diff --git a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
index aba4363..8e11850 100644
--- a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
+++ b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@
 		"android.hardware.wifi.hostapd.IHostapd/default":                          EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"android.hardware.wifi.supplicant.ISupplicant/default":                    EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"android.frameworks.cameraservice.service.ICameraService/default":         EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+		"android.frameworks.location.altitude.IAltitudeService/default":           EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"android.frameworks.sensorservice.ISensorManager/default":                 []string{"libsensorserviceaidl_fuzzer"},
 		"android.frameworks.stats.IStats/default":                                 EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"android.se.omapi.ISecureElementService/default":                          EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
diff --git a/private/app.te b/private/app.te
index db32be0..49b8cde 100644
--- a/private/app.te
+++ b/private/app.te
@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@
 # Allow to ro.camerax.extensions.enabled
 get_prop(appdomain, camerax_extensions_prop)
 
-userdebug_or_eng(`perfetto_producer({ appdomain })')
-
 # Prevent apps from causing presubmit failures.
 # Apps can cause selinux denials by accessing CE storage
 # and/or external storage. In either case, the selinux denial is
@@ -358,6 +356,12 @@
 allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
 allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 
+# Allow writing performance tracing data into the perfetto traced daemon.
+# Needed for java heap graph ART plugin (perfetto_hprof).
+# The perfetto profiling daemon will check for the specific application's
+# opt-in/opt-out.
+perfetto_producer(appdomain)
+
 # Send heap dumps to system_server via an already open file descriptor
 # % adb shell am set-watch-heap com.android.systemui 1048576
 # % adb shell dumpsys procstats --start-testing
diff --git a/private/app_zygote.te b/private/app_zygote.te
index 8aa288e..6552d63 100644
--- a/private/app_zygote.te
+++ b/private/app_zygote.te
@@ -142,18 +142,15 @@
   alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket
 } *;
 
-# Only allow app_zygote to talk to the logd socket, and
-# su/heapprofd/traced_perf on eng/userdebug. This is because
-# cap_setuid/cap_setgid allow to forge uid/gid in SCM_CREDENTIALS.
-# Think twice before changing.
+# Only allow app_zygote to talk to the logd socket, and su on eng/userdebug.
+# This is because cap_setuid/cap_setgid allow to forge uid/gid in
+# SCM_CREDENTIALS. Think twice before changing.
 neverallow app_zygote {
   domain
   -app_zygote
   -logd
   -system_server
   userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
-  userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
-  userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
 }:unix_dgram_socket *;
 
 neverallow app_zygote {
@@ -161,8 +158,6 @@
   -app_zygote
   -prng_seeder
   userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
-  userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
-  userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
 }:unix_stream_socket *;
 
 # Never allow ptrace
diff --git a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
index 55d3840..30a7e35 100644
--- a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
     device_config_memory_safety_native_prop
     device_config_vendor_system_native_prop
     devicelock_service
+    fwk_altitude_service
     fwk_camera_service
     fwk_sensor_service
     grammatical_inflection_service
diff --git a/private/crash_dump.te b/private/crash_dump.te
index 31f0128..bc6020e 100644
--- a/private/crash_dump.te
+++ b/private/crash_dump.te
@@ -30,13 +30,16 @@
   }:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
 ')
 
+# Read ART APEX data directory
+allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
 ###
 ### neverallow assertions
 ###
 
-# ptrace neverallow assertions are spread throughout the other policy
-# files, so we avoid adding redundant assertions here
-
+# sigchld not explicitly forbidden since it's part of the
+# domain-transition-on-exec macros, and is by itself not sensitive
 neverallow crash_dump {
   apexd
   userdebug_or_eng(`-apexd')
@@ -54,11 +57,7 @@
   vendor_init
   vold
   userdebug_or_eng(`-vold')
-}:process { signal sigstop sigkill };
+}:process { ptrace signal sigstop sigkill };
 
 neverallow crash_dump self:process ptrace;
 neverallow crash_dump gpu_device:chr_file *;
-
-# Read ART APEX data directory
-allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:dir { getattr search };
-allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index 00936b8..4ad7298 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -12,44 +12,49 @@
 # heap profiling, as initialization will fail if it does not have the
 # necessary SELinux permissions.
 get_prop(domain, heapprofd_prop);
-# Allow heap profiling on debug builds.
-userdebug_or_eng(`can_profile_heap({
-  domain
-  -bpfloader
-  -init
-  -kernel
-  -keystore
-  -llkd
-  -logd
-  -logpersist
-  -recovery
-  -recovery_persist
-  -recovery_refresh
-  -ueventd
-  -vendor_init
-  -vold
-})')
 
-# As above, allow perf profiling most processes on debug builds.
-# zygote is excluded as system-wide profiling could end up with it
-# (unexpectedly) holding an open fd across a fork.
-userdebug_or_eng(`can_profile_perf({
+# See private/crash_dump.te
+define(`dumpable_domain',`{
   domain
+  -apexd
   -bpfloader
+  -crash_dump
+  -crosvm # TODO(b/236672526): Remove exception for crosvm
+  -diced
   -init
   -kernel
   -keystore
   -llkd
   -logd
+  -ueventd
+  -vendor_init
+  -vold
+}')
+
+# Allow heap profiling by heapprofd.
+# Zygotes are excluded due to potential issues with holding open file
+# descriptors or other state across forks. Other exclusions conflict with
+# neverallows, and are not considered important to profile.
+can_profile_heap({
+  dumpable_domain
+  -app_zygote
+  -hal_configstore
   -logpersist
   -recovery
   -recovery_persist
   -recovery_refresh
-  -ueventd
-  -vendor_init
-  -vold
+  -webview_zygote
   -zygote
-})')
+})
+
+# Allow profiling using perf_event_open by traced_perf.
+can_profile_perf({
+  dumpable_domain
+  -app_zygote
+  -hal_configstore
+  -webview_zygote
+  -zygote
+})
 
 # Everyone can access the IncFS list of features.
 r_dir_file(domain, sysfs_fs_incfs_features);
@@ -556,9 +561,9 @@
     userdebug_or_eng(`-su') # communications with su are permitted only on userdebug or eng builds
     -init
     -tombstoned # linker to tombstoned
-    userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
-    userdebug_or_eng(`-traced')
-    userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
+    -heapprofd
+    -traced
+    -traced_perf
   });
 ')
 
diff --git a/private/ephemeral_app.te b/private/ephemeral_app.te
index 3b916e2..9f2b1d5 100644
--- a/private/ephemeral_app.te
+++ b/private/ephemeral_app.te
@@ -45,14 +45,6 @@
 allow ephemeral_app radio_service:service_manager find;
 allow ephemeral_app ephemeral_app_api_service:service_manager find;
 
-# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
-# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
-perfetto_producer(ephemeral_app)
-
-# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
-can_profile_heap(ephemeral_app)
-can_profile_perf(ephemeral_app)
-
 # allow ephemeral apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
 # modify them other than to connect
 allow ephemeral_app system_server:udp_socket {
diff --git a/private/file.te b/private/file.te
index 776c8e5..539e63e 100644
--- a/private/file.te
+++ b/private/file.te
@@ -130,3 +130,6 @@
 # write permission on this to connect, and needs to be mlstrustedobject
 # in to satisfy MLS constraints for trusted domains.
 type prng_seeder_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+
+# /sys/firmware/devicetree/base/avf
+type sysfs_dt_avf, fs_type, sysfs_type;
diff --git a/private/genfs_contexts b/private/genfs_contexts
index 6fa98ea..77e3954 100644
--- a/private/genfs_contexts
+++ b/private/genfs_contexts
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@
 genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/net             u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0
 genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/switch          u:object_r:sysfs_switch:s0
 genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/wakeup          u:object_r:sysfs_wakeup:s0
+genfscon sysfs /firmware/devicetree/base/avf u:object_r:sysfs_dt_avf:s0
 genfscon sysfs /firmware/devicetree/base/firmware/android u:object_r:sysfs_dt_firmware_android:s0
 genfscon sysfs /fs/ext4/features                  u:object_r:sysfs_fs_ext4_features:s0
 genfscon sysfs /fs/f2fs                           u:object_r:sysfs_fs_f2fs:s0
diff --git a/private/gmscore_app.te b/private/gmscore_app.te
index 8795798..cd05a65 100644
--- a/private/gmscore_app.te
+++ b/private/gmscore_app.te
@@ -149,6 +149,9 @@
 # b/186488185: Allow GMSCore to read dck properties
 get_prop(gmscore_app, dck_prop)
 
+# Allow GMSCore to read RKP properties for the purpose of GTS testing.
+get_prop(gmscore_app, remote_prov_prop)
+
 # Do not allow getting permission-protected network information from sysfs.
 neverallow gmscore_app sysfs_net:file *;
 
diff --git a/private/heapprofd.te b/private/heapprofd.te
index 36d2938..1b41823 100644
--- a/private/heapprofd.te
+++ b/private/heapprofd.te
@@ -1,14 +1,4 @@
 # Android heap profiling daemon. go/heapprofd.
-#
-# On user builds, this daemon is responsible for receiving the initial
-# profiling configuration, finding matching target processes (if profiling by
-# process name), and sending the activation signal to them (+ setting system
-# properties for new processes to start profiling from startup). When profiling
-# is triggered in a process, it spawns a private heapprofd subprocess (in its
-# own SELinux domain), which will exclusively handle profiling of its parent.
-#
-# On debug builds, this central daemon performs profiling for all target
-# processes (which talk directly to this daemon).
 type heapprofd_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
 type heapprofd_tmpfs, file_type;
 
@@ -56,23 +46,28 @@
 # For checking profileability.
 allow heapprofd packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
 
-# This is going to happen on user but is benign because central heapprofd
-# does not actually need these permission.
-# If the dac_read_search capability check is rejected, the kernel then tries
-# to perform a dac_override capability check, so we need to dontaudit that
-# as well.
-dontaudit heapprofd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_read_search dac_override };
-
+# Never allow profiling privileged or otherwise incompatible domains.
+# Corresponding allow-rule is in private/domain.te.
 never_profile_heap(`{
+  apexd
+  app_zygote
   bpfloader
+  diced
+  hal_configstore
   init
   kernel
   keystore
   llkd
   logd
+  logpersist
+  recovery
+  recovery_persist
+  recovery_refresh
   ueventd
   vendor_init
   vold
+  webview_zygote
+  zygote
 }')
 
 full_treble_only(`
diff --git a/private/isolated_app.te b/private/isolated_app.te
index 7230844..9d0fd73 100644
--- a/private/isolated_app.te
+++ b/private/isolated_app.te
@@ -34,12 +34,3 @@
 allow isolated_app webview_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
 # Read system properties managed by webview_zygote.
 allow isolated_app webview_zygote_tmpfs:file read;
-
-# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
-# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
-perfetto_producer(isolated_app)
-
-# Allow profiling if the main app has been marked as profileable or
-# debuggable.
-can_profile_heap(isolated_app)
-can_profile_perf(isolated_app)
diff --git a/private/isolated_compute_app.te b/private/isolated_compute_app.te
index 2c6d570..bde6195 100644
--- a/private/isolated_compute_app.te
+++ b/private/isolated_compute_app.te
@@ -20,19 +20,17 @@
 allow isolated_compute_app content_capture_service:service_manager find;
 allow isolated_compute_app device_state_service:service_manager find;
 allow isolated_compute_app speech_recognition_service:service_manager find;
+allow isolated_compute_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
 
 # Enable access to hardware services for camera functionalilites
 hal_client_domain(isolated_compute_app, hal_allocator)
 hwbinder_use(isolated_compute_app)
 
-# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
-# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
-perfetto_producer(isolated_compute_app)
+allow isolated_compute_app dmabuf_system_heap_device:chr_file r_file_perms;
 
-# Allow profiling if the main app has been marked as profileable or
-# debuggable.
-can_profile_heap(isolated_compute_app)
-can_profile_perf(isolated_compute_app)
+# Allow access to network sockets received over IPC. New socket creation is not
+# permitted.
+allow isolated_compute_app { ephemeral_app priv_app untrusted_app_all }:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } { rw_socket_perms_no_ioctl };
 
 #####
 ##### Neverallow
diff --git a/private/platform_app.te b/private/platform_app.te
index 46abb16..5d16d85 100644
--- a/private/platform_app.te
+++ b/private/platform_app.te
@@ -115,9 +115,6 @@
 # suppress denials caused by debugfs_tracing
 dontaudit platform_app debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
 
-# Allow platform apps to act as Perfetto producers.
-perfetto_producer(platform_app)
-
 # Allow platform apps to create VMs
 virtualizationservice_use(platform_app)
 
diff --git a/private/priv_app.te b/private/priv_app.te
index 8c965fc..cfd8721 100644
--- a/private/priv_app.te
+++ b/private/priv_app.te
@@ -126,20 +126,12 @@
 
 read_runtime_log_tags(priv_app)
 
-# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
-# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
-perfetto_producer(priv_app)
-
 # Allow priv_apps to request and collect incident reports.
 # (Also requires DUMP and PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS permissions)
 allow priv_app incident_service:service_manager find;
 binder_call(priv_app, incidentd)
 allow priv_app incidentd:fifo_file { read write };
 
-# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
-can_profile_heap(priv_app)
-can_profile_perf(priv_app)
-
 # Allow priv_apps to check whether Dynamic System Update is enabled
 get_prop(priv_app, dynamic_system_prop)
 
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index 6d9f5b1..fdc6f89 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -495,13 +495,18 @@
 media.stagefright.thumbnail.prefer_hw_codecs u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 persist.sys.media.avsync                     u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 
-persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap             u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact string
-persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.disabled        u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact bool
-persist.bluetooth.bluetooth_audio_hal.disabled u:object_r:bluetooth_audio_hal_prop:s0 exact bool
-persist.bluetooth.btsnoopenable                u:object_r:exported_bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
-persist.bluetooth.btsnoopdefaultmode           u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact enum empty disabled filtered full
-persist.bluetooth.btsnooplogmode               u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact enum empty disabled filtered full
-persist.bluetooth.factoryreset                 u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap                          u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact string
+persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.disabled                     u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.bluetooth_audio_hal.disabled              u:object_r:bluetooth_audio_hal_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.btsnoopenable                             u:object_r:exported_bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.btsnoopdefaultmode                        u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact enum empty disabled filtered full
+persist.bluetooth.btsnooplogmode                            u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact enum empty disabled filtered full
+persist.bluetooth.snooplogfilter.headers.enabled            u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.snooplogfilter.profiles.a2dp.enabled      u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.snooplogfilter.profiles.map               u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact enum empty disabled fullfilter header magic
+persist.bluetooth.snooplogfilter.profiles.pbap              u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact enum empty disabled fullfilter header magic
+persist.bluetooth.snooplogfilter.profiles.rfcomm.enabled    u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.factoryreset                              u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
 
 bluetooth.hardware.power.operating_voltage_mv        u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact int
 bluetooth.hardware.power.idle_cur_ma                 u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact int
@@ -514,6 +519,7 @@
 bluetooth.core.gap.le.privacy.enabled                u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 bluetooth.core.gap.le.conn.min.limit                 u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact int
 bluetooth.core.gap.le.conn.only_init_1m_phy.enabled  u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+bluetooth.core.le_audio.inband_ringtone.supported    u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 
 bluetooth.device.default_name                        u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact string
 bluetooth.device.class_of_device                     u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact string
@@ -578,6 +584,9 @@
 bluetooth.sco.disable_enhanced_connection            u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 
 persist.nfc.debug_enabled                      u:object_r:nfc_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.nfc.vendor_debug_enabled               u:object_r:nfc_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.nfc.snoop_log_mode                     u:object_r:nfc_prop:s0 exact enum full filtered
+nfc.dta.skip_ndef_read                         u:object_r:nfc_prop:s0 exact bool
 
 persist.radio.multisim.config u:object_r:radio_control_prop:s0 exact string
 persist.radio.allow_mock_modem u:object_r:radio_control_prop:s0 exact bool
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox.te b/private/sdk_sandbox.te
index 6ebfa0a..cfcf2a4 100644
--- a/private/sdk_sandbox.te
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox.te
@@ -218,14 +218,6 @@
 allow sdk_sandbox shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow sdk_sandbox shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
-# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
-# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
-perfetto_producer(sdk_sandbox)
-
-# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
-can_profile_heap(sdk_sandbox)
-can_profile_perf(sdk_sandbox)
-
 # allow sdk sandbox to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
 # modify them other than to connect
 allow sdk_sandbox system_server:udp_socket {
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index 288c9b5..6af5eab 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 android.frameworks.cameraservice.service.ICameraService/default      u:object_r:fwk_camera_service:s0
+android.frameworks.location.altitude.IAltitudeService/default        u:object_r:fwk_altitude_service:s0
 android.frameworks.stats.IStats/default                              u:object_r:fwk_stats_service:s0
 android.frameworks.sensorservice.ISensorManager/default              u:object_r:fwk_sensor_service:s0
 android.hardware.audio.core.IConfig/default                          u:object_r:hal_audio_service:s0
diff --git a/private/system_app.te b/private/system_app.te
index 9116058..e2bec30 100644
--- a/private/system_app.te
+++ b/private/system_app.te
@@ -180,9 +180,6 @@
 # Settings app reads ro.usb.uvc.enabled
 get_prop(system_app, usb_uvc_enabled_prop)
 
-# Allow system apps to act as Perfetto producers.
-perfetto_producer(system_app)
-
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 62185fc..4e5b2e8 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -421,7 +421,9 @@
 allow system_server mediadrmserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
 allow system_server mediadrmserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
 
-userdebug_or_eng(`perfetto_producer({ system_server })')
+# Write trace data to the Perfetto traced daemon. This requires connecting to
+# its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
+perfetto_producer(system_server)
 
 # Get file context
 allow system_server file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/technical_debt.cil b/private/technical_debt.cil
index 069bb10..27ea187 100644
--- a/private/technical_debt.cil
+++ b/private/technical_debt.cil
@@ -14,11 +14,11 @@
 
 ; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of OMX-related services
 ; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
-(typeattributeset hal_omx_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
+(typeattributeset hal_omx_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
 
 ; Apps, except isolated apps, are clients of Codec2-related services
 ; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
-(typeattributeset hal_codec2_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app_all))))))
+(typeattributeset hal_codec2_client ((and (appdomain) ((not (isolated_app))))))
 
 ; Apps, except isolated apps and SDK sandboxes, are clients of Drm-related services
 ; Unfortunately, we can't currently express this in module policy language:
diff --git a/private/traced_perf.te b/private/traced_perf.te
index 811bf48..080b6fe 100644
--- a/private/traced_perf.te
+++ b/private/traced_perf.te
@@ -60,9 +60,14 @@
 # Never allow access to app data files
 neverallow traced_perf { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file *;
 
-# Never allow profiling highly privileged processes.
+# Never allow profiling privileged or otherwise incompatible domains.
+# Corresponding allow-rule is in private/domain.te.
 never_profile_perf(`{
+  apexd
+  app_zygote
   bpfloader
+  diced
+  hal_configstore
   init
   kernel
   keystore
@@ -71,4 +76,6 @@
   ueventd
   vendor_init
   vold
+  webview_zygote
+  zygote
 }')
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_all.te b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
index 8c7fe7a..f666cc8 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_all.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
@@ -129,14 +129,6 @@
 allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
 allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:lnk_file { open getattr read };
 
-# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
-# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
-perfetto_producer(untrusted_app_all)
-
-# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
-can_profile_heap(untrusted_app_all)
-can_profile_perf(untrusted_app_all)
-
 # allow untrusted apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
 # modify them other than to connect
 allow untrusted_app_all system_server:udp_socket {
diff --git a/private/virtualizationmanager.te b/private/virtualizationmanager.te
index 4cd32b7..946c783 100644
--- a/private/virtualizationmanager.te
+++ b/private/virtualizationmanager.te
@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@
 allow virtualizationmanager tombstone_data_file:file { append getattr };
 allow virtualizationmanager tombstoned:fd use;
 
+# Allow virtualizationservice to read AVF debug policy
+allow virtualizationmanager sysfs_dt_avf:dir search;
+allow virtualizationmanager sysfs_dt_avf:file { open read };
+
 # Allow reading files under /proc/[crosvm pid]/, for collecting CPU & memory usage inside VM.
 r_dir_file(virtualizationmanager, crosvm);
 
diff --git a/public/hal_configstore.te b/public/hal_configstore.te
index 7d4d150..8867a8d 100644
--- a/public/hal_configstore.te
+++ b/public/hal_configstore.te
@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@
   -prng_seeder
   userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
   -tombstoned
-  userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
-  userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
 }:{ unix_dgram_socket unix_stream_socket } *;
 
 # Should never need access to anything on /data
diff --git a/public/service.te b/public/service.te
index af799b3..3d3d98a 100644
--- a/public/service.te
+++ b/public/service.te
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@
 type platform_compat_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type face_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type fingerprint_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type fwk_altitude_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type fwk_stats_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type fwk_sensor_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type game_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;