey[EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE],
- const uint8_t signingKeyBlob[60], const char* docType,
- size_t docTypeLength, unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues,
- size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize) {
- if (ctx->sessionId != 0) {
- EicSession* session = eicSessionGetForId(ctx->sessionId);
- if (session == NULL) {
- eicDebug("Error looking up session for sessionId %" PRIu32, ctx->sessionId);
- return false;
- }
- EicSha256Ctx sha256;
- uint8_t sessionTranscriptSha256[EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
- eicOpsSha256Init(&sha256);
- eicOpsSha256Update(&sha256, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize);
- eicOpsSha256Final(&sha256, sessionTranscriptSha256);
- if (eicCryptoMemCmp(sessionTranscriptSha256, session->sessionTranscriptSha256,
- EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0) {
- eicDebug("SessionTranscript mismatch");
- return false;
- }
- readerEphemeralPublicKey = session->readerEphemeralPublicKey;
- }
-
- uint8_t signingKeyPriv[EIC_P256_PRIV_KEY_SIZE];
- if (!eicOpsDecryptAes128Gcm(ctx->storageKey, signingKeyBlob, 60, (const uint8_t*)docType,
- docTypeLength, signingKeyPriv)) {
- eicDebug("Error decrypting signingKeyBlob");
- return false;
- }
-
- uint8_t sharedSecret[EIC_P256_COORDINATE_SIZE];
- if (!eicOpsEcdh(readerEphemeralPublicKey, signingKeyPriv, sharedSecret)) {
- eicDebug("ECDH failed");
- return false;
- }
-
- EicCbor cbor;
- eicCborInit(&cbor, NULL, 0);
- eicCborAppendSemantic(&cbor, EIC_CBOR_SEMANTIC_TAG_ENCODED_CBOR);
- eicCborAppendByteString(&cbor, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize);
- uint8_t salt[EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
- eicCborFinal(&cbor, salt);
-
- const uint8_t info[7] = {'E', 'M', 'a', 'c', 'K', 'e', 'y'};
- uint8_t derivedKey[32];
- if (!eicOpsHkdf(sharedSecret, EIC_P256_COORDINATE_SIZE, salt, sizeof(salt), info, sizeof(info),
- derivedKey, sizeof(derivedKey))) {
- eicDebug("HKDF failed");
- return false;
- }
-
- eicCborInitHmacSha256(&ctx->cbor, NULL, 0, derivedKey, sizeof(derivedKey));
- ctx->buildCbor = true;
-
- // What we're going to calculate the HMAC-SHA256 is the COSE ToBeMaced
- // structure which looks like the following:
- //
- // MAC_structure = [
- // context : "MAC" / "MAC0",
- // protected : empty_or_serialized_map,
- // external_aad : bstr,
- // payload : bstr
- // ]
- //
- eicCborAppendArray(&ctx->cbor, 4);
- eicCborAppendStringZ(&ctx->cbor, "MAC0");
-
- // The COSE Encoded protected headers is just a single field with
- // COSE_LABEL_ALG (1) -> COSE_ALG_HMAC_256_256 (5). For simplicitly we just
- // hard-code the CBOR encoding:
- static const uint8_t coseEncodedProtectedHeaders[] = {0xa1, 0x01, 0x05};
- eicCborAppendByteString(&ctx->cbor, coseEncodedProtectedHeaders,
- sizeof(coseEncodedProtectedHeaders));
-
- // We currently don't support Externally Supplied Data (RFC 8152 section 4.3)
- // so external_aad is the empty bstr
- static const uint8_t externalAad[0] = {};
- eicCborAppendByteString(&ctx->cbor, externalAad, sizeof(externalAad));
-
+// Helper used to append the DeviceAuthencation prelude, used for both MACing and ECDSA signing.
+static size_t appendDeviceAuthentication(EicCbor* cbor, const uint8_t* sessionTranscript,
+ size_t sessionTranscriptSize, const char* docType,
+ size_t docTypeLength,
+ size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize) {
// For the payload, the _encoded_ form follows here. We handle this by simply
// opening a bstr, and then writing the CBOR. This requires us to know the
// size of said bstr, ahead of time... the CBOR to be written is
@@ -674,26 +598,148 @@
dabCalculatedSize += calculatedSize;
// Begin the bytestring for DeviceAuthenticationBytes;
- eicCborBegin(&ctx->cbor, EIC_CBOR_MAJOR_TYPE_BYTE_STRING, dabCalculatedSize);
+ eicCborBegin(cbor, EIC_CBOR_MAJOR_TYPE_BYTE_STRING, dabCalculatedSize);
- eicCborAppendSemantic(&ctx->cbor, EIC_CBOR_SEMANTIC_TAG_ENCODED_CBOR);
+ eicCborAppendSemantic(cbor, EIC_CBOR_SEMANTIC_TAG_ENCODED_CBOR);
// Begins the bytestring for DeviceAuthentication;
- eicCborBegin(&ctx->cbor, EIC_CBOR_MAJOR_TYPE_BYTE_STRING, calculatedSize);
+ eicCborBegin(cbor, EIC_CBOR_MAJOR_TYPE_BYTE_STRING, calculatedSize);
- eicCborAppendArray(&ctx->cbor, 4);
- eicCborAppendStringZ(&ctx->cbor, "DeviceAuthentication");
- eicCborAppend(&ctx->cbor, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize);
- eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cbor, docType, docTypeLength);
+ eicCborAppendArray(cbor, 4);
+ eicCborAppendStringZ(cbor, "DeviceAuthentication");
+ eicCborAppend(cbor, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize);
+ eicCborAppendString(cbor, docType, docTypeLength);
// For the payload, the _encoded_ form follows here. We handle this by simply
// opening a bstr, and then writing the CBOR. This requires us to know the
// size of said bstr, ahead of time.
- eicCborAppendSemantic(&ctx->cbor, EIC_CBOR_SEMANTIC_TAG_ENCODED_CBOR);
- eicCborBegin(&ctx->cbor, EIC_CBOR_MAJOR_TYPE_BYTE_STRING, expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
- ctx->expectedCborSizeAtEnd = expectedDeviceNamespacesSize + ctx->cbor.size;
+ eicCborAppendSemantic(cbor, EIC_CBOR_SEMANTIC_TAG_ENCODED_CBOR);
+ eicCborBegin(cbor, EIC_CBOR_MAJOR_TYPE_BYTE_STRING, expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
+ size_t expectedCborSizeAtEnd = expectedDeviceNamespacesSize + cbor->size;
- eicCborAppendMap(&ctx->cbor, numNamespacesWithValues);
+ return expectedCborSizeAtEnd;
+}
+
+bool eicPresentationPrepareDeviceAuthentication(
+ EicPresentation* ctx, const uint8_t* sessionTranscript, size_t sessionTranscriptSize,
+ const uint8_t* readerEphemeralPublicKey, size_t readerEphemeralPublicKeySize,
+ const uint8_t signingKeyBlob[60], const char* docType, size_t docTypeLength,
+ unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues, size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize) {
+ if (ctx->sessionId != 0) {
+ if (readerEphemeralPublicKeySize != 0) {
+ eicDebug("In a session but readerEphemeralPublicKeySize is non-zero");
+ return false;
+ }
+ EicSession* session = eicSessionGetForId(ctx->sessionId);
+ if (session == NULL) {
+ eicDebug("Error looking up session for sessionId %" PRIu32, ctx->sessionId);
+ return false;
+ }
+ EicSha256Ctx sha256;
+ uint8_t sessionTranscriptSha256[EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ eicOpsSha256Init(&sha256);
+ eicOpsSha256Update(&sha256, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize);
+ eicOpsSha256Final(&sha256, sessionTranscriptSha256);
+ if (eicCryptoMemCmp(sessionTranscriptSha256, session->sessionTranscriptSha256,
+ EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0) {
+ eicDebug("SessionTranscript mismatch");
+ return false;
+ }
+ readerEphemeralPublicKey = session->readerEphemeralPublicKey;
+ readerEphemeralPublicKeySize = session->readerEphemeralPublicKeySize;
+ }
+
+ // Stash the decrypted DeviceKey in context since we'll need it later in
+ // eicPresentationFinishRetrievalWithSignature()
+ if (!eicOpsDecryptAes128Gcm(ctx->storageKey, signingKeyBlob, 60, (const uint8_t*)docType,
+ docTypeLength, ctx->deviceKeyPriv)) {
+ eicDebug("Error decrypting signingKeyBlob");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // We can only do MACing if EReaderKey has been set... it might not have been set if for
+ // example mdoc session encryption isn't in use. In that case we can still do ECDSA
+ if (readerEphemeralPublicKeySize > 0) {
+ if (readerEphemeralPublicKeySize != EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE) {
+ eicDebug("Unexpected size %zd for readerEphemeralPublicKeySize",
+ readerEphemeralPublicKeySize);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ uint8_t sharedSecret[EIC_P256_COORDINATE_SIZE];
+ if (!eicOpsEcdh(readerEphemeralPublicKey, ctx->deviceKeyPriv, sharedSecret)) {
+ eicDebug("ECDH failed");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ EicCbor cbor;
+ eicCborInit(&cbor, NULL, 0);
+ eicCborAppendSemantic(&cbor, EIC_CBOR_SEMANTIC_TAG_ENCODED_CBOR);
+ eicCborAppendByteString(&cbor, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize);
+ uint8_t salt[EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ eicCborFinal(&cbor, salt);
+
+ const uint8_t info[7] = {'E', 'M', 'a', 'c', 'K', 'e', 'y'};
+ uint8_t derivedKey[32];
+ if (!eicOpsHkdf(sharedSecret, EIC_P256_COORDINATE_SIZE, salt, sizeof(salt), info,
+ sizeof(info), derivedKey, sizeof(derivedKey))) {
+ eicDebug("HKDF failed");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ eicCborInitHmacSha256(&ctx->cbor, NULL, 0, derivedKey, sizeof(derivedKey));
+
+ // What we're going to calculate the HMAC-SHA256 is the COSE ToBeMaced
+ // structure which looks like the following:
+ //
+ // MAC_structure = [
+ // context : "MAC" / "MAC0",
+ // protected : empty_or_serialized_map,
+ // external_aad : bstr,
+ // payload : bstr
+ // ]
+ //
+ eicCborAppendArray(&ctx->cbor, 4);
+ eicCborAppendStringZ(&ctx->cbor, "MAC0");
+
+ // The COSE Encoded protected headers is just a single field with
+ // COSE_LABEL_ALG (1) -> COSE_ALG_HMAC_256_256 (5). For simplicitly we just
+ // hard-code the CBOR encoding:
+ static const uint8_t coseEncodedProtectedHeaders[] = {0xa1, 0x01, 0x05};
+ eicCborAppendByteString(&ctx->cbor, coseEncodedProtectedHeaders,
+ sizeof(coseEncodedProtectedHeaders));
+
+ // We currently don't support Externally Supplied Data (RFC 8152 section 4.3)
+ // so external_aad is the empty bstr
+ static const uint8_t externalAad[0] = {};
+ eicCborAppendByteString(&ctx->cbor, externalAad, sizeof(externalAad));
+
+ // Append DeviceAuthentication prelude and open the DeviceSigned map...
+ ctx->expectedCborSizeAtEnd =
+ appendDeviceAuthentication(&ctx->cbor, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize,
+ docType, docTypeLength, expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
+ eicCborAppendMap(&ctx->cbor, numNamespacesWithValues);
+ ctx->buildCbor = true;
+ }
+
+ // Now do the same for ECDSA signatures...
+ //
+ eicCborInit(&ctx->cborEcdsa, NULL, 0);
+ eicCborAppendArray(&ctx->cborEcdsa, 4);
+ eicCborAppendStringZ(&ctx->cborEcdsa, "Signature1");
+ static const uint8_t coseEncodedProtectedHeadersEcdsa[] = {0xa1, 0x01, 0x26};
+ eicCborAppendByteString(&ctx->cborEcdsa, coseEncodedProtectedHeadersEcdsa,
+ sizeof(coseEncodedProtectedHeadersEcdsa));
+ static const uint8_t externalAadEcdsa[0] = {};
+ eicCborAppendByteString(&ctx->cborEcdsa, externalAadEcdsa, sizeof(externalAadEcdsa));
+
+ // Append DeviceAuthentication prelude and open the DeviceSigned map...
+ ctx->expectedCborEcdsaSizeAtEnd =
+ appendDeviceAuthentication(&ctx->cborEcdsa, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize,
+ docType, docTypeLength, expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
+ eicCborAppendMap(&ctx->cborEcdsa, numNamespacesWithValues);
+ ctx->buildCborEcdsa = true;
+
return true;
}
@@ -702,6 +748,7 @@
// state objects here.
ctx->requestMessageValidated = false;
ctx->buildCbor = false;
+ ctx->buildCborEcdsa = false;
ctx->accessControlProfileMaskValidated = 0;
ctx->accessControlProfileMaskUsesReaderAuth = 0;
ctx->accessControlProfileMaskFailedReaderAuth = 0;
@@ -724,6 +771,9 @@
if (newNamespaceNumEntries > 0) {
eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cbor, nameSpace, nameSpaceLength);
eicCborAppendMap(&ctx->cbor, newNamespaceNumEntries);
+
+ eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cborEcdsa, nameSpace, nameSpaceLength);
+ eicCborAppendMap(&ctx->cborEcdsa, newNamespaceNumEntries);
}
// We'll need to calc and store a digest of additionalData to check that it's the same
@@ -778,6 +828,7 @@
if (result == EIC_ACCESS_CHECK_RESULT_OK) {
eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cbor, name, nameLength);
+ eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cborEcdsa, name, nameLength);
ctx->accessCheckOk = true;
}
return result;
@@ -821,6 +872,7 @@
}
eicCborAppend(&ctx->cbor, content, encryptedContentSize - 28);
+ eicCborAppend(&ctx->cborEcdsa, content, encryptedContentSize - 28);
return true;
}
@@ -842,6 +894,40 @@
return false;
}
eicCborFinal(&ctx->cbor, digestToBeMaced);
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+bool eicPresentationFinishRetrievalWithSignature(EicPresentation* ctx, uint8_t* digestToBeMaced,
+ size_t* digestToBeMacedSize,
+ uint8_t* signatureOfToBeSigned,
+ size_t* signatureOfToBeSignedSize) {
+ if (!eicPresentationFinishRetrieval(ctx, digestToBeMaced, digestToBeMacedSize)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (!ctx->buildCborEcdsa) {
+ *signatureOfToBeSignedSize = 0;
+ return true;
+ }
+ if (*signatureOfToBeSignedSize != EIC_ECDSA_P256_SIGNATURE_SIZE) {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ // This verifies that the correct expectedDeviceNamespacesSize value was
+ // passed in at eicPresentationCalcMacKey() time.
+ if (ctx->cborEcdsa.size != ctx->expectedCborEcdsaSizeAtEnd) {
+ eicDebug("CBOR ECDSA size is %zd, was expecting %zd", ctx->cborEcdsa.size,
+ ctx->expectedCborEcdsaSizeAtEnd);
+ return false;
+ }
+ uint8_t cborSha256[EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ eicCborFinal(&ctx->cborEcdsa, cborSha256);
+ if (!eicOpsEcDsa(ctx->deviceKeyPriv, cborSha256, signatureOfToBeSigned)) {
+ eicDebug("Error signing DeviceAuthentication");
+ return false;
+ }
+ eicDebug("set the signature");
return true;
}
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
index a031890..cd3162a 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
// aren't.
bool requestMessageValidated;
bool buildCbor;
+ bool buildCborEcdsa;
// Set to true initialized as a test credential.
bool testCredential;
@@ -101,6 +102,12 @@
size_t expectedCborSizeAtEnd;
EicCbor cbor;
+
+ // The selected DeviceKey / AuthKey
+ uint8_t deviceKeyPriv[EIC_P256_PRIV_KEY_SIZE];
+
+ EicCbor cborEcdsa;
+ size_t expectedCborEcdsaSizeAtEnd;
} EicPresentation;
// If sessionId is zero (EIC_PRESENTATION_ID_UNSET), the presentation object is not associated
@@ -214,14 +221,13 @@
EIC_ACCESS_CHECK_RESULT_READER_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED,
} EicAccessCheckResult;
-// Passes enough information to calculate the MACing key
+// Passes enough information to calculate the MACing key and/or prepare ECDSA signing
//
-bool eicPresentationCalcMacKey(EicPresentation* ctx, const uint8_t* sessionTranscript,
- size_t sessionTranscriptSize,
- const uint8_t readerEphemeralPublicKey[EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE],
- const uint8_t signingKeyBlob[60], const char* docType,
- size_t docTypeLength, unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues,
- size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
+bool eicPresentationPrepareDeviceAuthentication(
+ EicPresentation* ctx, const uint8_t* sessionTranscript, size_t sessionTranscriptSize,
+ const uint8_t* readerEphemeralPublicKey, size_t readerEphemeralPublicKeySize,
+ const uint8_t signingKeyBlob[60], const char* docType, size_t docTypeLength,
+ unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues, size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
// The scratchSpace should be set to a buffer at least 512 bytes (ideally 1024
// bytes, the bigger the better). It's done this way to avoid allocating stack
@@ -253,6 +259,13 @@
bool eicPresentationFinishRetrieval(EicPresentation* ctx, uint8_t* digestToBeMaced,
size_t* digestToBeMacedSize);
+// Like eicPresentationFinishRetrieval() but also returns an ECDSA signature.
+//
+bool eicPresentationFinishRetrievalWithSignature(EicPresentation* ctx, uint8_t* digestToBeMaced,
+ size_t* digestToBeMacedSize,
+ uint8_t* signatureOfToBeSigned,
+ size_t* signatureOfToBeSignedSize);
+
// The data returned in |signatureOfToBeSigned| contains the ECDSA signature of
// the ToBeSigned CBOR from RFC 8051 "4.4. Signing and Verification Process"
// where content is set to the ProofOfDeletion CBOR.
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.c b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.c
index d0c7a0d..e44fa68 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.c
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.c
@@ -84,30 +84,35 @@
bool eicSessionGetEphemeralKeyPair(EicSession* ctx,
uint8_t ephemeralPrivateKey[EIC_P256_PRIV_KEY_SIZE]) {
eicMemCpy(ephemeralPrivateKey, ctx->ephemeralPrivateKey, EIC_P256_PRIV_KEY_SIZE);
+ ctx->getEphemeralKeyPairCalled = true;
return true;
}
bool eicSessionSetReaderEphemeralPublicKey(
EicSession* ctx, const uint8_t readerEphemeralPublicKey[EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE]) {
eicMemCpy(ctx->readerEphemeralPublicKey, readerEphemeralPublicKey, EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE);
+ ctx->readerEphemeralPublicKeySize = EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE;
return true;
}
bool eicSessionSetSessionTranscript(EicSession* ctx, const uint8_t* sessionTranscript,
size_t sessionTranscriptSize) {
- // Only accept the SessionTranscript if X and Y from the ephemeral key
- // we created is somewhere in SessionTranscript...
+ // If mdoc session encryption is in use, only accept the
+ // SessionTranscript if X and Y from the ephemeral key we created
+ // is somewhere in SessionTranscript...
//
- if (eicMemMem(sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize, ctx->ephemeralPublicKey,
- EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE / 2) == NULL) {
- eicDebug("Error finding X from ephemeralPublicKey in sessionTranscript");
- return false;
- }
- if (eicMemMem(sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize,
- ctx->ephemeralPublicKey + EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE / 2,
- EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE / 2) == NULL) {
- eicDebug("Error finding Y from ephemeralPublicKey in sessionTranscript");
- return false;
+ if (ctx->getEphemeralKeyPairCalled) {
+ if (eicMemMem(sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize, ctx->ephemeralPublicKey,
+ EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE / 2) == NULL) {
+ eicDebug("Error finding X from ephemeralPublicKey in sessionTranscript");
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (eicMemMem(sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize,
+ ctx->ephemeralPublicKey + EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE / 2,
+ EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE / 2) == NULL) {
+ eicDebug("Error finding Y from ephemeralPublicKey in sessionTranscript");
+ return false;
+ }
}
// To save space we only store the SHA-256 of SessionTranscript
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.h b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.h
index 0303dae..ae9babf 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.h
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
// A non-zero number unique for this EicSession instance
uint32_t id;
+ // Set to true iff eicSessionGetEphemeralKeyPair() has been called.
+ bool getEphemeralKeyPairCalled;
+
// The challenge generated at construction time by eicSessionInit().
uint64_t authChallenge;
@@ -41,6 +44,7 @@
uint8_t sessionTranscriptSha256[EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ size_t readerEphemeralPublicKeySize;
} EicSession;
bool eicSessionInit(EicSession* ctx);
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/EndToEndTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/EndToEndTests.cpp
index 67db915..ae9035b 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/EndToEndTests.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/EndToEndTests.cpp
@@ -441,8 +441,18 @@
}
vector<uint8_t> mac;
+ vector<uint8_t> ecdsaSignature;
vector<uint8_t> deviceNameSpacesEncoded;
- ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
+ // API version 5 (feature version 202301) returns both MAC and ECDSA signature.
+ if (halApiVersion_ >= 5) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credential
+ ->finishRetrievalWithSignature(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded,
+ &ecdsaSignature)
+ .isOk());
+ ASSERT_GT(ecdsaSignature.size(), 0);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
+ }
cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(deviceNameSpacesEncoded, 32, {});
ASSERT_EQ(
"{\n"
@@ -475,6 +485,21 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(calculatedMac);
EXPECT_EQ(mac, calculatedMac);
+ if (ecdsaSignature.size() > 0) {
+ vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceAuthentication =
+ cppbor::Array()
+ .add("DeviceAuthentication")
+ .add(sessionTranscript.clone())
+ .add(docType)
+ .add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceNameSpacesEncoded))
+ .encode();
+ vector<uint8_t> deviceAuthenticationBytes =
+ cppbor::SemanticTag(24, encodedDeviceAuthentication).encode();
+ EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(ecdsaSignature,
+ deviceAuthenticationBytes, // Detached content
+ signingPubKey.value()));
+ }
+
// Also perform an additional empty request. This is what mDL applications
// are envisioned to do - one call to get the data elements, another to get
// an empty DeviceSignedItems and corresponding MAC.
@@ -486,7 +511,16 @@
signingKeyBlob, sessionTranscriptEncoded, {}, // readerSignature,
testEntriesEntryCounts)
.isOk());
- ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
+ // API version 5 (feature version 202301) returns both MAC and ECDSA signature.
+ if (halApiVersion_ >= 5) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credential
+ ->finishRetrievalWithSignature(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded,
+ &ecdsaSignature)
+ .isOk());
+ ASSERT_GT(ecdsaSignature.size(), 0);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
+ }
cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(deviceNameSpacesEncoded, 32, {});
ASSERT_EQ("{}", cborPretty);
// Calculate DeviceAuthentication and MAC (MACing key hasn't changed)
@@ -497,6 +531,21 @@
ASSERT_TRUE(calculatedMac);
EXPECT_EQ(mac, calculatedMac);
+ if (ecdsaSignature.size() > 0) {
+ vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceAuthentication =
+ cppbor::Array()
+ .add("DeviceAuthentication")
+ .add(sessionTranscript.clone())
+ .add(docType)
+ .add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceNameSpacesEncoded))
+ .encode();
+ vector<uint8_t> deviceAuthenticationBytes =
+ cppbor::SemanticTag(24, encodedDeviceAuthentication).encode();
+ EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(ecdsaSignature,
+ deviceAuthenticationBytes, // Detached content
+ signingPubKey.value()));
+ }
+
// Some mDL apps might send a request but with a single empty
// namespace. Check that too.
RequestNamespace emptyRequestNS;
@@ -508,7 +557,16 @@
signingKeyBlob, sessionTranscriptEncoded, {}, // readerSignature,
testEntriesEntryCounts)
.isOk());
- ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
+ // API version 5 (feature version 202301) returns both MAC and ECDSA signature.
+ if (halApiVersion_ >= 5) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credential
+ ->finishRetrievalWithSignature(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded,
+ &ecdsaSignature)
+ .isOk());
+ ASSERT_GT(ecdsaSignature.size(), 0);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
+ }
cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(deviceNameSpacesEncoded, 32, {});
ASSERT_EQ("{}", cborPretty);
// Calculate DeviceAuthentication and MAC (MACing key hasn't changed)
@@ -518,6 +576,248 @@
eMacKey.value()); // EMacKey
ASSERT_TRUE(calculatedMac);
EXPECT_EQ(mac, calculatedMac);
+
+ if (ecdsaSignature.size() > 0) {
+ vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceAuthentication =
+ cppbor::Array()
+ .add("DeviceAuthentication")
+ .add(sessionTranscript.clone())
+ .add(docType)
+ .add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceNameSpacesEncoded))
+ .encode();
+ vector<uint8_t> deviceAuthenticationBytes =
+ cppbor::SemanticTag(24, encodedDeviceAuthentication).encode();
+ EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(ecdsaSignature,
+ deviceAuthenticationBytes, // Detached content
+ signingPubKey.value()));
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_P(EndToEndTests, noSessionEncryption) {
+ if (halApiVersion_ < 5) {
+ GTEST_SKIP() << "Need HAL API version 5, have " << halApiVersion_;
+ }
+
+ const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {// Profile 0 (no authentication)
+ {0, {}, false, 0}};
+
+ HardwareAuthToken authToken;
+ VerificationToken verificationToken;
+ authToken.challenge = 0;
+ authToken.userId = 0;
+ authToken.authenticatorId = 0;
+ authToken.authenticatorType = ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthenticatorType::NONE;
+ authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
+ authToken.mac.clear();
+ verificationToken.challenge = 0;
+ verificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
+ verificationToken.securityLevel = ::android::hardware::keymaster::SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE;
+ verificationToken.mac.clear();
+
+ // Here's the actual test data:
+ const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries = {
+ {"PersonalData", "Last name", string("Turing"), vector<int32_t>{0}},
+ {"PersonalData", "Birth date", string("19120623"), vector<int32_t>{0}},
+ {"PersonalData", "First name", string("Alan"), vector<int32_t>{0}},
+ };
+ const vector<int32_t> testEntriesEntryCounts = {3};
+ HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
+ string cborPretty;
+ sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_,
+ true /* testCredential */));
+
+ string challenge = "attestationChallenge";
+ test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge,
+ {1} /* atteestationApplicationId */);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
+ << attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
+
+ // This is kinda of a hack but we need to give the size of
+ // ProofOfProvisioning that we'll expect to receive.
+ const int32_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize = 230;
+ // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+ writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(
+ writableCredential->startPersonalization(testProfiles.size(), testEntriesEntryCounts)
+ .isOk());
+
+ optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
+ test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
+
+ // Uses TestEntryData* pointer as key and values are the encrypted blobs. This
+ // is a little hacky but it works well enough.
+ map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
+
+ for (const auto& entry : testEntries) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+ encryptedBlobs, true));
+ }
+
+ vector<uint8_t> credentialData;
+ vector<uint8_t> proofOfProvisioningSignature;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(
+ writableCredential->finishAddingEntries(&credentialData, &proofOfProvisioningSignature)
+ .isOk());
+
+ // Validate the proofOfProvisioning which was returned
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> proofOfProvisioning =
+ support::coseSignGetPayload(proofOfProvisioningSignature);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(proofOfProvisioning);
+ cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(proofOfProvisioning.value(), 32, {"readerCertificate"});
+ EXPECT_EQ(
+ "[\n"
+ " 'ProofOfProvisioning',\n"
+ " 'org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl',\n"
+ " [\n"
+ " {\n"
+ " 'id' : 0,\n"
+ " },\n"
+ " ],\n"
+ " {\n"
+ " 'PersonalData' : [\n"
+ " {\n"
+ " 'name' : 'Last name',\n"
+ " 'value' : 'Turing',\n"
+ " 'accessControlProfiles' : [0, ],\n"
+ " },\n"
+ " {\n"
+ " 'name' : 'Birth date',\n"
+ " 'value' : '19120623',\n"
+ " 'accessControlProfiles' : [0, ],\n"
+ " },\n"
+ " {\n"
+ " 'name' : 'First name',\n"
+ " 'value' : 'Alan',\n"
+ " 'accessControlProfiles' : [0, ],\n"
+ " },\n"
+ " ],\n"
+ " },\n"
+ " true,\n"
+ "]",
+ cborPretty);
+
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> credentialPubKey = support::certificateChainGetTopMostKey(
+ attData.attestationCertificate[0].encodedCertificate);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credentialPubKey);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(proofOfProvisioningSignature,
+ {}, // Additional data
+ credentialPubKey.value()));
+ writableCredential = nullptr;
+
+ // Extract doctype, storage key, and credentialPrivKey from credentialData... this works
+ // only because we asked for a test-credential meaning that the HBK is all zeroes.
+ auto [exSuccess, exDocType, exStorageKey, exCredentialPrivKey, exSha256Pop] =
+ extractFromTestCredentialData(credentialData);
+
+ ASSERT_TRUE(exSuccess);
+ ASSERT_EQ(exDocType, "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl");
+ // ... check that the public key derived from the private key matches what was
+ // in the certificate.
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> exCredentialKeyPair =
+ support::ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(exCredentialPrivKey);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(exCredentialKeyPair);
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> exCredentialPubKey =
+ support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(exCredentialKeyPair.value());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(exCredentialPubKey);
+ ASSERT_EQ(exCredentialPubKey.value(), credentialPubKey.value());
+
+ sp<IIdentityCredential> credential;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_
+ ->getCredential(
+ CipherSuite::CIPHERSUITE_ECDHE_HKDF_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256,
+ credentialData, &credential)
+ .isOk());
+ ASSERT_NE(credential, nullptr);
+
+ // Calculate sessionTranscript, make something that resembles what you'd use for
+ // an over-the-Internet presentation not using mdoc session encryption.
+ cppbor::Array sessionTranscript =
+ cppbor::Array()
+ .add(cppbor::Null()) // DeviceEngagementBytes isn't used.
+ .add(cppbor::Null()) // EReaderKeyBytes isn't used.
+ .add(cppbor::Array() // Proprietary handover structure follows.
+ .add(cppbor::Tstr("TestHandover"))
+ .add(cppbor::Bstr(vector<uint8_t>{1, 2, 3}))
+ .add(cppbor::Bstr(vector<uint8_t>{9, 8, 7, 6})));
+ vector<uint8_t> sessionTranscriptEncoded = sessionTranscript.encode();
+
+ // Generate the key that will be used to sign AuthenticatedData.
+ vector<uint8_t> signingKeyBlob;
+ Certificate signingKeyCertificate;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credential->generateSigningKeyPair(&signingKeyBlob, &signingKeyCertificate).isOk());
+ optional<vector<uint8_t>> signingPubKey =
+ support::certificateChainGetTopMostKey(signingKeyCertificate.encodedCertificate);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(signingPubKey);
+ test_utils::verifyAuthKeyCertificate(signingKeyCertificate.encodedCertificate);
+
+ vector<RequestNamespace> requestedNamespaces = test_utils::buildRequestNamespaces(testEntries);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credential->setRequestedNamespaces(requestedNamespaces).isOk());
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credential->setVerificationToken(verificationToken).isOk());
+ Status status = credential->startRetrieval(
+ secureProfiles.value(), authToken, {} /* itemsRequestBytes*/, signingKeyBlob,
+ sessionTranscriptEncoded, {} /* readerSignature */, testEntriesEntryCounts);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.exceptionCode() << ": " << status.exceptionMessage();
+
+ for (const auto& entry : testEntries) {
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credential
+ ->startRetrieveEntryValue(entry.nameSpace, entry.name,
+ entry.valueCbor.size(), entry.profileIds)
+ .isOk());
+
+ auto it = encryptedBlobs.find(&entry);
+ ASSERT_NE(it, encryptedBlobs.end());
+ const vector<vector<uint8_t>>& encryptedChunks = it->second;
+
+ vector<uint8_t> content;
+ for (const auto& encryptedChunk : encryptedChunks) {
+ vector<uint8_t> chunk;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(credential->retrieveEntryValue(encryptedChunk, &chunk).isOk());
+ content.insert(content.end(), chunk.begin(), chunk.end());
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(content, entry.valueCbor);
+ }
+
+ vector<uint8_t> mac;
+ vector<uint8_t> ecdsaSignature;
+ vector<uint8_t> deviceNameSpacesEncoded;
+ status = credential->finishRetrievalWithSignature(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded,
+ &ecdsaSignature);
+ ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.exceptionCode() << ": " << status.exceptionMessage();
+ // MACing should NOT work since we're not using session encryption
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, mac.size());
+
+ // ECDSA signatures should work, however. Check this.
+ ASSERT_GT(ecdsaSignature.size(), 0);
+
+ cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(deviceNameSpacesEncoded, 32, {});
+ ASSERT_EQ(
+ "{\n"
+ " 'PersonalData' : {\n"
+ " 'Last name' : 'Turing',\n"
+ " 'Birth date' : '19120623',\n"
+ " 'First name' : 'Alan',\n"
+ " },\n"
+ "}",
+ cborPretty);
+
+ string docType = "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl";
+
+ vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceAuthentication =
+ cppbor::Array()
+ .add("DeviceAuthentication")
+ .add(sessionTranscript.clone())
+ .add(docType)
+ .add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceNameSpacesEncoded))
+ .encode();
+ vector<uint8_t> deviceAuthenticationBytes =
+ cppbor::SemanticTag(24, encodedDeviceAuthentication).encode();
+ EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(ecdsaSignature,
+ deviceAuthenticationBytes, // Detached content
+ signingPubKey.value()));
}
GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(EndToEndTests);