DO NOT MERGE Fake 29.0 sepolicy prebuilts
I took current AOSP policy as base, then removed sepolicy so that the
set of type and attributes was a subset of types and attributes in Q
sepolicy, with exception of those that have not yet been cleand up in
current AOSP:
mediaswcodec_server
netd_socket
mediaextractor_update_service
thermalserviced
thermalserviced_exec
Bug: 133196056
Test: n/a
Change-Id: I2cbe749777684146114c89e1e6fc3f07400c0ae5
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/29.0/private/domain.te b/prebuilts/api/29.0/private/domain.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..037a7d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/prebuilts/api/29.0/private/domain.te
@@ -0,0 +1,314 @@
+# Transition to crash_dump when /system/bin/crash_dump* is executed.
+# This occurs when the process crashes.
+# We do not apply this to the su domain to avoid interfering with
+# tests (b/114136122)
+domain_auto_trans({ domain userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }, crash_dump_exec, crash_dump);
+allow domain crash_dump:process sigchld;
+
+# Allow every process to check the heapprofd.enable properties to determine
+# whether to load the heap profiling library. This does not necessarily enable
+# heap profiling, as initialization will fail if it does not have the
+# necessary SELinux permissions.
+get_prop(domain, heapprofd_prop);
+# Allow heap profiling on debug builds.
+userdebug_or_eng(`can_profile_heap_userdebug_or_eng({
+ domain
+ -bpfloader
+ -init
+ -kernel
+ -keystore
+ -llkd
+ -logd
+ -logpersist
+ -recovery
+ -recovery_persist
+ -recovery_refresh
+ -ueventd
+ -vendor_init
+ -vold
+})')
+
+# Path resolution access in cgroups.
+allow domain cgroup:dir search;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:dir w_dir_perms;
+allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:file w_file_perms;
+
+allow domain cgroup_rc_file:dir search;
+allow domain cgroup_rc_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;
+allow domain vendor_task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow all domains to read sys.use_memfd to determine
+# if memfd support can be used if device supports it
+get_prop(domain, use_memfd_prop);
+
+# For now, everyone can access core property files
+# Device specific properties are not granted by default
+not_compatible_property(`
+ get_prop(domain, core_property_type)
+ get_prop(domain, exported_dalvik_prop)
+ get_prop(domain, exported_ffs_prop)
+ get_prop(domain, exported_system_radio_prop)
+ get_prop(domain, exported2_config_prop)
+ get_prop(domain, exported2_radio_prop)
+ get_prop(domain, exported2_system_prop)
+ get_prop(domain, exported2_vold_prop)
+ get_prop(domain, exported3_default_prop)
+ get_prop(domain, exported3_radio_prop)
+ get_prop(domain, exported3_system_prop)
+ get_prop(domain, vendor_default_prop)
+')
+compatible_property_only(`
+ get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, core_property_type)
+ get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported_dalvik_prop)
+ get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported_ffs_prop)
+ get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported_system_radio_prop)
+ get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported2_config_prop)
+ get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported2_radio_prop)
+ get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported2_system_prop)
+ get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported2_vold_prop)
+ get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_default_prop)
+ get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_radio_prop)
+ get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_system_prop)
+ get_prop({domain -coredomain -appdomain}, vendor_default_prop)
+')
+
+# Allow access to fsverity keyring.
+allow domain kernel:key search;
+# Allow access to keys in the fsverity keyring that were installed at boot.
+allow domain fsverity_init:key search;
+# For testing purposes, allow access to keys installed with su.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+ allow domain su:key search;
+')
+
+# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
+# with other UIDs to these whitelisted domains.
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -vold
+ userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd')
+ -dumpstate
+ userdebug_or_eng(`-incidentd')
+ -storaged
+ -system_server
+ userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
+} self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
+
+# Limit ability to generate hardware unique device ID attestations to priv_apps
+neverallow { domain -priv_app } *:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -vendor_init
+ userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
+} debugfs_tracing_debug:file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# System_server owns dropbox data, and init creates/restorecons the directory
+# Disallow direct access by other processes.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } dropbox_data_file:dir *;
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } dropbox_data_file:file ~{ getattr read };
+
+###
+# Services should respect app sandboxes
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -appdomain
+ -installd # creation of sandbox
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
+
+# Only the following processes should be directly accessing private app
+# directories.
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -adbd
+ -appdomain
+ -app_zygote
+ -dexoptanalyzer
+ -installd
+ userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
+ -profman
+ -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+ -runas
+ -system_server
+ -viewcompiler
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir *;
+
+# Only apps should be modifying app data. installd is exempted for
+# restorecon and package install/uninstall.
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -appdomain
+ -installd
+ -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir ~r_dir_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -appdomain
+ -app_zygote
+ -installd
+ userdebug_or_eng(`-perfprofd')
+ -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:file_class_set open;
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -appdomain
+ -installd # creation of sandbox
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -installd
+} { privapp_data_file app_data_file }:dir_file_class_set { relabelfrom relabelto };
+
+# The staging directory contains APEX and APK files. It is important to ensure
+# that these files cannot be accessed by other domains to ensure that the files
+# do not change between system_server staging the files and apexd processing
+# the files.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -apexd -installd} staging_data_file:dir *;
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -apexd -kernel -installd } staging_data_file:file *;
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -installd} staging_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+# apexd needs the link and unlink permissions, so list every `no_w_file_perms`
+# except for `link` and `unlink`.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server } staging_data_file:file
+ { append create relabelfrom rename setattr write no_x_file_perms };
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -appdomain # for oemfs
+ -bootanim # for oemfs
+ -recovery # for /tmp/update_binary in tmpfs
+} { fs_type -rootfs }:file execute;
+
+#
+# Assert that, to the extent possible, we're not loading executable content from
+# outside the rootfs or /system partition except for a few whitelisted domains.
+# Executable files loaded from /data is a persistence vector
+# we want to avoid. See
+# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=955 for example.
+#
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -appdomain
+ with_asan(`-asan_extract')
+ -shell
+ userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+ -system_server_startup # for memfd backed executable regions
+ -app_zygote
+ -webview_zygote
+ -zygote
+ userdebug_or_eng(`-mediaextractor')
+ userdebug_or_eng(`-mediaswcodec')
+} {
+ file_type
+ -system_file_type
+ -system_lib_file
+ -system_linker_exec
+ -vendor_file_type
+ -exec_type
+ -postinstall_file
+}:file execute;
+
+# Only init is allowed to write cgroup.rc file
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -vendor_init
+} cgroup_rc_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+# Only authorized processes should be writing to files in /data/dalvik-cache
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init # TODO: limit init to relabelfrom for files
+ -zygote
+ -installd
+ -postinstall_dexopt
+ -cppreopts
+ -dex2oat
+ -otapreopt_slot
+ -art_apex_postinstall
+ -art_apex_boot_integrity
+} dalvikcache_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -installd
+ -postinstall_dexopt
+ -cppreopts
+ -dex2oat
+ -zygote
+ -otapreopt_slot
+ -art_apex_boot_integrity
+ -art_apex_postinstall
+} dalvikcache_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
+
+# Minimize dac_override and dac_read_search.
+# Instead of granting them it is usually better to add the domain to
+# a Unix group or change the permissions of a file.
+define(`dac_override_allowed', `{
+ dnsmasq
+ dumpstate
+ init
+ installd
+ install_recovery
+ userdebug_or_eng(`llkd')
+ lmkd
+ netd
+ perfprofd
+ postinstall_dexopt
+ recovery
+ rss_hwm_reset
+ sdcardd
+ tee
+ ueventd
+ uncrypt
+ vendor_init
+ vold
+ vold_prepare_subdirs
+ zygote
+}')
+neverallow ~dac_override_allowed self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
+# Since the kernel checks dac_read_search before dac_override, domains that
+# have dac_override should also have dac_read_search to eliminate spurious
+# denials. Some domains have dac_read_search without having dac_override, so
+# this list should be a superset of the one above.
+neverallow ~{
+ dac_override_allowed
+ traced_probes
+ userdebug_or_eng(`heapprofd')
+} self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;
+
+# Limit what domains can mount filesystems or change their mount flags.
+# sdcard_type / vfat is exempt as a larger set of domains need
+# this capability, including device-specific domains.
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -apexd
+ recovery_only(`userdebug_or_eng(`-fastbootd')')
+ -init
+ -kernel
+ -otapreopt_chroot
+ -recovery
+ -update_engine
+ -vold
+ -zygote
+} { fs_type -sdcard_type }:filesystem { mount remount relabelfrom relabelto };
+
+# Limit raw I/O to these whitelisted domains. Do not apply to debug builds.
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
+ -kernel
+ -gsid
+ -init
+ -recovery
+ -ueventd
+ -healthd
+ -uncrypt
+ -tee
+ -hal_bootctl_server
+} self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;