diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index c31ec06..e61ef29 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -265,6 +265,8 @@
 # Vendor files
 #
 /(vendor|system/vendor)(/.*)?                  u:object_r:vendor_file:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/sh                 u:object_r:vendor_shell_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/toybox_vendor      u:object_r:vendor_toolbox_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/etc(/.*)?              u:object_r:vendor_configs_file:s0
 
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/egl(/.*)?     u:object_r:same_process_hal_file:s0
diff --git a/private/priv_app.te b/private/priv_app.te
index f157073..bb7598e 100644
--- a/private/priv_app.te
+++ b/private/priv_app.te
@@ -73,9 +73,6 @@
   allow priv_app perfprofd_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 ')
 
-# Allow GMS core to scan executables on the system partition
-allow priv_app exec_type:file { getattr read open };
-
 # For AppFuse.
 allow priv_app vold:fd use;
 allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index 10e1bb5..24e21e6 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@
         coredomain
         -appdomain
         -idmap
-	-init
+        -init
         -system_server
         -zygote
     } vendor_overlay_file:dir { getattr open read search };
@@ -666,10 +666,33 @@
         coredomain
         -appdomain
         -idmap
-	-init
+        -init
         -system_server
         -zygote
     } vendor_overlay_file:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
+
+    # Non-vendor domains are not allowed to file execute shell
+    # from vendor
+    neverallow {
+        coredomain
+        -init
+    } vendor_shell_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
+
+    # Do not allow vendor components to execute files from system
+    # except for the ones whitelist here.
+    # TODO:(b/36463595) Make this a neverallow
+    userdebug_or_eng(`
+        auditallow {
+            domain
+            -coredomain
+            -appdomain
+            -rild
+        } {
+            exec_type
+            -vendor_file_type
+            -crash_dump_exec
+        }:file { entrypoint execute execute_no_trans };
+    ')
 ')
 
 # Only authorized processes should be writing to files in /data/dalvik-cache
diff --git a/public/init.te b/public/init.te
index 0deb8cd..e997e13 100644
--- a/public/init.te
+++ b/public/init.te
@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@
 allow init system_data_file:file { getattr read };
 allow init system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
+# For init to be able to run shell scripts from vendor
+allow init vendor_shell_exec:file execute;
 
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
diff --git a/public/vendor_shell.te b/public/vendor_shell.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b330542
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/vendor_shell.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# vendor shell MUST never run as interactive or login shell.
+# vendor shell CAN never be traisitioned to by any process, so it is
+# only intended by shell script interpreter.
+type vendor_shell_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
diff --git a/public/vendor_toolbox.te b/public/vendor_toolbox.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..39462f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/vendor_toolbox.te
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+# Toolbox installation for vendor binaries / scripts
+# Non-vendor processes are not allowed to execute the binary
+# and is always executed without transition.
+type vendor_toolbox_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+
+# Do not allow domains to transition to vendor toolbox
+# or read, execute the vendor_toolbox file.
+full_treble_only(`
+    # Do not allow non-vendor domains to transition
+    # to vendor toolbox
+    neverallow coredomain vendor_toolbox_exec:file { entrypoint execute execute_no_trans };
+')