diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/file.te b/microdroid/system/private/file.te
index 18fa8bb..d15f9ba 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/file.te
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/file.te
@@ -13,3 +13,7 @@
 allow system_data_file tmpfs:filesystem associate;
 
 type authfs_fuse, fs_type, contextmount_type;
+
+# /dev/selinux/test - used to verify that apex sepolicy is loaded and
+# property labeled.
+type sepolicy_test_file, file_type;
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/kernel.te b/microdroid/system/private/kernel.te
index 1d03c4a..258c8d7 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/kernel.te
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/kernel.te
@@ -81,3 +81,19 @@
 
 #-----------------------------------------
 allow kernel apkdmverity:fd use;
+
+# Some contexts are changed before the device is flipped into enforcing mode
+# during the setup of Apex sepolicy. These denials can be suppressed since
+# the permissions should not be allowed after the device is flipped into
+# enforcing mode.
+dontaudit kernel device:dir { open read relabelto };
+dontaudit kernel tmpfs:file { getattr open read relabelfrom };
+dontaudit kernel {
+  file_contexts_file
+  hwservice_contexts_file
+  mac_perms_file
+  property_contexts_file
+  seapp_contexts_file
+  sepolicy_test_file
+  service_contexts_file
+}:file relabelto;
diff --git a/private/file.te b/private/file.te
index f3e1855..0eb2018 100644
--- a/private/file.te
+++ b/private/file.te
@@ -77,3 +77,7 @@
 
 # /metadata/sepolicy
 type sepolicy_metadata_file, file_type;
+
+# /dev/selinux/test - used to verify that apex sepolicy is loaded and
+# property labeled.
+type sepolicy_test_file, file_type;
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index ea5f66f..895b579 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -196,6 +196,15 @@
 # Linker configuration
 #
 /linkerconfig(/.*)?          u:object_r:linkerconfig_file:s0
+
+# Apex sepoolicy files.
+/dev/selinux/apex_file_contexts                 u:object_r:file_contexts_file:s0
+/dev/selinux/apex_seapp_contexts                u:object_r:seapp_contexts_file:s0
+/dev/selinux/apex_service_contexts              u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
+/dev/selinux/apex_property_contexts             u:object_r:property_contexts_file:s0
+/dev/selinux/apex_hwservice_contexts            u:object_r:hwservice_contexts_file:s0
+/dev/selinux/apex_mac_permissions\.xml          u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
+
 #############################
 # System files
 #
diff --git a/private/kernel.te b/private/kernel.te
index 5341163..6775b3b 100644
--- a/private/kernel.te
+++ b/private/kernel.te
@@ -31,3 +31,19 @@
 
 allow kernel kmsg_device:chr_file write;
 allow kernel gsid:fd use;
+
+# Some contexts are changed before the device is flipped into enforcing mode
+# during the setup of Apex sepolicy. These denials can be suppressed since
+# the permissions should not be allowed after the device is flipped into
+# enforcing mode.
+dontaudit kernel device:dir { open read relabelto };
+dontaudit kernel tmpfs:file { getattr open read relabelfrom };
+dontaudit kernel {
+  file_contexts_file
+  hwservice_contexts_file
+  mac_perms_file
+  property_contexts_file
+  seapp_contexts_file
+  sepolicy_test_file
+  service_contexts_file
+}:file relabelto;