[automerged blank] Fix the incorrect parameter quota when userdata is formatted with EXT4 2p: 681c629a9e
Blank merge reason: Change-Id Ibff10e8e67b4e6ffabea97f534ff6551aed91963 with SHA-1 3101ac01ac is in history
Original change: https://googleplex-android-review.googlesource.com/c/platform/system/vold/+/16779026
Bug: 199802158
Bug: 211847181
Change-Id: I37d3c5f354c7d03ddcb9c7169a75cdcb916419e0
diff --git a/Android.bp b/Android.bp
index d2c6ffc..1550264 100644
--- a/Android.bp
+++ b/Android.bp
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@
"libfec_rs",
"libfs_avb",
"libfs_mgr",
- "libscrypt_static",
"libsquashfs_utils",
"libvold_binder",
],
@@ -108,6 +107,7 @@
defaults: [
"vold_default_flags",
"vold_default_libs",
+ "keystore2_use_latest_aidl_ndk_shared",
],
srcs: [
@@ -123,14 +123,13 @@
"KeyBuffer.cpp",
"KeyStorage.cpp",
"KeyUtil.cpp",
- "Keymaster.cpp",
+ "Keystore.cpp",
"Loop.cpp",
"MetadataCrypt.cpp",
"MoveStorage.cpp",
"NetlinkHandler.cpp",
"NetlinkManager.cpp",
"Process.cpp",
- "ScryptParameters.cpp",
"Utils.cpp",
"VoldNativeService.cpp",
"VoldNativeServiceValidation.cpp",
@@ -165,9 +164,8 @@
},
shared_libs: [
"android.hardware.health.storage@1.0",
- "android.hardware.health.storage-V1-ndk_platform",
- "android.system.keystore2-V1-ndk_platform",
- "android.security.maintenance-ndk_platform",
+ "android.hardware.health.storage-V1-ndk",
+ "android.security.maintenance-ndk",
"libbinder_ndk",
"libkeymint_support",
],
@@ -182,26 +180,25 @@
defaults: [
"vold_default_flags",
"vold_default_libs",
+ "keystore2_use_latest_aidl_ndk_shared",
],
srcs: ["main.cpp"],
static_libs: ["libvold"],
init_rc: [
"vold.rc",
- "wait_for_keymaster.rc",
],
required: [
"mke2fs",
"vold_prepare_subdirs",
- "wait_for_keymaster",
+ "fuse_media.o",
],
shared_libs: [
"android.hardware.health.storage@1.0",
- "android.hardware.health.storage-V1-ndk_platform",
- "android.system.keystore2-V1-ndk_platform",
- "android.security.maintenance-ndk_platform",
+ "android.hardware.health.storage-V1-ndk",
+ "android.security.maintenance-ndk",
"libbinder_ndk",
"libkeymint_support",
],
@@ -237,30 +234,6 @@
static_libs: [
"libvold_binder",
],
- init_rc: ["vdc.rc"],
-}
-
-cc_binary {
- name: "wait_for_keymaster",
- defaults: ["vold_default_flags"],
-
- srcs: [
- "wait_for_keymaster.cpp",
- "Keymaster.cpp",
- ],
- shared_libs: [
- "libbase",
- "libbinder",
- "libbinder_ndk",
-
- "android.system.keystore2-V1-ndk_platform",
- "android.security.maintenance-ndk_platform",
- "libhardware",
- "libhardware_legacy",
- "libhidlbase",
- "libkeymint_support",
- "libutils",
- ],
}
cc_binary {
diff --git a/Devmapper.cpp b/Devmapper.cpp
index d55d92d..00fb4b3 100644
--- a/Devmapper.cpp
+++ b/Devmapper.cpp
@@ -94,8 +94,6 @@
PLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to destroy dm device named " << device.name();
}
}
- } else {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Found unmanaged dm device named " << device.name();
}
}
return 0;
diff --git a/FsCrypt.cpp b/FsCrypt.cpp
index 04def5c..be68222 100644
--- a/FsCrypt.cpp
+++ b/FsCrypt.cpp
@@ -186,10 +186,7 @@
auto const current_path = get_ce_key_current_path(directory_path);
if (to_fix != current_path) {
LOG(DEBUG) << "Renaming " << to_fix << " to " << current_path;
- if (rename(to_fix.c_str(), current_path.c_str()) != 0) {
- PLOG(WARNING) << "Unable to rename " << to_fix << " to " << current_path;
- return;
- }
+ if (!android::vold::RenameKeyDir(to_fix, current_path)) return;
}
android::vold::FsyncDirectory(directory_path);
}
@@ -211,7 +208,7 @@
return false;
}
-static bool IsEmmcStorage(const std::string& blk_device) {
+static bool MightBeEmmcStorage(const std::string& blk_device) {
// Handle symlinks.
std::string real_path;
if (!Realpath(blk_device, &real_path)) {
@@ -227,8 +224,15 @@
}
// Now we should have the "real" block device.
- LOG(DEBUG) << "IsEmmcStorage(): blk_device = " << blk_device << ", real_path=" << real_path;
- return StartsWith(Basename(real_path), "mmcblk");
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "MightBeEmmcStorage(): blk_device = " << blk_device
+ << ", real_path=" << real_path;
+ std::string name = Basename(real_path);
+ return StartsWith(name, "mmcblk") ||
+ // virtio devices may provide inline encryption support that is
+ // backed by eMMC inline encryption on the host, thus inheriting the
+ // DUN size limitation. So virtio devices must be allowed here too.
+ // TODO(b/207390665): check the maximum DUN size directly instead.
+ StartsWith(name, "vd");
}
// Retrieve the options to use for encryption policies on the /data filesystem.
@@ -244,7 +248,7 @@
return false;
}
if ((options->flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32) &&
- !IsEmmcStorage(entry->blk_device)) {
+ !MightBeEmmcStorage(entry->blk_device)) {
LOG(ERROR) << "The emmc_optimized encryption flag is only allowed on eMMC storage. Remove "
"this flag from the device's fstab";
return false;
@@ -569,9 +573,12 @@
if (it != s_ephemeral_users.end()) {
s_ephemeral_users.erase(it);
} else {
- for (auto const path : get_ce_key_paths(get_ce_key_directory_path(user_id))) {
+ auto ce_path = get_ce_key_directory_path(user_id);
+ for (auto const path : get_ce_key_paths(ce_path)) {
success &= android::vold::destroyKey(path);
}
+ success &= destroy_dir(ce_path);
+
auto de_key_path = get_de_key_path(user_id);
if (android::vold::pathExists(de_key_path)) {
success &= android::vold::destroyKey(de_key_path);
diff --git a/IdleMaint.cpp b/IdleMaint.cpp
index 8005cf4..769d7a5 100644
--- a/IdleMaint.cpp
+++ b/IdleMaint.cpp
@@ -85,6 +85,13 @@
*/
static const int GC_TIMEOUT_SEC = 420;
static const int DEVGC_TIMEOUT_SEC = 120;
+static const int KBYTES_IN_SEGMENT = 2048;
+static const int MIN_GC_URGENT_SLEEP_TIME = 500;
+static const int ONE_HOUR_IN_MS = 3600000;
+static const int GC_NORMAL_MODE = 0;
+static const int GC_URGENT_HIGH_MODE = 1;
+
+static int32_t previousSegmentWrite = 0;
static IdleMaintStats idle_maint_stat(IdleMaintStats::kStopped);
static std::condition_variable cv_abort, cv_stop;
@@ -111,7 +118,7 @@
}
}
-static void addFromFstab(std::list<std::string>* paths, PathTypes path_type) {
+static void addFromFstab(std::list<std::string>* paths, PathTypes path_type, bool only_data_part) {
std::string previous_mount_point;
for (const auto& entry : fstab_default) {
// Skip raw partitions and swap space.
@@ -133,6 +140,10 @@
continue;
}
+ if (only_data_part && entry.mount_point != "/data") {
+ continue;
+ }
+
// Skip the multi-type partitions, which are required to be following each other.
// See fs_mgr.c's mount_with_alternatives().
if (entry.mount_point == previous_mount_point) {
@@ -142,10 +153,10 @@
if (path_type == PathTypes::kMountPoint) {
paths->push_back(entry.mount_point);
} else if (path_type == PathTypes::kBlkDevice) {
- std::string gc_path;
+ std::string path;
if (entry.fs_type == "f2fs" &&
- Realpath(android::vold::BlockDeviceForPath(entry.mount_point + "/"), &gc_path)) {
- paths->push_back("/sys/fs/" + entry.fs_type + "/" + Basename(gc_path));
+ Realpath(android::vold::BlockDeviceForPath(entry.mount_point + "/"), &path)) {
+ paths->push_back("/sys/fs/" + entry.fs_type + "/" + Basename(path));
}
}
@@ -161,7 +172,7 @@
// Collect both fstab and vold volumes
std::list<std::string> paths;
- addFromFstab(&paths, PathTypes::kMountPoint);
+ addFromFstab(&paths, PathTypes::kMountPoint, false);
addFromVolumeManager(&paths, PathTypes::kMountPoint);
for (const auto& path : paths) {
@@ -264,15 +275,18 @@
return android::OK;
}
-static void runDevGcFstab(void) {
- std::string path;
+static std::string getDevSysfsPath() {
for (const auto& entry : fstab_default) {
if (!entry.sysfs_path.empty()) {
- path = entry.sysfs_path;
- break;
+ return entry.sysfs_path;
}
}
+ LOG(WARNING) << "Cannot find dev sysfs path";
+ return "";
+}
+static void runDevGcFstab(void) {
+ std::string path = getDevSysfsPath();
if (path.empty()) {
return;
}
@@ -402,8 +416,10 @@
runDevGcFstab();
}
-int RunIdleMaint(const android::sp<android::os::IVoldTaskListener>& listener) {
+int RunIdleMaint(bool needGC, const android::sp<android::os::IVoldTaskListener>& listener) {
std::unique_lock<std::mutex> lk(cv_m);
+ bool gc_aborted = false;
+
if (idle_maint_stat != IdleMaintStats::kStopped) {
LOG(DEBUG) << "idle maintenance is already running";
if (listener) {
@@ -422,15 +438,17 @@
return android::UNEXPECTED_NULL;
}
- std::list<std::string> paths;
- addFromFstab(&paths, PathTypes::kBlkDevice);
- addFromVolumeManager(&paths, PathTypes::kBlkDevice);
+ if (needGC) {
+ std::list<std::string> paths;
+ addFromFstab(&paths, PathTypes::kBlkDevice, false);
+ addFromVolumeManager(&paths, PathTypes::kBlkDevice);
- startGc(paths);
+ startGc(paths);
- bool gc_aborted = waitForGc(paths);
+ gc_aborted = waitForGc(paths);
- stopGc(paths);
+ stopGc(paths);
+ }
lk.lock();
idle_maint_stat = IdleMaintStats::kStopped;
@@ -480,5 +498,150 @@
return android::OK;
}
+int getLifeTime(const std::string& path) {
+ std::string result;
+
+ if (!ReadFileToString(path, &result)) {
+ PLOG(WARNING) << "Reading lifetime estimation failed for " << path;
+ return -1;
+ }
+ return std::stoi(result, 0, 16);
+}
+
+int32_t GetStorageLifeTime() {
+ std::string path = getDevSysfsPath();
+ if (path.empty()) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ std::string lifeTimeBasePath = path + "/health_descriptor/life_time_estimation_";
+
+ int32_t lifeTime = getLifeTime(lifeTimeBasePath + "c");
+ if (lifeTime != -1) {
+ return lifeTime;
+ }
+
+ int32_t lifeTimeA = getLifeTime(lifeTimeBasePath + "a");
+ int32_t lifeTimeB = getLifeTime(lifeTimeBasePath + "b");
+ lifeTime = std::max(lifeTimeA, lifeTimeB);
+ if (lifeTime != -1) {
+ return lifeTime == 0 ? -1 : lifeTime * 10;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+void SetGCUrgentPace(int32_t neededSegments, int32_t minSegmentThreshold, float dirtyReclaimRate,
+ float reclaimWeight) {
+ std::list<std::string> paths;
+ bool needGC = true;
+
+ addFromFstab(&paths, PathTypes::kBlkDevice, true);
+ if (paths.empty()) {
+ LOG(WARNING) << "There is no valid blk device path for data partition";
+ return;
+ }
+
+ std::string f2fsSysfsPath = paths.front();
+ std::string freeSegmentsPath = f2fsSysfsPath + "/free_segments";
+ std::string dirtySegmentsPath = f2fsSysfsPath + "/dirty_segments";
+ std::string gcSleepTimePath = f2fsSysfsPath + "/gc_urgent_sleep_time";
+ std::string gcUrgentModePath = f2fsSysfsPath + "/gc_urgent";
+ std::string freeSegmentsStr, dirtySegmentsStr;
+
+ if (!ReadFileToString(freeSegmentsPath, &freeSegmentsStr)) {
+ PLOG(WARNING) << "Reading failed in " << freeSegmentsPath;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!ReadFileToString(dirtySegmentsPath, &dirtySegmentsStr)) {
+ PLOG(WARNING) << "Reading failed in " << dirtySegmentsPath;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ int32_t freeSegments = std::stoi(freeSegmentsStr);
+ int32_t dirtySegments = std::stoi(dirtySegmentsStr);
+
+ neededSegments *= reclaimWeight;
+ if (freeSegments >= neededSegments) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Enough free segments: " << freeSegments
+ << ", needed segments: " << neededSegments;
+ needGC = false;
+ } else if (freeSegments + dirtySegments < minSegmentThreshold) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "The sum of free segments: " << freeSegments
+ << ", dirty segments: " << dirtySegments << " is under " << minSegmentThreshold;
+ needGC = false;
+ }
+
+ if (!needGC) {
+ if (!WriteStringToFile(std::to_string(GC_NORMAL_MODE), gcUrgentModePath)) {
+ PLOG(WARNING) << "Writing failed in " << gcUrgentModePath;
+ }
+ return;
+ }
+
+ int32_t sleepTime;
+
+ neededSegments -= freeSegments;
+ neededSegments = std::min(neededSegments, (int32_t)(dirtySegments * dirtyReclaimRate));
+ if (neededSegments == 0) {
+ sleepTime = MIN_GC_URGENT_SLEEP_TIME;
+ } else {
+ sleepTime = ONE_HOUR_IN_MS / neededSegments;
+ if (sleepTime < MIN_GC_URGENT_SLEEP_TIME) {
+ sleepTime = MIN_GC_URGENT_SLEEP_TIME;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WriteStringToFile(std::to_string(sleepTime), gcSleepTimePath)) {
+ PLOG(WARNING) << "Writing failed in " << gcSleepTimePath;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!WriteStringToFile(std::to_string(GC_URGENT_HIGH_MODE), gcUrgentModePath)) {
+ PLOG(WARNING) << "Writing failed in " << gcUrgentModePath;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ LOG(INFO) << "Successfully set gc urgent mode: "
+ << "free segments: " << freeSegments << ", reclaim target: " << neededSegments
+ << ", sleep time: " << sleepTime;
+}
+
+static int32_t getLifeTimeWrite() {
+ std::list<std::string> paths;
+ addFromFstab(&paths, PathTypes::kBlkDevice, true);
+ if (paths.empty()) {
+ LOG(WARNING) << "There is no valid blk device path for data partition";
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ std::string writeKbytesPath = paths.front() + "/lifetime_write_kbytes";
+ std::string writeKbytesStr;
+ if (!ReadFileToString(writeKbytesPath, &writeKbytesStr)) {
+ PLOG(WARNING) << "Reading failed in " << writeKbytesPath;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ long long writeBytes = std::stoll(writeKbytesStr);
+ return writeBytes / KBYTES_IN_SEGMENT;
+}
+
+void RefreshLatestWrite() {
+ int32_t segmentWrite = getLifeTimeWrite();
+ if (segmentWrite != -1) {
+ previousSegmentWrite = segmentWrite;
+ }
+}
+
+int32_t GetWriteAmount() {
+ int32_t currentSegmentWrite = getLifeTimeWrite();
+ if (currentSegmentWrite == -1) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ int32_t writeAmount = currentSegmentWrite - previousSegmentWrite;
+ previousSegmentWrite = currentSegmentWrite;
+ return writeAmount;
+}
+
} // namespace vold
} // namespace android
diff --git a/IdleMaint.h b/IdleMaint.h
index e043db4..ae70b63 100644
--- a/IdleMaint.h
+++ b/IdleMaint.h
@@ -23,8 +23,13 @@
namespace vold {
void Trim(const android::sp<android::os::IVoldTaskListener>& listener);
-int RunIdleMaint(const android::sp<android::os::IVoldTaskListener>& listener);
+int RunIdleMaint(bool needGC, const android::sp<android::os::IVoldTaskListener>& listener);
int AbortIdleMaint(const android::sp<android::os::IVoldTaskListener>& listener);
+int32_t GetStorageLifeTime();
+void SetGCUrgentPace(int32_t neededSegments, int32_t minSegmentThreshold, float dirtyReclaimRate,
+ float reclaimWeight);
+void RefreshLatestWrite();
+int32_t GetWriteAmount();
} // namespace vold
} // namespace android
diff --git a/KeyStorage.cpp b/KeyStorage.cpp
index 11045a4..3ede67e 100644
--- a/KeyStorage.cpp
+++ b/KeyStorage.cpp
@@ -17,8 +17,7 @@
#include "KeyStorage.h"
#include "Checkpoint.h"
-#include "Keymaster.h"
-#include "ScryptParameters.h"
+#include "Keystore.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include <algorithm>
@@ -45,11 +44,6 @@
#include <cutils/properties.h>
-extern "C" {
-
-#include "crypto_scrypt.h"
-}
-
namespace android {
namespace vold {
@@ -123,51 +117,49 @@
SHA512_Final(reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(&(*res)[0]), &c);
}
-// Generates a keymaster key, using rollback resistance if supported.
-static bool generateKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster,
- const km::AuthorizationSetBuilder& paramBuilder,
- std::string* key) {
+// Generates a keystore key, using rollback resistance if supported.
+static bool generateKeystoreKey(Keystore& keystore, const km::AuthorizationSetBuilder& paramBuilder,
+ std::string* key) {
auto paramsWithRollback = paramBuilder;
paramsWithRollback.Authorization(km::TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANCE);
- if (!keymaster.generateKey(paramsWithRollback, key)) {
- LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to generate rollback-resistant key. This is expected if keymaster "
+ if (!keystore.generateKey(paramsWithRollback, key)) {
+ LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to generate rollback-resistant key. This is expected if keystore "
"doesn't support rollback resistance. Falling back to "
"non-rollback-resistant key.";
- if (!keymaster.generateKey(paramBuilder, key)) return false;
+ if (!keystore.generateKey(paramBuilder, key)) return false;
}
return true;
}
-static bool generateKeyStorageKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& appId,
- std::string* key) {
+static bool generateKeyStorageKey(Keystore& keystore, const std::string& appId, std::string* key) {
auto paramBuilder = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.AesEncryptionKey(AES_KEY_BYTES * 8)
.GcmModeMinMacLen(GCM_MAC_BYTES * 8)
.Authorization(km::TAG_APPLICATION_ID, appId)
.Authorization(km::TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED);
LOG(DEBUG) << "Generating \"key storage\" key";
- return generateKeymasterKey(keymaster, paramBuilder, key);
+ return generateKeystoreKey(keystore, paramBuilder, key);
}
bool generateWrappedStorageKey(KeyBuffer* key) {
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
+ Keystore keystore;
+ if (!keystore) return false;
std::string key_temp;
auto paramBuilder = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder().AesEncryptionKey(AES_KEY_BYTES * 8);
paramBuilder.Authorization(km::TAG_STORAGE_KEY);
- if (!generateKeymasterKey(keymaster, paramBuilder, &key_temp)) return false;
+ if (!generateKeystoreKey(keystore, paramBuilder, &key_temp)) return false;
*key = KeyBuffer(key_temp.size());
memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(key->data()), key_temp.c_str(), key->size());
return true;
}
-bool exportWrappedStorageKey(const KeyBuffer& kmKey, KeyBuffer* key) {
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
+bool exportWrappedStorageKey(const KeyBuffer& ksKey, KeyBuffer* key) {
+ Keystore keystore;
+ if (!keystore) return false;
std::string key_temp;
- if (!keymaster.exportKey(kmKey, &key_temp)) return false;
+ if (!keystore.exportKey(ksKey, &key_temp)) return false;
*key = KeyBuffer(key_temp.size());
memcpy(reinterpret_cast<void*>(key->data()), key_temp.c_str(), key->size());
return true;
@@ -213,14 +205,15 @@
static std::mutex key_upgrade_lock;
-// List of key directories that have had their Keymaster key upgraded during
+// List of key directories that have had their Keystore key upgraded during
// this boot and written to "keymaster_key_blob_upgraded", but replacing the old
// key was delayed due to an active checkpoint. Protected by key_upgrade_lock.
+// A directory can be in this list at most once.
static std::vector<std::string> key_dirs_to_commit;
// Replaces |dir|/keymaster_key_blob with |dir|/keymaster_key_blob_upgraded and
-// deletes the old key from Keymaster.
-static bool CommitUpgradedKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir) {
+// deletes the old key from Keystore.
+static bool CommitUpgradedKey(Keystore& keystore, const std::string& dir) {
auto blob_file = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob;
auto upgraded_blob_file = dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded;
@@ -231,13 +224,13 @@
PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to rename " << upgraded_blob_file << " to " << blob_file;
return false;
}
- // Ensure that the rename is persisted before deleting the Keymaster key.
+ // Ensure that the rename is persisted before deleting the Keystore key.
if (!FsyncDirectory(dir)) return false;
- if (!keymaster || !keymaster.deleteKey(blob)) {
+ if (!keystore || !keystore.deleteKey(blob)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to delete old key " << blob_file
- << " from Keymaster; continuing anyway";
- // Continue on, but the space in Keymaster used by the old key won't be freed.
+ << " from Keystore; continuing anyway";
+ // Continue on, but the space in Keystore used by the old key won't be freed.
}
return true;
}
@@ -245,20 +238,20 @@
static void DeferredCommitKeys() {
android::base::WaitForProperty("vold.checkpoint_committed", "1");
LOG(INFO) << "Committing upgraded keys";
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open Keymaster; old keys won't be deleted from Keymaster";
- // Continue on, but the space in Keymaster used by the old keys won't be freed.
+ Keystore keystore;
+ if (!keystore) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to open Keystore; old keys won't be deleted from Keystore";
+ // Continue on, but the space in Keystore used by the old keys won't be freed.
}
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(key_upgrade_lock);
for (auto& dir : key_dirs_to_commit) {
LOG(INFO) << "Committing upgraded key " << dir;
- CommitUpgradedKey(keymaster, dir);
+ CommitUpgradedKey(keystore, dir);
}
key_dirs_to_commit.clear();
}
-// Returns true if the Keymaster key in |dir| has already been upgraded and is
+// Returns true if the Keystore key in |dir| has already been upgraded and is
// pending being committed. Assumes that key_upgrade_lock is held.
static bool IsKeyCommitPending(const std::string& dir) {
for (const auto& dir_to_commit : key_dirs_to_commit) {
@@ -267,8 +260,9 @@
return false;
}
-// Schedules the upgraded Keymaster key in |dir| to be committed later.
-// Assumes that key_upgrade_lock is held.
+// Schedules the upgraded Keystore key in |dir| to be committed later. Assumes
+// that key_upgrade_lock is held and that a commit isn't already pending for the
+// directory.
static void ScheduleKeyCommit(const std::string& dir) {
if (key_dirs_to_commit.empty()) std::thread(DeferredCommitKeys).detach();
key_dirs_to_commit.push_back(dir);
@@ -286,37 +280,41 @@
}
}
-// Renames a key directory. Also updates the deferred commit vector
-// (key_dirs_to_commit) appropriately.
-//
-// However, @old_name must be the path to the directory that was used to put that
-// directory into the deferred commit list in the first place (since this function
-// directly compares paths instead of using IsSameFile()).
-static bool RenameKeyDir(const std::string& old_name, const std::string& new_name) {
+bool RenameKeyDir(const std::string& old_name, const std::string& new_name) {
std::lock_guard<std::mutex> lock(key_upgrade_lock);
- if (rename(old_name.c_str(), new_name.c_str()) != 0) return false;
-
- // IsSameFile() doesn't work here since we just renamed @old_name.
- for (auto it = key_dirs_to_commit.begin(); it != key_dirs_to_commit.end(); it++) {
- if (*it == old_name) *it = new_name;
+ // Find the entry in key_dirs_to_commit (if any) for this directory so that
+ // we can update it if the rename succeeds. We don't allow duplicates in
+ // this list, so there can be at most one such entry.
+ auto it = key_dirs_to_commit.begin();
+ for (; it != key_dirs_to_commit.end(); it++) {
+ if (IsSameFile(old_name, *it)) break;
}
+
+ if (rename(old_name.c_str(), new_name.c_str()) != 0) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "Failed to rename key directory \"" << old_name << "\" to \"" << new_name
+ << "\"";
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (it != key_dirs_to_commit.end()) *it = new_name;
+
return true;
}
// Deletes a leftover upgraded key, if present. An upgraded key can be left
// over if an update failed, or if we rebooted before committing the key in a
// freak accident. Either way, we can re-upgrade the key if we need to.
-static void DeleteUpgradedKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& path) {
+static void DeleteUpgradedKey(Keystore& keystore, const std::string& path) {
if (pathExists(path)) {
LOG(DEBUG) << "Deleting leftover upgraded key " << path;
std::string blob;
if (!android::base::ReadFileToString(path, &blob)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to read leftover upgraded key " << path
<< "; continuing anyway";
- } else if (!keymaster.deleteKey(blob)) {
+ } else if (!keystore.deleteKey(blob)) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to delete leftover upgraded key " << path
- << " from Keymaster; continuing anyway";
+ << " from Keystore; continuing anyway";
}
if (unlink(path.c_str()) != 0) {
LOG(WARNING) << "Failed to unlink leftover upgraded key " << path
@@ -325,11 +323,11 @@
}
}
-// Begins a Keymaster operation using the key stored in |dir|.
-static KeymasterOperation BeginKeymasterOp(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
- const km::AuthorizationSet& keyParams,
- const km::AuthorizationSet& opParams,
- km::AuthorizationSet* outParams) {
+// Begins a Keystore operation using the key stored in |dir|.
+static KeystoreOperation BeginKeystoreOp(Keystore& keystore, const std::string& dir,
+ const km::AuthorizationSet& keyParams,
+ const km::AuthorizationSet& opParams,
+ km::AuthorizationSet* outParams) {
km::AuthorizationSet inParams(keyParams);
inParams.append(opParams.begin(), opParams.end());
@@ -344,13 +342,13 @@
LOG(DEBUG)
<< blob_file
<< " was already upgraded and is waiting to be committed; using the upgraded blob";
- if (!readFileToString(upgraded_blob_file, &blob)) return KeymasterOperation();
+ if (!readFileToString(upgraded_blob_file, &blob)) return KeystoreOperation();
} else {
- DeleteUpgradedKey(keymaster, upgraded_blob_file);
- if (!readFileToString(blob_file, &blob)) return KeymasterOperation();
+ DeleteUpgradedKey(keystore, upgraded_blob_file);
+ if (!readFileToString(blob_file, &blob)) return KeystoreOperation();
}
- auto opHandle = keymaster.begin(blob, inParams, outParams);
+ auto opHandle = keystore.begin(blob, inParams, outParams);
if (!opHandle) return opHandle;
// If key blob wasn't upgraded, nothing left to do.
@@ -359,29 +357,29 @@
if (already_upgraded) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Unexpected case; already-upgraded key " << upgraded_blob_file
<< " still requires upgrade";
- return KeymasterOperation();
+ return KeystoreOperation();
}
LOG(INFO) << "Upgrading key: " << blob_file;
if (!writeStringToFile(*opHandle.getUpgradedBlob(), upgraded_blob_file))
- return KeymasterOperation();
+ return KeystoreOperation();
if (cp_needsCheckpoint()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Wrote upgraded key to " << upgraded_blob_file
<< "; delaying commit due to checkpoint";
ScheduleKeyCommit(dir);
} else {
- if (!CommitUpgradedKey(keymaster, dir)) return KeymasterOperation();
+ if (!CommitUpgradedKey(keystore, dir)) return KeystoreOperation();
LOG(INFO) << "Key upgraded: " << blob_file;
}
return opHandle;
}
-static bool encryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
- const km::AuthorizationSet& keyParams,
- const KeyBuffer& message, std::string* ciphertext) {
+static bool encryptWithKeystoreKey(Keystore& keystore, const std::string& dir,
+ const km::AuthorizationSet& keyParams, const KeyBuffer& message,
+ std::string* ciphertext) {
km::AuthorizationSet opParams =
km::AuthorizationSetBuilder().Authorization(km::TAG_PURPOSE, km::KeyPurpose::ENCRYPT);
km::AuthorizationSet outParams;
- auto opHandle = BeginKeymasterOp(keymaster, dir, keyParams, opParams, &outParams);
+ auto opHandle = BeginKeystoreOp(keystore, dir, keyParams, opParams, &outParams);
if (!opHandle) return false;
auto nonceBlob = outParams.GetTagValue(km::TAG_NONCE);
if (!nonceBlob) {
@@ -401,15 +399,15 @@
return true;
}
-static bool decryptWithKeymasterKey(Keymaster& keymaster, const std::string& dir,
- const km::AuthorizationSet& keyParams,
- const std::string& ciphertext, KeyBuffer* message) {
+static bool decryptWithKeystoreKey(Keystore& keystore, const std::string& dir,
+ const km::AuthorizationSet& keyParams,
+ const std::string& ciphertext, KeyBuffer* message) {
const std::string nonce = ciphertext.substr(0, GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
auto bodyAndMac = ciphertext.substr(GCM_NONCE_BYTES);
auto opParams = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
.Authorization(km::TAG_NONCE, nonce)
.Authorization(km::TAG_PURPOSE, km::KeyPurpose::DECRYPT);
- auto opHandle = BeginKeymasterOp(keymaster, dir, keyParams, opParams, nullptr);
+ auto opHandle = BeginKeystoreOp(keystore, dir, keyParams, opParams, nullptr);
if (!opHandle) return false;
if (!opHandle.updateCompletely(bodyAndMac, message)) return false;
if (!opHandle.finish(nullptr)) return false;
@@ -417,7 +415,7 @@
}
static std::string getStretching(const KeyAuthentication& auth) {
- if (auth.usesKeymaster()) {
+ if (auth.usesKeystore()) {
return kStretch_nopassword;
} else {
return kStretch_none;
@@ -467,8 +465,8 @@
LOG(ERROR) << "Openssl error: " << ERR_get_error();
}
-static bool encryptWithoutKeymaster(const std::string& preKey, const KeyBuffer& plaintext,
- std::string* ciphertext) {
+static bool encryptWithoutKeystore(const std::string& preKey, const KeyBuffer& plaintext,
+ std::string* ciphertext) {
std::string key;
hashWithPrefix(kHashPrefix_keygen, preKey, &key);
key.resize(AES_KEY_BYTES);
@@ -517,8 +515,8 @@
return true;
}
-static bool decryptWithoutKeymaster(const std::string& preKey, const std::string& ciphertext,
- KeyBuffer* plaintext) {
+static bool decryptWithoutKeystore(const std::string& preKey, const std::string& ciphertext,
+ KeyBuffer* plaintext) {
if (ciphertext.size() < GCM_NONCE_BYTES + GCM_MAC_BYTES) {
LOG(ERROR) << "GCM ciphertext too small: " << ciphertext.size();
return false;
@@ -569,7 +567,12 @@
return true;
}
-bool storeKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, const KeyBuffer& key) {
+// Creates a directory at the given path |dir| and stores |key| in it, in such a
+// way that it can only be retrieved via Keystore (if no secret is given in
+// |auth|) or with the given secret (if a secret is given in |auth|), and can be
+// securely deleted. If a storage binding seed has been set, then the storage
+// binding seed will be required to retrieve the key as well.
+static bool storeKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, const KeyBuffer& key) {
if (TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(mkdir(dir.c_str(), 0700)) == -1) {
PLOG(ERROR) << "key mkdir " << dir;
return false;
@@ -582,16 +585,22 @@
std::string appId;
if (!generateAppId(auth, stretching, secdiscardable_hash, &appId)) return false;
std::string encryptedKey;
- if (auth.usesKeymaster()) {
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- std::string kmKey;
- if (!generateKeyStorageKey(keymaster, appId, &kmKey)) return false;
- if (!writeStringToFile(kmKey, dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob)) return false;
+ if (auth.usesKeystore()) {
+ Keystore keystore;
+ if (!keystore) return false;
+ std::string ksKey;
+ if (!generateKeyStorageKey(keystore, appId, &ksKey)) return false;
+ if (!writeStringToFile(ksKey, dir + "/" + kFn_keymaster_key_blob)) return false;
km::AuthorizationSet keyParams = beginParams(appId);
- if (!encryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, dir, keyParams, key, &encryptedKey)) return false;
+ if (!encryptWithKeystoreKey(keystore, dir, keyParams, key, &encryptedKey)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "encryptWithKeystoreKey failed";
+ return false;
+ }
} else {
- if (!encryptWithoutKeymaster(appId, key, &encryptedKey)) return false;
+ if (!encryptWithoutKeystore(appId, key, &encryptedKey)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "encryptWithoutKeystore failed";
+ return false;
+ }
}
if (!writeStringToFile(encryptedKey, dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key)) return false;
if (!FsyncDirectory(dir)) return false;
@@ -610,10 +619,8 @@
}
if (!storeKey(tmp_path, auth, key)) return false;
- if (!RenameKeyDir(tmp_path, key_path)) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Unable to move new key to location: " << key_path;
- return false;
- }
+ if (!RenameKeyDir(tmp_path, key_path)) return false;
+
if (!FsyncParentDirectory(key_path)) return false;
LOG(DEBUG) << "Created key: " << key_path;
return true;
@@ -634,25 +641,30 @@
if (!generateAppId(auth, stretching, secdiscardable_hash, &appId)) return false;
std::string encryptedMessage;
if (!readFileToString(dir + "/" + kFn_encrypted_key, &encryptedMessage)) return false;
- if (auth.usesKeymaster()) {
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
+ if (auth.usesKeystore()) {
+ Keystore keystore;
+ if (!keystore) return false;
km::AuthorizationSet keyParams = beginParams(appId);
- if (!decryptWithKeymasterKey(keymaster, dir, keyParams, encryptedMessage, key))
+ if (!decryptWithKeystoreKey(keystore, dir, keyParams, encryptedMessage, key)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "decryptWithKeystoreKey failed";
return false;
+ }
} else {
- if (!decryptWithoutKeymaster(appId, encryptedMessage, key)) return false;
+ if (!decryptWithoutKeystore(appId, encryptedMessage, key)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "decryptWithoutKeystore failed";
+ return false;
+ }
}
return true;
}
-static bool DeleteKeymasterKey(const std::string& blob_file) {
+static bool DeleteKeystoreKey(const std::string& blob_file) {
std::string blob;
if (!readFileToString(blob_file, &blob)) return false;
- Keymaster keymaster;
- if (!keymaster) return false;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Deleting key " << blob_file << " from Keymaster";
- if (!keymaster.deleteKey(blob)) return false;
+ Keystore keystore;
+ if (!keystore) return false;
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "Deleting key " << blob_file << " from Keystore";
+ if (!keystore.deleteKey(blob)) return false;
return true;
}
@@ -688,7 +700,7 @@
for (auto& fn : {kFn_keymaster_key_blob, kFn_keymaster_key_blob_upgraded}) {
auto blob_file = dir + "/" + fn;
if (pathExists(blob_file)) {
- success &= DeleteKeymasterKey(blob_file);
+ success &= DeleteKeystoreKey(blob_file);
secdiscard_cmd.push_back(blob_file);
}
}
diff --git a/KeyStorage.h b/KeyStorage.h
index e318959..cc2f549 100644
--- a/KeyStorage.h
+++ b/KeyStorage.h
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
public:
KeyAuthentication(const std::string& s) : secret{s} {};
- bool usesKeymaster() const { return secret.empty(); };
+ bool usesKeystore() const { return secret.empty(); };
const std::string secret;
};
@@ -41,11 +41,9 @@
bool createSecdiscardable(const std::string& path, std::string* hash);
bool readSecdiscardable(const std::string& path, std::string* hash);
-// Create a directory at the named path, and store "key" in it,
-// in such a way that it can only be retrieved via Keymaster and
-// can be securely deleted.
-// It's safe to move/rename the directory after creation.
-bool storeKey(const std::string& dir, const KeyAuthentication& auth, const KeyBuffer& key);
+// Renames a key directory while also managing deferred commits appropriately.
+// This method should be used whenever a key directory needs to be moved/renamed.
+bool RenameKeyDir(const std::string& old_name, const std::string& new_name);
// Create a directory at the named path, and store "key" in it as storeKey
// This version creates the key in "tmp_path" then atomically renames "tmp_path"
@@ -63,10 +61,10 @@
bool runSecdiscardSingle(const std::string& file);
-// Generate wrapped storage key using keymaster. Uses STORAGE_KEY tag in keymaster.
+// Generate wrapped storage key using keystore. Uses STORAGE_KEY tag in keystore.
bool generateWrappedStorageKey(KeyBuffer* key);
-// Export the per-boot boot wrapped storage key using keymaster.
-bool exportWrappedStorageKey(const KeyBuffer& kmKey, KeyBuffer* key);
+// Export the per-boot boot wrapped storage key using keystore.
+bool exportWrappedStorageKey(const KeyBuffer& ksKey, KeyBuffer* key);
// Set a seed to be mixed into all key storage encryption keys.
bool setKeyStorageBindingSeed(const std::vector<uint8_t>& seed);
diff --git a/KeyUtil.cpp b/KeyUtil.cpp
index 886054e..25d5af3 100644
--- a/KeyUtil.cpp
+++ b/KeyUtil.cpp
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
namespace android {
namespace vold {
+using android::fscrypt::EncryptionOptions;
+using android::fscrypt::EncryptionPolicy;
+
const KeyGeneration neverGen() {
return KeyGeneration{0, false, false};
}
@@ -51,7 +54,10 @@
}
bool generateStorageKey(const KeyGeneration& gen, KeyBuffer* key) {
- if (!gen.allow_gen) return false;
+ if (!gen.allow_gen) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Generating storage key not allowed";
+ return false;
+ }
if (gen.use_hw_wrapped_key) {
if (gen.keysize != FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE) {
LOG(ERROR) << "Cannot generate a wrapped key " << gen.keysize << " bytes long";
diff --git a/KeyUtil.h b/KeyUtil.h
index 73255a3..5940b8a 100644
--- a/KeyUtil.h
+++ b/KeyUtil.h
@@ -28,8 +28,6 @@
namespace android {
namespace vold {
-using namespace android::fscrypt;
-
// Description of how to generate a key when needed.
struct KeyGeneration {
size_t keysize;
@@ -63,8 +61,8 @@
//
// Returns %true on success, %false on failure. On success also sets *policy
// to the EncryptionPolicy used to refer to this key.
-bool installKey(const std::string& mountpoint, const EncryptionOptions& options,
- const KeyBuffer& key, EncryptionPolicy* policy);
+bool installKey(const std::string& mountpoint, const android::fscrypt::EncryptionOptions& options,
+ const KeyBuffer& key, android::fscrypt::EncryptionPolicy* policy);
// Evict a file-based encryption key from the kernel.
//
@@ -72,7 +70,7 @@
//
// If the kernel doesn't support the filesystem-level keyring, the caller is
// responsible for dropping caches.
-bool evictKey(const std::string& mountpoint, const EncryptionPolicy& policy);
+bool evictKey(const std::string& mountpoint, const android::fscrypt::EncryptionPolicy& policy);
// Retrieves the key from the named directory, or generates it if it doesn't
// exist.
@@ -82,7 +80,8 @@
// Re-installs a file-based encryption key of fscrypt-provisioning type from the
// global session keyring back into fs keyring of the mountpoint.
-bool reloadKeyFromSessionKeyring(const std::string& mountpoint, const EncryptionPolicy& policy);
+bool reloadKeyFromSessionKeyring(const std::string& mountpoint,
+ const android::fscrypt::EncryptionPolicy& policy);
} // namespace vold
} // namespace android
diff --git a/Keymaster.cpp b/Keystore.cpp
similarity index 88%
rename from Keymaster.cpp
rename to Keystore.cpp
index 2314550..a017d68 100644
--- a/Keymaster.cpp
+++ b/Keystore.cpp
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
* limitations under the License.
*/
-#include "Keymaster.h"
+#include "Keystore.h"
#include <android-base/logging.h>
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
namespace ks2_maint = ::aidl::android::security::maintenance;
-KeymasterOperation::~KeymasterOperation() {
+KeystoreOperation::~KeystoreOperation() {
if (ks2Operation) ks2Operation->abort();
}
@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@
return true;
}
-bool KeymasterOperation::updateCompletely(const char* input, size_t inputLen,
- const std::function<void(const char*, size_t)> consumer) {
+bool KeystoreOperation::updateCompletely(const char* input, size_t inputLen,
+ const std::function<void(const char*, size_t)> consumer) {
if (!ks2Operation) return false;
while (inputLen != 0) {
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@
return true;
}
-bool KeymasterOperation::finish(std::string* output) {
+bool KeystoreOperation::finish(std::string* output) {
std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> out_vec;
if (!ks2Operation) return false;
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@
return true;
}
-Keymaster::Keymaster() {
+Keystore::Keystore() {
::ndk::SpAIBinder binder(AServiceManager_waitForService(keystore2_service_name));
auto keystore2Service = ks2::IKeystoreService::fromBinder(binder);
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@
LOG(ERROR) << "Vold unable to get security level from keystore2.";
}
-bool Keymaster::generateKey(const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams, std::string* key) {
+bool Keystore::generateKey(const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams, std::string* key) {
ks2::KeyDescriptor in_key = {
.domain = ks2::Domain::BLOB,
.alias = std::nullopt,
@@ -150,14 +150,14 @@
return true;
}
-bool Keymaster::exportKey(const KeyBuffer& kmKey, std::string* key) {
+bool Keystore::exportKey(const KeyBuffer& ksKey, std::string* key) {
bool ret = false;
ks2::KeyDescriptor storageKey = {
.domain = ks2::Domain::BLOB,
.alias = std::nullopt,
.nspace = VOLD_NAMESPACE,
};
- storageKey.blob = std::make_optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>(kmKey.begin(), kmKey.end());
+ storageKey.blob = std::make_optional<std::vector<uint8_t>>(ksKey.begin(), ksKey.end());
ks2::EphemeralStorageKeyResponse ephemeral_key_response;
auto rc = securityLevel->convertStorageKeyToEphemeral(storageKey, &ephemeral_key_response);
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@
return ret;
}
-bool Keymaster::deleteKey(const std::string& key) {
+bool Keystore::deleteKey(const std::string& key) {
ks2::KeyDescriptor keyDesc = {
.domain = ks2::Domain::BLOB,
.alias = std::nullopt,
@@ -188,8 +188,8 @@
return !logKeystore2ExceptionIfPresent(rc, "deleteKey");
}
-KeymasterOperation Keymaster::begin(const std::string& key, const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams,
- km::AuthorizationSet* outParams) {
+KeystoreOperation Keystore::begin(const std::string& key, const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams,
+ km::AuthorizationSet* outParams) {
ks2::KeyDescriptor keyDesc = {
.domain = ks2::Domain::BLOB,
.alias = std::nullopt,
@@ -202,22 +202,22 @@
auto rc = securityLevel->createOperation(keyDesc, inParams.vector_data(), true, &cor);
if (logKeystore2ExceptionIfPresent(rc, "createOperation")) {
if (rc.getExceptionCode() == EX_SERVICE_SPECIFIC)
- return KeymasterOperation((km::ErrorCode)rc.getServiceSpecificError());
+ return KeystoreOperation((km::ErrorCode)rc.getServiceSpecificError());
else
- return KeymasterOperation();
+ return KeystoreOperation();
}
if (!cor.iOperation) {
LOG(ERROR) << "keystore2 createOperation didn't return an operation";
- return KeymasterOperation();
+ return KeystoreOperation();
}
if (outParams && cor.parameters) *outParams = cor.parameters->keyParameter;
- return KeymasterOperation(cor.iOperation, cor.upgradedBlob);
+ return KeystoreOperation(cor.iOperation, cor.upgradedBlob);
}
-void Keymaster::earlyBootEnded() {
+void Keystore::earlyBootEnded() {
::ndk::SpAIBinder binder(AServiceManager_getService(maintenance_service_name));
auto maint_service = ks2_maint::IKeystoreMaintenance::fromBinder(binder);
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@
logKeystore2ExceptionIfPresent(rc, "earlyBootEnded");
}
-void Keymaster::deleteAllKeys() {
+void Keystore::deleteAllKeys() {
::ndk::SpAIBinder binder(AServiceManager_getService(maintenance_service_name));
auto maint_service = ks2_maint::IKeystoreMaintenance::fromBinder(binder);
diff --git a/Keymaster.h b/Keystore.h
similarity index 81%
rename from Keymaster.h
rename to Keystore.h
index 47bf4a2..d8c488e 100644
--- a/Keymaster.h
+++ b/Keystore.h
@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
-// TODO: Maybe "Keymaster" should be replaced with Keystore2 everywhere?
-#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_KEYMASTER_H
-#define ANDROID_VOLD_KEYMASTER_H
+#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_KEYSTORE_H
+#define ANDROID_VOLD_KEYSTORE_H
#include "KeyBuffer.h"
@@ -45,9 +44,9 @@
// ongoing Keystore2 operation. Aborts the operation
// in the destructor if it is unfinished. Methods log failures
// to LOG(ERROR).
-class KeymasterOperation {
+class KeystoreOperation {
public:
- ~KeymasterOperation();
+ ~KeystoreOperation();
// Is this instance valid? This is false if creation fails, and becomes
// false on finish or if an update fails.
explicit operator bool() const { return (bool)ks2Operation; }
@@ -66,11 +65,11 @@
// Finish and write the output to this string, unless pointer is null.
bool finish(std::string* output);
// Move constructor
- KeymasterOperation(KeymasterOperation&& rhs) { *this = std::move(rhs); }
+ KeystoreOperation(KeystoreOperation&& rhs) { *this = std::move(rhs); }
// Construct an object in an error state for error returns
- KeymasterOperation() { errorCode = km::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR; }
+ KeystoreOperation() { errorCode = km::ErrorCode::UNKNOWN_ERROR; }
// Move Assignment
- KeymasterOperation& operator=(KeymasterOperation&& rhs) {
+ KeystoreOperation& operator=(KeystoreOperation&& rhs) {
ks2Operation = rhs.ks2Operation;
rhs.ks2Operation = nullptr;
@@ -84,8 +83,8 @@
}
private:
- KeymasterOperation(std::shared_ptr<ks2::IKeystoreOperation> ks2Op,
- std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> blob)
+ KeystoreOperation(std::shared_ptr<ks2::IKeystoreOperation> ks2Op,
+ std::optional<std::vector<uint8_t>> blob)
: ks2Operation{ks2Op}, errorCode{km::ErrorCode::OK} {
if (blob)
upgradedBlob = std::optional(std::string(blob->begin(), blob->end()));
@@ -93,7 +92,7 @@
upgradedBlob = std::nullopt;
}
- KeymasterOperation(km::ErrorCode errCode) : errorCode{errCode} {}
+ KeystoreOperation(km::ErrorCode errCode) : errorCode{errCode} {}
bool updateCompletely(const char* input, size_t inputLen,
const std::function<void(const char*, size_t)> consumer);
@@ -101,27 +100,27 @@
std::shared_ptr<ks2::IKeystoreOperation> ks2Operation;
std::optional<std::string> upgradedBlob;
km::ErrorCode errorCode;
- DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(KeymasterOperation);
- friend class Keymaster;
+ DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(KeystoreOperation);
+ friend class Keystore;
};
// Wrapper for keystore2 methods that vold uses.
-class Keymaster {
+class Keystore {
public:
- Keymaster();
+ Keystore();
// false if we failed to get a keystore2 security level.
explicit operator bool() { return (bool)securityLevel; }
// Generate a key using keystore2 from the given params.
bool generateKey(const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams, std::string* key);
// Exports a keystore2 key with STORAGE_KEY tag wrapped with a per-boot ephemeral key
- bool exportKey(const KeyBuffer& kmKey, std::string* key);
+ bool exportKey(const KeyBuffer& ksKey, std::string* key);
// If supported, permanently delete a key from the keymint device it belongs to.
bool deleteKey(const std::string& key);
// Begin a new cryptographic operation, collecting output parameters if pointer is non-null
- // If the key was upgraded as a result of a call to this method, the returned KeymasterOperation
+ // If the key was upgraded as a result of a call to this method, the returned KeystoreOperation
// also stores the upgraded key blob.
- KeymasterOperation begin(const std::string& key, const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams,
- km::AuthorizationSet* outParams);
+ KeystoreOperation begin(const std::string& key, const km::AuthorizationSet& inParams,
+ km::AuthorizationSet* outParams);
// Tell all Keymint devices that early boot has ended and early boot-only keys can no longer
// be created or used.
@@ -132,7 +131,7 @@
private:
std::shared_ptr<ks2::IKeystoreSecurityLevel> securityLevel;
- DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Keymaster);
+ DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Keystore);
};
} // namespace vold
diff --git a/Loop.cpp b/Loop.cpp
index 87f105d..4c86788 100644
--- a/Loop.cpp
+++ b/Loop.cpp
@@ -163,8 +163,6 @@
if (ioctl(fd.get(), LOOP_CLR_FD, 0) < 0) {
PLOG(WARNING) << "Failed to LOOP_CLR_FD " << path;
}
- } else {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Found unmanaged loop device at " << path << " named " << id;
}
}
diff --git a/MetadataCrypt.cpp b/MetadataCrypt.cpp
index 9038e8d..6550be4 100644
--- a/MetadataCrypt.cpp
+++ b/MetadataCrypt.cpp
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
#include "EncryptInplace.h"
#include "KeyStorage.h"
#include "KeyUtil.h"
-#include "Keymaster.h"
+#include "Keystore.h"
#include "Utils.h"
#include "VoldUtil.h"
#include "fs/Ext4.h"
@@ -49,8 +49,10 @@
using android::fs_mgr::FstabEntry;
using android::fs_mgr::GetEntryForMountPoint;
+using android::fscrypt::GetFirstApiLevel;
using android::vold::KeyBuffer;
using namespace android::dm;
+using namespace std::chrono_literals;
// Parsed from metadata options
struct CryptoOptions {
@@ -80,6 +82,17 @@
return KeyGeneration{options.cipher.get_keysize(), true, options.use_hw_wrapped_key};
}
+void defaultkey_precreate_dm_device() {
+ auto& dm = DeviceMapper::Instance();
+ if (dm.GetState(kDmNameUserdata) != DmDeviceState::INVALID) {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Not pre-creating userdata encryption device; device already exists";
+ return;
+ }
+ if (!dm.CreateEmptyDevice(kDmNameUserdata)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to pre-create userdata metadata encryption device";
+ }
+}
+
static bool mount_via_fs_mgr(const char* mount_point, const char* blk_device) {
// fs_mgr_do_mount runs fsck. Use setexeccon to run trusted
// partitions in the fsck domain.
@@ -112,12 +125,14 @@
auto dir = metadata_key_dir + "/key";
LOG(DEBUG) << "metadata_key_dir/key: " << dir;
if (!MkdirsSync(dir, 0700)) return false;
- if (!pathExists(dir)) {
+ auto in_dsu = android::base::GetBoolProperty("ro.gsid.image_running", false);
+ // !pathExists(dir) does not imply there's a factory reset when in DSU mode.
+ if (!pathExists(dir) && !in_dsu) {
auto delete_all = android::base::GetBoolProperty(
"ro.crypto.metadata_init_delete_all_keys.enabled", false);
if (delete_all) {
LOG(INFO) << "Metadata key does not exist, calling deleteAllKeys";
- Keymaster::deleteAllKeys();
+ Keystore::deleteAllKeys();
} else {
LOG(DEBUG) << "Metadata key does not exist but "
"ro.crypto.metadata_init_delete_all_keys.enabled is false";
@@ -170,8 +185,18 @@
table.AddTarget(std::move(target));
auto& dm = DeviceMapper::Instance();
- if (!dm.CreateDevice(dm_name, table, crypto_blkdev, std::chrono::seconds(5))) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "Could not create default-key device " << dm_name;
+ if (dm_name == kDmNameUserdata && dm.GetState(dm_name) == DmDeviceState::SUSPENDED) {
+ // The device was created in advance, populate it now.
+ if (!dm.LoadTableAndActivate(dm_name, table)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to populate default-key device " << dm_name;
+ return false;
+ }
+ if (!dm.WaitForDevice(dm_name, 5s, crypto_blkdev)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to wait for default-key device " << dm_name;
+ return false;
+ }
+ } else if (!dm.CreateDevice(dm_name, table, crypto_blkdev, 5s)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Could not create default-key device " << dm_name;
return false;
}
return true;
@@ -219,7 +244,8 @@
<< fs_type;
auto encrypted_state = android::base::GetProperty("ro.crypto.state", "");
if (encrypted_state != "" && encrypted_state != "encrypted") {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fscrypt_enable_crypto got unexpected starting state: " << encrypted_state;
+ LOG(ERROR) << "fscrypt_mount_metadata_encrypted got unexpected starting state: "
+ << encrypted_state;
return false;
}
@@ -256,12 +282,18 @@
auto gen = needs_encrypt ? makeGen(options) : neverGen();
KeyBuffer key;
- if (!read_key(data_rec->metadata_key_dir, gen, &key)) return false;
+ if (!read_key(data_rec->metadata_key_dir, gen, &key)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "read_key failed in mountFstab";
+ return false;
+ }
std::string crypto_blkdev;
uint64_t nr_sec;
- if (!create_crypto_blk_dev(kDmNameUserdata, blk_device, key, options, &crypto_blkdev, &nr_sec))
+ if (!create_crypto_blk_dev(kDmNameUserdata, blk_device, key, options, &crypto_blkdev,
+ &nr_sec)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "create_crypto_blk_dev failed in mountFstab";
return false;
+ }
if (needs_encrypt) {
if (should_format) {
@@ -275,10 +307,17 @@
LOG(ERROR) << "Unknown filesystem type: " << fs_type;
return false;
}
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Format (err=" << error << ") " << crypto_blkdev << " on " << mount_point;
- if (error != 0) return false;
+ if (error != 0) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Format of " << crypto_blkdev << " for " << mount_point
+ << " failed (err=" << error << ").";
+ return false;
+ }
+ LOG(DEBUG) << "Format of " << crypto_blkdev << " for " << mount_point << " succeeded.";
} else {
- if (!encrypt_inplace(crypto_blkdev, blk_device, nr_sec, false)) return false;
+ if (!encrypt_inplace(crypto_blkdev, blk_device, nr_sec, false)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "encrypt_inplace failed in mountFstab";
+ return false;
+ }
}
}
diff --git a/MetadataCrypt.h b/MetadataCrypt.h
index e482765..06131ad 100644
--- a/MetadataCrypt.h
+++ b/MetadataCrypt.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
namespace android {
namespace vold {
+void defaultkey_precreate_dm_device();
bool fscrypt_mount_metadata_encrypted(const std::string& block_device,
const std::string& mount_point, bool needs_encrypt,
bool should_format, const std::string& fs_type);
diff --git a/ScryptParameters.cpp b/ScryptParameters.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index f5a964f..0000000
--- a/ScryptParameters.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include "ScryptParameters.h"
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-bool parse_scrypt_parameters(const char* paramstr, int* Nf, int* rf, int* pf) {
- int params[3] = {};
- char* token;
- char* saveptr;
- int i;
-
- /*
- * The token we're looking for should be three integers separated by
- * colons (e.g., "12:8:1"). Scan the property to make sure it matches.
- */
- for (i = 0, token = strtok_r(const_cast<char*>(paramstr), ":", &saveptr);
- token != nullptr && i < 3; i++, token = strtok_r(nullptr, ":", &saveptr)) {
- char* endptr;
- params[i] = strtol(token, &endptr, 10);
-
- /*
- * Check that there was a valid number and it's 8-bit.
- */
- if ((*token == '\0') || (*endptr != '\0') || params[i] < 0 || params[i] > 255) {
- return false;
- }
- }
- if (token != nullptr) {
- return false;
- }
- *Nf = params[0];
- *rf = params[1];
- *pf = params[2];
- return true;
-}
diff --git a/ScryptParameters.h b/ScryptParameters.h
deleted file mode 100644
index edb80cc..0000000
--- a/ScryptParameters.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#ifndef ANDROID_VOLD_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS_H
-#define ANDROID_VOLD_SCRYPT_PARAMETERS_H
-
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <sys/cdefs.h>
-
-#define SCRYPT_PROP "ro.crypto.scrypt_params"
-#define SCRYPT_DEFAULTS "15:3:1"
-
-bool parse_scrypt_parameters(const char* paramstr, int* Nf, int* rf, int* pf);
-
-#endif
diff --git a/Utils.cpp b/Utils.cpp
index 2144a3a..864cbf8 100644
--- a/Utils.cpp
+++ b/Utils.cpp
@@ -68,10 +68,10 @@
namespace android {
namespace vold {
-security_context_t sBlkidContext = nullptr;
-security_context_t sBlkidUntrustedContext = nullptr;
-security_context_t sFsckContext = nullptr;
-security_context_t sFsckUntrustedContext = nullptr;
+char* sBlkidContext = nullptr;
+char* sBlkidUntrustedContext = nullptr;
+char* sFsckContext = nullptr;
+char* sFsckUntrustedContext = nullptr;
bool sSleepOnUnmount = true;
@@ -702,7 +702,7 @@
}
status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args, std::vector<std::string>* output,
- security_context_t context) {
+ char* context) {
auto argv = ConvertToArgv(args);
android::base::unique_fd pipe_read, pipe_write;
@@ -754,7 +754,53 @@
return OK;
}
-pid_t ForkExecvpAsync(const std::vector<std::string>& args) {
+status_t ForkExecvpTimeout(const std::vector<std::string>& args, std::chrono::seconds timeout,
+ char* context) {
+ int status;
+
+ pid_t wait_timeout_pid = fork();
+ if (wait_timeout_pid == 0) {
+ pid_t pid = ForkExecvpAsync(args, context);
+ if (pid == -1) {
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ pid_t timer_pid = fork();
+ if (timer_pid == 0) {
+ sleep(timeout.count());
+ _exit(ETIMEDOUT);
+ }
+ if (timer_pid == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "fork in ForkExecvpAsync_timeout";
+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+ _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ pid_t finished = wait(&status);
+ if (finished == pid) {
+ kill(timer_pid, SIGTERM);
+ } else {
+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+ }
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ _exit(ECHILD);
+ }
+ _exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
+ }
+ if (waitpid(wait_timeout_pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+ PLOG(ERROR) << "waitpid in ForkExecvpAsync_timeout";
+ return -errno;
+ }
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Process did not exit normally, status: " << status;
+ return -ECHILD;
+ }
+ if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Process exited with code: " << WEXITSTATUS(status);
+ return WEXITSTATUS(status);
+ }
+ return OK;
+}
+
+pid_t ForkExecvpAsync(const std::vector<std::string>& args, char* context) {
auto argv = ConvertToArgv(args);
pid_t pid = fork();
@@ -762,6 +808,12 @@
close(STDIN_FILENO);
close(STDOUT_FILENO);
close(STDERR_FILENO);
+ if (context) {
+ if (setexeccon(context)) {
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to setexeccon in ForkExecvpAsync";
+ abort();
+ }
+ }
execvp(argv[0], const_cast<char**>(argv.data()));
PLOG(ERROR) << "exec in ForkExecvpAsync";
@@ -1442,6 +1494,17 @@
namespace fs = std::filesystem;
for (const auto& itEntry : fs::directory_iterator("/sys/fs/fuse/connections")) {
+ std::string fsPath = itEntry.path().string() + "/filesystem";
+ std::string fs;
+
+ // Virtiofs is on top of fuse and there isn't any user space daemon.
+ // Android user space doesn't manage it.
+ if (android::base::ReadFileToString(fsPath, &fs, false) &&
+ android::base::Trim(fs) == "virtiofs") {
+ LOG(INFO) << "Ignore virtiofs connection entry " << itEntry.path().string();
+ continue;
+ }
+
std::string abortPath = itEntry.path().string() + "/abort";
LOG(DEBUG) << "Aborting fuse connection entry " << abortPath;
bool ret = writeStringToFile("1", abortPath);
diff --git a/Utils.h b/Utils.h
index 54578b4..2d54639 100644
--- a/Utils.h
+++ b/Utils.h
@@ -37,12 +37,15 @@
static const char* kVoldAppDataIsolationEnabled = "persist.sys.vold_app_data_isolation_enabled";
static const char* kExternalStorageSdcardfs = "external_storage.sdcardfs.enabled";
+static const char* kFuseBpfEnabled = "persist.sys.fuse.bpf.enable";
+
+static constexpr std::chrono::seconds kUntrustedFsckSleepTime(45);
/* SELinux contexts used depending on the block device type */
-extern security_context_t sBlkidContext;
-extern security_context_t sBlkidUntrustedContext;
-extern security_context_t sFsckContext;
-extern security_context_t sFsckUntrustedContext;
+extern char* sBlkidContext;
+extern char* sBlkidUntrustedContext;
+extern char* sFsckContext;
+extern char* sFsckUntrustedContext;
// TODO remove this with better solution, b/64143519
extern bool sSleepOnUnmount;
@@ -105,10 +108,12 @@
std::string* fsLabel);
/* Returns either WEXITSTATUS() status, or a negative errno */
-status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args, std::vector<std::string>* output = nullptr,
- security_context_t context = nullptr);
+status_t ForkExecvp(const std::vector<std::string>& args,
+ std::vector<std::string>* output = nullptr, char* context = nullptr);
+status_t ForkExecvpTimeout(const std::vector<std::string>& args, std::chrono::seconds timeout,
+ char* context = nullptr);
-pid_t ForkExecvpAsync(const std::vector<std::string>& args);
+pid_t ForkExecvpAsync(const std::vector<std::string>& args, char* context = nullptr);
/* Gets block device size in bytes */
status_t GetBlockDevSize(int fd, uint64_t* size);
diff --git a/VoldNativeService.cpp b/VoldNativeService.cpp
index 4817ff1..1033af9 100644
--- a/VoldNativeService.cpp
+++ b/VoldNativeService.cpp
@@ -19,14 +19,13 @@
#include "VoldNativeService.h"
#include <android-base/logging.h>
-#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
#include <android-base/strings.h>
#include <fs_mgr.h>
#include <fscrypt/fscrypt.h>
#include <private/android_filesystem_config.h>
#include <utils/Trace.h>
-#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <fstream>
#include <thread>
@@ -35,18 +34,15 @@
#include "FsCrypt.h"
#include "IdleMaint.h"
#include "KeyStorage.h"
-#include "Keymaster.h"
+#include "Keystore.h"
#include "MetadataCrypt.h"
#include "MoveStorage.h"
-#include "Process.h"
#include "VoldNativeServiceValidation.h"
#include "VoldUtil.h"
#include "VolumeManager.h"
#include "cryptfs.h"
#include "incfs.h"
-using android::base::StringPrintf;
-using std::endl;
using namespace std::literals;
namespace android {
@@ -133,15 +129,14 @@
}
status_t VoldNativeService::dump(int fd, const Vector<String16>& /* args */) {
- auto out = std::fstream(StringPrintf("/proc/self/fd/%d", fd));
const binder::Status dump_permission = CheckPermission(kDump);
if (!dump_permission.isOk()) {
- out << dump_permission.toString8() << endl;
+ dprintf(fd, "%s\n", dump_permission.toString8().c_str());
return PERMISSION_DENIED;
}
ACQUIRE_LOCK;
- out << "vold is happy!" << endl;
+ dprintf(fd, "vold is happy!\n");
return NO_ERROR;
}
@@ -475,11 +470,11 @@
}
binder::Status VoldNativeService::runIdleMaint(
- const android::sp<android::os::IVoldTaskListener>& listener) {
+ bool needGC, const android::sp<android::os::IVoldTaskListener>& listener) {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_LOCK;
- std::thread([=]() { android::vold::RunIdleMaint(listener); }).detach();
+ std::thread([=]() { android::vold::RunIdleMaint(needGC, listener); }).detach();
return Ok();
}
@@ -492,6 +487,40 @@
return Ok();
}
+binder::Status VoldNativeService::getStorageLifeTime(int32_t* _aidl_return) {
+ ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
+ ACQUIRE_LOCK;
+
+ *_aidl_return = GetStorageLifeTime();
+ return Ok();
+}
+
+binder::Status VoldNativeService::setGCUrgentPace(int32_t neededSegments,
+ int32_t minSegmentThreshold,
+ float dirtyReclaimRate, float reclaimWeight) {
+ ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
+ ACQUIRE_LOCK;
+
+ SetGCUrgentPace(neededSegments, minSegmentThreshold, dirtyReclaimRate, reclaimWeight);
+ return Ok();
+}
+
+binder::Status VoldNativeService::refreshLatestWrite() {
+ ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
+ ACQUIRE_LOCK;
+
+ RefreshLatestWrite();
+ return Ok();
+}
+
+binder::Status VoldNativeService::getWriteAmount(int32_t* _aidl_return) {
+ ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
+ ACQUIRE_LOCK;
+
+ *_aidl_return = GetWriteAmount();
+ return Ok();
+}
+
binder::Status VoldNativeService::mountAppFuse(int32_t uid, int32_t mountId,
android::base::unique_fd* _aidl_return) {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
@@ -524,130 +553,107 @@
return Ok();
}
+// TODO(b/191796797) remove this once caller is removed
binder::Status VoldNativeService::fdeCheckPassword(const std::string& password) {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_CRYPT_LOCK;
- return translate(cryptfs_check_passwd(password.c_str()));
+ SLOGE("fdeCheckPassword is no longer supported");
+ return translate(-1);
}
+// TODO(b/191796797) remove this once caller is removed
binder::Status VoldNativeService::fdeRestart() {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_CRYPT_LOCK;
- // Spawn as thread so init can issue commands back to vold without
- // causing deadlock, usually as a result of prep_data_fs.
- std::thread(&cryptfs_restart).detach();
+ SLOGE("fdeRestart is no longer supported");
return Ok();
}
+// TODO(b/191796797) remove this once caller is removed
+#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED 1
binder::Status VoldNativeService::fdeComplete(int32_t* _aidl_return) {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_CRYPT_LOCK;
- *_aidl_return = cryptfs_crypto_complete();
+ SLOGE("fdeComplete is no longer supported");
+ *_aidl_return = CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED;
return Ok();
}
-static int fdeEnableInternal(int32_t passwordType, const std::string& password,
- int32_t encryptionFlags) {
- bool noUi = (encryptionFlags & VoldNativeService::ENCRYPTION_FLAG_NO_UI) != 0;
-
- for (int tries = 0; tries < 2; ++tries) {
- int rc;
- if (passwordType == VoldNativeService::PASSWORD_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
- rc = cryptfs_enable_default(noUi);
- } else {
- rc = cryptfs_enable(passwordType, password.c_str(), noUi);
- }
-
- if (rc == 0) {
- return 0;
- } else if (tries == 0) {
- KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(DATA_MNT_POINT, SIGKILL);
- }
- }
-
- return -1;
-}
-
+// TODO(b/191796797) remove this once caller is removed
binder::Status VoldNativeService::fdeEnable(int32_t passwordType, const std::string& password,
int32_t encryptionFlags) {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_CRYPT_LOCK;
- LOG(DEBUG) << "fdeEnable(" << passwordType << ", *, " << encryptionFlags << ")";
- if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "fscrypt_is_native, fdeEnable invalid";
- return error("fscrypt_is_native, fdeEnable invalid");
- }
- LOG(DEBUG) << "!fscrypt_is_native, spawning fdeEnableInternal";
-
- // Spawn as thread so init can issue commands back to vold without
- // causing deadlock, usually as a result of prep_data_fs.
- std::thread(&fdeEnableInternal, passwordType, password, encryptionFlags).detach();
- return Ok();
+ SLOGE("fdeEnable is no longer supported");
+ return translate(-1);
}
+// TODO(b/191796797) remove this once caller is removed
binder::Status VoldNativeService::fdeChangePassword(int32_t passwordType,
const std::string& password) {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_CRYPT_LOCK;
- return translate(cryptfs_changepw(passwordType, password.c_str()));
+ SLOGE("fdeChangePassword is no longer supported");
+ return translate(-1);
}
+// TODO(b/191796797) remove this once caller is removed
binder::Status VoldNativeService::fdeVerifyPassword(const std::string& password) {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_CRYPT_LOCK;
- return translate(cryptfs_verify_passwd(password.c_str()));
+ SLOGE("fdeVerifyPassword is no longer supported");
+ return translate(-1);
}
+// TODO(b/191796797) remove this once caller is removed
binder::Status VoldNativeService::fdeGetField(const std::string& key, std::string* _aidl_return) {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_CRYPT_LOCK;
- char buf[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
- if (cryptfs_getfield(key.c_str(), buf, sizeof(buf)) != CRYPTO_GETFIELD_OK) {
- return error(StringPrintf("Failed to read field %s", key.c_str()));
- } else {
- *_aidl_return = buf;
- return Ok();
- }
+ SLOGE("fdeGetField is no longer supported");
+ return translate(-1);
}
+// TODO(b/191796797) remove this once caller is removed
binder::Status VoldNativeService::fdeSetField(const std::string& key, const std::string& value) {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_CRYPT_LOCK;
- return translate(cryptfs_setfield(key.c_str(), value.c_str()));
+ SLOGE("fdeSetField is no longer supported");
+ return translate(-1);
}
+// TODO(b/191796797) remove this once caller is removed
binder::Status VoldNativeService::fdeGetPasswordType(int32_t* _aidl_return) {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_CRYPT_LOCK;
- *_aidl_return = cryptfs_get_password_type();
+ SLOGE("fdeGetPasswordType is no longer supported");
+ *_aidl_return = -1;
return Ok();
}
+// TODO(b/191796797) remove this once caller is removed
binder::Status VoldNativeService::fdeGetPassword(std::string* _aidl_return) {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_CRYPT_LOCK;
- const char* res = cryptfs_get_password();
- if (res != nullptr) {
- *_aidl_return = res;
- }
+ SLOGE("fdeGetPassword is no longer supported");
return Ok();
}
+// TODO(b/191796797) remove this once caller is removed
binder::Status VoldNativeService::fdeClearPassword() {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_CRYPT_LOCK;
- cryptfs_clear_password();
+ SLOGE("fdeClearPassword is no longer supported");
return Ok();
}
@@ -658,15 +664,12 @@
return translateBool(fscrypt_initialize_systemwide_keys());
}
+// TODO(b/191796797) remove this once caller is removed
binder::Status VoldNativeService::mountDefaultEncrypted() {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_CRYPT_LOCK;
- if (!fscrypt_is_native()) {
- // Spawn as thread so init can issue commands back to vold without
- // causing deadlock, usually as a result of prep_data_fs.
- std::thread(&cryptfs_mount_default_encrypted).detach();
- }
+ SLOGE("mountDefaultEncrypted is no longer supported");
return Ok();
}
@@ -677,11 +680,13 @@
return translateBool(fscrypt_init_user0());
}
+// TODO(b/191796797) remove this once caller is removed
binder::Status VoldNativeService::isConvertibleToFbe(bool* _aidl_return) {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_CRYPT_LOCK;
- *_aidl_return = cryptfs_isConvertibleToFBE() != 0;
+ SLOGE("isConvertibleToFbe is no longer supported");
+ *_aidl_return = false;
return Ok();
}
@@ -940,44 +945,12 @@
incfs::features();
}
-// This is missing from the kernel UAPI headers.
-#define ST_RDONLY 0x0001
-
-// FDE devices run the post-fs-data trigger (and hence also earlyBootEnded)
-// multiple times, sometimes prior to the real /data being mounted. That causes
-// keystore2 to try to open a file in /data, causing it to panic or have to be
-// killed by vold later, causing problems (vold failing to connect to keystore2,
-// or keystore2 operations erroring out later). As a workaround to keep FDE
-// working, ignore these too-early calls to earlyBootEnded.
-//
-// This can be removed when support for FDE is removed.
-static bool IgnoreEarlyBootEnded() {
- // The statfs("/data") below should be sufficient by itself, but to be safe
- // we also explicitly return false on FBE devices. (This really should be
- // ro.crypto.type != "block" for "non-FDE devices", but on FDE devices this
- // is sometimes called before ro.crypto.type gets set.)
- if (fscrypt_is_native()) return false;
-
- struct statfs buf;
- if (statfs(DATA_MNT_POINT, &buf) != 0) {
- PLOG(ERROR) << "statfs(\"/data\") failed";
- return false;
- }
- if (buf.f_type == TMPFS_MAGIC || (buf.f_flags & ST_RDONLY)) {
- LOG(INFO) << "Ignoring earlyBootEnded since real /data isn't mounted yet";
- return true;
- }
- return false;
-}
-
binder::Status VoldNativeService::earlyBootEnded() {
ENFORCE_SYSTEM_OR_ROOT;
ACQUIRE_LOCK;
- if (IgnoreEarlyBootEnded()) return Ok();
-
initializeIncFs();
- Keymaster::earlyBootEnded();
+ Keystore::earlyBootEnded();
return Ok();
}
diff --git a/VoldNativeService.h b/VoldNativeService.h
index 5fa04f5..49bcbaa 100644
--- a/VoldNativeService.h
+++ b/VoldNativeService.h
@@ -85,8 +85,14 @@
binder::Status fstrim(int32_t fstrimFlags,
const android::sp<android::os::IVoldTaskListener>& listener);
- binder::Status runIdleMaint(const android::sp<android::os::IVoldTaskListener>& listener);
+ binder::Status runIdleMaint(bool needGC,
+ const android::sp<android::os::IVoldTaskListener>& listener);
binder::Status abortIdleMaint(const android::sp<android::os::IVoldTaskListener>& listener);
+ binder::Status getStorageLifeTime(int32_t* _aidl_return);
+ binder::Status setGCUrgentPace(int32_t neededSegments, int32_t minSegmentThreshold,
+ float dirtyReclaimRate, float reclaimWeight);
+ binder::Status refreshLatestWrite();
+ binder::Status getWriteAmount(int32_t* _aidl_return);
binder::Status mountAppFuse(int32_t uid, int32_t mountId,
android::base::unique_fd* _aidl_return);
diff --git a/VolumeManager.cpp b/VolumeManager.cpp
index 2697f67..9311321 100644
--- a/VolumeManager.cpp
+++ b/VolumeManager.cpp
@@ -239,7 +239,7 @@
break;
}
case NetlinkEvent::Action::kChange: {
- LOG(DEBUG) << "Disk at " << major << ":" << minor << " changed";
+ LOG(VERBOSE) << "Disk at " << major << ":" << minor << " changed";
handleDiskChanged(device);
break;
}
@@ -899,10 +899,21 @@
}
mInternalEmulatedVolumes.clear();
+ // Destroy and recreate all disks except that StubVolume disks are just
+ // destroyed and removed from both mDisks and mPendingDisks.
+ // StubVolumes are managed from outside Android (e.g. from Chrome OS) and
+ // their disk recreation on reset events should be handled from outside by
+ // calling createStubVolume() again.
for (const auto& disk : mDisks) {
disk->destroy();
- disk->create();
+ if (!disk->isStub()) {
+ disk->create();
+ }
}
+ const auto isStub = [](const auto& disk) { return disk->isStub(); };
+ mDisks.remove_if(isStub);
+ mPendingDisks.remove_if(isStub);
+
updateVirtualDisk();
mAddedUsers.clear();
mStartedUsers.clear();
@@ -1002,8 +1013,8 @@
// The volume must be mounted
return false;
}
- if ((vol.getMountFlags() & VolumeBase::MountFlags::kVisible) == 0) {
- // and visible
+ if (!vol.isVisibleForWrite()) {
+ // App dirs should only be created for writable volumes.
return false;
}
if (vol.getInternalPath().empty()) {
@@ -1077,8 +1088,8 @@
// The volume must be mounted
return false;
}
- if ((vol.getMountFlags() & VolumeBase::MountFlags::kVisible) == 0) {
- // and visible
+ if (!vol.isVisibleForWrite()) {
+ // Obb volume should only be created for writable volumes.
return false;
}
if (vol.getInternalPath().empty()) {
diff --git a/binder/android/os/IVold.aidl b/binder/android/os/IVold.aidl
index 606f473..c72ceea 100644
--- a/binder/android/os/IVold.aidl
+++ b/binder/android/os/IVold.aidl
@@ -65,8 +65,13 @@
void destroyObb(@utf8InCpp String volId);
void fstrim(int fstrimFlags, IVoldTaskListener listener);
- void runIdleMaint(IVoldTaskListener listener);
+ void runIdleMaint(boolean needGC, IVoldTaskListener listener);
void abortIdleMaint(IVoldTaskListener listener);
+ int getStorageLifeTime();
+ void setGCUrgentPace(int neededSegments, int minSegmentThreshold,
+ float dirtyReclaimRate, float reclaimWeight);
+ void refreshLatestWrite();
+ int getWriteAmount();
FileDescriptor mountAppFuse(int uid, int mountId);
void unmountAppFuse(int uid, int mountId);
@@ -159,7 +164,8 @@
const int FSTRIM_FLAG_DEEP_TRIM = 1;
const int MOUNT_FLAG_PRIMARY = 1;
- const int MOUNT_FLAG_VISIBLE = 2;
+ const int MOUNT_FLAG_VISIBLE_FOR_READ = 2;
+ const int MOUNT_FLAG_VISIBLE_FOR_WRITE = 4;
const int PARTITION_TYPE_PUBLIC = 0;
const int PARTITION_TYPE_PRIVATE = 1;
diff --git a/cryptfs.cpp b/cryptfs.cpp
index 91235d2..ab8f3ec 100644
--- a/cryptfs.cpp
+++ b/cryptfs.cpp
@@ -14,292 +14,40 @@
* limitations under the License.
*/
+//
+// This file contains the implementation of the dm-crypt volume metadata
+// encryption method, which is deprecated. Devices that launched with Android
+// 11 or higher use a different method instead. For details, see
+// https://source.android.com/security/encryption/metadata#configuration-on-adoptable-storage
+//
+
#define LOG_TAG "Cryptfs"
#include "cryptfs.h"
-#include "Checkpoint.h"
#include "CryptoType.h"
-#include "EncryptInplace.h"
-#include "FsCrypt.h"
-#include "Keymaster.h"
-#include "Process.h"
-#include "ScryptParameters.h"
#include "Utils.h"
-#include "VoldUtil.h"
-#include "VolumeManager.h"
-#include <android-base/logging.h>
#include <android-base/parseint.h>
#include <android-base/properties.h>
-#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
-#include <android-base/strings.h>
-#include <bootloader_message/bootloader_message.h>
-#include <cutils/android_reboot.h>
#include <cutils/properties.h>
-#include <ext4_utils/ext4_utils.h>
-#include <f2fs_sparseblock.h>
-#include <fs_mgr.h>
-#include <fscrypt/fscrypt.h>
#include <libdm/dm.h>
#include <log/log.h>
-#include <logwrap/logwrap.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-#include <wakelock/wakelock.h>
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <inttypes.h>
-#include <libgen.h>
-#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
-#include <math.h>
-#include <mntent.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/mount.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
#include <chrono>
-#include <thread>
-
-extern "C" {
-#include <crypto_scrypt.h>
-}
using android::base::ParseUint;
-using android::base::StringPrintf;
-using android::fs_mgr::GetEntryForMountPoint;
using android::vold::CryptoType;
using android::vold::KeyBuffer;
using android::vold::KeyGeneration;
-using namespace android::vold;
using namespace android::dm;
+using namespace android::vold;
using namespace std::chrono_literals;
-/* The current cryptfs version */
-#define CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION 1
-#define CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION 3
-
-#define CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET 0x1000
-#define CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE 0x1000
-
-#define CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE 512
-
-#define MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN 64
-
#define MAX_KEY_LEN 48
-#define SALT_LEN 16
-#define SCRYPT_LEN 32
-
-/* definitions of flags in the structure below */
-#define CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED 0x1 /* The key for the partition is not encrypted. */
-#define CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS 0x2 /* no longer used */
-#define CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE \
- 0x4 /* Set when starting encryption, clear when \
- exit cleanly, either through success or \
- correctly marked partial encryption */
-#define CRYPT_DATA_CORRUPT \
- 0x8 /* Set when encryption is fine, but the \
- underlying volume is corrupt */
-#define CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION \
- 0x10 /* Set when it is time to encrypt this \
- volume on boot. Everything in this \
- structure is set up correctly as \
- though device is encrypted except \
- that the master key is encrypted with the \
- default password. */
-#define CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE \
- 0x20 /* Set when the above encryption cycle is \
- complete. On next cryptkeeper entry, match \
- the password. If it matches fix the master \
- key and remove this flag. */
-
-/* Allowed values for type in the structure below */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_PASSWORD \
- 0 /* master_key is encrypted with a password \
- * Must be zero to be compatible with pre-L \
- * devices where type is always password.*/
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT \
- 1 /* master_key is encrypted with default \
- * password */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_PATTERN 2 /* master_key is encrypted with a pattern */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_PIN 3 /* master_key is encrypted with a pin */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_MAX_TYPE 3 /* type cannot be larger than this value */
-
-#define CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC 0xD0B5B1C4
-#define PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC 0xE950CD44
-
-/* Key Derivation Function algorithms */
-#define KDF_PBKDF2 1
-#define KDF_SCRYPT 2
-/* Algorithms 3 & 4 deprecated before shipping outside of google, so removed */
-#define KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER 5
-
-/* Maximum allowed keymaster blob size. */
-#define KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE 2048
-
-/* __le32 and __le16 defined in system/extras/ext4_utils/ext4_utils.h */
-#define __le8 unsigned char
-
-#if !defined(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
-#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32
-#endif
-
-/* This structure starts 16,384 bytes before the end of a hardware
- * partition that is encrypted, or in a separate partition. It's location
- * is specified by a property set in init.<device>.rc.
- * The structure allocates 48 bytes for a key, but the real key size is
- * specified in the struct. Currently, the code is hardcoded to use 128
- * bit keys.
- * The fields after salt are only valid in rev 1.1 and later stuctures.
- * Obviously, the filesystem does not include the last 16 kbytes
- * of the partition if the crypt_mnt_ftr lives at the end of the
- * partition.
- */
-
-struct crypt_mnt_ftr {
- __le32 magic; /* See above */
- __le16 major_version;
- __le16 minor_version;
- __le32 ftr_size; /* in bytes, not including key following */
- __le32 flags; /* See above */
- __le32 keysize; /* in bytes */
- __le32 crypt_type; /* how master_key is encrypted. Must be a
- * CRYPT_TYPE_XXX value */
- __le64 fs_size; /* Size of the encrypted fs, in 512 byte sectors */
- __le32 failed_decrypt_count; /* count of # of failed attempts to decrypt and
- mount, set to 0 on successful mount */
- unsigned char crypto_type_name[MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN]; /* The type of encryption
- needed to decrypt this
- partition, null terminated */
- __le32 spare2; /* ignored */
- unsigned char master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN]; /* The encrypted key for decrypting the filesystem */
- unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN]; /* The salt used for this encryption */
- __le64 persist_data_offset[2]; /* Absolute offset to both copies of crypt_persist_data
- * on device with that info, either the footer of the
- * real_blkdevice or the metadata partition. */
-
- __le32 persist_data_size; /* The number of bytes allocated to each copy of the
- * persistent data table*/
-
- __le8 kdf_type; /* The key derivation function used. */
-
- /* scrypt parameters. See www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf */
- __le8 N_factor; /* (1 << N) */
- __le8 r_factor; /* (1 << r) */
- __le8 p_factor; /* (1 << p) */
- __le64 encrypted_upto; /* no longer used */
- __le8 hash_first_block[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* no longer used */
-
- /* key_master key, used to sign the derived key which is then used to generate
- * the intermediate key
- * This key should be used for no other purposes! We use this key to sign unpadded
- * data, which is acceptable but only if the key is not reused elsewhere. */
- __le8 keymaster_blob[KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE];
- __le32 keymaster_blob_size;
-
- /* Store scrypt of salted intermediate key. When decryption fails, we can
- check if this matches, and if it does, we know that the problem is with the
- drive, and there is no point in asking the user for more passwords.
-
- Note that if any part of this structure is corrupt, this will not match and
- we will continue to believe the user entered the wrong password. In that
- case the only solution is for the user to enter a password enough times to
- force a wipe.
-
- Note also that there is no need to worry about migration. If this data is
- wrong, we simply won't recognise a right password, and will continue to
- prompt. On the first password change, this value will be populated and
- then we will be OK.
- */
- unsigned char scrypted_intermediate_key[SCRYPT_LEN];
-
- /* sha of this structure with this element set to zero
- Used when encrypting on reboot to validate structure before doing something
- fatal
- */
- unsigned char sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-};
-
-/* Persistant data that should be available before decryption.
- * Things like airplane mode, locale and timezone are kept
- * here and can be retrieved by the CryptKeeper UI to properly
- * configure the phone before asking for the password
- * This is only valid if the major and minor version above
- * is set to 1.1 or higher.
- *
- * This is a 4K structure. There are 2 copies, and the code alternates
- * writing one and then clearing the previous one. The reading
- * code reads the first valid copy it finds, based on the magic number.
- * The absolute offset to the first of the two copies is kept in rev 1.1
- * and higher crypt_mnt_ftr structures.
- */
-struct crypt_persist_entry {
- char key[PROPERTY_KEY_MAX];
- char val[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-};
-
-/* Should be exactly 4K in size */
-struct crypt_persist_data {
- __le32 persist_magic;
- __le32 persist_valid_entries;
- __le32 persist_spare[30];
- struct crypt_persist_entry persist_entry[0];
-};
-
-typedef int (*kdf_func)(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey,
- void* params);
-
-#define UNUSED __attribute__((unused))
-
-#define HASH_COUNT 2000
-
-constexpr size_t INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES = 16;
-constexpr size_t INTERMEDIATE_IV_LEN_BYTES = 16;
-constexpr size_t INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE = (INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES + INTERMEDIATE_IV_LEN_BYTES);
-
-// SCRYPT_LEN is used by struct crypt_mnt_ftr for its intermediate key.
-static_assert(INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE == SCRYPT_LEN, "Mismatch of intermediate key sizes");
-
-#define KEY_IN_FOOTER "footer"
-
-#define DEFAULT_PASSWORD "default_password"
-
-#define CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE "userdata"
-
-#define BREADCRUMB_FILE "/data/misc/vold/convert_fde"
-
-#define EXT4_FS 1
-#define F2FS_FS 2
#define TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES 10
-#define RSA_KEY_SIZE 2048
-#define RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES (RSA_KEY_SIZE / 8)
-#define RSA_EXPONENT 0x10001
-#define KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT 1 // Maximum one try per second
-
-#define RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPTS 10
-#define RETRY_MOUNT_DELAY_SECONDS 1
-
-#define CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE (1)
-
-static int put_crypt_ftr_and_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr);
-
-static unsigned char saved_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
-static char* saved_mount_point;
-static int master_key_saved = 0;
-static struct crypt_persist_data* persist_data = NULL;
-
constexpr CryptoType aes_128_cbc = CryptoType()
.set_config_name("AES-128-CBC")
.set_kernel_name("aes-cbc-essiv:sha256")
@@ -326,805 +74,24 @@
return KeyGeneration{get_crypto_type().get_keysize(), true, false};
}
-static bool write_string_to_buf(const std::string& towrite, uint8_t* buffer, uint32_t buffer_size,
- uint32_t* out_size) {
- if (!buffer || !out_size) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Missing target pointers";
- return false;
- }
- *out_size = towrite.size();
- if (buffer_size < towrite.size()) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Buffer too small " << buffer_size << " < " << towrite.size();
- return false;
- }
- memset(buffer, '\0', buffer_size);
- std::copy(towrite.begin(), towrite.end(), buffer);
- return true;
-}
-
-static int keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(uint32_t rsa_key_size, uint64_t rsa_exponent,
- uint32_t ratelimit, uint8_t* key_buffer,
- uint32_t key_buffer_size,
- uint32_t* key_out_size) {
- if (key_out_size) {
- *key_out_size = 0;
- }
- Keymaster dev;
- if (!dev) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session";
- return -1;
- }
- auto keyParams = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
- .RsaSigningKey(rsa_key_size, rsa_exponent)
- .NoDigestOrPadding()
- .Authorization(km::TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
- .Authorization(km::TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS, ratelimit);
- std::string key;
- if (!dev.generateKey(keyParams, &key)) return -1;
- if (!write_string_to_buf(key, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_out_size)) return -1;
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Create a new keymaster key and store it in this footer */
-static int keymaster_create_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr) {
- if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size) {
- SLOGI("Already have key");
- return 0;
- }
-
- int rc = keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(
- RSA_KEY_SIZE, RSA_EXPONENT, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, ftr->keymaster_blob,
- KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE, &ftr->keymaster_blob_size);
- if (rc) {
- if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size > KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE) {
- SLOGE("Keymaster key blob too large");
- ftr->keymaster_blob_size = 0;
- }
- SLOGE("Failed to generate keypair");
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr, uint32_t ratelimit,
- const uint8_t* object, const size_t object_size,
- uint8_t** signature_buffer,
- size_t* signature_buffer_size) {
- if (!object || !signature_buffer || !signature_buffer_size) {
- LOG(ERROR) << __FILE__ << ":" << __LINE__ << ":Invalid argument";
- return -1;
- }
-
- Keymaster dev;
- if (!dev) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session";
- return -1;
- }
-
- km::AuthorizationSet outParams;
- std::string key(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(ftr->keymaster_blob), ftr->keymaster_blob_size);
- std::string input(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(object), object_size);
- std::string output;
- KeymasterOperation op;
-
- auto paramBuilder = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder().NoDigestOrPadding().Authorization(
- km::TAG_PURPOSE, km::KeyPurpose::SIGN);
- while (true) {
- op = dev.begin(key, paramBuilder, &outParams);
- if (op.getErrorCode() == km::ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED) {
- sleep(ratelimit);
- continue;
- } else
- break;
- }
-
- if (!op) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error starting keymaster signature transaction: "
- << int32_t(op.getErrorCode());
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (op.getUpgradedBlob()) {
- write_string_to_buf(*op.getUpgradedBlob(), ftr->keymaster_blob, KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE,
- &ftr->keymaster_blob_size);
-
- SLOGD("Upgrading key");
- if (put_crypt_ftr_and_key(ftr) != 0) {
- SLOGE("Failed to write upgraded key to disk");
- return -1;
- }
- SLOGD("Key upgraded successfully");
- }
-
- if (!op.updateCompletely(input, &output)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error sending data to keymaster signature transaction: "
- << int32_t(op.getErrorCode());
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!op.finish(&output)) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error finalizing keymaster signature transaction: "
- << int32_t(op.getErrorCode());
- return -1;
- }
-
- *signature_buffer = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(malloc(output.size()));
- if (*signature_buffer == nullptr) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Error allocation buffer for keymaster signature";
- return -1;
- }
- *signature_buffer_size = output.size();
- std::copy(output.data(), output.data() + output.size(), *signature_buffer);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* This signs the given object using the keymaster key. */
-static int keymaster_sign_object(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr, const unsigned char* object,
- const size_t object_size, unsigned char** signature,
- size_t* signature_size) {
- unsigned char to_sign[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
- size_t to_sign_size = sizeof(to_sign);
- memset(to_sign, 0, RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES);
-
- // To sign a message with RSA, the message must satisfy two
- // constraints:
- //
- // 1. The message, when interpreted as a big-endian numeric value, must
- // be strictly less than the public modulus of the RSA key. Note
- // that because the most significant bit of the public modulus is
- // guaranteed to be 1 (else it's an (n-1)-bit key, not an n-bit
- // key), an n-bit message with most significant bit 0 always
- // satisfies this requirement.
- //
- // 2. The message must have the same length in bits as the public
- // modulus of the RSA key. This requirement isn't mathematically
- // necessary, but is necessary to ensure consistency in
- // implementations.
- switch (ftr->kdf_type) {
- case KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER:
- // This ensures the most significant byte of the signed message
- // is zero. We could have zero-padded to the left instead, but
- // this approach is slightly more robust against changes in
- // object size. However, it's still broken (but not unusably
- // so) because we really should be using a proper deterministic
- // RSA padding function, such as PKCS1.
- memcpy(to_sign + 1, object, std::min((size_t)RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES - 1, object_size));
- SLOGI("Signing safely-padded object");
- break;
- default:
- SLOGE("Unknown KDF type %d", ftr->kdf_type);
- return -1;
- }
- return keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(ftr, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, to_sign,
- to_sign_size, signature, signature_size);
-}
-
-/* Store password when userdata is successfully decrypted and mounted.
- * Cleared by cryptfs_clear_password
- *
- * To avoid a double prompt at boot, we need to store the CryptKeeper
- * password and pass it to KeyGuard, which uses it to unlock KeyStore.
- * Since the entire framework is torn down and rebuilt after encryption,
- * we have to use a daemon or similar to store the password. Since vold
- * is secured against IPC except from system processes, it seems a reasonable
- * place to store this.
- *
- * password should be cleared once it has been used.
- *
- * password is aged out after password_max_age_seconds seconds.
- */
-static char* password = 0;
-static int password_expiry_time = 0;
-static const int password_max_age_seconds = 60;
-
-enum class RebootType { reboot, recovery, shutdown };
-static void cryptfs_reboot(RebootType rt) {
- switch (rt) {
- case RebootType::reboot:
- property_set(ANDROID_RB_PROPERTY, "reboot");
- break;
-
- case RebootType::recovery:
- property_set(ANDROID_RB_PROPERTY, "reboot,recovery");
- break;
-
- case RebootType::shutdown:
- property_set(ANDROID_RB_PROPERTY, "shutdown");
- break;
- }
-
- sleep(20);
-
- /* Shouldn't get here, reboot should happen before sleep times out */
- return;
-}
-
-/**
- * Gets the default device scrypt parameters for key derivation time tuning.
- * The parameters should lead to about one second derivation time for the
- * given device.
- */
-static void get_device_scrypt_params(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr) {
- char paramstr[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
- int Nf, rf, pf;
-
- property_get(SCRYPT_PROP, paramstr, SCRYPT_DEFAULTS);
- if (!parse_scrypt_parameters(paramstr, &Nf, &rf, &pf)) {
- SLOGW("bad scrypt parameters '%s' should be like '12:8:1'; using defaults", paramstr);
- parse_scrypt_parameters(SCRYPT_DEFAULTS, &Nf, &rf, &pf);
- }
- ftr->N_factor = Nf;
- ftr->r_factor = rf;
- ftr->p_factor = pf;
-}
-
-static uint64_t get_fs_size(const char* dev) {
- int fd, block_size;
- struct ext4_super_block sb;
- uint64_t len;
-
- if ((fd = open(dev, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
- SLOGE("Cannot open device to get filesystem size ");
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (lseek64(fd, 1024, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
- SLOGE("Cannot seek to superblock");
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (read(fd, &sb, sizeof(sb)) != sizeof(sb)) {
- SLOGE("Cannot read superblock");
- return 0;
- }
-
- close(fd);
-
- if (le32_to_cpu(sb.s_magic) != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC) {
- SLOGE("Not a valid ext4 superblock");
- return 0;
- }
- block_size = 1024 << sb.s_log_block_size;
- /* compute length in bytes */
- len = (((uint64_t)sb.s_blocks_count_hi << 32) + sb.s_blocks_count_lo) * block_size;
-
- /* return length in sectors */
- return len / 512;
-}
-
-static void get_crypt_info(std::string* key_loc, std::string* real_blk_device) {
- for (const auto& entry : fstab_default) {
- if (!entry.fs_mgr_flags.vold_managed &&
- (entry.fs_mgr_flags.crypt || entry.fs_mgr_flags.force_crypt ||
- entry.fs_mgr_flags.force_fde_or_fbe || entry.fs_mgr_flags.file_encryption)) {
- if (key_loc != nullptr) {
- *key_loc = entry.key_loc;
- }
- if (real_blk_device != nullptr) {
- *real_blk_device = entry.blk_device;
- }
- return;
- }
- }
-}
-
-static int get_crypt_ftr_info(char** metadata_fname, off64_t* off) {
- static int cached_data = 0;
- static uint64_t cached_off = 0;
- static char cached_metadata_fname[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = "";
- char key_loc[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
- char real_blkdev[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
- int rc = -1;
-
- if (!cached_data) {
- std::string key_loc;
- std::string real_blkdev;
- get_crypt_info(&key_loc, &real_blkdev);
-
- if (key_loc == KEY_IN_FOOTER) {
- if (android::vold::GetBlockDevSize(real_blkdev, &cached_off) == android::OK) {
- /* If it's an encrypted Android partition, the last 16 Kbytes contain the
- * encryption info footer and key, and plenty of bytes to spare for future
- * growth.
- */
- strlcpy(cached_metadata_fname, real_blkdev.c_str(), sizeof(cached_metadata_fname));
- cached_off -= CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET;
- cached_data = 1;
- } else {
- SLOGE("Cannot get size of block device %s\n", real_blkdev.c_str());
- }
- } else {
- strlcpy(cached_metadata_fname, key_loc.c_str(), sizeof(cached_metadata_fname));
- cached_off = 0;
- cached_data = 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (cached_data) {
- if (metadata_fname) {
- *metadata_fname = cached_metadata_fname;
- }
- if (off) {
- *off = cached_off;
- }
- rc = 0;
- }
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/* Set sha256 checksum in structure */
-static void set_ftr_sha(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
- SHA256_CTX c;
- SHA256_Init(&c);
- memset(crypt_ftr->sha256, 0, sizeof(crypt_ftr->sha256));
- SHA256_Update(&c, crypt_ftr, sizeof(*crypt_ftr));
- SHA256_Final(crypt_ftr->sha256, &c);
-}
-
-/* key or salt can be NULL, in which case just skip writing that value. Useful to
- * update the failed mount count but not change the key.
- */
-static int put_crypt_ftr_and_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
- int fd;
- unsigned int cnt;
- /* starting_off is set to the SEEK_SET offset
- * where the crypto structure starts
- */
- off64_t starting_off;
- int rc = -1;
- char* fname = NULL;
- struct stat statbuf;
-
- set_ftr_sha(crypt_ftr);
-
- if (get_crypt_ftr_info(&fname, &starting_off)) {
- SLOGE("Unable to get crypt_ftr_info\n");
- return -1;
- }
- if (fname[0] != '/') {
- SLOGE("Unexpected value for crypto key location\n");
- return -1;
- }
- if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_CLOEXEC, 0600)) < 0) {
- SLOGE("Cannot open footer file %s for put\n", fname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Seek to the start of the crypt footer */
- if (lseek64(fd, starting_off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
- SLOGE("Cannot seek to real block device footer\n");
- goto errout;
- }
-
- if ((cnt = write(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr))) != sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr)) {
- SLOGE("Cannot write real block device footer\n");
- goto errout;
- }
-
- fstat(fd, &statbuf);
- /* If the keys are kept on a raw block device, do not try to truncate it. */
- if (S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode)) {
- if (ftruncate(fd, 0x4000)) {
- SLOGE("Cannot set footer file size\n");
- goto errout;
- }
- }
-
- /* Success! */
- rc = 0;
-
-errout:
- close(fd);
- return rc;
-}
-
-static bool check_ftr_sha(const struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr copy;
- memcpy(©, crypt_ftr, sizeof(copy));
- set_ftr_sha(©);
- return memcmp(copy.sha256, crypt_ftr->sha256, sizeof(copy.sha256)) == 0;
-}
-
-static inline int unix_read(int fd, void* buff, int len) {
- return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, buff, len));
-}
-
-static inline int unix_write(int fd, const void* buff, int len) {
- return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(write(fd, buff, len));
-}
-
-static void init_empty_persist_data(struct crypt_persist_data* pdata, int len) {
- memset(pdata, 0, len);
- pdata->persist_magic = PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC;
- pdata->persist_valid_entries = 0;
-}
-
-/* A routine to update the passed in crypt_ftr to the lastest version.
- * fd is open read/write on the device that holds the crypto footer and persistent
- * data, crypt_ftr is a pointer to the struct to be updated, and offset is the
- * absolute offset to the start of the crypt_mnt_ftr on the passed in fd.
- */
-static void upgrade_crypt_ftr(int fd, struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, off64_t offset) {
- int orig_major = crypt_ftr->major_version;
- int orig_minor = crypt_ftr->minor_version;
-
- if ((crypt_ftr->major_version == 1) && (crypt_ftr->minor_version == 0)) {
- struct crypt_persist_data* pdata;
- off64_t pdata_offset = offset + CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET;
-
- SLOGW("upgrading crypto footer to 1.1");
-
- pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
- if (pdata == NULL) {
- SLOGE("Cannot allocate persisent data\n");
- return;
- }
- memset(pdata, 0, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
-
- /* Need to initialize the persistent data area */
- if (lseek64(fd, pdata_offset, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
- SLOGE("Cannot seek to persisent data offset\n");
- free(pdata);
- return;
- }
- /* Write all zeros to the first copy, making it invalid */
- unix_write(fd, pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
-
- /* Write a valid but empty structure to the second copy */
- init_empty_persist_data(pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
- unix_write(fd, pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
-
- /* Update the footer */
- crypt_ftr->persist_data_size = CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE;
- crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[0] = pdata_offset;
- crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[1] = pdata_offset + CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE;
- crypt_ftr->minor_version = 1;
- free(pdata);
- }
-
- if ((crypt_ftr->major_version == 1) && (crypt_ftr->minor_version == 1)) {
- SLOGW("upgrading crypto footer to 1.2");
- /* But keep the old kdf_type.
- * It will get updated later to KDF_SCRYPT after the password has been verified.
- */
- crypt_ftr->kdf_type = KDF_PBKDF2;
- get_device_scrypt_params(crypt_ftr);
- crypt_ftr->minor_version = 2;
- }
-
- if ((crypt_ftr->major_version == 1) && (crypt_ftr->minor_version == 2)) {
- SLOGW("upgrading crypto footer to 1.3");
- crypt_ftr->crypt_type = CRYPT_TYPE_PASSWORD;
- crypt_ftr->minor_version = 3;
- }
-
- if ((orig_major != crypt_ftr->major_version) || (orig_minor != crypt_ftr->minor_version)) {
- if (lseek64(fd, offset, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
- SLOGE("Cannot seek to crypt footer\n");
- return;
- }
- unix_write(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr));
- }
-}
-
-static int get_crypt_ftr_and_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
- int fd;
- unsigned int cnt;
- off64_t starting_off;
- int rc = -1;
- char* fname = NULL;
- struct stat statbuf;
-
- if (get_crypt_ftr_info(&fname, &starting_off)) {
- SLOGE("Unable to get crypt_ftr_info\n");
- return -1;
- }
- if (fname[0] != '/') {
- SLOGE("Unexpected value for crypto key location\n");
- return -1;
- }
- if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
- SLOGE("Cannot open footer file %s for get\n", fname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Make sure it's 16 Kbytes in length */
- fstat(fd, &statbuf);
- if (S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode) && (statbuf.st_size != 0x4000)) {
- SLOGE("footer file %s is not the expected size!\n", fname);
- goto errout;
- }
-
- /* Seek to the start of the crypt footer */
- if (lseek64(fd, starting_off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
- SLOGE("Cannot seek to real block device footer\n");
- goto errout;
- }
-
- if ((cnt = read(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr))) != sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr)) {
- SLOGE("Cannot read real block device footer\n");
- goto errout;
- }
-
- if (crypt_ftr->magic != CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC) {
- SLOGE("Bad magic for real block device %s\n", fname);
- goto errout;
- }
-
- if (crypt_ftr->major_version != CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION) {
- SLOGE("Cannot understand major version %d real block device footer; expected %d\n",
- crypt_ftr->major_version, CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION);
- goto errout;
- }
-
- // We risk buffer overflows with oversized keys, so we just reject them.
- // 0-sized keys are problematic (essentially by-passing encryption), and
- // AES-CBC key wrapping only works for multiples of 16 bytes.
- if ((crypt_ftr->keysize == 0) || ((crypt_ftr->keysize % 16) != 0) ||
- (crypt_ftr->keysize > MAX_KEY_LEN)) {
- SLOGE(
- "Invalid keysize (%u) for block device %s; Must be non-zero, "
- "divisible by 16, and <= %d\n",
- crypt_ftr->keysize, fname, MAX_KEY_LEN);
- goto errout;
- }
-
- if (crypt_ftr->minor_version > CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION) {
- SLOGW("Warning: crypto footer minor version %d, expected <= %d, continuing...\n",
- crypt_ftr->minor_version, CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION);
- }
-
- /* If this is a verion 1.0 crypt_ftr, make it a 1.1 crypt footer, and update the
- * copy on disk before returning.
- */
- if (crypt_ftr->minor_version < CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION) {
- upgrade_crypt_ftr(fd, crypt_ftr, starting_off);
- }
-
- /* Success! */
- rc = 0;
-
-errout:
- close(fd);
- return rc;
-}
-
-static int validate_persistent_data_storage(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
- if (crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[0] + crypt_ftr->persist_data_size >
- crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[1]) {
- SLOGE("Crypt_ftr persist data regions overlap");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[0] >= crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[1]) {
- SLOGE("Crypt_ftr persist data region 0 starts after region 1");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (((crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[1] + crypt_ftr->persist_data_size) -
- (crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[0] - CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET)) >
- CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET) {
- SLOGE("Persistent data extends past crypto footer");
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int load_persistent_data(void) {
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
- struct crypt_persist_data* pdata = NULL;
- char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
- char* fname;
- int found = 0;
- int fd;
- int ret;
- int i;
-
- if (persist_data) {
- /* Nothing to do, we've already loaded or initialized it */
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* If not encrypted, just allocate an empty table and initialize it */
- property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
- if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
- pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
- if (pdata) {
- init_empty_persist_data(pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
- persist_data = pdata;
- return 0;
- }
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- if ((crypt_ftr.major_version < 1) ||
- (crypt_ftr.major_version == 1 && crypt_ftr.minor_version < 1)) {
- SLOGE("Crypt_ftr version doesn't support persistent data");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (get_crypt_ftr_info(&fname, NULL)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- ret = validate_persistent_data_storage(&crypt_ftr);
- if (ret) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
- if (fd < 0) {
- SLOGE("Cannot open %s metadata file", fname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
- if (pdata == NULL) {
- SLOGE("Cannot allocate memory for persistent data");
- goto err;
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
- if (lseek64(fd, crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[i], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
- SLOGE("Cannot seek to read persistent data on %s", fname);
- goto err2;
- }
- if (unix_read(fd, pdata, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) < 0) {
- SLOGE("Error reading persistent data on iteration %d", i);
- goto err2;
- }
- if (pdata->persist_magic == PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC) {
- found = 1;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (!found) {
- SLOGI("Could not find valid persistent data, creating");
- init_empty_persist_data(pdata, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
- }
-
- /* Success */
- persist_data = pdata;
- close(fd);
- return 0;
-
-err2:
- free(pdata);
-
-err:
- close(fd);
- return -1;
-}
-
-static int save_persistent_data(void) {
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
- struct crypt_persist_data* pdata;
- char* fname;
- off64_t write_offset;
- off64_t erase_offset;
- int fd;
- int ret;
-
- if (persist_data == NULL) {
- SLOGE("No persistent data to save");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- if ((crypt_ftr.major_version < 1) ||
- (crypt_ftr.major_version == 1 && crypt_ftr.minor_version < 1)) {
- SLOGE("Crypt_ftr version doesn't support persistent data");
- return -1;
- }
-
- ret = validate_persistent_data_storage(&crypt_ftr);
- if (ret) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (get_crypt_ftr_info(&fname, NULL)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
- if (fd < 0) {
- SLOGE("Cannot open %s metadata file", fname);
- return -1;
- }
-
- pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
- if (pdata == NULL) {
- SLOGE("Cannot allocate persistant data");
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (lseek64(fd, crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[0], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
- SLOGE("Cannot seek to read persistent data on %s", fname);
- goto err2;
- }
-
- if (unix_read(fd, pdata, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) < 0) {
- SLOGE("Error reading persistent data before save");
- goto err2;
- }
-
- if (pdata->persist_magic == PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC) {
- /* The first copy is the curent valid copy, so write to
- * the second copy and erase this one */
- write_offset = crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[1];
- erase_offset = crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[0];
- } else {
- /* The second copy must be the valid copy, so write to
- * the first copy, and erase the second */
- write_offset = crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[0];
- erase_offset = crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[1];
- }
-
- /* Write the new copy first, if successful, then erase the old copy */
- if (lseek64(fd, write_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
- SLOGE("Cannot seek to write persistent data");
- goto err2;
- }
- if (unix_write(fd, persist_data, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) ==
- (int)crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) {
- if (lseek64(fd, erase_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
- SLOGE("Cannot seek to erase previous persistent data");
- goto err2;
- }
- fsync(fd);
- memset(pdata, 0, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
- if (unix_write(fd, pdata, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) != (int)crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) {
- SLOGE("Cannot write to erase previous persistent data");
- goto err2;
- }
- fsync(fd);
- } else {
- SLOGE("Cannot write to save persistent data");
- goto err2;
- }
-
- /* Success */
- free(pdata);
- close(fd);
- return 0;
-
-err2:
- free(pdata);
-err:
- close(fd);
- return -1;
-}
-
/* Convert a binary key of specified length into an ascii hex string equivalent,
* without the leading 0x and with null termination
*/
-static void convert_key_to_hex_ascii(const unsigned char* master_key, unsigned int keysize,
- char* master_key_ascii) {
+static void convert_key_to_hex_ascii(const KeyBuffer& key, char* key_ascii) {
unsigned int i, a;
unsigned char nibble;
- for (i = 0, a = 0; i < keysize; i++, a += 2) {
+ for (i = 0, a = 0; i < key.size(); i++, a += 2) {
/* For each byte, write out two ascii hex digits */
- nibble = (master_key[i] >> 4) & 0xf;
- master_key_ascii[a] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
+ nibble = (key[i] >> 4) & 0xf;
+ key_ascii[a] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
- nibble = master_key[i] & 0xf;
- master_key_ascii[a + 1] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
+ nibble = key[i] & 0xf;
+ key_ascii[a + 1] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
}
/* Add the null termination */
- master_key_ascii[a] = '\0';
+ key_ascii[a] = '\0';
}
/*
@@ -1132,7 +99,7 @@
* parameters to make dm-crypt use the specified crypto sector size and round
* the crypto device size down to a crypto sector boundary.
*/
-static int add_sector_size_param(DmTargetCrypt* target, struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr) {
+static int add_sector_size_param(DmTargetCrypt* target, uint64_t* nr_sec) {
constexpr char DM_CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE[] = "ro.crypto.fde_sector_size";
char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
@@ -1153,800 +120,11 @@
target->SetIvLargeSectors();
// Round the crypto device size down to a crypto sector boundary.
- ftr->fs_size &= ~((sector_size / 512) - 1);
+ *nr_sec &= ~((sector_size / 512) - 1);
}
return 0;
}
-static int create_crypto_blk_dev(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, const unsigned char* master_key,
- const char* real_blk_name, std::string* crypto_blk_name,
- const char* name, uint32_t flags) {
- auto& dm = DeviceMapper::Instance();
-
- // We need two ASCII characters to represent each byte, and need space for
- // the '\0' terminator.
- char master_key_ascii[MAX_KEY_LEN * 2 + 1];
- convert_key_to_hex_ascii(master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize, master_key_ascii);
-
- auto target = std::make_unique<DmTargetCrypt>(0, crypt_ftr->fs_size,
- (const char*)crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name,
- master_key_ascii, 0, real_blk_name, 0);
- target->AllowDiscards();
-
- if (flags & CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE) {
- target->AllowEncryptOverride();
- }
- if (add_sector_size_param(target.get(), crypt_ftr)) {
- SLOGE("Error processing dm-crypt sector size param\n");
- return -1;
- }
-
- DmTable table;
- table.AddTarget(std::move(target));
-
- int load_count = 1;
- while (load_count < TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
- if (dm.CreateDevice(name, table)) {
- break;
- }
- load_count++;
- }
-
- if (load_count >= TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
- SLOGE("Cannot load dm-crypt mapping table.\n");
- return -1;
- }
- if (load_count > 1) {
- SLOGI("Took %d tries to load dmcrypt table.\n", load_count);
- }
-
- if (!dm.GetDmDevicePathByName(name, crypto_blk_name)) {
- SLOGE("Cannot determine dm-crypt path for %s.\n", name);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Ensure the dm device has been created before returning. */
- if (android::vold::WaitForFile(crypto_blk_name->c_str(), 1s) < 0) {
- // WaitForFile generates a suitable log message
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int delete_crypto_blk_dev(const std::string& name) {
- bool ret;
- auto& dm = DeviceMapper::Instance();
- // TODO(b/149396179) there appears to be a race somewhere in the system where trying
- // to delete the device fails with EBUSY; for now, work around this by retrying.
- int tries = 5;
- while (tries-- > 0) {
- ret = dm.DeleteDevice(name);
- if (ret || errno != EBUSY) {
- break;
- }
- SLOGW("DM_DEV Cannot remove dm-crypt device %s: %s, retrying...\n", name.c_str(),
- strerror(errno));
- std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(100));
- }
- if (!ret) {
- SLOGE("DM_DEV Cannot remove dm-crypt device %s: %s\n", name.c_str(), strerror(errno));
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int pbkdf2(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey,
- void* params UNUSED) {
- SLOGI("Using pbkdf2 for cryptfs KDF");
-
- /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
- return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(passwd, strlen(passwd), salt, SALT_LEN, HASH_COUNT,
- INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE, ikey) != 1;
-}
-
-static int scrypt(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey, void* params) {
- SLOGI("Using scrypt for cryptfs KDF");
-
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr = (struct crypt_mnt_ftr*)params;
-
- int N = 1 << ftr->N_factor;
- int r = 1 << ftr->r_factor;
- int p = 1 << ftr->p_factor;
-
- /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
- crypto_scrypt((const uint8_t*)passwd, strlen(passwd), salt, SALT_LEN, N, r, p, ikey,
- INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int scrypt_keymaster(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey,
- void* params) {
- SLOGI("Using scrypt with keymaster for cryptfs KDF");
-
- int rc;
- size_t signature_size;
- unsigned char* signature;
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr = (struct crypt_mnt_ftr*)params;
-
- int N = 1 << ftr->N_factor;
- int r = 1 << ftr->r_factor;
- int p = 1 << ftr->p_factor;
-
- rc = crypto_scrypt((const uint8_t*)passwd, strlen(passwd), salt, SALT_LEN, N, r, p, ikey,
- INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE);
-
- if (rc) {
- SLOGE("scrypt failed");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (keymaster_sign_object(ftr, ikey, INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE, &signature, &signature_size)) {
- SLOGE("Signing failed");
- return -1;
- }
-
- rc = crypto_scrypt(signature, signature_size, salt, SALT_LEN, N, r, p, ikey,
- INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE);
- free(signature);
-
- if (rc) {
- SLOGE("scrypt failed");
- return -1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int encrypt_master_key(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt,
- const unsigned char* decrypted_master_key,
- unsigned char* encrypted_master_key, struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
- unsigned char ikey[INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE] = {0};
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX e_ctx;
- int encrypted_len, final_len;
- int rc = 0;
-
- /* Turn the password into an intermediate key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
- get_device_scrypt_params(crypt_ftr);
-
- switch (crypt_ftr->kdf_type) {
- case KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER:
- if (keymaster_create_key(crypt_ftr)) {
- SLOGE("keymaster_create_key failed");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (scrypt_keymaster(passwd, salt, ikey, crypt_ftr)) {
- SLOGE("scrypt failed");
- return -1;
- }
- break;
-
- case KDF_SCRYPT:
- if (scrypt(passwd, salt, ikey, crypt_ftr)) {
- SLOGE("scrypt failed");
- return -1;
- }
- break;
-
- default:
- SLOGE("Invalid kdf_type");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Initialize the decryption engine */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&e_ctx);
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&e_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, ikey,
- ikey + INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
- SLOGE("EVP_EncryptInit failed\n");
- return -1;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&e_ctx, 0); /* Turn off padding as our data is block aligned */
-
- /* Encrypt the master key */
- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&e_ctx, encrypted_master_key, &encrypted_len, decrypted_master_key,
- crypt_ftr->keysize)) {
- SLOGE("EVP_EncryptUpdate failed\n");
- return -1;
- }
- if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&e_ctx, encrypted_master_key + encrypted_len, &final_len)) {
- SLOGE("EVP_EncryptFinal failed\n");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (encrypted_len + final_len != static_cast<int>(crypt_ftr->keysize)) {
- SLOGE("EVP_Encryption length check failed with %d, %d bytes\n", encrypted_len, final_len);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Store the scrypt of the intermediate key, so we can validate if it's a
- password error or mount error when things go wrong.
- Note there's no need to check for errors, since if this is incorrect, we
- simply won't wipe userdata, which is the correct default behavior
- */
- int N = 1 << crypt_ftr->N_factor;
- int r = 1 << crypt_ftr->r_factor;
- int p = 1 << crypt_ftr->p_factor;
-
- rc = crypto_scrypt(ikey, INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES, crypt_ftr->salt, sizeof(crypt_ftr->salt),
- N, r, p, crypt_ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key,
- sizeof(crypt_ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key));
-
- if (rc) {
- SLOGE("encrypt_master_key: crypto_scrypt failed");
- }
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&e_ctx);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int decrypt_master_key_aux(const char* passwd, unsigned char* salt,
- const unsigned char* encrypted_master_key, size_t keysize,
- unsigned char* decrypted_master_key, kdf_func kdf,
- void* kdf_params, unsigned char** intermediate_key,
- size_t* intermediate_key_size) {
- unsigned char ikey[INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE] = {0};
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX d_ctx;
- int decrypted_len, final_len;
-
- /* Turn the password into an intermediate key and IV that can decrypt the
- master key */
- if (kdf(passwd, salt, ikey, kdf_params)) {
- SLOGE("kdf failed");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Initialize the decryption engine */
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&d_ctx);
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&d_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, ikey,
- ikey + INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
- return -1;
- }
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&d_ctx, 0); /* Turn off padding as our data is block aligned */
- /* Decrypt the master key */
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&d_ctx, decrypted_master_key, &decrypted_len, encrypted_master_key,
- keysize)) {
- return -1;
- }
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&d_ctx, decrypted_master_key + decrypted_len, &final_len)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (decrypted_len + final_len != static_cast<int>(keysize)) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Copy intermediate key if needed by params */
- if (intermediate_key && intermediate_key_size) {
- *intermediate_key = (unsigned char*)malloc(INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES);
- if (*intermediate_key) {
- memcpy(*intermediate_key, ikey, INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES);
- *intermediate_key_size = INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES;
- }
- }
-
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&d_ctx);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void get_kdf_func(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr, kdf_func* kdf, void** kdf_params) {
- if (ftr->kdf_type == KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER) {
- *kdf = scrypt_keymaster;
- *kdf_params = ftr;
- } else if (ftr->kdf_type == KDF_SCRYPT) {
- *kdf = scrypt;
- *kdf_params = ftr;
- } else {
- *kdf = pbkdf2;
- *kdf_params = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-static int decrypt_master_key(const char* passwd, unsigned char* decrypted_master_key,
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, unsigned char** intermediate_key,
- size_t* intermediate_key_size) {
- kdf_func kdf;
- void* kdf_params;
- int ret;
-
- get_kdf_func(crypt_ftr, &kdf, &kdf_params);
- ret = decrypt_master_key_aux(passwd, crypt_ftr->salt, crypt_ftr->master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize,
- decrypted_master_key, kdf, kdf_params, intermediate_key,
- intermediate_key_size);
- if (ret != 0) {
- SLOGW("failure decrypting master key");
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int create_encrypted_random_key(const char* passwd, unsigned char* master_key,
- unsigned char* salt, struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
- unsigned char key_buf[MAX_KEY_LEN];
-
- /* Get some random bits for a key and salt */
- if (android::vold::ReadRandomBytes(sizeof(key_buf), reinterpret_cast<char*>(key_buf)) != 0) {
- return -1;
- }
- if (android::vold::ReadRandomBytes(SALT_LEN, reinterpret_cast<char*>(salt)) != 0) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Now encrypt it with the password */
- return encrypt_master_key(passwd, salt, key_buf, master_key, crypt_ftr);
-}
-
-static void ensure_subdirectory_unmounted(const char *prefix) {
- std::vector<std::string> umount_points;
- std::unique_ptr<FILE, int (*)(FILE*)> mnts(setmntent("/proc/mounts", "r"), endmntent);
- if (!mnts) {
- SLOGW("could not read mount files");
- return;
- }
-
- //Find sudirectory mount point
- mntent* mentry;
- std::string top_directory(prefix);
- if (!android::base::EndsWith(prefix, "/")) {
- top_directory = top_directory + "/";
- }
- while ((mentry = getmntent(mnts.get())) != nullptr) {
- if (strcmp(mentry->mnt_dir, top_directory.c_str()) == 0) {
- continue;
- }
-
- if (android::base::StartsWith(mentry->mnt_dir, top_directory)) {
- SLOGW("found sub-directory mount %s - %s\n", prefix, mentry->mnt_dir);
- umount_points.push_back(mentry->mnt_dir);
- }
- }
-
- //Sort by path length to umount longest path first
- std::sort(std::begin(umount_points), std::end(umount_points),
- [](const std::string& s1, const std::string& s2) {return s1.length() > s2.length(); });
-
- for (std::string& mount_point : umount_points) {
- umount(mount_point.c_str());
- SLOGW("umount sub-directory mount %s\n", mount_point.c_str());
- }
-}
-
-static int wait_and_unmount(const char* mountpoint) {
- int i, err, rc;
-
- // Subdirectory mount will cause a failure of umount.
- ensure_subdirectory_unmounted(mountpoint);
-#define WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT 20
-
- /* Now umount the tmpfs filesystem */
- for (i = 0; i < WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT; i++) {
- if (umount(mountpoint) == 0) {
- break;
- }
-
- if (errno == EINVAL) {
- /* EINVAL is returned if the directory is not a mountpoint,
- * i.e. there is no filesystem mounted there. So just get out.
- */
- break;
- }
-
- err = errno;
-
- // If it's taking too long, kill the processes with open files.
- //
- // Originally this logic was only a fail-safe, but now it's relied on to
- // kill certain processes that aren't stopped by init because they
- // aren't in the main or late_start classes. So to avoid waiting for
- // too long, we now are fairly aggressive in starting to kill processes.
- static_assert(WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT >= 4);
- if (i == 2) {
- SLOGW("sending SIGTERM to processes with open files\n");
- android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(mountpoint, SIGTERM);
- } else if (i >= 3) {
- SLOGW("sending SIGKILL to processes with open files\n");
- android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(mountpoint, SIGKILL);
- }
-
- sleep(1);
- }
-
- if (i < WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT) {
- SLOGD("unmounting %s succeeded\n", mountpoint);
- rc = 0;
- } else {
- android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(mountpoint, 0);
- SLOGE("unmounting %s failed: %s\n", mountpoint, strerror(err));
- rc = -1;
- }
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-static void prep_data_fs(void) {
- // NOTE: post_fs_data results in init calling back around to vold, so all
- // callers to this method must be async
-
- /* Do the prep of the /data filesystem */
- property_set("vold.post_fs_data_done", "0");
- property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_post_fs_data");
- SLOGD("Just triggered post_fs_data");
-
- /* Wait a max of 50 seconds, hopefully it takes much less */
- while (!android::base::WaitForProperty("vold.post_fs_data_done", "1", std::chrono::seconds(15))) {
- /* We timed out to prep /data in time. Continue wait. */
- SLOGE("waited 15s for vold.post_fs_data_done, still waiting...");
- }
- SLOGD("post_fs_data done");
-}
-
-static void cryptfs_set_corrupt() {
- // Mark the footer as bad
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
- if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
- SLOGE("Failed to get crypto footer - panic");
- return;
- }
-
- crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_DATA_CORRUPT;
- if (put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
- SLOGE("Failed to set crypto footer - panic");
- return;
- }
-}
-
-static void cryptfs_trigger_restart_min_framework() {
- if (fs_mgr_do_tmpfs_mount(DATA_MNT_POINT)) {
- SLOGE("Failed to mount tmpfs on data - panic");
- return;
- }
-
- if (property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_post_fs_data")) {
- SLOGE("Failed to trigger post fs data - panic");
- return;
- }
-
- if (property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_min_framework")) {
- SLOGE("Failed to trigger restart min framework - panic");
- return;
- }
-}
-
-/* returns < 0 on failure */
-static int cryptfs_restart_internal(int restart_main) {
- char crypto_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
- int rc = -1;
- static int restart_successful = 0;
-
- /* Validate that it's OK to call this routine */
- if (!master_key_saved) {
- SLOGE("Encrypted filesystem not validated, aborting");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (restart_successful) {
- SLOGE("System already restarted with encrypted disk, aborting");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (restart_main) {
- /* Here is where we shut down the framework. The init scripts
- * start all services in one of these classes: core, early_hal, hal,
- * main and late_start. To get to the minimal UI for PIN entry, we
- * need to start core, early_hal, hal and main. When we want to
- * shutdown the framework again, we need to stop most of the services in
- * these classes, but only those services that were started after
- * /data was mounted. This excludes critical services like vold and
- * ueventd, which need to keep running. We could possible stop
- * even fewer services, but because we want services to pick up APEX
- * libraries from the real /data, restarting is better, as it makes
- * these devices consistent with FBE devices and lets them use the
- * most recent code.
- *
- * Once these services have stopped, we should be able
- * to umount the tmpfs /data, then mount the encrypted /data.
- * We then restart the class core, hal, main, and also the class
- * late_start.
- *
- * At the moment, I've only put a few things in late_start that I know
- * are not needed to bring up the framework, and that also cause problems
- * with unmounting the tmpfs /data, but I hope to add add more services
- * to the late_start class as we optimize this to decrease the delay
- * till the user is asked for the password to the filesystem.
- */
-
- /* The init files are setup to stop the right set of services when
- * vold.decrypt is set to trigger_shutdown_framework.
- */
- property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_shutdown_framework");
- SLOGD("Just asked init to shut down class main\n");
-
- /* Ugh, shutting down the framework is not synchronous, so until it
- * can be fixed, this horrible hack will wait a moment for it all to
- * shut down before proceeding. Without it, some devices cannot
- * restart the graphics services.
- */
- sleep(2);
- }
-
- /* Now that the framework is shutdown, we should be able to umount()
- * the tmpfs filesystem, and mount the real one.
- */
-
- property_get("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", crypto_blkdev, "");
- if (strlen(crypto_blkdev) == 0) {
- SLOGE("fs_crypto_blkdev not set\n");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!(rc = wait_and_unmount(DATA_MNT_POINT))) {
- /* If ro.crypto.readonly is set to 1, mount the decrypted
- * filesystem readonly. This is used when /data is mounted by
- * recovery mode.
- */
- char ro_prop[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
- property_get("ro.crypto.readonly", ro_prop, "");
- if (strlen(ro_prop) > 0 && std::stoi(ro_prop)) {
- auto entry = GetEntryForMountPoint(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT);
- if (entry != nullptr) {
- entry->flags |= MS_RDONLY;
- }
- }
-
- /* If that succeeded, then mount the decrypted filesystem */
- int retries = RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPTS;
- int mount_rc;
-
- /*
- * fs_mgr_do_mount runs fsck. Use setexeccon to run trusted
- * partitions in the fsck domain.
- */
- if (setexeccon(android::vold::sFsckContext)) {
- SLOGE("Failed to setexeccon");
- return -1;
- }
- bool needs_cp = android::vold::cp_needsCheckpoint();
- while ((mount_rc = fs_mgr_do_mount(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT, crypto_blkdev, 0,
- needs_cp, false)) != 0) {
- if (mount_rc == FS_MGR_DOMNT_BUSY) {
- /* TODO: invoke something similar to
- Process::killProcessWithOpenFiles(DATA_MNT_POINT,
- retries > RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPT/2 ? 1 : 2 ) */
- SLOGI("Failed to mount %s because it is busy - waiting", crypto_blkdev);
- if (--retries) {
- sleep(RETRY_MOUNT_DELAY_SECONDS);
- } else {
- /* Let's hope that a reboot clears away whatever is keeping
- the mount busy */
- cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::reboot);
- }
- } else {
- SLOGE("Failed to mount decrypted data");
- cryptfs_set_corrupt();
- cryptfs_trigger_restart_min_framework();
- SLOGI("Started framework to offer wipe");
- if (setexeccon(NULL)) {
- SLOGE("Failed to setexeccon");
- }
- return -1;
- }
- }
- if (setexeccon(NULL)) {
- SLOGE("Failed to setexeccon");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Create necessary paths on /data */
- prep_data_fs();
- property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_load_persist_props");
-
- /* startup service classes main and late_start */
- property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_framework");
- SLOGD("Just triggered restart_framework\n");
-
- /* Give it a few moments to get started */
- sleep(1);
- }
-
- if (rc == 0) {
- restart_successful = 1;
- }
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-int cryptfs_restart(void) {
- SLOGI("cryptfs_restart");
- if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
- SLOGE("cryptfs_restart not valid for file encryption:");
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* Call internal implementation forcing a restart of main service group */
- return cryptfs_restart_internal(1);
-}
-
-static int do_crypto_complete(const char* mount_point) {
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
- char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-
- property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
- if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
- SLOGE("not running with encryption, aborting");
- return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED;
- }
-
- // crypto_complete is full disk encrypted status
- if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
- return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED;
- }
-
- if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
- std::string key_loc;
- get_crypt_info(&key_loc, nullptr);
-
- /*
- * Only report this error if key_loc is a file and it exists.
- * If the device was never encrypted, and /data is not mountable for
- * some reason, returning 1 should prevent the UI from presenting the
- * a "enter password" screen, or worse, a "press button to wipe the
- * device" screen.
- */
- if (!key_loc.empty() && key_loc[0] == '/' && (access("key_loc", F_OK) == -1)) {
- SLOGE("master key file does not exist, aborting");
- return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED;
- } else {
- SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
- return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_BAD_METADATA;
- }
- }
-
- // Test for possible error flags
- if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS) {
- SLOGE("Encryption process is partway completed\n");
- return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_PARTIAL;
- }
-
- if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE) {
- SLOGE("Encryption process was interrupted but cannot continue\n");
- return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_INCONSISTENT;
- }
-
- if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_DATA_CORRUPT) {
- SLOGE("Encryption is successful but data is corrupt\n");
- return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_CORRUPT;
- }
-
- /* We passed the test! We shall diminish, and return to the west */
- return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_ENCRYPTED;
-}
-
-static int test_mount_encrypted_fs(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, const char* passwd,
- const char* mount_point, const char* label) {
- unsigned char decrypted_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
- std::string crypto_blkdev;
- std::string real_blkdev;
- char tmp_mount_point[64];
- unsigned int orig_failed_decrypt_count;
- int rc;
- int upgrade = 0;
- unsigned char* intermediate_key = 0;
- size_t intermediate_key_size = 0;
- int N = 1 << crypt_ftr->N_factor;
- int r = 1 << crypt_ftr->r_factor;
- int p = 1 << crypt_ftr->p_factor;
-
- SLOGD("crypt_ftr->fs_size = %lld\n", crypt_ftr->fs_size);
- orig_failed_decrypt_count = crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count;
-
- if (!(crypt_ftr->flags & CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED)) {
- if (decrypt_master_key(passwd, decrypted_master_key, crypt_ftr, &intermediate_key,
- &intermediate_key_size)) {
- SLOGE("Failed to decrypt master key\n");
- rc = -1;
- goto errout;
- }
- }
-
- get_crypt_info(nullptr, &real_blkdev);
-
- // Create crypto block device - all (non fatal) code paths
- // need it
- if (create_crypto_blk_dev(crypt_ftr, decrypted_master_key, real_blkdev.c_str(), &crypto_blkdev,
- label, 0)) {
- SLOGE("Error creating decrypted block device\n");
- rc = -1;
- goto errout;
- }
-
- /* Work out if the problem is the password or the data */
- unsigned char scrypted_intermediate_key[sizeof(crypt_ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key)];
-
- rc = crypto_scrypt(intermediate_key, intermediate_key_size, crypt_ftr->salt,
- sizeof(crypt_ftr->salt), N, r, p, scrypted_intermediate_key,
- sizeof(scrypted_intermediate_key));
-
- // Does the key match the crypto footer?
- if (rc == 0 && memcmp(scrypted_intermediate_key, crypt_ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key,
- sizeof(scrypted_intermediate_key)) == 0) {
- SLOGI("Password matches");
- rc = 0;
- } else {
- /* Try mounting the file system anyway, just in case the problem's with
- * the footer, not the key. */
- snprintf(tmp_mount_point, sizeof(tmp_mount_point), "%s/tmp_mnt", mount_point);
- mkdir(tmp_mount_point, 0755);
- if (fs_mgr_do_mount(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT,
- const_cast<char*>(crypto_blkdev.c_str()), tmp_mount_point)) {
- SLOGE("Error temp mounting decrypted block device\n");
- delete_crypto_blk_dev(label);
-
- rc = ++crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count;
- put_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr);
- } else {
- /* Success! */
- SLOGI("Password did not match but decrypted drive mounted - continue");
- umount(tmp_mount_point);
- rc = 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (rc == 0) {
- crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count = 0;
- if (orig_failed_decrypt_count != 0) {
- put_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr);
- }
-
- /* Save the name of the crypto block device
- * so we can mount it when restarting the framework. */
- property_set("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", crypto_blkdev.c_str());
-
- /* Also save a the master key so we can reencrypted the key
- * the key when we want to change the password on it. */
- memcpy(saved_master_key, decrypted_master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize);
- saved_mount_point = strdup(mount_point);
- master_key_saved = 1;
- SLOGD("%s(): Master key saved\n", __FUNCTION__);
- rc = 0;
-
- // Upgrade if we're not using the latest KDF.
- if (crypt_ftr->kdf_type != KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER) {
- crypt_ftr->kdf_type = KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER;
- upgrade = 1;
- }
-
- if (upgrade) {
- rc = encrypt_master_key(passwd, crypt_ftr->salt, saved_master_key,
- crypt_ftr->master_key, crypt_ftr);
- if (!rc) {
- rc = put_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr);
- }
- SLOGD("Key Derivation Function upgrade: rc=%d\n", rc);
-
- // Do not fail even if upgrade failed - machine is bootable
- // Note that if this code is ever hit, there is a *serious* problem
- // since KDFs should never fail. You *must* fix the kdf before
- // proceeding!
- if (rc) {
- SLOGW(
- "Upgrade failed with error %d,"
- " but continuing with previous state",
- rc);
- rc = 0;
- }
- }
- }
-
-errout:
- if (intermediate_key) {
- memset(intermediate_key, 0, intermediate_key_size);
- free(intermediate_key);
- }
- return rc;
-}
-
/*
* Called by vold when it's asked to mount an encrypted external
* storage volume. The incoming partition has no crypto header/footer,
@@ -1967,899 +145,54 @@
return -1;
}
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr ext_crypt_ftr;
- memset(&ext_crypt_ftr, 0, sizeof(ext_crypt_ftr));
- ext_crypt_ftr.fs_size = nr_sec;
- ext_crypt_ftr.keysize = crypto_type.get_keysize();
- strlcpy((char*)ext_crypt_ftr.crypto_type_name, crypto_type.get_kernel_name(),
- MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN);
- uint32_t flags = 0;
+ auto& dm = DeviceMapper::Instance();
+
+ // We need two ASCII characters to represent each byte, and need space for
+ // the '\0' terminator.
+ char key_ascii[MAX_KEY_LEN * 2 + 1];
+ convert_key_to_hex_ascii(key, key_ascii);
+
+ auto target = std::make_unique<DmTargetCrypt>(0, nr_sec, crypto_type.get_kernel_name(),
+ key_ascii, 0, real_blkdev, 0);
+ target->AllowDiscards();
+
if (fscrypt_is_native() &&
- android::base::GetBoolProperty("ro.crypto.allow_encrypt_override", false))
- flags |= CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE;
-
- return create_crypto_blk_dev(&ext_crypt_ftr, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(key.data()),
- real_blkdev, out_crypto_blkdev, label, flags);
-}
-
-int cryptfs_crypto_complete(void) {
- return do_crypto_complete("/data");
-}
-
-int check_unmounted_and_get_ftr(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
- char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
- property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
- if (master_key_saved || strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
- SLOGE(
- "encrypted fs already validated or not running with encryption,"
- " aborting");
+ android::base::GetBoolProperty("ro.crypto.allow_encrypt_override", false)) {
+ target->AllowEncryptOverride();
+ }
+ if (add_sector_size_param(target.get(), &nr_sec)) {
+ SLOGE("Error processing dm-crypt sector size param\n");
return -1;
}
- if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr)) {
- SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key");
+ DmTable table;
+ table.AddTarget(std::move(target));
+
+ int load_count = 1;
+ while (load_count < TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
+ if (dm.CreateDevice(label, table)) {
+ break;
+ }
+ load_count++;
+ }
+
+ if (load_count >= TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot load dm-crypt mapping table.\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (load_count > 1) {
+ SLOGI("Took %d tries to load dmcrypt table.\n", load_count);
+ }
+
+ if (!dm.GetDmDevicePathByName(label, out_crypto_blkdev)) {
+ SLOGE("Cannot determine dm-crypt path for %s.\n", label);
return -1;
}
+ /* Ensure the dm device has been created before returning. */
+ if (android::vold::WaitForFile(out_crypto_blkdev->c_str(), 1s) < 0) {
+ // WaitForFile generates a suitable log message
+ return -1;
+ }
return 0;
}
-
-int cryptfs_check_passwd(const char* passwd) {
- SLOGI("cryptfs_check_passwd");
- if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
- SLOGE("cryptfs_check_passwd not valid for file encryption");
- return -1;
- }
-
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
- int rc;
-
- rc = check_unmounted_and_get_ftr(&crypt_ftr);
- if (rc) {
- SLOGE("Could not get footer");
- return rc;
- }
-
- rc = test_mount_encrypted_fs(&crypt_ftr, passwd, DATA_MNT_POINT, CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
- if (rc) {
- SLOGE("Password did not match");
- return rc;
- }
-
- if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE) {
- // Here we have a default actual password but a real password
- // we must test against the scrypted value
- // First, we must delete the crypto block device that
- // test_mount_encrypted_fs leaves behind as a side effect
- delete_crypto_blk_dev(CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
- rc = test_mount_encrypted_fs(&crypt_ftr, DEFAULT_PASSWORD, DATA_MNT_POINT,
- CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
- if (rc) {
- SLOGE("Default password did not match on reboot encryption");
- return rc;
- }
-
- crypt_ftr.flags &= ~CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE;
- put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
- rc = cryptfs_changepw(crypt_ftr.crypt_type, passwd);
- if (rc) {
- SLOGE("Could not change password on reboot encryption");
- return rc;
- }
- }
-
- if (crypt_ftr.crypt_type != CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
- cryptfs_clear_password();
- password = strdup(passwd);
- struct timespec now;
- clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &now);
- password_expiry_time = now.tv_sec + password_max_age_seconds;
- }
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-int cryptfs_verify_passwd(const char* passwd) {
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
- unsigned char decrypted_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
- char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
- int rc;
-
- property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
- if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
- SLOGE("device not encrypted, aborting");
- return -2;
- }
-
- if (!master_key_saved) {
- SLOGE("encrypted fs not yet mounted, aborting");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (!saved_mount_point) {
- SLOGE("encrypted fs failed to save mount point, aborting");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
- SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED) {
- /* If the device has no password, then just say the password is valid */
- rc = 0;
- } else {
- decrypt_master_key(passwd, decrypted_master_key, &crypt_ftr, 0, 0);
- if (!memcmp(decrypted_master_key, saved_master_key, crypt_ftr.keysize)) {
- /* They match, the password is correct */
- rc = 0;
- } else {
- /* If incorrect, sleep for a bit to prevent dictionary attacks */
- sleep(1);
- rc = 1;
- }
- }
-
- return rc;
-}
-
-/* Initialize a crypt_mnt_ftr structure. The keysize is
- * defaulted to get_crypto_type().get_keysize() bytes, and the filesystem size to 0.
- * Presumably, at a minimum, the caller will update the
- * filesystem size and crypto_type_name after calling this function.
- */
-static int cryptfs_init_crypt_mnt_ftr(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr) {
- off64_t off;
-
- memset(ftr, 0, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr));
- ftr->magic = CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC;
- ftr->major_version = CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION;
- ftr->minor_version = CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION;
- ftr->ftr_size = sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr);
- ftr->keysize = get_crypto_type().get_keysize();
- ftr->kdf_type = KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER;
-
- get_device_scrypt_params(ftr);
-
- ftr->persist_data_size = CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE;
- if (get_crypt_ftr_info(NULL, &off) == 0) {
- ftr->persist_data_offset[0] = off + CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET;
- ftr->persist_data_offset[1] = off + CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET + ftr->persist_data_size;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-#define FRAMEWORK_BOOT_WAIT 60
-
-static int vold_unmountAll(void) {
- VolumeManager* vm = VolumeManager::Instance();
- return vm->unmountAll();
-}
-
-int cryptfs_enable_internal(int crypt_type, const char* passwd, int no_ui) {
- std::string crypto_blkdev;
- std::string real_blkdev;
- unsigned char decrypted_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
- int rc = -1, i;
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
- struct crypt_persist_data* pdata;
- char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
- char lockid[32] = {0};
- std::string key_loc;
- int num_vols;
- bool rebootEncryption = false;
- bool onlyCreateHeader = false;
-
- /* Get a wakelock as this may take a while, and we don't want the
- * device to sleep on us. We'll grab a partial wakelock, and if the UI
- * wants to keep the screen on, it can grab a full wakelock.
- */
- snprintf(lockid, sizeof(lockid), "enablecrypto%d", (int)getpid());
- auto wl = android::wakelock::WakeLock::tryGet(lockid);
- if (!wl.has_value()) {
- return android::UNEXPECTED_NULL;
- }
-
- if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr) == 0) {
- if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION) {
- if (!check_ftr_sha(&crypt_ftr)) {
- memset(&crypt_ftr, 0, sizeof(crypt_ftr));
- put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
- goto error_unencrypted;
- }
-
- /* Doing a reboot-encryption*/
- crypt_ftr.flags &= ~CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION;
- crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE;
- rebootEncryption = true;
- }
- } else {
- // We don't want to accidentally reference invalid data.
- memset(&crypt_ftr, 0, sizeof(crypt_ftr));
- }
-
- property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
- if (!strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
- SLOGE("Device is already running encrypted, aborting");
- goto error_unencrypted;
- }
-
- get_crypt_info(&key_loc, &real_blkdev);
-
- /* Get the size of the real block device */
- uint64_t nr_sec;
- if (android::vold::GetBlockDev512Sectors(real_blkdev, &nr_sec) != android::OK) {
- SLOGE("Cannot get size of block device %s\n", real_blkdev.c_str());
- goto error_unencrypted;
- }
-
- /* If doing inplace encryption, make sure the orig fs doesn't include the crypto footer */
- if (key_loc == KEY_IN_FOOTER) {
- uint64_t fs_size_sec, max_fs_size_sec;
- fs_size_sec = get_fs_size(real_blkdev.c_str());
- if (fs_size_sec == 0) fs_size_sec = get_f2fs_filesystem_size_sec(real_blkdev.data());
-
- max_fs_size_sec = nr_sec - (CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET / CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE);
-
- if (fs_size_sec > max_fs_size_sec) {
- SLOGE("Orig filesystem overlaps crypto footer region. Cannot encrypt in place.");
- goto error_unencrypted;
- }
- }
-
- /* The init files are setup to stop the class main and late start when
- * vold sets trigger_shutdown_framework.
- */
- property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_shutdown_framework");
- SLOGD("Just asked init to shut down class main\n");
-
- /* Ask vold to unmount all devices that it manages */
- if (vold_unmountAll()) {
- SLOGE("Failed to unmount all vold managed devices");
- }
-
- /* no_ui means we are being called from init, not settings.
- Now we always reboot from settings, so !no_ui means reboot
- */
- if (!no_ui) {
- /* Try fallback, which is to reboot and try there */
- onlyCreateHeader = true;
- FILE* breadcrumb = fopen(BREADCRUMB_FILE, "we");
- if (breadcrumb == 0) {
- SLOGE("Failed to create breadcrumb file");
- goto error_shutting_down;
- }
- fclose(breadcrumb);
- }
-
- /* Do extra work for a better UX when doing the long inplace encryption */
- if (!onlyCreateHeader) {
- /* Now that /data is unmounted, we need to mount a tmpfs
- * /data, set a property saying we're doing inplace encryption,
- * and restart the framework.
- */
- wait_and_unmount(DATA_MNT_POINT);
- if (fs_mgr_do_tmpfs_mount(DATA_MNT_POINT)) {
- goto error_shutting_down;
- }
- /* Tells the framework that inplace encryption is starting */
- property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "0");
-
- /* restart the framework. */
- /* Create necessary paths on /data */
- prep_data_fs();
-
- /* Ugh, shutting down the framework is not synchronous, so until it
- * can be fixed, this horrible hack will wait a moment for it all to
- * shut down before proceeding. Without it, some devices cannot
- * restart the graphics services.
- */
- sleep(2);
- }
-
- /* Start the actual work of making an encrypted filesystem */
- /* Initialize a crypt_mnt_ftr for the partition */
- if (!rebootEncryption) {
- if (cryptfs_init_crypt_mnt_ftr(&crypt_ftr)) {
- goto error_shutting_down;
- }
-
- if (key_loc == KEY_IN_FOOTER) {
- crypt_ftr.fs_size = nr_sec - (CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET / CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE);
- } else {
- crypt_ftr.fs_size = nr_sec;
- }
- /* At this point, we are in an inconsistent state. Until we successfully
- complete encryption, a reboot will leave us broken. So mark the
- encryption failed in case that happens.
- On successfully completing encryption, remove this flag */
- if (onlyCreateHeader) {
- crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION;
- } else {
- crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE;
- }
- crypt_ftr.crypt_type = crypt_type;
- strlcpy((char*)crypt_ftr.crypto_type_name, get_crypto_type().get_kernel_name(),
- MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN);
-
- /* Make an encrypted master key */
- if (create_encrypted_random_key(onlyCreateHeader ? DEFAULT_PASSWORD : passwd,
- crypt_ftr.master_key, crypt_ftr.salt, &crypt_ftr)) {
- SLOGE("Cannot create encrypted master key\n");
- goto error_shutting_down;
- }
-
- /* Replace scrypted intermediate key if we are preparing for a reboot */
- if (onlyCreateHeader) {
- unsigned char fake_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
- unsigned char encrypted_fake_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
- memset(fake_master_key, 0, sizeof(fake_master_key));
- encrypt_master_key(passwd, crypt_ftr.salt, fake_master_key, encrypted_fake_master_key,
- &crypt_ftr);
- }
-
- /* Write the key to the end of the partition */
- put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
-
- /* If any persistent data has been remembered, save it.
- * If none, create a valid empty table and save that.
- */
- if (!persist_data) {
- pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
- if (pdata) {
- init_empty_persist_data(pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
- persist_data = pdata;
- }
- }
- if (persist_data) {
- save_persistent_data();
- }
- }
-
- if (onlyCreateHeader) {
- sleep(2);
- cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::reboot);
- }
-
- if (!no_ui || rebootEncryption) {
- /* startup service classes main and late_start */
- property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_min_framework");
- SLOGD("Just triggered restart_min_framework\n");
-
- /* OK, the framework is restarted and will soon be showing a
- * progress bar. Time to setup an encrypted mapping, and
- * either write a new filesystem, or encrypt in place updating
- * the progress bar as we work.
- */
- }
-
- decrypt_master_key(passwd, decrypted_master_key, &crypt_ftr, 0, 0);
- rc = create_crypto_blk_dev(&crypt_ftr, decrypted_master_key, real_blkdev.c_str(),
- &crypto_blkdev, CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE, 0);
- if (!rc) {
- if (encrypt_inplace(crypto_blkdev, real_blkdev, crypt_ftr.fs_size, true)) {
- crypt_ftr.encrypted_upto = crypt_ftr.fs_size;
- rc = 0;
- } else {
- rc = -1;
- }
- /* Undo the dm-crypt mapping whether we succeed or not */
- delete_crypto_blk_dev(CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
- }
-
- if (!rc) {
- /* Success */
- crypt_ftr.flags &= ~CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE;
-
- put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
-
- char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
- property_get("ro.crypto.state", value, "");
- if (!strcmp(value, "")) {
- /* default encryption - continue first boot sequence */
- property_set("ro.crypto.state", "encrypted");
- property_set("ro.crypto.type", "block");
- wl.reset();
- if (rebootEncryption && crypt_ftr.crypt_type != CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
- // Bring up cryptkeeper that will check the password and set it
- property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_shutdown_framework");
- sleep(2);
- property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "");
- cryptfs_trigger_restart_min_framework();
- } else {
- cryptfs_check_passwd(DEFAULT_PASSWORD);
- cryptfs_restart_internal(1);
- }
- return 0;
- } else {
- sleep(2); /* Give the UI a chance to show 100% progress */
- cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::reboot);
- }
- } else {
- char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-
- property_get("ro.vold.wipe_on_crypt_fail", value, "0");
- if (!strcmp(value, "1")) {
- /* wipe data if encryption failed */
- SLOGE("encryption failed - rebooting into recovery to wipe data\n");
- std::string err;
- const std::vector<std::string> options = {
- "--wipe_data\n--reason=cryptfs_enable_internal\n"};
- if (!write_bootloader_message(options, &err)) {
- SLOGE("could not write bootloader message: %s", err.c_str());
- }
- cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::recovery);
- } else {
- /* set property to trigger dialog */
- property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "error_partially_encrypted");
- }
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* hrm, the encrypt step claims success, but the reboot failed.
- * This should not happen.
- * Set the property and return. Hope the framework can deal with it.
- */
- property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "error_reboot_failed");
- return rc;
-
-error_unencrypted:
- property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "error_not_encrypted");
- return -1;
-
-error_shutting_down:
- /* we failed, and have not encrypted anthing, so the users's data is still intact,
- * but the framework is stopped and not restarted to show the error, so it's up to
- * vold to restart the system.
- */
- SLOGE(
- "Error enabling encryption after framework is shutdown, no data changed, restarting "
- "system");
- cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::reboot);
-
- /* shouldn't get here */
- property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "error_shutting_down");
- return -1;
-}
-
-int cryptfs_enable(int type, const char* passwd, int no_ui) {
- return cryptfs_enable_internal(type, passwd, no_ui);
-}
-
-int cryptfs_enable_default(int no_ui) {
- return cryptfs_enable_internal(CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT, DEFAULT_PASSWORD, no_ui);
-}
-
-int cryptfs_changepw(int crypt_type, const char* newpw) {
- if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
- SLOGE("cryptfs_changepw not valid for file encryption");
- return -1;
- }
-
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
- int rc;
-
- /* This is only allowed after we've successfully decrypted the master key */
- if (!master_key_saved) {
- SLOGE("Key not saved, aborting");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (crypt_type < 0 || crypt_type > CRYPT_TYPE_MAX_TYPE) {
- SLOGE("Invalid crypt_type %d", crypt_type);
- return -1;
- }
-
- /* get key */
- if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
- SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key");
- return -1;
- }
-
- crypt_ftr.crypt_type = crypt_type;
-
- rc = encrypt_master_key(crypt_type == CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT ? DEFAULT_PASSWORD : newpw,
- crypt_ftr.salt, saved_master_key, crypt_ftr.master_key, &crypt_ftr);
- if (rc) {
- SLOGE("Encrypt master key failed: %d", rc);
- return -1;
- }
- /* save the key */
- put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static unsigned int persist_get_max_entries(int encrypted) {
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
- unsigned int dsize;
-
- /* If encrypted, use the values from the crypt_ftr, otherwise
- * use the values for the current spec.
- */
- if (encrypted) {
- if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
- /* Something is wrong, assume no space for entries */
- return 0;
- }
- dsize = crypt_ftr.persist_data_size;
- } else {
- dsize = CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE;
- }
-
- if (dsize > sizeof(struct crypt_persist_data)) {
- return (dsize - sizeof(struct crypt_persist_data)) / sizeof(struct crypt_persist_entry);
- } else {
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-static int persist_get_key(const char* fieldname, char* value) {
- unsigned int i;
-
- if (persist_data == NULL) {
- return -1;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < persist_data->persist_valid_entries; i++) {
- if (!strncmp(persist_data->persist_entry[i].key, fieldname, PROPERTY_KEY_MAX)) {
- /* We found it! */
- strlcpy(value, persist_data->persist_entry[i].val, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- return -1;
-}
-
-static int persist_set_key(const char* fieldname, const char* value, int encrypted) {
- unsigned int i;
- unsigned int num;
- unsigned int max_persistent_entries;
-
- if (persist_data == NULL) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- max_persistent_entries = persist_get_max_entries(encrypted);
-
- num = persist_data->persist_valid_entries;
-
- for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
- if (!strncmp(persist_data->persist_entry[i].key, fieldname, PROPERTY_KEY_MAX)) {
- /* We found an existing entry, update it! */
- memset(persist_data->persist_entry[i].val, 0, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
- strlcpy(persist_data->persist_entry[i].val, value, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* We didn't find it, add it to the end, if there is room */
- if (persist_data->persist_valid_entries < max_persistent_entries) {
- memset(&persist_data->persist_entry[num], 0, sizeof(struct crypt_persist_entry));
- strlcpy(persist_data->persist_entry[num].key, fieldname, PROPERTY_KEY_MAX);
- strlcpy(persist_data->persist_entry[num].val, value, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
- persist_data->persist_valid_entries++;
- return 0;
- }
-
- return -1;
-}
-
-/**
- * Test if key is part of the multi-entry (field, index) sequence. Return non-zero if key is in the
- * sequence and its index is greater than or equal to index. Return 0 otherwise.
- */
-int match_multi_entry(const char* key, const char* field, unsigned index) {
- std::string key_ = key;
- std::string field_ = field;
-
- std::string parsed_field;
- unsigned parsed_index;
-
- std::string::size_type split = key_.find_last_of('_');
- if (split == std::string::npos) {
- parsed_field = key_;
- parsed_index = 0;
- } else {
- parsed_field = key_.substr(0, split);
- parsed_index = std::stoi(key_.substr(split + 1));
- }
-
- return parsed_field == field_ && parsed_index >= index;
-}
-
-/*
- * Delete entry/entries from persist_data. If the entries are part of a multi-segment field, all
- * remaining entries starting from index will be deleted.
- * returns PERSIST_DEL_KEY_OK if deletion succeeds,
- * PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_NO_FIELD if the field does not exist,
- * and PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_OTHER if error occurs.
- *
- */
-static int persist_del_keys(const char* fieldname, unsigned index) {
- unsigned int i;
- unsigned int j;
- unsigned int num;
-
- if (persist_data == NULL) {
- return PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_OTHER;
- }
-
- num = persist_data->persist_valid_entries;
-
- j = 0; // points to the end of non-deleted entries.
- // Filter out to-be-deleted entries in place.
- for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
- if (!match_multi_entry(persist_data->persist_entry[i].key, fieldname, index)) {
- persist_data->persist_entry[j] = persist_data->persist_entry[i];
- j++;
- }
- }
-
- if (j < num) {
- persist_data->persist_valid_entries = j;
- // Zeroise the remaining entries
- memset(&persist_data->persist_entry[j], 0, (num - j) * sizeof(struct crypt_persist_entry));
- return PERSIST_DEL_KEY_OK;
- } else {
- // Did not find an entry matching the given fieldname
- return PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_NO_FIELD;
- }
-}
-
-static int persist_count_keys(const char* fieldname) {
- unsigned int i;
- unsigned int count;
-
- if (persist_data == NULL) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- count = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < persist_data->persist_valid_entries; i++) {
- if (match_multi_entry(persist_data->persist_entry[i].key, fieldname, 0)) {
- count++;
- }
- }
-
- return count;
-}
-
-/* Return the value of the specified field. */
-int cryptfs_getfield(const char* fieldname, char* value, int len) {
- if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
- SLOGE("Cannot get field when file encrypted");
- return -1;
- }
-
- char temp_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
- /* CRYPTO_GETFIELD_OK is success,
- * CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_NO_FIELD is value not set,
- * CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_BUF_TOO_SMALL is buffer (as given by len) too small,
- * CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER is any other error
- */
- int rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER;
- int i;
- char temp_field[PROPERTY_KEY_MAX];
-
- if (persist_data == NULL) {
- load_persistent_data();
- if (persist_data == NULL) {
- SLOGE("Getfield error, cannot load persistent data");
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- // Read value from persistent entries. If the original value is split into multiple entries,
- // stitch them back together.
- if (!persist_get_key(fieldname, temp_value)) {
- // We found it, copy it to the caller's buffer and keep going until all entries are read.
- if (strlcpy(value, temp_value, len) >= (unsigned)len) {
- // value too small
- rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
- goto out;
- }
- rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_OK;
-
- for (i = 1; /* break explicitly */; i++) {
- if (snprintf(temp_field, sizeof(temp_field), "%s_%d", fieldname, i) >=
- (int)sizeof(temp_field)) {
- // If the fieldname is very long, we stop as soon as it begins to overflow the
- // maximum field length. At this point we have in fact fully read out the original
- // value because cryptfs_setfield would not allow fields with longer names to be
- // written in the first place.
- break;
- }
- if (!persist_get_key(temp_field, temp_value)) {
- if (strlcat(value, temp_value, len) >= (unsigned)len) {
- // value too small.
- rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
- goto out;
- }
- } else {
- // Exhaust all entries.
- break;
- }
- }
- } else {
- /* Sadness, it's not there. Return the error */
- rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_NO_FIELD;
- }
-
-out:
- return rc;
-}
-
-/* Set the value of the specified field. */
-int cryptfs_setfield(const char* fieldname, const char* value) {
- if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
- SLOGE("Cannot set field when file encrypted");
- return -1;
- }
-
- char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
- /* 0 is success, negative values are error */
- int rc = CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER;
- int encrypted = 0;
- unsigned int field_id;
- char temp_field[PROPERTY_KEY_MAX];
- unsigned int num_entries;
- unsigned int max_keylen;
-
- if (persist_data == NULL) {
- load_persistent_data();
- if (persist_data == NULL) {
- SLOGE("Setfield error, cannot load persistent data");
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
- if (!strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
- encrypted = 1;
- }
-
- // Compute the number of entries required to store value, each entry can store up to
- // (PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX - 1) chars
- if (strlen(value) == 0) {
- // Empty value also needs one entry to store.
- num_entries = 1;
- } else {
- num_entries = (strlen(value) + (PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX - 1) - 1) / (PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX - 1);
- }
-
- max_keylen = strlen(fieldname);
- if (num_entries > 1) {
- // Need an extra "_%d" suffix.
- max_keylen += 1 + log10(num_entries);
- }
- if (max_keylen > PROPERTY_KEY_MAX - 1) {
- rc = CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_FIELD_TOO_LONG;
- goto out;
- }
-
- // Make sure we have enough space to write the new value
- if (persist_data->persist_valid_entries + num_entries - persist_count_keys(fieldname) >
- persist_get_max_entries(encrypted)) {
- rc = CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_VALUE_TOO_LONG;
- goto out;
- }
-
- // Now that we know persist_data has enough space for value, let's delete the old field first
- // to make up space.
- persist_del_keys(fieldname, 0);
-
- if (persist_set_key(fieldname, value, encrypted)) {
- // fail to set key, should not happen as we have already checked the available space
- SLOGE("persist_set_key() error during setfield()");
- goto out;
- }
-
- for (field_id = 1; field_id < num_entries; field_id++) {
- snprintf(temp_field, sizeof(temp_field), "%s_%u", fieldname, field_id);
-
- if (persist_set_key(temp_field, value + field_id * (PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX - 1), encrypted)) {
- // fail to set key, should not happen as we have already checked the available space.
- SLOGE("persist_set_key() error during setfield()");
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- /* If we are running encrypted, save the persistent data now */
- if (encrypted) {
- if (save_persistent_data()) {
- SLOGE("Setfield error, cannot save persistent data");
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- rc = CRYPTO_SETFIELD_OK;
-
-out:
- return rc;
-}
-
-/* Checks userdata. Attempt to mount the volume if default-
- * encrypted.
- * On success trigger next init phase and return 0.
- * Currently do not handle failure - see TODO below.
- */
-int cryptfs_mount_default_encrypted(void) {
- int crypt_type = cryptfs_get_password_type();
- if (crypt_type < 0 || crypt_type > CRYPT_TYPE_MAX_TYPE) {
- SLOGE("Bad crypt type - error");
- } else if (crypt_type != CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
- SLOGD(
- "Password is not default - "
- "starting min framework to prompt");
- property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_min_framework");
- return 0;
- } else if (cryptfs_check_passwd(DEFAULT_PASSWORD) == 0) {
- SLOGD("Password is default - restarting filesystem");
- cryptfs_restart_internal(0);
- return 0;
- } else {
- SLOGE("Encrypted, default crypt type but can't decrypt");
- }
-
- /** Corrupt. Allow us to boot into framework, which will detect bad
- crypto when it calls do_crypto_complete, then do a factory reset
- */
- property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_min_framework");
- return 0;
-}
-
-/* Returns type of the password, default, pattern, pin or password.
- */
-int cryptfs_get_password_type(void) {
- if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
- SLOGE("cryptfs_get_password_type not valid for file encryption");
- return -1;
- }
-
- struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
-
- if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
- SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
- return -1;
- }
-
- if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- return crypt_ftr.crypt_type;
-}
-
-const char* cryptfs_get_password() {
- if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
- SLOGE("cryptfs_get_password not valid for file encryption");
- return 0;
- }
-
- struct timespec now;
- clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &now);
- if (now.tv_sec < password_expiry_time) {
- return password;
- } else {
- cryptfs_clear_password();
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-void cryptfs_clear_password() {
- if (password) {
- size_t len = strlen(password);
- memset(password, 0, len);
- free(password);
- password = 0;
- password_expiry_time = 0;
- }
-}
-
-int cryptfs_isConvertibleToFBE() {
- auto entry = GetEntryForMountPoint(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT);
- return entry && entry->fs_mgr_flags.force_fde_or_fbe;
-}
diff --git a/cryptfs.h b/cryptfs.h
index 872806e..e166f49 100644
--- a/cryptfs.h
+++ b/cryptfs.h
@@ -19,61 +19,11 @@
#include <string>
-#include <linux/types.h>
-#include <stdbool.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
-
-#include <cutils/properties.h>
-
#include "KeyBuffer.h"
#include "KeyUtil.h"
-#define CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET 0x4000
-
-/* Return values for cryptfs_crypto_complete */
-#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED 1
-#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_ENCRYPTED 0
-#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_BAD_METADATA (-1)
-#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_PARTIAL (-2)
-#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_INCONSISTENT (-3)
-#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_CORRUPT (-4)
-
-/* Return values for cryptfs_getfield */
-#define CRYPTO_GETFIELD_OK 0
-#define CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_NO_FIELD (-1)
-#define CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER (-2)
-#define CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_BUF_TOO_SMALL (-3)
-
-/* Return values for cryptfs_setfield */
-#define CRYPTO_SETFIELD_OK 0
-#define CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER (-1)
-#define CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_FIELD_TOO_LONG (-2)
-#define CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_VALUE_TOO_LONG (-3)
-
-/* Return values for persist_del_key */
-#define PERSIST_DEL_KEY_OK 0
-#define PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_OTHER (-1)
-#define PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_NO_FIELD (-2)
-
-// Exposed for testing only
-int match_multi_entry(const char* key, const char* field, unsigned index);
-
-int cryptfs_crypto_complete(void);
-int cryptfs_check_passwd(const char* pw);
-int cryptfs_verify_passwd(const char* pw);
-int cryptfs_restart(void);
-int cryptfs_enable(int type, const char* passwd, int no_ui);
-int cryptfs_changepw(int type, const char* newpw);
-int cryptfs_enable_default(int no_ui);
int cryptfs_setup_ext_volume(const char* label, const char* real_blkdev,
const android::vold::KeyBuffer& key, std::string* out_crypto_blkdev);
-int cryptfs_getfield(const char* fieldname, char* value, int len);
-int cryptfs_setfield(const char* fieldname, const char* value);
-int cryptfs_mount_default_encrypted(void);
-int cryptfs_get_password_type(void);
-const char* cryptfs_get_password(void);
-void cryptfs_clear_password(void);
-int cryptfs_isConvertibleToFBE(void);
const android::vold::KeyGeneration cryptfs_get_keygen();
#endif /* ANDROID_VOLD_CRYPTFS_H */
diff --git a/fs/Exfat.cpp b/fs/Exfat.cpp
index 7782dd3..c8b19e0 100644
--- a/fs/Exfat.cpp
+++ b/fs/Exfat.cpp
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
cmd.push_back("-y");
cmd.push_back(source);
- int rc = ForkExecvp(cmd, nullptr, sFsckUntrustedContext);
+ int rc = ForkExecvpTimeout(cmd, kUntrustedFsckSleepTime, sFsckUntrustedContext);
if (rc == 0) {
LOG(INFO) << "Check OK";
return 0;
diff --git a/fs/Vfat.cpp b/fs/Vfat.cpp
index 4f1e982..f3f04d8 100644
--- a/fs/Vfat.cpp
+++ b/fs/Vfat.cpp
@@ -68,10 +68,9 @@
cmd.push_back(source);
// Fat devices are currently always untrusted
- rc = ForkExecvp(cmd, nullptr, sFsckUntrustedContext);
-
+ rc = ForkExecvpTimeout(cmd, kUntrustedFsckSleepTime, sFsckUntrustedContext);
if (rc < 0) {
- LOG(ERROR) << "Filesystem check failed due to logwrap error";
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Filesystem check failed due to fork error";
errno = EIO;
return -1;
}
@@ -81,6 +80,10 @@
LOG(INFO) << "Filesystem check completed OK";
return 0;
+ case 1:
+ LOG(INFO) << "Failed to check filesystem";
+ return -1;
+
case 2:
LOG(ERROR) << "Filesystem check failed (not a FAT filesystem)";
errno = ENODATA;
@@ -100,6 +103,11 @@
errno = ENODATA;
return -1;
+ case ETIMEDOUT:
+ LOG(ERROR) << "Filesystem check timed out";
+ errno = ETIMEDOUT;
+ return -1;
+
default:
LOG(ERROR) << "Filesystem check failed (unknown exit code " << rc << ")";
errno = EIO;
diff --git a/main.cpp b/main.cpp
index 1f85fb5..978db66 100644
--- a/main.cpp
+++ b/main.cpp
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#define ATRACE_TAG ATRACE_TAG_PACKAGE_MANAGER
+#include "MetadataCrypt.h"
#include "NetlinkManager.h"
#include "VoldNativeService.h"
#include "VoldUtil.h"
@@ -51,8 +52,11 @@
static int process_config(VolumeManager* vm, VoldConfigs* configs);
static void coldboot(const char* path);
static void parse_args(int argc, char** argv);
+static void VoldLogger(android::base::LogId log_buffer_id, android::base::LogSeverity severity,
+ const char* tag, const char* file, unsigned int line, const char* message);
struct selabel_handle* sehandle;
+android::base::LogdLogger logd_logger(android::base::SYSTEM);
using android::base::StringPrintf;
using android::fs_mgr::ReadDefaultFstab;
@@ -60,7 +64,7 @@
int main(int argc, char** argv) {
atrace_set_tracing_enabled(false);
setenv("ANDROID_LOG_TAGS", "*:d", 1); // Do not submit with verbose logs enabled
- android::base::InitLogging(argv, android::base::LogdLogger(android::base::SYSTEM));
+ android::base::InitLogging(argv, &VoldLogger);
LOG(INFO) << "Vold 3.0 (the awakening) firing up";
@@ -247,6 +251,11 @@
PLOG(FATAL) << "could not find logical partition " << entry.blk_device;
}
+ if (entry.mount_point == "/data" && !entry.metadata_encryption.empty()) {
+ // Pre-populate userdata dm-devices since the uevents are asynchronous (b/198405417).
+ android::vold::defaultkey_precreate_dm_device();
+ }
+
if (entry.fs_mgr_flags.vold_managed) {
if (entry.fs_mgr_flags.nonremovable) {
LOG(WARNING) << "nonremovable no longer supported; ignoring volume";
@@ -272,3 +281,23 @@
}
return 0;
}
+
+static void VoldLogger(android::base::LogId log_buffer_id, android::base::LogSeverity severity,
+ const char* tag, const char* file, unsigned int line, const char* message) {
+ logd_logger(log_buffer_id, severity, tag, file, line, message);
+
+ if (severity >= android::base::ERROR) {
+ static bool is_data_mounted = false;
+
+ // When /data fails to mount, we don't have adb to get logcat. So until /data is
+ // mounted we log errors to the kernel. This allows us to get failures via serial logs
+ // and via last dmesg/"fastboot oem dmesg" on devices that support it.
+ //
+ // As a very quick-and-dirty test for /data, we check whether /data/misc/vold exists.
+ if (is_data_mounted || access("/data/misc/vold", F_OK) == 0) {
+ is_data_mounted = true;
+ return;
+ }
+ android::base::KernelLogger(log_buffer_id, severity, tag, file, line, message);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/model/Disk.h b/model/Disk.h
index 16476dc..8c75f59 100644
--- a/model/Disk.h
+++ b/model/Disk.h
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@
const std::string& getLabel() const { return mLabel; }
int getFlags() const { return mFlags; }
+ bool isStub() const { return (mFlags & kStubInvisible) || (mFlags & kStubVisible); }
+
std::shared_ptr<VolumeBase> findVolume(const std::string& id);
void listVolumes(VolumeBase::Type type, std::list<std::string>& list) const;
@@ -123,8 +125,6 @@
int getMaxMinors();
- bool isStub() { return (mFlags & kStubInvisible) || (mFlags & kStubVisible); }
-
DISALLOW_COPY_AND_ASSIGN(Disk);
};
diff --git a/model/EmulatedVolume.cpp b/model/EmulatedVolume.cpp
index 6f21ff8..7c8a4e0 100644
--- a/model/EmulatedVolume.cpp
+++ b/model/EmulatedVolume.cpp
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
mRawPath = rawPath;
mLabel = "emulated";
mFuseMounted = false;
+ mFuseBpfEnabled = base::GetBoolProperty(kFuseBpfEnabled, false);
mUseSdcardFs = IsSdcardfsUsed();
mAppDataIsolationEnabled = base::GetBoolProperty(kVoldAppDataIsolationEnabled, false);
}
@@ -60,6 +61,7 @@
mRawPath = rawPath;
mLabel = fsUuid;
mFuseMounted = false;
+ mFuseBpfEnabled = base::GetBoolProperty(kFuseBpfEnabled, false);
mUseSdcardFs = IsSdcardfsUsed();
mAppDataIsolationEnabled = base::GetBoolProperty(kVoldAppDataIsolationEnabled, false);
}
@@ -246,7 +248,7 @@
status_t EmulatedVolume::doMount() {
std::string label = getLabel();
- bool isVisible = getMountFlags() & MountFlags::kVisible;
+ bool isVisible = isVisibleForWrite();
mSdcardFsDefault = StringPrintf("/mnt/runtime/default/%s", label.c_str());
mSdcardFsRead = StringPrintf("/mnt/runtime/read/%s", label.c_str());
@@ -359,10 +361,12 @@
}
}
- // Only do the bind-mounts when we know for sure the FUSE daemon can resolve the path.
- res = mountFuseBindMounts();
- if (res != OK) {
- return res;
+ if (!mFuseBpfEnabled) {
+ // Only do the bind-mounts when we know for sure the FUSE daemon can resolve the path.
+ res = mountFuseBindMounts();
+ if (res != OK) {
+ return res;
+ }
}
ConfigureReadAheadForFuse(GetFuseMountPathForUser(user_id, label), 256u);
@@ -416,9 +420,11 @@
if (mFuseMounted) {
std::string label = getLabel();
- // Ignoring unmount return status because we do want to try to unmount
- // the rest cleanly.
- unmountFuseBindMounts();
+ if (!mFuseBpfEnabled) {
+ // Ignoring unmount return status because we do want to try to
+ // unmount the rest cleanly.
+ unmountFuseBindMounts();
+ }
if (UnmountUserFuse(userId, getInternalPath(), label) != OK) {
PLOG(INFO) << "UnmountUserFuse failed on emulated fuse volume";
diff --git a/model/EmulatedVolume.h b/model/EmulatedVolume.h
index 1d2385d..0f39fbd 100644
--- a/model/EmulatedVolume.h
+++ b/model/EmulatedVolume.h
@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@
/* Whether we mounted FUSE for this volume */
bool mFuseMounted;
+ /* Whether the FUSE BPF feature is enabled */
+ bool mFuseBpfEnabled;
+
/* Whether to use sdcardfs for this volume */
bool mUseSdcardFs;
diff --git a/model/PublicVolume.cpp b/model/PublicVolume.cpp
index 12e31ff..bf54c95 100644
--- a/model/PublicVolume.cpp
+++ b/model/PublicVolume.cpp
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@
}
status_t PublicVolume::doMount() {
- bool isVisible = getMountFlags() & MountFlags::kVisible;
+ bool isVisible = isVisibleForWrite();
readMetadata();
if (mFsType == "vfat" && vfat::IsSupported()) {
diff --git a/model/VolumeBase.h b/model/VolumeBase.h
index 689750d..f29df65 100644
--- a/model/VolumeBase.h
+++ b/model/VolumeBase.h
@@ -63,8 +63,14 @@
enum MountFlags {
/* Flag that volume is primary external storage */
kPrimary = 1 << 0,
- /* Flag that volume is visible to normal apps */
- kVisible = 1 << 1,
+ /*
+ * Flags indicating that volume is visible to normal apps.
+ * kVisibleForRead and kVisibleForWrite correspond to
+ * VolumeInfo.MOUNT_FLAG_VISIBLE_FOR_READ and
+ * VolumeInfo.MOUNT_FLAG_VISIBLE_FOR_WRITE, respectively.
+ */
+ kVisibleForRead = 1 << 1,
+ kVisibleForWrite = 1 << 2,
};
enum class State {
@@ -103,6 +109,9 @@
std::shared_ptr<VolumeBase> findVolume(const std::string& id);
bool isEmulated() { return mType == Type::kEmulated; }
+ bool isVisibleForRead() const { return (mMountFlags & MountFlags::kVisibleForRead) != 0; }
+ bool isVisibleForWrite() const { return (mMountFlags & MountFlags::kVisibleForWrite) != 0; }
+ bool isVisible() const { return isVisibleForRead() || isVisibleForWrite(); }
status_t create();
status_t destroy();
diff --git a/tests/Android.bp b/tests/Android.bp
index cad96fd..3c4f07b 100644
--- a/tests/Android.bp
+++ b/tests/Android.bp
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@
srcs: [
"Utils_test.cpp",
"VoldNativeServiceValidation_test.cpp",
- "cryptfs_test.cpp",
],
static_libs: ["libvold"],
shared_libs: ["libbinder"]
diff --git a/tests/cryptfs_test.cpp b/tests/cryptfs_test.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index 2093768..0000000
--- a/tests/cryptfs_test.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2017 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include <gtest/gtest.h>
-
-#include "../cryptfs.h"
-
-namespace android {
-
-class CryptfsTest : public testing::Test {
- protected:
- virtual void SetUp() {}
-
- virtual void TearDown() {}
-};
-
-TEST_F(CryptfsTest, MatchMultiEntryTest) {
- ASSERT_NE(0, match_multi_entry("foo", "foo", 0));
- ASSERT_NE(0, match_multi_entry("foo_0", "foo", 0));
- ASSERT_NE(0, match_multi_entry("foo_1", "foo", 0));
- ASSERT_NE(0, match_multi_entry("foo_2", "foo", 0));
-
- ASSERT_EQ(0, match_multi_entry("foo", "foo", 1));
- ASSERT_EQ(0, match_multi_entry("foo_0", "foo", 1));
- ASSERT_NE(0, match_multi_entry("foo_1", "foo", 1));
- ASSERT_NE(0, match_multi_entry("foo_2", "foo", 1));
-
- ASSERT_EQ(0, match_multi_entry("foo", "foo", 2));
- ASSERT_EQ(0, match_multi_entry("foo_0", "foo", 2));
- ASSERT_EQ(0, match_multi_entry("foo_1", "foo", 2));
- ASSERT_NE(0, match_multi_entry("foo_2", "foo", 2));
-
- ASSERT_EQ(0, match_multi_entry("food", "foo", 0));
- ASSERT_EQ(0, match_multi_entry("foo", "food", 0));
- ASSERT_EQ(0, match_multi_entry("foo", "bar", 0));
- ASSERT_EQ(0, match_multi_entry("foo_2", "bar", 0));
-}
-
-} // namespace android
diff --git a/vdc.rc b/vdc.rc
deleted file mode 100644
index f2a8076..0000000
--- a/vdc.rc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-# One shot invocation to deal with encrypted volume.
-on defaultcrypto
- exec - root -- /system/bin/vdc --wait cryptfs mountdefaultencrypted
- # vold will set vold.decrypt to trigger_restart_framework (default
- # encryption) or trigger_restart_min_framework (other encryption)
-
-# One shot invocation to encrypt unencrypted volumes
-on encrypt
- start surfaceflinger
- exec - root -- /system/bin/vdc --wait cryptfs enablecrypto
- # vold will set vold.decrypt to trigger_restart_framework (default
- # encryption)
diff --git a/vold.rc b/vold.rc
index a21d1d9..9474a1e 100644
--- a/vold.rc
+++ b/vold.rc
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
--fsck_context=u:r:fsck:s0 --fsck_untrusted_context=u:r:fsck_untrusted:s0
class core
ioprio be 2
- writepid /dev/cpuset/foreground/tasks
+ task_profiles ProcessCapacityHigh
shutdown critical
group root reserved_disk
reboot_on_failure reboot,vold-failed
diff --git a/vold_prepare_subdirs.cpp b/vold_prepare_subdirs.cpp
index e2afb81..0d58e4d 100644
--- a/vold_prepare_subdirs.cpp
+++ b/vold_prepare_subdirs.cpp
@@ -208,10 +208,23 @@
if (!prepare_dir(sehandle, 0700, 0, 0, misc_ce_path + "/vold")) return false;
if (!prepare_dir(sehandle, 0700, 0, 0, misc_ce_path + "/storaged")) return false;
if (!prepare_dir(sehandle, 0700, 0, 0, misc_ce_path + "/rollback")) return false;
-
// TODO: Return false if this returns false once sure this should succeed.
prepare_dir(sehandle, 0700, 0, 0, misc_ce_path + "/apexrollback");
prepare_apex_subdirs(sehandle, misc_ce_path);
+ // Give gmscore (who runs in cache group) access to the checkin directory. Also provide
+ // the user id to set the correct selinux mls_level.
+ if (!prepare_dir_for_user(sehandle, 0770, AID_SYSTEM, AID_CACHE,
+ misc_ce_path + "/checkin", user_id)) {
+ // TODO(b/203742483) the checkin directory was created with the wrong permission &
+ // context. Delete the directory to get these devices out of the bad state. Revert
+ // the change once the droidfood population is on newer build.
+ LOG(INFO) << "Failed to prepare the checkin directory, deleting for recreation";
+ android::vold::DeleteDirContentsAndDir(misc_ce_path + "/checkin");
+ if (!prepare_dir_for_user(sehandle, 0770, AID_SYSTEM, AID_CACHE,
+ misc_ce_path + "/checkin", user_id)) {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
auto system_ce_path = android::vold::BuildDataSystemCePath(user_id);
if (!prepare_dir(sehandle, 0700, AID_SYSTEM, AID_SYSTEM, system_ce_path + "/backup")) {
diff --git a/wait_for_keymaster.cpp b/wait_for_keymaster.cpp
deleted file mode 100644
index bf26518..0000000
--- a/wait_for_keymaster.cpp
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (C) 2018 The Android Open Source Project
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
- * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
- * You may obtain a copy of the License at
- *
- * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
- *
- * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
- * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
- * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
- * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
- * limitations under the License.
- */
-
-#include <android-base/logging.h>
-
-#include "Keymaster.h"
-
-int main(int argc, char** argv) {
- setenv("ANDROID_LOG_TAGS", "*:v", 1);
- if (getppid() == 1) {
- // If init is calling us then it's during boot and we should log to kmsg
- android::base::InitLogging(argv, &android::base::KernelLogger);
- } else {
- android::base::InitLogging(argv, &android::base::StderrLogger);
- }
- LOG(INFO) << "Waiting for Keymaster device";
- android::vold::Keymaster keymaster;
- LOG(INFO) << "Keymaster device ready";
- return 0;
-}
diff --git a/wait_for_keymaster.rc b/wait_for_keymaster.rc
deleted file mode 100644
index 9e83a93..0000000
--- a/wait_for_keymaster.rc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-service wait_for_keymaster /system/bin/wait_for_keymaster
- user root
- group root system
- priority -20
- ioprio rt 0