Merge "Add sepolicy for non-secure AuthGraph impl" into main
diff --git a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
index 2c9676f..f35ce44 100644
--- a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
+++ b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
@@ -393,6 +393,7 @@
"search": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"search_ui": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"secure_element": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+ "security_state": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"sec_key_att_app_id_provider": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"selection_toolbar": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"sensorservice": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
diff --git a/contexts/plat_file_contexts_test b/contexts/plat_file_contexts_test
index 287f754..50d9de4 100644
--- a/contexts/plat_file_contexts_test
+++ b/contexts/plat_file_contexts_test
@@ -280,6 +280,8 @@
/dev/zero zero_device
/dev/__properties__ properties_device
/dev/__properties__/property_info property_info
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override properties_device
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override/property_info property_info
/linkerconfig linkerconfig_file
/linkerconfig/test linkerconfig_file
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/file_contexts b/microdroid/system/private/file_contexts
index e483237..046f20f 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/file_contexts
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/file_contexts
@@ -72,7 +72,9 @@
/dev/vsock u:object_r:vsock_device:s0
/dev/zero u:object_r:zero_device:s0
/dev/__properties__ u:object_r:properties_device:s0
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override u:object_r:properties_device:s0
/dev/__properties__/property_info u:object_r:property_info:s0
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override/property_info u:object_r:property_info:s0
#############################
# Linker configuration
#
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/init.te b/microdroid/system/private/init.te
index 2dbf495..896590d 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/init.te
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/init.te
@@ -32,11 +32,11 @@
# /dev/__null__ node created by init.
allow init tmpfs:chr_file { create setattr unlink rw_file_perms };
-# /dev/__properties__
+# /dev/__properties__ and /dev/__properties__/appcompat_override
allow init properties_device:dir relabelto;
allow init properties_serial:file { write relabelto };
allow init property_type:file { append create getattr map open read relabelto rename setattr unlink write };
-# /dev/__properties__/property_info
+# /dev/__properties__/property_info and /dev/__properties__/appcompat_override/property_info
allow init properties_device:file create_file_perms;
allow init property_info:file relabelto;
# /dev/socket
@@ -435,7 +435,3 @@
# PRNG seeder daemon socket is created and listened on by init before forking.
allow init prng_seeder:unix_stream_socket { create bind listen };
-
-# Workaround for test failures (b/306516077)
-# We get a denial for this on VM boot, but the denial is correct.
-dontaudit init device:file relabelto;
diff --git a/private/app_zygote.te b/private/app_zygote.te
index e3869cd..46cea8e 100644
--- a/private/app_zygote.te
+++ b/private/app_zygote.te
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
# Interaction between the app_zygote and its children.
allow app_zygote isolated_app:process setpgid;
+allow app_zygote properties_device:dir mounton;
+
# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
dontaudit app_zygote mnt_expand_file:dir getattr;
diff --git a/private/attributes b/private/attributes
index 77143a3..fe50b0d 100644
--- a/private/attributes
+++ b/private/attributes
@@ -13,4 +13,5 @@
# All SDK sandbox domains
attribute sdk_sandbox_all;
-
+# The SDK sandbox domains for the current SDK level.
+attribute sdk_sandbox_current;
diff --git a/private/compat/34.0/34.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/34.0/34.0.ignore.cil
index d102818..7a4248f 100644
--- a/private/compat/34.0/34.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/34.0/34.0.ignore.cil
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
virtual_camera_service
ot_daemon_service
remote_auth_service
+ security_state_service
sysfs_sync_on_suspend
threadnetwork_service
device_config_aconfig_flags_prop
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index 2d9b30d..2481c07 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -200,7 +200,9 @@
/dev/xt_qtaguid u:object_r:qtaguid_device:s0
/dev/zero u:object_r:zero_device:s0
/dev/__properties__ u:object_r:properties_device:s0
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override u:object_r:properties_device:s0
/dev/__properties__/property_info u:object_r:property_info:s0
+/dev/__properties__/appcompat_override/property_info u:object_r:property_info:s0
#############################
# Linker configuration
#
diff --git a/private/init.te b/private/init.te
index 67e5561..9d3a2c3 100644
--- a/private/init.te
+++ b/private/init.te
@@ -123,7 +123,3 @@
-vm_manager_device_type
-port_device
}:chr_file setattr;
-
-# Workaround for test failures (b/306516077)
-# We get a denial for this on boot, but the denial is correct.
-dontaudit init device:file relabelto;
diff --git a/private/ot_daemon.te b/private/ot_daemon.te
index 1021fd9..066d3d5 100644
--- a/private/ot_daemon.te
+++ b/private/ot_daemon.te
@@ -29,3 +29,6 @@
binder_use(ot_daemon)
add_service(ot_daemon, ot_daemon_service)
binder_call(ot_daemon, system_server)
+
+# Allow OT daemon to write to statsd
+unix_socket_send(ot_daemon, statsdw, statsd)
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te b/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te
index d45da88..bb15057 100644
--- a/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox_34.te
@@ -3,89 +3,7 @@
###
### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes
### for targetSdkVersion=34.
-type sdk_sandbox_34, domain, coredomain, sdk_sandbox_all;
+type sdk_sandbox_34, domain, coredomain, sdk_sandbox_all, sdk_sandbox_current;
net_domain(sdk_sandbox_34)
app_domain(sdk_sandbox_34)
-
-# Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy.
-# Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used.
-allow sdk_sandbox_34 {
- activity_service
- activity_task_service
- appops_service
- audio_service
- audioserver_service
- batteryproperties_service
- batterystats_service
- cameraserver_service
- connectivity_service
- connmetrics_service
- deviceidle_service
- display_service
- dropbox_service
- ephemeral_app_api_service
- font_service
- game_service
- gpu_service
- graphicsstats_service
- hardware_properties_service
- hint_service
- imms_service
- input_method_service
- input_service
- IProxyService_service
- ipsec_service
- launcherapps_service
- legacy_permission_service
- light_service
- locale_service
- media_communication_service
- mediadrmserver_service
- mediaextractor_service
- mediametrics_service
- media_projection_service
- media_router_service
- mediaserver_service
- media_session_service
- memtrackproxy_service
- midi_service
- netpolicy_service
- netstats_service
- network_management_service
- notification_service
- package_service
- permission_checker_service
- permission_service
- permissionmgr_service
- platform_compat_service
- power_service
- procstats_service
- radio_service
- registry_service
- restrictions_service
- rttmanager_service
- search_service
- selection_toolbar_service
- sensor_privacy_service
- sensorservice_service
- servicediscovery_service
- settings_service
- speech_recognition_service
- statusbar_service
- storagestats_service
- surfaceflinger_service
- telecom_service
- tethering_service
- textclassification_service
- textservices_service
- texttospeech_service
- thermal_service
- translation_service
- tv_iapp_service
- tv_input_service
- uimode_service
- vcn_management_service
- webviewupdate_service
-}:service_manager find;
-
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox_audit.te b/private/sdk_sandbox_audit.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bb531ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox_audit.te
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+###
+### SDK Sandbox process.
+###
+### This file defines the audit sdk sandbox security policy for
+### the set of restrictions proposed for the next SDK level.
+###
+### The sdk_sandbox_audit domain has the same rules as the
+### sdk_sandbox_current domain and additional auditing rules
+### for the accesses we are considering forbidding in the upcoming
+### sdk_sandbox_next domain.
+type sdk_sandbox_audit, domain, coredomain, sdk_sandbox_all, sdk_sandbox_current;
+
+net_domain(sdk_sandbox_audit)
+app_domain(sdk_sandbox_audit)
+
+# Auditallow rules for accesses that are currently allowed but we
+# might remove in the future.
+
+auditallow sdk_sandbox_audit {
+ cameraserver_service
+ ephemeral_app_api_service
+ mediadrmserver_service
+ radio_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
+auditallow sdk_sandbox_audit {
+ property_type
+ -system_property_type
+}:file rw_file_perms;
+
+auditallow sdk_sandbox_audit {
+ property_type
+ -system_property_type
+}:dir rw_dir_perms;
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox_current.te b/private/sdk_sandbox_current.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..55e5bc1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox_current.te
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+###
+### SDK Sandbox process.
+###
+### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes
+### for the current SDK level.
+
+# Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy.
+# Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used.
+allow sdk_sandbox_current {
+ activity_service
+ activity_task_service
+ appops_service
+ audio_service
+ audioserver_service
+ batteryproperties_service
+ batterystats_service
+ cameraserver_service
+ connectivity_service
+ connmetrics_service
+ deviceidle_service
+ display_service
+ dropbox_service
+ ephemeral_app_api_service
+ font_service
+ game_service
+ gpu_service
+ graphicsstats_service
+ hardware_properties_service
+ hint_service
+ imms_service
+ input_method_service
+ input_service
+ IProxyService_service
+ ipsec_service
+ launcherapps_service
+ legacy_permission_service
+ light_service
+ locale_service
+ media_communication_service
+ mediadrmserver_service
+ mediaextractor_service
+ mediametrics_service
+ media_projection_service
+ media_router_service
+ mediaserver_service
+ media_session_service
+ memtrackproxy_service
+ midi_service
+ netpolicy_service
+ netstats_service
+ network_management_service
+ notification_service
+ package_service
+ permission_checker_service
+ permission_service
+ permissionmgr_service
+ platform_compat_service
+ power_service
+ procstats_service
+ radio_service
+ registry_service
+ restrictions_service
+ rttmanager_service
+ search_service
+ selection_toolbar_service
+ sensor_privacy_service
+ sensorservice_service
+ servicediscovery_service
+ settings_service
+ speech_recognition_service
+ statusbar_service
+ storagestats_service
+ surfaceflinger_service
+ telecom_service
+ tethering_service
+ textclassification_service
+ textservices_service
+ texttospeech_service
+ thermal_service
+ translation_service
+ tv_iapp_service
+ tv_input_service
+ uimode_service
+ vcn_management_service
+ webviewupdate_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
diff --git a/private/seapp_contexts b/private/seapp_contexts
index bc68209..74701df 100644
--- a/private/seapp_contexts
+++ b/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
# fromRunAs (boolean)
# isIsolatedComputeApp (boolean)
# isSdkSandboxNext (boolean)
+# isSdkSandboxAudit (boolean)
#
# All specified input selectors in an entry must match (i.e. logical AND).
# An unspecified string or boolean selector with no default will match any
@@ -49,10 +50,20 @@
# to provide isolated processes with relaxed security restrictions.
# An unspecified isIsolatedComputeApp defaults to false.
#
+# The sdk_sandbox_next and sdk_sandbox_audit domains are special domains for the
+# SDK sandbox process. sdk_sandbox_next defines the set of restrictions proposed
+# for the upcoming dessert release. sdk_sandbox_audit uses the same restrictions
+# as the current dessert release, with additional auditing rules for the accesses
+# we are considering forbidding in the upcoming release.
+#
# isSdkSandboxNext=true means sdk sandbox processes will get
# sdk_sandbox_next sepolicy applied to them.
# An unspecified isSdkSandboxNext defaults to false.
#
+# isSdkSandboxAudit=true means sdk sandbox processes will get
+# sdk_sandbox_audit sepolicy applied to them.
+# An unspecified isSdkSandboxAudit defaults to false.
+#
# Precedence: entries are compared using the following rules, in the order shown
# (see external/selinux/libselinux/src/android/android_platform.c,
# seapp_context_cmp()).
@@ -174,6 +185,7 @@
user=_isolated isIsolatedComputeApp=true domain=isolated_compute_app levelFrom=user
user=_sdksandbox domain=sdk_sandbox_34 type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
user=_sdksandbox isSdkSandboxNext=true domain=sdk_sandbox_next type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_sdksandbox isSdkSandboxAudit=true domain=sdk_sandbox_audit type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
user=_app seinfo=app_zygote domain=app_zygote levelFrom=user
user=_app seinfo=media domain=mediaprovider type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
user=_app seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index f97e638..ae30b3f 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -369,6 +369,7 @@
search_ui u:object_r:search_ui_service:s0
secure_element u:object_r:secure_element_service:s0
sec_key_att_app_id_provider u:object_r:sec_key_att_app_id_provider_service:s0
+security_state u:object_r:security_state_service:s0
selection_toolbar u:object_r:selection_toolbar_service:s0
sensorservice u:object_r:sensorservice_service:s0
sensor_privacy u:object_r:sensor_privacy_service:s0
diff --git a/private/webview_zygote.te b/private/webview_zygote.te
index 0556950..7b05af2 100644
--- a/private/webview_zygote.te
+++ b/private/webview_zygote.te
@@ -83,6 +83,8 @@
allow webview_zygote system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+allow webview_zygote properties_device:dir mounton;
+
# Send unsolicited message to system_server
unix_socket_send(webview_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
diff --git a/private/zygote.te b/private/zygote.te
index 788dafe..4815ecc 100644
--- a/private/zygote.te
+++ b/private/zygote.te
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@
user_profile_data_file
# /storage/emulated/$userId/Android/{data,obb}
media_rw_data_file
+ # /dev/__properties__
+ properties_device
}:dir { mounton search };
# Traverse /data_mirror to get to the above directories while their normal paths
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index d630a24..ec8b247 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -337,10 +337,6 @@
allow domain apex_mnt_dir:dir { getattr search };
allow domain apex_mnt_dir:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-# Allow everyone to read media server-configurable flags, so that libstagefright can be
-# configured using server-configurable flags
-get_prop(domain, device_config_media_native_prop)
-
###
### neverallow rules
###
diff --git a/public/init.te b/public/init.te
index e552ec2..29dd42d 100644
--- a/public/init.te
+++ b/public/init.te
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@
allow init properties_device:dir relabelto;
allow init properties_serial:file { write relabelto };
allow init property_type:file { append create getattr map open read relabelto rename setattr unlink write };
-# /dev/__properties__/property_info
+# /dev/__properties__/property_info and /dev/__properties/appcompat_override/property_info
allow init properties_device:file create_file_perms;
allow init property_info:file relabelto;
# /dev/event-log-tags
diff --git a/public/service.te b/public/service.te
index 8f13cb2..3484469 100644
--- a/public/service.te
+++ b/public/service.te
@@ -212,6 +212,7 @@
type search_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type search_ui_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type sec_key_att_app_id_provider_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type security_state_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type selection_toolbar_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type sensorservice_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type sensor_privacy_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
diff --git a/tools/check_seapp.c b/tools/check_seapp.c
index 21bc87a..02882af 100644
--- a/tools/check_seapp.c
+++ b/tools/check_seapp.c
@@ -228,6 +228,7 @@
{ .name = "minTargetSdkVersion", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_uint },
{ .name = "fromRunAs", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
{ .name = "isIsolatedComputeApp", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
+ { .name = "isSdkSandboxAudit", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
{ .name = "isSdkSandboxNext", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
/*Outputs*/
{ .name = "domain", .dir = dir_out, .fn_validate = validate_domain },
diff --git a/vendor/hal_drm_clearkey.te b/vendor/hal_drm_clearkey.te
index ab474d6..4b4ee46 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_drm_clearkey.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_drm_clearkey.te
@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
init_daemon_domain(hal_drm_clearkey_aidl)
hal_server_domain(hal_drm_clearkey_aidl, hal_drm)
+allow hal_drm_clearkey_aidl mediacodec:fd use;