private/system_app.te

###
### Apps that run with the system UID, e.g. com.android.system.ui,
### com.android.settings.  These are not as privileged as the system
### server.
###

typeattribute system_app coredomain;

app_domain(system_app)
net_domain(system_app)
binder_service(system_app)

# android.ui and system.ui
allow system_app rootfs:dir getattr;

# Read and write /data/data subdirectory.
allow system_app system_app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_app system_app_data_file:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms;

# Read and write to /data/misc/user.
allow system_app misc_user_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_app misc_user_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Access to vold-mounted storage for measuring free space
allow system_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;

# Read wallpaper file.
allow system_app wallpaper_file:file r_file_perms;

# Read icon file.
allow system_app icon_file:file r_file_perms;

# Write to properties
set_prop(system_app, bluetooth_prop)
set_prop(system_app, debug_prop)
set_prop(system_app, system_prop)
set_prop(system_app, exported_system_prop)
set_prop(system_app, exported2_system_prop)
set_prop(system_app, exported3_system_prop)
set_prop(system_app, logd_prop)
set_prop(system_app, net_radio_prop)
set_prop(system_app, system_radio_prop)
set_prop(system_app, exported_system_radio_prop)
set_prop(system_app, log_tag_prop)
userdebug_or_eng(`set_prop(system_app, logpersistd_logging_prop)')
auditallow system_app net_radio_prop:property_service set;
auditallow system_app system_radio_prop:property_service set;
auditallow system_app exported_system_radio_prop:property_service set;

# ctl interface
set_prop(system_app, ctl_default_prop)
set_prop(system_app, ctl_bugreport_prop)

# Create /data/anr/traces.txt.
allow system_app anr_data_file:dir ra_dir_perms;
allow system_app anr_data_file:file create_file_perms;

# Settings need to access app name and icon from asec
allow system_app asec_apk_file:file r_file_perms;

# Allow system apps to interact with incidentd
binder_call(system_app, incidentd)

allow system_app servicemanager:service_manager list;
# TODO: scope this down? Too broad?
allow system_app {
  service_manager_type
  -dumpstate_service
  -installd_service
  -netd_service
  -virtual_touchpad_service
  -vold_service
  -vr_hwc_service
}:service_manager find;
# suppress denials for services system_app should not be accessing.
dontaudit system_app {
  dumpstate_service
  installd_service
  netd_service
  virtual_touchpad_service
  vold_service
  vr_hwc_service
}:service_manager find;

allow system_app keystore:keystore_key {
    get_state
    get
    insert
    delete
    exist
    list
    reset
    password
    lock
    unlock
    is_empty
    sign
    verify
    grant
    duplicate
    clear_uid
    user_changed
};

# /sys access
r_dir_file(system_app, sysfs_type)

# settings app reads /proc/version and /proc/pagetypeinfo
allow system_app {
  proc
  proc_version
}:file r_file_perms;

control_logd(system_app)
read_runtime_log_tags(system_app)

###
### Neverallow rules
###

# app domains which access /dev/fuse should not run as system_app
neverallow system_app fuse_device:chr_file *;