Share isolated properties across islolated apps
Introduce isolated_app_all typeattribute to share policies between
isolated_app and future similar apps that wish to be enforced with
isolation properties.
Bug: 255597123
Test: m && presubmit
Change-Id: I0d53816f71e7d7a91cc379bcba796ba65a197c89
diff --git a/private/isolated_app.te b/private/isolated_app.te
index 828ffb1..730e4af 100644
--- a/private/isolated_app.te
+++ b/private/isolated_app.te
@@ -1,153 +1,11 @@
###
-### Services with isolatedProcess=true in their manifest.
+### isolated_apps.
###
-### This file defines the rules for isolated apps. An "isolated
-### app" is an APP with UID between AID_ISOLATED_START (99000)
-### and AID_ISOLATED_END (99999).
+### This file defines the rules for isolated apps that does not wish to use
+### service managers and does not require extra computational resources.
###
typeattribute isolated_app coredomain;
app_domain(isolated_app)
-
-# Access already open app data files received over Binder or local socket IPC.
-allow isolated_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file sdk_sandbox_data_file}:file { append read write getattr lock map };
-
-# Allow access to network sockets received over IPC. New socket creation is not
-# permitted.
-allow isolated_app { ephemeral_app priv_app untrusted_app_all }:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } { rw_socket_perms_no_ioctl };
-
-allow isolated_app activity_service:service_manager find;
-allow isolated_app display_service:service_manager find;
-allow isolated_app webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
-
-# Google Breakpad (crash reporter for Chrome) relies on ptrace
-# functionality. Without the ability to ptrace, the crash reporter
-# tool is broken.
-# b/20150694
-# https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=475270
-allow isolated_app self:process ptrace;
-
-# b/32896414: Allow accessing sdcard file descriptors passed to isolated_apps
-# by other processes. Open should never be allowed, and is blocked by
-# neverallow rules below.
-# media_rw_data_file is included for sdcardfs, and can be removed if sdcardfs
-# is modified to change the secontext when accessing the lower filesystem.
-allow isolated_app { sdcard_type fuse media_rw_data_file }:file { read write append getattr lock map };
-
-# For webviews, isolated_app processes can be forked from the webview_zygote
-# in addition to the zygote. Allow access to resources inherited from the
-# webview_zygote process. These rules are specialized copies of the ones in app.te.
-# Inherit FDs from the webview_zygote.
-allow isolated_app webview_zygote:fd use;
-# Notify webview_zygote of child death.
-allow isolated_app webview_zygote:process sigchld;
-# Inherit logd write socket.
-allow isolated_app webview_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
-# Read system properties managed by webview_zygote.
-allow isolated_app webview_zygote_tmpfs:file read;
-
-# Inherit FDs from the app_zygote.
-allow isolated_app app_zygote:fd use;
-# Notify app_zygote of child death.
-allow isolated_app app_zygote:process sigchld;
-# Inherit logd write socket.
-allow isolated_app app_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
-
-# TODO (b/63631799) fix this access
-# suppress denials to /data/local/tmp
-dontaudit isolated_app shell_data_file:dir search;
-
-# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
-# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
-perfetto_producer(isolated_app)
-
-# Allow profiling if the main app has been marked as profileable or
-# debuggable.
-can_profile_heap(isolated_app)
-can_profile_perf(isolated_app)
-
-#####
-##### Neverallow
-#####
-
-# Isolated apps should not directly open app data files themselves.
-neverallow isolated_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file sdk_sandbox_data_file}:file open;
-
-# Only allow appending to /data/anr/traces.txt (b/27853304, b/18340553)
-# TODO: are there situations where isolated_apps write to this file?
-# TODO: should we tighten these restrictions further?
-neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:file ~{ open append };
-neverallow isolated_app anr_data_file:dir ~search;
-
-# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use HwBinder
-neverallow isolated_app hwbinder_device:chr_file *;
-neverallow isolated_app *:hwservice_manager *;
-
-# Isolated apps must not be permitted to use VndBinder
-neverallow isolated_app vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
-
-# Isolated apps must not be permitted to perform actions on Binder and VndBinder service_manager
-# except the find actions for services allowlisted below.
-neverallow isolated_app *:service_manager ~find;
-
-# b/17487348
-# Isolated apps can only access three services,
-# activity_service, display_service, webviewupdate_service.
-neverallow isolated_app {
- service_manager_type
- -activity_service
- -display_service
- -webviewupdate_service
-}:service_manager find;
-
-# Isolated apps shouldn't be able to access the driver directly.
-neverallow isolated_app gpu_device:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
-
-# Do not allow isolated_app access to /cache
-neverallow isolated_app cache_file:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
-neverallow isolated_app cache_file:file ~{ read getattr };
-
-# Do not allow isolated_app to access external storage, except for files passed
-# via file descriptors (b/32896414).
-neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file sdcard_type fuse }:dir ~getattr;
-neverallow isolated_app { storage_file mnt_user_file }:file_class_set *;
-neverallow isolated_app { sdcard_type fuse }:{ devfile_class_set lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } *;
-neverallow isolated_app { sdcard_type fuse }:file ~{ read write append getattr lock map };
-
-# Do not allow USB access
-neverallow isolated_app { usb_device usbaccessory_device }:chr_file *;
-
-# Restrict the webview_zygote control socket.
-neverallow isolated_app webview_zygote:sock_file write;
-
-# Limit the /sys files which isolated_app can access. This is important
-# for controlling isolated_app attack surface.
-neverallow isolated_app {
- sysfs_type
- -sysfs_devices_system_cpu
- -sysfs_transparent_hugepage
- -sysfs_usb # TODO: check with audio team if needed for isolated_app (b/28417852)
- -sysfs_fs_incfs_features
-}:file no_rw_file_perms;
-
-# No creation of sockets families other than AF_UNIX sockets.
-# List taken from system/sepolicy/public/global_macros - socket_class_set
-# excluding unix_stream_socket and unix_dgram_socket.
-# Many of these are socket families which have never and will never
-# be compiled into the Android kernel.
-neverallow isolated_app { self ephemeral_app priv_app sdk_sandbox untrusted_app_all }:{
- socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket
- key_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket
- netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket
- netlink_selinux_socket netlink_audit_socket netlink_dnrt_socket
- netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket netlink_iscsi_socket
- netlink_fib_lookup_socket netlink_connector_socket netlink_netfilter_socket
- netlink_generic_socket netlink_scsitransport_socket netlink_rdma_socket
- netlink_crypto_socket sctp_socket icmp_socket ax25_socket ipx_socket
- netrom_socket atmpvc_socket x25_socket rose_socket decnet_socket atmsvc_socket
- rds_socket irda_socket pppox_socket llc_socket can_socket tipc_socket
- bluetooth_socket iucv_socket rxrpc_socket isdn_socket phonet_socket
- ieee802154_socket caif_socket alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket
- qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket
-} create;
+isolated_app_domain(isolated_app)