Merge "sepolicy: allow AAudio apps to use FDs from the audio HAL" into oc-dev
am: b9d5d20790
Change-Id: I521150942c9f654ad038b7b74070b35a47370300
diff --git a/Android.mk b/Android.mk
index b7db00b..96b2237 100644
--- a/Android.mk
+++ b/Android.mk
@@ -217,10 +217,14 @@
-D target_full_treble=$(PRODUCT_FULL_TREBLE) \
-s $^ > $@
+# b/37755687
+CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS := ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=0
+
reqd_policy_mask.cil := $(intermediates)/reqd_policy_mask.cil
$(reqd_policy_mask.cil): $(reqd_policy_mask.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
- $(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -C -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $<
+ $(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -C -M -c \
+ $(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $<
reqd_policy_mask.conf :=
@@ -253,7 +257,7 @@
$(plat_pub_policy.cil): PRIVATE_REQD_MASK := $(reqd_policy_mask.cil)
$(plat_pub_policy.cil): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy $(plat_pub_policy.conf) $(reqd_policy_mask.cil)
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
- $(hide) $< -C -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@.tmp $(PRIVATE_POL_CONF)
+ $(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $< -C -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@.tmp $(PRIVATE_POL_CONF)
$(hide) grep -Fxv -f $(PRIVATE_REQD_MASK) $@.tmp > $@
plat_pub_policy.conf :=
@@ -311,7 +315,8 @@
$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc \
$(call build_policy, $(sepolicy_build_cil_workaround_files), $(PLAT_PRIVATE_POLICY))
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
- $(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -C -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $<
+ $(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -C -c \
+ $(POLICYVERS) -o $@ $<
$(hide) cat $(PRIVATE_ADDITIONAL_CIL_FILES) >> $@
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/secilc -M true -G -N -c $(POLICYVERS) $@ -o /dev/null -f /dev/null
@@ -419,7 +424,7 @@
$(nonplat_policy_raw): $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy $(nonplat_policy.conf) \
$(reqd_policy_mask.cil)
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
- $(hide) $< -C -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@.tmp $(PRIVATE_POL_CONF)
+ $(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $< -C -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@.tmp $(PRIVATE_POL_CONF)
$(hide) grep -Fxv -f $(PRIVATE_REQD_MASK) $@.tmp > $@
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE) : PRIVATE_VERS := $(BOARD_SEPOLICY_VERS)
@@ -543,7 +548,8 @@
$(LOCAL_BUILT_MODULE): $(sepolicy.recovery.conf) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy \
$(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sepolicy-analyze
@mkdir -p $(dir $@)
- $(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -c $(POLICYVERS) -o $@.tmp $<
+ $(hide) $(CHECKPOLICY_ASAN_OPTIONS) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/checkpolicy -M -c \
+ $(POLICYVERS) -o $@.tmp $<
$(hide) $(HOST_OUT_EXECUTABLES)/sepolicy-analyze $@.tmp permissive > $@.permissivedomains
$(hide) if [ "$(TARGET_BUILD_VARIANT)" = "user" -a -s $@.permissivedomains ]; then \
echo "==========" 1>&2; \
diff --git a/private/app_neverallows.te b/private/app_neverallows.te
index 0917724..9c762a1 100644
--- a/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -5,7 +5,15 @@
# Only allow domains in AOSP to use the untrusted_app_all attribute.
neverallow { untrusted_app_all -untrusted_app -untrusted_app_25 } domain:process fork;
-define(`all_untrusted_apps',`{ untrusted_app_all untrusted_app_25 untrusted_app ephemeral_app isolated_app }')
+define(`all_untrusted_apps',`{
+ ephemeral_app
+ isolated_app
+ mediaprovider
+ untrusted_app
+ untrusted_app_25
+ untrusted_app_all
+ untrusted_v2_app
+}')
# Receive or send uevent messages.
neverallow all_untrusted_apps domain:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket *;
@@ -27,9 +35,9 @@
# Do not allow untrusted apps to connect to the property service
# or set properties. b/10243159
-neverallow all_untrusted_apps property_socket:sock_file write;
-neverallow all_untrusted_apps init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-neverallow all_untrusted_apps property_type:property_service set;
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } property_socket:sock_file write;
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } init:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } property_type:property_service set;
# Do not allow untrusted apps to be assigned mlstrustedsubject.
# This would undermine the per-user isolation model being
@@ -67,15 +75,15 @@
} *;
# Do not allow untrusted apps access to /cache
-neverallow all_untrusted_apps { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
-neverallow all_untrusted_apps { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };
# Do not allow untrusted apps to create/unlink files outside of its sandbox,
# internal storage or sdcard.
# World accessible data locations allow application to fill the device
# with unaccounted for data. This data will not get removed during
# application un-installation.
-neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } {
fs_type
-fuse # sdcard
-sdcardfs # sdcard
diff --git a/private/bluetooth.te b/private/bluetooth.te
index 1c0e14f..451d27a 100644
--- a/private/bluetooth.te
+++ b/private/bluetooth.te
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
-# bluetooth subsystem
+# bluetooth app
typeattribute bluetooth coredomain;
-typeattribute bluetooth domain_deprecated;
app_domain(bluetooth)
net_domain(bluetooth)
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index 2879265..937ede6 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -94,7 +94,6 @@
/dev/ion u:object_r:ion_device:s0
/dev/keychord u:object_r:keychord_device:s0
/dev/kmem u:object_r:kmem_device:s0
-/dev/log(/.*)? u:object_r:log_device:s0
/dev/loop-control u:object_r:loop_control_device:s0
/dev/mem u:object_r:kmem_device:s0
/dev/modem.* u:object_r:radio_device:s0
@@ -107,6 +106,7 @@
/dev/ptmx u:object_r:ptmx_device:s0
/dev/pvrsrvkm u:object_r:gpu_device:s0
/dev/kmsg u:object_r:kmsg_device:s0
+/dev/kmsg_debug u:object_r:kmsg_debug_device:s0
/dev/null u:object_r:null_device:s0
/dev/nvhdcp1 u:object_r:video_device:s0
/dev/random u:object_r:random_device:s0
diff --git a/private/mediaprovider.te b/private/mediaprovider.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..63f56c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/mediaprovider.te
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+###
+### A domain for android.process.media, which contains both
+### MediaProvider and DownloadProvider and associated services.
+###
+
+typeattribute mediaprovider coredomain;
+app_domain(mediaprovider)
+
+# DownloadProvider accesses the network.
+net_domain(mediaprovider)
+
+# DownloadProvider uses /cache.
+allow mediaprovider cache_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow mediaprovider cache_file:file create_file_perms;
+# /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link.
+allow mediaprovider cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+allow mediaprovider app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaprovider audioserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaprovider drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaprovider mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+allow mediaprovider surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow MediaProvider to read/write cached ringtones (opened by system).
+allow mediaprovider ringtone_file:file { getattr read write };
+
+# MtpServer uses /dev/mtp_usb
+allow mediaprovider mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# MtpServer uses /dev/usb-ffs/mtp
+allow mediaprovider functionfs:dir search;
+allow mediaprovider functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
+
+# MtpServer sets sys.usb.ffs.mtp.ready
+set_prop(mediaprovider, ffs_prop)
diff --git a/private/priv_app.te b/private/priv_app.te
index 065ea1a..109c869 100644
--- a/private/priv_app.te
+++ b/private/priv_app.te
@@ -105,20 +105,6 @@
allow priv_app preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
allow priv_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-# TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909
-# android.process.media uses /dev/mtp_usb
-allow priv_app mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909
-# MtpServer uses /dev/usb-ffs/mtp
-allow priv_app functionfs:dir search;
-allow priv_app functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# TODO: revert this as part of fixing 33574909
-# Traverse into /mnt/media_rw for bypassing FUSE daemon
-# TODO: narrow this to just MediaProvider
-allow priv_app mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
-
# Allow privileged apps (e.g. GMS core) to generate unique hardware IDs
allow priv_app keystore:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
diff --git a/private/seapp_contexts b/private/seapp_contexts
index 4356889..dc7e389 100644
--- a/private/seapp_contexts
+++ b/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -102,6 +102,7 @@
user=shared_relro domain=shared_relro
user=shell seinfo=platform domain=shell type=shell_data_file
user=_isolated domain=isolated_app levelFrom=user
+user=_app seinfo=media domain=mediaprovider name=android.process.media type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
user=_app seinfo=platform domain=platform_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
user=_app isV2App=true isEphemeralApp=true domain=ephemeral_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
user=_app isV2App=true domain=untrusted_v2_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app.te b/private/untrusted_app.te
index 68c1a41..93a73f1 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app.te
@@ -24,6 +24,14 @@
net_domain(untrusted_app)
bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app)
+# allow untrusted apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
+# modify them other than to connect
+allow untrusted_app system_server:udp_socket { connect getattr read recvfrom sendto write };
+
# Allow the allocation and use of ptys
# Used by: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
create_pty(untrusted_app)
+
+neverallow untrusted_app system_server:udp_socket {
+ accept append bind create getopt ioctl listen lock name_bind
+ relabelfrom relabelto setattr setopt shutdown };
diff --git a/public/crash_dump.te b/public/crash_dump.te
index ee617a1..c101b34 100644
--- a/public/crash_dump.te
+++ b/public/crash_dump.te
@@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow crash_dump logd:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
+
+ # Let crash_dump write to /dev/kmsg_debug crashes that happen before logd comes up.
+ allow crash_dump kmsg_debug_device:chr_file { open append };
')
# Use inherited file descriptors
diff --git a/public/device.te b/public/device.te
index 4a3bec9..475948d 100644
--- a/public/device.te
+++ b/public/device.te
@@ -30,12 +30,12 @@
type input_device, dev_type;
type kmem_device, dev_type;
type port_device, dev_type;
-type log_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
type mtd_device, dev_type;
type mtp_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
type nfc_device, dev_type;
type ptmx_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
type kmsg_device, dev_type;
+type kmsg_debug_device, dev_type;
type null_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
type random_device, dev_type, mlstrustedobject;
type sensors_device, dev_type;
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index c48950d..61fd28c 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@
# Only domains spawned from zygote and runas may have the appdomain attribute.
neverallow { domain -runas -webview_zygote -zygote } {
- appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su') -bluetooth
+ appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
}:process { transition dyntransition };
# Minimize read access to shell- or app-writable symlinks.
diff --git a/public/domain_deprecated.te b/public/domain_deprecated.te
index 9777753..dc99b89 100644
--- a/public/domain_deprecated.te
+++ b/public/domain_deprecated.te
@@ -208,7 +208,6 @@
} proc:lnk_file { open ioctl lock }; # getattr read granted in domain
auditallow {
domain_deprecated
- -bluetooth
-fingerprintd
-healthd
-netd
@@ -222,7 +221,6 @@
} sysfs:dir { open getattr read ioctl lock }; # search granted in domain
auditallow {
domain_deprecated
- -bluetooth
-fingerprintd
-healthd
-netd
@@ -236,7 +234,6 @@
} sysfs:file r_file_perms;
auditallow {
domain_deprecated
- -bluetooth
-fingerprintd
-healthd
-netd
diff --git a/public/init.te b/public/init.te
index 6d43ef4..02859ba 100644
--- a/public/init.te
+++ b/public/init.te
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@
# /dev/kmsg
allow init tmpfs:chr_file relabelfrom;
allow init kmsg_device:chr_file { write relabelto };
+# /dev/kmsg_debug
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+ allow init kmsg_debug_device:chr_file { write relabelto };
+')
# /dev/__properties__
allow init properties_device:dir relabelto;
allow init properties_serial:file { write relabelto };
@@ -81,6 +85,7 @@
# /config
allow init configfs:dir mounton;
allow init configfs:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow init configfs:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms;
# Use tmpfs as /data, used for booting when /data is encrypted
allow init tmpfs:dir relabelfrom;
diff --git a/public/kernel.te b/public/kernel.te
index 9537c0d..7f5d224 100644
--- a/public/kernel.te
+++ b/public/kernel.te
@@ -50,11 +50,12 @@
allow kernel selinuxfs:file write;
allow kernel self:security setcheckreqprot;
-# MTP sync (b/15835289)
# kernel thread "loop0", used by the loop block device, for ASECs (b/17158723)
-allow kernel priv_app:fd use;
allow kernel sdcard_type:file { read write };
+# f_mtp driver accesses files from kernel context.
+allow kernel mediaprovider:fd use;
+
# Allow the kernel to read OBB files from app directories. (b/17428116)
# Kernel thread "loop0" reads a vold supplied file descriptor.
# Fixes CTS tests:
diff --git a/public/mediaprovider.te b/public/mediaprovider.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..24170a5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/mediaprovider.te
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+###
+### A domain for android.process.media, which contains both
+### MediaProvider and DownloadProvider and associated services.
+###
+
+type mediaprovider, domain;
diff --git a/public/shell.te b/public/shell.te
index 1fb896a..9540cca 100644
--- a/public/shell.te
+++ b/public/shell.te
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
r_dir_file(shell, system_file)
allow shell system_file:file x_file_perms;
allow shell toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow shell tzdatacheck_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow shell shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
allow shell zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/tzdatacheck.te b/public/tzdatacheck.te
index 93ae165..6f60c8e 100644
--- a/public/tzdatacheck.te
+++ b/public/tzdatacheck.te
@@ -4,3 +4,15 @@
allow tzdatacheck zoneinfo_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow tzdatacheck zoneinfo_data_file:file unlink;
+
+# Below are strong assertion that only init, system_server and tzdatacheck
+# can modify the /data time zone rules directories. This is to make it very
+# clear that only these domains should modify the actual time zone rules data.
+# The tzdatacheck binary itself may be executed by shell for tests but it must
+# not be able to modify the real rules.
+# If other users / binaries could modify time zone rules on device this might
+# have negative implications for users (who may get incorrect local times)
+# or break assumptions made / invalidate data held by the components actually
+# responsible for updating time zone rules.
+neverallow { domain -system_server -init -tzdatacheck } zoneinfo_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -system_server -init -tzdatacheck } zoneinfo_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
diff --git a/tools/fc_sort/fc_sort.c b/tools/fc_sort/fc_sort.c
index 5561288..9a3a3ee 100644
--- a/tools/fc_sort/fc_sort.c
+++ b/tools/fc_sort/fc_sort.c
@@ -350,6 +350,7 @@
/* Parse the file into a file_context linked list. */
line_buf = NULL;
+ buf_len = 0;
while ( getline(&line_buf, &buf_len, in_file) != -1 ){
line_len = strlen(line_buf);
@@ -478,15 +479,13 @@
current->next = temp;
current = current->next;
lines++;
-
-
- free(line_buf);
- line_buf = NULL;
}
+ free(line_buf);
fclose(in_file);
/* Create the bucket linked list from the earlier linked list. */
current = head->next;
+ free(head);
bcurrent = master =
(file_context_bucket_t *)
malloc(sizeof(file_context_bucket_t));
diff --git a/tools/sepolicy-analyze/README b/tools/sepolicy-analyze/README
index fdee588..c6657ec 100644
--- a/tools/sepolicy-analyze/README
+++ b/tools/sepolicy-analyze/README
@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@
Displays the attributes associated with the specified type name.
+ sepolicy-analyze out/target/product/<board>/root/sepolicy attribute -l
+
+ Displays all attributes in the policy.
+
NEVERALLOW CHECKING (neverallow)
sepolicy-analyze out/target/product/<board>/root/sepolicy neverallow \
[-w] [-d] [-f neverallows.conf] | [-n "neverallow string"]
diff --git a/tools/sepolicy-analyze/attribute.c b/tools/sepolicy-analyze/attribute.c
index ae98aa9..f7c9b4c 100644
--- a/tools/sepolicy-analyze/attribute.c
+++ b/tools/sepolicy-analyze/attribute.c
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
#include "attribute.h"
void attribute_usage() {
- fprintf(stderr, "\tattribute <name> [-r|--reverse]\n");
+ fprintf(stderr, "\tattribute [-l|--list] [-r|--reverse] <name>\n");
}
static void retrieve_mapping(policydb_t *policydb, struct type_datum *dat, char *name, int reverse) {
@@ -53,29 +53,58 @@
return 0;
}
+static int print_attr(__attribute__ ((unused)) hashtab_key_t k,
+ hashtab_datum_t d, void *args) {
+ struct type_datum *dat = (struct type_datum *)d;
+ policydb_t *pdb = (policydb_t *)args;
+ if (!dat) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "type encountered without datum!\n");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (dat->flavor == TYPE_ATTRIB) {
+ printf("%s\n", pdb->p_type_val_to_name[dat->s.value - 1]);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int list_all_attributes(policydb_t *policydb) {
+ return hashtab_map(policydb->p_types.table, print_attr, policydb);
+}
+
int attribute_func (int argc, char **argv, policydb_t *policydb) {
+ int rc = -1;
+ int list = 0;
int reverse = 0;
char ch;
struct option attribute_options[] = {
+ {"list", no_argument, NULL, 'l'},
{"reverse", no_argument, NULL, 'r'},
{NULL, 0, NULL, 0}
};
- while ((ch = getopt_long(argc, argv, "r", attribute_options, NULL)) != -1) {
+ while ((ch = getopt_long(argc, argv, "lr", attribute_options, NULL)) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
+ case 'l':
+ list = 1;
+ break;
case 'r':
reverse = 1;
break;
default:
USAGE_ERROR = true;
- return -1;
+ goto out;
}
}
- if (argc != 2 && !(reverse && argc == 3)) {
+ if ((argc != 2 && !(reverse && argc == 3)) || (list && reverse)) {
USAGE_ERROR = true;
- return -1;
+ goto out;
}
- return list_attribute(policydb, argv[optind], reverse);
+ if (list)
+ rc = list_all_attributes(policydb);
+ else
+ rc = list_attribute(policydb, argv[optind], reverse);
+ out:
+ return rc;
}
diff --git a/tools/sepolicy-analyze/sepolicy-analyze.c b/tools/sepolicy-analyze/sepolicy-analyze.c
index b70eaaa..b4571a6 100644
--- a/tools/sepolicy-analyze/sepolicy-analyze.c
+++ b/tools/sepolicy-analyze/sepolicy-analyze.c
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
rc = analyze_components[i].func(argc - 2, argv + 2, &policydb);
if (rc && USAGE_ERROR) {
usage(argv[0]); }
+ policydb_destroy(&policydb);
return rc;
}
}