diff --git a/bluetooth/1.0/default/test/fuzzer/bluetoothV1.0_fuzzer.cpp b/bluetooth/1.0/default/test/fuzzer/bluetoothV1.0_fuzzer.cpp
index 90cdc66..fb8df99 100644
--- a/bluetooth/1.0/default/test/fuzzer/bluetoothV1.0_fuzzer.cpp
+++ b/bluetooth/1.0/default/test/fuzzer/bluetoothV1.0_fuzzer.cpp
@@ -88,11 +88,18 @@
     }
     mBtHci->close();
     mBtHci.clear();
+    for (size_t i = 0; i < mFdCount; ++i) {
+      if (mFdList[i]) {
+        close(mFdList[i]);
+      }
+    }
   }
   bool init(const uint8_t* data, size_t size);
   void process();
 
  private:
+  size_t mFdCount = 1;
+  int32_t mFdList[CH_MAX] = {0};
   sp<BluetoothHci> mBtHci = nullptr;
   FuzzedDataProvider* mFdp = nullptr;
 };
@@ -143,17 +150,15 @@
   bool shouldSetH4Protocol = mFdp->ConsumeBool();
   BtVendor* btVendor = BtVendor::getInstance();
 
-  size_t fdcount = 1;
-  int32_t fdList[CH_MAX] = {0};
   if (!shouldSetH4Protocol) {
-    fdcount = mFdp->ConsumeIntegralInRange<size_t>(kMinFdcount, CH_MAX - 1);
+    mFdCount = mFdp->ConsumeIntegralInRange<size_t>(kMinFdcount, CH_MAX - 1);
   }
 
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < fdcount; ++i) {
-    fdList[i] = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR | O_CREAT);
+  for (size_t i = 0; i < mFdCount; ++i) {
+    mFdList[i] = open("/dev/null", O_RDWR | O_CREAT);
   }
 
-  btVendor->populateFdList(fdList, fdcount);
+  btVendor->populateFdList(mFdList, mFdCount);
   mBtHci->initialize(bluetoothCallback);
 
   if (!bluetoothCallback->isInitialized) {
@@ -181,12 +186,6 @@
   }
 
   btVendor->callRemainingCbacks();
-
-  for (size_t i = 0; i < fdcount; ++i) {
-    if (fdList[i]) {
-      close(fdList[i]);
-    }
-  }
 }
 
 extern "C" int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size) {
diff --git a/confirmationui/support/Android.bp b/confirmationui/support/Android.bp
index 6ab83f2..1200115 100644
--- a/confirmationui/support/Android.bp
+++ b/confirmationui/support/Android.bp
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@
     ],
     export_include_dirs: [
         "include",
-    ]
+    ],
 }
 
 cc_test {
@@ -56,6 +56,5 @@
         "libhidlbase",
     ],
     test_suites: ["general-tests"],
-    clang: true,
-    cflags: [ "-O0" ],
+    cflags: ["-O0"],
 }
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2on1adapter/Android.bp b/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2on1adapter/Android.bp
index 0171dd6..3527cca 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2on1adapter/Android.bp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2on1adapter/Android.bp
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
     name: "libhwc2on1adapter",
     vendor: true,
 
-    clang: true,
     cflags: [
         "-Wall",
         "-Werror",
diff --git a/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2onfbadapter/Android.bp b/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2onfbadapter/Android.bp
index 3965d12..d613ba9 100644
--- a/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2onfbadapter/Android.bp
+++ b/graphics/composer/2.1/utils/hwc2onfbadapter/Android.bp
@@ -25,7 +25,6 @@
     name: "libhwc2onfbadapter",
     vendor: true,
 
-    clang: true,
     cflags: [
         "-Wall",
         "-Wextra",
@@ -37,6 +36,9 @@
     ],
 
     header_libs: ["libhardware_headers"],
-    shared_libs: ["liblog", "libsync"],
+    shared_libs: [
+        "liblog",
+        "libsync",
+    ],
     export_include_dirs: ["include"],
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index da02d54..43dc84c 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -196,12 +196,12 @@
  * derive a key that is used to encrypt the private/secret key material.
  *
  * The root of trust consists of a bitstring that must be derived from the public key used by
- * Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image and from the lock state of the
- * device.  If the public key is changed to allow a different system image to be used or if the
- * lock state is changed, then all of the IKeyMintDevice-protected keys created by the previous
- * system state must be unusable, unless the previous state is restored.  The goal is to increase
- * the value of the software-enforced key access controls by making it impossible for an attacker-
- * installed operating system to use IKeyMintDevice keys.
+ * Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image, from the lock state and from the
+ * Verified Boot state of the device.  If the public key is changed to allow a different system
+ * image to be used or if the lock state is changed, then all of the IKeyMintDevice-protected keys
+ * created by the previous system state must be unusable, unless the previous state is restored.
+ * The goal is to increase the value of the software-enforced key access controls by making it
+ * impossible for an attacker-installed operating system to use IKeyMintDevice keys.
  *
  * == Version Binding ==
  *
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
index 6db58f2..8b3875b 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/ProtectedData.aidl
@@ -100,15 +100,13 @@
      *     SignerName = tstr
      *
      *     DKCertChain = [
-     *         2* Certificate           // Root -> ... -> Leaf. "Root" is the vendor self-signed
+     *         2* X509Certificate       // Root -> ... -> Leaf. "Root" is the vendor self-signed
      *                                  // cert, "Leaf" contains DK_pub. There may also be
      *                                  // intermediate certificates between Root and Leaf.
      *     ]
      *
-     *     // Certificates may be either:
-     *     // 1. COSE_Sign1, with payload containing PubKeyEd25519 or PubKeyECDSA256
-     *     // 2. a bstr containing a DER-encoded X.509 certificate (RSA, NIST P-curve, or edDSA)
-     *     Certificate = COSE_Sign1 / bstr
+     *     // A bstr containing a DER-encoded X.509 certificate (RSA, NIST P-curve, or edDSA)
+     *     X509Certificate = bstr
      *
      *     // The SignedMac, which authenticates the MAC key that is used to authenticate the
      *     // keysToSign.
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index c9e57d5..c4c7d73 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -7482,7 +7482,6 @@
             uint8_t privKeyData[32];
             uint8_t pubKeyData[32];
             X25519_keypair(pubKeyData, privKeyData);
-            *localPublicKey = vector<uint8_t>(pubKeyData, pubKeyData + 32);
             *localPrivKey = EVP_PKEY_Ptr(EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(
                     EVP_PKEY_X25519, nullptr, privKeyData, sizeof(privKeyData)));
         } else {
@@ -7494,16 +7493,15 @@
             ASSERT_EQ(EC_KEY_generate_key(ecKey.get()), 1);
             *localPrivKey = EVP_PKEY_Ptr(EVP_PKEY_new());
             ASSERT_EQ(EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(localPrivKey->get(), ecKey.get()), 1);
-
-            // Get encoded form of the public part of the locally generated key...
-            unsigned char* p = nullptr;
-            int localPublicKeySize = i2d_PUBKEY(localPrivKey->get(), &p);
-            ASSERT_GT(localPublicKeySize, 0);
-            *localPublicKey =
-                    vector<uint8_t>(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(p),
-                                    reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(p + localPublicKeySize));
-            OPENSSL_free(p);
         }
+
+        // Get encoded form of the public part of the locally generated key...
+        unsigned char* p = nullptr;
+        int localPublicKeySize = i2d_PUBKEY(localPrivKey->get(), &p);
+        ASSERT_GT(localPublicKeySize, 0);
+        *localPublicKey = vector<uint8_t>(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(p),
+                                          reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(p + localPublicKeySize));
+        OPENSSL_free(p);
     }
 
     void GenerateKeyMintEcKey(EcCurve curve, EVP_PKEY_Ptr* kmPubKey) {
@@ -7598,6 +7596,9 @@
     //
     for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
         for (auto localCurve : ValidCurves()) {
+            SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                         << "local-curve-" << localCurve << "-keymint-curve-" << curve);
+
             // Generate EC key locally (with access to private key material)
             EVP_PKEY_Ptr localPrivKey;
             vector<uint8_t> localPublicKey;