Merge "Fix IFace VTS unable to link default HAL" into sc-dev
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
index 608890b..a75ed25 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@
<instance>default</instance>
</interface>
</hal>
- <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
<version>3.0</version>
<version>4.0</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
index e5e012c..3b8ee21 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@
<instance>default</instance>
</interface>
</hal>
- <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
<version>3.0</version>
<version>4.0</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
index 8e175f0..0fb21a7 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@
<instance>default</instance>
</interface>
</hal>
- <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
<version>3.0</version>
<version>4.0-1</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
index bb22974..01cd1f6 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@
<instance>default</instance>
</interface>
</hal>
- <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+ <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
<name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
<version>3.0</version>
<version>4.0-1</version>
diff --git a/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index e74cca9..7d32ced 100644
--- a/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -306,6 +306,8 @@
if (first != nullptr && second != nullptr) {
EXPECT_NE(first->user_id, second->user_id);
}
+ // the old enrollment should be invalid now
+ verifyPassword(password, enrollRsp.data, 0, verifyRsp, false);
ALOGI("Testing Untrusted Reenroll done");
}
diff --git a/nfc/1.0/default/Nfc.cpp b/nfc/1.0/default/Nfc.cpp
index fcdcbbc..a1e50f0 100644
--- a/nfc/1.0/default/Nfc.cpp
+++ b/nfc/1.0/default/Nfc.cpp
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
::android::hardware::Return<NfcStatus> Nfc::coreInitialized(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& data) {
hidl_vec<uint8_t> copy = data;
- if (mDevice == nullptr) {
+ if (mDevice == nullptr || copy.size() == 0) {
return NfcStatus::FAILED;
}
int ret = mDevice->core_initialized(mDevice, ©[0]);
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index 3f75af6..fa643fc 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -48,5 +48,6 @@
void deviceLocked(in boolean passwordOnly, in @nullable android.hardware.security.secureclock.TimeStampToken timestampToken);
void earlyBootEnded();
byte[] convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(in byte[] storageKeyBlob);
+ android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCharacteristics[] getKeyCharacteristics(in byte[] keyBlob, in byte[] appId, in byte[] appData);
const int AUTH_TOKEN_MAC_LENGTH = 32;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
index b4bc60c..4e3008f 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
@@ -27,7 +27,19 @@
@VintfStability
@RustDerive(Clone=true, Eq=true, PartialEq=true, Ord=true, PartialOrd=true, Hash=true)
parcelable AttestationKey {
+ /**
+ * Key blob containing a key pair with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY
+ */
byte[] keyBlob;
+
+ /**
+ * Key parameters needed to use the key in keyBlob, notably Tag::APPLICATION_ID and
+ * Tag::APPLICATION_DATA, if they were provided during generation of the key in keyBlob.
+ */
KeyParameter[] attestKeyParams;
+
+ /**
+ * The issuerSubjectName to use in the generated attestation.
+ */
byte[] issuerSubjectName;
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
index 2304a58..b5336b9 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
@@ -25,7 +25,10 @@
*/
@VintfStability
parcelable BeginResult {
- /* This is the challenge used in verifyAuthorization. It must be a nonce. */
+ /**
+ * This is the challenge used to verify authorization of an operation.
+ * See IKeyMintOperation.aidl entrypoints updateAad() and update().
+ */
long challenge;
/**
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index a3260f5..c6f89bd 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
import android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.IKeyMintOperation;
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCharacteristics;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCreationResult;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyFormat;
import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyMintHardwareInfo;
@@ -107,7 +108,6 @@
*
* - 168-bit keys.
* - CBC and ECB mode.
-
* - CBC and ECB modes must support unpadded and PKCS7 padding modes. With no padding CBC and
* ECB-mode operations must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the input isn't a
* multiple of the DES block size.
@@ -150,8 +150,8 @@
*
* The IKeyMintDevice must ignore unknown tags.
*
- * The caller must always provide the current date time in the keyParameter CREATION_DATETIME
- * tags.
+ * The caller may provide the current date time in the keyParameter CREATION_DATETIME tag, but
+ * this is optional and informational only.
*
* All authorization tags and their values enforced by an IKeyMintDevice must be cryptographically
* bound to the private/secret key material such that any modification of the portion of the key
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@
* startup, preferably by the bootloader. This bitstring must be cryptographically bound to every
* key managed by the IKeyMintDevice. As above, the recommended mechanism for this cryptographic
* binding is to include the Root of Trust data in the input to the key derivation function used to
- * derive a key that is used to encryp the private/secret key material.
+ * derive a key that is used to encrypt the private/secret key material.
*
* The root of trust consists of a bitstring that must be derived from the public key used by
* Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image and from the lock state of the
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@
* Generates a new cryptographic key, specifying associated parameters, which must be
* cryptographically bound to the key. IKeyMintDevice implementations must disallow any use
* of a key in any way inconsistent with the authorizations specified at generation time. With
- * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure envionment's
+ * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure environment's
* obligation is limited to ensuring that the unenforceable parameters associated with the key
* cannot be modified. In addition, the characteristics returned by generateKey places
* parameters correctly in the tee-enforced and strongbox-enforced lists.
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@
*
* The following parameters are required to generate an RSA key:
*
- * o Tag::Key_SIZE specifies the size of the public modulus, in bits. If omitted, generateKey
+ * o Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size of the public modulus, in bits. If omitted, generateKey
* must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. Required values for TEE IKeyMintDevice
* implementations are 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096. StrongBox IKeyMintDevice implementations
* must support 2048.
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@
* except AGREE_KEY must be supported for RSA keys.
*
* o Tag::DIGEST specifies digest algorithms that may be used with the new key. TEE
- * IKeyMintDevice implementatiosn must support all Digest values (see digest.aidl) for RSA
+ * IKeyMintDevice implementations must support all Digest values (see digest.aidl) for RSA
* keys. StrongBox IKeyMintDevice implementations must support SHA_2_256.
*
* o Tag::PADDING specifies the padding modes that may be used with the new
@@ -295,11 +295,9 @@
*
* == ECDSA Keys ==
*
- * Either Tag::KEY_SIZE or Tag::EC_CURVE must be provided to generate an ECDSA key. If neither
- * is provided, generateKey must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. If Tag::KEY_SIZE is
- * provided, the possible values are 224, 256, 384 and 521, and must be mapped to Tag::EC_CURVE
- * values P_224, P_256, P_384 and P_521, respectively. TEE IKeyMintDevice implementations
- * must support all curves. StrongBox implementations must support P_256.
+ * Tag::EC_CURVE must be provided to generate an ECDSA key. If it is not provided, generateKey
+ * must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. TEE IKeyMintDevice implementations must support
+ * all curves. StrongBox implementations must support P_256.
*
* == AES Keys ==
*
@@ -309,6 +307,10 @@
* If Tag::BLOCK_MODE is specified with value BlockMode::GCM, then the caller must also provide
* Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH. If omitted, generateKey must return ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
*
+ * == 3DES Keys ==
+ *
+ * Only Tag::KEY_SIZE is required to generate an 3DES key, and its value must be 168. If
+ * omitted, generateKey must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
*
* @param keyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
* provided in params. See above for detailed specifications of which tags are required
@@ -349,13 +351,12 @@
*
* o Tag::ORIGIN (returned in keyCharacteristics) must have the value KeyOrigin::IMPORTED.
*
- * @param inKeyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
+ * @param keyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
* provided in params.
*
- * @param inKeyFormat The format of the key material to import. See KeyFormat in
- * keyformat.aidl.
+ * @param keyFormat The format of the key material to import. See KeyFormat in keyformat.aidl.
*
- * @param inKeyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat.
+ * @param keyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat.
*
* @param attestationKey, if provided, specifies the key that must be used to sign the
* attestation certificate. If `keyParams` does not contain a Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE
@@ -378,9 +379,8 @@
* Securely imports a key, or key pair, returning a key blob and a description of the imported
* key.
*
- * @param inWrappedKeyData The wrapped key material to import.
- * TODO(seleneh) Decide if we want the wrapped key in DER-encoded ASN.1 format or CBOR
- * format or both. And specify the standarized format.
+ * @param wrappedKeyData The wrapped key material to import, as ASN.1 DER-encoded data
+ * corresponding to the following schema.
*
* KeyDescription ::= SEQUENCE(
* keyFormat INTEGER, # Values from KeyFormat enum.
@@ -398,20 +398,20 @@
*
* Where:
*
- * o keyFormat is an integer from the KeyFormat enum, defining the format of the plaintext
+ * - keyFormat is an integer from the KeyFormat enum, defining the format of the plaintext
* key material.
- * o keyParams is the characteristics of the key to be imported (as with generateKey or
+ * - keyParams is the characteristics of the key to be imported (as with generateKey or
* importKey). If the secure import is successful, these characteristics must be
* associated with the key exactly as if the key material had been insecurely imported
- * with the IKeyMintDevice::importKey. See attestKey() for documentation of the
- * AuthorizationList schema.
- * o encryptedTransportKey is a 256-bit AES key, XORed with a masking key and then encrypted
+ * with the IKeyMintDevice::importKey. See KeyCreationResult.aidl for documentation of
+ * the AuthorizationList schema.
+ * - encryptedTransportKey is a 256-bit AES key, XORed with a masking key and then encrypted
* with the wrapping key specified by wrappingKeyBlob.
- * o keyDescription is a KeyDescription, above.
- * o encryptedKey is the key material of the key to be imported, in format keyFormat, and
+ * - keyDescription is a KeyDescription, above.
+ * - encryptedKey is the key material of the key to be imported, in format keyFormat, and
* encrypted with encryptedEphemeralKey in AES-GCM mode, with the DER-encoded
* representation of keyDescription provided as additional authenticated data.
- * o tag is the tag produced by the AES-GCM encryption of encryptedKey.
+ * - tag is the tag produced by the AES-GCM encryption of encryptedKey.
*
* So, importWrappedKey does the following:
*
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@
*
* @param passwordSid specifies the password secure ID (SID) of the user that owns the key being
* installed. If the authorization list in wrappedKeyData contains a
- * Tag::USER_SECURE_IDwith a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD bit
+ * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID with a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD bit
* set, the constructed key must be bound to the SID value provided by this argument. If
* the wrappedKeyData does not contain such a tag and value, this argument must be
* ignored.
@@ -483,9 +483,9 @@
* patch level and OS version. This requirement is relaxed for 4.0::IKeymasterDevice and
* IKeyMintDevice, and the OS version in the boot image footer is no longer used.
*
- * @param inKeyBlobToUpgrade The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+ * @param keyBlobToUpgrade The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey().
*
- * @param inUpgradeParams A parameter list containing any parameters needed to complete the
+ * @param upgradeParams A parameter list containing any parameters needed to complete the
* upgrade, including Tag::APPLICATION_ID and Tag::APPLICATION_DATA.
*
* @return A new key blob that references the same key as keyBlobToUpgrade, but is in the new
@@ -499,7 +499,9 @@
* render the key permanently unusable. Keys without Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or
* may not be rendered unusable.
*
- * @param inKeyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+ * @param keyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+ *
+ * @return error See the ErrorCode enum.
*/
void deleteKey(in byte[] keyBlob);
@@ -508,8 +510,6 @@
* this function is called all keys with Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE in their hardware-enforced
* authorization lists must be rendered permanently unusable. Keys without
* Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or may not be rendered unusable.
- *
- * @return error See the ErrorCode enum.
*/
void deleteAllKeys();
@@ -528,28 +528,27 @@
/**
* Begins a cryptographic operation using the specified key. If all is well, begin() must
- * return ErrorCode::OK and create an operation handle which must be passed to subsequent calls
- * to update(), finish() or abort().
+ * return ErrorCode::OK and create an IKeyMintOperation handle which will be used to perform
+ * the cryptographic operation.
*
- * It is critical that each call to begin() be paired with a subsequent call to finish() or
- * abort(), to allow the IKeyMintDevice implementation to clean up any internal operation
- * state. The caller's failure to do this may leak internal state space or other internal
- * resources and may eventually cause begin() to return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS when it
- * runs out of space for operations. Any result other than ErrorCode::OK from begin(), update()
- * or finish() implicitly aborts the operation, in which case abort() need not be called (and
- * must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE if called). IKeyMintDevice implementations
- * must support 32 concurrent operations.
+ * It is critical that each successful call to begin() be paired with a subsequent call to
+ * finish() or abort() on the resulting IKeyMintOperation, to allow the IKeyMintDevice
+ * implementation to clean up any internal operation state. The caller's failure to do this may
+ * leak internal state space or other internal resources and may eventually cause begin() to
+ * return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS when it runs out of space for operations. Any result
+ * other than ErrorCode::OK from begin() will not return an IKeyMintOperation (in which case
+ * calling finish() or abort() is neither possible nor necessary). IKeyMintDevice
+ * implementations must support 32 concurrent operations.
*
* If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were specified during key generation or
* import, calls to begin must include those tags with the originally-specified values in the
- * inParams argument to this method. If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
+ * params argument to this method. If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
*
* == Authorization Enforcement ==
*
* The following key authorization parameters must be enforced by the IKeyMintDevice secure
* environment if the tags were returned in the "hardwareEnforced" list in the
- * KeyCharacteristics. Public key operations, meaning KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and
- * KeyPurpose::VERIFY must be allowed to succeed even if authorization requirements are not met.
+ * KeyCharacteristics.
*
* -- All Key Types --
*
@@ -578,9 +577,9 @@
*
* o Tag::USER_SECURE_ID must be enforced by this method if and only if the key also has
* Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT (if it does not have Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT, the Tag::USER_SECURE_ID
- * requirement must be enforced by update() and finish()). If the key has both, then this
- * method must receive a non-empty HardwareAuthToken in the authToken argument. For the auth
- * token to be valid, all of the following have to be true:
+ * requirement must be enforced by updateAad(), update() and finish()). If the key has both,
+ * then this method must receive a non-empty HardwareAuthToken in the authToken argument. For
+ * the auth token to be valid, all of the following have to be true:
*
* o The HMAC field must validate correctly.
*
@@ -607,32 +606,30 @@
*
* -- RSA Keys --
*
- * All RSA key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams. If unspecified or
+ * All RSA key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in params. If unspecified or
* specified more than once, the begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.
*
- * RSA signing and verification operations need a digest, as do RSA encryption and decryption
- * operations with OAEP padding mode. For those cases, the caller must specify exactly one
- * digest in inParams. If unspecified or specified more than once, begin() must return
+ * RSA signing operations need a digest, as do RSA encryption and decryption operations with
+ * OAEP padding mode. For those cases, the caller must specify exactly one digest in params.
+ * If unspecified or specified more than once, begin() must return
* ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST.
*
* Private key operations (KeyPurpose::DECRYPT and KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of
* digest and padding, which means that the key authorizations need to contain the specified
* values. If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST or
- * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING, as appropriate. Public key operations (KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT
- * and KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are permitted with unauthorized digest or padding modes.
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, as appropriate.
*
* With the exception of PaddingMode::NONE, all RSA padding modes are applicable only to certain
* purposes. Specifically, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN and PaddingMode::RSA_PSS only
- * support signing and verification, while PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and
- * PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP only support encryption and decryption. begin() must return
- * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE if the specified mode does not support the specified
- * purpose.
+ * support signing, while PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP only
+ * support encryption and decryption. begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE
+ * if the specified mode does not support the specified purpose.
*
* There are some important interactions between padding modes and digests:
*
- * o PaddingMode::NONE indicates that a "raw" RSA operation is performed. If signing or
- * verifying, Digest::NONE is specified for the digest. No digest is necessary for unpadded
- * encryption or decryption.
+ * o PaddingMode::NONE indicates that a "raw" RSA operation is performed. If signing,
+ * Digest::NONE is specified for the digest. No digest is necessary for unpadded encryption
+ * or decryption.
*
* o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN padding requires a digest. The digest may be Digest::NONE,
* in which case the KeyMint implementation cannot build a proper PKCS#1 v1.5 signature
@@ -644,37 +641,37 @@
*
* o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_1_5_ENCRYPT padding does not require a digest.
*
- * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE. If
- * Digest::NONE is specified, the begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. In
- * addition, the size of the RSA key must be at least 2 + D bytes larger than the output size
- * of the digest, where D is the size of the digest, in bytes. Otherwise begin() must
- * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. The salt size must be D.
+ * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS padding requires a digest, which must match one of the padding values
+ * in the key authorizations, and which may not be Digest::NONE. begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST if this is not the case. In addition, the size of the RSA
+ * key must be at least 2 + D bytes larger than the output size of the digest, where D is the
+ * size of the digest, in bytes. Otherwise begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. The salt size must be D.
*
- * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE. If
- * Digest::NONE is specified, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. The OAEP
- * mask generation function must be MGF1 and the MGF1 digest must be SHA1, regardless of the
- * OAEP digest specified.
+ * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP padding requires a digest, which must match one of the padding values
+ * in the key authorizations, and which may not be Digest::NONE. begin() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST if this is not the case. RSA_OAEP padding also requires an
+ * MGF1 digest, specified with Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, which must match one of the MGF1
+ * padding values in the key authorizations and which may not be Digest::NONE. begin() must
+ * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST if this is not the case. The OAEP mask generation
+ * function must be MGF1.
*
* -- EC Keys --
*
- * EC key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams. If unspecified or
- * specified more than once, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.
- *
* Private key operations (KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of digest and padding, which
* means that the key authorizations must contain the specified values. If not, begin() must
- * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST. Public key operations (KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are
- * permitted with unauthorized digest or padding.
+ * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
*
* -- AES Keys --
*
* AES key operations must specify exactly one block mode (Tag::BLOCK_MODE) and one padding mode
- * (Tag::PADDING) in inParams. If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
+ * (Tag::PADDING) in params. If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
* begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE or
* ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE. The specified modes must be authorized by the key,
* otherwise begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE or
* ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
*
- * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM, inParams must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH, and the specified
+ * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM, params must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH, and the specified
* value must be a multiple of 8 that is not greater than 128 or less than the value of
* Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations. For MAC lengths greater than 128 or
* non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH. For values less
@@ -687,43 +684,63 @@
*
* If the block mode is BlockMode::CBC, BlockMode::CTR, or BlockMode::GCM, an initialization
* vector or nonce is required. In most cases, callers shouldn't provide an IV or nonce and the
- * IKeyMintDevice implementation must generate a random IV or nonce and return it via
- * Tag::NONCE in outParams. CBC and CTR IVs are 16 bytes. GCM nonces are 12 bytes. If the key
+ * IKeyMintDevice implementation must generate a random IV or nonce and return it via Tag::NONCE
+ * in outParams. CBC and CTR IVs are 16 bytes. GCM nonces are 12 bytes. If the key
* authorizations contain Tag::CALLER_NONCE, then the caller may provide an IV/nonce with
- * Tag::NONCE in inParams. If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
+ * Tag::NONCE in params, which must be of the correct size (if not, return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE). If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
* begin() must return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED. If a nonce is not provided when
- * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice msut generate a random IV/nonce.
+ * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice must generate a random IV/nonce.
+ *
+ * -- 3DES Keys --
+ *
+ * 3DES key operations must specify exactly one block mode (Tag::BLOCK_MODE) and one padding
+ * mode (Tag::PADDING) in params. If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
+ * begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE or
+ * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE. The specified modes must be authorized by the key,
+ * otherwise begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE or
+ * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
+ *
+ * If the block mode is BlockMode::CBC, an initialization vector or nonce is required. In most
+ * cases, callers shouldn't provide an IV or nonce and the IKeyMintDevice implementation must
+ * generate a random IV or nonce and return it via Tag::NONCE in outParams. CBC IVs are 8
+ * bytes. If the key authorizations contain Tag::CALLER_NONCE, then the caller may provide an
+ * IV/nonce with Tag::NONCE in params, which must be of the correct size (if not, return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE). If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
+ * begin() must return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED. If a nonce is not provided when
+ * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice must generate a random IV/nonce.
+ *
*
* -- HMAC keys --
*
- * HMAC key operations must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH in inParams. The specified value must be a
+ * HMAC key operations must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH in params. The specified value must be a
* multiple of 8 that is not greater than the digest length or less than the value of
* Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations. For MAC lengths greater than the digest
* length or non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH. For
* values less than the key's minimum length, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH.
*
- * @param inPurpose The purpose of the operation, one of KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
- * KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, KeyPurpose::SIGN, KeyPurpose::VERIFY, or KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY.
- * Note that for AEAD modes, encryption and decryption imply signing and verification,
- * respectively, but must be specified as KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and KeyPurpose::DECRYPT.
+ * @param purpose The purpose of the operation, one of KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT,
+ * KeyPurpose::SIGN, KeyPurpose::VERIFY, or KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY. Note that for AEAD
+ * modes, encryption and decryption imply signing and verification, respectively, but
+ * must be specified as KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and KeyPurpose::DECRYPT.
*
- * @param inKeyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey(). The key
+ * @param keyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey(). The key
* must have a purpose compatible with purpose and all of its usage requirements must be
* satisfied, or begin() must return an appropriate error code (see above).
*
- * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation. If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or
+ * @param params Additional parameters for the operation. If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or
* Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were provided during generation, they must be provided here, or
* the operation must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB. For operations that require
- * a nonce or IV, on keys that were generated with Tag::CALLER_NONCE, inParams may
+ * a nonce or IV, on keys that were generated with Tag::CALLER_NONCE, params may
* contain a tag Tag::NONCE. If Tag::NONCE is provided for a key without
* Tag:CALLER_NONCE, ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED must be returned.
*
- * @param inAuthToken Authentication token.
+ * @param authToken Authentication token.
*
* @return BeginResult as output, which contains the challenge, KeyParameters which haves
* additional data from the operation initialization, notably to return the IV or nonce
* from operations that generate an IV or nonce, and IKeyMintOperation object pointer
- * which is used to perform update(), finish() or abort() operations.
+ * which is used to perform updateAad(), update(), finish() or abort() operations.
*/
BeginResult begin(in KeyPurpose purpose, in byte[] keyBlob, in KeyParameter[] params,
in @nullable HardwareAuthToken authToken);
@@ -740,7 +757,7 @@
* Note that the IKeyMintDevice UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED semantics are slightly different from
* the UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED semantics enforced by keystore. Keystore handles device locking
* on a per-user basis. Because auth tokens do not contain an Android user ID, it's not
- * possible to replicate the keystore enformcement logic in IKeyMintDevice. So from the
+ * possible to replicate the keystore enforcement logic in IKeyMintDevice. So from the
* IKeyMintDevice perspective, any user unlock unlocks all UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED keys.
* Keystore will continue enforcing the per-user device locking.
*
@@ -766,7 +783,7 @@
*/
void earlyBootEnded();
- /*
+ /**
* Called by the client to get a wrapped per-boot ephemeral key from a wrapped storage key.
* Clients will then use the returned per-boot ephemeral key in place of the wrapped storage
* key. Whenever the hardware is presented with a per-boot ephemeral key for an operation, it
@@ -786,4 +803,26 @@
* place of the input storageKeyBlob
*/
byte[] convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(in byte[] storageKeyBlob);
+
+ /**
+ * Returns parameters associated with the provided key. This should match the
+ * KeyCharacteristics present in the KeyCreationResult returned by generateKey(),
+ * importKey(), or importWrappedKey().
+ *
+ * @param keyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey, importKey or importWrappedKey.
+ *
+ * @param appId An opaque byte string identifying the client. This value must match the
+ * Tag::APPLICATION_ID data provided during key generation/import. Without the correct
+ * value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to obtain the
+ * key material.
+ *
+ * @param appData An opaque byte string provided by the application. This value must match the
+ * Tag::APPLICATION_DATA data provided during key generation/import. Without the
+ * correct value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to
+ * obtain the key material.
+ *
+ * @return Characteristics of the generated key. See KeyCreationResult for details.
+ */
+ KeyCharacteristics[] getKeyCharacteristics(
+ in byte[] keyBlob, in byte[] appId, in byte[] appData);
}
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
index d2a993f..aa7b492 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@
* update() is called. If updateAad() is called after update(), it must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG.
*
- * If operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
+ * If the operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
*
* If this method returns an error code other than ErrorCode::OK, the operation is aborted and
- * the operation handle must be invalidated. Any future use of the handle, with this method,
- * finish, or abort, must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
+ * the operation handle must be invalidated. Any future use of this object must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
*
* == Authorization Enforcement ==
*
@@ -58,9 +58,10 @@
*
* o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
*
- * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operationHandle
+ * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the value returned from
+ * IKeyMintDevice::begin(), given by the challenge field of the BeginResult structure.
*
- * If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return
+ * If any of these conditions are not met, updateAad() must return
* ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
*
* The caller must provide the auth token on every call to updateAad(), update() and finish().
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@
*
* @param input Additional Authentication Data to be processed.
*
- * @param authToken Authentication token. Can be nullable if not provided.
+ * @param authToken Authentication token, if provided.
*
* @param timeStampToken timestamp token, certifies the freshness of an auth token in case
* the security domain of this KeyMint instance has a different clock than the
@@ -93,18 +94,9 @@
* If operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
*
- * To provide more flexibility for buffer handling, implementations of this method have the
- * option of consuming less data than was provided. The caller is responsible for looping to
- * feed the rest of the data in subsequent calls. The amount of input consumed must be returned
- * in the inputConsumed parameter. Implementations must always consume at least one byte,
- * unless the operation cannot accept any more; if more than zero bytes are provided and zero
- * bytes are consumed, callers must consider this an error and abort the operation.
- * TODO(seleneh) update the code to always consume alll the input data. b/168665179.
- *
- * Implementations may also choose how much data to return, as a result of the update. This is
- * only relevant for encryption and decryption operations, because signing and verification
- * return no data until finish. It is recommended to return data as early as possible, rather
- * than buffer it.
+ * Implementations may choose how much data to return as a result of the update. This is
+ * only relevant for encryption and decryption operations, because signing returns no data
+ * until finish. It is recommended to return data as early as possible, rather than buffer it.
*
* If this method returns an error code other than ErrorCode::OK, the operation is aborted and
* the operation handle must be invalidated. Any future use of the handle, with this method,
@@ -112,8 +104,8 @@
*
* == Authorization Enforcement ==
*
- * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in begin(). The one exception is the
- * case where the key has:
+ * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in IKeyMintDevice::begin(). The one
+ * exception is the case where the key has:
*
* o One or more Tag::USER_SECURE_IDs, and
*
@@ -130,7 +122,8 @@
*
* o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
*
- * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operationHandle
+ * o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the challenge value contained in the
+ * BeginResult returned from IKeyMintDevice::begin().
*
* If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return
* ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
@@ -139,22 +132,20 @@
*
* -- RSA keys --
*
- * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire
- * block to be signed or verified in a single update. It may not consume only a portion of the
- * block in these cases. However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple
- * updates, and update() must accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more
- * data to sign than can be used (length of data exceeds RSA key size), update() must return
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+ * For signing operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire block to be
+ * signed in a single update. It may not consume only a portion of the block in these cases.
+ * However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates, and update() must
+ * accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more data to sign than can be used
+ * (length of data exceeds RSA key size), update() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
*
* -- ECDSA keys --
*
- * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire
- * block to be signed or verified in a single update. This method may not consume only a
- * portion of the block. However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates
- * and update() must accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more data to sign
- * than can be used, the data is silently truncated. (This differs from the handling of excess
- * data provided in similar RSA operations. The reason for this is compatibility with legacy
- * clients.)
+ * For signing operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire block to be
+ * signed in a single update. This method may not consume only a portion of the block.
+ * However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates and update() must
+ * accept the data this way as well. If the caller provides more data to sign than can be used,
+ * the data is silently truncated. (This differs from the handling of excess data provided in
+ * similar RSA operations. The reason for this is compatibility with legacy clients.)
*
* -- AES keys --
*
@@ -182,7 +173,7 @@
in @nullable TimeStampToken timeStampToken);
/**
- * Finalizes a cryptographic operation begun with begin() and invalidates operation.
+ * Finalizes a cryptographic operation begun with begin() and invalidates the operation.
*
* This method is the last one called in an operation, so all processed data must be returned.
*
@@ -190,8 +181,7 @@
* Any future use of the operation, with finish(), update(), or abort(), must return
* ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
*
- * Signing operations return the signature as the output. Verification operations accept the
- * signature in the signature parameter, and return no output.
+ * Signing operations return the signature as the output.
*
* == Authorization enforcement ==
*
@@ -230,44 +220,35 @@
* Some additional requirements, depending on the padding mode:
*
* o PaddingMode::NONE. For unpadded signing and encryption operations, if the provided data is
- * shorter than the key, the data must be zero-padded on the left before
- * signing/encryption. If the data is the same length as the key, but numerically larger,
- * finish() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. For verification and decryption
- * operations, the data must be exactly as long as the key. Otherwise, return
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+ * shorter than the key, the data must be zero-padded on the left before signing/encryption.
+ * If the data is the same length as the key, but numerically larger, finish() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT. For decryption operations, the data must be exactly as long
+ * as the key. Otherwise, return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
*
* o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS. For PSS-padded signature operations, the PSS salt length must match
- * the size of the PSS digest selected. The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams
+ * the size of the PSS digest selected. The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in params
* on begin() must be used as the PSS digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask
* generation function and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm.
*
- * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP. The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams on begin is
- * used as the OAEP digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask generation function and
- * and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm.
- *
* -- ECDSA keys --
*
- * If the data provided for unpadded signing or verification is too long, truncate it.
+ * If the data provided for undigested signing is too long, truncate it.
*
* -- AES keys --
*
* Some additional conditions, depending on block mode:
*
* o BlockMode::ECB or BlockMode::CBC. If padding is PaddingMode::NONE and the data length is
- * not a multiple of the AES block size, finish() must return
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. If padding is PaddingMode::PKCS7, pad the data per the
- * PKCS#7 specification, including adding an additional padding block if the data is a multiple
- * of the block length.
+ * not a multiple of the AES block size, finish() must return
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH. If padding is PaddingMode::PKCS7, pad the data per the
+ * PKCS#7 specification, including adding an additional padding block if the data is a
+ * multiple of the block length.
*
* o BlockMode::GCM. During encryption, after processing all plaintext, compute the tag
* (Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes) and append it to the returned ciphertext. During decryption,
* process the last Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes as the tag. If tag verification fails, finish()
* must return ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED.
*
- * TODO: update() will need to be refactored into 2 function. b/168665179.
- *
- * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation.
- *
* @param input Data to be processed, per the parameters established in the call to begin().
* finish() must consume all provided data or return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
*
@@ -281,11 +262,9 @@
* token.
*
* @param confirmationToken is the confirmation token required by keys with
- * Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.
+ * Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.
*
* @return The output data, if any.
- *
- * @return outParams Any output parameters generated by finish().
*/
byte[] finish(in @nullable byte[] input, in @nullable byte[] signature,
in @nullable HardwareAuthToken authToken,
@@ -293,13 +272,10 @@
in @nullable byte[] confirmationToken);
/**
- * Aborts a cryptographic operation begun with begin(), freeing all internal resources. If an
- * operation was finalized, calling update, finish, or abort yields
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. An operation is finalized if finish or abort was
- * called on it, or if update returned an ErrorCode.
- *
- * @param operationHandle The operation handle returned by begin(). This handle must be
- * invalid when abort() returns.
+ * Aborts a cryptographic operation begun with IKeyMintDevice::begin(), freeing all internal
+ * resources. If an operation was finalized, calling updateAad, update, finish, or abort yields
+ * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. An operation is finalized if finish or abort was called
+ * on it, or if updateAad or update returned an ErrorCode.
*
* @return error See the ErrorCode enum in ErrorCode.aidl.
*/
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index b6285d9..04d91d0 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
* While a proper BCC, as described above, reflects the complete boot sequence from boot ROM to the
* secure area image of the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent, it's also possible to use a "degenerate"
* BCC which consists only of a single, self-signed certificate containing the public key of a
- * hardware-bound key pair. This is an appopriate solution for devices which haven't implemented
+ * hardware-bound key pair. This is an appropriate solution for devices which haven't implemented
* everything necessary to produce a proper BCC, but can derive a unique key pair in the secure
* area. In this degenerate case, DK_pub is the same as KM_pub.
*
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
index 972a6a5..f93dbba 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
* There are a few variations in what is contained in `certificateChain`, depending on whether
* the caller requested attestation, whether they provided an attestation key (via the
* `attestationKey` parameter of `generateKey()`, `importKey()` or `importWrappedKey()`), and in
- * the non-attestaion case, whether the key can self-sign.
+ * the non-attestation case, whether the key can self-sign.
*
* 1. Asymmetric key attestation with factory key. If Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is provided
* and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generate/import call is null, the returned
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
* attestation keys.
*
* 2. Asymmetric key attestation with caller-provided key. If Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is
- * provided and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generat/import call is non-null and
+ * provided and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generate/import call is non-null and
* contains the key blob of a key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the returned certificate
* chain must contain only an attestation certificate signed with the specified key. The
* caller must know the certificate chain for the provided key. Tag::
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
index f896125..5840c6b 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
* The origin of a key (or pair), i.e. where it was generated. Note that ORIGIN can be found in
* either the hardware-enforced or software-enforced list for a key, indicating whether the key is
* hardware or software-based. Specifically, a key with GENERATED in the hardware-enforced list
- * must be guaranteed never to have existed outide the secure hardware.
+ * must be guaranteed never to have existed outside the secure hardware.
* @hide
*/
@VintfStability
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
index c874fc3..e141e55 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@
@VintfStability
@Backing(type="int")
enum KeyPurpose {
- /* Usable with RSA, EC and AES keys. */
+ /* Usable with RSA, 3DES and AES keys. */
ENCRYPT = 0,
- /* Usable with RSA, EC and AES keys. */
+ /* Usable with RSA, 3DES and AES keys. */
DECRYPT = 1,
/* Usable with RSA, EC and HMAC keys. */
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
VERIFY = 3,
/* 4 is reserved */
+
/* Usable with wrapping keys. */
WRAP_KEY = 5,
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
index 02e7f00..1e101ab 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
import android.hardware.security.keymint.TagType;
// TODO(seleneh) : note aidl currently does not support double nested enum definitions such as
-// ROOT_OF_TRUST = TagType:BYTES | 704. So we are forced to write definations as
+// ROOT_OF_TRUST = TagType:BYTES | 704. So we are forced to write definitions as
// ROOT_OF_TRUST = (9 << 28) for now. Will need to flip this back later when aidl support is added.
/**
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
ALGORITHM = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 2,
/**
- * Tag::KEY_SIZE pecifies the size, in bits, of the key, measuring in the normal way for the
+ * Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size, in bits, of the key, measuring in the normal way for the
* key's algorithm. For example, for RSA keys, Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size of the public
* modulus. For AES keys it specifies the length of the secret key material. For 3DES keys it
* specifies the length of the key material, not counting parity bits (though parity bits must
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@
* is only relevant to AES and 3DES keys. Possible values are defined by the BlockMode enum.
*
* This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. For AES and 3DES operations the caller
- * must specify a Tag::BLOCK_MODE in the additionalParams argument of begin(). If the mode is
- * missing or the specified mode is not in the modes specified for the key during
- * generation/import, the operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE.
+ * must specify a Tag::BLOCK_MODE in the params argument of begin(). If the mode is missing or
+ * the specified mode is not in the modes specified for the key during generation/import, the
+ * operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
@@ -89,9 +89,9 @@
* values are defined by the Digest enum.
*
* This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. For signing and verification operations,
- * the caller must specify a digest in the additionalParams argument of begin(). If the digest
- * is missing or the specified digest is not in the digests associated with the key, the
- * operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
+ * the caller must specify a digest in the params argument of begin(). If the digest is missing
+ * or the specified digest is not in the digests associated with the key, the operation must
+ * fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
* This value is the minimum MAC length, in bits. It must be a multiple of 8 bits. For HMAC
* keys, the value must be least 64 and no more than 512. For GCM keys, the value must be at
* least 96 and no more than 128. If the provided value violates these requirements,
- * generateKey() or importKey() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ * generateKey() or importKey() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
@@ -154,9 +154,8 @@
// Tag 9 reserved
/**
- * Tag::EC_CURVE specifies the elliptic curve. EC key generation requests may have
- * Tag:EC_CURVE, Tag::KEY_SIZE, or both. If both are provided and the size and curve do not
- * match, IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+ * Tag::EC_CURVE specifies the elliptic curve. Possible values are defined in the EcCurve
+ * enumeration.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
@@ -188,16 +187,13 @@
INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 202,
/**
- * Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST specifies the MGF1 digest algorithms that may be used with
- * RSA encryption/decryption with OAEP padding. If the key characteristics supports OAEP
- * and this tag is absent then SHA1 digest is selected by default for MGF1.
+ * Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST specifies the MGF1 digest algorithms that may be used with RSA
+ * encryption/decryption with OAEP padding. Possible values are defined by the Digest enum.
*
- * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. If this tag is present in the key
- * characteristics with one or more values from @4.0::Digest, then for RSA cipher
- * operations with OAEP Padding, the caller must specify a digest in the additionalParams
- * argument of begin operation. If this tag is missing or the specified digest is not in
- * the digests associated with the key then begin operation must fail with
- * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST.
+ * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import. RSA cipher operations with OAEP padding
+ * must specify an MGF1 digest in the params argument of begin(). If this tag is missing or the
+ * specified digest is not in the MGF1 digests associated with the key then begin operation must
+ * fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST.
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
@@ -226,7 +222,7 @@
* ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE. IKeyMintDevice implementations are not
* required to support rollback resistance.
*
- * Must be hardwared-enforced.
+ * Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 303,
@@ -236,7 +232,7 @@
/**
* Keys tagged with EARLY_BOOT_ONLY may only be used during early boot, until
* IKeyMintDevice::earlyBootEnded() is called. Early boot keys may be created after
- * early boot. Early boot keys may not be imprted at all, if Tag::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY is
+ * early boot. Early boot keys may not be imported at all, if Tag::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY is
* provided to IKeyMintDevice::importKey, the import must fail with
* ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
*/
@@ -292,7 +288,7 @@
* with ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED. This implies that the IKeyMintDevice must keep a
* table of use counters for keys with this tag. Because memory is often limited, this table
* may have a fixed maximum size and KeyMint may fail operations that attempt to use keys with
- * this tag when the table is full. The table must acommodate at least 8 in-use keys and
+ * this tag when the table is full. The table must accommodate at least 8 in-use keys and
* aggressively reuse table slots when key minimum-usage intervals expire. If an operation
* fails because the table is full, KeyMint returns ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
*
@@ -312,7 +308,7 @@
* device is restarted. This implies that the IKeyMintDevice must keep a table of use
* counters for keys with this tag. Because KeyMint memory is often limited, this table can
* have a fixed maximum size and KeyMint can fail operations that attempt to use keys with
- * this tag when the table is full. The table needs to acommodate at least 8 keys. If an
+ * this tag when the table is full. The table needs to accommodate at least 8 keys. If an
* operation fails because the table is full, IKeyMintDevice must
* ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
*
@@ -371,14 +367,14 @@
* key, and may only be used if the difference between the current time when begin() is called
* and the timestamp in the HardwareAuthToken is less than the value in Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT * 1000
* (the multiplier is because Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT is in seconds, but the HardwareAuthToken
- * timestamp is in milliseconds). Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must returrn
+ * timestamp is in milliseconds). Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must return
* ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
*
* If Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT is not present, then the key is an "auth-per-operation" key. In this
* case, begin() must not require a HardwareAuthToken with appropriate contents. Instead,
* update() and finish() must receive a HardwareAuthToken with Tag::USER_SECURE_ID value in
* userId or authenticatorId fields, and the current operation's operation handle in the
- * challenge field. Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must returrn
+ * challenge field. Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must return
* ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
*
* This tag is repeatable. If repeated, and any one of the values matches the HardwareAuthToken
@@ -419,7 +415,7 @@
/**
* Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT specifies the time in seconds for which the key is authorized for use,
* after user authentication. If
- * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID is present and this tag is not, then the key requies authentication for
+ * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID is present and this tag is not, then the key requires authentication for
* every usage (see begin() for the details of the authentication-per-operation flow).
*
* The value is a 32-bit integer specifying the time in seconds after a successful
@@ -489,7 +485,7 @@
* Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED is only applicable to keys with KeyPurpose SIGN, and
* specifies that this key must not be usable unless the user provides confirmation of the data
* to be signed. Confirmation is proven to keyMint via an approval token. See
- * CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, as well as the ConfirmatinUI HAL.
+ * CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, as well as the ConfirmationUI HAL.
*
* If an attempt to use a key with this tag does not have a cryptographically valid
* CONFIRMATION_TOKEN provided to finish() or if the data provided to update()/finish() does not
@@ -509,10 +505,10 @@
/**
* Tag::APPLICATION_ID. When provided to generateKey or importKey, this tag specifies data
- * that is necessary during all uses of the key. In particular, calls to exportKey() and
- * getKeyCharacteristics() must provide the same value to the clientId parameter, and calls to
- * begin must provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set. If
- * the correct data is not provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
+ * that is necessary during all uses of the key. In particular, calls to exportKey() must
+ * provide the same value to the clientId parameter, and calls to begin() must provide this
+ * tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set. If the correct data is not
+ * provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
*
* The content of this tag must be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
* possible for an adversary who has access to all of the secure world secrets but does not have
@@ -535,7 +531,7 @@
* provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set. If the correct
* data is not provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
*
- * The content of this tag msut be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
+ * The content of this tag must be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
* possible for an adversary who has access to all of the secure world secrets but does not have
* access to the tag content to decrypt the key without brute-forcing the tag content, which
* applications can prevent by specifying sufficiently high-entropy content.
@@ -546,10 +542,9 @@
/**
* Tag::CREATION_DATETIME specifies the date and time the key was created, in milliseconds since
- * January 1, 1970. This tag is optional and informational only.
+ * January 1, 1970. This tag is optional and informational only, and not enforced by anything.
*
- * Tag::CREATED is informational only, and not enforced by anything. Must be in the
- * software-enforced list, if provided.
+ * Must be in the software-enforced list, if provided.
*/
CREATION_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 701,
@@ -578,8 +573,8 @@
* Tag::OS_VERSION specifies the system OS version with which the key may be used. This tag is
* never sent to the IKeyMintDevice, but is added to the hardware-enforced authorization list
* by the TA. Any attempt to use a key with a Tag::OS_VERSION value different from the
- * currently-running OS version must cause begin(), getKeyCharacteristics() or exportKey() to
- * return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. See upgradeKey() for details.
+ * currently-running OS version must cause begin() or exportKey() to return
+ * ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. See upgradeKey() for details.
*
* The value of the tag is an integer of the form MMmmss, where MM is the major version number,
* mm is the minor version number, and ss is the sub-minor version number. For example, for a
@@ -601,9 +596,8 @@
* Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL specifies the system security patch level with which the key may be used.
* This tag is never sent to the keyMint TA, but is added to the hardware-enforced
* authorization list by the TA. Any attempt to use a key with a Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL value
- * different from the currently-running system patchlevel must cause begin(),
- * getKeyCharacteristics() or exportKey() to return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. See
- * upgradeKey() for details.
+ * different from the currently-running system patchlevel must cause begin() or
+ * exportKey() to return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. See upgradeKey() for details.
*
* The value of the tag is an integer of the form YYYYMM, where YYYY is the four-digit year of
* the last update and MM is the two-digit month of the last update. For example, for a key
@@ -635,10 +629,11 @@
* Tag::CREATION_DATETIME by 2592000000, dropping any remainder. T changes every 30 days
* (2592000000 = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000).
*
- * C is the value of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID that is provided to attestKey().
+ * C is the value of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID that is provided to attested key
+ * generation/import operations.
*
- * R is 1 if Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION was provided to attestKey or 0 if the tag was not
- * provided.
+ * R is 1 if Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION was provided to attested key generation/import or 0
+ * if the tag was not provided.
*
* HBK is a unique hardware-bound secret known to the secure environment and never revealed
* by it. The secret must contain at least 128 bits of entropy and be unique to the
@@ -653,9 +648,9 @@
UNIQUE_ID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 707,
/**
- * Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is used to deliver a "challenge" value to the attestKey() method,
- * which must place the value in the KeyDescription SEQUENCE of the attestation extension. See
- * attestKey().
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is used to deliver a "challenge" value to the attested key
+ * generation/import methods, which must place the value in the KeyDescription SEQUENCE of the
+ * attestation extension.
*
* Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
*/
@@ -663,7 +658,7 @@
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID identifies the set of applications which may use a key, used
- * only with attestKey().
+ * only with attested key generation/import operations.
*
* The content of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID is a DER-encoded ASN.1 structure, with the
* following schema:
@@ -689,8 +684,8 @@
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND provides the device's brand name, as returned by Build.BRAND in
- * Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
- * device's identifiers.
+ * Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must be set only when
+ * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -702,8 +697,8 @@
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE provides the device's device name, as returned by Build.DEVICE in
- * Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
- * device's identifiers.
+ * Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must be set only when
+ * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -715,8 +710,8 @@
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT provides the device's product name, as returned by Build.PRODUCT
- * in Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
- * device's identifiers.
+ * in Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must be set only when
+ * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -739,8 +734,9 @@
ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 713,
/**
- * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI provides the IMEIs for all radios on the device to attestKey().
- * This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI provides the IMEIs for all radios on the device to attested key
+ * generation/import operations. This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+ * device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -751,8 +747,9 @@
ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 714,
/**
- * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID provides the MEIDs for all radios on the device to attestKey().
- * This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
+ * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID provides the MEIDs for all radios on the device to attested key
+ * generation/import operations. This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+ * device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -764,8 +761,8 @@
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER provides the device's manufacturer name, as returned by
- * Build.MANUFACTURER in Android, to attstKey(). This field must be set only when requesting
- * attestation of the device's identifiers.
+ * Build.MANUFACTURER in Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must
+ * be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -777,8 +774,8 @@
/**
* Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL provides the device's model name, as returned by Build.MODEL in
- * Android, to attestKey(). This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
- * device's identifiers.
+ * Android, to attested key generation/import operations. This field must be set only when
+ * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
*
* If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
* called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -792,9 +789,8 @@
* Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL specifies the vendor image security patch level with which the key may
* be used. This tag is never sent to the keyMint TA, but is added to the hardware-enforced
* authorization list by the TA. Any attempt to use a key with a Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL value
- * different from the currently-running system patchlevel must cause begin(),
- * getKeyCharacteristics() or exportKey() to return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. See
- * upgradeKey() for details.
+ * different from the currently-running system patchlevel must cause begin() or
+ * exportKey() to return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. See upgradeKey() for details.
*
* The value of the tag is an integer of the form YYYYMMDD, where YYYY is the four-digit year of
* the last update, MM is the two-digit month and DD is the two-digit day of the last
@@ -815,8 +811,8 @@
* key may be used. This tag is never sent to the keyMint TA, but is added to the
* hardware-enforced authorization list by the TA. Any attempt to use a key with a
* Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL value different from the currently-running system patchlevel must
- * cause begin(), getKeyCharacteristics() or exportKey() to return
- * ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. See upgradeKey() for details.
+ * cause begin() or exportKey() to return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE. See upgradeKey() for
+ * details.
*
* The value of the tag is an integer of the form YYYYMMDD, where YYYY is the four-digit year of
* the last update, MM is the two-digit month and DD is the two-digit day of the last
@@ -824,20 +820,20 @@
* the value would be 20180605. If the day is not known, 00 may be substituted.
*
* During each boot, the bootloader must provide the patch level of the boot image to the secure
- * envirionment (mechanism is implementation-defined).
+ * environment (mechanism is implementation-defined).
*
* Must be hardware-enforced.
*/
BOOT_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 719,
/**
- * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attestKey(). It indicates that
- * attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather than a batch key. When a
- * device-unique key is used, only the attestation certificate is returned; no additional
- * chained certificates are provided. It's up to the caller to recognize the device-unique
- * signing key. Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices may support device-unique
- * attestations. SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must return
- * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
+ * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attested key generation/import
+ * operations. It indicates that attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather
+ * than a batch key. When a device-unique key is used, only the attestation certificate is
+ * returned; no additional chained certificates are provided. It's up to the caller to
+ * recognize the device-unique signing key. Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices may
+ * support device-unique attestations. SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must
+ * return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
* SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices need not support DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, and
* return ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS if they do not support it.
*
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
index 4e951d6..afb2193 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AllRsaSizes) {
for (auto size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
/*
- * Create attestaton key.
+ * Create attestation key.
*/
AttestationKey attest_key;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@
TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AllEcCurves) {
for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
/*
- * Create attestaton key.
+ * Create attestation key.
*/
AttestationKey attest_key;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@
}
TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AttestWithNonAttestKey) {
- // Create non-attestaton key.
+ // Create non-attestation key.
AttestationKey non_attest_key;
vector<KeyCharacteristics> non_attest_key_characteristics;
vector<Certificate> non_attest_key_cert_chain;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
index 61f2f77..f0dfff1 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@
os_version_ = getOsVersion();
os_patch_level_ = getOsPatchlevel();
+ vendor_patch_level_ = getVendorPatchlevel();
}
void KeyMintAidlTestBase::SetUp() {
@@ -743,6 +744,15 @@
return {224, 384, 521};
case Algorithm::AES:
return {192};
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ return {56};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+ } else {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ return {56};
default:
return {};
}
@@ -750,6 +760,68 @@
return {};
}
+vector<BlockMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidBlockModes(Algorithm algorithm) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ return {
+ BlockMode::CBC,
+ BlockMode::CTR,
+ BlockMode::ECB,
+ BlockMode::GCM,
+ };
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ return {
+ BlockMode::CBC,
+ BlockMode::ECB,
+ };
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+}
+
+vector<PaddingMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm,
+ BlockMode blockMode) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ switch (blockMode) {
+ case BlockMode::CBC:
+ case BlockMode::ECB:
+ return {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+ case BlockMode::CTR:
+ case BlockMode::GCM:
+ return {PaddingMode::NONE};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ };
+ case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+ switch (blockMode) {
+ case BlockMode::CBC:
+ case BlockMode::ECB:
+ return {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ };
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+}
+
+vector<PaddingMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm,
+ BlockMode blockMode) {
+ switch (algorithm) {
+ case Algorithm::AES:
+ switch (blockMode) {
+ case BlockMode::CTR:
+ case BlockMode::GCM:
+ return {PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+ default:
+ return {};
+ };
+ default:
+ return {};
+ }
+}
+
vector<EcCurve> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidCurves() {
if (securityLevel_ == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
return {EcCurve::P_256};
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
index 75a4418..88998d5 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
IKeyMintDevice& keyMint() { return *keymint_; }
uint32_t os_version() { return os_version_; }
uint32_t os_patch_level() { return os_patch_level_; }
+ uint32_t vendor_patch_level() { return vendor_patch_level_; }
ErrorCode GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result);
@@ -230,6 +231,10 @@
vector<uint32_t> ValidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
vector<uint32_t> InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
+ vector<BlockMode> ValidBlockModes(Algorithm algorithm);
+ vector<PaddingMode> ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm, BlockMode blockMode);
+ vector<PaddingMode> InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm, BlockMode blockMode);
+
vector<EcCurve> ValidCurves();
vector<EcCurve> InvalidCurves();
@@ -262,6 +267,7 @@
std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> keymint_;
uint32_t os_version_;
uint32_t os_patch_level_;
+ uint32_t vendor_patch_level_;
SecurityLevel securityLevel_;
string name_;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index a89cc5b..f9a99aa 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@
namespace {
+bool check_patchLevels = false;
+
template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
bool contains(const vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag,
ValueT expected_value) {
@@ -291,37 +293,340 @@
class NewKeyGenerationTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
protected:
void CheckBaseParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
- // TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
-
- AuthorizationSet auths;
- for (auto& entry : keyCharacteristics) {
- auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
- }
-
- EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+ AuthorizationSet auths = CheckCommonParams(keyCharacteristics);
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
- // Verify that App data and ROT are NOT included.
- EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
- EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
-
// Check that some unexpected tags/values are NOT present.
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+ }
+
+ void CheckSymmetricParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
+ AuthorizationSet auths = CheckCommonParams(keyCharacteristics);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
+ }
+
+ AuthorizationSet CheckCommonParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
+ // TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
+ AuthorizationSet auths;
+ for (auto& entry : keyCharacteristics) {
+ auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+ }
+ EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+
+ // Verify that App data, ROT and auth timeout are NOT included.
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
+ EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 301U));
+ // Check OS details match the original hardware info.
auto os_ver = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
- ASSERT_TRUE(os_ver);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(os_ver);
EXPECT_EQ(*os_ver, os_version());
-
auto os_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL);
- ASSERT_TRUE(os_pl);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(os_pl);
EXPECT_EQ(*os_pl, os_patch_level());
+
+ if (check_patchLevels) {
+ // Should include vendor and boot patchlevels.
+ auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(vendor_pl);
+ EXPECT_EQ(*vendor_pl, vendor_patch_level());
+ auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(boot_pl);
+ }
+
+ return auths;
}
};
/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.Aes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required AES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Aes) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesInvalidSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesInvalidSize) {
+ for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ // No key size specified
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesInvalidPadding
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid padding on AES keys gives a failure
+ * somewhere along the way.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesInvalidPadding) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+ builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+ }
+
+ auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+ if (result == ErrorCode::OK) {
+ // Key creation was OK but has generated a key that cannot be used.
+ auto params =
+ AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(block_mode).Padding(padding_mode);
+ auto result = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params);
+ EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE ||
+ result == ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB);
+ } else {
+ // The KeyMint implementation detected that the generated key
+ // is unusable.
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, result);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesGcmMissingMinMac
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesGcmMissingMinMac) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+ BlockMode block_mode = BlockMode::GCM;
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ // No MIN_MAC_LENGTH provided.
+ auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .SetDefaultValidity();
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+ GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required 3DES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDes) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDesWithAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required 3DES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ *
+ * Request attestation, which doesn't help for symmetric keys (as there is no public key to
+ * put in a certificate) but which isn't an error.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDesWithAttestation) {
+ for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+
+ auto challenge = "hello";
+ auto app_id = "foo";
+
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+ .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+ EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+ CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+
+ AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES));
+ EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+ << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+ CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDesInvalidSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for 3-DES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDesInvalidSize) {
+ for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Omitting the key size fails.
+ for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+ for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+ SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+ << "3DES-default-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+ vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+ vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)
+ .BlockMode(block_mode)
+ .Padding(padding_mode)
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .SetDefaultValidity(),
+ &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/*
* NewKeyGenerationTest.Rsa
*
* Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes, and that the resulting keys
@@ -1720,7 +2025,7 @@
}
/*
- * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoDigest
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoPadding
*
* Verifies that RSA operations fail when no padding mode is specified. PaddingMode::NONE is
* supported in some cases (as validated in other tests), but a mode must be specified.
@@ -2075,7 +2380,7 @@
}
/*
- * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests
*
* Verifies RSA signature/verification for all padding modes and digests.
*/
@@ -2171,7 +2476,7 @@
}
/*
- * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaAllDigestsAndCurves
*
* Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
*/
@@ -2571,7 +2876,72 @@
}
/*
- * ImportKeyTest.AesSuccess
+ * ImportKeyTest.AesFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an invalid AES key fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, AesFailure) {
+ string key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+ uint32_t bitlen = key.size() * 8;
+ for (uint32_t key_size : {bitlen - 1, bitlen + 1, bitlen - 8, bitlen + 8}) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.TripleDesSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using a 3DES key works.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, TripleDesSuccess) {
+ string key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358");
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 168U);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ CheckCryptoParam(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB);
+ CheckOrigin();
+
+ string message = "Hello World!";
+ auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+ string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+ EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.TripleDesFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an invalid 3DES key fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, TripleDesFailure) {
+ string key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358");
+ uint32_t bitlen = key.size() * 8;
+ for (uint32_t key_size : {bitlen - 1, bitlen + 1, bitlen - 8, bitlen + 8}) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+ ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+ .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+ .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+ .EcbMode()
+ .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+ KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+ }
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.HmacKeySuccess
*
* Verifies that importing and using an HMAC key works.
*/
@@ -2881,7 +3251,7 @@
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepDecryptWithWrongDigest
*
* Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to decrypt
* with a different digest than was used to encrypt.
@@ -3165,7 +3535,7 @@
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbRoundTripSuccess
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesWrongMode
*
* Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized mode is specified.
*/
@@ -3565,7 +3935,7 @@
}
/*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCbcRoundTripSuccess
*
* Verifies that keymint fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size nonce.
*/
@@ -4231,11 +4601,8 @@
.BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
.Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
.Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
- for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
- auto inParams =
- AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
- EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
- }
+ auto inParams = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
}
/*
@@ -4912,6 +5279,19 @@
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(UsageCountLimitTest);
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase GetHardwareInfoTest;
+
+TEST_P(GetHardwareInfoTest, GetHardwareInfo) {
+ // Retrieving hardware info should give the same result each time.
+ KeyMintHardwareInfo info;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint().getHardwareInfo(&info).isOk());
+ KeyMintHardwareInfo info2;
+ ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint().getHardwareInfo(&info2).isOk());
+ EXPECT_EQ(info, info2);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(GetHardwareInfoTest);
+
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase AddEntropyTest;
/*
@@ -4943,6 +5323,16 @@
EXPECT_TRUE(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf(string(2 * 1024, 'a'))).isOk());
}
+/*
+ * AddEntropyTest.AddTooLargeEntropy
+ *
+ * Verifies that the addRngEntropy method rejects more than 2KiB of data.
+ */
+TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddTooLargeEntropy) {
+ ErrorCode rc = GetReturnErrorCode(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf(string(2 * 1024 + 1, 'a'))));
+ EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, rc);
+}
+
INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AddEntropyTest);
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase KeyDeletionTest;
@@ -5122,7 +5512,7 @@
typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase TransportLimitTest;
/*
- * TransportLimitTest.FinishInput
+ * TransportLimitTest.LargeFinishInput
*
* Verifies that passing input data to finish succeeds as expected.
*/
@@ -5396,6 +5786,10 @@
} else {
std::cout << "NOT dumping attestations" << std::endl;
}
+ // TODO(drysdale): Remove this flag when available KeyMint devices comply with spec
+ if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--check_patchLevels") {
+ aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test::check_patchLevels = true;
+ }
}
}
return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
index 53d5b96..e1ead21 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
+++ b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
@@ -38,5 +38,6 @@
uint32_t getOsVersion();
uint32_t getOsPatchlevel();
+uint32_t getVendorPatchlevel();
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
index e73d602..2dbdfa8 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
@@ -31,10 +31,11 @@
constexpr size_t kPlatformVersionMatchCount = kSubminorVersionMatch + 1;
constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.build.version.security_patch";
-constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-[0-9]{2}$";
+constexpr char kVendorPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.vendor.build.security_patch";
+constexpr char kPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-[0-9]{2}$";
constexpr size_t kYearMatch = 1;
constexpr size_t kMonthMatch = 2;
-constexpr size_t kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount = kMonthMatch + 1;
+constexpr size_t kPatchlevelMatchCount = kMonthMatch + 1;
uint32_t match_to_uint32(const char* expression, const regmatch_t& match) {
if (match.rm_so == -1) return 0;
@@ -80,15 +81,14 @@
return getOsVersion(version.c_str());
}
-uint32_t getOsPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str) {
+uint32_t getPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str) {
regex_t regex;
- if (regcomp(®ex, kPlatformPatchlevelRegex, REG_EXTENDED) != 0) {
+ if (regcomp(®ex, kPatchlevelRegex, REG_EXTENDED) != 0) {
return 0;
}
- regmatch_t matches[kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount];
- int not_match =
- regexec(®ex, patchlevel_str, kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount, matches, 0 /* flags */);
+ regmatch_t matches[kPatchlevelMatchCount];
+ int not_match = regexec(®ex, patchlevel_str, kPatchlevelMatchCount, matches, 0 /* flags */);
regfree(®ex);
if (not_match) {
return 0;
@@ -105,7 +105,12 @@
uint32_t getOsPatchlevel() {
std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformPatchlevelProp);
- return getOsPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
+ return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
+}
+
+uint32_t getVendorPatchlevel() {
+ std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kVendorPatchlevelProp);
+ return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
}
} // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl b/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
index 71b4278..2fbd29a 100644
--- a/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
+++ b/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
*
* where:
*
- * ``ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL'' is a sting constant defined in ISecureClock.aidl.
+ * ``ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL'' is a string constant defined in ISecureClock.aidl.
*
* ``H'' is the shared HMAC key (see computeSharedHmac() in ISharedSecret).
*