diff --git a/identity/aidl/Android.bp b/identity/aidl/Android.bp
index 2090473..6a25e62 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/Android.bp
+++ b/identity/aidl/Android.bp
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
         "android.hardware.security.rkp-V3",
     ],
     stability: "vintf",
-    frozen: true,
+    frozen: false,
     backend: {
         java: {
             platform_apis: true,
@@ -67,20 +67,20 @@
 cc_defaults {
     name: "identity_use_latest_hal_aidl_ndk_static",
     static_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.identity-V4-ndk",
+        "android.hardware.identity-V5-ndk",
     ],
 }
 
 cc_defaults {
     name: "identity_use_latest_hal_aidl_ndk_shared",
     shared_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.identity-V4-ndk",
+        "android.hardware.identity-V5-ndk",
     ],
 }
 
 cc_defaults {
     name: "identity_use_latest_hal_aidl_cpp_static",
     static_libs: [
-        "android.hardware.identity-V4-cpp",
+        "android.hardware.identity-V5-cpp",
     ],
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index 5065641..4f2fe0b 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.identity/current/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -51,4 +51,5 @@
   byte[] deleteCredentialWithChallenge(in byte[] challenge);
   byte[] proveOwnership(in byte[] challenge);
   android.hardware.identity.IWritableIdentityCredential updateCredential();
+  @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"}) void finishRetrievalWithSignature(out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces, out byte[] ecdsaSignature);
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
index 82b0a83..abdb00b 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IIdentityCredential.aidl
@@ -194,7 +194,8 @@
      * is permissible for this to be empty in which case the readerSignature parameter
      * must also be empty. If this is not the case, the call fails with STATUS_FAILED.
      *
-     * If the SessionTranscript CBOR is not empty, the X and Y coordinates of the public
+     * If mdoc session encryption is used (e.g. createEphemeralKeyPair() has been called)
+     * and the SessionTranscript CBOR is not empty, the X and Y coordinates of the public
      * part of the key-pair previously generated by createEphemeralKeyPair() must appear
      * somewhere in the bytes of the CBOR. Each of these coordinates must appear encoded
      * with the most significant bits first and use the exact amount of bits indicated by
@@ -239,8 +240,8 @@
      *   and remove the corresponding requests from the counts.
      */
     void startRetrieval(in SecureAccessControlProfile[] accessControlProfiles,
-        in HardwareAuthToken authToken, in byte[] itemsRequest, in byte[] signingKeyBlob,
-        in byte[] sessionTranscript, in byte[] readerSignature, in int[] requestCounts);
+            in HardwareAuthToken authToken, in byte[] itemsRequest, in byte[] signingKeyBlob,
+            in byte[] sessionTranscript, in byte[] readerSignature, in int[] requestCounts);
 
     /**
      * Starts retrieving an entry, subject to access control requirements.  Entries must be
@@ -271,8 +272,8 @@
      *     is given and this profile wasn't passed to startRetrieval() this call fails
      *     with STATUS_INVALID_DATA.
      */
-    void startRetrieveEntryValue(in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace, in @utf8InCpp String name,
-                                 in int entrySize, in int[] accessControlProfileIds);
+    void startRetrieveEntryValue(in @utf8InCpp String nameSpace,
+            in @utf8InCpp String name, in int entrySize, in int[] accessControlProfileIds);
 
     /**
      * Retrieves an entry value, or part of one, if the entry value is larger than gcmChunkSize.
@@ -293,11 +294,13 @@
      * returned data.
      *
      * If signingKeyBlob or the sessionTranscript parameter passed to startRetrieval() is
-     * empty then the returned MAC will be empty.
+     * empty or if mdoc session encryption is not being used (e.g. if createEphemeralKeyPair()
+     * was not called) then the returned MAC will be empty.
      *
-     * @param out mac is empty if signingKeyBlob or the sessionTranscript passed to
-     *    startRetrieval() is empty. Otherwise it is a COSE_Mac0 with empty payload
-     *    and the detached content is set to DeviceAuthenticationBytes as defined below.
+     * @param out mac is empty if signingKeyBlob, or the sessionTranscript passed to
+     *    startRetrieval() is empty, or if mdoc session encryption is not being used (e.g. if
+     *    createEphemeralKeyPair() was not called). Otherwise it is a COSE_Mac0 with empty
+     *    payload and the detached content is set to DeviceAuthenticationBytes as defined below.
      *    This code is produced by using the key agreement and key derivation function
      *    from the ciphersuite with the authentication private key and the reader
      *    ephemeral public key to compute a shared message authentication code (MAC)
@@ -407,13 +410,13 @@
      */
     void setRequestedNamespaces(in RequestNamespace[] requestNamespaces);
 
-   /**
-    * Sets the VerificationToken. This method must be called before startRetrieval() is
-    * called. This token uses the same challenge as returned by createAuthChallenge().
-    *
-    * @param verificationToken
-    *   The verification token. This token is only valid if the timestamp field is non-zero.
-    */
+    /**
+     * Sets the VerificationToken. This method must be called before startRetrieval() is
+     * called. This token uses the same challenge as returned by createAuthChallenge().
+     *
+     * @param verificationToken
+     *   The verification token. This token is only valid if the timestamp field is non-zero.
+     */
     void setVerificationToken(in VerificationToken verificationToken);
 
     /**
@@ -485,4 +488,20 @@
      * @return an IWritableIdentityCredential
      */
     IWritableIdentityCredential updateCredential();
+
+    /**
+     * Like finishRetrieval() but also returns an ECDSA signature in addition to the MAC.
+     *
+     * See section 9.1.3.6 of ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021 for details of how the signature is calculated.
+     *
+     * Unlike MACing, an ECDSA signature will be returned even if mdoc session encryption isn't
+     * being used.
+     *
+     * This method was introduced in API version 5.
+     *
+     * @param ecdsaSignature a COSE_Sign1 signature described above.
+     */
+    @SuppressWarnings(value={"out-array"})
+    void finishRetrievalWithSignature(
+            out byte[] mac, out byte[] deviceNameSpaces, out byte[] ecdsaSignature);
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IPresentationSession.aidl b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IPresentationSession.aidl
index b0449f0..0a06740 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IPresentationSession.aidl
+++ b/identity/aidl/android/hardware/identity/IPresentationSession.aidl
@@ -70,6 +70,17 @@
      *
      * This can be empty but if it's non-empty it must be valid CBOR.
      *
+     * If mdoc session encryption is used (e.g. getEphemeralKeyPair() has been called)
+     * and the SessionTranscript CBOR is not empty, the X and Y coordinates of the public
+     * part of the key-pair previously generated by createEphemeralKeyPair() must appear
+     * somewhere in the bytes of the CBOR. Each of these coordinates must appear encoded
+     * with the most significant bits first and use the exact amount of bits indicated by
+     * the key size of the ephemeral keys. For example, if the ephemeral key is using the
+     * P-256 curve then the 32 bytes for the X coordinate encoded with the most significant
+     * bits first must appear somewhere in the CBOR and ditto for the 32 bytes for the Y
+     * coordinate. If this is not satisfied, the call fails with
+     * STATUS_EPHEMERAL_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_FOUND.
+     *
      * This method may only be called once per instance. If called more than once, STATUS_FAILED
      * must be returned.
      *
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.cpp
index 9b9a749..8551ab7 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.cpp
@@ -596,10 +596,10 @@
     return eicPresentationStartRetrieveEntries(&ctx_);
 }
 
-bool FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy::calcMacKey(
+bool FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy::prepareDeviceAuthentication(
         const vector<uint8_t>& sessionTranscript, const vector<uint8_t>& readerEphemeralPublicKey,
         const vector<uint8_t>& signingKeyBlob, const string& docType,
-        unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues, size_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize) {
+        unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues, size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize) {
     if (!validateId(__func__)) {
         return false;
     }
@@ -608,10 +608,10 @@
         eicDebug("Unexpected size %zd of signingKeyBlob, expected 60", signingKeyBlob.size());
         return false;
     }
-    return eicPresentationCalcMacKey(&ctx_, sessionTranscript.data(), sessionTranscript.size(),
-                                     readerEphemeralPublicKey.data(), signingKeyBlob.data(),
-                                     docType.c_str(), docType.size(), numNamespacesWithValues,
-                                     expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
+    return eicPresentationPrepareDeviceAuthentication(
+            &ctx_, sessionTranscript.data(), sessionTranscript.size(),
+            readerEphemeralPublicKey.data(), readerEphemeralPublicKey.size(), signingKeyBlob.data(),
+            docType.c_str(), docType.size(), numNamespacesWithValues, expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
 }
 
 AccessCheckResult FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy::startRetrieveEntryValue(
@@ -673,6 +673,25 @@
     return content;
 }
 
+optional<pair<vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>>>
+FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy::finishRetrievalWithSignature() {
+    if (!validateId(__func__)) {
+        return std::nullopt;
+    }
+
+    vector<uint8_t> mac(32);
+    size_t macSize = 32;
+    vector<uint8_t> ecdsaSignature(EIC_ECDSA_P256_SIGNATURE_SIZE);
+    size_t ecdsaSignatureSize = EIC_ECDSA_P256_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
+    if (!eicPresentationFinishRetrievalWithSignature(&ctx_, mac.data(), &macSize,
+                                                     ecdsaSignature.data(), &ecdsaSignatureSize)) {
+        return std::nullopt;
+    }
+    mac.resize(macSize);
+    ecdsaSignature.resize(ecdsaSignatureSize);
+    return std::make_pair(mac, ecdsaSignature);
+}
+
 optional<vector<uint8_t>> FakeSecureHardwarePresentationProxy::finishRetrieval() {
     if (!validateId(__func__)) {
         return std::nullopt;
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.h b/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.h
index 2512074..b56ab93 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/FakeSecureHardwareProxy.h
@@ -175,11 +175,11 @@
                                 const vector<uint8_t>& requestMessage, int coseSignAlg,
                                 const vector<uint8_t>& readerSignatureOfToBeSigned) override;
 
-    bool calcMacKey(const vector<uint8_t>& sessionTranscript,
-                    const vector<uint8_t>& readerEphemeralPublicKey,
-                    const vector<uint8_t>& signingKeyBlob, const string& docType,
-                    unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues,
-                    size_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize) override;
+    bool prepareDeviceAuthentication(const vector<uint8_t>& sessionTranscript,
+                                     const vector<uint8_t>& readerEphemeralPublicKey,
+                                     const vector<uint8_t>& signingKeyBlob, const string& docType,
+                                     unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues,
+                                     size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize) override;
 
     AccessCheckResult startRetrieveEntryValue(
             const string& nameSpace, const string& name, unsigned int newNamespaceNumEntries,
@@ -191,6 +191,8 @@
 
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> finishRetrieval() override;
 
+    optional<pair<vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>>> finishRetrievalWithSignature() override;
+
     optional<vector<uint8_t>> deleteCredential(const string& docType,
                                                const vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
                                                bool includeChallenge,
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.cpp
index ff80752..4c3b7b2 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.cpp
@@ -457,17 +457,16 @@
     }
 
     if (session_) {
-        // If presenting in a session, the TA has already done this check.
-
+        // If presenting in a session, the TA has already done the check for (X, Y) as done
+        // below, see eicSessionSetSessionTranscript().
     } else {
-        // To prevent replay-attacks, we check that the public part of the ephemeral
-        // key we previously created, is present in the DeviceEngagement part of
-        // SessionTranscript as a COSE_Key, in uncompressed form.
+        // If mdoc session encryption is in use, check that the
+        // public part of the ephemeral key we previously created, is
+        // present in the DeviceEngagement part of SessionTranscript
+        // as a COSE_Key, in uncompressed form.
         //
         // We do this by just searching for the X and Y coordinates.
-        //
-        // Would be nice to move this check to the TA.
-        if (sessionTranscript.size() > 0) {
+        if (sessionTranscript.size() > 0 && ephemeralPublicKey_.size() > 0) {
             auto [getXYSuccess, ePubX, ePubY] = support::ecPublicKeyGetXandY(ephemeralPublicKey_);
             if (!getXYSuccess) {
                 return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
@@ -608,33 +607,36 @@
     // Finally, pass info so the HMAC key can be derived and the TA can start
     // creating the DeviceNameSpaces CBOR...
     if (!session_) {
-        if (sessionTranscript_.size() > 0 && readerPublicKey_.size() > 0 &&
-            signingKeyBlob.size() > 0) {
-            // We expect the reader ephemeral public key to be same size and curve
-            // as the ephemeral key we generated (e.g. P-256 key), otherwise ECDH
-            // won't work. So its length should be 65 bytes and it should be
-            // starting with 0x04.
-            if (readerPublicKey_.size() != 65 || readerPublicKey_[0] != 0x04) {
-                return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
-                        IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED,
-                        "Reader public key is not in expected format"));
+        if (sessionTranscript_.size() > 0 && signingKeyBlob.size() > 0) {
+            vector<uint8_t> eReaderKeyP256;
+            if (readerPublicKey_.size() > 0) {
+                // If set, we expect the reader ephemeral public key to be same size and curve
+                // as the ephemeral key we generated (e.g. P-256 key), otherwise ECDH won't
+                // work. So its length should be 65 bytes and it should be starting with 0x04.
+                if (readerPublicKey_.size() != 65 || readerPublicKey_[0] != 0x04) {
+                    return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+                            IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED,
+                            "Reader public key is not in expected format"));
+                }
+                eReaderKeyP256 =
+                        vector<uint8_t>(readerPublicKey_.begin() + 1, readerPublicKey_.end());
             }
-            vector<uint8_t> pubKeyP256(readerPublicKey_.begin() + 1, readerPublicKey_.end());
-            if (!hwProxy_->calcMacKey(sessionTranscript_, pubKeyP256, signingKeyBlob, docType_,
-                                      numNamespacesWithValues, expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_)) {
+            if (!hwProxy_->prepareDeviceAuthentication(
+                        sessionTranscript_, eReaderKeyP256, signingKeyBlob, docType_,
+                        numNamespacesWithValues, expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_)) {
                 return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
                         IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED,
                         "Error starting retrieving entries"));
             }
         }
     } else {
-        if (session_->getSessionTranscript().size() > 0 &&
-            session_->getReaderEphemeralPublicKey().size() > 0 && signingKeyBlob.size() > 0) {
+        if (session_->getSessionTranscript().size() > 0 && signingKeyBlob.size() > 0) {
             // Don't actually pass the reader ephemeral public key in, the TA will get
             // it from the session object.
             //
-            if (!hwProxy_->calcMacKey(sessionTranscript_, {}, signingKeyBlob, docType_,
-                                      numNamespacesWithValues, expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_)) {
+            if (!hwProxy_->prepareDeviceAuthentication(sessionTranscript_, {}, signingKeyBlob,
+                                                       docType_, numNamespacesWithValues,
+                                                       expectedDeviceNameSpacesSize_)) {
                 return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
                         IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED,
                         "Error starting retrieving entries"));
@@ -924,8 +926,9 @@
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
-ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::finishRetrieval(vector<uint8_t>* outMac,
-                                                       vector<uint8_t>* outDeviceNameSpaces) {
+ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::finishRetrievalWithSignature(
+        vector<uint8_t>* outMac, vector<uint8_t>* outDeviceNameSpaces,
+        vector<uint8_t>* outEcdsaSignature) {
     ndk::ScopedAStatus status = ensureHwProxy();
     if (!status.isOk()) {
         return status;
@@ -948,17 +951,34 @@
                         .c_str()));
     }
 
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> digestToBeMaced;
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> signatureToBeSigned;
+
+    // This relies on the fact that binder calls never pass a nullptr
+    // for out parameters. Hence if it's null here we know this was
+    // called from finishRetrieval() below.
+    if (outEcdsaSignature == nullptr) {
+        digestToBeMaced = hwProxy_->finishRetrieval();
+        if (!digestToBeMaced) {
+            return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+                    IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
+                    "Error generating digestToBeMaced"));
+        }
+    } else {
+        auto macAndSignature = hwProxy_->finishRetrievalWithSignature();
+        if (!macAndSignature) {
+            return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+                    IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA,
+                    "Error generating digestToBeMaced and signatureToBeSigned"));
+        }
+        digestToBeMaced = macAndSignature->first;
+        signatureToBeSigned = macAndSignature->second;
+    }
+
     // If the TA calculated a MAC (it might not have), format it as a COSE_Mac0
     //
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> mac;
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> digestToBeMaced = hwProxy_->finishRetrieval();
-
-    // The MAC not being set means an error occurred.
-    if (!digestToBeMaced) {
-        return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
-                IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_INVALID_DATA, "Error generating digestToBeMaced"));
-    }
     // Size 0 means that the MAC isn't set. If it's set, it has to be 32 bytes.
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> mac;
     if (digestToBeMaced.value().size() != 0) {
         if (digestToBeMaced.value().size() != 32) {
             return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
@@ -967,12 +987,27 @@
         }
         mac = support::coseMacWithDigest(digestToBeMaced.value(), {} /* data */);
     }
-
     *outMac = mac.value_or(vector<uint8_t>({}));
+
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> signature;
+    if (signatureToBeSigned && signatureToBeSigned.value().size() != 0) {
+        signature = support::coseSignEcDsaWithSignature(signatureToBeSigned.value(), {},  // data
+                                                        {});  // certificateChain
+    }
+    if (outEcdsaSignature != nullptr) {
+        *outEcdsaSignature = signature.value_or(vector<uint8_t>({}));
+    }
+
     *outDeviceNameSpaces = encodedDeviceNameSpaces;
+
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
 
+ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::finishRetrieval(vector<uint8_t>* outMac,
+                                                       vector<uint8_t>* outDeviceNameSpaces) {
+    return finishRetrievalWithSignature(outMac, outDeviceNameSpaces, nullptr);
+}
+
 ndk::ScopedAStatus IdentityCredential::generateSigningKeyPair(
         vector<uint8_t>* outSigningKeyBlob, Certificate* outSigningKeyCertificate) {
     if (session_) {
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.h b/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.h
index 5929829..1e0cd64 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/common/IdentityCredential.h
@@ -92,6 +92,10 @@
     ndk::ScopedAStatus updateCredential(
             shared_ptr<IWritableIdentityCredential>* outWritableCredential) override;
 
+    ndk::ScopedAStatus finishRetrievalWithSignature(vector<uint8_t>* outMac,
+                                                    vector<uint8_t>* outDeviceNameSpaces,
+                                                    vector<uint8_t>* outEcdsaSignature) override;
+
   private:
     ndk::ScopedAStatus deleteCredentialCommon(const vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
                                               bool includeChallenge,
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.cpp b/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.cpp
index 2eb7f2e..cf5b066 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.cpp
@@ -54,19 +54,6 @@
     }
     id_ = id.value();
 
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> ephemeralKeyPriv = hwProxy_->getEphemeralKeyPair();
-    if (!ephemeralKeyPriv) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << "Error getting ephemeral private key for session";
-        return IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED;
-    }
-    optional<vector<uint8_t>> ephemeralKeyPair =
-            support::ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(ephemeralKeyPriv.value());
-    if (!ephemeralKeyPair) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << "Error creating ephemeral key-pair";
-        return IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED;
-    }
-    ephemeralKeyPair_ = ephemeralKeyPair.value();
-
     optional<uint64_t> authChallenge = hwProxy_->getAuthChallenge();
     if (!authChallenge) {
         LOG(ERROR) << "Error getting authChallenge for session";
@@ -78,6 +65,23 @@
 }
 
 ndk::ScopedAStatus PresentationSession::getEphemeralKeyPair(vector<uint8_t>* outKeyPair) {
+    if (ephemeralKeyPair_.size() == 0) {
+        optional<vector<uint8_t>> ephemeralKeyPriv = hwProxy_->getEphemeralKeyPair();
+        if (!ephemeralKeyPriv) {
+            LOG(ERROR) << "Error getting ephemeral private key for session";
+            return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+                    IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED,
+                    "Error getting ephemeral private key for session"));
+        }
+        optional<vector<uint8_t>> ephemeralKeyPair =
+                support::ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(ephemeralKeyPriv.value());
+        if (!ephemeralKeyPair) {
+            LOG(ERROR) << "Error creating ephemeral key-pair";
+            return ndk::ScopedAStatus(AStatus_fromServiceSpecificErrorWithMessage(
+                    IIdentityCredentialStore::STATUS_FAILED, "Error creating ephemeral key-pair"));
+        }
+        ephemeralKeyPair_ = ephemeralKeyPair.value();
+    }
     *outKeyPair = ephemeralKeyPair_;
     return ndk::ScopedAStatus::ok();
 }
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.h b/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.h
index 4cb174a..b3d46f9 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/common/PresentationSession.h
@@ -72,9 +72,11 @@
 
     // Set by initialize()
     uint64_t id_;
-    vector<uint8_t> ephemeralKeyPair_;
     uint64_t authChallenge_;
 
+    // Set by getEphemeralKeyPair()
+    vector<uint8_t> ephemeralKeyPair_;
+
     // Set by setReaderEphemeralPublicKey()
     vector<uint8_t> readerPublicKey_;
 
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/common/SecureHardwareProxy.h b/identity/aidl/default/common/SecureHardwareProxy.h
index 9f63ad8..6463318 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/common/SecureHardwareProxy.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/common/SecureHardwareProxy.h
@@ -194,11 +194,12 @@
                                         const vector<uint8_t>& requestMessage, int coseSignAlg,
                                         const vector<uint8_t>& readerSignatureOfToBeSigned) = 0;
 
-    virtual bool calcMacKey(const vector<uint8_t>& sessionTranscript,
-                            const vector<uint8_t>& readerEphemeralPublicKey,
-                            const vector<uint8_t>& signingKeyBlob, const string& docType,
-                            unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues,
-                            size_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize) = 0;
+    virtual bool prepareDeviceAuthentication(const vector<uint8_t>& sessionTranscript,
+                                             const vector<uint8_t>& readerEphemeralPublicKey,
+                                             const vector<uint8_t>& signingKeyBlob,
+                                             const string& docType,
+                                             unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues,
+                                             size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize) = 0;
 
     virtual AccessCheckResult startRetrieveEntryValue(
             const string& nameSpace, const string& name, unsigned int newNamespaceNumEntries,
@@ -209,6 +210,7 @@
             const vector<int32_t>& accessControlProfileIds) = 0;
 
     virtual optional<vector<uint8_t>> finishRetrieval();
+    virtual optional<pair<vector<uint8_t>, vector<uint8_t>>> finishRetrievalWithSignature();
 
     virtual optional<vector<uint8_t>> deleteCredential(const string& docType,
                                                        const vector<uint8_t>& challenge,
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/identity-default.xml b/identity/aidl/default/identity-default.xml
index cc0ddc7..d0d43af 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/identity-default.xml
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/identity-default.xml
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 <manifest version="1.0" type="device">
     <hal format="aidl">
         <name>android.hardware.identity</name>
-        <version>4</version>
+        <version>5</version>
         <interface>
             <name>IIdentityCredentialStore</name>
             <instance>default</instance>
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
index 104a559..23fd0b3 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.c
@@ -557,87 +557,11 @@
     return true;
 }
 
-bool eicPresentationCalcMacKey(EicPresentation* ctx, const uint8_t* sessionTranscript,
-                               size_t sessionTranscriptSize,
-                               const uint8_t readerEphemeralPublicKey[EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE],
-                               const uint8_t signingKeyBlob[60], const char* docType,
-                               size_t docTypeLength, unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues,
-                               size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize) {
-    if (ctx->sessionId != 0) {
-        EicSession* session = eicSessionGetForId(ctx->sessionId);
-        if (session == NULL) {
-            eicDebug("Error looking up session for sessionId %" PRIu32, ctx->sessionId);
-            return false;
-        }
-        EicSha256Ctx sha256;
-        uint8_t sessionTranscriptSha256[EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
-        eicOpsSha256Init(&sha256);
-        eicOpsSha256Update(&sha256, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize);
-        eicOpsSha256Final(&sha256, sessionTranscriptSha256);
-        if (eicCryptoMemCmp(sessionTranscriptSha256, session->sessionTranscriptSha256,
-                            EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0) {
-            eicDebug("SessionTranscript mismatch");
-            return false;
-        }
-        readerEphemeralPublicKey = session->readerEphemeralPublicKey;
-    }
-
-    uint8_t signingKeyPriv[EIC_P256_PRIV_KEY_SIZE];
-    if (!eicOpsDecryptAes128Gcm(ctx->storageKey, signingKeyBlob, 60, (const uint8_t*)docType,
-                                docTypeLength, signingKeyPriv)) {
-        eicDebug("Error decrypting signingKeyBlob");
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    uint8_t sharedSecret[EIC_P256_COORDINATE_SIZE];
-    if (!eicOpsEcdh(readerEphemeralPublicKey, signingKeyPriv, sharedSecret)) {
-        eicDebug("ECDH failed");
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    EicCbor cbor;
-    eicCborInit(&cbor, NULL, 0);
-    eicCborAppendSemantic(&cbor, EIC_CBOR_SEMANTIC_TAG_ENCODED_CBOR);
-    eicCborAppendByteString(&cbor, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize);
-    uint8_t salt[EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
-    eicCborFinal(&cbor, salt);
-
-    const uint8_t info[7] = {'E', 'M', 'a', 'c', 'K', 'e', 'y'};
-    uint8_t derivedKey[32];
-    if (!eicOpsHkdf(sharedSecret, EIC_P256_COORDINATE_SIZE, salt, sizeof(salt), info, sizeof(info),
-                    derivedKey, sizeof(derivedKey))) {
-        eicDebug("HKDF failed");
-        return false;
-    }
-
-    eicCborInitHmacSha256(&ctx->cbor, NULL, 0, derivedKey, sizeof(derivedKey));
-    ctx->buildCbor = true;
-
-    // What we're going to calculate the HMAC-SHA256 is the COSE ToBeMaced
-    // structure which looks like the following:
-    //
-    // MAC_structure = [
-    //   context : "MAC" / "MAC0",
-    //   protected : empty_or_serialized_map,
-    //   external_aad : bstr,
-    //   payload : bstr
-    // ]
-    //
-    eicCborAppendArray(&ctx->cbor, 4);
-    eicCborAppendStringZ(&ctx->cbor, "MAC0");
-
-    // The COSE Encoded protected headers is just a single field with
-    // COSE_LABEL_ALG (1) -> COSE_ALG_HMAC_256_256 (5). For simplicitly we just
-    // hard-code the CBOR encoding:
-    static const uint8_t coseEncodedProtectedHeaders[] = {0xa1, 0x01, 0x05};
-    eicCborAppendByteString(&ctx->cbor, coseEncodedProtectedHeaders,
-                            sizeof(coseEncodedProtectedHeaders));
-
-    // We currently don't support Externally Supplied Data (RFC 8152 section 4.3)
-    // so external_aad is the empty bstr
-    static const uint8_t externalAad[0] = {};
-    eicCborAppendByteString(&ctx->cbor, externalAad, sizeof(externalAad));
-
+// Helper used to append the DeviceAuthencation prelude, used for both MACing and ECDSA signing.
+static size_t appendDeviceAuthentication(EicCbor* cbor, const uint8_t* sessionTranscript,
+                                         size_t sessionTranscriptSize, const char* docType,
+                                         size_t docTypeLength,
+                                         size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize) {
     // For the payload, the _encoded_ form follows here. We handle this by simply
     // opening a bstr, and then writing the CBOR. This requires us to know the
     // size of said bstr, ahead of time... the CBOR to be written is
@@ -674,26 +598,148 @@
     dabCalculatedSize += calculatedSize;
 
     // Begin the bytestring for DeviceAuthenticationBytes;
-    eicCborBegin(&ctx->cbor, EIC_CBOR_MAJOR_TYPE_BYTE_STRING, dabCalculatedSize);
+    eicCborBegin(cbor, EIC_CBOR_MAJOR_TYPE_BYTE_STRING, dabCalculatedSize);
 
-    eicCborAppendSemantic(&ctx->cbor, EIC_CBOR_SEMANTIC_TAG_ENCODED_CBOR);
+    eicCborAppendSemantic(cbor, EIC_CBOR_SEMANTIC_TAG_ENCODED_CBOR);
 
     // Begins the bytestring for DeviceAuthentication;
-    eicCborBegin(&ctx->cbor, EIC_CBOR_MAJOR_TYPE_BYTE_STRING, calculatedSize);
+    eicCborBegin(cbor, EIC_CBOR_MAJOR_TYPE_BYTE_STRING, calculatedSize);
 
-    eicCborAppendArray(&ctx->cbor, 4);
-    eicCborAppendStringZ(&ctx->cbor, "DeviceAuthentication");
-    eicCborAppend(&ctx->cbor, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize);
-    eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cbor, docType, docTypeLength);
+    eicCborAppendArray(cbor, 4);
+    eicCborAppendStringZ(cbor, "DeviceAuthentication");
+    eicCborAppend(cbor, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize);
+    eicCborAppendString(cbor, docType, docTypeLength);
 
     // For the payload, the _encoded_ form follows here. We handle this by simply
     // opening a bstr, and then writing the CBOR. This requires us to know the
     // size of said bstr, ahead of time.
-    eicCborAppendSemantic(&ctx->cbor, EIC_CBOR_SEMANTIC_TAG_ENCODED_CBOR);
-    eicCborBegin(&ctx->cbor, EIC_CBOR_MAJOR_TYPE_BYTE_STRING, expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
-    ctx->expectedCborSizeAtEnd = expectedDeviceNamespacesSize + ctx->cbor.size;
+    eicCborAppendSemantic(cbor, EIC_CBOR_SEMANTIC_TAG_ENCODED_CBOR);
+    eicCborBegin(cbor, EIC_CBOR_MAJOR_TYPE_BYTE_STRING, expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
+    size_t expectedCborSizeAtEnd = expectedDeviceNamespacesSize + cbor->size;
 
-    eicCborAppendMap(&ctx->cbor, numNamespacesWithValues);
+    return expectedCborSizeAtEnd;
+}
+
+bool eicPresentationPrepareDeviceAuthentication(
+        EicPresentation* ctx, const uint8_t* sessionTranscript, size_t sessionTranscriptSize,
+        const uint8_t* readerEphemeralPublicKey, size_t readerEphemeralPublicKeySize,
+        const uint8_t signingKeyBlob[60], const char* docType, size_t docTypeLength,
+        unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues, size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize) {
+    if (ctx->sessionId != 0) {
+        if (readerEphemeralPublicKeySize != 0) {
+            eicDebug("In a session but readerEphemeralPublicKeySize is non-zero");
+            return false;
+        }
+        EicSession* session = eicSessionGetForId(ctx->sessionId);
+        if (session == NULL) {
+            eicDebug("Error looking up session for sessionId %" PRIu32, ctx->sessionId);
+            return false;
+        }
+        EicSha256Ctx sha256;
+        uint8_t sessionTranscriptSha256[EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+        eicOpsSha256Init(&sha256);
+        eicOpsSha256Update(&sha256, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize);
+        eicOpsSha256Final(&sha256, sessionTranscriptSha256);
+        if (eicCryptoMemCmp(sessionTranscriptSha256, session->sessionTranscriptSha256,
+                            EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE) != 0) {
+            eicDebug("SessionTranscript mismatch");
+            return false;
+        }
+        readerEphemeralPublicKey = session->readerEphemeralPublicKey;
+        readerEphemeralPublicKeySize = session->readerEphemeralPublicKeySize;
+    }
+
+    // Stash the decrypted DeviceKey in context since we'll need it later in
+    // eicPresentationFinishRetrievalWithSignature()
+    if (!eicOpsDecryptAes128Gcm(ctx->storageKey, signingKeyBlob, 60, (const uint8_t*)docType,
+                                docTypeLength, ctx->deviceKeyPriv)) {
+        eicDebug("Error decrypting signingKeyBlob");
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // We can only do MACing if EReaderKey has been set... it might not have been set if for
+    // example mdoc session encryption isn't in use. In that case we can still do ECDSA
+    if (readerEphemeralPublicKeySize > 0) {
+        if (readerEphemeralPublicKeySize != EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE) {
+            eicDebug("Unexpected size %zd for readerEphemeralPublicKeySize",
+                     readerEphemeralPublicKeySize);
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        uint8_t sharedSecret[EIC_P256_COORDINATE_SIZE];
+        if (!eicOpsEcdh(readerEphemeralPublicKey, ctx->deviceKeyPriv, sharedSecret)) {
+            eicDebug("ECDH failed");
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        EicCbor cbor;
+        eicCborInit(&cbor, NULL, 0);
+        eicCborAppendSemantic(&cbor, EIC_CBOR_SEMANTIC_TAG_ENCODED_CBOR);
+        eicCborAppendByteString(&cbor, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize);
+        uint8_t salt[EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+        eicCborFinal(&cbor, salt);
+
+        const uint8_t info[7] = {'E', 'M', 'a', 'c', 'K', 'e', 'y'};
+        uint8_t derivedKey[32];
+        if (!eicOpsHkdf(sharedSecret, EIC_P256_COORDINATE_SIZE, salt, sizeof(salt), info,
+                        sizeof(info), derivedKey, sizeof(derivedKey))) {
+            eicDebug("HKDF failed");
+            return false;
+        }
+
+        eicCborInitHmacSha256(&ctx->cbor, NULL, 0, derivedKey, sizeof(derivedKey));
+
+        // What we're going to calculate the HMAC-SHA256 is the COSE ToBeMaced
+        // structure which looks like the following:
+        //
+        // MAC_structure = [
+        //   context : "MAC" / "MAC0",
+        //   protected : empty_or_serialized_map,
+        //   external_aad : bstr,
+        //   payload : bstr
+        // ]
+        //
+        eicCborAppendArray(&ctx->cbor, 4);
+        eicCborAppendStringZ(&ctx->cbor, "MAC0");
+
+        // The COSE Encoded protected headers is just a single field with
+        // COSE_LABEL_ALG (1) -> COSE_ALG_HMAC_256_256 (5). For simplicitly we just
+        // hard-code the CBOR encoding:
+        static const uint8_t coseEncodedProtectedHeaders[] = {0xa1, 0x01, 0x05};
+        eicCborAppendByteString(&ctx->cbor, coseEncodedProtectedHeaders,
+                                sizeof(coseEncodedProtectedHeaders));
+
+        // We currently don't support Externally Supplied Data (RFC 8152 section 4.3)
+        // so external_aad is the empty bstr
+        static const uint8_t externalAad[0] = {};
+        eicCborAppendByteString(&ctx->cbor, externalAad, sizeof(externalAad));
+
+        // Append DeviceAuthentication prelude and open the DeviceSigned map...
+        ctx->expectedCborSizeAtEnd =
+                appendDeviceAuthentication(&ctx->cbor, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize,
+                                           docType, docTypeLength, expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
+        eicCborAppendMap(&ctx->cbor, numNamespacesWithValues);
+        ctx->buildCbor = true;
+    }
+
+    // Now do the same for ECDSA signatures...
+    //
+    eicCborInit(&ctx->cborEcdsa, NULL, 0);
+    eicCborAppendArray(&ctx->cborEcdsa, 4);
+    eicCborAppendStringZ(&ctx->cborEcdsa, "Signature1");
+    static const uint8_t coseEncodedProtectedHeadersEcdsa[] = {0xa1, 0x01, 0x26};
+    eicCborAppendByteString(&ctx->cborEcdsa, coseEncodedProtectedHeadersEcdsa,
+                            sizeof(coseEncodedProtectedHeadersEcdsa));
+    static const uint8_t externalAadEcdsa[0] = {};
+    eicCborAppendByteString(&ctx->cborEcdsa, externalAadEcdsa, sizeof(externalAadEcdsa));
+
+    // Append DeviceAuthentication prelude and open the DeviceSigned map...
+    ctx->expectedCborEcdsaSizeAtEnd =
+            appendDeviceAuthentication(&ctx->cborEcdsa, sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize,
+                                       docType, docTypeLength, expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
+    eicCborAppendMap(&ctx->cborEcdsa, numNamespacesWithValues);
+    ctx->buildCborEcdsa = true;
+
     return true;
 }
 
@@ -702,6 +748,7 @@
     // state objects here.
     ctx->requestMessageValidated = false;
     ctx->buildCbor = false;
+    ctx->buildCborEcdsa = false;
     ctx->accessControlProfileMaskValidated = 0;
     ctx->accessControlProfileMaskUsesReaderAuth = 0;
     ctx->accessControlProfileMaskFailedReaderAuth = 0;
@@ -724,6 +771,9 @@
     if (newNamespaceNumEntries > 0) {
         eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cbor, nameSpace, nameSpaceLength);
         eicCborAppendMap(&ctx->cbor, newNamespaceNumEntries);
+
+        eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cborEcdsa, nameSpace, nameSpaceLength);
+        eicCborAppendMap(&ctx->cborEcdsa, newNamespaceNumEntries);
     }
 
     // We'll need to calc and store a digest of additionalData to check that it's the same
@@ -778,6 +828,7 @@
 
     if (result == EIC_ACCESS_CHECK_RESULT_OK) {
         eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cbor, name, nameLength);
+        eicCborAppendString(&ctx->cborEcdsa, name, nameLength);
         ctx->accessCheckOk = true;
     }
     return result;
@@ -821,6 +872,7 @@
     }
 
     eicCborAppend(&ctx->cbor, content, encryptedContentSize - 28);
+    eicCborAppend(&ctx->cborEcdsa, content, encryptedContentSize - 28);
 
     return true;
 }
@@ -842,6 +894,40 @@
         return false;
     }
     eicCborFinal(&ctx->cbor, digestToBeMaced);
+
+    return true;
+}
+
+bool eicPresentationFinishRetrievalWithSignature(EicPresentation* ctx, uint8_t* digestToBeMaced,
+                                                 size_t* digestToBeMacedSize,
+                                                 uint8_t* signatureOfToBeSigned,
+                                                 size_t* signatureOfToBeSignedSize) {
+    if (!eicPresentationFinishRetrieval(ctx, digestToBeMaced, digestToBeMacedSize)) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    if (!ctx->buildCborEcdsa) {
+        *signatureOfToBeSignedSize = 0;
+        return true;
+    }
+    if (*signatureOfToBeSignedSize != EIC_ECDSA_P256_SIGNATURE_SIZE) {
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // This verifies that the correct expectedDeviceNamespacesSize value was
+    // passed in at eicPresentationCalcMacKey() time.
+    if (ctx->cborEcdsa.size != ctx->expectedCborEcdsaSizeAtEnd) {
+        eicDebug("CBOR ECDSA size is %zd, was expecting %zd", ctx->cborEcdsa.size,
+                 ctx->expectedCborEcdsaSizeAtEnd);
+        return false;
+    }
+    uint8_t cborSha256[EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
+    eicCborFinal(&ctx->cborEcdsa, cborSha256);
+    if (!eicOpsEcDsa(ctx->deviceKeyPriv, cborSha256, signatureOfToBeSigned)) {
+        eicDebug("Error signing DeviceAuthentication");
+        return false;
+    }
+    eicDebug("set the signature");
     return true;
 }
 
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
index a031890..cd3162a 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicPresentation.h
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
     // aren't.
     bool requestMessageValidated;
     bool buildCbor;
+    bool buildCborEcdsa;
 
     // Set to true initialized as a test credential.
     bool testCredential;
@@ -101,6 +102,12 @@
 
     size_t expectedCborSizeAtEnd;
     EicCbor cbor;
+
+    // The selected DeviceKey / AuthKey
+    uint8_t deviceKeyPriv[EIC_P256_PRIV_KEY_SIZE];
+
+    EicCbor cborEcdsa;
+    size_t expectedCborEcdsaSizeAtEnd;
 } EicPresentation;
 
 // If sessionId is zero (EIC_PRESENTATION_ID_UNSET), the presentation object is not associated
@@ -214,14 +221,13 @@
     EIC_ACCESS_CHECK_RESULT_READER_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED,
 } EicAccessCheckResult;
 
-// Passes enough information to calculate the MACing key
+// Passes enough information to calculate the MACing key and/or prepare ECDSA signing
 //
-bool eicPresentationCalcMacKey(EicPresentation* ctx, const uint8_t* sessionTranscript,
-                               size_t sessionTranscriptSize,
-                               const uint8_t readerEphemeralPublicKey[EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE],
-                               const uint8_t signingKeyBlob[60], const char* docType,
-                               size_t docTypeLength, unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues,
-                               size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
+bool eicPresentationPrepareDeviceAuthentication(
+        EicPresentation* ctx, const uint8_t* sessionTranscript, size_t sessionTranscriptSize,
+        const uint8_t* readerEphemeralPublicKey, size_t readerEphemeralPublicKeySize,
+        const uint8_t signingKeyBlob[60], const char* docType, size_t docTypeLength,
+        unsigned int numNamespacesWithValues, size_t expectedDeviceNamespacesSize);
 
 // The scratchSpace should be set to a buffer at least 512 bytes (ideally 1024
 // bytes, the bigger the better). It's done this way to avoid allocating stack
@@ -253,6 +259,13 @@
 bool eicPresentationFinishRetrieval(EicPresentation* ctx, uint8_t* digestToBeMaced,
                                     size_t* digestToBeMacedSize);
 
+// Like eicPresentationFinishRetrieval() but also returns an ECDSA signature.
+//
+bool eicPresentationFinishRetrievalWithSignature(EicPresentation* ctx, uint8_t* digestToBeMaced,
+                                                 size_t* digestToBeMacedSize,
+                                                 uint8_t* signatureOfToBeSigned,
+                                                 size_t* signatureOfToBeSignedSize);
+
 // The data returned in |signatureOfToBeSigned| contains the ECDSA signature of
 // the ToBeSigned CBOR from RFC 8051 "4.4. Signing and Verification Process"
 // where content is set to the ProofOfDeletion CBOR.
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.c b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.c
index d0c7a0d..e44fa68 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.c
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.c
@@ -84,30 +84,35 @@
 bool eicSessionGetEphemeralKeyPair(EicSession* ctx,
                                    uint8_t ephemeralPrivateKey[EIC_P256_PRIV_KEY_SIZE]) {
     eicMemCpy(ephemeralPrivateKey, ctx->ephemeralPrivateKey, EIC_P256_PRIV_KEY_SIZE);
+    ctx->getEphemeralKeyPairCalled = true;
     return true;
 }
 
 bool eicSessionSetReaderEphemeralPublicKey(
         EicSession* ctx, const uint8_t readerEphemeralPublicKey[EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE]) {
     eicMemCpy(ctx->readerEphemeralPublicKey, readerEphemeralPublicKey, EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE);
+    ctx->readerEphemeralPublicKeySize = EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE;
     return true;
 }
 
 bool eicSessionSetSessionTranscript(EicSession* ctx, const uint8_t* sessionTranscript,
                                     size_t sessionTranscriptSize) {
-    // Only accept the SessionTranscript if X and Y from the ephemeral key
-    // we created is somewhere in SessionTranscript...
+    // If mdoc session encryption is in use, only accept the
+    // SessionTranscript if X and Y from the ephemeral key we created
+    // is somewhere in SessionTranscript...
     //
-    if (eicMemMem(sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize, ctx->ephemeralPublicKey,
-                  EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE / 2) == NULL) {
-        eicDebug("Error finding X from ephemeralPublicKey in sessionTranscript");
-        return false;
-    }
-    if (eicMemMem(sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize,
-                  ctx->ephemeralPublicKey + EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE / 2,
-                  EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE / 2) == NULL) {
-        eicDebug("Error finding Y from ephemeralPublicKey in sessionTranscript");
-        return false;
+    if (ctx->getEphemeralKeyPairCalled) {
+        if (eicMemMem(sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize, ctx->ephemeralPublicKey,
+                      EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE / 2) == NULL) {
+            eicDebug("Error finding X from ephemeralPublicKey in sessionTranscript");
+            return false;
+        }
+        if (eicMemMem(sessionTranscript, sessionTranscriptSize,
+                      ctx->ephemeralPublicKey + EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE / 2,
+                      EIC_P256_PUB_KEY_SIZE / 2) == NULL) {
+            eicDebug("Error finding Y from ephemeralPublicKey in sessionTranscript");
+            return false;
+        }
     }
 
     // To save space we only store the SHA-256 of SessionTranscript
diff --git a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.h b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.h
index 0303dae..ae9babf 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.h
+++ b/identity/aidl/default/libeic/EicSession.h
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
     // A non-zero number unique for this EicSession instance
     uint32_t id;
 
+    // Set to true iff eicSessionGetEphemeralKeyPair() has been called.
+    bool getEphemeralKeyPairCalled;
+
     // The challenge generated at construction time by eicSessionInit().
     uint64_t authChallenge;
 
@@ -41,6 +44,7 @@
 
     uint8_t sessionTranscriptSha256[EIC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
 
+    size_t readerEphemeralPublicKeySize;
 } EicSession;
 
 bool eicSessionInit(EicSession* ctx);
diff --git a/identity/aidl/vts/EndToEndTests.cpp b/identity/aidl/vts/EndToEndTests.cpp
index 67db915..ae9035b 100644
--- a/identity/aidl/vts/EndToEndTests.cpp
+++ b/identity/aidl/vts/EndToEndTests.cpp
@@ -441,8 +441,18 @@
     }
 
     vector<uint8_t> mac;
+    vector<uint8_t> ecdsaSignature;
     vector<uint8_t> deviceNameSpacesEncoded;
-    ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
+    // API version 5 (feature version 202301) returns both MAC and ECDSA signature.
+    if (halApiVersion_ >= 5) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(credential
+                            ->finishRetrievalWithSignature(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded,
+                                                           &ecdsaSignature)
+                            .isOk());
+        ASSERT_GT(ecdsaSignature.size(), 0);
+    } else {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
+    }
     cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(deviceNameSpacesEncoded, 32, {});
     ASSERT_EQ(
             "{\n"
@@ -475,6 +485,21 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(calculatedMac);
     EXPECT_EQ(mac, calculatedMac);
 
+    if (ecdsaSignature.size() > 0) {
+        vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceAuthentication =
+                cppbor::Array()
+                        .add("DeviceAuthentication")
+                        .add(sessionTranscript.clone())
+                        .add(docType)
+                        .add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceNameSpacesEncoded))
+                        .encode();
+        vector<uint8_t> deviceAuthenticationBytes =
+                cppbor::SemanticTag(24, encodedDeviceAuthentication).encode();
+        EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(ecdsaSignature,
+                                                     deviceAuthenticationBytes,  // Detached content
+                                                     signingPubKey.value()));
+    }
+
     // Also perform an additional empty request. This is what mDL applications
     // are envisioned to do - one call to get the data elements, another to get
     // an empty DeviceSignedItems and corresponding MAC.
@@ -486,7 +511,16 @@
                                 signingKeyBlob, sessionTranscriptEncoded, {},  // readerSignature,
                                 testEntriesEntryCounts)
                         .isOk());
-    ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
+    // API version 5 (feature version 202301) returns both MAC and ECDSA signature.
+    if (halApiVersion_ >= 5) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(credential
+                            ->finishRetrievalWithSignature(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded,
+                                                           &ecdsaSignature)
+                            .isOk());
+        ASSERT_GT(ecdsaSignature.size(), 0);
+    } else {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
+    }
     cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(deviceNameSpacesEncoded, 32, {});
     ASSERT_EQ("{}", cborPretty);
     // Calculate DeviceAuthentication and MAC (MACing key hasn't changed)
@@ -497,6 +531,21 @@
     ASSERT_TRUE(calculatedMac);
     EXPECT_EQ(mac, calculatedMac);
 
+    if (ecdsaSignature.size() > 0) {
+        vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceAuthentication =
+                cppbor::Array()
+                        .add("DeviceAuthentication")
+                        .add(sessionTranscript.clone())
+                        .add(docType)
+                        .add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceNameSpacesEncoded))
+                        .encode();
+        vector<uint8_t> deviceAuthenticationBytes =
+                cppbor::SemanticTag(24, encodedDeviceAuthentication).encode();
+        EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(ecdsaSignature,
+                                                     deviceAuthenticationBytes,  // Detached content
+                                                     signingPubKey.value()));
+    }
+
     // Some mDL apps might send a request but with a single empty
     // namespace. Check that too.
     RequestNamespace emptyRequestNS;
@@ -508,7 +557,16 @@
                                 signingKeyBlob, sessionTranscriptEncoded, {},  // readerSignature,
                                 testEntriesEntryCounts)
                         .isOk());
-    ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
+    // API version 5 (feature version 202301) returns both MAC and ECDSA signature.
+    if (halApiVersion_ >= 5) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(credential
+                            ->finishRetrievalWithSignature(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded,
+                                                           &ecdsaSignature)
+                            .isOk());
+        ASSERT_GT(ecdsaSignature.size(), 0);
+    } else {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(credential->finishRetrieval(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded).isOk());
+    }
     cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(deviceNameSpacesEncoded, 32, {});
     ASSERT_EQ("{}", cborPretty);
     // Calculate DeviceAuthentication and MAC (MACing key hasn't changed)
@@ -518,6 +576,248 @@
                                      eMacKey.value());            // EMacKey
     ASSERT_TRUE(calculatedMac);
     EXPECT_EQ(mac, calculatedMac);
+
+    if (ecdsaSignature.size() > 0) {
+        vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceAuthentication =
+                cppbor::Array()
+                        .add("DeviceAuthentication")
+                        .add(sessionTranscript.clone())
+                        .add(docType)
+                        .add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceNameSpacesEncoded))
+                        .encode();
+        vector<uint8_t> deviceAuthenticationBytes =
+                cppbor::SemanticTag(24, encodedDeviceAuthentication).encode();
+        EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(ecdsaSignature,
+                                                     deviceAuthenticationBytes,  // Detached content
+                                                     signingPubKey.value()));
+    }
+}
+
+TEST_P(EndToEndTests, noSessionEncryption) {
+    if (halApiVersion_ < 5) {
+        GTEST_SKIP() << "Need HAL API version 5, have " << halApiVersion_;
+    }
+
+    const vector<test_utils::TestProfile> testProfiles = {// Profile 0 (no authentication)
+                                                          {0, {}, false, 0}};
+
+    HardwareAuthToken authToken;
+    VerificationToken verificationToken;
+    authToken.challenge = 0;
+    authToken.userId = 0;
+    authToken.authenticatorId = 0;
+    authToken.authenticatorType = ::android::hardware::keymaster::HardwareAuthenticatorType::NONE;
+    authToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
+    authToken.mac.clear();
+    verificationToken.challenge = 0;
+    verificationToken.timestamp.milliSeconds = 0;
+    verificationToken.securityLevel = ::android::hardware::keymaster::SecurityLevel::SOFTWARE;
+    verificationToken.mac.clear();
+
+    // Here's the actual test data:
+    const vector<test_utils::TestEntryData> testEntries = {
+            {"PersonalData", "Last name", string("Turing"), vector<int32_t>{0}},
+            {"PersonalData", "Birth date", string("19120623"), vector<int32_t>{0}},
+            {"PersonalData", "First name", string("Alan"), vector<int32_t>{0}},
+    };
+    const vector<int32_t> testEntriesEntryCounts = {3};
+    HardwareInformation hwInfo;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_->getHardwareInformation(&hwInfo).isOk());
+
+    string cborPretty;
+    sp<IWritableIdentityCredential> writableCredential;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::setupWritableCredential(writableCredential, credentialStore_,
+                                                    true /* testCredential */));
+
+    string challenge = "attestationChallenge";
+    test_utils::AttestationData attData(writableCredential, challenge,
+                                        {1} /* atteestationApplicationId */);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(attData.result.isOk())
+            << attData.result.exceptionCode() << "; " << attData.result.exceptionMessage() << endl;
+
+    // This is kinda of a hack but we need to give the size of
+    // ProofOfProvisioning that we'll expect to receive.
+    const int32_t expectedProofOfProvisioningSize = 230;
+    // OK to fail, not available in v1 HAL
+    writableCredential->setExpectedProofOfProvisioningSize(expectedProofOfProvisioningSize);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+            writableCredential->startPersonalization(testProfiles.size(), testEntriesEntryCounts)
+                    .isOk());
+
+    optional<vector<SecureAccessControlProfile>> secureProfiles =
+            test_utils::addAccessControlProfiles(writableCredential, testProfiles);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(secureProfiles);
+
+    // Uses TestEntryData* pointer as key and values are the encrypted blobs. This
+    // is a little hacky but it works well enough.
+    map<const test_utils::TestEntryData*, vector<vector<uint8_t>>> encryptedBlobs;
+
+    for (const auto& entry : testEntries) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(test_utils::addEntry(writableCredential, entry, hwInfo.dataChunkSize,
+                                         encryptedBlobs, true));
+    }
+
+    vector<uint8_t> credentialData;
+    vector<uint8_t> proofOfProvisioningSignature;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(
+            writableCredential->finishAddingEntries(&credentialData, &proofOfProvisioningSignature)
+                    .isOk());
+
+    // Validate the proofOfProvisioning which was returned
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> proofOfProvisioning =
+            support::coseSignGetPayload(proofOfProvisioningSignature);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(proofOfProvisioning);
+    cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(proofOfProvisioning.value(), 32, {"readerCertificate"});
+    EXPECT_EQ(
+            "[\n"
+            "  'ProofOfProvisioning',\n"
+            "  'org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl',\n"
+            "  [\n"
+            "    {\n"
+            "      'id' : 0,\n"
+            "    },\n"
+            "  ],\n"
+            "  {\n"
+            "    'PersonalData' : [\n"
+            "      {\n"
+            "        'name' : 'Last name',\n"
+            "        'value' : 'Turing',\n"
+            "        'accessControlProfiles' : [0, ],\n"
+            "      },\n"
+            "      {\n"
+            "        'name' : 'Birth date',\n"
+            "        'value' : '19120623',\n"
+            "        'accessControlProfiles' : [0, ],\n"
+            "      },\n"
+            "      {\n"
+            "        'name' : 'First name',\n"
+            "        'value' : 'Alan',\n"
+            "        'accessControlProfiles' : [0, ],\n"
+            "      },\n"
+            "    ],\n"
+            "  },\n"
+            "  true,\n"
+            "]",
+            cborPretty);
+
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> credentialPubKey = support::certificateChainGetTopMostKey(
+            attData.attestationCertificate[0].encodedCertificate);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialPubKey);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(proofOfProvisioningSignature,
+                                                 {},  // Additional data
+                                                 credentialPubKey.value()));
+    writableCredential = nullptr;
+
+    // Extract doctype, storage key, and credentialPrivKey from credentialData... this works
+    // only because we asked for a test-credential meaning that the HBK is all zeroes.
+    auto [exSuccess, exDocType, exStorageKey, exCredentialPrivKey, exSha256Pop] =
+            extractFromTestCredentialData(credentialData);
+
+    ASSERT_TRUE(exSuccess);
+    ASSERT_EQ(exDocType, "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl");
+    // ... check that the public key derived from the private key matches what was
+    // in the certificate.
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> exCredentialKeyPair =
+            support::ecPrivateKeyToKeyPair(exCredentialPrivKey);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(exCredentialKeyPair);
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> exCredentialPubKey =
+            support::ecKeyPairGetPublicKey(exCredentialKeyPair.value());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(exCredentialPubKey);
+    ASSERT_EQ(exCredentialPubKey.value(), credentialPubKey.value());
+
+    sp<IIdentityCredential> credential;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credentialStore_
+                        ->getCredential(
+                                CipherSuite::CIPHERSUITE_ECDHE_HKDF_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA256,
+                                credentialData, &credential)
+                        .isOk());
+    ASSERT_NE(credential, nullptr);
+
+    // Calculate sessionTranscript, make something that resembles what you'd use for
+    // an over-the-Internet presentation not using mdoc session encryption.
+    cppbor::Array sessionTranscript =
+            cppbor::Array()
+                    .add(cppbor::Null())  // DeviceEngagementBytes isn't used.
+                    .add(cppbor::Null())  // EReaderKeyBytes isn't used.
+                    .add(cppbor::Array()  // Proprietary handover structure follows.
+                                 .add(cppbor::Tstr("TestHandover"))
+                                 .add(cppbor::Bstr(vector<uint8_t>{1, 2, 3}))
+                                 .add(cppbor::Bstr(vector<uint8_t>{9, 8, 7, 6})));
+    vector<uint8_t> sessionTranscriptEncoded = sessionTranscript.encode();
+
+    // Generate the key that will be used to sign AuthenticatedData.
+    vector<uint8_t> signingKeyBlob;
+    Certificate signingKeyCertificate;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credential->generateSigningKeyPair(&signingKeyBlob, &signingKeyCertificate).isOk());
+    optional<vector<uint8_t>> signingPubKey =
+            support::certificateChainGetTopMostKey(signingKeyCertificate.encodedCertificate);
+    EXPECT_TRUE(signingPubKey);
+    test_utils::verifyAuthKeyCertificate(signingKeyCertificate.encodedCertificate);
+
+    vector<RequestNamespace> requestedNamespaces = test_utils::buildRequestNamespaces(testEntries);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credential->setRequestedNamespaces(requestedNamespaces).isOk());
+    ASSERT_TRUE(credential->setVerificationToken(verificationToken).isOk());
+    Status status = credential->startRetrieval(
+            secureProfiles.value(), authToken, {} /* itemsRequestBytes*/, signingKeyBlob,
+            sessionTranscriptEncoded, {} /* readerSignature */, testEntriesEntryCounts);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.exceptionCode() << ": " << status.exceptionMessage();
+
+    for (const auto& entry : testEntries) {
+        ASSERT_TRUE(credential
+                            ->startRetrieveEntryValue(entry.nameSpace, entry.name,
+                                                      entry.valueCbor.size(), entry.profileIds)
+                            .isOk());
+
+        auto it = encryptedBlobs.find(&entry);
+        ASSERT_NE(it, encryptedBlobs.end());
+        const vector<vector<uint8_t>>& encryptedChunks = it->second;
+
+        vector<uint8_t> content;
+        for (const auto& encryptedChunk : encryptedChunks) {
+            vector<uint8_t> chunk;
+            ASSERT_TRUE(credential->retrieveEntryValue(encryptedChunk, &chunk).isOk());
+            content.insert(content.end(), chunk.begin(), chunk.end());
+        }
+        EXPECT_EQ(content, entry.valueCbor);
+    }
+
+    vector<uint8_t> mac;
+    vector<uint8_t> ecdsaSignature;
+    vector<uint8_t> deviceNameSpacesEncoded;
+    status = credential->finishRetrievalWithSignature(&mac, &deviceNameSpacesEncoded,
+                                                      &ecdsaSignature);
+    ASSERT_TRUE(status.isOk()) << status.exceptionCode() << ": " << status.exceptionMessage();
+    // MACing should NOT work since we're not using session encryption
+    ASSERT_EQ(0, mac.size());
+
+    // ECDSA signatures should work, however. Check this.
+    ASSERT_GT(ecdsaSignature.size(), 0);
+
+    cborPretty = cppbor::prettyPrint(deviceNameSpacesEncoded, 32, {});
+    ASSERT_EQ(
+            "{\n"
+            "  'PersonalData' : {\n"
+            "    'Last name' : 'Turing',\n"
+            "    'Birth date' : '19120623',\n"
+            "    'First name' : 'Alan',\n"
+            "  },\n"
+            "}",
+            cborPretty);
+
+    string docType = "org.iso.18013-5.2019.mdl";
+
+    vector<uint8_t> encodedDeviceAuthentication =
+            cppbor::Array()
+                    .add("DeviceAuthentication")
+                    .add(sessionTranscript.clone())
+                    .add(docType)
+                    .add(cppbor::SemanticTag(24, deviceNameSpacesEncoded))
+                    .encode();
+    vector<uint8_t> deviceAuthenticationBytes =
+            cppbor::SemanticTag(24, encodedDeviceAuthentication).encode();
+    EXPECT_TRUE(support::coseCheckEcDsaSignature(ecdsaSignature,
+                                                 deviceAuthenticationBytes,  // Detached content
+                                                 signingPubKey.value()));
 }
 
 GTEST_ALLOW_UNINSTANTIATED_PARAMETERIZED_TEST(EndToEndTests);