diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
index 608890b..a75ed25 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.3.xml
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
         <version>3.0</version>
         <version>4.0</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
index e5e012c..3b8ee21 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.4.xml
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
         <version>3.0</version>
         <version>4.0</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
index 8e175f0..0fb21a7 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.5.xml
@@ -284,7 +284,7 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
         <version>3.0</version>
         <version>4.0-1</version>
diff --git a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
index bb22974..01cd1f6 100644
--- a/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
+++ b/compatibility_matrices/compatibility_matrix.current.xml
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@
             <instance>default</instance>
         </interface>
     </hal>
-    <hal format="hidl" optional="false">
+    <hal format="hidl" optional="true">
         <name>android.hardware.keymaster</name>
         <version>3.0</version>
         <version>4.0-1</version>
diff --git a/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp b/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
index e74cca9..7d32ced 100644
--- a/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
+++ b/gatekeeper/1.0/vts/functional/VtsHalGatekeeperV1_0TargetTest.cpp
@@ -306,6 +306,8 @@
   if (first != nullptr && second != nullptr) {
     EXPECT_NE(first->user_id, second->user_id);
   }
+  // the old enrollment should be invalid now
+  verifyPassword(password, enrollRsp.data, 0, verifyRsp, false);
   ALOGI("Testing Untrusted Reenroll done");
 }
 
diff --git a/nfc/1.0/default/Nfc.cpp b/nfc/1.0/default/Nfc.cpp
index fcdcbbc..a1e50f0 100644
--- a/nfc/1.0/default/Nfc.cpp
+++ b/nfc/1.0/default/Nfc.cpp
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 ::android::hardware::Return<NfcStatus> Nfc::coreInitialized(const hidl_vec<uint8_t>& data)  {
     hidl_vec<uint8_t> copy = data;
 
-    if (mDevice == nullptr) {
+    if (mDevice == nullptr || copy.size() == 0) {
         return NfcStatus::FAILED;
     }
     int ret = mDevice->core_initialized(mDevice, &copy[0]);
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index 3f75af6..fa643fc 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/aidl_api/android.hardware.security.keymint/current/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -48,5 +48,6 @@
   void deviceLocked(in boolean passwordOnly, in @nullable android.hardware.security.secureclock.TimeStampToken timestampToken);
   void earlyBootEnded();
   byte[] convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(in byte[] storageKeyBlob);
+  android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCharacteristics[] getKeyCharacteristics(in byte[] keyBlob, in byte[] appId, in byte[] appData);
   const int AUTH_TOKEN_MAC_LENGTH = 32;
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
index b4bc60c..4e3008f 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/AttestationKey.aidl
@@ -27,7 +27,19 @@
 @VintfStability
 @RustDerive(Clone=true, Eq=true, PartialEq=true, Ord=true, PartialOrd=true, Hash=true)
 parcelable AttestationKey {
+    /**
+     * Key blob containing a key pair with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY
+     */
     byte[] keyBlob;
+
+    /**
+     * Key parameters needed to use the key in keyBlob, notably Tag::APPLICATION_ID and
+     * Tag::APPLICATION_DATA, if they were provided during generation of the key in keyBlob.
+     */
     KeyParameter[] attestKeyParams;
+
+    /**
+     * The issuerSubjectName to use in the generated attestation.
+     */
     byte[] issuerSubjectName;
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
index 2304a58..b5336b9 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/BeginResult.aidl
@@ -25,7 +25,10 @@
  */
 @VintfStability
 parcelable BeginResult {
-    /* This is the challenge used in verifyAuthorization.  It must be a nonce. */
+    /**
+     * This is the challenge used to verify authorization of an operation.
+     * See IKeyMintOperation.aidl entrypoints updateAad() and update().
+     */
     long challenge;
 
     /**
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
index a3260f5..c6f89bd 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintDevice.aidl
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.BeginResult;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.HardwareAuthToken;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.IKeyMintOperation;
+import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCharacteristics;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyCreationResult;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyFormat;
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.KeyMintHardwareInfo;
@@ -107,7 +108,6 @@
  *
  *      - 168-bit keys.
  *      - CBC and ECB mode.
-
  *      - CBC and ECB modes must support unpadded and PKCS7 padding modes.  With no padding CBC and
  *        ECB-mode operations must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH if the input isn't a
  *        multiple of the DES block size.
@@ -150,8 +150,8 @@
  *
  * The IKeyMintDevice must ignore unknown tags.
  *
- * The caller must always provide the current date time in the keyParameter CREATION_DATETIME
- * tags.
+ * The caller may provide the current date time in the keyParameter CREATION_DATETIME tag, but
+ * this is optional and informational only.
  *
  * All authorization tags and their values enforced by an IKeyMintDevice must be cryptographically
  * bound to the private/secret key material such that any modification of the portion of the key
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@
  * startup, preferably by the bootloader.  This bitstring must be cryptographically bound to every
  * key managed by the IKeyMintDevice.  As above, the recommended mechanism for this cryptographic
  * binding is to include the Root of Trust data in the input to the key derivation function used to
- * derive a key that is used to encryp the private/secret key material.
+ * derive a key that is used to encrypt the private/secret key material.
  *
  * The root of trust consists of a bitstring that must be derived from the public key used by
  * Verified Boot to verify the signature on the boot image and from the lock state of the
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@
      * Generates a new cryptographic key, specifying associated parameters, which must be
      * cryptographically bound to the key.  IKeyMintDevice implementations must disallow any use
      * of a key in any way inconsistent with the authorizations specified at generation time.  With
-     * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure envionment's
+     * respect to parameters that the secure environment cannot enforce, the secure environment's
      * obligation is limited to ensuring that the unenforceable parameters associated with the key
      * cannot be modified.  In addition, the characteristics returned by generateKey places
      * parameters correctly in the tee-enforced and strongbox-enforced lists.
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@
      *
      * The following parameters are required to generate an RSA key:
      *
-     * o Tag::Key_SIZE specifies the size of the public modulus, in bits.  If omitted, generateKey
+     * o Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size of the public modulus, in bits.  If omitted, generateKey
      *   must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.  Required values for TEE IKeyMintDevice
      *   implementations are 1024, 2048, 3072 and 4096.  StrongBox IKeyMintDevice implementations
      *   must support 2048.
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@
      *   except AGREE_KEY must be supported for RSA keys.
      *
      * o Tag::DIGEST specifies digest algorithms that may be used with the new key.  TEE
-     *   IKeyMintDevice implementatiosn must support all Digest values (see digest.aidl) for RSA
+     *   IKeyMintDevice implementations must support all Digest values (see digest.aidl) for RSA
      *   keys.  StrongBox IKeyMintDevice implementations must support SHA_2_256.
      *
      * o Tag::PADDING specifies the padding modes that may be used with the new
@@ -295,11 +295,9 @@
      *
      * == ECDSA Keys ==
      *
-     * Either Tag::KEY_SIZE or Tag::EC_CURVE must be provided to generate an ECDSA key.  If neither
-     * is provided, generateKey must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.  If Tag::KEY_SIZE is
-     * provided, the possible values are 224, 256, 384 and 521, and must be mapped to Tag::EC_CURVE
-     * values P_224, P_256, P_384 and P_521, respectively.  TEE IKeyMintDevice implementations
-     * must support all curves.  StrongBox implementations must support P_256.
+     * Tag::EC_CURVE must be provided to generate an ECDSA key.  If it is not provided, generateKey
+     * must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE. TEE IKeyMintDevice implementations must support
+     * all curves.  StrongBox implementations must support P_256.
      *
      * == AES Keys ==
      *
@@ -309,6 +307,10 @@
      * If Tag::BLOCK_MODE is specified with value BlockMode::GCM, then the caller must also provide
      * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH.  If omitted, generateKey must return ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
      *
+     * == 3DES Keys ==
+     *
+     * Only Tag::KEY_SIZE is required to generate an 3DES key, and its value must be 168.  If
+     * omitted, generateKey must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
      *
      * @param keyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
      *        provided in params.  See above for detailed specifications of which tags are required
@@ -349,13 +351,12 @@
      *
      * o Tag::ORIGIN (returned in keyCharacteristics) must have the value KeyOrigin::IMPORTED.
      *
-     * @param inKeyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
+     * @param keyParams Key generation parameters are defined as KeyMintDevice tag/value pairs,
      *        provided in params.
      *
-     * @param inKeyFormat The format of the key material to import.  See KeyFormat in
-     *        keyformat.aidl.
+     * @param keyFormat The format of the key material to import.  See KeyFormat in keyformat.aidl.
      *
-     * @param inKeyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat.
+     * @param keyData The key material to import, in the format specified in keyFormat.
      *
      * @param attestationKey, if provided, specifies the key that must be used to sign the
      *        attestation certificate.  If `keyParams` does not contain a Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE
@@ -378,9 +379,8 @@
      * Securely imports a key, or key pair, returning a key blob and a description of the imported
      * key.
      *
-     * @param inWrappedKeyData The wrapped key material to import.
-     *     TODO(seleneh) Decide if we want the wrapped key in DER-encoded ASN.1 format or CBOR
-     *     format or both.  And specify the standarized format.
+     * @param wrappedKeyData The wrapped key material to import, as ASN.1 DER-encoded data
+     *        corresponding to the following schema.
      *
      *     KeyDescription ::= SEQUENCE(
      *         keyFormat INTEGER,                   # Values from KeyFormat enum.
@@ -398,20 +398,20 @@
      *
      *     Where:
      *
-     *     o keyFormat is an integer from the KeyFormat enum, defining the format of the plaintext
+     *     - keyFormat is an integer from the KeyFormat enum, defining the format of the plaintext
      *       key material.
-     *     o keyParams is the characteristics of the key to be imported (as with generateKey or
+     *     - keyParams is the characteristics of the key to be imported (as with generateKey or
      *       importKey).  If the secure import is successful, these characteristics must be
      *       associated with the key exactly as if the key material had been insecurely imported
-     *       with the IKeyMintDevice::importKey.  See attestKey() for documentation of the
-     *       AuthorizationList schema.
-     *     o encryptedTransportKey is a 256-bit AES key, XORed with a masking key and then encrypted
+     *       with the IKeyMintDevice::importKey.  See KeyCreationResult.aidl for documentation of
+     *       the AuthorizationList schema.
+     *     - encryptedTransportKey is a 256-bit AES key, XORed with a masking key and then encrypted
      *       with the wrapping key specified by wrappingKeyBlob.
-     *     o keyDescription is a KeyDescription, above.
-     *     o encryptedKey is the key material of the key to be imported, in format keyFormat, and
+     *     - keyDescription is a KeyDescription, above.
+     *     - encryptedKey is the key material of the key to be imported, in format keyFormat, and
      *       encrypted with encryptedEphemeralKey in AES-GCM mode, with the DER-encoded
      *       representation of keyDescription provided as additional authenticated data.
-     *     o tag is the tag produced by the AES-GCM encryption of encryptedKey.
+     *     - tag is the tag produced by the AES-GCM encryption of encryptedKey.
      *
      * So, importWrappedKey does the following:
      *
@@ -440,7 +440,7 @@
      *
      * @param passwordSid specifies the password secure ID (SID) of the user that owns the key being
      *        installed.  If the authorization list in wrappedKeyData contains a
-     *        Tag::USER_SECURE_IDwith a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD bit
+     *        Tag::USER_SECURE_ID with a value that has the HardwareAuthenticatorType::PASSWORD bit
      *        set, the constructed key must be bound to the SID value provided by this argument.  If
      *        the wrappedKeyData does not contain such a tag and value, this argument must be
      *        ignored.
@@ -483,9 +483,9 @@
      * patch level and OS version.  This requirement is relaxed for 4.0::IKeymasterDevice and
      * IKeyMintDevice, and the OS version in the boot image footer is no longer used.
      *
-     * @param inKeyBlobToUpgrade The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+     * @param keyBlobToUpgrade The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey().
      *
-     * @param inUpgradeParams A parameter list containing any parameters needed to complete the
+     * @param upgradeParams A parameter list containing any parameters needed to complete the
      *        upgrade, including Tag::APPLICATION_ID and Tag::APPLICATION_DATA.
      *
      * @return A new key blob that references the same key as keyBlobToUpgrade, but is in the new
@@ -499,7 +499,9 @@
      * render the key permanently unusable.  Keys without Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or
      * may not be rendered unusable.
      *
-     * @param inKeyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+     * @param keyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey();
+     *
+     * @return error See the ErrorCode enum.
      */
     void deleteKey(in byte[] keyBlob);
 
@@ -508,8 +510,6 @@
      * this function is called all keys with Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE in their hardware-enforced
      * authorization lists must be rendered permanently unusable.  Keys without
      * Tag::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE may or may not be rendered unusable.
-     *
-     * @return error See the ErrorCode enum.
      */
     void deleteAllKeys();
 
@@ -528,28 +528,27 @@
 
     /**
      * Begins a cryptographic operation using the specified key.  If all is well, begin() must
-     * return ErrorCode::OK and create an operation handle which must be passed to subsequent calls
-     * to update(), finish() or abort().
+     * return ErrorCode::OK and create an IKeyMintOperation handle which will be used to perform
+     * the cryptographic operation.
      *
-     * It is critical that each call to begin() be paired with a subsequent call to finish() or
-     * abort(), to allow the IKeyMintDevice implementation to clean up any internal operation
-     * state.  The caller's failure to do this may leak internal state space or other internal
-     * resources and may eventually cause begin() to return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS when it
-     * runs out of space for operations.  Any result other than ErrorCode::OK from begin(), update()
-     * or finish() implicitly aborts the operation, in which case abort() need not be called (and
-     * must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE if called).  IKeyMintDevice implementations
-     * must support 32 concurrent operations.
+     * It is critical that each successful call to begin() be paired with a subsequent call to
+     * finish() or abort() on the resulting IKeyMintOperation, to allow the IKeyMintDevice
+     * implementation to clean up any internal operation state.  The caller's failure to do this may
+     * leak internal state space or other internal resources and may eventually cause begin() to
+     * return ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS when it runs out of space for operations.  Any result
+     * other than ErrorCode::OK from begin() will not return an IKeyMintOperation (in which case
+     * calling finish() or abort() is neither possible nor necessary). IKeyMintDevice
+     * implementations must support 32 concurrent operations.
      *
      * If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were specified during key generation or
      * import, calls to begin must include those tags with the originally-specified values in the
-     * inParams argument to this method.  If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
+     * params argument to this method.  If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
      *
      * == Authorization Enforcement ==
      *
      * The following key authorization parameters must be enforced by the IKeyMintDevice secure
      * environment if the tags were returned in the "hardwareEnforced" list in the
-     * KeyCharacteristics.  Public key operations, meaning KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and
-     * KeyPurpose::VERIFY must be allowed to succeed even if authorization requirements are not met.
+     * KeyCharacteristics.
      *
      * -- All Key Types --
      *
@@ -578,9 +577,9 @@
      *
      * o Tag::USER_SECURE_ID must be enforced by this method if and only if the key also has
      *   Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT (if it does not have Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT, the Tag::USER_SECURE_ID
-     *   requirement must be enforced by update() and finish()).  If the key has both, then this
-     *   method must receive a non-empty HardwareAuthToken in the authToken argument.  For the auth
-     *   token to be valid, all of the following have to be true:
+     *   requirement must be enforced by updateAad(), update() and finish()).  If the key has both,
+     *   then this method must receive a non-empty HardwareAuthToken in the authToken argument.  For
+     *   the auth token to be valid, all of the following have to be true:
      *
      *   o The HMAC field must validate correctly.
      *
@@ -607,32 +606,30 @@
      *
      * -- RSA Keys --
      *
-     * All RSA key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams.  If unspecified or
+     * All RSA key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in params.  If unspecified or
      * specified more than once, the begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.
      *
-     * RSA signing and verification operations need a digest, as do RSA encryption and decryption
-     * operations with OAEP padding mode.  For those cases, the caller must specify exactly one
-     * digest in inParams.  If unspecified or specified more than once, begin() must return
+     * RSA signing operations need a digest, as do RSA encryption and decryption operations with
+     * OAEP padding mode.  For those cases, the caller must specify exactly one digest in params.
+     * If unspecified or specified more than once, begin() must return
      * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST.
      *
      * Private key operations (KeyPurpose::DECRYPT and KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of
      * digest and padding, which means that the key authorizations need to contain the specified
      * values.  If not, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST or
-     * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING, as appropriate.  Public key operations (KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT
-     * and KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are permitted with unauthorized digest or padding modes.
+     * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, as appropriate.
      *
      * With the exception of PaddingMode::NONE, all RSA padding modes are applicable only to certain
      * purposes.  Specifically, PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN and PaddingMode::RSA_PSS only
-     * support signing and verification, while PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and
-     * PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP only support encryption and decryption.  begin() must return
-     * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE if the specified mode does not support the specified
-     * purpose.
+     * support signing, while PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_ENCRYPT and PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP only
+     * support encryption and decryption.  begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE
+     * if the specified mode does not support the specified purpose.
      *
      * There are some important interactions between padding modes and digests:
      *
-     * o PaddingMode::NONE indicates that a "raw" RSA operation is performed.  If signing or
-     *   verifying, Digest::NONE is specified for the digest.  No digest is necessary for unpadded
-     *   encryption or decryption.
+     * o PaddingMode::NONE indicates that a "raw" RSA operation is performed.  If signing,
+     *   Digest::NONE is specified for the digest.  No digest is necessary for unpadded encryption
+     *   or decryption.
      *
      * o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_5_SIGN padding requires a digest.  The digest may be Digest::NONE,
      *   in which case the KeyMint implementation cannot build a proper PKCS#1 v1.5 signature
@@ -644,37 +641,37 @@
      *
      * o PaddingMode::RSA_PKCS1_1_1_5_ENCRYPT padding does not require a digest.
      *
-     * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE.  If
-     *   Digest::NONE is specified, the begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.  In
-     *   addition, the size of the RSA key must be at least 2 + D bytes larger than the output size
-     *   of the digest, where D is the size of the digest, in bytes.  Otherwise begin() must
-     *   return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.  The salt size must be D.
+     * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS padding requires a digest, which must match one of the padding values
+     *   in the key authorizations, and which may not be Digest::NONE.  begin() must return
+     *   ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST if this is not the case.  In addition, the size of the RSA
+     *   key must be at least 2 + D bytes larger than the output size of the digest, where D is the
+     *   size of the digest, in bytes.  Otherwise begin() must return
+     *   ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.  The salt size must be D.
      *
-     * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP padding requires a digest, which may not be Digest::NONE.  If
-     *   Digest::NONE is specified, begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.  The OAEP
-     *   mask generation function must be MGF1 and the MGF1 digest must be SHA1, regardless of the
-     *   OAEP digest specified.
+     * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP padding requires a digest, which must match one of the padding values
+     *   in the key authorizations, and which may not be Digest::NONE.  begin() must return
+     *   ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST if this is not the case.  RSA_OAEP padding also requires an
+     *   MGF1 digest, specified with Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST, which must match one of the MGF1
+     *   padding values in the key authorizations and which may not be Digest::NONE.  begin() must
+     *   return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST if this is not the case. The OAEP mask generation
+     *   function must be MGF1.
      *
      * -- EC Keys --
      *
-     * EC key operations must specify exactly one padding mode in inParams.  If unspecified or
-     * specified more than once, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.
-     *
      * Private key operations (KeyPurpose::SIGN) need authorization of digest and padding, which
      * means that the key authorizations must contain the specified values.  If not, begin() must
-     * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.  Public key operations (KeyPurpose::VERIFY) are
-     * permitted with unauthorized digest or padding.
+     * return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
      *
      * -- AES Keys --
      *
      * AES key operations must specify exactly one block mode (Tag::BLOCK_MODE) and one padding mode
-     * (Tag::PADDING) in inParams.  If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
+     * (Tag::PADDING) in params.  If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
      * begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE or
      * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.  The specified modes must be authorized by the key,
      * otherwise begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE or
      * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
      *
-     * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM, inParams must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH, and the specified
+     * If the block mode is BlockMode::GCM, params must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH, and the specified
      * value must be a multiple of 8 that is not greater than 128 or less than the value of
      * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations.  For MAC lengths greater than 128 or
      * non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH.  For values less
@@ -687,43 +684,63 @@
      *
      * If the block mode is BlockMode::CBC, BlockMode::CTR, or BlockMode::GCM, an initialization
      * vector or nonce is required.  In most cases, callers shouldn't provide an IV or nonce and the
-     * IKeyMintDevice implementation must generate a random IV or nonce and return it via
-     * Tag::NONCE in outParams.  CBC and CTR IVs are 16 bytes.  GCM nonces are 12 bytes.  If the key
+     * IKeyMintDevice implementation must generate a random IV or nonce and return it via Tag::NONCE
+     * in outParams.  CBC and CTR IVs are 16 bytes.  GCM nonces are 12 bytes.  If the key
      * authorizations contain Tag::CALLER_NONCE, then the caller may provide an IV/nonce with
-     * Tag::NONCE in inParams.  If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
+     * Tag::NONCE in params, which must be of the correct size (if not, return
+     * ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE).  If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
      * begin() must return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED.  If a nonce is not provided when
-     * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice msut generate a random IV/nonce.
+     * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice must generate a random IV/nonce.
+     *
+     * -- 3DES Keys --
+     *
+     * 3DES key operations must specify exactly one block mode (Tag::BLOCK_MODE) and one padding
+     * mode (Tag::PADDING) in params.  If either value is unspecified or specified more than once,
+     * begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_BLOCK_MODE or
+     * ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE.  The specified modes must be authorized by the key,
+     * otherwise begin() must return ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE or
+     * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE.
+     *
+     * If the block mode is BlockMode::CBC, an initialization vector or nonce is required.  In most
+     * cases, callers shouldn't provide an IV or nonce and the IKeyMintDevice implementation must
+     * generate a random IV or nonce and return it via Tag::NONCE in outParams.  CBC IVs are 8
+     * bytes.  If the key authorizations contain Tag::CALLER_NONCE, then the caller may provide an
+     * IV/nonce with Tag::NONCE in params, which must be of the correct size (if not, return
+     * ErrorCode::INVALID_NONCE).  If a nonce is provided when Tag::CALLER_NONCE is not authorized,
+     * begin() must return ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED.  If a nonce is not provided when
+     * Tag::CALLER_NONCE is authorized, IKeyMintDevice must generate a random IV/nonce.
+     *
      *
      * -- HMAC keys --
      *
-     * HMAC key operations must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH in inParams.  The specified value must be a
+     * HMAC key operations must specify Tag::MAC_LENGTH in params.  The specified value must be a
      * multiple of 8 that is not greater than the digest length or less than the value of
      * Tag::MIN_MAC_LENGTH in the key authorizations.  For MAC lengths greater than the digest
      * length or non-multiples of 8, begin() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MAC_LENGTH.  For
      * values less than the key's minimum length, begin() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_MAC_LENGTH.
      *
-     * @param inPurpose The purpose of the operation, one of KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT,
-     *        KeyPurpose::DECRYPT, KeyPurpose::SIGN, KeyPurpose::VERIFY, or KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY.
-     *        Note that for AEAD modes, encryption and decryption imply signing and verification,
-     *        respectively, but must be specified as KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and KeyPurpose::DECRYPT.
+     * @param purpose The purpose of the operation, one of KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT,
+     *        KeyPurpose::SIGN, KeyPurpose::VERIFY, or KeyPurpose::AGREE_KEY.  Note that for AEAD
+     *        modes, encryption and decryption imply signing and verification, respectively, but
+     *        must be specified as KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT and KeyPurpose::DECRYPT.
      *
-     * @param inKeyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey().  The key
+     * @param keyBlob The opaque key descriptor returned by generateKey() or importKey().  The key
      *        must have a purpose compatible with purpose and all of its usage requirements must be
      *        satisfied, or begin() must return an appropriate error code (see above).
      *
-     * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation.  If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or
+     * @param params Additional parameters for the operation.  If Tag::APPLICATION_ID or
      *        Tag::APPLICATION_DATA were provided during generation, they must be provided here, or
      *        the operation must fail with ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.  For operations that require
-     *        a nonce or IV, on keys that were generated with Tag::CALLER_NONCE, inParams may
+     *        a nonce or IV, on keys that were generated with Tag::CALLER_NONCE, params may
      *        contain a tag Tag::NONCE.  If Tag::NONCE is provided for a key without
      *        Tag:CALLER_NONCE, ErrorCode::CALLER_NONCE_PROHIBITED must be returned.
      *
-     * @param inAuthToken Authentication token.
+     * @param authToken Authentication token.
      *
      * @return BeginResult as output, which contains the challenge, KeyParameters which haves
      *         additional data from the operation initialization, notably to return the IV or nonce
      *         from operations that generate an IV or nonce, and IKeyMintOperation object pointer
-     *         which is used to perform update(), finish() or abort() operations.
+     *         which is used to perform updateAad(), update(), finish() or abort() operations.
      */
     BeginResult begin(in KeyPurpose purpose, in byte[] keyBlob, in KeyParameter[] params,
             in @nullable HardwareAuthToken authToken);
@@ -740,7 +757,7 @@
      * Note that the IKeyMintDevice UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED semantics are slightly different from
      * the UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED semantics enforced by keystore.  Keystore handles device locking
      * on a per-user basis.  Because auth tokens do not contain an Android user ID, it's not
-     * possible to replicate the keystore enformcement logic in IKeyMintDevice.  So from the
+     * possible to replicate the keystore enforcement logic in IKeyMintDevice.  So from the
      * IKeyMintDevice perspective, any user unlock unlocks all UNLOCKED_DEVICE_REQUIRED keys.
      * Keystore will continue enforcing the per-user device locking.
      *
@@ -766,7 +783,7 @@
      */
     void earlyBootEnded();
 
-    /*
+    /**
      * Called by the client to get a wrapped per-boot ephemeral key from a wrapped storage key.
      * Clients will then use the returned per-boot ephemeral key in place of the wrapped storage
      * key. Whenever the hardware is presented with a per-boot ephemeral key for an operation, it
@@ -786,4 +803,26 @@
      *         place of the input storageKeyBlob
      */
     byte[] convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(in byte[] storageKeyBlob);
+
+    /**
+     * Returns parameters associated with the provided key. This should match the
+     * KeyCharacteristics present in the KeyCreationResult returned by generateKey(),
+     * importKey(), or importWrappedKey().
+     *
+     * @param keyBlob The opaque descriptor returned by generateKey, importKey or importWrappedKey.
+     *
+     * @param appId An opaque byte string identifying the client.  This value must match the
+     *        Tag::APPLICATION_ID data provided during key generation/import.  Without the correct
+     *        value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to obtain the
+     *        key material.
+     *
+     * @param appData An opaque byte string provided by the application.  This value must match the
+     *        Tag::APPLICATION_DATA data provided during key generation/import.  Without the
+     *        correct value, it must be computationally infeasible for the secure hardware to
+     *        obtain the key material.
+     *
+     * @return Characteristics of the generated key. See KeyCreationResult for details.
+     */
+    KeyCharacteristics[] getKeyCharacteristics(
+            in byte[] keyBlob, in byte[] appId, in byte[] appData);
 }
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
index d2a993f..aa7b492 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IKeyMintOperation.aidl
@@ -31,12 +31,12 @@
      * update() is called.  If updateAad() is called after update(), it must return
      * ErrorCode::INVALID_TAG.
      *
-     * If operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
+     * If the operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
      * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
      *
      * If this method returns an error code other than ErrorCode::OK, the operation is aborted and
-     * the operation handle must be invalidated.  Any future use of the handle, with this method,
-     * finish, or abort, must return ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
+     * the operation handle must be invalidated.  Any future use of this object must return
+     * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
      *
      * == Authorization Enforcement ==
      *
@@ -58,9 +58,10 @@
      *
      *   o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
      *
-     *   o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operationHandle
+     *   o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the value returned from
+     *     IKeyMintDevice::begin(), given by the challenge field of the BeginResult structure.
      *
-     *   If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return
+     *   If any of these conditions are not met, updateAad() must return
      *   ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
      *
      * The caller must provide the auth token on every call to updateAad(), update() and finish().
@@ -74,7 +75,7 @@
      *
      * @param input Additional Authentication Data to be processed.
      *
-     * @param authToken Authentication token. Can be nullable if not provided.
+     * @param authToken Authentication token, if provided.
      *
      * @param timeStampToken timestamp token, certifies the freshness of an auth token in case
      *        the security domain of this KeyMint instance has a different clock than the
@@ -93,18 +94,9 @@
      * If operation is in an invalid state (was aborted or had an error) update() must return
      * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
      *
-     * To provide more flexibility for buffer handling, implementations of this method have the
-     * option of consuming less data than was provided.  The caller is responsible for looping to
-     * feed the rest of the data in subsequent calls.  The amount of input consumed must be returned
-     * in the inputConsumed parameter.  Implementations must always consume at least one byte,
-     * unless the operation cannot accept any more; if more than zero bytes are provided and zero
-     * bytes are consumed, callers must consider this an error and abort the operation.
-     * TODO(seleneh) update the code to always consume alll the input data. b/168665179.
-     *
-     * Implementations may also choose how much data to return, as a result of the update.  This is
-     * only relevant for encryption and decryption operations, because signing and verification
-     * return no data until finish.  It is recommended to return data as early as possible, rather
-     * than buffer it.
+     * Implementations may choose how much data to return as a result of the update.  This is
+     * only relevant for encryption and decryption operations, because signing returns no data
+     * until finish.  It is recommended to return data as early as possible, rather than buffer it.
      *
      * If this method returns an error code other than ErrorCode::OK, the operation is aborted and
      * the operation handle must be invalidated.  Any future use of the handle, with this method,
@@ -112,8 +104,8 @@
      *
      * == Authorization Enforcement ==
      *
-     * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in begin().  The one exception is the
-     * case where the key has:
+     * Key authorization enforcement is performed primarily in IKeyMintDevice::begin().  The one
+     * exception is the case where the key has:
      *
      * o One or more Tag::USER_SECURE_IDs, and
      *
@@ -130,7 +122,8 @@
      *
      *   o The key must have a Tag::USER_AUTH_TYPE that matches the auth type in the token.
      *
-     *   o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the operationHandle
+     *   o The challenge field in the auth token must contain the challenge value contained in the
+     *     BeginResult returned from IKeyMintDevice::begin().
      *
      *   If any of these conditions are not met, update() must return
      *   ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
@@ -139,22 +132,20 @@
      *
      * -- RSA keys --
      *
-     * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire
-     * block to be signed or verified in a single update.  It may not consume only a portion of the
-     * block in these cases.  However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple
-     * updates, and update() must accept the data this way as well.  If the caller provides more
-     * data to sign than can be used (length of data exceeds RSA key size), update() must return
-     * ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+     * For signing operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire block to be
+     * signed in a single update.  It may not consume only a portion of the block in these cases.
+     * However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates, and update() must
+     * accept the data this way as well.  If the caller provides more data to sign than can be used
+     * (length of data exceeds RSA key size), update() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
      *
      * -- ECDSA keys --
      *
-     * For signing and verification operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire
-     * block to be signed or verified in a single update.  This method may not consume only a
-     * portion of the block.  However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates
-     * and update() must accept the data this way as well.  If the caller provides more data to sign
-     * than can be used, the data is silently truncated.  (This differs from the handling of excess
-     * data provided in similar RSA operations.  The reason for this is compatibility with legacy
-     * clients.)
+     * For signing operations with Digest::NONE, this method must accept the entire block to be
+     * signed in a single update.  This method may not consume only a portion of the block.
+     * However, the caller may choose to provide the data in multiple updates and update() must
+     * accept the data this way as well.  If the caller provides more data to sign than can be used,
+     * the data is silently truncated.  (This differs from the handling of excess data provided in
+     * similar RSA operations.  The reason for this is compatibility with legacy clients.)
      *
      * -- AES keys --
      *
@@ -182,7 +173,7 @@
             in @nullable TimeStampToken timeStampToken);
 
     /**
-     * Finalizes a cryptographic operation begun with begin() and invalidates operation.
+     * Finalizes a cryptographic operation begun with begin() and invalidates the operation.
      *
      * This method is the last one called in an operation, so all processed data must be returned.
      *
@@ -190,8 +181,7 @@
      * Any future use of the operation, with finish(), update(), or abort(), must return
      * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE.
      *
-     * Signing operations return the signature as the output.  Verification operations accept the
-     * signature in the signature parameter, and return no output.
+     * Signing operations return the signature as the output.
      *
      * == Authorization enforcement ==
      *
@@ -230,44 +220,35 @@
      * Some additional requirements, depending on the padding mode:
      *
      * o PaddingMode::NONE.  For unpadded signing and encryption operations, if the provided data is
-     *   shorter than the key, the data must be zero-padded on the left before
-     *   signing/encryption.  If the data is the same length as the key, but numerically larger,
-     *   finish() must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.  For verification and decryption
-     *   operations, the data must be exactly as long as the key.  Otherwise, return
-     *   ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
+     *   shorter than the key, the data must be zero-padded on the left before signing/encryption.
+     *   If the data is the same length as the key, but numerically larger, finish() must return
+     *   ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.  For decryption operations, the data must be exactly as long
+     *   as the key.  Otherwise, return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
      *
      * o PaddingMode::RSA_PSS.  For PSS-padded signature operations, the PSS salt length must match
-     *   the size of the PSS digest selected.  The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams
+     *   the size of the PSS digest selected.  The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in params
      *   on begin() must be used as the PSS digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask
      *   generation function and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm.
      *
-     * o PaddingMode::RSA_OAEP.  The digest specified with Tag::DIGEST in inputParams on begin is
-     *   used as the OAEP digest algorithm, MGF1 must be used as the mask generation function and
-     *   and SHA1 must be used as the MGF1 digest algorithm.
-     *
      * -- ECDSA keys --
      *
-     * If the data provided for unpadded signing or verification is too long, truncate it.
+     * If the data provided for undigested signing is too long, truncate it.
      *
      * -- AES keys --
      *
      * Some additional conditions, depending on block mode:
      *
      * o BlockMode::ECB or BlockMode::CBC.  If padding is PaddingMode::NONE and the data length is
-     *  not a multiple of the AES block size, finish() must return
-     *  ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.  If padding is PaddingMode::PKCS7, pad the data per the
-     *  PKCS#7 specification, including adding an additional padding block if the data is a multiple
-     *  of the block length.
+     *   not a multiple of the AES block size, finish() must return
+     *   ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.  If padding is PaddingMode::PKCS7, pad the data per the
+     *   PKCS#7 specification, including adding an additional padding block if the data is a
+     *   multiple of the block length.
      *
      * o BlockMode::GCM.  During encryption, after processing all plaintext, compute the tag
      *   (Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes) and append it to the returned ciphertext.  During decryption,
      *   process the last Tag::MAC_LENGTH bytes as the tag.  If tag verification fails, finish()
      *   must return ErrorCode::VERIFICATION_FAILED.
      *
-     * TODO: update() will need to be refactored into 2 function. b/168665179.
-     *
-     * @param inParams Additional parameters for the operation.
-     *
      * @param input Data to be processed, per the parameters established in the call to begin().
      *        finish() must consume all provided data or return ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH.
      *
@@ -281,11 +262,9 @@
      *        token.
      *
      * @param confirmationToken is the confirmation token required by keys with
-     * Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.
+     *        Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED.
      *
      * @return The output data, if any.
-     *
-     * @return outParams Any output parameters generated by finish().
      */
     byte[] finish(in @nullable byte[] input, in @nullable byte[] signature,
             in @nullable HardwareAuthToken authToken,
@@ -293,13 +272,10 @@
             in @nullable byte[] confirmationToken);
 
     /**
-     * Aborts a cryptographic operation begun with begin(), freeing all internal resources. If an
-     * operation was finalized, calling update, finish, or abort yields
-     * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. An operation is finalized if finish or abort was
-     * called on it, or if update returned an ErrorCode.
-     *
-     * @param operationHandle The operation handle returned by begin().  This handle must be
-     *        invalid when abort() returns.
+     * Aborts a cryptographic operation begun with IKeyMintDevice::begin(), freeing all internal
+     * resources.  If an operation was finalized, calling updateAad, update, finish, or abort yields
+     * ErrorCode::INVALID_OPERATION_HANDLE. An operation is finalized if finish or abort was called
+     * on it, or if updateAad or update returned an ErrorCode.
      *
      * @return error See the ErrorCode enum in ErrorCode.aidl.
      */
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
index b6285d9..04d91d0 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/IRemotelyProvisionedComponent.aidl
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
  * While a proper BCC, as described above, reflects the complete boot sequence from boot ROM to the
  * secure area image of the IRemotelyProvisionedComponent, it's also possible to use a "degenerate"
  * BCC which consists only of a single, self-signed certificate containing the public key of a
- * hardware-bound key pair. This is an appopriate solution for devices which haven't implemented
+ * hardware-bound key pair. This is an appropriate solution for devices which haven't implemented
  * everything necessary to produce a proper BCC, but can derive a unique key pair in the secure
  * area.  In this degenerate case, DK_pub is the same as KM_pub.
  *
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
index 972a6a5..f93dbba 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyCreationResult.aidl
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
      * There are a few variations in what is contained in `certificateChain`, depending on whether
      * the caller requested attestation, whether they provided an attestation key (via the
      * `attestationKey` parameter of `generateKey()`, `importKey()` or `importWrappedKey()`), and in
-     * the non-attestaion case, whether the key can self-sign.
+     * the non-attestation case, whether the key can self-sign.
      *
      * 1.  Asymmetric key attestation with factory key.  If Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is provided
      *     and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generate/import call is null, the returned
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@
      *     attestation keys.
      *
      * 2.  Asymmetric key attestation with caller-provided key.  If Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is
-     *     provided and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generat/import call is non-null and
+     *     provided and the `attestationKey` parameter on the generate/import call is non-null and
      *     contains the key blob of a key with KeyPurpose::ATTEST_KEY, the returned certificate
      *     chain must contain only an attestation certificate signed with the specified key.  The
      *     caller must know the certificate chain for the provided key.  Tag::
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
index f896125..5840c6b 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyOrigin.aidl
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
  * The origin of a key (or pair), i.e. where it was generated.  Note that ORIGIN can be found in
  * either the hardware-enforced or software-enforced list for a key, indicating whether the key is
  * hardware or software-based.  Specifically, a key with GENERATED in the hardware-enforced list
- * must be guaranteed never to have existed outide the secure hardware.
+ * must be guaranteed never to have existed outside the secure hardware.
  * @hide
  */
 @VintfStability
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
index c874fc3..e141e55 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/KeyPurpose.aidl
@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@
 @VintfStability
 @Backing(type="int")
 enum KeyPurpose {
-    /* Usable with RSA, EC and AES keys. */
+    /* Usable with RSA, 3DES and AES keys. */
     ENCRYPT = 0,
 
-    /* Usable with RSA, EC and AES keys. */
+    /* Usable with RSA, 3DES and AES keys. */
     DECRYPT = 1,
 
     /* Usable with RSA, EC and HMAC keys. */
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
     VERIFY = 3,
 
     /* 4 is reserved */
+
     /* Usable with wrapping keys. */
     WRAP_KEY = 5,
 
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
index 02e7f00..1e101ab 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/android/hardware/security/keymint/Tag.aidl
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 import android.hardware.security.keymint.TagType;
 
 // TODO(seleneh) : note aidl currently does not support double nested enum definitions such as
-// ROOT_OF_TRUST = TagType:BYTES | 704.  So we are forced to write definations as
+// ROOT_OF_TRUST = TagType:BYTES | 704.  So we are forced to write definitions as
 // ROOT_OF_TRUST = (9 << 28) for now.  Will need to flip this back later when aidl support is added.
 
 /**
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
     ALGORITHM = (1 << 28) /* TagType:ENUM */ | 2,
 
     /**
-     * Tag::KEY_SIZE pecifies the size, in bits, of the key, measuring in the normal way for the
+     * Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size, in bits, of the key, measuring in the normal way for the
      * key's algorithm.  For example, for RSA keys, Tag::KEY_SIZE specifies the size of the public
      * modulus.  For AES keys it specifies the length of the secret key material.  For 3DES keys it
      * specifies the length of the key material, not counting parity bits (though parity bits must
@@ -75,9 +75,9 @@
      * is only relevant to AES and 3DES keys.  Possible values are defined by the BlockMode enum.
      *
      * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import.  For AES and 3DES operations the caller
-     * must specify a Tag::BLOCK_MODE in the additionalParams argument of begin().  If the mode is
-     * missing or the specified mode is not in the modes specified for the key during
-     * generation/import, the operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE.
+     * must specify a Tag::BLOCK_MODE in the params argument of begin().  If the mode is missing or
+     * the specified mode is not in the modes specified for the key during generation/import, the
+     * operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_BLOCK_MODE.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
@@ -89,9 +89,9 @@
      * values are defined by the Digest enum.
      *
      * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import.  For signing and verification operations,
-     * the caller must specify a digest in the additionalParams argument of begin().  If the digest
-     * is missing or the specified digest is not in the digests associated with the key, the
-     * operation must fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
+     * the caller must specify a digest in the params argument of begin().  If the digest is missing
+     * or the specified digest is not in the digests associated with the key, the operation must
+     * fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_DIGEST.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
      * This value is the minimum MAC length, in bits.  It must be a multiple of 8 bits.  For HMAC
      * keys, the value must be least 64 and no more than 512.  For GCM keys, the value must be at
      * least 96 and no more than 128.  If the provided value violates these requirements,
-     * generateKey() or importKey() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+     * generateKey() or importKey() must return ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_MIN_MAC_LENGTH.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
@@ -154,9 +154,8 @@
     // Tag 9 reserved
 
     /**
-     * Tag::EC_CURVE specifies the elliptic curve.  EC key generation requests may have
-     * Tag:EC_CURVE, Tag::KEY_SIZE, or both.  If both are provided and the size and curve do not
-     * match, IKeyMintDevice must return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
+     * Tag::EC_CURVE specifies the elliptic curve.  Possible values are defined in the EcCurve
+     * enumeration.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
@@ -188,16 +187,13 @@
     INCLUDE_UNIQUE_ID = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 202,
 
     /**
-     * Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST specifies the MGF1 digest algorithms that may be used with
-     * RSA encryption/decryption with OAEP padding. If the key characteristics supports OAEP
-     * and this tag is absent then SHA1 digest is selected by default for MGF1.
+     * Tag::RSA_OAEP_MGF_DIGEST specifies the MGF1 digest algorithms that may be used with RSA
+     * encryption/decryption with OAEP padding.  Possible values are defined by the Digest enum.
      *
-     * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import.  If this tag is present in the key
-     * characteristics with one or more values from @4.0::Digest, then for RSA cipher
-     * operations with OAEP Padding, the caller must specify a digest in the additionalParams
-     * argument of begin operation. If this tag is missing or the specified digest is not in
-     * the digests associated with the key then begin operation must fail with
-     * ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST.
+     * This tag is repeatable for key generation/import.  RSA cipher operations with OAEP padding
+     * must specify an MGF1 digest in the params argument of begin(). If this tag is missing or the
+     * specified digest is not in the MGF1 digests associated with the key then begin operation must
+     * fail with ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_MGF_DIGEST.
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
@@ -226,7 +222,7 @@
      * ErrorCode::ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE_UNAVAILABLE.  IKeyMintDevice implementations are not
      * required to support rollback resistance.
      *
-     * Must be hardwared-enforced.
+     * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
     ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE = (7 << 28) /* TagType:BOOL */ | 303,
 
@@ -236,7 +232,7 @@
     /**
      * Keys tagged with EARLY_BOOT_ONLY may only be used during early boot, until
      * IKeyMintDevice::earlyBootEnded() is called.  Early boot keys may be created after
-     * early boot.  Early boot keys may not be imprted at all, if Tag::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY is
+     * early boot.  Early boot keys may not be imported at all, if Tag::EARLY_BOOT_ONLY is
      * provided to IKeyMintDevice::importKey, the import must fail with
      * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT.
      */
@@ -292,7 +288,7 @@
      * with ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED.  This implies that the IKeyMintDevice must keep a
      * table of use counters for keys with this tag.  Because memory is often limited, this table
      * may have a fixed maximum size and KeyMint may fail operations that attempt to use keys with
-     * this tag when the table is full.  The table must acommodate at least 8 in-use keys and
+     * this tag when the table is full.  The table must accommodate at least 8 in-use keys and
      * aggressively reuse table slots when key minimum-usage intervals expire.  If an operation
      * fails because the table is full, KeyMint returns ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
      *
@@ -312,7 +308,7 @@
      * device is restarted.  This implies that the IKeyMintDevice must keep a table of use
      * counters for keys with this tag.  Because KeyMint memory is often limited, this table can
      * have a fixed maximum size and KeyMint can fail operations that attempt to use keys with
-     * this tag when the table is full.  The table needs to acommodate at least 8 keys.  If an
+     * this tag when the table is full.  The table needs to accommodate at least 8 keys.  If an
      * operation fails because the table is full, IKeyMintDevice must
      * ErrorCode::TOO_MANY_OPERATIONS.
      *
@@ -371,14 +367,14 @@
      * key, and may only be used if the difference between the current time when begin() is called
      * and the timestamp in the HardwareAuthToken is less than the value in Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT * 1000
      * (the multiplier is because Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT is in seconds, but the HardwareAuthToken
-     * timestamp is in milliseconds).  Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must returrn
+     * timestamp is in milliseconds).  Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must return
      * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
      *
      * If Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT is not present, then the key is an "auth-per-operation" key.  In this
      * case, begin() must not require a HardwareAuthToken with appropriate contents.  Instead,
      * update() and finish() must receive a HardwareAuthToken with Tag::USER_SECURE_ID value in
      * userId or authenticatorId fields, and the current operation's operation handle in the
-     * challenge field.  Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must returrn
+     * challenge field.  Otherwise the IKeyMintDevice must return
      * ErrorCode::KEY_USER_NOT_AUTHENTICATED.
      *
      * This tag is repeatable.  If repeated, and any one of the values matches the HardwareAuthToken
@@ -419,7 +415,7 @@
     /**
      * Tag::AUTH_TIMEOUT specifies the time in seconds for which the key is authorized for use,
      * after user authentication.  If
-     * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID is present and this tag is not, then the key requies authentication for
+     * Tag::USER_SECURE_ID is present and this tag is not, then the key requires authentication for
      * every usage (see begin() for the details of the authentication-per-operation flow).
      *
      * The value is a 32-bit integer specifying the time in seconds after a successful
@@ -489,7 +485,7 @@
      * Tag::TRUSTED_CONFIRMATION_REQUIRED is only applicable to keys with KeyPurpose SIGN, and
      *  specifies that this key must not be usable unless the user provides confirmation of the data
      *  to be signed.  Confirmation is proven to keyMint via an approval token.  See
-     *  CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, as well as the ConfirmatinUI HAL.
+     *  CONFIRMATION_TOKEN, as well as the ConfirmationUI HAL.
      *
      * If an attempt to use a key with this tag does not have a cryptographically valid
      * CONFIRMATION_TOKEN provided to finish() or if the data provided to update()/finish() does not
@@ -509,10 +505,10 @@
 
     /**
      * Tag::APPLICATION_ID.  When provided to generateKey or importKey, this tag specifies data
-     * that is necessary during all uses of the key.  In particular, calls to exportKey() and
-     * getKeyCharacteristics() must provide the same value to the clientId parameter, and calls to
-     * begin must provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set.  If
-     * the correct data is not provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
+     * that is necessary during all uses of the key.  In particular, calls to exportKey() must
+     * provide the same value to the clientId parameter, and calls to begin() must provide this
+     * tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set.  If the correct data is not
+     * provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
      *
      * The content of this tag must be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
      * possible for an adversary who has access to all of the secure world secrets but does not have
@@ -535,7 +531,7 @@
      * provide this tag and the same associated data as part of the inParams set.  If the correct
      * data is not provided, the method must return ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB.
      *
-     * The content of this tag msut be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
+     * The content of this tag must be bound to the key cryptographically, meaning it must not be
      * possible for an adversary who has access to all of the secure world secrets but does not have
      * access to the tag content to decrypt the key without brute-forcing the tag content, which
      * applications can prevent by specifying sufficiently high-entropy content.
@@ -546,10 +542,9 @@
 
     /**
      * Tag::CREATION_DATETIME specifies the date and time the key was created, in milliseconds since
-     * January 1, 1970.  This tag is optional and informational only.
+     * January 1, 1970.  This tag is optional and informational only, and not enforced by anything.
      *
-     * Tag::CREATED is informational only, and not enforced by anything.  Must be in the
-     * software-enforced list, if provided.
+     * Must be in the software-enforced list, if provided.
      */
     CREATION_DATETIME = (6 << 28) /* TagType:DATE */ | 701,
 
@@ -578,8 +573,8 @@
      * Tag::OS_VERSION specifies the system OS version with which the key may be used.  This tag is
      * never sent to the IKeyMintDevice, but is added to the hardware-enforced authorization list
      * by the TA.  Any attempt to use a key with a Tag::OS_VERSION value different from the
-     * currently-running OS version must cause begin(), getKeyCharacteristics() or exportKey() to
-     * return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE.  See upgradeKey() for details.
+     * currently-running OS version must cause begin() or exportKey() to return
+     * ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE.  See upgradeKey() for details.
      *
      * The value of the tag is an integer of the form MMmmss, where MM is the major version number,
      * mm is the minor version number, and ss is the sub-minor version number.  For example, for a
@@ -601,9 +596,8 @@
      * Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL specifies the system security patch level with which the key may be used.
      * This tag is never sent to the keyMint TA, but is added to the hardware-enforced
      * authorization list by the TA.  Any attempt to use a key with a Tag::OS_PATCHLEVEL value
-     * different from the currently-running system patchlevel must cause begin(),
-     * getKeyCharacteristics() or exportKey() to return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE.  See
-     * upgradeKey() for details.
+     * different from the currently-running system patchlevel must cause begin() or
+     * exportKey() to return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE.  See upgradeKey() for details.
      *
      * The value of the tag is an integer of the form YYYYMM, where YYYY is the four-digit year of
      * the last update and MM is the two-digit month of the last update.  For example, for a key
@@ -635,10 +629,11 @@
      *      Tag::CREATION_DATETIME by 2592000000, dropping any remainder.  T changes every 30 days
      *      (2592000000 = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000).
      *
-     *    C is the value of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID that is provided to attestKey().
+     *    C is the value of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID that is provided to attested key
+     *      generation/import operations.
      *
-     *    R is 1 if Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION was provided to attestKey or 0 if the tag was not
-     *      provided.
+     *    R is 1 if Tag::RESET_SINCE_ID_ROTATION was provided to attested key generation/import or 0
+     *      if the tag was not provided.
      *
      *    HBK is a unique hardware-bound secret known to the secure environment and never revealed
      *    by it.  The secret must contain at least 128 bits of entropy and be unique to the
@@ -653,9 +648,9 @@
     UNIQUE_ID = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 707,
 
     /**
-     * Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is used to deliver a "challenge" value to the attestKey() method,
-     * which must place the value in the KeyDescription SEQUENCE of the attestation extension.  See
-     * attestKey().
+     * Tag::ATTESTATION_CHALLENGE is used to deliver a "challenge" value to the attested key
+     * generation/import methods, which must place the value in the KeyDescription SEQUENCE of the
+     * attestation extension.
      *
      * Must never appear in KeyCharacteristics.
      */
@@ -663,7 +658,7 @@
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID identifies the set of applications which may use a key, used
-     * only with attestKey().
+     * only with attested key generation/import operations.
      *
      * The content of Tag::ATTESTATION_APPLICATION_ID is a DER-encoded ASN.1 structure, with the
      * following schema:
@@ -689,8 +684,8 @@
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_BRAND provides the device's brand name, as returned by Build.BRAND in
-     * Android, to attestKey().  This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
-     * device's identifiers.
+     * Android, to attested key generation/import operations.  This field must be set only when
+     * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
      *
      * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
      * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -702,8 +697,8 @@
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_DEVICE provides the device's device name, as returned by Build.DEVICE in
-     * Android, to attestKey().  This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
-     * device's identifiers.
+     * Android, to attested key generation/import operations.  This field must be set only when
+     * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
      *
      * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
      * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -715,8 +710,8 @@
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_PRODUCT provides the device's product name, as returned by Build.PRODUCT
-     * in Android, to attestKey().  This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
-     * device's identifiers.
+     * in Android, to attested key generation/import operations.  This field must be set only when
+     * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
      *
      * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
      * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -739,8 +734,9 @@
     ATTESTATION_ID_SERIAL = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 713,
 
     /**
-     * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI provides the IMEIs for all radios on the device to attestKey().
-     * This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
+     * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI provides the IMEIs for all radios on the device to attested key
+     * generation/import operations.  This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+     * device's identifiers.
      *
      * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
      * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -751,8 +747,9 @@
     ATTESTATION_ID_IMEI = (9 << 28) /* TagType:BYTES */ | 714,
 
     /**
-     * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID provides the MEIDs for all radios on the device to attestKey().
-     * This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
+     * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MEID provides the MEIDs for all radios on the device to attested key
+     * generation/import operations.  This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
+     * device's identifiers.
      *
      * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
      * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -764,8 +761,8 @@
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MANUFACTURER provides the device's manufacturer name, as returned by
-     * Build.MANUFACTURER in Android, to attstKey().  This field must be set only when requesting
-     * attestation of the device's identifiers.
+     * Build.MANUFACTURER in Android, to attested key generation/import operations.  This field must
+     * be set only when requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
      *
      * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
      * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -777,8 +774,8 @@
 
     /**
      * Tag::ATTESTATION_ID_MODEL provides the device's model name, as returned by Build.MODEL in
-     * Android, to attestKey().  This field must be set only when requesting attestation of the
-     * device's identifiers.
+     * Android, to attested key generation/import operations.  This field must be set only when
+     * requesting attestation of the device's identifiers.
      *
      * If the device does not support ID attestation (or destroyAttestationIds() was previously
      * called and the device can no longer attest its IDs), any key attestation request that
@@ -792,9 +789,8 @@
      * Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL specifies the vendor image security patch level with which the key may
      * be used.  This tag is never sent to the keyMint TA, but is added to the hardware-enforced
      * authorization list by the TA.  Any attempt to use a key with a Tag::VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL value
-     * different from the currently-running system patchlevel must cause begin(),
-     * getKeyCharacteristics() or exportKey() to return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE.  See
-     * upgradeKey() for details.
+     * different from the currently-running system patchlevel must cause begin() or
+     * exportKey() to return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE.  See upgradeKey() for details.
      *
      * The value of the tag is an integer of the form YYYYMMDD, where YYYY is the four-digit year of
      * the last update, MM is the two-digit month and DD is the two-digit day of the last
@@ -815,8 +811,8 @@
      * key may be used.  This tag is never sent to the keyMint TA, but is added to the
      * hardware-enforced authorization list by the TA.  Any attempt to use a key with a
      * Tag::BOOT_PATCHLEVEL value different from the currently-running system patchlevel must
-     * cause begin(), getKeyCharacteristics() or exportKey() to return
-     * ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE.  See upgradeKey() for details.
+     * cause begin() or exportKey() to return ErrorCode::KEY_REQUIRES_UPGRADE.  See upgradeKey() for
+     * details.
      *
      * The value of the tag is an integer of the form YYYYMMDD, where YYYY is the four-digit year of
      * the last update, MM is the two-digit month and DD is the two-digit day of the last
@@ -824,20 +820,20 @@
      * the value would be 20180605.  If the day is not known, 00 may be substituted.
      *
      * During each boot, the bootloader must provide the patch level of the boot image to the secure
-     * envirionment (mechanism is implementation-defined).
+     * environment (mechanism is implementation-defined).
      *
      * Must be hardware-enforced.
      */
     BOOT_PATCHLEVEL = (3 << 28) /* TagType:UINT */ | 719,
 
     /**
-     * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attestKey().  It indicates that
-     * attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather than a batch key.  When a
-     * device-unique key is used, only the attestation certificate is returned; no additional
-     * chained certificates are provided.  It's up to the caller to recognize the device-unique
-     * signing key.  Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices may support device-unique
-     * attestations.  SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must return
-     * ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
+     * DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION is an argument to IKeyMintDevice::attested key generation/import
+     * operations.  It indicates that attestation using a device-unique key is requested, rather
+     * than a batch key.  When a device-unique key is used, only the attestation certificate is
+     * returned; no additional chained certificates are provided.  It's up to the caller to
+     * recognize the device-unique signing key.  Only SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices may
+     * support device-unique attestations.  SecurityLevel::TRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT IKeyMintDevices must
+     * return ErrorCode::INVALID_ARGUMENT if they receive DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION.
      * SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX IKeyMintDevices need not support DEVICE_UNIQUE_ATTESTATION, and
      * return ErrorCode::CANNOT_ATTEST_IDS if they do not support it.
      *
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
index 4e951d6..afb2193 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/AttestKeyTest.cpp
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
 TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AllRsaSizes) {
     for (auto size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::RSA)) {
         /*
-         * Create attestaton key.
+         * Create attestation key.
          */
         AttestationKey attest_key;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
@@ -482,7 +482,7 @@
 TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AllEcCurves) {
     for (auto curve : ValidCurves()) {
         /*
-         * Create attestaton key.
+         * Create attestation key.
          */
         AttestationKey attest_key;
         vector<KeyCharacteristics> attest_key_characteristics;
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@
 }
 
 TEST_P(AttestKeyTest, AttestWithNonAttestKey) {
-    // Create non-attestaton key.
+    // Create non-attestation key.
     AttestationKey non_attest_key;
     vector<KeyCharacteristics> non_attest_key_characteristics;
     vector<Certificate> non_attest_key_cert_chain;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
index 61f2f77..f0dfff1 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.cpp
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@
 
     os_version_ = getOsVersion();
     os_patch_level_ = getOsPatchlevel();
+    vendor_patch_level_ = getVendorPatchlevel();
 }
 
 void KeyMintAidlTestBase::SetUp() {
@@ -743,6 +744,15 @@
                 return {224, 384, 521};
             case Algorithm::AES:
                 return {192};
+            case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+                return {56};
+            default:
+                return {};
+        }
+    } else {
+        switch (algorithm) {
+            case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+                return {56};
             default:
                 return {};
         }
@@ -750,6 +760,68 @@
     return {};
 }
 
+vector<BlockMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidBlockModes(Algorithm algorithm) {
+    switch (algorithm) {
+        case Algorithm::AES:
+            return {
+                    BlockMode::CBC,
+                    BlockMode::CTR,
+                    BlockMode::ECB,
+                    BlockMode::GCM,
+            };
+        case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+            return {
+                    BlockMode::CBC,
+                    BlockMode::ECB,
+            };
+        default:
+            return {};
+    }
+}
+
+vector<PaddingMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm,
+                                                           BlockMode blockMode) {
+    switch (algorithm) {
+        case Algorithm::AES:
+            switch (blockMode) {
+                case BlockMode::CBC:
+                case BlockMode::ECB:
+                    return {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+                case BlockMode::CTR:
+                case BlockMode::GCM:
+                    return {PaddingMode::NONE};
+                default:
+                    return {};
+            };
+        case Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES:
+            switch (blockMode) {
+                case BlockMode::CBC:
+                case BlockMode::ECB:
+                    return {PaddingMode::NONE, PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+                default:
+                    return {};
+            };
+        default:
+            return {};
+    }
+}
+
+vector<PaddingMode> KeyMintAidlTestBase::InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm,
+                                                             BlockMode blockMode) {
+    switch (algorithm) {
+        case Algorithm::AES:
+            switch (blockMode) {
+                case BlockMode::CTR:
+                case BlockMode::GCM:
+                    return {PaddingMode::PKCS7};
+                default:
+                    return {};
+            };
+        default:
+            return {};
+    }
+}
+
 vector<EcCurve> KeyMintAidlTestBase::ValidCurves() {
     if (securityLevel_ == SecurityLevel::STRONGBOX) {
         return {EcCurve::P_256};
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
index 75a4418..88998d5 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintAidlTestBase.h
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
     IKeyMintDevice& keyMint() { return *keymint_; }
     uint32_t os_version() { return os_version_; }
     uint32_t os_patch_level() { return os_patch_level_; }
+    uint32_t vendor_patch_level() { return vendor_patch_level_; }
 
     ErrorCode GetReturnErrorCode(const Status& result);
 
@@ -230,6 +231,10 @@
     vector<uint32_t> ValidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
     vector<uint32_t> InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm algorithm);
 
+    vector<BlockMode> ValidBlockModes(Algorithm algorithm);
+    vector<PaddingMode> ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm, BlockMode blockMode);
+    vector<PaddingMode> InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm algorithm, BlockMode blockMode);
+
     vector<EcCurve> ValidCurves();
     vector<EcCurve> InvalidCurves();
 
@@ -262,6 +267,7 @@
     std::shared_ptr<IKeyMintDevice> keymint_;
     uint32_t os_version_;
     uint32_t os_patch_level_;
+    uint32_t vendor_patch_level_;
 
     SecurityLevel securityLevel_;
     string name_;
diff --git a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
index a89cc5b..f9a99aa 100644
--- a/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/aidl/vts/functional/KeyMintTest.cpp
@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@
 
 namespace {
 
+bool check_patchLevels = false;
+
 template <TagType tag_type, Tag tag, typename ValueT>
 bool contains(const vector<KeyParameter>& set, TypedTag<tag_type, tag> ttag,
               ValueT expected_value) {
@@ -291,37 +293,340 @@
 class NewKeyGenerationTest : public KeyMintAidlTestBase {
   protected:
     void CheckBaseParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
-        // TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
-
-        AuthorizationSet auths;
-        for (auto& entry : keyCharacteristics) {
-            auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
-        }
-
-        EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+        AuthorizationSet auths = CheckCommonParams(keyCharacteristics);
         EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
         EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
 
-        // Verify that App data and ROT are NOT included.
-        EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
-        EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
-
         // Check that some unexpected tags/values are NOT present.
         EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
         EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+    }
+
+    void CheckSymmetricParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
+        AuthorizationSet auths = CheckCommonParams(keyCharacteristics);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT));
+        EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::DECRYPT));
+
+        EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::SIGN));
+        EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_PURPOSE, KeyPurpose::VERIFY));
+    }
+
+    AuthorizationSet CheckCommonParams(const vector<KeyCharacteristics>& keyCharacteristics) {
+        // TODO(swillden): Distinguish which params should be in which auth list.
+        AuthorizationSet auths;
+        for (auto& entry : keyCharacteristics) {
+            auths.push_back(AuthorizationSet(entry.authorizations));
+        }
+        EXPECT_TRUE(auths.Contains(TAG_ORIGIN, KeyOrigin::GENERATED));
+
+        // Verify that App data, ROT and auth timeout are NOT included.
+        EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST));
+        EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_APPLICATION_DATA));
         EXPECT_FALSE(auths.Contains(TAG_AUTH_TIMEOUT, 301U));
 
+        // Check OS details match the original hardware info.
         auto os_ver = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_VERSION);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(os_ver);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(os_ver);
         EXPECT_EQ(*os_ver, os_version());
-
         auto os_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL);
-        ASSERT_TRUE(os_pl);
+        EXPECT_TRUE(os_pl);
         EXPECT_EQ(*os_pl, os_patch_level());
+
+        if (check_patchLevels) {
+            // Should include vendor and boot patchlevels.
+            auto vendor_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_VENDOR_PATCHLEVEL);
+            EXPECT_TRUE(vendor_pl);
+            EXPECT_EQ(*vendor_pl, vendor_patch_level());
+            auto boot_pl = auths.GetTagValue(TAG_BOOT_PATCHLEVEL);
+            EXPECT_TRUE(boot_pl);
+        }
+
+        return auths;
     }
 };
 
 /*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.Aes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required AES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, Aes) {
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+        for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+            for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+                SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                             << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+                vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+                vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+                auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                       .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                       .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                       .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                       .SetDefaultValidity();
+                if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+                    builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+                }
+                ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+                EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+                CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+
+                AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+                EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES));
+                EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                        << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+                CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesInvalidSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesInvalidSize) {
+    for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+        for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+            for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+                SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                             << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+                vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+                vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+                auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                       .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                       .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                       .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                       .SetDefaultValidity();
+                if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+                    builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+                }
+                EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+                          GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+        for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+            vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+            vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+            // No key size specified
+            auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                   .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::AES)
+                                   .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                   .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                   .SetDefaultValidity();
+            if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+                builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+            }
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+                      GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesInvalidPadding
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid padding on AES keys gives a failure
+ * somewhere along the way.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesInvalidPadding) {
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+        for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+            for (auto padding_mode : InvalidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+                SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                             << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+                vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+                vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+                auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                       .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                       .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                       .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                       .SetDefaultValidity();
+                if (block_mode == BlockMode::GCM) {
+                    builder.Authorization(TAG_MIN_MAC_LENGTH, 128);
+                }
+
+                auto result = GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics);
+                if (result == ErrorCode::OK) {
+                    // Key creation was OK but has generated a key that cannot be used.
+                    auto params =
+                            AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(block_mode).Padding(padding_mode);
+                    auto result = Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, params);
+                    EXPECT_TRUE(result == ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE ||
+                                result == ErrorCode::INVALID_KEY_BLOB);
+                } else {
+                    // The KeyMint implementation detected that the generated key
+                    // is unusable.
+                    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, result);
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.AesGcmMissingMinMac
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for AES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, AesGcmMissingMinMac) {
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::AES)) {
+        BlockMode block_mode = BlockMode::GCM;
+        for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+            SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                         << "AES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+            vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+            vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+            // No MIN_MAC_LENGTH provided.
+            auto builder = AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                   .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                   .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                   .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                   .SetDefaultValidity();
+            EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::MISSING_MIN_MAC_LENGTH,
+                      GenerateKey(builder, &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDes
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required 3DES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDes) {
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+        for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+            for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+                SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                             << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+                vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+                vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+                ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                             .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                                             .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                                             .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                                             .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                             .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                                     &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+                EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+                CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+
+                AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+                EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES));
+                EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                        << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+                CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDesWithAttestation
+ *
+ * Verifies that keymint can generate all required 3DES key sizes, and that the resulting keys
+ * have correct characteristics.
+ *
+ * Request attestation, which doesn't help for symmetric keys (as there is no public key to
+ * put in a certificate) but which isn't an error.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDesWithAttestation) {
+    for (auto key_size : ValidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+        for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+            for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+                SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                             << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+
+                auto challenge = "hello";
+                auto app_id = "foo";
+
+                vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+                vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+                ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                                             .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                                             .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                                             .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                                             .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                                             .AttestationChallenge(challenge)
+                                                             .AttestationApplicationId(app_id)
+                                                             .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                                     &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+
+                EXPECT_GT(key_blob.size(), 0U);
+                CheckSymmetricParams(key_characteristics);
+
+                AuthorizationSet crypto_params = SecLevelAuthorizations(key_characteristics);
+
+                EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES));
+                EXPECT_TRUE(crypto_params.Contains(TAG_KEY_SIZE, key_size))
+                        << "Key size " << key_size << "missing";
+
+                CheckedDeleteKey(&key_blob);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * NewKeyGenerationTest.TripleDesInvalidSize
+ *
+ * Verifies that specifying an invalid key size for 3-DES key generation returns
+ * UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE.
+ */
+TEST_P(NewKeyGenerationTest, TripleDesInvalidSize) {
+    for (auto key_size : InvalidKeySizes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+        for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+            for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+                SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                             << "3DES-" << key_size << "-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+                vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+                vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+                EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+                          GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                              .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                              .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                              .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                              .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                              .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                      &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Omitting the key size fails.
+    for (auto block_mode : ValidBlockModes(Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)) {
+        for (auto padding_mode : ValidPaddingModes(Algorithm::AES, block_mode)) {
+            SCOPED_TRACE(testing::Message()
+                         << "3DES-default-" << block_mode << "-" << padding_mode);
+            vector<uint8_t> key_blob;
+            vector<KeyCharacteristics> key_characteristics;
+            ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+                      GenerateKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                          .Authorization(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES)
+                                          .BlockMode(block_mode)
+                                          .Padding(padding_mode)
+                                          .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                          .SetDefaultValidity(),
+                                  &key_blob, &key_characteristics));
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
  * NewKeyGenerationTest.Rsa
  *
  * Verifies that keymint can generate all required RSA key sizes, and that the resulting keys
@@ -1720,7 +2025,7 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoDigest
+ * SigningOperationsTest.RsaPssNoPadding
  *
  * Verifies that RSA operations fail when no padding mode is specified.  PaddingMode::NONE is
  * supported in some cases (as validated in other tests), but a mode must be specified.
@@ -2075,7 +2380,7 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaAllPaddingsAndDigests
  *
  * Verifies RSA signature/verification for all padding modes and digests.
  */
@@ -2171,7 +2476,7 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaSuccess
+ * VerificationOperationsTest.RsaAllDigestsAndCurves
  *
  * Verifies ECDSA signature/verification for all digests and curves.
  */
@@ -2571,7 +2876,72 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * ImportKeyTest.AesSuccess
+ * ImportKeyTest.AesFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an invalid AES key fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, AesFailure) {
+    string key = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+    uint32_t bitlen = key.size() * 8;
+    for (uint32_t key_size : {bitlen - 1, bitlen + 1, bitlen - 8, bitlen + 8}) {
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+                  ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                    .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                    .AesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                    .EcbMode()
+                                    .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+                            KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.TripleDesSuccess
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing and using a 3DES key works.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, TripleDesSuccess) {
+    string key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358");
+    ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::OK, ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                               .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                               .TripleDesEncryptionKey(168)
+                                               .EcbMode()
+                                               .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+                                       KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+
+    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_ALGORITHM, Algorithm::TRIPLE_DES);
+    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_KEY_SIZE, 168U);
+    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_PADDING, PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+    CheckCryptoParam(TAG_BLOCK_MODE, BlockMode::ECB);
+    CheckOrigin();
+
+    string message = "Hello World!";
+    auto params = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+    string ciphertext = EncryptMessage(message, params);
+    string plaintext = DecryptMessage(ciphertext, params);
+    EXPECT_EQ(message, plaintext);
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.TripleDesFailure
+ *
+ * Verifies that importing an invalid 3DES key fails.
+ */
+TEST_P(ImportKeyTest, TripleDesFailure) {
+    string key = hex2str("a49d7564199e97cb529d2c9d97bf2f98d35edf57ba1f7358");
+    uint32_t bitlen = key.size() * 8;
+    for (uint32_t key_size : {bitlen - 1, bitlen + 1, bitlen - 8, bitlen + 8}) {
+        ASSERT_EQ(ErrorCode::UNSUPPORTED_KEY_SIZE,
+                  ImportKey(AuthorizationSetBuilder()
+                                    .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
+                                    .TripleDesEncryptionKey(key_size)
+                                    .EcbMode()
+                                    .Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7),
+                            KeyFormat::RAW, key));
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * ImportKeyTest.HmacKeySuccess
  *
  * Verifies that importing and using an HMAC key works.
  */
@@ -2881,7 +3251,7 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepInvalidDigest
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.RsaOaepDecryptWithWrongDigest
  *
  * Verifies that RSA-OAEP encryption operations fail in the correct way when asked to decrypt
  * with a different digest than was used to encrypt.
@@ -3165,7 +3535,7 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesEcbRoundTripSuccess
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesWrongMode
  *
  * Verifies that AES encryption fails in the correct way when an unauthorized mode is specified.
  */
@@ -3565,7 +3935,7 @@
 }
 
 /*
- * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCtrInvalidCallerNonce
+ * EncryptionOperationsTest.AesCbcRoundTripSuccess
  *
  * Verifies that keymint fails correctly when the user supplies an incorrect-size nonce.
  */
@@ -4231,11 +4601,8 @@
                                                  .BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB)
                                                  .Authorization(TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
                                                  .Padding(PaddingMode::NONE)));
-    for (size_t i = 0; i < 32; ++i) {
-        auto inParams =
-                AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
-        EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
-    }
+    auto inParams = AuthorizationSetBuilder().BlockMode(BlockMode::ECB).Padding(PaddingMode::PKCS7);
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INCOMPATIBLE_PADDING_MODE, Begin(KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT, inParams));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -4912,6 +5279,19 @@
 
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(UsageCountLimitTest);
 
+typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase GetHardwareInfoTest;
+
+TEST_P(GetHardwareInfoTest, GetHardwareInfo) {
+    // Retrieving hardware info should give the same result each time.
+    KeyMintHardwareInfo info;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint().getHardwareInfo(&info).isOk());
+    KeyMintHardwareInfo info2;
+    ASSERT_TRUE(keyMint().getHardwareInfo(&info2).isOk());
+    EXPECT_EQ(info, info2);
+}
+
+INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(GetHardwareInfoTest);
+
 typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase AddEntropyTest;
 
 /*
@@ -4943,6 +5323,16 @@
     EXPECT_TRUE(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf(string(2 * 1024, 'a'))).isOk());
 }
 
+/*
+ * AddEntropyTest.AddTooLargeEntropy
+ *
+ * Verifies that the addRngEntropy method rejects more than 2KiB  of data.
+ */
+TEST_P(AddEntropyTest, AddTooLargeEntropy) {
+    ErrorCode rc = GetReturnErrorCode(keyMint().addRngEntropy(AidlBuf(string(2 * 1024 + 1, 'a'))));
+    EXPECT_EQ(ErrorCode::INVALID_INPUT_LENGTH, rc);
+}
+
 INSTANTIATE_KEYMINT_AIDL_TEST(AddEntropyTest);
 
 typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase KeyDeletionTest;
@@ -5122,7 +5512,7 @@
 typedef KeyMintAidlTestBase TransportLimitTest;
 
 /*
- * TransportLimitTest.FinishInput
+ * TransportLimitTest.LargeFinishInput
  *
  * Verifies that passing input data to finish succeeds as expected.
  */
@@ -5396,6 +5786,10 @@
             } else {
                 std::cout << "NOT dumping attestations" << std::endl;
             }
+            // TODO(drysdale): Remove this flag when available KeyMint devices comply with spec
+            if (std::string(argv[i]) == "--check_patchLevels") {
+                aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint::test::check_patchLevels = true;
+            }
         }
     }
     return RUN_ALL_TESTS();
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
index 53d5b96..e1ead21 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
+++ b/security/keymint/support/include/keymint_support/keymint_utils.h
@@ -38,5 +38,6 @@
 
 uint32_t getOsVersion();
 uint32_t getOsPatchlevel();
+uint32_t getVendorPatchlevel();
 
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
index e73d602..2dbdfa8 100644
--- a/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
+++ b/security/keymint/support/keymint_utils.cpp
@@ -31,10 +31,11 @@
 constexpr size_t kPlatformVersionMatchCount = kSubminorVersionMatch + 1;
 
 constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.build.version.security_patch";
-constexpr char kPlatformPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-[0-9]{2}$";
+constexpr char kVendorPatchlevelProp[] = "ro.vendor.build.security_patch";
+constexpr char kPatchlevelRegex[] = "^([0-9]{4})-([0-9]{2})-[0-9]{2}$";
 constexpr size_t kYearMatch = 1;
 constexpr size_t kMonthMatch = 2;
-constexpr size_t kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount = kMonthMatch + 1;
+constexpr size_t kPatchlevelMatchCount = kMonthMatch + 1;
 
 uint32_t match_to_uint32(const char* expression, const regmatch_t& match) {
     if (match.rm_so == -1) return 0;
@@ -80,15 +81,14 @@
     return getOsVersion(version.c_str());
 }
 
-uint32_t getOsPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str) {
+uint32_t getPatchlevel(const char* patchlevel_str) {
     regex_t regex;
-    if (regcomp(&regex, kPlatformPatchlevelRegex, REG_EXTENDED) != 0) {
+    if (regcomp(&regex, kPatchlevelRegex, REG_EXTENDED) != 0) {
         return 0;
     }
 
-    regmatch_t matches[kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount];
-    int not_match =
-            regexec(&regex, patchlevel_str, kPlatformPatchlevelMatchCount, matches, 0 /* flags */);
+    regmatch_t matches[kPatchlevelMatchCount];
+    int not_match = regexec(&regex, patchlevel_str, kPatchlevelMatchCount, matches, 0 /* flags */);
     regfree(&regex);
     if (not_match) {
         return 0;
@@ -105,7 +105,12 @@
 
 uint32_t getOsPatchlevel() {
     std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kPlatformPatchlevelProp);
-    return getOsPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
+    return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
+}
+
+uint32_t getVendorPatchlevel() {
+    std::string patchlevel = wait_and_get_property(kVendorPatchlevelProp);
+    return getPatchlevel(patchlevel.c_str());
 }
 
 }  // namespace aidl::android::hardware::security::keymint
diff --git a/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl b/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
index 71b4278..2fbd29a 100644
--- a/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
+++ b/security/secureclock/aidl/android/hardware/security/secureclock/TimeStampToken.aidl
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
      *
      * where:
      *
-     *   ``ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL'' is a sting constant defined in ISecureClock.aidl.
+     *   ``ISecureClock.TIME_STAMP_MAC_LABEL'' is a string constant defined in ISecureClock.aidl.
      *
      *   ``H'' is the shared HMAC key (see computeSharedHmac() in ISharedSecret).
      *