diff --git a/cryptfs.h b/cryptfs.h
index dc7a8c3..692d7ee 100644
--- a/cryptfs.h
+++ b/cryptfs.h
@@ -51,32 +51,39 @@
 
 /* definitions of flags in the structure below */
 #define CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED 0x1 /* The key for the partition is not encrypted. */
-#define CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS 0x2 /* Encryption partially completed,
-                                            encrypted_upto valid*/
-#define CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE 0x4 /* Set when starting encryption, clear when
-                                        exit cleanly, either through success or
-                                        correctly marked partial encryption */
-#define CRYPT_DATA_CORRUPT 0x8 /* Set when encryption is fine, but the
-                                  underlying volume is corrupt */
-#define CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION 0x10 /* Set when it is time to encrypt this
-                                       volume on boot. Everything in this
-                                       structure is set up correctly as
-                                       though device is encrypted except
-                                       that the master key is encrypted with the
-                                       default password. */
-#define CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE 0x20 /* Set when the above encryption cycle is
-                                     complete. On next cryptkeeper entry, match
-                                     the password. If it matches fix the master
-                                     key and remove this flag. */
+#define CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS       \
+    0x2 /* Encryption partially completed, \
+           encrypted_upto valid*/
+#define CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE                    \
+    0x4 /* Set when starting encryption, clear when \
+           exit cleanly, either through success or  \
+           correctly marked partial encryption */
+#define CRYPT_DATA_CORRUPT                      \
+    0x8 /* Set when encryption is fine, but the \
+           underlying volume is corrupt */
+#define CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION                        \
+    0x10 /* Set when it is time to encrypt this       \
+            volume on boot. Everything in this        \
+            structure is set up correctly as          \
+            though device is encrypted except         \
+            that the master key is encrypted with the \
+            default password. */
+#define CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE                           \
+    0x20 /* Set when the above encryption cycle is     \
+            complete. On next cryptkeeper entry, match \
+            the password. If it matches fix the master \
+            key and remove this flag. */
 
 /* Allowed values for type in the structure below */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_PASSWORD 0 /* master_key is encrypted with a password
-                               * Must be zero to be compatible with pre-L
-                               * devices where type is always password.*/
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT  1 /* master_key is encrypted with default
-                               * password */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_PATTERN  2 /* master_key is encrypted with a pattern */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_PIN      3 /* master_key is encrypted with a pin */
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_PASSWORD                       \
+    0 /* master_key is encrypted with a password  \
+       * Must be zero to be compatible with pre-L \
+       * devices where type is always password.*/
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT                                           \
+    1                        /* master_key is encrypted with default \
+                              * password */
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_PATTERN 2 /* master_key is encrypted with a pattern */
+#define CRYPT_TYPE_PIN 3     /* master_key is encrypted with a pin */
 #define CRYPT_TYPE_MAX_TYPE 3 /* type cannot be larger than this value */
 
 #define CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC 0xD0B5B1C4
@@ -92,78 +99,78 @@
 #define KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE 2048
 
 /* __le32 and __le16 defined in system/extras/ext4_utils/ext4_utils.h */
-#define __le8  unsigned char
+#define __le8 unsigned char
 
 #if !defined(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
 #define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32
 #endif
 
 struct crypt_mnt_ftr {
-  __le32 magic;         /* See above */
-  __le16 major_version;
-  __le16 minor_version;
-  __le32 ftr_size;      /* in bytes, not including key following */
-  __le32 flags;         /* See above */
-  __le32 keysize;       /* in bytes */
-  __le32 crypt_type;    /* how master_key is encrypted. Must be a
-                         * CRYPT_TYPE_XXX value */
-  __le64 fs_size;       /* Size of the encrypted fs, in 512 byte sectors */
-  __le32 failed_decrypt_count; /* count of # of failed attempts to decrypt and
-                                  mount, set to 0 on successful mount */
-  unsigned char crypto_type_name[MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN]; /* The type of encryption
-                                                               needed to decrypt this
-                                                               partition, null terminated */
-  __le32 spare2;        /* ignored */
-  unsigned char master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN]; /* The encrypted key for decrypting the filesystem */
-  unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN];   /* The salt used for this encryption */
-  __le64 persist_data_offset[2];  /* Absolute offset to both copies of crypt_persist_data
-                                   * on device with that info, either the footer of the
-                                   * real_blkdevice or the metadata partition. */
+    __le32 magic; /* See above */
+    __le16 major_version;
+    __le16 minor_version;
+    __le32 ftr_size;             /* in bytes, not including key following */
+    __le32 flags;                /* See above */
+    __le32 keysize;              /* in bytes */
+    __le32 crypt_type;           /* how master_key is encrypted. Must be a
+                                  * CRYPT_TYPE_XXX value */
+    __le64 fs_size;              /* Size of the encrypted fs, in 512 byte sectors */
+    __le32 failed_decrypt_count; /* count of # of failed attempts to decrypt and
+                                    mount, set to 0 on successful mount */
+    unsigned char crypto_type_name[MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN]; /* The type of encryption
+                                                                 needed to decrypt this
+                                                                 partition, null terminated */
+    __le32 spare2;                                            /* ignored */
+    unsigned char master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN]; /* The encrypted key for decrypting the filesystem */
+    unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN];          /* The salt used for this encryption */
+    __le64 persist_data_offset[2];         /* Absolute offset to both copies of crypt_persist_data
+                                            * on device with that info, either the footer of the
+                                            * real_blkdevice or the metadata partition. */
 
-  __le32 persist_data_size;       /* The number of bytes allocated to each copy of the
-                                   * persistent data table*/
+    __le32 persist_data_size; /* The number of bytes allocated to each copy of the
+                               * persistent data table*/
 
-  __le8  kdf_type; /* The key derivation function used. */
+    __le8 kdf_type; /* The key derivation function used. */
 
-  /* scrypt parameters. See www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf */
-  __le8  N_factor; /* (1 << N) */
-  __le8  r_factor; /* (1 << r) */
-  __le8  p_factor; /* (1 << p) */
-  __le64 encrypted_upto; /* If we are in state CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS and
-                            we have to stop (e.g. power low) this is the last
-                            encrypted 512 byte sector.*/
-  __le8  hash_first_block[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* When CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS
-                                                    set, hash of first block, used
-                                                    to validate before continuing*/
+    /* scrypt parameters. See www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf */
+    __le8 N_factor;        /* (1 << N) */
+    __le8 r_factor;        /* (1 << r) */
+    __le8 p_factor;        /* (1 << p) */
+    __le64 encrypted_upto; /* If we are in state CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS and
+                              we have to stop (e.g. power low) this is the last
+                              encrypted 512 byte sector.*/
+    __le8 hash_first_block[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* When CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS
+                                                     set, hash of first block, used
+                                                     to validate before continuing*/
 
-  /* key_master key, used to sign the derived key which is then used to generate
-   * the intermediate key
-   * This key should be used for no other purposes! We use this key to sign unpadded 
-   * data, which is acceptable but only if the key is not reused elsewhere. */
-  __le8 keymaster_blob[KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE];
-  __le32 keymaster_blob_size;
+    /* key_master key, used to sign the derived key which is then used to generate
+     * the intermediate key
+     * This key should be used for no other purposes! We use this key to sign unpadded
+     * data, which is acceptable but only if the key is not reused elsewhere. */
+    __le8 keymaster_blob[KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE];
+    __le32 keymaster_blob_size;
 
-  /* Store scrypt of salted intermediate key. When decryption fails, we can
-     check if this matches, and if it does, we know that the problem is with the
-     drive, and there is no point in asking the user for more passwords.
+    /* Store scrypt of salted intermediate key. When decryption fails, we can
+       check if this matches, and if it does, we know that the problem is with the
+       drive, and there is no point in asking the user for more passwords.
 
-     Note that if any part of this structure is corrupt, this will not match and
-     we will continue to believe the user entered the wrong password. In that
-     case the only solution is for the user to enter a password enough times to
-     force a wipe.
+       Note that if any part of this structure is corrupt, this will not match and
+       we will continue to believe the user entered the wrong password. In that
+       case the only solution is for the user to enter a password enough times to
+       force a wipe.
 
-     Note also that there is no need to worry about migration. If this data is
-     wrong, we simply won't recognise a right password, and will continue to
-     prompt. On the first password change, this value will be populated and
-     then we will be OK.
-   */
-  unsigned char scrypted_intermediate_key[SCRYPT_LEN];
+       Note also that there is no need to worry about migration. If this data is
+       wrong, we simply won't recognise a right password, and will continue to
+       prompt. On the first password change, this value will be populated and
+       then we will be OK.
+     */
+    unsigned char scrypted_intermediate_key[SCRYPT_LEN];
 
-  /* sha of this structure with this element set to zero
-     Used when encrypting on reboot to validate structure before doing something
-     fatal
-   */
-  unsigned char sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+    /* sha of this structure with this element set to zero
+       Used when encrypting on reboot to validate structure before doing something
+       fatal
+     */
+    unsigned char sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 };
 
 /* Persistant data that should be available before decryption.
@@ -180,49 +187,49 @@
  * and higher crypt_mnt_ftr structures.
  */
 struct crypt_persist_entry {
-  char key[PROPERTY_KEY_MAX];
-  char val[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
+    char key[PROPERTY_KEY_MAX];
+    char val[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
 };
 
 /* Should be exactly 4K in size */
 struct crypt_persist_data {
-  __le32 persist_magic;
-  __le32 persist_valid_entries;
-  __le32 persist_spare[30];
-  struct crypt_persist_entry persist_entry[0];
+    __le32 persist_magic;
+    __le32 persist_valid_entries;
+    __le32 persist_spare[30];
+    struct crypt_persist_entry persist_entry[0];
 };
 
 #define DATA_MNT_POINT "/data"
 
 /* Return values for cryptfs_crypto_complete */
-#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED  1
-#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_ENCRYPTED      0
-#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_BAD_METADATA  (-1)
-#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_PARTIAL       (-2)
-#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_INCONSISTENT  (-3)
-#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_CORRUPT       (-4)
+#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED 1
+#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_ENCRYPTED 0
+#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_BAD_METADATA (-1)
+#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_PARTIAL (-2)
+#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_INCONSISTENT (-3)
+#define CRYPTO_COMPLETE_CORRUPT (-4)
 
 /* Return values for cryptfs_enable_inplace*() */
 #define ENABLE_INPLACE_OK 0
 #define ENABLE_INPLACE_ERR_OTHER (-1)
-#define ENABLE_INPLACE_ERR_DEV (-2)  /* crypto_blkdev issue */
+#define ENABLE_INPLACE_ERR_DEV (-2) /* crypto_blkdev issue */
 
 /* Return values for cryptfs_getfield */
-#define CRYPTO_GETFIELD_OK                   0
-#define CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_NO_FIELD      (-1)
-#define CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER         (-2)
+#define CRYPTO_GETFIELD_OK 0
+#define CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_NO_FIELD (-1)
+#define CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER (-2)
 #define CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_BUF_TOO_SMALL (-3)
 
 /* Return values for cryptfs_setfield */
-#define CRYPTO_SETFIELD_OK                    0
-#define CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER          (-1)
+#define CRYPTO_SETFIELD_OK 0
+#define CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER (-1)
 #define CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_FIELD_TOO_LONG (-2)
 #define CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_VALUE_TOO_LONG (-3)
 
 /* Return values for persist_del_key */
-#define PERSIST_DEL_KEY_OK                 0
-#define PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_OTHER       (-1)
-#define PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_NO_FIELD    (-2)
+#define PERSIST_DEL_KEY_OK 0
+#define PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_OTHER (-1)
+#define PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_NO_FIELD (-2)
 
 int match_multi_entry(const char* key, const char* field, unsigned index);
 int wait_and_unmount(const char* mountpoint, bool kill);