diff --git a/cryptfs.cpp b/cryptfs.cpp
index f9d4ed4..ab8f3ec 100644
--- a/cryptfs.cpp
+++ b/cryptfs.cpp
@@ -14,292 +14,40 @@
  * limitations under the License.
  */
 
+//
+// This file contains the implementation of the dm-crypt volume metadata
+// encryption method, which is deprecated.  Devices that launched with Android
+// 11 or higher use a different method instead.  For details, see
+// https://source.android.com/security/encryption/metadata#configuration-on-adoptable-storage
+//
+
 #define LOG_TAG "Cryptfs"
 
 #include "cryptfs.h"
 
-#include "Checkpoint.h"
 #include "CryptoType.h"
-#include "EncryptInplace.h"
-#include "FsCrypt.h"
-#include "Keystore.h"
-#include "Process.h"
-#include "ScryptParameters.h"
 #include "Utils.h"
-#include "VoldUtil.h"
-#include "VolumeManager.h"
 
-#include <android-base/logging.h>
 #include <android-base/parseint.h>
 #include <android-base/properties.h>
-#include <android-base/stringprintf.h>
-#include <android-base/strings.h>
-#include <bootloader_message/bootloader_message.h>
-#include <cutils/android_reboot.h>
 #include <cutils/properties.h>
-#include <ext4_utils/ext4_utils.h>
-#include <f2fs_sparseblock.h>
-#include <fs_mgr.h>
-#include <fscrypt/fscrypt.h>
 #include <libdm/dm.h>
 #include <log/log.h>
-#include <logwrap/logwrap.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-#include <wakelock/wakelock.h>
-
-#include <ctype.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <inttypes.h>
-#include <libgen.h>
-#include <linux/kdev_t.h>
-#include <math.h>
-#include <mntent.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/mount.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/wait.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
 
 #include <chrono>
-#include <thread>
-
-extern "C" {
-#include <crypto_scrypt.h>
-}
 
 using android::base::ParseUint;
-using android::base::StringPrintf;
-using android::fs_mgr::GetEntryForMountPoint;
 using android::vold::CryptoType;
 using android::vold::KeyBuffer;
 using android::vold::KeyGeneration;
-using namespace android::vold;
 using namespace android::dm;
+using namespace android::vold;
 using namespace std::chrono_literals;
 
-/* The current cryptfs version */
-#define CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION 1
-#define CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION 3
-
-#define CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET 0x1000
-#define CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE 0x1000
-
-#define CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE 512
-
-#define MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN 64
-
 #define MAX_KEY_LEN 48
-#define SALT_LEN 16
-#define SCRYPT_LEN 32
-
-/* definitions of flags in the structure below */
-#define CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED 0x1 /* The key for the partition is not encrypted. */
-#define CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS 0x2 /* no longer used */
-#define CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE                    \
-    0x4 /* Set when starting encryption, clear when \
-           exit cleanly, either through success or  \
-           correctly marked partial encryption */
-#define CRYPT_DATA_CORRUPT                      \
-    0x8 /* Set when encryption is fine, but the \
-           underlying volume is corrupt */
-#define CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION                        \
-    0x10 /* Set when it is time to encrypt this       \
-            volume on boot. Everything in this        \
-            structure is set up correctly as          \
-            though device is encrypted except         \
-            that the master key is encrypted with the \
-            default password. */
-#define CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE                           \
-    0x20 /* Set when the above encryption cycle is     \
-            complete. On next cryptkeeper entry, match \
-            the password. If it matches fix the master \
-            key and remove this flag. */
-
-/* Allowed values for type in the structure below */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_PASSWORD                       \
-    0 /* master_key is encrypted with a password  \
-       * Must be zero to be compatible with pre-L \
-       * devices where type is always password.*/
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT                                            \
-    1                         /* master_key is encrypted with default \
-                               * password */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_PATTERN 2  /* master_key is encrypted with a pattern */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_PIN 3      /* master_key is encrypted with a pin */
-#define CRYPT_TYPE_MAX_TYPE 3 /* type cannot be larger than this value */
-
-#define CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC 0xD0B5B1C4
-#define PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC 0xE950CD44
-
-/* Key Derivation Function algorithms */
-#define KDF_PBKDF2 1
-#define KDF_SCRYPT 2
-/* Algorithms 3 & 4 deprecated before shipping outside of google, so removed */
-#define KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER 5
-
-/* Maximum allowed keymaster blob size. */
-#define KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE 2048
-
-/* __le32 and __le16 defined in system/extras/ext4_utils/ext4_utils.h */
-#define __le8 unsigned char
-
-#if !defined(SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH)
-#define SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH 32
-#endif
-
-/* This structure starts 16,384 bytes before the end of a hardware
- * partition that is encrypted, or in a separate partition.  It's location
- * is specified by a property set in init.<device>.rc.
- * The structure allocates 48 bytes for a key, but the real key size is
- * specified in the struct.  Currently, the code is hardcoded to use 128
- * bit keys.
- * The fields after salt are only valid in rev 1.1 and later stuctures.
- * Obviously, the filesystem does not include the last 16 kbytes
- * of the partition if the crypt_mnt_ftr lives at the end of the
- * partition.
- */
-
-struct crypt_mnt_ftr {
-    __le32 magic; /* See above */
-    __le16 major_version;
-    __le16 minor_version;
-    __le32 ftr_size;             /* in bytes, not including key following */
-    __le32 flags;                /* See above */
-    __le32 keysize;              /* in bytes */
-    __le32 crypt_type;           /* how master_key is encrypted. Must be a
-                                  * CRYPT_TYPE_XXX value */
-    __le64 fs_size;              /* Size of the encrypted fs, in 512 byte sectors */
-    __le32 failed_decrypt_count; /* count of # of failed attempts to decrypt and
-                                    mount, set to 0 on successful mount */
-    unsigned char crypto_type_name[MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN]; /* The type of encryption
-                                                                 needed to decrypt this
-                                                                 partition, null terminated */
-    __le32 spare2;                                            /* ignored */
-    unsigned char master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN]; /* The encrypted key for decrypting the filesystem */
-    unsigned char salt[SALT_LEN];          /* The salt used for this encryption */
-    __le64 persist_data_offset[2];         /* Absolute offset to both copies of crypt_persist_data
-                                            * on device with that info, either the footer of the
-                                            * real_blkdevice or the metadata partition. */
-
-    __le32 persist_data_size; /* The number of bytes allocated to each copy of the
-                               * persistent data table*/
-
-    __le8 kdf_type; /* The key derivation function used. */
-
-    /* scrypt parameters. See www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt.pdf */
-    __le8 N_factor;        /* (1 << N) */
-    __le8 r_factor;        /* (1 << r) */
-    __le8 p_factor;        /* (1 << p) */
-    __le64 encrypted_upto; /* no longer used */
-    __le8 hash_first_block[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; /* no longer used */
-
-    /* key_master key, used to sign the derived key which is then used to generate
-     * the intermediate key
-     * This key should be used for no other purposes! We use this key to sign unpadded
-     * data, which is acceptable but only if the key is not reused elsewhere. */
-    __le8 keymaster_blob[KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE];
-    __le32 keymaster_blob_size;
-
-    /* Store scrypt of salted intermediate key. When decryption fails, we can
-       check if this matches, and if it does, we know that the problem is with the
-       drive, and there is no point in asking the user for more passwords.
-
-       Note that if any part of this structure is corrupt, this will not match and
-       we will continue to believe the user entered the wrong password. In that
-       case the only solution is for the user to enter a password enough times to
-       force a wipe.
-
-       Note also that there is no need to worry about migration. If this data is
-       wrong, we simply won't recognise a right password, and will continue to
-       prompt. On the first password change, this value will be populated and
-       then we will be OK.
-     */
-    unsigned char scrypted_intermediate_key[SCRYPT_LEN];
-
-    /* sha of this structure with this element set to zero
-       Used when encrypting on reboot to validate structure before doing something
-       fatal
-     */
-    unsigned char sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-};
-
-/* Persistant data that should be available before decryption.
- * Things like airplane mode, locale and timezone are kept
- * here and can be retrieved by the CryptKeeper UI to properly
- * configure the phone before asking for the password
- * This is only valid if the major and minor version above
- * is set to 1.1 or higher.
- *
- * This is a 4K structure.  There are 2 copies, and the code alternates
- * writing one and then clearing the previous one.  The reading
- * code reads the first valid copy it finds, based on the magic number.
- * The absolute offset to the first of the two copies is kept in rev 1.1
- * and higher crypt_mnt_ftr structures.
- */
-struct crypt_persist_entry {
-    char key[PROPERTY_KEY_MAX];
-    char val[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-};
-
-/* Should be exactly 4K in size */
-struct crypt_persist_data {
-    __le32 persist_magic;
-    __le32 persist_valid_entries;
-    __le32 persist_spare[30];
-    struct crypt_persist_entry persist_entry[0];
-};
-
-typedef int (*kdf_func)(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey,
-                        void* params);
-
-#define UNUSED __attribute__((unused))
-
-#define HASH_COUNT 2000
-
-constexpr size_t INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES = 16;
-constexpr size_t INTERMEDIATE_IV_LEN_BYTES = 16;
-constexpr size_t INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE = (INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES + INTERMEDIATE_IV_LEN_BYTES);
-
-// SCRYPT_LEN is used by struct crypt_mnt_ftr for its intermediate key.
-static_assert(INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE == SCRYPT_LEN, "Mismatch of intermediate key sizes");
-
-#define KEY_IN_FOOTER "footer"
-
-#define DEFAULT_PASSWORD "default_password"
-
-#define CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE "userdata"
-
-#define BREADCRUMB_FILE "/data/misc/vold/convert_fde"
-
-#define EXT4_FS 1
-#define F2FS_FS 2
 
 #define TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES 10
 
-#define RSA_KEY_SIZE 2048
-#define RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES (RSA_KEY_SIZE / 8)
-#define RSA_EXPONENT 0x10001
-#define KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT 1  // Maximum one try per second
-
-#define RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPTS 10
-#define RETRY_MOUNT_DELAY_SECONDS 1
-
-#define CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE (1)
-
-static int put_crypt_ftr_and_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr);
-
-static unsigned char saved_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
-static char* saved_mount_point;
-static int master_key_saved = 0;
-static struct crypt_persist_data* persist_data = NULL;
-
 constexpr CryptoType aes_128_cbc = CryptoType()
                                            .set_config_name("AES-128-CBC")
                                            .set_kernel_name("aes-cbc-essiv:sha256")
@@ -326,805 +74,24 @@
     return KeyGeneration{get_crypto_type().get_keysize(), true, false};
 }
 
-static bool write_string_to_buf(const std::string& towrite, uint8_t* buffer, uint32_t buffer_size,
-                                uint32_t* out_size) {
-    if (!buffer || !out_size) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << "Missing target pointers";
-        return false;
-    }
-    *out_size = towrite.size();
-    if (buffer_size < towrite.size()) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << "Buffer too small " << buffer_size << " < " << towrite.size();
-        return false;
-    }
-    memset(buffer, '\0', buffer_size);
-    std::copy(towrite.begin(), towrite.end(), buffer);
-    return true;
-}
-
-static int keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(uint32_t rsa_key_size, uint64_t rsa_exponent,
-                                                   uint32_t ratelimit, uint8_t* key_buffer,
-                                                   uint32_t key_buffer_size,
-                                                   uint32_t* key_out_size) {
-    if (key_out_size) {
-        *key_out_size = 0;
-    }
-    Keystore dev;
-    if (!dev) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session";
-        return -1;
-    }
-    auto keyParams = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder()
-                             .RsaSigningKey(rsa_key_size, rsa_exponent)
-                             .NoDigestOrPadding()
-                             .Authorization(km::TAG_NO_AUTH_REQUIRED)
-                             .Authorization(km::TAG_MIN_SECONDS_BETWEEN_OPS, ratelimit);
-    std::string key;
-    if (!dev.generateKey(keyParams, &key)) return -1;
-    if (!write_string_to_buf(key, key_buffer, key_buffer_size, key_out_size)) return -1;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/* Create a new keymaster key and store it in this footer */
-static int keymaster_create_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr) {
-    if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size) {
-        SLOGI("Already have key");
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    int rc = keymaster_create_key_for_cryptfs_scrypt(
-        RSA_KEY_SIZE, RSA_EXPONENT, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, ftr->keymaster_blob,
-        KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE, &ftr->keymaster_blob_size);
-    if (rc) {
-        if (ftr->keymaster_blob_size > KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE) {
-            SLOGE("Keymaster key blob too large");
-            ftr->keymaster_blob_size = 0;
-        }
-        SLOGE("Failed to generate keypair");
-        return -1;
-    }
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr, uint32_t ratelimit,
-                                                    const uint8_t* object, const size_t object_size,
-                                                    uint8_t** signature_buffer,
-                                                    size_t* signature_buffer_size) {
-    if (!object || !signature_buffer || !signature_buffer_size) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << __FILE__ << ":" << __LINE__ << ":Invalid argument";
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    Keystore dev;
-    if (!dev) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << "Failed to initiate keymaster session";
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    km::AuthorizationSet outParams;
-    std::string key(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(ftr->keymaster_blob), ftr->keymaster_blob_size);
-    std::string input(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(object), object_size);
-    std::string output;
-    KeystoreOperation op;
-
-    auto paramBuilder = km::AuthorizationSetBuilder().NoDigestOrPadding().Authorization(
-            km::TAG_PURPOSE, km::KeyPurpose::SIGN);
-    while (true) {
-        op = dev.begin(key, paramBuilder, &outParams);
-        if (op.getErrorCode() == km::ErrorCode::KEY_RATE_LIMIT_EXCEEDED) {
-            sleep(ratelimit);
-            continue;
-        } else
-            break;
-    }
-
-    if (!op) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << "Error starting keymaster signature transaction: "
-                   << int32_t(op.getErrorCode());
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (op.getUpgradedBlob()) {
-        write_string_to_buf(*op.getUpgradedBlob(), ftr->keymaster_blob, KEYMASTER_BLOB_SIZE,
-                            &ftr->keymaster_blob_size);
-
-        SLOGD("Upgrading key");
-        if (put_crypt_ftr_and_key(ftr) != 0) {
-            SLOGE("Failed to write upgraded key to disk");
-            return -1;
-        }
-        SLOGD("Key upgraded successfully");
-    }
-
-    if (!op.updateCompletely(input, &output)) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << "Error sending data to keymaster signature transaction: "
-                   << int32_t(op.getErrorCode());
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (!op.finish(&output)) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << "Error finalizing keymaster signature transaction: "
-                   << int32_t(op.getErrorCode());
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    *signature_buffer = reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(malloc(output.size()));
-    if (*signature_buffer == nullptr) {
-        LOG(ERROR) << "Error allocation buffer for keymaster signature";
-        return -1;
-    }
-    *signature_buffer_size = output.size();
-    std::copy(output.data(), output.data() + output.size(), *signature_buffer);
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/* This signs the given object using the keymaster key. */
-static int keymaster_sign_object(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr, const unsigned char* object,
-                                 const size_t object_size, unsigned char** signature,
-                                 size_t* signature_size) {
-    unsigned char to_sign[RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES];
-    size_t to_sign_size = sizeof(to_sign);
-    memset(to_sign, 0, RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES);
-
-    // To sign a message with RSA, the message must satisfy two
-    // constraints:
-    //
-    // 1. The message, when interpreted as a big-endian numeric value, must
-    //    be strictly less than the public modulus of the RSA key.  Note
-    //    that because the most significant bit of the public modulus is
-    //    guaranteed to be 1 (else it's an (n-1)-bit key, not an n-bit
-    //    key), an n-bit message with most significant bit 0 always
-    //    satisfies this requirement.
-    //
-    // 2. The message must have the same length in bits as the public
-    //    modulus of the RSA key.  This requirement isn't mathematically
-    //    necessary, but is necessary to ensure consistency in
-    //    implementations.
-    switch (ftr->kdf_type) {
-        case KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER:
-            // This ensures the most significant byte of the signed message
-            // is zero.  We could have zero-padded to the left instead, but
-            // this approach is slightly more robust against changes in
-            // object size.  However, it's still broken (but not unusably
-            // so) because we really should be using a proper deterministic
-            // RSA padding function, such as PKCS1.
-            memcpy(to_sign + 1, object, std::min((size_t)RSA_KEY_SIZE_BYTES - 1, object_size));
-            SLOGI("Signing safely-padded object");
-            break;
-        default:
-            SLOGE("Unknown KDF type %d", ftr->kdf_type);
-            return -1;
-    }
-    return keymaster_sign_object_for_cryptfs_scrypt(ftr, KEYMASTER_CRYPTFS_RATE_LIMIT, to_sign,
-                                                    to_sign_size, signature, signature_size);
-}
-
-/* Store password when userdata is successfully decrypted and mounted.
- * Cleared by cryptfs_clear_password
- *
- * To avoid a double prompt at boot, we need to store the CryptKeeper
- * password and pass it to KeyGuard, which uses it to unlock KeyStore.
- * Since the entire framework is torn down and rebuilt after encryption,
- * we have to use a daemon or similar to store the password. Since vold
- * is secured against IPC except from system processes, it seems a reasonable
- * place to store this.
- *
- * password should be cleared once it has been used.
- *
- * password is aged out after password_max_age_seconds seconds.
- */
-static char* password = 0;
-static int password_expiry_time = 0;
-static const int password_max_age_seconds = 60;
-
-enum class RebootType { reboot, recovery, shutdown };
-static void cryptfs_reboot(RebootType rt) {
-    switch (rt) {
-        case RebootType::reboot:
-            property_set(ANDROID_RB_PROPERTY, "reboot");
-            break;
-
-        case RebootType::recovery:
-            property_set(ANDROID_RB_PROPERTY, "reboot,recovery");
-            break;
-
-        case RebootType::shutdown:
-            property_set(ANDROID_RB_PROPERTY, "shutdown");
-            break;
-    }
-
-    sleep(20);
-
-    /* Shouldn't get here, reboot should happen before sleep times out */
-    return;
-}
-
-/**
- * Gets the default device scrypt parameters for key derivation time tuning.
- * The parameters should lead to about one second derivation time for the
- * given device.
- */
-static void get_device_scrypt_params(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr) {
-    char paramstr[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-    int Nf, rf, pf;
-
-    property_get(SCRYPT_PROP, paramstr, SCRYPT_DEFAULTS);
-    if (!parse_scrypt_parameters(paramstr, &Nf, &rf, &pf)) {
-        SLOGW("bad scrypt parameters '%s' should be like '12:8:1'; using defaults", paramstr);
-        parse_scrypt_parameters(SCRYPT_DEFAULTS, &Nf, &rf, &pf);
-    }
-    ftr->N_factor = Nf;
-    ftr->r_factor = rf;
-    ftr->p_factor = pf;
-}
-
-static uint64_t get_fs_size(const char* dev) {
-    int fd, block_size;
-    struct ext4_super_block sb;
-    uint64_t len;
-
-    if ((fd = open(dev, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot open device to get filesystem size ");
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (lseek64(fd, 1024, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot seek to superblock");
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    if (read(fd, &sb, sizeof(sb)) != sizeof(sb)) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot read superblock");
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    close(fd);
-
-    if (le32_to_cpu(sb.s_magic) != EXT4_SUPER_MAGIC) {
-        SLOGE("Not a valid ext4 superblock");
-        return 0;
-    }
-    block_size = 1024 << sb.s_log_block_size;
-    /* compute length in bytes */
-    len = (((uint64_t)sb.s_blocks_count_hi << 32) + sb.s_blocks_count_lo) * block_size;
-
-    /* return length in sectors */
-    return len / 512;
-}
-
-static void get_crypt_info(std::string* key_loc, std::string* real_blk_device) {
-    for (const auto& entry : fstab_default) {
-        if (!entry.fs_mgr_flags.vold_managed &&
-            (entry.fs_mgr_flags.crypt || entry.fs_mgr_flags.force_crypt ||
-             entry.fs_mgr_flags.force_fde_or_fbe || entry.fs_mgr_flags.file_encryption)) {
-            if (key_loc != nullptr) {
-                *key_loc = entry.key_loc;
-            }
-            if (real_blk_device != nullptr) {
-                *real_blk_device = entry.blk_device;
-            }
-            return;
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-static int get_crypt_ftr_info(char** metadata_fname, off64_t* off) {
-    static int cached_data = 0;
-    static uint64_t cached_off = 0;
-    static char cached_metadata_fname[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX] = "";
-    char key_loc[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-    char real_blkdev[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-    int rc = -1;
-
-    if (!cached_data) {
-        std::string key_loc;
-        std::string real_blkdev;
-        get_crypt_info(&key_loc, &real_blkdev);
-
-        if (key_loc == KEY_IN_FOOTER) {
-            if (android::vold::GetBlockDevSize(real_blkdev, &cached_off) == android::OK) {
-                /* If it's an encrypted Android partition, the last 16 Kbytes contain the
-                 * encryption info footer and key, and plenty of bytes to spare for future
-                 * growth.
-                 */
-                strlcpy(cached_metadata_fname, real_blkdev.c_str(), sizeof(cached_metadata_fname));
-                cached_off -= CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET;
-                cached_data = 1;
-            } else {
-                SLOGE("Cannot get size of block device %s\n", real_blkdev.c_str());
-            }
-        } else {
-            strlcpy(cached_metadata_fname, key_loc.c_str(), sizeof(cached_metadata_fname));
-            cached_off = 0;
-            cached_data = 1;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (cached_data) {
-        if (metadata_fname) {
-            *metadata_fname = cached_metadata_fname;
-        }
-        if (off) {
-            *off = cached_off;
-        }
-        rc = 0;
-    }
-
-    return rc;
-}
-
-/* Set sha256 checksum in structure */
-static void set_ftr_sha(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
-    SHA256_CTX c;
-    SHA256_Init(&c);
-    memset(crypt_ftr->sha256, 0, sizeof(crypt_ftr->sha256));
-    SHA256_Update(&c, crypt_ftr, sizeof(*crypt_ftr));
-    SHA256_Final(crypt_ftr->sha256, &c);
-}
-
-/* key or salt can be NULL, in which case just skip writing that value.  Useful to
- * update the failed mount count but not change the key.
- */
-static int put_crypt_ftr_and_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
-    int fd;
-    unsigned int cnt;
-    /* starting_off is set to the SEEK_SET offset
-     * where the crypto structure starts
-     */
-    off64_t starting_off;
-    int rc = -1;
-    char* fname = NULL;
-    struct stat statbuf;
-
-    set_ftr_sha(crypt_ftr);
-
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_info(&fname, &starting_off)) {
-        SLOGE("Unable to get crypt_ftr_info\n");
-        return -1;
-    }
-    if (fname[0] != '/') {
-        SLOGE("Unexpected value for crypto key location\n");
-        return -1;
-    }
-    if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CREAT | O_CLOEXEC, 0600)) < 0) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot open footer file %s for put\n", fname);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* Seek to the start of the crypt footer */
-    if (lseek64(fd, starting_off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot seek to real block device footer\n");
-        goto errout;
-    }
-
-    if ((cnt = write(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr))) != sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr)) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot write real block device footer\n");
-        goto errout;
-    }
-
-    fstat(fd, &statbuf);
-    /* If the keys are kept on a raw block device, do not try to truncate it. */
-    if (S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode)) {
-        if (ftruncate(fd, 0x4000)) {
-            SLOGE("Cannot set footer file size\n");
-            goto errout;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* Success! */
-    rc = 0;
-
-errout:
-    close(fd);
-    return rc;
-}
-
-static bool check_ftr_sha(const struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr copy;
-    memcpy(&copy, crypt_ftr, sizeof(copy));
-    set_ftr_sha(&copy);
-    return memcmp(copy.sha256, crypt_ftr->sha256, sizeof(copy.sha256)) == 0;
-}
-
-static inline int unix_read(int fd, void* buff, int len) {
-    return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, buff, len));
-}
-
-static inline int unix_write(int fd, const void* buff, int len) {
-    return TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(write(fd, buff, len));
-}
-
-static void init_empty_persist_data(struct crypt_persist_data* pdata, int len) {
-    memset(pdata, 0, len);
-    pdata->persist_magic = PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC;
-    pdata->persist_valid_entries = 0;
-}
-
-/* A routine to update the passed in crypt_ftr to the lastest version.
- * fd is open read/write on the device that holds the crypto footer and persistent
- * data, crypt_ftr is a pointer to the struct to be updated, and offset is the
- * absolute offset to the start of the crypt_mnt_ftr on the passed in fd.
- */
-static void upgrade_crypt_ftr(int fd, struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, off64_t offset) {
-    int orig_major = crypt_ftr->major_version;
-    int orig_minor = crypt_ftr->minor_version;
-
-    if ((crypt_ftr->major_version == 1) && (crypt_ftr->minor_version == 0)) {
-        struct crypt_persist_data* pdata;
-        off64_t pdata_offset = offset + CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET;
-
-        SLOGW("upgrading crypto footer to 1.1");
-
-        pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
-        if (pdata == NULL) {
-            SLOGE("Cannot allocate persisent data\n");
-            return;
-        }
-        memset(pdata, 0, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
-
-        /* Need to initialize the persistent data area */
-        if (lseek64(fd, pdata_offset, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
-            SLOGE("Cannot seek to persisent data offset\n");
-            free(pdata);
-            return;
-        }
-        /* Write all zeros to the first copy, making it invalid */
-        unix_write(fd, pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
-
-        /* Write a valid but empty structure to the second copy */
-        init_empty_persist_data(pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
-        unix_write(fd, pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
-
-        /* Update the footer */
-        crypt_ftr->persist_data_size = CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE;
-        crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[0] = pdata_offset;
-        crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[1] = pdata_offset + CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE;
-        crypt_ftr->minor_version = 1;
-        free(pdata);
-    }
-
-    if ((crypt_ftr->major_version == 1) && (crypt_ftr->minor_version == 1)) {
-        SLOGW("upgrading crypto footer to 1.2");
-        /* But keep the old kdf_type.
-         * It will get updated later to KDF_SCRYPT after the password has been verified.
-         */
-        crypt_ftr->kdf_type = KDF_PBKDF2;
-        get_device_scrypt_params(crypt_ftr);
-        crypt_ftr->minor_version = 2;
-    }
-
-    if ((crypt_ftr->major_version == 1) && (crypt_ftr->minor_version == 2)) {
-        SLOGW("upgrading crypto footer to 1.3");
-        crypt_ftr->crypt_type = CRYPT_TYPE_PASSWORD;
-        crypt_ftr->minor_version = 3;
-    }
-
-    if ((orig_major != crypt_ftr->major_version) || (orig_minor != crypt_ftr->minor_version)) {
-        if (lseek64(fd, offset, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
-            SLOGE("Cannot seek to crypt footer\n");
-            return;
-        }
-        unix_write(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr));
-    }
-}
-
-static int get_crypt_ftr_and_key(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
-    int fd;
-    unsigned int cnt;
-    off64_t starting_off;
-    int rc = -1;
-    char* fname = NULL;
-    struct stat statbuf;
-
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_info(&fname, &starting_off)) {
-        SLOGE("Unable to get crypt_ftr_info\n");
-        return -1;
-    }
-    if (fname[0] != '/') {
-        SLOGE("Unexpected value for crypto key location\n");
-        return -1;
-    }
-    if ((fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC)) < 0) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot open footer file %s for get\n", fname);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* Make sure it's 16 Kbytes in length */
-    fstat(fd, &statbuf);
-    if (S_ISREG(statbuf.st_mode) && (statbuf.st_size != 0x4000)) {
-        SLOGE("footer file %s is not the expected size!\n", fname);
-        goto errout;
-    }
-
-    /* Seek to the start of the crypt footer */
-    if (lseek64(fd, starting_off, SEEK_SET) == -1) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot seek to real block device footer\n");
-        goto errout;
-    }
-
-    if ((cnt = read(fd, crypt_ftr, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr))) != sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr)) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot read real block device footer\n");
-        goto errout;
-    }
-
-    if (crypt_ftr->magic != CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC) {
-        SLOGE("Bad magic for real block device %s\n", fname);
-        goto errout;
-    }
-
-    if (crypt_ftr->major_version != CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot understand major version %d real block device footer; expected %d\n",
-              crypt_ftr->major_version, CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION);
-        goto errout;
-    }
-
-    // We risk buffer overflows with oversized keys, so we just reject them.
-    // 0-sized keys are problematic (essentially by-passing encryption), and
-    // AES-CBC key wrapping only works for multiples of 16 bytes.
-    if ((crypt_ftr->keysize == 0) || ((crypt_ftr->keysize % 16) != 0) ||
-        (crypt_ftr->keysize > MAX_KEY_LEN)) {
-        SLOGE(
-            "Invalid keysize (%u) for block device %s; Must be non-zero, "
-            "divisible by 16, and <= %d\n",
-            crypt_ftr->keysize, fname, MAX_KEY_LEN);
-        goto errout;
-    }
-
-    if (crypt_ftr->minor_version > CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION) {
-        SLOGW("Warning: crypto footer minor version %d, expected <= %d, continuing...\n",
-              crypt_ftr->minor_version, CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION);
-    }
-
-    /* If this is a verion 1.0 crypt_ftr, make it a 1.1 crypt footer, and update the
-     * copy on disk before returning.
-     */
-    if (crypt_ftr->minor_version < CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION) {
-        upgrade_crypt_ftr(fd, crypt_ftr, starting_off);
-    }
-
-    /* Success! */
-    rc = 0;
-
-errout:
-    close(fd);
-    return rc;
-}
-
-static int validate_persistent_data_storage(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
-    if (crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[0] + crypt_ftr->persist_data_size >
-        crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[1]) {
-        SLOGE("Crypt_ftr persist data regions overlap");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[0] >= crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[1]) {
-        SLOGE("Crypt_ftr persist data region 0 starts after region 1");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (((crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[1] + crypt_ftr->persist_data_size) -
-         (crypt_ftr->persist_data_offset[0] - CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET)) >
-        CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET) {
-        SLOGE("Persistent data extends past crypto footer");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int load_persistent_data(void) {
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
-    struct crypt_persist_data* pdata = NULL;
-    char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-    char* fname;
-    int found = 0;
-    int fd;
-    int ret;
-    int i;
-
-    if (persist_data) {
-        /* Nothing to do, we've already loaded or initialized it */
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* If not encrypted, just allocate an empty table and initialize it */
-    property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
-    if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
-        pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
-        if (pdata) {
-            init_empty_persist_data(pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
-            persist_data = pdata;
-            return 0;
-        }
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if ((crypt_ftr.major_version < 1) ||
-        (crypt_ftr.major_version == 1 && crypt_ftr.minor_version < 1)) {
-        SLOGE("Crypt_ftr version doesn't support persistent data");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_info(&fname, NULL)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    ret = validate_persistent_data_storage(&crypt_ftr);
-    if (ret) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    fd = open(fname, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
-    if (fd < 0) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot open %s metadata file", fname);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
-    if (pdata == NULL) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot allocate memory for persistent data");
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
-        if (lseek64(fd, crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[i], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
-            SLOGE("Cannot seek to read persistent data on %s", fname);
-            goto err2;
-        }
-        if (unix_read(fd, pdata, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) < 0) {
-            SLOGE("Error reading persistent data on iteration %d", i);
-            goto err2;
-        }
-        if (pdata->persist_magic == PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC) {
-            found = 1;
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (!found) {
-        SLOGI("Could not find valid persistent data, creating");
-        init_empty_persist_data(pdata, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
-    }
-
-    /* Success */
-    persist_data = pdata;
-    close(fd);
-    return 0;
-
-err2:
-    free(pdata);
-
-err:
-    close(fd);
-    return -1;
-}
-
-static int save_persistent_data(void) {
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
-    struct crypt_persist_data* pdata;
-    char* fname;
-    off64_t write_offset;
-    off64_t erase_offset;
-    int fd;
-    int ret;
-
-    if (persist_data == NULL) {
-        SLOGE("No persistent data to save");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if ((crypt_ftr.major_version < 1) ||
-        (crypt_ftr.major_version == 1 && crypt_ftr.minor_version < 1)) {
-        SLOGE("Crypt_ftr version doesn't support persistent data");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    ret = validate_persistent_data_storage(&crypt_ftr);
-    if (ret) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_info(&fname, NULL)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    fd = open(fname, O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC);
-    if (fd < 0) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot open %s metadata file", fname);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
-    if (pdata == NULL) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot allocate persistant data");
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (lseek64(fd, crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[0], SEEK_SET) < 0) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot seek to read persistent data on %s", fname);
-        goto err2;
-    }
-
-    if (unix_read(fd, pdata, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) < 0) {
-        SLOGE("Error reading persistent data before save");
-        goto err2;
-    }
-
-    if (pdata->persist_magic == PERSIST_DATA_MAGIC) {
-        /* The first copy is the curent valid copy, so write to
-         * the second copy and erase this one */
-        write_offset = crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[1];
-        erase_offset = crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[0];
-    } else {
-        /* The second copy must be the valid copy, so write to
-         * the first copy, and erase the second */
-        write_offset = crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[0];
-        erase_offset = crypt_ftr.persist_data_offset[1];
-    }
-
-    /* Write the new copy first, if successful, then erase the old copy */
-    if (lseek64(fd, write_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot seek to write persistent data");
-        goto err2;
-    }
-    if (unix_write(fd, persist_data, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) ==
-        (int)crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) {
-        if (lseek64(fd, erase_offset, SEEK_SET) < 0) {
-            SLOGE("Cannot seek to erase previous persistent data");
-            goto err2;
-        }
-        fsync(fd);
-        memset(pdata, 0, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size);
-        if (unix_write(fd, pdata, crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) != (int)crypt_ftr.persist_data_size) {
-            SLOGE("Cannot write to erase previous persistent data");
-            goto err2;
-        }
-        fsync(fd);
-    } else {
-        SLOGE("Cannot write to save persistent data");
-        goto err2;
-    }
-
-    /* Success */
-    free(pdata);
-    close(fd);
-    return 0;
-
-err2:
-    free(pdata);
-err:
-    close(fd);
-    return -1;
-}
-
 /* Convert a binary key of specified length into an ascii hex string equivalent,
  * without the leading 0x and with null termination
  */
-static void convert_key_to_hex_ascii(const unsigned char* master_key, unsigned int keysize,
-                                     char* master_key_ascii) {
+static void convert_key_to_hex_ascii(const KeyBuffer& key, char* key_ascii) {
     unsigned int i, a;
     unsigned char nibble;
 
-    for (i = 0, a = 0; i < keysize; i++, a += 2) {
+    for (i = 0, a = 0; i < key.size(); i++, a += 2) {
         /* For each byte, write out two ascii hex digits */
-        nibble = (master_key[i] >> 4) & 0xf;
-        master_key_ascii[a] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
+        nibble = (key[i] >> 4) & 0xf;
+        key_ascii[a] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
 
-        nibble = master_key[i] & 0xf;
-        master_key_ascii[a + 1] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
+        nibble = key[i] & 0xf;
+        key_ascii[a + 1] = nibble + (nibble > 9 ? 0x37 : 0x30);
     }
 
     /* Add the null termination */
-    master_key_ascii[a] = '\0';
+    key_ascii[a] = '\0';
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1132,7 +99,7 @@
  * parameters to make dm-crypt use the specified crypto sector size and round
  * the crypto device size down to a crypto sector boundary.
  */
-static int add_sector_size_param(DmTargetCrypt* target, struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr) {
+static int add_sector_size_param(DmTargetCrypt* target, uint64_t* nr_sec) {
     constexpr char DM_CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE[] = "ro.crypto.fde_sector_size";
     char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
 
@@ -1153,806 +120,11 @@
         target->SetIvLargeSectors();
 
         // Round the crypto device size down to a crypto sector boundary.
-        ftr->fs_size &= ~((sector_size / 512) - 1);
+        *nr_sec &= ~((sector_size / 512) - 1);
     }
     return 0;
 }
 
-static int create_crypto_blk_dev(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, const unsigned char* master_key,
-                                 const char* real_blk_name, std::string* crypto_blk_name,
-                                 const char* name, uint32_t flags) {
-    auto& dm = DeviceMapper::Instance();
-
-    // We need two ASCII characters to represent each byte, and need space for
-    // the '\0' terminator.
-    char master_key_ascii[MAX_KEY_LEN * 2 + 1];
-    convert_key_to_hex_ascii(master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize, master_key_ascii);
-
-    auto target = std::make_unique<DmTargetCrypt>(0, crypt_ftr->fs_size,
-                                                  (const char*)crypt_ftr->crypto_type_name,
-                                                  master_key_ascii, 0, real_blk_name, 0);
-    target->AllowDiscards();
-
-    if (flags & CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE) {
-        target->AllowEncryptOverride();
-    }
-    if (add_sector_size_param(target.get(), crypt_ftr)) {
-        SLOGE("Error processing dm-crypt sector size param\n");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    DmTable table;
-    table.AddTarget(std::move(target));
-
-    int load_count = 1;
-    while (load_count < TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
-        if (dm.CreateDevice(name, table)) {
-            break;
-        }
-        load_count++;
-    }
-
-    if (load_count >= TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot load dm-crypt mapping table.\n");
-        return -1;
-    }
-    if (load_count > 1) {
-        SLOGI("Took %d tries to load dmcrypt table.\n", load_count);
-    }
-
-    if (!dm.GetDmDevicePathByName(name, crypto_blk_name)) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot determine dm-crypt path for %s.\n", name);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* Ensure the dm device has been created before returning. */
-    if (android::vold::WaitForFile(crypto_blk_name->c_str(), 1s) < 0) {
-        // WaitForFile generates a suitable log message
-        return -1;
-    }
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int delete_crypto_blk_dev(const std::string& name) {
-    bool ret;
-    auto& dm = DeviceMapper::Instance();
-    // TODO(b/149396179) there appears to be a race somewhere in the system where trying
-    // to delete the device fails with EBUSY; for now, work around this by retrying.
-    int tries = 5;
-    while (tries-- > 0) {
-        ret = dm.DeleteDevice(name);
-        if (ret || errno != EBUSY) {
-            break;
-        }
-        SLOGW("DM_DEV Cannot remove dm-crypt device %s: %s, retrying...\n", name.c_str(),
-              strerror(errno));
-        std::this_thread::sleep_for(std::chrono::milliseconds(100));
-    }
-    if (!ret) {
-        SLOGE("DM_DEV Cannot remove dm-crypt device %s: %s\n", name.c_str(), strerror(errno));
-        return -1;
-    }
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int pbkdf2(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey,
-                  void* params UNUSED) {
-    SLOGI("Using pbkdf2 for cryptfs KDF");
-
-    /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
-    return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(passwd, strlen(passwd), salt, SALT_LEN, HASH_COUNT,
-                                  INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE, ikey) != 1;
-}
-
-static int scrypt(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey, void* params) {
-    SLOGI("Using scrypt for cryptfs KDF");
-
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr = (struct crypt_mnt_ftr*)params;
-
-    int N = 1 << ftr->N_factor;
-    int r = 1 << ftr->r_factor;
-    int p = 1 << ftr->p_factor;
-
-    /* Turn the password into a key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
-    crypto_scrypt((const uint8_t*)passwd, strlen(passwd), salt, SALT_LEN, N, r, p, ikey,
-                  INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE);
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int scrypt_keymaster(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt, unsigned char* ikey,
-                            void* params) {
-    SLOGI("Using scrypt with keymaster for cryptfs KDF");
-
-    int rc;
-    size_t signature_size;
-    unsigned char* signature;
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr = (struct crypt_mnt_ftr*)params;
-
-    int N = 1 << ftr->N_factor;
-    int r = 1 << ftr->r_factor;
-    int p = 1 << ftr->p_factor;
-
-    rc = crypto_scrypt((const uint8_t*)passwd, strlen(passwd), salt, SALT_LEN, N, r, p, ikey,
-                       INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE);
-
-    if (rc) {
-        SLOGE("scrypt failed");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (keymaster_sign_object(ftr, ikey, INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE, &signature, &signature_size)) {
-        SLOGE("Signing failed");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    rc = crypto_scrypt(signature, signature_size, salt, SALT_LEN, N, r, p, ikey,
-                       INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE);
-    free(signature);
-
-    if (rc) {
-        SLOGE("scrypt failed");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int encrypt_master_key(const char* passwd, const unsigned char* salt,
-                              const unsigned char* decrypted_master_key,
-                              unsigned char* encrypted_master_key, struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
-    unsigned char ikey[INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE] = {0};
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX e_ctx;
-    int encrypted_len, final_len;
-    int rc = 0;
-
-    /* Turn the password into an intermediate key and IV that can decrypt the master key */
-    get_device_scrypt_params(crypt_ftr);
-
-    switch (crypt_ftr->kdf_type) {
-        case KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER:
-            if (keymaster_create_key(crypt_ftr)) {
-                SLOGE("keymaster_create_key failed");
-                return -1;
-            }
-
-            if (scrypt_keymaster(passwd, salt, ikey, crypt_ftr)) {
-                SLOGE("scrypt failed");
-                return -1;
-            }
-            break;
-
-        case KDF_SCRYPT:
-            if (scrypt(passwd, salt, ikey, crypt_ftr)) {
-                SLOGE("scrypt failed");
-                return -1;
-            }
-            break;
-
-        default:
-            SLOGE("Invalid kdf_type");
-            return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* Initialize the decryption engine */
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&e_ctx);
-    if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&e_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, ikey,
-                            ikey + INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
-        SLOGE("EVP_EncryptInit failed\n");
-        return -1;
-    }
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&e_ctx, 0); /* Turn off padding as our data is block aligned */
-
-    /* Encrypt the master key */
-    if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&e_ctx, encrypted_master_key, &encrypted_len, decrypted_master_key,
-                           crypt_ftr->keysize)) {
-        SLOGE("EVP_EncryptUpdate failed\n");
-        return -1;
-    }
-    if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&e_ctx, encrypted_master_key + encrypted_len, &final_len)) {
-        SLOGE("EVP_EncryptFinal failed\n");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (encrypted_len + final_len != static_cast<int>(crypt_ftr->keysize)) {
-        SLOGE("EVP_Encryption length check failed with %d, %d bytes\n", encrypted_len, final_len);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* Store the scrypt of the intermediate key, so we can validate if it's a
-       password error or mount error when things go wrong.
-       Note there's no need to check for errors, since if this is incorrect, we
-       simply won't wipe userdata, which is the correct default behavior
-    */
-    int N = 1 << crypt_ftr->N_factor;
-    int r = 1 << crypt_ftr->r_factor;
-    int p = 1 << crypt_ftr->p_factor;
-
-    rc = crypto_scrypt(ikey, INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES, crypt_ftr->salt, sizeof(crypt_ftr->salt),
-                       N, r, p, crypt_ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key,
-                       sizeof(crypt_ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key));
-
-    if (rc) {
-        SLOGE("encrypt_master_key: crypto_scrypt failed");
-    }
-
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&e_ctx);
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static int decrypt_master_key_aux(const char* passwd, unsigned char* salt,
-                                  const unsigned char* encrypted_master_key, size_t keysize,
-                                  unsigned char* decrypted_master_key, kdf_func kdf,
-                                  void* kdf_params, unsigned char** intermediate_key,
-                                  size_t* intermediate_key_size) {
-    unsigned char ikey[INTERMEDIATE_BUF_SIZE] = {0};
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX d_ctx;
-    int decrypted_len, final_len;
-
-    /* Turn the password into an intermediate key and IV that can decrypt the
-       master key */
-    if (kdf(passwd, salt, ikey, kdf_params)) {
-        SLOGE("kdf failed");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* Initialize the decryption engine */
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&d_ctx);
-    if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&d_ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, ikey,
-                            ikey + INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&d_ctx, 0); /* Turn off padding as our data is block aligned */
-    /* Decrypt the master key */
-    if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&d_ctx, decrypted_master_key, &decrypted_len, encrypted_master_key,
-                           keysize)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-    if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&d_ctx, decrypted_master_key + decrypted_len, &final_len)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (decrypted_len + final_len != static_cast<int>(keysize)) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* Copy intermediate key if needed by params */
-    if (intermediate_key && intermediate_key_size) {
-        *intermediate_key = (unsigned char*)malloc(INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES);
-        if (*intermediate_key) {
-            memcpy(*intermediate_key, ikey, INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES);
-            *intermediate_key_size = INTERMEDIATE_KEY_LEN_BYTES;
-        }
-    }
-
-    EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&d_ctx);
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static void get_kdf_func(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr, kdf_func* kdf, void** kdf_params) {
-    if (ftr->kdf_type == KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER) {
-        *kdf = scrypt_keymaster;
-        *kdf_params = ftr;
-    } else if (ftr->kdf_type == KDF_SCRYPT) {
-        *kdf = scrypt;
-        *kdf_params = ftr;
-    } else {
-        *kdf = pbkdf2;
-        *kdf_params = NULL;
-    }
-}
-
-static int decrypt_master_key(const char* passwd, unsigned char* decrypted_master_key,
-                              struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, unsigned char** intermediate_key,
-                              size_t* intermediate_key_size) {
-    kdf_func kdf;
-    void* kdf_params;
-    int ret;
-
-    get_kdf_func(crypt_ftr, &kdf, &kdf_params);
-    ret = decrypt_master_key_aux(passwd, crypt_ftr->salt, crypt_ftr->master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize,
-                                 decrypted_master_key, kdf, kdf_params, intermediate_key,
-                                 intermediate_key_size);
-    if (ret != 0) {
-        SLOGW("failure decrypting master key");
-    }
-
-    return ret;
-}
-
-static int create_encrypted_random_key(const char* passwd, unsigned char* master_key,
-                                       unsigned char* salt, struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
-    unsigned char key_buf[MAX_KEY_LEN];
-
-    /* Get some random bits for a key and salt */
-    if (android::vold::ReadRandomBytes(sizeof(key_buf), reinterpret_cast<char*>(key_buf)) != 0) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-    if (android::vold::ReadRandomBytes(SALT_LEN, reinterpret_cast<char*>(salt)) != 0) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* Now encrypt it with the password */
-    return encrypt_master_key(passwd, salt, key_buf, master_key, crypt_ftr);
-}
-
-static void ensure_subdirectory_unmounted(const char *prefix) {
-    std::vector<std::string> umount_points;
-    std::unique_ptr<FILE, int (*)(FILE*)> mnts(setmntent("/proc/mounts", "r"), endmntent);
-    if (!mnts) {
-        SLOGW("could not read mount files");
-        return;
-    }
-
-    //Find sudirectory mount point
-    mntent* mentry;
-    std::string top_directory(prefix);
-    if (!android::base::EndsWith(prefix, "/")) {
-        top_directory = top_directory + "/";
-    }
-    while ((mentry = getmntent(mnts.get())) != nullptr) {
-        if (strcmp(mentry->mnt_dir, top_directory.c_str()) == 0) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        if (android::base::StartsWith(mentry->mnt_dir, top_directory)) {
-            SLOGW("found sub-directory mount %s - %s\n", prefix, mentry->mnt_dir);
-            umount_points.push_back(mentry->mnt_dir);
-        }
-    }
-
-    //Sort by path length to umount longest path first
-    std::sort(std::begin(umount_points), std::end(umount_points),
-        [](const std::string& s1, const std::string& s2) {return s1.length() > s2.length(); });
-
-    for (std::string& mount_point : umount_points) {
-        SLOGW("unmounting sub-directory mount %s\n", mount_point.c_str());
-        if (umount(mount_point.c_str()) != 0) {
-            SLOGE("unmounting %s failed: %s\n", mount_point.c_str(), strerror(errno));
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-static int wait_and_unmount(const char* mountpoint) {
-    int i, err, rc;
-
-#define WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT 20
-
-    /*  Now umount the tmpfs filesystem */
-    for (i = 0; i < WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT; i++) {
-        // Subdirectory mount will cause a failure of umount.
-        ensure_subdirectory_unmounted(mountpoint);
-
-        SLOGD("unmounting mount %s\n", mountpoint);
-        if (umount(mountpoint) == 0) {
-            break;
-        }
-
-        if (errno == EINVAL) {
-            /* EINVAL is returned if the directory is not a mountpoint,
-             * i.e. there is no filesystem mounted there.  So just get out.
-             */
-            SLOGD("%s is not a mountpoint, nothing to do\n", mountpoint);
-            break;
-        }
-
-        err = errno;
-        SLOGW("unmounting mount %s failed: %s\n", mountpoint, strerror(err));
-
-        // If it's taking too long, kill the processes with open files.
-        //
-        // Originally this logic was only a fail-safe, but now it's relied on to
-        // kill certain processes that aren't stopped by init because they
-        // aren't in the main or late_start classes.  So to avoid waiting for
-        // too long, we now are fairly aggressive in starting to kill processes.
-        static_assert(WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT >= 4);
-        if (i == 2) {
-            SLOGW("sending SIGTERM to processes with open files\n");
-            android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(mountpoint, SIGTERM);
-        } else if (i >= 3) {
-            SLOGW("sending SIGKILL to processes with open files\n");
-            android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(mountpoint, SIGKILL);
-        }
-
-        sleep(1);
-    }
-
-    if (i < WAIT_UNMOUNT_COUNT) {
-        SLOGD("unmounting %s succeeded\n", mountpoint);
-        rc = 0;
-    } else {
-        SLOGE("too many retries -- giving up unmounting %s\n", mountpoint);
-        android::vold::KillProcessesWithOpenFiles(mountpoint, 0);
-        rc = -1;
-    }
-
-    return rc;
-}
-
-static void prep_data_fs(void) {
-    // NOTE: post_fs_data results in init calling back around to vold, so all
-    // callers to this method must be async
-
-    /* Do the prep of the /data filesystem */
-    property_set("vold.post_fs_data_done", "0");
-    property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_post_fs_data");
-    SLOGD("Just triggered post_fs_data");
-
-    /* Wait a max of 50 seconds, hopefully it takes much less */
-    while (!android::base::WaitForProperty("vold.post_fs_data_done", "1", std::chrono::seconds(15))) {
-        /* We timed out to prep /data in time.  Continue wait. */
-        SLOGE("waited 15s for vold.post_fs_data_done, still waiting...");
-    }
-    SLOGD("post_fs_data done");
-}
-
-static void cryptfs_set_corrupt() {
-    // Mark the footer as bad
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
-        SLOGE("Failed to get crypto footer - panic");
-        return;
-    }
-
-    crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_DATA_CORRUPT;
-    if (put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
-        SLOGE("Failed to set crypto footer - panic");
-        return;
-    }
-}
-
-static void cryptfs_trigger_restart_min_framework() {
-    if (fs_mgr_do_tmpfs_mount(DATA_MNT_POINT)) {
-        SLOGE("Failed to mount tmpfs on data - panic");
-        return;
-    }
-
-    if (property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_post_fs_data")) {
-        SLOGE("Failed to trigger post fs data - panic");
-        return;
-    }
-
-    if (property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_min_framework")) {
-        SLOGE("Failed to trigger restart min framework - panic");
-        return;
-    }
-}
-
-/* returns < 0 on failure */
-static int cryptfs_restart_internal(int restart_main) {
-    char crypto_blkdev[MAXPATHLEN];
-    int rc = -1;
-    static int restart_successful = 0;
-
-    /* Validate that it's OK to call this routine */
-    if (!master_key_saved) {
-        SLOGE("Encrypted filesystem not validated, aborting");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (restart_successful) {
-        SLOGE("System already restarted with encrypted disk, aborting");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (restart_main) {
-        /* Here is where we shut down the framework.  The init scripts
-         * start all services in one of these classes: core, early_hal, hal,
-         * main and late_start. To get to the minimal UI for PIN entry, we
-         * need to start core, early_hal, hal and main. When we want to
-         * shutdown the framework again, we need to stop most of the services in
-         * these classes, but only those services that were started after
-         * /data was mounted. This excludes critical services like vold and
-         * ueventd, which need to keep running. We could possible stop
-         * even fewer services, but because we want services to pick up APEX
-         * libraries from the real /data, restarting is better, as it makes
-         * these devices consistent with FBE devices and lets them use the
-         * most recent code.
-         *
-         * Once these services have stopped, we should be able
-         * to umount the tmpfs /data, then mount the encrypted /data.
-         * We then restart the class core, hal, main, and also the class
-         * late_start.
-         *
-         * At the moment, I've only put a few things in late_start that I know
-         * are not needed to bring up the framework, and that also cause problems
-         * with unmounting the tmpfs /data, but I hope to add add more services
-         * to the late_start class as we optimize this to decrease the delay
-         * till the user is asked for the password to the filesystem.
-         */
-
-        /* The init files are setup to stop the right set of services when
-         * vold.decrypt is set to trigger_shutdown_framework.
-         */
-        property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_shutdown_framework");
-        SLOGD("Just asked init to shut down class main\n");
-
-        /* Ugh, shutting down the framework is not synchronous, so until it
-         * can be fixed, this horrible hack will wait a moment for it all to
-         * shut down before proceeding.  Without it, some devices cannot
-         * restart the graphics services.
-         */
-        sleep(2);
-    }
-
-    /* Now that the framework is shutdown, we should be able to umount()
-     * the tmpfs filesystem, and mount the real one.
-     */
-
-    property_get("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", crypto_blkdev, "");
-    if (strlen(crypto_blkdev) == 0) {
-        SLOGE("fs_crypto_blkdev not set\n");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (!(rc = wait_and_unmount(DATA_MNT_POINT))) {
-        /* If ro.crypto.readonly is set to 1, mount the decrypted
-         * filesystem readonly.  This is used when /data is mounted by
-         * recovery mode.
-         */
-        char ro_prop[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-        property_get("ro.crypto.readonly", ro_prop, "");
-        if (strlen(ro_prop) > 0 && std::stoi(ro_prop)) {
-            auto entry = GetEntryForMountPoint(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT);
-            if (entry != nullptr) {
-                entry->flags |= MS_RDONLY;
-            }
-        }
-
-        /* If that succeeded, then mount the decrypted filesystem */
-        int retries = RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPTS;
-        int mount_rc;
-
-        /*
-         * fs_mgr_do_mount runs fsck. Use setexeccon to run trusted
-         * partitions in the fsck domain.
-         */
-        if (setexeccon(android::vold::sFsckContext)) {
-            SLOGE("Failed to setexeccon");
-            return -1;
-        }
-        bool needs_cp = android::vold::cp_needsCheckpoint();
-        while ((mount_rc = fs_mgr_do_mount(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT, crypto_blkdev, 0,
-                                           needs_cp, false)) != 0) {
-            if (mount_rc == FS_MGR_DOMNT_BUSY) {
-                /* TODO: invoke something similar to
-                   Process::killProcessWithOpenFiles(DATA_MNT_POINT,
-                                   retries > RETRY_MOUNT_ATTEMPT/2 ? 1 : 2 ) */
-                SLOGI("Failed to mount %s because it is busy - waiting", crypto_blkdev);
-                if (--retries) {
-                    sleep(RETRY_MOUNT_DELAY_SECONDS);
-                } else {
-                    /* Let's hope that a reboot clears away whatever is keeping
-                       the mount busy */
-                    cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::reboot);
-                }
-            } else {
-                SLOGE("Failed to mount decrypted data");
-                cryptfs_set_corrupt();
-                cryptfs_trigger_restart_min_framework();
-                SLOGI("Started framework to offer wipe");
-                if (setexeccon(NULL)) {
-                    SLOGE("Failed to setexeccon");
-                }
-                return -1;
-            }
-        }
-        if (setexeccon(NULL)) {
-            SLOGE("Failed to setexeccon");
-            return -1;
-        }
-
-        /* Create necessary paths on /data */
-        prep_data_fs();
-        property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_load_persist_props");
-
-        /* startup service classes main and late_start */
-        property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_framework");
-        SLOGD("Just triggered restart_framework\n");
-
-        /* Give it a few moments to get started */
-        sleep(1);
-    }
-
-    if (rc == 0) {
-        restart_successful = 1;
-    }
-
-    return rc;
-}
-
-int cryptfs_restart(void) {
-    SLOGI("cryptfs_restart");
-    if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
-        SLOGE("cryptfs_restart not valid for file encryption:");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* Call internal implementation forcing a restart of main service group */
-    return cryptfs_restart_internal(1);
-}
-
-static int do_crypto_complete(const char* mount_point) {
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
-    char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-
-    property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
-    if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
-        SLOGE("not running with encryption, aborting");
-        return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED;
-    }
-
-    // crypto_complete is full disk encrypted status
-    if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
-        return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED;
-    }
-
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
-        std::string key_loc;
-        get_crypt_info(&key_loc, nullptr);
-
-        /*
-         * Only report this error if key_loc is a file and it exists.
-         * If the device was never encrypted, and /data is not mountable for
-         * some reason, returning 1 should prevent the UI from presenting the
-         * a "enter password" screen, or worse, a "press button to wipe the
-         * device" screen.
-         */
-        if (!key_loc.empty() && key_loc[0] == '/' && (access("key_loc", F_OK) == -1)) {
-            SLOGE("master key file does not exist, aborting");
-            return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_NOT_ENCRYPTED;
-        } else {
-            SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
-            return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_BAD_METADATA;
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Test for possible error flags
-    if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_ENCRYPTION_IN_PROGRESS) {
-        SLOGE("Encryption process is partway completed\n");
-        return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_PARTIAL;
-    }
-
-    if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE) {
-        SLOGE("Encryption process was interrupted but cannot continue\n");
-        return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_INCONSISTENT;
-    }
-
-    if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_DATA_CORRUPT) {
-        SLOGE("Encryption is successful but data is corrupt\n");
-        return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_CORRUPT;
-    }
-
-    /* We passed the test! We shall diminish, and return to the west */
-    return CRYPTO_COMPLETE_ENCRYPTED;
-}
-
-static int test_mount_encrypted_fs(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr, const char* passwd,
-                                   const char* mount_point, const char* label) {
-    unsigned char decrypted_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
-    std::string crypto_blkdev;
-    std::string real_blkdev;
-    char tmp_mount_point[64];
-    unsigned int orig_failed_decrypt_count;
-    int rc;
-    int upgrade = 0;
-    unsigned char* intermediate_key = 0;
-    size_t intermediate_key_size = 0;
-    int N = 1 << crypt_ftr->N_factor;
-    int r = 1 << crypt_ftr->r_factor;
-    int p = 1 << crypt_ftr->p_factor;
-
-    SLOGD("crypt_ftr->fs_size = %lld\n", crypt_ftr->fs_size);
-    orig_failed_decrypt_count = crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count;
-
-    if (!(crypt_ftr->flags & CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED)) {
-        if (decrypt_master_key(passwd, decrypted_master_key, crypt_ftr, &intermediate_key,
-                               &intermediate_key_size)) {
-            SLOGE("Failed to decrypt master key\n");
-            rc = -1;
-            goto errout;
-        }
-    }
-
-    get_crypt_info(nullptr, &real_blkdev);
-
-    // Create crypto block device - all (non fatal) code paths
-    // need it
-    if (create_crypto_blk_dev(crypt_ftr, decrypted_master_key, real_blkdev.c_str(), &crypto_blkdev,
-                              label, 0)) {
-        SLOGE("Error creating decrypted block device\n");
-        rc = -1;
-        goto errout;
-    }
-
-    /* Work out if the problem is the password or the data */
-    unsigned char scrypted_intermediate_key[sizeof(crypt_ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key)];
-
-    rc = crypto_scrypt(intermediate_key, intermediate_key_size, crypt_ftr->salt,
-                       sizeof(crypt_ftr->salt), N, r, p, scrypted_intermediate_key,
-                       sizeof(scrypted_intermediate_key));
-
-    // Does the key match the crypto footer?
-    if (rc == 0 && memcmp(scrypted_intermediate_key, crypt_ftr->scrypted_intermediate_key,
-                          sizeof(scrypted_intermediate_key)) == 0) {
-        SLOGI("Password matches");
-        rc = 0;
-    } else {
-        /* Try mounting the file system anyway, just in case the problem's with
-         * the footer, not the key. */
-        snprintf(tmp_mount_point, sizeof(tmp_mount_point), "%s/tmp_mnt", mount_point);
-        mkdir(tmp_mount_point, 0755);
-        if (fs_mgr_do_mount(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT,
-                            const_cast<char*>(crypto_blkdev.c_str()), tmp_mount_point)) {
-            SLOGE("Error temp mounting decrypted block device\n");
-            delete_crypto_blk_dev(label);
-
-            rc = ++crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count;
-            put_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr);
-        } else {
-            /* Success! */
-            SLOGI("Password did not match but decrypted drive mounted - continue");
-            umount(tmp_mount_point);
-            rc = 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (rc == 0) {
-        crypt_ftr->failed_decrypt_count = 0;
-        if (orig_failed_decrypt_count != 0) {
-            put_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr);
-        }
-
-        /* Save the name of the crypto block device
-         * so we can mount it when restarting the framework. */
-        property_set("ro.crypto.fs_crypto_blkdev", crypto_blkdev.c_str());
-
-        /* Also save a the master key so we can reencrypted the key
-         * the key when we want to change the password on it. */
-        memcpy(saved_master_key, decrypted_master_key, crypt_ftr->keysize);
-        saved_mount_point = strdup(mount_point);
-        master_key_saved = 1;
-        SLOGD("%s(): Master key saved\n", __FUNCTION__);
-        rc = 0;
-
-        // Upgrade if we're not using the latest KDF.
-        if (crypt_ftr->kdf_type != KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER) {
-            crypt_ftr->kdf_type = KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER;
-            upgrade = 1;
-        }
-
-        if (upgrade) {
-            rc = encrypt_master_key(passwd, crypt_ftr->salt, saved_master_key,
-                                    crypt_ftr->master_key, crypt_ftr);
-            if (!rc) {
-                rc = put_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr);
-            }
-            SLOGD("Key Derivation Function upgrade: rc=%d\n", rc);
-
-            // Do not fail even if upgrade failed - machine is bootable
-            // Note that if this code is ever hit, there is a *serious* problem
-            // since KDFs should never fail. You *must* fix the kdf before
-            // proceeding!
-            if (rc) {
-                SLOGW(
-                    "Upgrade failed with error %d,"
-                    " but continuing with previous state",
-                    rc);
-                rc = 0;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-errout:
-    if (intermediate_key) {
-        memset(intermediate_key, 0, intermediate_key_size);
-        free(intermediate_key);
-    }
-    return rc;
-}
-
 /*
  * Called by vold when it's asked to mount an encrypted external
  * storage volume. The incoming partition has no crypto header/footer,
@@ -1973,899 +145,54 @@
         return -1;
     }
 
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr ext_crypt_ftr;
-    memset(&ext_crypt_ftr, 0, sizeof(ext_crypt_ftr));
-    ext_crypt_ftr.fs_size = nr_sec;
-    ext_crypt_ftr.keysize = crypto_type.get_keysize();
-    strlcpy((char*)ext_crypt_ftr.crypto_type_name, crypto_type.get_kernel_name(),
-            MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN);
-    uint32_t flags = 0;
+    auto& dm = DeviceMapper::Instance();
+
+    // We need two ASCII characters to represent each byte, and need space for
+    // the '\0' terminator.
+    char key_ascii[MAX_KEY_LEN * 2 + 1];
+    convert_key_to_hex_ascii(key, key_ascii);
+
+    auto target = std::make_unique<DmTargetCrypt>(0, nr_sec, crypto_type.get_kernel_name(),
+                                                  key_ascii, 0, real_blkdev, 0);
+    target->AllowDiscards();
+
     if (fscrypt_is_native() &&
-        android::base::GetBoolProperty("ro.crypto.allow_encrypt_override", false))
-        flags |= CREATE_CRYPTO_BLK_DEV_FLAGS_ALLOW_ENCRYPT_OVERRIDE;
-
-    return create_crypto_blk_dev(&ext_crypt_ftr, reinterpret_cast<const unsigned char*>(key.data()),
-                                 real_blkdev, out_crypto_blkdev, label, flags);
-}
-
-int cryptfs_crypto_complete(void) {
-    return do_crypto_complete("/data");
-}
-
-int check_unmounted_and_get_ftr(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* crypt_ftr) {
-    char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-    property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
-    if (master_key_saved || strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
-        SLOGE(
-            "encrypted fs already validated or not running with encryption,"
-            " aborting");
+        android::base::GetBoolProperty("ro.crypto.allow_encrypt_override", false)) {
+        target->AllowEncryptOverride();
+    }
+    if (add_sector_size_param(target.get(), &nr_sec)) {
+        SLOGE("Error processing dm-crypt sector size param\n");
         return -1;
     }
 
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(crypt_ftr)) {
-        SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key");
+    DmTable table;
+    table.AddTarget(std::move(target));
+
+    int load_count = 1;
+    while (load_count < TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
+        if (dm.CreateDevice(label, table)) {
+            break;
+        }
+        load_count++;
+    }
+
+    if (load_count >= TABLE_LOAD_RETRIES) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot load dm-crypt mapping table.\n");
+        return -1;
+    }
+    if (load_count > 1) {
+        SLOGI("Took %d tries to load dmcrypt table.\n", load_count);
+    }
+
+    if (!dm.GetDmDevicePathByName(label, out_crypto_blkdev)) {
+        SLOGE("Cannot determine dm-crypt path for %s.\n", label);
         return -1;
     }
 
+    /* Ensure the dm device has been created before returning. */
+    if (android::vold::WaitForFile(out_crypto_blkdev->c_str(), 1s) < 0) {
+        // WaitForFile generates a suitable log message
+        return -1;
+    }
     return 0;
 }
-
-int cryptfs_check_passwd(const char* passwd) {
-    SLOGI("cryptfs_check_passwd");
-    if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
-        SLOGE("cryptfs_check_passwd not valid for file encryption");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
-    int rc;
-
-    rc = check_unmounted_and_get_ftr(&crypt_ftr);
-    if (rc) {
-        SLOGE("Could not get footer");
-        return rc;
-    }
-
-    rc = test_mount_encrypted_fs(&crypt_ftr, passwd, DATA_MNT_POINT, CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
-    if (rc) {
-        SLOGE("Password did not match");
-        return rc;
-    }
-
-    if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE) {
-        // Here we have a default actual password but a real password
-        // we must test against the scrypted value
-        // First, we must delete the crypto block device that
-        // test_mount_encrypted_fs leaves behind as a side effect
-        delete_crypto_blk_dev(CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
-        rc = test_mount_encrypted_fs(&crypt_ftr, DEFAULT_PASSWORD, DATA_MNT_POINT,
-                                     CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
-        if (rc) {
-            SLOGE("Default password did not match on reboot encryption");
-            return rc;
-        }
-
-        crypt_ftr.flags &= ~CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE;
-        put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
-        rc = cryptfs_changepw(crypt_ftr.crypt_type, passwd);
-        if (rc) {
-            SLOGE("Could not change password on reboot encryption");
-            return rc;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (crypt_ftr.crypt_type != CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
-        cryptfs_clear_password();
-        password = strdup(passwd);
-        struct timespec now;
-        clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &now);
-        password_expiry_time = now.tv_sec + password_max_age_seconds;
-    }
-
-    return rc;
-}
-
-int cryptfs_verify_passwd(const char* passwd) {
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
-    unsigned char decrypted_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
-    char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-    int rc;
-
-    property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
-    if (strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
-        SLOGE("device not encrypted, aborting");
-        return -2;
-    }
-
-    if (!master_key_saved) {
-        SLOGE("encrypted fs not yet mounted, aborting");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (!saved_mount_point) {
-        SLOGE("encrypted fs failed to save mount point, aborting");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
-        SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_MNT_KEY_UNENCRYPTED) {
-        /* If the device has no password, then just say the password is valid */
-        rc = 0;
-    } else {
-        decrypt_master_key(passwd, decrypted_master_key, &crypt_ftr, 0, 0);
-        if (!memcmp(decrypted_master_key, saved_master_key, crypt_ftr.keysize)) {
-            /* They match, the password is correct */
-            rc = 0;
-        } else {
-            /* If incorrect, sleep for a bit to prevent dictionary attacks */
-            sleep(1);
-            rc = 1;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return rc;
-}
-
-/* Initialize a crypt_mnt_ftr structure.  The keysize is
- * defaulted to get_crypto_type().get_keysize() bytes, and the filesystem size to 0.
- * Presumably, at a minimum, the caller will update the
- * filesystem size and crypto_type_name after calling this function.
- */
-static int cryptfs_init_crypt_mnt_ftr(struct crypt_mnt_ftr* ftr) {
-    off64_t off;
-
-    memset(ftr, 0, sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr));
-    ftr->magic = CRYPT_MNT_MAGIC;
-    ftr->major_version = CURRENT_MAJOR_VERSION;
-    ftr->minor_version = CURRENT_MINOR_VERSION;
-    ftr->ftr_size = sizeof(struct crypt_mnt_ftr);
-    ftr->keysize = get_crypto_type().get_keysize();
-    ftr->kdf_type = KDF_SCRYPT_KEYMASTER;
-
-    get_device_scrypt_params(ftr);
-
-    ftr->persist_data_size = CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE;
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_info(NULL, &off) == 0) {
-        ftr->persist_data_offset[0] = off + CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET;
-        ftr->persist_data_offset[1] = off + CRYPT_FOOTER_TO_PERSIST_OFFSET + ftr->persist_data_size;
-    }
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-#define FRAMEWORK_BOOT_WAIT 60
-
-static int vold_unmountAll(void) {
-    VolumeManager* vm = VolumeManager::Instance();
-    return vm->unmountAll();
-}
-
-int cryptfs_enable_internal(int crypt_type, const char* passwd, int no_ui) {
-    std::string crypto_blkdev;
-    std::string real_blkdev;
-    unsigned char decrypted_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
-    int rc = -1, i;
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
-    struct crypt_persist_data* pdata;
-    char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-    char lockid[32] = {0};
-    std::string key_loc;
-    int num_vols;
-    bool rebootEncryption = false;
-    bool onlyCreateHeader = false;
-
-    /* Get a wakelock as this may take a while, and we don't want the
-     * device to sleep on us.  We'll grab a partial wakelock, and if the UI
-     * wants to keep the screen on, it can grab a full wakelock.
-     */
-    snprintf(lockid, sizeof(lockid), "enablecrypto%d", (int)getpid());
-    auto wl = android::wakelock::WakeLock::tryGet(lockid);
-    if (!wl.has_value()) {
-        return android::UNEXPECTED_NULL;
-    }
-
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr) == 0) {
-        if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION) {
-            if (!check_ftr_sha(&crypt_ftr)) {
-                memset(&crypt_ftr, 0, sizeof(crypt_ftr));
-                put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
-                goto error_unencrypted;
-            }
-
-            /* Doing a reboot-encryption*/
-            crypt_ftr.flags &= ~CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION;
-            crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_FORCE_COMPLETE;
-            rebootEncryption = true;
-        }
-    } else {
-        // We don't want to accidentally reference invalid data.
-        memset(&crypt_ftr, 0, sizeof(crypt_ftr));
-    }
-
-    property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
-    if (!strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
-        SLOGE("Device is already running encrypted, aborting");
-        goto error_unencrypted;
-    }
-
-    get_crypt_info(&key_loc, &real_blkdev);
-
-    /* Get the size of the real block device */
-    uint64_t nr_sec;
-    if (android::vold::GetBlockDev512Sectors(real_blkdev, &nr_sec) != android::OK) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot get size of block device %s\n", real_blkdev.c_str());
-        goto error_unencrypted;
-    }
-
-    /* If doing inplace encryption, make sure the orig fs doesn't include the crypto footer */
-    if (key_loc == KEY_IN_FOOTER) {
-        uint64_t fs_size_sec, max_fs_size_sec;
-        fs_size_sec = get_fs_size(real_blkdev.c_str());
-        if (fs_size_sec == 0) fs_size_sec = get_f2fs_filesystem_size_sec(real_blkdev.data());
-
-        max_fs_size_sec = nr_sec - (CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET / CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE);
-
-        if (fs_size_sec > max_fs_size_sec) {
-            SLOGE("Orig filesystem overlaps crypto footer region.  Cannot encrypt in place.");
-            goto error_unencrypted;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* The init files are setup to stop the class main and late start when
-     * vold sets trigger_shutdown_framework.
-     */
-    property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_shutdown_framework");
-    SLOGD("Just asked init to shut down class main\n");
-
-    /* Ask vold to unmount all devices that it manages */
-    if (vold_unmountAll()) {
-        SLOGE("Failed to unmount all vold managed devices");
-    }
-
-    /* no_ui means we are being called from init, not settings.
-       Now we always reboot from settings, so !no_ui means reboot
-     */
-    if (!no_ui) {
-        /* Try fallback, which is to reboot and try there */
-        onlyCreateHeader = true;
-        FILE* breadcrumb = fopen(BREADCRUMB_FILE, "we");
-        if (breadcrumb == 0) {
-            SLOGE("Failed to create breadcrumb file");
-            goto error_shutting_down;
-        }
-        fclose(breadcrumb);
-    }
-
-    /* Do extra work for a better UX when doing the long inplace encryption */
-    if (!onlyCreateHeader) {
-        /* Now that /data is unmounted, we need to mount a tmpfs
-         * /data, set a property saying we're doing inplace encryption,
-         * and restart the framework.
-         */
-        wait_and_unmount(DATA_MNT_POINT);
-        if (fs_mgr_do_tmpfs_mount(DATA_MNT_POINT)) {
-            goto error_shutting_down;
-        }
-        /* Tells the framework that inplace encryption is starting */
-        property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "0");
-
-        /* restart the framework. */
-        /* Create necessary paths on /data */
-        prep_data_fs();
-
-        /* Ugh, shutting down the framework is not synchronous, so until it
-         * can be fixed, this horrible hack will wait a moment for it all to
-         * shut down before proceeding.  Without it, some devices cannot
-         * restart the graphics services.
-         */
-        sleep(2);
-    }
-
-    /* Start the actual work of making an encrypted filesystem */
-    /* Initialize a crypt_mnt_ftr for the partition */
-    if (!rebootEncryption) {
-        if (cryptfs_init_crypt_mnt_ftr(&crypt_ftr)) {
-            goto error_shutting_down;
-        }
-
-        if (key_loc == KEY_IN_FOOTER) {
-            crypt_ftr.fs_size = nr_sec - (CRYPT_FOOTER_OFFSET / CRYPT_SECTOR_SIZE);
-        } else {
-            crypt_ftr.fs_size = nr_sec;
-        }
-        /* At this point, we are in an inconsistent state. Until we successfully
-           complete encryption, a reboot will leave us broken. So mark the
-           encryption failed in case that happens.
-           On successfully completing encryption, remove this flag */
-        if (onlyCreateHeader) {
-            crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_FORCE_ENCRYPTION;
-        } else {
-            crypt_ftr.flags |= CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE;
-        }
-        crypt_ftr.crypt_type = crypt_type;
-        strlcpy((char*)crypt_ftr.crypto_type_name, get_crypto_type().get_kernel_name(),
-                MAX_CRYPTO_TYPE_NAME_LEN);
-
-        /* Make an encrypted master key */
-        if (create_encrypted_random_key(onlyCreateHeader ? DEFAULT_PASSWORD : passwd,
-                                        crypt_ftr.master_key, crypt_ftr.salt, &crypt_ftr)) {
-            SLOGE("Cannot create encrypted master key\n");
-            goto error_shutting_down;
-        }
-
-        /* Replace scrypted intermediate key if we are preparing for a reboot */
-        if (onlyCreateHeader) {
-            unsigned char fake_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
-            unsigned char encrypted_fake_master_key[MAX_KEY_LEN];
-            memset(fake_master_key, 0, sizeof(fake_master_key));
-            encrypt_master_key(passwd, crypt_ftr.salt, fake_master_key, encrypted_fake_master_key,
-                               &crypt_ftr);
-        }
-
-        /* Write the key to the end of the partition */
-        put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
-
-        /* If any persistent data has been remembered, save it.
-         * If none, create a valid empty table and save that.
-         */
-        if (!persist_data) {
-            pdata = (crypt_persist_data*)malloc(CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
-            if (pdata) {
-                init_empty_persist_data(pdata, CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE);
-                persist_data = pdata;
-            }
-        }
-        if (persist_data) {
-            save_persistent_data();
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (onlyCreateHeader) {
-        sleep(2);
-        cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::reboot);
-    }
-
-    if (!no_ui || rebootEncryption) {
-        /* startup service classes main and late_start */
-        property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_min_framework");
-        SLOGD("Just triggered restart_min_framework\n");
-
-        /* OK, the framework is restarted and will soon be showing a
-         * progress bar.  Time to setup an encrypted mapping, and
-         * either write a new filesystem, or encrypt in place updating
-         * the progress bar as we work.
-         */
-    }
-
-    decrypt_master_key(passwd, decrypted_master_key, &crypt_ftr, 0, 0);
-    rc = create_crypto_blk_dev(&crypt_ftr, decrypted_master_key, real_blkdev.c_str(),
-                               &crypto_blkdev, CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE, 0);
-    if (!rc) {
-        if (encrypt_inplace(crypto_blkdev, real_blkdev, crypt_ftr.fs_size, true)) {
-            crypt_ftr.encrypted_upto = crypt_ftr.fs_size;
-            rc = 0;
-        } else {
-            rc = -1;
-        }
-        /* Undo the dm-crypt mapping whether we succeed or not */
-        delete_crypto_blk_dev(CRYPTO_BLOCK_DEVICE);
-    }
-
-    if (!rc) {
-        /* Success */
-        crypt_ftr.flags &= ~CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE;
-
-        put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
-
-        char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-        property_get("ro.crypto.state", value, "");
-        if (!strcmp(value, "")) {
-            /* default encryption - continue first boot sequence */
-            property_set("ro.crypto.state", "encrypted");
-            property_set("ro.crypto.type", "block");
-            wl.reset();
-            if (rebootEncryption && crypt_ftr.crypt_type != CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
-                // Bring up cryptkeeper that will check the password and set it
-                property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_shutdown_framework");
-                sleep(2);
-                property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "");
-                cryptfs_trigger_restart_min_framework();
-            } else {
-                cryptfs_check_passwd(DEFAULT_PASSWORD);
-                cryptfs_restart_internal(1);
-            }
-            return 0;
-        } else {
-            sleep(2); /* Give the UI a chance to show 100% progress */
-            cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::reboot);
-        }
-    } else {
-        char value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-
-        property_get("ro.vold.wipe_on_crypt_fail", value, "0");
-        if (!strcmp(value, "1")) {
-            /* wipe data if encryption failed */
-            SLOGE("encryption failed - rebooting into recovery to wipe data\n");
-            std::string err;
-            const std::vector<std::string> options = {
-                "--wipe_data\n--reason=cryptfs_enable_internal\n"};
-            if (!write_bootloader_message(options, &err)) {
-                SLOGE("could not write bootloader message: %s", err.c_str());
-            }
-            cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::recovery);
-        } else {
-            /* set property to trigger dialog */
-            property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "error_partially_encrypted");
-        }
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* hrm, the encrypt step claims success, but the reboot failed.
-     * This should not happen.
-     * Set the property and return.  Hope the framework can deal with it.
-     */
-    property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "error_reboot_failed");
-    return rc;
-
-error_unencrypted:
-    property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "error_not_encrypted");
-    return -1;
-
-error_shutting_down:
-    /* we failed, and have not encrypted anthing, so the users's data is still intact,
-     * but the framework is stopped and not restarted to show the error, so it's up to
-     * vold to restart the system.
-     */
-    SLOGE(
-        "Error enabling encryption after framework is shutdown, no data changed, restarting "
-        "system");
-    cryptfs_reboot(RebootType::reboot);
-
-    /* shouldn't get here */
-    property_set("vold.encrypt_progress", "error_shutting_down");
-    return -1;
-}
-
-int cryptfs_enable(int type, const char* passwd, int no_ui) {
-    return cryptfs_enable_internal(type, passwd, no_ui);
-}
-
-int cryptfs_enable_default(int no_ui) {
-    return cryptfs_enable_internal(CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT, DEFAULT_PASSWORD, no_ui);
-}
-
-int cryptfs_changepw(int crypt_type, const char* newpw) {
-    if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
-        SLOGE("cryptfs_changepw not valid for file encryption");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
-    int rc;
-
-    /* This is only allowed after we've successfully decrypted the master key */
-    if (!master_key_saved) {
-        SLOGE("Key not saved, aborting");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (crypt_type < 0 || crypt_type > CRYPT_TYPE_MAX_TYPE) {
-        SLOGE("Invalid crypt_type %d", crypt_type);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* get key */
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
-        SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    crypt_ftr.crypt_type = crypt_type;
-
-    rc = encrypt_master_key(crypt_type == CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT ? DEFAULT_PASSWORD : newpw,
-                            crypt_ftr.salt, saved_master_key, crypt_ftr.master_key, &crypt_ftr);
-    if (rc) {
-        SLOGE("Encrypt master key failed: %d", rc);
-        return -1;
-    }
-    /* save the key */
-    put_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr);
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-static unsigned int persist_get_max_entries(int encrypted) {
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
-    unsigned int dsize;
-
-    /* If encrypted, use the values from the crypt_ftr, otherwise
-     * use the values for the current spec.
-     */
-    if (encrypted) {
-        if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
-            /* Something is wrong, assume no space for entries */
-            return 0;
-        }
-        dsize = crypt_ftr.persist_data_size;
-    } else {
-        dsize = CRYPT_PERSIST_DATA_SIZE;
-    }
-
-    if (dsize > sizeof(struct crypt_persist_data)) {
-        return (dsize - sizeof(struct crypt_persist_data)) / sizeof(struct crypt_persist_entry);
-    } else {
-        return 0;
-    }
-}
-
-static int persist_get_key(const char* fieldname, char* value) {
-    unsigned int i;
-
-    if (persist_data == NULL) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-    for (i = 0; i < persist_data->persist_valid_entries; i++) {
-        if (!strncmp(persist_data->persist_entry[i].key, fieldname, PROPERTY_KEY_MAX)) {
-            /* We found it! */
-            strlcpy(value, persist_data->persist_entry[i].val, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return -1;
-}
-
-static int persist_set_key(const char* fieldname, const char* value, int encrypted) {
-    unsigned int i;
-    unsigned int num;
-    unsigned int max_persistent_entries;
-
-    if (persist_data == NULL) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    max_persistent_entries = persist_get_max_entries(encrypted);
-
-    num = persist_data->persist_valid_entries;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
-        if (!strncmp(persist_data->persist_entry[i].key, fieldname, PROPERTY_KEY_MAX)) {
-            /* We found an existing entry, update it! */
-            memset(persist_data->persist_entry[i].val, 0, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
-            strlcpy(persist_data->persist_entry[i].val, value, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* We didn't find it, add it to the end, if there is room */
-    if (persist_data->persist_valid_entries < max_persistent_entries) {
-        memset(&persist_data->persist_entry[num], 0, sizeof(struct crypt_persist_entry));
-        strlcpy(persist_data->persist_entry[num].key, fieldname, PROPERTY_KEY_MAX);
-        strlcpy(persist_data->persist_entry[num].val, value, PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX);
-        persist_data->persist_valid_entries++;
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    return -1;
-}
-
-/**
- * Test if key is part of the multi-entry (field, index) sequence. Return non-zero if key is in the
- * sequence and its index is greater than or equal to index. Return 0 otherwise.
- */
-int match_multi_entry(const char* key, const char* field, unsigned index) {
-    std::string key_ = key;
-    std::string field_ = field;
-
-    std::string parsed_field;
-    unsigned parsed_index;
-
-    std::string::size_type split = key_.find_last_of('_');
-    if (split == std::string::npos) {
-        parsed_field = key_;
-        parsed_index = 0;
-    } else {
-        parsed_field = key_.substr(0, split);
-        parsed_index = std::stoi(key_.substr(split + 1));
-    }
-
-    return parsed_field == field_ && parsed_index >= index;
-}
-
-/*
- * Delete entry/entries from persist_data. If the entries are part of a multi-segment field, all
- * remaining entries starting from index will be deleted.
- * returns PERSIST_DEL_KEY_OK if deletion succeeds,
- * PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_NO_FIELD if the field does not exist,
- * and PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_OTHER if error occurs.
- *
- */
-static int persist_del_keys(const char* fieldname, unsigned index) {
-    unsigned int i;
-    unsigned int j;
-    unsigned int num;
-
-    if (persist_data == NULL) {
-        return PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_OTHER;
-    }
-
-    num = persist_data->persist_valid_entries;
-
-    j = 0;  // points to the end of non-deleted entries.
-    // Filter out to-be-deleted entries in place.
-    for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
-        if (!match_multi_entry(persist_data->persist_entry[i].key, fieldname, index)) {
-            persist_data->persist_entry[j] = persist_data->persist_entry[i];
-            j++;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (j < num) {
-        persist_data->persist_valid_entries = j;
-        // Zeroise the remaining entries
-        memset(&persist_data->persist_entry[j], 0, (num - j) * sizeof(struct crypt_persist_entry));
-        return PERSIST_DEL_KEY_OK;
-    } else {
-        // Did not find an entry matching the given fieldname
-        return PERSIST_DEL_KEY_ERROR_NO_FIELD;
-    }
-}
-
-static int persist_count_keys(const char* fieldname) {
-    unsigned int i;
-    unsigned int count;
-
-    if (persist_data == NULL) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    count = 0;
-    for (i = 0; i < persist_data->persist_valid_entries; i++) {
-        if (match_multi_entry(persist_data->persist_entry[i].key, fieldname, 0)) {
-            count++;
-        }
-    }
-
-    return count;
-}
-
-/* Return the value of the specified field. */
-int cryptfs_getfield(const char* fieldname, char* value, int len) {
-    if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot get field when file encrypted");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    char temp_value[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-    /* CRYPTO_GETFIELD_OK is success,
-     * CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_NO_FIELD is value not set,
-     * CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_BUF_TOO_SMALL is buffer (as given by len) too small,
-     * CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER is any other error
-     */
-    int rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER;
-    int i;
-    char temp_field[PROPERTY_KEY_MAX];
-
-    if (persist_data == NULL) {
-        load_persistent_data();
-        if (persist_data == NULL) {
-            SLOGE("Getfield error, cannot load persistent data");
-            goto out;
-        }
-    }
-
-    // Read value from persistent entries. If the original value is split into multiple entries,
-    // stitch them back together.
-    if (!persist_get_key(fieldname, temp_value)) {
-        // We found it, copy it to the caller's buffer and keep going until all entries are read.
-        if (strlcpy(value, temp_value, len) >= (unsigned)len) {
-            // value too small
-            rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
-            goto out;
-        }
-        rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_OK;
-
-        for (i = 1; /* break explicitly */; i++) {
-            if (snprintf(temp_field, sizeof(temp_field), "%s_%d", fieldname, i) >=
-                (int)sizeof(temp_field)) {
-                // If the fieldname is very long, we stop as soon as it begins to overflow the
-                // maximum field length. At this point we have in fact fully read out the original
-                // value because cryptfs_setfield would not allow fields with longer names to be
-                // written in the first place.
-                break;
-            }
-            if (!persist_get_key(temp_field, temp_value)) {
-                if (strlcat(value, temp_value, len) >= (unsigned)len) {
-                    // value too small.
-                    rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_BUF_TOO_SMALL;
-                    goto out;
-                }
-            } else {
-                // Exhaust all entries.
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-    } else {
-        /* Sadness, it's not there.  Return the error */
-        rc = CRYPTO_GETFIELD_ERROR_NO_FIELD;
-    }
-
-out:
-    return rc;
-}
-
-/* Set the value of the specified field. */
-int cryptfs_setfield(const char* fieldname, const char* value) {
-    if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
-        SLOGE("Cannot set field when file encrypted");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    char encrypted_state[PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX];
-    /* 0 is success, negative values are error */
-    int rc = CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_OTHER;
-    int encrypted = 0;
-    unsigned int field_id;
-    char temp_field[PROPERTY_KEY_MAX];
-    unsigned int num_entries;
-    unsigned int max_keylen;
-
-    if (persist_data == NULL) {
-        load_persistent_data();
-        if (persist_data == NULL) {
-            SLOGE("Setfield error, cannot load persistent data");
-            goto out;
-        }
-    }
-
-    property_get("ro.crypto.state", encrypted_state, "");
-    if (!strcmp(encrypted_state, "encrypted")) {
-        encrypted = 1;
-    }
-
-    // Compute the number of entries required to store value, each entry can store up to
-    // (PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX - 1) chars
-    if (strlen(value) == 0) {
-        // Empty value also needs one entry to store.
-        num_entries = 1;
-    } else {
-        num_entries = (strlen(value) + (PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX - 1) - 1) / (PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX - 1);
-    }
-
-    max_keylen = strlen(fieldname);
-    if (num_entries > 1) {
-        // Need an extra "_%d" suffix.
-        max_keylen += 1 + log10(num_entries);
-    }
-    if (max_keylen > PROPERTY_KEY_MAX - 1) {
-        rc = CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_FIELD_TOO_LONG;
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    // Make sure we have enough space to write the new value
-    if (persist_data->persist_valid_entries + num_entries - persist_count_keys(fieldname) >
-        persist_get_max_entries(encrypted)) {
-        rc = CRYPTO_SETFIELD_ERROR_VALUE_TOO_LONG;
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    // Now that we know persist_data has enough space for value, let's delete the old field first
-    // to make up space.
-    persist_del_keys(fieldname, 0);
-
-    if (persist_set_key(fieldname, value, encrypted)) {
-        // fail to set key, should not happen as we have already checked the available space
-        SLOGE("persist_set_key() error during setfield()");
-        goto out;
-    }
-
-    for (field_id = 1; field_id < num_entries; field_id++) {
-        snprintf(temp_field, sizeof(temp_field), "%s_%u", fieldname, field_id);
-
-        if (persist_set_key(temp_field, value + field_id * (PROPERTY_VALUE_MAX - 1), encrypted)) {
-            // fail to set key, should not happen as we have already checked the available space.
-            SLOGE("persist_set_key() error during setfield()");
-            goto out;
-        }
-    }
-
-    /* If we are running encrypted, save the persistent data now */
-    if (encrypted) {
-        if (save_persistent_data()) {
-            SLOGE("Setfield error, cannot save persistent data");
-            goto out;
-        }
-    }
-
-    rc = CRYPTO_SETFIELD_OK;
-
-out:
-    return rc;
-}
-
-/* Checks userdata. Attempt to mount the volume if default-
- * encrypted.
- * On success trigger next init phase and return 0.
- * Currently do not handle failure - see TODO below.
- */
-int cryptfs_mount_default_encrypted(void) {
-    int crypt_type = cryptfs_get_password_type();
-    if (crypt_type < 0 || crypt_type > CRYPT_TYPE_MAX_TYPE) {
-        SLOGE("Bad crypt type - error");
-    } else if (crypt_type != CRYPT_TYPE_DEFAULT) {
-        SLOGD(
-            "Password is not default - "
-            "starting min framework to prompt");
-        property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_min_framework");
-        return 0;
-    } else if (cryptfs_check_passwd(DEFAULT_PASSWORD) == 0) {
-        SLOGD("Password is default - restarting filesystem");
-        cryptfs_restart_internal(0);
-        return 0;
-    } else {
-        SLOGE("Encrypted, default crypt type but can't decrypt");
-    }
-
-    /** Corrupt. Allow us to boot into framework, which will detect bad
-        crypto when it calls do_crypto_complete, then do a factory reset
-     */
-    property_set("vold.decrypt", "trigger_restart_min_framework");
-    return 0;
-}
-
-/* Returns type of the password, default, pattern, pin or password.
- */
-int cryptfs_get_password_type(void) {
-    if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
-        SLOGE("cryptfs_get_password_type not valid for file encryption");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    struct crypt_mnt_ftr crypt_ftr;
-
-    if (get_crypt_ftr_and_key(&crypt_ftr)) {
-        SLOGE("Error getting crypt footer and key\n");
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (crypt_ftr.flags & CRYPT_INCONSISTENT_STATE) {
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    return crypt_ftr.crypt_type;
-}
-
-const char* cryptfs_get_password() {
-    if (fscrypt_is_native()) {
-        SLOGE("cryptfs_get_password not valid for file encryption");
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    struct timespec now;
-    clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &now);
-    if (now.tv_sec < password_expiry_time) {
-        return password;
-    } else {
-        cryptfs_clear_password();
-        return 0;
-    }
-}
-
-void cryptfs_clear_password() {
-    if (password) {
-        size_t len = strlen(password);
-        memset(password, 0, len);
-        free(password);
-        password = 0;
-        password_expiry_time = 0;
-    }
-}
-
-int cryptfs_isConvertibleToFBE() {
-    auto entry = GetEntryForMountPoint(&fstab_default, DATA_MNT_POINT);
-    return entry && entry->fs_mgr_flags.force_fde_or_fbe;
-}