Merge "Bluetooth LE Audio: pass the 24 bit stream as unpacked through HAL"
diff --git a/bluetooth/1.0/default/test/fuzzer/bluetoothV1.0_fuzzer.cpp b/bluetooth/1.0/default/test/fuzzer/bluetoothV1.0_fuzzer.cpp
index 90cdc66..fb8df99 100644
--- a/bluetooth/1.0/default/test/fuzzer/bluetoothV1.0_fuzzer.cpp
+++ b/bluetooth/1.0/default/test/fuzzer/bluetoothV1.0_fuzzer.cpp
@@ -88,11 +88,18 @@
}
mBtHci->close();
mBtHci.clear();
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < mFdCount; ++i) {
+ if (mFdList[i]) {
+ close(mFdList[i]);
+ }
+ }
}
bool init(const uint8_t* data, size_t size);
void process();
private:
+ size_t mFdCount = 1;
+ int32_t mFdList[CH_MAX] = {0};
sp<BluetoothHci> mBtHci = nullptr;
FuzzedDataProvider* mFdp = nullptr;
};
@@ -143,17 +150,15 @@
bool shouldSetH4Protocol = mFdp->ConsumeBool();
BtVendor* btVendor = BtVendor::getInstance();
- size_t fdcount = 1;
- int32_t fdList[CH_MAX] = {0};
if (!shouldSetH4Protocol) {
- fdcount = mFdp->ConsumeIntegralInRange<size_t>(kMinFdcount, CH_MAX - 1);
+ mFdCount = mFdp->ConsumeIntegralInRange<size_t>(kMinFdcount, CH_MAX - 1);
}
- for (size_t i = 0; i < fdcount; ++i) {
- fdList[i] = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR | O_CREAT);
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < mFdCount; ++i) {
+ mFdList[i] = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR | O_CREAT);
}
- btVendor->populateFdList(fdList, fdcount);
+ btVendor->populateFdList(mFdList, mFdCount);
mBtHci->initialize(bluetoothCallback);
if (!bluetoothCallback->isInitialized) {
@@ -181,12 +186,6 @@
}
btVendor->callRemainingCbacks();
-
- for (size_t i = 0; i < fdcount; ++i) {
- if (fdList[i]) {
- close(fdList[i]);
- }
- }
}
extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
diff --git a/confirmationui/support/Android.bp b/confirmationui/support/Android.bp
index 6ab83f2..1200115 100644
--- a/confirmationui/support/Android.bp
+++ b/confirmationui/support/Android.bp
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
],
export_include_dirs: [
"include",
- ]
+ ],
}
cc_test {
@@ -56,6 +56,5 @@
"libhidlbase",
],
test_suites: ["general-tests"],
- clang: true,
- cflags: [ "-O0" ],
+ cflags: ["-O0"],
}
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2on1adapter/Android.bp b/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2on1adapter/Android.bp
index 0171dd6..3527cca 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2on1adapter/Android.bp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2on1adapter/Android.bp
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
name: "libhwc2on1adapter",
vendor: true,
- clang: true,
cflags: [
"-Wall",
"-Werror",
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2onfbadapter/Android.bp b/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2onfbadapter/Android.bp
index 3965d12..d613ba9 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2onfbadapter/Android.bp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2onfbadapter/Android.bp
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
name: "libhwc2onfbadapter",
vendor: true,
- clang: true,
cflags: [
"-Wall",
"-Wextra",
@@ -37,6 +36,9 @@
],
header_libs: ["libhardware_headers"],
- shared_libs: ["liblog", "libsync"],
+ shared_libs: [
+ "liblog",
+ "libsync",
+ ],
export_include_dirs: ["include"],
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index da02d54..43dc84c 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -196,12 +196,12 @@
* derive a key that is used to encrypt the private/secret key material.
*
* The root of trust consists of a bitstring that must be derived from the public key used by
- * Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image and from the lock state of the
- * device. If the public key is changed to allow a different system image to be used or if the
- * lock state is changed, then all of the IKeyMintDevice-protected keys created by the previous
- * system state must be unusable, unless the previous state is restored. The goal is to increase
- * the value of the software-enforced key access controls by making it impossible for an attacker-
- * installed operating system to use IKeyMintDevice keys.
+ * Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image, from the lock state and from the
+ * Verified Boot state of the device. If the public key is changed to allow a different system
+ * image to be used or if the lock state is changed, then all of the IKeyMintDevice-protected keys
+ * created by the previous system state must be unusable, unless the previous state is restored.
+ * The goal is to increase the value of the software-enforced key access controls by making it
+ * impossible for an attacker-installed operating system to use IKeyMintDevice keys.
*
* == Version Binding ==
*
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
index 6db58f2..8b3875b 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
@@ -100,15 +100,13 @@
* SignerName = tstr
*
* DKCertChain = [
- * 2* Certificate // Root -> ... -> Leaf. "Root" is the vendor self-signed
+ * 2* X509Certificate // Root -> ... -> Leaf. "Root" is the vendor self-signed
* // cert, "Leaf" contains DK_pub. There may also be
* // intermediate certificates between Root and Leaf.
* ]
*
- * // Certificates may be either:
- * // 1. COSE_Sign1, with payload containing PubKeyEd25519 or PubKeyECDSA256
- * // 2. a bstr containing a DER-encoded X.509 certificate (RSA, NIST P-curve, or edDSA)
- * Certificate = COSE_Sign1 / bstr
+ * // A bstr containing a DER-encoded X.509 certificate (RSA, NIST P-curve, or edDSA)
+ * X509Certificate = bstr
*
* // The SignedMac, which authenticates the MAC key that is used to authenticate the
* // keysToSign.
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index c9e57d5..c4c7d73 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -7482,7 +7482,6 @@
uint8_t privKeyData[32];
uint8_t pubKeyData[32];
X25519_keypair(pubKeyData, privKeyData);
- *localPublicKey = vector<uint8_t>(pubKeyData, pubKeyData + 32);
*localPrivKey = EVP_PKEY_Ptr(EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(
EVP_PKEY_X25519, nullptr, privKeyData, sizeof(privKeyData)));
} else {
@@ -7494,16 +7493,15 @@
ASSERT_EQ(EC_KEY_generate_key(ecKey.get()), 1);
*localPrivKey = EVP_PKEY_Ptr(EVP_PKEY_new());
ASSERT_EQ(EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(localPrivKey->get(), ecKey.get()), 1);
-
- // Get encoded form of the public part of the locally generated key...
- unsigned char* p = nullptr;
- int localPublicKeySize = i2d_PUBKEY(localPrivKey->get(), &p);
- ASSERT_GT(localPublicKeySize, 0);
- *localPublicKey =
- vector<uint8_t>(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(p),
- reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(p + localPublicKeySize));
- OPENSSL_free(p);
}
+
+ // Get encoded form of the public part of the locally generated key...
+ unsigned char* p = nullptr;
+ int localPublicKeySize = i2d_PUBKEY(localPrivKey->get(), &p);
+ ASSERT_GT(localPublicKeySize, 0);
+ *localPublicKey = vector<uint8_t>(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(p),
+ reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(p + localPublicKeySize));
+ OPENSSL_free(p);
}
void GenerateKeyMintEcKey(EcCurve curve, EVP_PKEY_Ptr* kmPubKey) {
@@ -7598,6 +7596,9 @@
//
for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
for (auto localCurve : ValidCurves()) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "local-curve-" << localCurve << "-keymint-curve-" << curve);
+
// Generate EC key locally (with access to private key material)
EVP_PKEY_Ptr localPrivKey;
vector<uint8_t> localPublicKey;