diff --git a/README.apps.md b/README.apps.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bdb13e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/README.apps.md
@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+The policy defines multiple types and attributes for apps. This document is a
+high-level overview of these. For further details on each type, refer to their
+specific files in the public/ and private/ directories.
+
+## appdomain
+In general, all apps will have the `appdomain` attribute. You can think of
+`appdomain` as any app started by Zygote. The macro `app_domain()` should be
+used to define a type that is considered an app (see public/te_macros).
+
+## untrusted_app
+Third-party apps (for example, installed from the Play Store), targeting the
+most recent SDK version will be typed as `untrusted_app`. This is the default
+domain for apps, unless a more specific criteria applies.
+
+When an app is targeting a previous SDK version, it may have the
+`untrusted_app_xx` type where xx is the targetSdkVersion. For instance, an app
+with `targetSdkVersion = 32` in its manifest will be typed as `untrusted_app_32`.
+Not all targetSdkVersion have a specific type, some version are skipped when no
+differences were introduced (see public/untrusted_app.te for more details).
+
+The `untrusted_app_all` attribute can be used to reference all the types
+described in this section (that is, `untrusted_app`, `untrusted_app_30`,
+`untrusted_app_32`, etc.).
+
+## isolated_app
+Apps may be restricted when using isolatedProcess=true in their manifest. In
+this case, they will be assigned the `isolated_app` type. A similar type
+`isolated_compute_app` exist for some restricted services.
+
+Both types `isolated_app` and `isolated_compute_app` are grouped under the
+attribute `isolated_app_all`.
+
+## ephemeral_app
+Apps that are run without installation. These are apps deployed for example via
+Google Play Instant. These are more constrained than `untrusted_app`.
+
+## sdk_sandbox
+SDK runtime apps, installed as part of the Privacy Sandbox project. These are
+sandboxed to limit their communication channels.
+
+## platform_app
+Apps that are signed with the platform key. These are installed within the
+system or vendor image. com.android.systemui is an example of an app running
+with this type.
+
+## system_app
+Apps pre-installed on a device, signed by the platform key and running with the
+system UID. com.android.settings is an example of an app running with this
+type.
+
+## priv_app
+Apps shipped as part of the device and installed in one of the
+`/{system,vendor,product}/priv-app` directories.
+com.google.android.apps.messaging is an example of an app running as priv_app.
+Permissions for these apps need to be explicitly granted, see
+https://source.android.com/docs/core/permissions/perms-allowlist for more
+details.
diff --git a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
index 7ff0702..dac85a2 100644
--- a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
+++ b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
@@ -260,14 +260,14 @@
 		"gnss_time_update_service":     EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"grammatical_inflection":       EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"graphicsstats":                EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
-		"gpu":                          EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+		"gpu":                          []string{"gpu_service_fuzzer"},
 		"hardware":                     EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"hardware_properties":          EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"hdmi_control":                 EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"healthconnect":                EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"ions":                         EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"idmap":                        EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
-		"incident":                     EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+		"incident":                     []string{"incidentd_service_fuzzer"},
 		"incidentcompanion":            EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"inputflinger":                 EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"input_method":                 EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
diff --git a/private/app.te b/private/app.te
index da60086..754c802 100644
--- a/private/app.te
+++ b/private/app.te
@@ -48,11 +48,6 @@
 get_prop(appdomain, persist_wm_debug_prop)
 get_prop(appdomain, persist_sysui_builder_extras_prop)
 
-# Allow ART to be configurable via device_config properties
-# (ART "runs" inside the app process)
-get_prop(appdomain, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
-get_prop(appdomain, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
-
 # Allow the heap dump ART plugin to the count of sessions waiting for OOME
 get_prop(appdomain, traced_oome_heap_session_count_prop)
 
@@ -267,6 +262,9 @@
 # Access via already open fds is ok even for mlstrustedsubject.
 allow { appdomain -isolated_app_all -sdk_sandbox_all } { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file { getattr map read write };
 
+# Access open fds from SDK sandbox
+allow appdomain sdk_sandbox_data_file:file { getattr read };
+
 # Traverse into expanded storage
 allow appdomain mnt_expand_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index 30ceb24..2cffdd8 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -87,8 +87,13 @@
 # Allow all domains to check whether MTE is set to permissive mode.
 get_prop(domain, permissive_mte_prop);
 
+# Allow ART to be configurable via device_config properties
+# (ART "runs" inside the app process), and MTE bootloader override to be
+# observed by everything
 get_prop(domain, device_config_memory_safety_native_boot_prop);
 get_prop(domain, device_config_memory_safety_native_prop);
+get_prop(domain, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop);
+get_prop(domain, device_config_runtime_native_prop);
 
 # For now, everyone can access core property files
 # Device specific properties are not granted by default
diff --git a/private/mediaprovider_app.te b/private/mediaprovider_app.te
index 1f84eca..7ad8feb 100644
--- a/private/mediaprovider_app.te
+++ b/private/mediaprovider_app.te
@@ -35,9 +35,6 @@
 # Talk to regular app services
 allow mediaprovider_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
 
-# Read SDK sandbox data files
-allow mediaprovider_app sdk_sandbox_data_file:file { getattr read };
-
 # Talk to the GPU service
 binder_call(mediaprovider_app, gpuservice)
 
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index 8135ae5..102c111 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -406,6 +406,8 @@
 ro.camera.notify_nfc          u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.camera.enableLazyHal       u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.camera.enableCamera1MaxZsl u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.camera.disableJpegR        u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.camera.enableCompositeAPI0JpegR u:object_r:camera_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 
 ro.camerax.extensions.enabled u:object_r:camerax_extensions_prop:s0 exact bool
 
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox_all.te b/private/sdk_sandbox_all.te
index 9a3f05f..6e7ba50 100644
--- a/private/sdk_sandbox_all.te
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox_all.te
@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@
 allow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow sdk_sandbox_all sdk_sandbox_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 
+# allow apps to pass open fds to the sdk sandbox
+allow sdk_sandbox_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { getattr read };
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
@@ -64,7 +67,7 @@
 
 # SDK sandbox processes have their own storage not related to app_data_file or privapp_data_file
 neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
-neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file ~{ getattr read };
 
 # SDK sandbox processes don't  have any access to external storage
 neverallow sdk_sandbox_all { media_rw_data_file }:dir no_rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox_next.te b/private/sdk_sandbox_next.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fd16ca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox_next.te
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
+###
+### SDK Sandbox process.
+###
+### This file defines the security policy for the sdk sandbox processes
+### for a test set of restrictions. These restrictions will be adapted
+### with modifications, into the set of restrictions for the next SDK
+### level.
+type sdk_sandbox_next, domain, coredomain, sdk_sandbox_all;
+
+net_domain(sdk_sandbox_next)
+app_domain(sdk_sandbox_next)
+
+# Allow finding services. This is different from ephemeral_app policy.
+# Adding services manually to the allowlist is preferred hence app_api_service is not used.
+allow sdk_sandbox_next {
+    activity_service
+    activity_task_service
+    appops_service
+    audio_service
+    audioserver_service
+    batteryproperties_service
+    batterystats_service
+    connectivity_service
+    connmetrics_service
+    deviceidle_service
+    display_service
+    dropbox_service
+    font_service
+    game_service
+    gpu_service
+    graphicsstats_service
+    hardware_properties_service
+    hint_service
+    imms_service
+    input_method_service
+    input_service
+    IProxyService_service
+    ipsec_service
+    launcherapps_service
+    legacy_permission_service
+    light_service
+    locale_service
+    media_communication_service
+    mediaextractor_service
+    mediametrics_service
+    media_projection_service
+    media_router_service
+    mediaserver_service
+    media_session_service
+    memtrackproxy_service
+    midi_service
+    netpolicy_service
+    netstats_service
+    network_management_service
+    notification_service
+    package_service
+    permission_checker_service
+    permission_service
+    permissionmgr_service
+    platform_compat_service
+    power_service
+    procstats_service
+    registry_service
+    restrictions_service
+    rttmanager_service
+    search_service
+    selection_toolbar_service
+    sensor_privacy_service
+    sensorservice_service
+    servicediscovery_service
+    settings_service
+    speech_recognition_service
+    statusbar_service
+    storagestats_service
+    surfaceflinger_service
+    telecom_service
+    tethering_service
+    textclassification_service
+    textservices_service
+    texttospeech_service
+    thermal_service
+    translation_service
+    tv_iapp_service
+    tv_input_service
+    uimode_service
+    vcn_management_service
+    webviewupdate_service
+}:service_manager find;
+
diff --git a/private/seapp_contexts b/private/seapp_contexts
index fbdd93f..4454bd7 100644
--- a/private/seapp_contexts
+++ b/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 #       minTargetSdkVersion (unsigned integer)
 #       fromRunAs (boolean)
 #       isIsolatedComputeApp (boolean)
+#       isSdkSandboxNext (boolean)
 #
 # All specified input selectors in an entry must match (i.e. logical AND).
 # An unspecified string or boolean selector with no default will match any
@@ -47,6 +48,9 @@
 # with user=_isolated. This selector should not be used unless it is intended
 # to provide isolated processes with relaxed security restrictions.
 #
+# isSdkSandboxNext=true means sdk sandbox processes will get
+# sdk_sandbox_next sepolicy applied to them.
+#
 # Precedence: entries are compared using the following rules, in the order shown
 # (see external/selinux/libselinux/src/android/android_platform.c,
 # seapp_context_cmp()).
@@ -64,6 +68,7 @@
 #              defaults to 0 if unspecified.
 #       (8) fromRunAs=true before fromRunAs=false.
 #       (9) isIsolatedComputeApp=true before isIsolatedComputeApp=false
+#       (10) isSdkSandboxNext=true before isSdkSandboxNext=false
 # (A fixed selector is more specific than a prefix, i.e. ending in *, and a
 # longer prefix is more specific than a shorter prefix.)
 # Apps are checked against entries in precedence order until the first match,
@@ -165,6 +170,7 @@
 user=_isolated domain=isolated_app levelFrom=user
 user=_isolated isIsolatedComputeApp=true domain=isolated_compute_app levelFrom=user
 user=_sdksandbox domain=sdk_sandbox_34 type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_sdksandbox isSdkSandboxNext=true domain=sdk_sandbox_next type=sdk_sandbox_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app seinfo=app_zygote domain=app_zygote levelFrom=user
 user=_app seinfo=media domain=mediaprovider type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index db6820d..4356c26 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -1207,6 +1207,7 @@
 
 # On userdebug build we may profile system server. Allow it to write and create its own profile.
 userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow system_server user_profile_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
   allow system_server user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 ')
 # Allow system server to load JVMTI agents under control of a property.
diff --git a/public/netd.te b/public/netd.te
index e3ea1cb..3854017 100644
--- a/public/netd.te
+++ b/public/netd.te
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@
 allow netd system_file:file lock;
 
 # Allow netd to spawn dnsmasq in it's own domain
-allow netd dnsmasq:process signal;
+allow netd dnsmasq:process { sigkill signal };
 
 # Allow netd to publish a binder service and make binder calls.
 binder_use(netd)
diff --git a/tools/check_seapp.c b/tools/check_seapp.c
index e57a6b3..0d7a4d1 100644
--- a/tools/check_seapp.c
+++ b/tools/check_seapp.c
@@ -214,6 +214,7 @@
                 { .name = "minTargetSdkVersion", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_uint },
                 { .name = "fromRunAs",       .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
                 { .name = "isIsolatedComputeApp", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
+                { .name = "isSdkSandboxNext", .dir = dir_in, .fn_validate = validate_bool },
                 /*Outputs*/
                 { .name = "domain",         .dir = dir_out, .fn_validate = validate_domain  },
                 { .name = "type",           .dir = dir_out, .fn_validate = validate_type  },