diff --git a/Android.mk b/Android.mk
index e3b4143..6c25fc1 100644
--- a/Android.mk
+++ b/Android.mk
@@ -202,6 +202,9 @@
 ifeq ($(NATIVE_COVERAGE),true)
   with_native_coverage := true
 endif
+ifeq ($(CLANG_COVERAGE),true)
+  with_native_coverage := true
+endif
 
 treble_sysprop_neverallow := true
 ifeq ($(BUILD_BROKEN_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW),true)
diff --git a/TEST_MAPPING b/TEST_MAPPING
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..db12ffe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/TEST_MAPPING
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+{
+    "presubmit": [
+        {
+            "name": "CtsSecurityHostTestCases",
+            "options": [
+                {
+                    "include-filter": "android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testPermissionControllerDomain"
+                },
+                {
+                    "include-filter": "android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testVzwOmaTriggerDomain"
+                },
+                {
+                    "include-filter": "android.security.cts.SELinuxHostTest#testGMSCoreDomain"
+                }
+
+            ]
+        }
+    ]
+}
diff --git a/apex/Android.bp b/apex/Android.bp
index 29c2518..d3acfdb 100644
--- a/apex/Android.bp
+++ b/apex/Android.bp
@@ -28,6 +28,13 @@
 }
 
 filegroup {
+  name: "com.android.sdkext-file_contexts",
+  srcs: [
+    "com.android.sdkext-file_contexts",
+  ],
+}
+
+filegroup {
   name: "com.android.art.debug-file_contexts",
   srcs: [
     "com.android.art.debug-file_contexts",
@@ -63,6 +70,13 @@
 }
 
 filegroup {
+  name: "com.android.cronet-file_contexts",
+  srcs: [
+    "com.android.cronet-file_contexts",
+  ],
+}
+
+filegroup {
   name: "com.android.ipsec-file_contexts",
   srcs: [
     "com.android.ipsec-file_contexts",
@@ -133,13 +147,6 @@
 }
 
 filegroup {
-  name: "com.android.sdkext-file_contexts",
-  srcs: [
-    "com.android.sdkext-file_contexts",
-  ],
-}
-
-filegroup {
   name: "com.android.telephony-file_contexts",
   srcs: [
     "com.android.telephony-file_contexts",
@@ -173,3 +180,10 @@
     "com.android.tethering-file_contexts",
   ],
 }
+
+filegroup {
+  name: "com.android.extservices-file_contexts",
+  srcs: [
+    "com.android.extservices-file_contexts",
+  ],
+}
diff --git a/apex/com.android.extservices-file_contexts b/apex/com.android.extservices-file_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3a65d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apex/com.android.extservices-file_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+(/.*)?                u:object_r:system_file:s0
diff --git a/apex/com.android.incremental-file_contexts b/apex/com.android.incremental-file_contexts
deleted file mode 100644
index f6b21da..0000000
--- a/apex/com.android.incremental-file_contexts
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-(/.*)?                u:object_r:system_file:s0
-/lib(64)?(/.*)        u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
diff --git a/private/access_vectors b/private/access_vectors
index 66c1b79..aa0109c 100644
--- a/private/access_vectors
+++ b/private/access_vectors
@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@
 	execute
 	quotaon
 	mounton
+	audit_access
+	open
+	execmod
+	watch
+	watch_mount
+	watch_sb
+	watch_with_perm
+	watch_reads
 }
 
 
@@ -125,7 +133,7 @@
 common cap2
 {
 	mac_override	# unused by SELinux
-	mac_admin	# unused by SELinux
+	mac_admin
 	syslog
 	wake_alarm
 	block_suspend
@@ -164,14 +172,6 @@
 	reparent
 	search
 	rmdir
-	open
-	audit_access
-	execmod
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
 }
 
 class file
@@ -179,82 +179,26 @@
 {
 	execute_no_trans
 	entrypoint
-	execmod
-	open
-	audit_access
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
 }
 
 class lnk_file
 inherits file
-{
-	open
-	audit_access
-	execmod
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
-}
 
 class chr_file
 inherits file
 {
 	execute_no_trans
 	entrypoint
-	execmod
-	open
-	audit_access
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
 }
 
 class blk_file
 inherits file
-{
-	open
-	audit_access
-	execmod
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
-}
 
 class sock_file
 inherits file
-{
-	open
-	audit_access
-	execmod
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
-}
 
 class fifo_file
 inherits file
-{
-	open
-	audit_access
-	execmod
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
-}
 
 class fd
 {
@@ -505,8 +449,6 @@
 	send
 	recv
 	relabelto
-	flow_in		# deprecated
-	flow_out	# deprecated
 	forward_in
 	forward_out
 }
@@ -781,3 +723,13 @@
 
 class xdp_socket
 inherits socket
+
+class perf_event
+{
+	open
+	cpu
+	kernel
+	tracepoint
+	read
+	write
+}
diff --git a/private/adbd.te b/private/adbd.te
index ec5c57e..dee3c9b 100644
--- a/private/adbd.te
+++ b/private/adbd.te
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@
 
 # Connect to shell and use a socket transferred from it.
 # Used for e.g. abb.
-allow adbd shell:unix_stream_socket { read write };
+allow adbd shell:unix_stream_socket { read write shutdown };
 allow adbd shell:fd use;
 
 ###
diff --git a/private/aidl_lazy_test_server.te b/private/aidl_lazy_test_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..33efde0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/aidl_lazy_test_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  typeattribute aidl_lazy_test_server coredomain;
+
+  init_daemon_domain(aidl_lazy_test_server)
+')
diff --git a/private/apexd.te b/private/apexd.te
index 1e1ccc5..36b7999 100644
--- a/private/apexd.te
+++ b/private/apexd.te
@@ -11,10 +11,18 @@
 allow apexd apex_metadata_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow apexd apex_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
 
-# Allow apexd to create directories for snapshots of apex data
+# Allow apexd to create files and directories for snapshots of apex data
+allow apexd apex_permission_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_permission_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelto };
+allow apexd apex_module_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms relabelfrom };
+allow apexd apex_module_data_file:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
 allow apexd apex_rollback_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow apexd apex_rollback_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 
+# Allow apexd to read directories under /data/misc_de in order to snapshot and
+# restore apex data for all users.
+allow apexd system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
 # allow apexd to create loop devices with /dev/loop-control
 allow apexd loop_control_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 # allow apexd to access loop devices
@@ -36,7 +44,16 @@
 allow apexd dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
 
 # sys_admin is required to access the device-mapper and mount
-allow apexd self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
+# dac_override, chown, and fowner are needed for snapshot and restore
+allow apexd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_admin chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner };
+
+# Note: fsetid is deliberately not included above. fsetid checks are
+# triggered by chmod on a directory or file owned by a group other
+# than one of the groups assigned to the current process to see if
+# the setgid bit should be cleared, regardless of whether the setgid
+# bit was even set.  We do not appear to truly need this capability
+# for apexd to operate.
+dontaudit apexd self:global_capability_class_set fsetid;
 
 # allow apexd to create a mount point in /apex
 allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:dir create_dir_perms;
@@ -71,12 +88,6 @@
 allow apexd sysfs_loop:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow apexd sysfs_loop:file rw_file_perms;
 
-# Spawning a libbinder thread results in a dac_override deny,
-# /dev/cpuset/tasks is owned by system.
-#
-# See b/35323867#comment3
-dontaudit apexd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
-
 # Allow apexd to log to the kernel.
 allow apexd kmsg_device:chr_file w_file_perms;
 
@@ -121,6 +132,16 @@
 # Allow apexd to be invoked with logwrapper from init during userspace reboot.
 allow apexd devpts:chr_file { read write };
 
+# Allow apexd to create pts files via logwrap_fork_exec for its own use, to pass to
+# other processes
+create_pty(apexd)
+
+# Allow apexd to read file contexts when performing restorecon of snapshots.
+allow apexd file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow apexd to execute toybox for snapshot & restore
+allow apexd toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
 neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apex_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
 neverallow { domain -apexd -init } apex_metadata_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
 neverallow { domain -apexd -init -kernel } apex_data_file:file no_w_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/app_neverallows.te b/private/app_neverallows.te
index eb798e3..f08f516 100644
--- a/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -6,9 +6,11 @@
   ephemeral_app
   isolated_app
   mediaprovider
+  mediaprovider_app
   untrusted_app
   untrusted_app_25
   untrusted_app_27
+  untrusted_app_29
   untrusted_app_all
 }')
 # Receive or send uevent messages.
@@ -111,6 +113,14 @@
   alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket
 } *;
 
+# Disallow sending RTM_GETLINK messages on netlink sockets.
+neverallow {
+  all_untrusted_apps
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+  -untrusted_app_29
+} domain:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
+
 # Do not allow untrusted apps access to /cache
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };
@@ -136,8 +146,8 @@
   ')
 }:dir_file_class_set { create unlink };
 
-# No untrusted component except mediaprovider should be touching /dev/fuse
-neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } fuse_device:chr_file *;
+# No untrusted component except mediaprovider_app should be touching /dev/fuse
+neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider_app } fuse_device:chr_file *;
 
 # Do not allow untrusted apps to directly open the tun_device
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps tun_device:chr_file open;
diff --git a/private/app_zygote.te b/private/app_zygote.te
index c111ac8..a826f7f 100644
--- a/private/app_zygote.te
+++ b/private/app_zygote.te
@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@
 allow app_zygote system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 allow app_zygote system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
 
+# Send unsolicited message to system_server
+unix_socket_send(app_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
+
 #####
 ##### Neverallow
 #####
@@ -129,15 +132,18 @@
   alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket
 } *;
 
-# Only allow app_zygote to talk to the logd socket, and su/heapprofd on eng/userdebug
-# This is because cap_setuid/cap_setgid allow to forge uid/gid in SCM_CREDENTIALS.
+# Only allow app_zygote to talk to the logd socket, and
+# su/heapprofd/traced_perf on eng/userdebug. This is because
+# cap_setuid/cap_setgid allow to forge uid/gid in SCM_CREDENTIALS.
 # Think twice before changing.
 neverallow app_zygote {
   domain
   -app_zygote
   -logd
+  -system_server
   userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
   userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
 }:unix_dgram_socket *;
 
 neverallow app_zygote {
@@ -145,6 +151,7 @@
   -app_zygote
   userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
   userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
 }:unix_stream_socket *;
 
 # Never allow ptrace
diff --git a/private/atrace.te b/private/atrace.te
index 2545c8b..ad7d177 100644
--- a/private/atrace.te
+++ b/private/atrace.te
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
   -installd_service
   -vold_service
   -lpdump_service
+  -default_android_service
 }:service_manager { find };
 allow atrace servicemanager:service_manager list;
 
diff --git a/private/automotive_display_service.te b/private/automotive_display_service.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e397d10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/automotive_display_service.te
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Display service for Automotive
+type automotive_display, domain, coredomain;
+type automotive_display_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(automotive_display)
+
+# Allow to use Binder IPC for SurfaceFlinger.
+binder_use(automotive_display)
+
+# Allow to use HwBinder IPC for HAL implementations.
+hwbinder_use(automotive_display)
+
+# Allow to read the target property.
+get_prop(automotive_display, hwservicemanager_prop)
+
+# Allow to find SurfaceFlinger.
+allow automotive_display surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow client domain to do binder IPC to serverdomain.
+binder_call(automotive_display, surfaceflinger)
diff --git a/private/automotive_display_service_server.te b/private/automotive_display_service_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a916de8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/automotive_display_service_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+add_hwservice(automotive_display, fwk_automotive_display_hwservice)
diff --git a/private/blank_screen.te b/private/blank_screen.te
index 51310d1..69dd7e6 100644
--- a/private/blank_screen.te
+++ b/private/blank_screen.te
@@ -4,3 +4,5 @@
 init_daemon_domain(blank_screen)
 
 hal_client_domain(blank_screen, hal_light)
+
+allow blank_screen hal_light_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/private/bluetooth.te b/private/bluetooth.te
index b96fc58..1680361 100644
--- a/private/bluetooth.te
+++ b/private/bluetooth.te
@@ -40,6 +40,9 @@
 allow bluetooth proc_bluetooth_writable:file rw_file_perms;
 
 # Allow write access to bluetooth specific properties
+set_prop(bluetooth, binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop);
+neverallow { domain -bluetooth -init }
+    binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop:property_service set;
 set_prop(bluetooth, bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
 set_prop(bluetooth, bluetooth_audio_hal_prop)
 set_prop(bluetooth, bluetooth_prop)
diff --git a/private/bpfloader.te b/private/bpfloader.te
index 00d4c79..34921e6 100644
--- a/private/bpfloader.te
+++ b/private/bpfloader.te
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
 neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf { map_create prog_load };
-neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper } *:bpf prog_run;
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper -system_server } *:bpf prog_run;
 neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init } bpfloader_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
 neverallow bpfloader domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
 # only system_server, netd and bpfloader can read/write the bpf maps
diff --git a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
index c62edd5..60e6fb1 100644
--- a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
@@ -1206,7 +1206,9 @@
 (typeattributeset exported_bluetooth_prop_29_0 (exported_bluetooth_prop))
 (typeattributeset exported_config_prop_29_0 (exported_config_prop))
 (typeattributeset exported_dalvik_prop_29_0 (exported_dalvik_prop))
-(typeattributeset exported_default_prop_29_0 (exported_default_prop))
+(typeattributeset exported_default_prop_29_0
+  ( exported_default_prop
+    vndk_prop))
 (typeattributeset exported_dumpstate_prop_29_0 (exported_dumpstate_prop))
 (typeattributeset exported_ffs_prop_29_0 (exported_ffs_prop))
 (typeattributeset exported_fingerprint_prop_29_0 (exported_fingerprint_prop))
diff --git a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
index 3e3e1bf..7300dfe 100644
--- a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
@@ -5,13 +5,21 @@
 (typeattribute new_objects)
 (typeattributeset new_objects
   ( new_objects
+    aidl_lazy_test_server
+    aidl_lazy_test_server_exec
+    aidl_lazy_test_service
     apex_module_data_file
+    apex_permission_data_file
     apex_rollback_data_file
     app_integrity_service
     app_search_service
     auth_service
+    automotive_display
+    automotive_display_exec
     ashmem_libcutils_device
     blob_store_service
+    binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop
+    binder_cache_system_server_prop
     binderfs
     binderfs_logs
     binderfs_logs_proc
@@ -23,16 +31,22 @@
     dataloader_manager_service
     device_config_storage_native_boot_prop
     device_config_sys_traced_prop
+    device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop
+    exported_camera_prop
     file_integrity_service
+    fwk_automotive_display_hwservice
     gmscore_app
     hal_can_bus_hwservice
     hal_can_controller_hwservice
+    hal_identity_hwservice
+    hal_light_service
+    hal_power_service
     hal_rebootescrow_service
     hal_tv_tuner_hwservice
     hal_vibrator_service
     incfs
     incremental_service
-    incremental_root_file
+    init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop
     init_svc_debug_prop
     iorap_prefetcherd
     iorap_prefetcherd_data_file
@@ -43,27 +57,39 @@
     mediatranscoding_exec
     mediatranscoding_tmpfs
     mirror_data_file
+    light_service
     linker_prop
     linkerconfig_file
+    mnt_pass_through_file
     mock_ota_prop
-    module_sdkext_prop
+    module_sdkextensions_prop
     ota_metadata_file
     ota_prop
     art_apex_dir
+    rebootescrow_hal_prop
     service_manager_service
+    simpleperf
+    snapshotctl_log_data_file
     soundtrigger_middleware_service
+    sysfs_dm_verity
+    system_config_service
     system_group_file
     system_jvmti_agent_prop
     system_passwd_file
+    system_unsolzygote_socket
     tethering_service
+    traced_perf
+    traced_perf_socket
     timezonedetector_service
+    untrusted_app_29
     usb_serial_device
-    userspace_reboot_prop
+    userspace_reboot_config_prop
     userspace_reboot_exported_prop
+    userspace_reboot_log_prop
     vehicle_hal_prop
     vendor_apex_file
     vendor_boringssl_self_test
+    vendor_incremental_module
     vendor_install_recovery
     vendor_install_recovery_exec
-    vndk_prop
     virtual_ab_prop))
diff --git a/private/coredomain.te b/private/coredomain.te
index dac061a..0c84797 100644
--- a/private/coredomain.te
+++ b/private/coredomain.te
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
         -postinstall_dexopt
         -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
         -system_server
+        -traced_perf
     } vendor_app_file:dir { open read getattr search };
 ')
 
@@ -44,6 +45,7 @@
         -postinstall_dexopt
         -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
         -system_server
+        -traced_perf
         -mediaserver
     } vendor_app_file:file r_file_perms;
 ')
@@ -60,6 +62,7 @@
         -postinstall_dexopt
         -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
         -system_server
+        -traced_perf
         -app_zygote
         -webview_zygote
         -zygote
@@ -78,6 +81,7 @@
         -postinstall_dexopt
         -rs # spawned by appdomain, so carryover the exception above
         -system_server
+        -traced_perf
         -app_zygote
         -webview_zygote
         -zygote
@@ -128,6 +132,7 @@
     -init
     -traced_probes
     -shell
+    -system_server
     -traceur_app
   } debugfs_tracing:file no_rw_file_perms;
 
diff --git a/private/derive_sdk.te b/private/derive_sdk.te
index 98cda20..1f60e34 100644
--- a/private/derive_sdk.te
+++ b/private/derive_sdk.te
@@ -8,5 +8,5 @@
 allow derive_sdk apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
 
 # Prop rules: writable by derive_sdk, readable by bootclasspath (apps)
-set_prop(derive_sdk, module_sdkext_prop)
-neverallow {domain -init -derive_sdk} module_sdkext_prop:property_service set;
+set_prop(derive_sdk, module_sdkextensions_prop)
+neverallow { domain -init -derive_sdk } module_sdkextensions_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index 8a0a8e5..1f31cea 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -28,6 +28,25 @@
   -vold
 })')
 
+# As above, allow perf profiling most processes on debug builds.
+# Do not diverge the two lists without a really good reason.
+userdebug_or_eng(`can_profile_perf({
+  domain
+  -bpfloader
+  -init
+  -kernel
+  -keystore
+  -llkd
+  -logd
+  -logpersist
+  -recovery
+  -recovery_persist
+  -recovery_refresh
+  -ueventd
+  -vendor_init
+  -vold
+})')
+
 # Path resolution access in cgroups.
 allow domain cgroup:dir search;
 allow { domain -appdomain -rs } cgroup:dir w_dir_perms;
@@ -45,8 +64,8 @@
 # Allow to read properties for linker
 get_prop(domain, linker_prop);
 
-# Read access to sdkext props
-get_prop(domain, module_sdkext_prop)
+# Read access to sdkextensions props
+get_prop(domain, module_sdkextensions_prop)
 
 # For now, everyone can access core property files
 # Device specific properties are not granted by default
@@ -76,8 +95,10 @@
     get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_default_prop)
     get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_radio_prop)
     get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_system_prop)
+    get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported_camera_prop)
+    get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, userspace_reboot_config_prop)
     get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
-    get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_prop)
+    get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_log_prop)
     get_prop({domain -coredomain -appdomain}, vendor_default_prop)
 ')
 
@@ -266,6 +287,7 @@
 # Instead of granting them it is usually better to add the domain to
 # a Unix group or change the permissions of a file.
 define(`dac_override_allowed', `{
+  apexd
   dnsmasq
   dumpstate
   init
@@ -294,6 +316,7 @@
 neverallow ~{
   dac_override_allowed
   iorap_prefetcherd
+  traced_perf
   traced_probes
   userdebug_or_eng(`heapprofd')
 } self:global_capability_class_set dac_read_search;
@@ -337,3 +360,7 @@
   -installd
   -zygote
 } mirror_data_file:dir *;
+
+# This property is being removed. Remove remaining access.
+neverallow { domain -init -system_server -vendor_init } net_dns_prop:property_service set;
+neverallow { domain -dumpstate -init -system_server -vendor_init } net_dns_prop:file read;
diff --git a/private/ephemeral_app.te b/private/ephemeral_app.te
index 508653c..56d4747 100644
--- a/private/ephemeral_app.te
+++ b/private/ephemeral_app.te
@@ -53,9 +53,9 @@
 # connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
 perfetto_producer(ephemeral_app)
 
-# Allow heap profiling if the app opts in by being marked
-# profileable/debuggable.
+# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
 can_profile_heap(ephemeral_app)
+can_profile_perf(ephemeral_app)
 
 # allow ephemeral apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
 # modify them other than to connect
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index 65d0e6f..62fbed3 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -150,8 +150,9 @@
 /dev/socket/tombstoned_crash u:object_r:tombstoned_crash_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/tombstoned_java_trace u:object_r:tombstoned_java_trace_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/tombstoned_intercept u:object_r:tombstoned_intercept_socket:s0
-/dev/socket/traced_producer	u:object_r:traced_producer_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/traced_consumer	u:object_r:traced_consumer_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/traced_perf	u:object_r:traced_perf_socket:s0
+/dev/socket/traced_producer	u:object_r:traced_producer_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/heapprofd	u:object_r:heapprofd_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/uncrypt	u:object_r:uncrypt_socket:s0
 /dev/socket/wpa_eth[0-9] u:object_r:wpa_socket:s0
@@ -282,6 +283,7 @@
 /system/bin/rss_hwm_reset	u:object_r:rss_hwm_reset_exec:s0
 /system/bin/perfetto        u:object_r:perfetto_exec:s0
 /system/bin/traced        u:object_r:traced_exec:s0
+/system/bin/traced_perf        u:object_r:traced_perf_exec:s0
 /system/bin/traced_probes        u:object_r:traced_probes_exec:s0
 /system/bin/heapprofd        u:object_r:heapprofd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/uncrypt     u:object_r:uncrypt_exec:s0
@@ -338,9 +340,11 @@
 /system/bin/watchdogd            u:object_r:watchdogd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/apexd                u:object_r:apexd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/gsid                 u:object_r:gsid_exec:s0
+/system/bin/simpleperf           u:object_r:simpleperf_exec:s0
 /system/bin/simpleperf_app_runner    u:object_r:simpleperf_app_runner_exec:s0
 /system/bin/notify_traceur\.sh       u:object_r:notify_traceur_exec:s0
 /system/bin/migrate_legacy_obb_data\.sh u:object_r:migrate_legacy_obb_data_exec:s0
+/system/bin/android\.frameworks\.automotive\.display@1\.0-service u:object_r:automotive_display_exec:s0
 
 #############################
 # Vendor files
@@ -368,6 +372,7 @@
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/apex(/[^/]+){0,2}                      u:object_r:vendor_apex_file:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/misc_writer                        u:object_r:vendor_misc_writer_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/boringssl_self_test(32|64)         u:object_r:vendor_boringssl_self_test_exec:s0
+(/vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/modules/incrementalfs\.ko     u:object_r:vendor_incremental_module:s0
 
 # HAL location
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/lib(64)?/hw            u:object_r:vendor_hal_file:s0
@@ -442,6 +447,8 @@
 /(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_service_contexts     u:object_r:service_contexts_file:s0
 /(system_ext|system/system_ext)/etc/selinux/system_ext_mac_permissions\.xml u:object_r:mac_perms_file:s0
 
+/(system_ext|system/system_ext)/bin/aidl_lazy_test_server   u:object_r:aidl_lazy_test_server_exec:s0
+
 #############################
 # Vendor files from /(product|system/product)/vendor_overlay
 #
@@ -463,6 +470,7 @@
 /data/backup(/.*)?		u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
 /data/secure/backup(/.*)?	u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
 /data/system/ndebugsocket	u:object_r:system_ndebug_socket:s0
+/data/system/unsolzygotesocket  u:object_r:system_unsolzygote_socket:s0
 /data/drm(/.*)?		u:object_r:drm_data_file:s0
 /data/resource-cache(/.*)? u:object_r:resourcecache_data_file:s0
 /data/dalvik-cache(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
@@ -474,14 +482,16 @@
 /data/apex/active/(.*)?		u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
 /data/apex/backup/(.*)?		u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
 /data/app(/.*)?                       u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
+# Traditional /data/app/[packageName]-[randomString]/base.apk location
 /data/app/[^/]+/oat(/.*)?                u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
+# /data/app/[randomStringA]/[packageName]-[randomStringB]/base.apk layout
+/data/app/[^/]+/[^/]+/oat(/.*)?                u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
 /data/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp(/.*)?           u:object_r:apk_tmp_file:s0
 /data/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp/oat(/.*)?           u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
 /data/app-private(/.*)?               u:object_r:apk_private_data_file:s0
 /data/app-private/vmdl.*\.tmp(/.*)?   u:object_r:apk_private_tmp_file:s0
 /data/gsi(/.*)?        u:object_r:gsi_data_file:s0
 /data/gsi/ota(/.*)?    u:object_r:ota_image_data_file:s0
-/data/incremental(/.*)?   u:object_r:incremental_root_file:s0
 /data/tombstones(/.*)?	u:object_r:tombstone_data_file:s0
 /data/vendor/tombstones/wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:tombstone_wifi_data_file:s0
 /data/local/tmp(/.*)?	u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0
@@ -503,6 +513,7 @@
 # Misc data
 /data/misc/adb(/.*)?            u:object_r:adb_keys_file:s0
 /data/misc/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.permission(/.*)?    u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/apexrollback(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/apns(/.*)?           u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/audio(/.*)?          u:object_r:audio_data_file:s0
@@ -533,6 +544,7 @@
 /data/misc/recovery(/.*)?       u:object_r:recovery_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/shared_relro(/.*)?   u:object_r:shared_relro_file:s0
 /data/misc/sms(/.*)?            u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/snapshotctl_log(/.*)?      u:object_r:snapshotctl_log_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/stats-active-metric(/.*)? u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/stats-data(/.*)?     u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/stats-service(/.*)?  u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
@@ -590,11 +602,16 @@
 # Apex data directories
 /data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
 /data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata/com.android.permission(/.*)?  u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata/com.android.permission(/.*)?  u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
 
 # Apex rollback directories
 /data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexrollback(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
 /data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexrollback(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
 
+# Incremental directories
+/data/incremental(/.*)?                        u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
+
 #############################
 # Expanded data files
 #
@@ -689,6 +706,7 @@
 # external storage
 /mnt/media_rw(/.*)?         u:object_r:mnt_media_rw_file:s0
 /mnt/user(/.*)?             u:object_r:mnt_user_file:s0
+/mnt/pass_through(/.*)?     u:object_r:mnt_pass_through_file:s0
 /mnt/sdcard                 u:object_r:mnt_sdcard_file:s0
 /mnt/runtime(/.*)?          u:object_r:storage_file:s0
 /storage(/.*)?              u:object_r:storage_file:s0
diff --git a/private/genfs_contexts b/private/genfs_contexts
index 07c44ca..92ef6a8 100644
--- a/private/genfs_contexts
+++ b/private/genfs_contexts
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@
 genfscon sysfs /kernel/notes u:object_r:sysfs_kernel_notes:s0
 genfscon sysfs /kernel/uevent_helper u:object_r:sysfs_usermodehelper:s0
 genfscon sysfs /kernel/wakeup_reasons u:object_r:sysfs_wakeup_reasons:s0
+genfscon sysfs /module/dm_verity/parameters/prefetch_cluster u:object_r:sysfs_dm_verity:s0
 genfscon sysfs /module/lowmemorykiller u:object_r:sysfs_lowmemorykiller:s0
 genfscon sysfs /module/tcp_cubic/parameters u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0
 genfscon sysfs /module/wlan/parameters/fwpath u:object_r:sysfs_wlan_fwpath:s0
diff --git a/private/gmscore_app.te b/private/gmscore_app.te
index daca057..4ae8eff 100644
--- a/private/gmscore_app.te
+++ b/private/gmscore_app.te
@@ -3,14 +3,6 @@
 ###
 typeattribute gmscore_app coredomain;
 
-# Allow everything.
-# TODO(b/142672293): remove when no selinux denials are triggered for this
-# domain
-# STOPSHIP(b/142672293): monitor http://go/sedenials for any denials around
-# `gmscore_app` and remove this line once we are confident about this having
-# the right set of permissions.
-userdebug_or_eng(`permissive gmscore_app;')
-
 app_domain(gmscore_app)
 
 allow gmscore_app sysfs_type:dir search;
diff --git a/private/gpuservice.te b/private/gpuservice.te
index 9e17d06..a4d84ea 100644
--- a/private/gpuservice.te
+++ b/private/gpuservice.te
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 
 binder_call(gpuservice, adbd)
 binder_call(gpuservice, shell)
+binder_call(gpuservice, system_server)
 binder_use(gpuservice)
 
 # Access the GPU.
@@ -35,6 +36,12 @@
 allow gpuservice dumpstate:fd use;
 allow gpuservice dumpstate:fifo_file write;
 
+# Needed for stats callback registration to statsd.
+allow gpuservice stats_service:service_manager find;
+allow gpuservice statsmanager_service:service_manager find;
+# TODO(b/146461633): remove this once native pullers talk to StatsManagerService
+binder_call(gpuservice, statsd);
+
 add_service(gpuservice, gpu_service)
 
 # Only uncomment below line when in development
diff --git a/private/gsid.te b/private/gsid.te
index 4771311..5d7b043 100644
--- a/private/gsid.te
+++ b/private/gsid.te
@@ -111,8 +111,12 @@
 allow gsid metadata_file:dir { search getattr };
 allow gsid {
     gsi_metadata_file
+}:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+allow gsid {
     ota_metadata_file
 }:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
 allow gsid {
     gsi_metadata_file
     ota_metadata_file
diff --git a/private/hwservice_contexts b/private/hwservice_contexts
index d72231b..238fd53 100644
--- a/private/hwservice_contexts
+++ b/private/hwservice_contexts
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 android.frameworks.schedulerservice::ISchedulingPolicyService   u:object_r:fwk_scheduler_hwservice:s0
 android.frameworks.sensorservice::ISensorManager                u:object_r:fwk_sensor_hwservice:s0
 android.frameworks.stats::IStats                                u:object_r:fwk_stats_hwservice:s0
+android.frameworks.automotive.display::ICarWindowService        u:object_r:fwk_automotive_display_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.atrace::IAtraceDevice                          u:object_r:hal_atrace_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.audio.effect::IEffectsFactory                  u:object_r:hal_audio_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.audio::IDevicesFactory                         u:object_r:hal_audio_hwservice:s0
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@
 android.hardware.camera.provider::ICameraProvider               u:object_r:hal_camera_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.configstore::ISurfaceFlingerConfigs            u:object_r:hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:s0
 android.hardware.confirmationui::IConfirmationUI                u:object_r:hal_confirmationui_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.identity::IIdentityCredentialStore             u:object_r:hal_identity_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.contexthub::IContexthub                        u:object_r:hal_contexthub_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.cas::IMediaCasService                          u:object_r:hal_cas_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.drm::ICryptoFactory                            u:object_r:hal_drm_hwservice:s0
diff --git a/private/incidentd.te b/private/incidentd.te
index b806f6e..45499fc 100644
--- a/private/incidentd.te
+++ b/private/incidentd.te
@@ -128,10 +128,18 @@
 # Run a shell.
 allow incidentd shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 
+# For running am, incident-helper-cmd and similar framework commands.
+# Run /system/bin/app_process.
+allow incidentd zygote_exec:file { rx_file_perms };
+
 # logd access - work to be done is a PII safe log (possibly an event log?)
 userdebug_or_eng(`read_logd(incidentd)')
 # TODO control_logd(incidentd)
 
+# Access /data/misc/logd
+allow incidentd misc_logd_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow incidentd misc_logd_file:file r_file_perms;
+
 # Allow incidentd to find these standard groups of services.
 # Others can be whitelisted individually.
 allow incidentd {
diff --git a/private/init.te b/private/init.te
index 116eff4..b0e7f80 100644
--- a/private/init.te
+++ b/private/init.te
@@ -41,7 +41,20 @@
 set_prop(init, powerctl_prop)
 
 # Only init is allowed to set userspace reboot related properties.
-set_prop(init, userspace_reboot_prop)
 set_prop(init, userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
-neverallow { domain -init } userspace_reboot_prop:property_service set;
 neverallow { domain -init } userspace_reboot_exported_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Second-stage init performs a test for whether the kernel has SELinux hooks
+# for the perf_event_open() syscall. This is done by testing for the syscall
+# outcomes corresponding to this policy.
+# TODO(b/137092007): this can be removed once the platform stops supporting
+# kernels that precede the perf_event_open hooks (Android common kernels 4.4
+# and 4.9).
+allow init self:perf_event { open cpu };
+neverallow init self:perf_event { kernel tracepoint read write };
+dontaudit init self:perf_event { kernel tracepoint read write };
+
+# Only init is allowed to set the sysprop indicating whether perf_event_open()
+# SELinux hooks were detected.
+set_prop(init, init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop)
+neverallow { domain -init } init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/private/isolated_app.te b/private/isolated_app.te
index 15c0f3f..4c6c5aa 100644
--- a/private/isolated_app.te
+++ b/private/isolated_app.te
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@
 # Access already open app data files received over Binder or local socket IPC.
 allow isolated_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { append read write getattr lock map };
 
+# Allow access to network sockets received over IPC. New socket creation is not
+# permitted.
+allow isolated_app { ephemeral_app priv_app untrusted_app_all }:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } { rw_socket_perms_no_ioctl };
+
 allow isolated_app activity_service:service_manager find;
 allow isolated_app display_service:service_manager find;
 allow isolated_app webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
@@ -58,9 +62,10 @@
 # connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
 perfetto_producer(isolated_app)
 
-# Allow heap profiling if the main app has been marked as profileable or
+# Allow profiling if the main app has been marked as profileable or
 # debuggable.
 can_profile_heap(isolated_app)
+can_profile_perf(isolated_app)
 
 #####
 ##### Neverallow
@@ -130,7 +135,7 @@
 # excluding unix_stream_socket and unix_dgram_socket.
 # Many of these are socket families which have never and will never
 # be compiled into the Android kernel.
-neverallow isolated_app self:{
+neverallow isolated_app { self ephemeral_app priv_app untrusted_app_all }:{
   socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket
   key_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket
   netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket
diff --git a/private/linkerconfig.te b/private/linkerconfig.te
index f82e05d..414b39f 100644
--- a/private/linkerconfig.te
+++ b/private/linkerconfig.te
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 init_daemon_domain(linkerconfig)
 
 ## Read and write linkerconfig subdirectory.
-allow linkerconfig linkerconfig_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow linkerconfig linkerconfig_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow linkerconfig linkerconfig_file:file create_file_perms;
 
 # Allow linkerconfig to log to the kernel.
@@ -13,4 +13,7 @@
 # Allow linkerconfig to be invoked with logwrapper from init.
 allow linkerconfig devpts:chr_file { read write };
 
+# Allow linkerconfig to scan for apex modules
+allow linkerconfig apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+
 neverallow { domain -init -linkerconfig } linkerconfig_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/llkd.te b/private/llkd.te
index 385f930..f218dec 100644
--- a/private/llkd.te
+++ b/private/llkd.te
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set kill;
 userdebug_or_eng(`
-  allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
+  allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace sys_admin };
   allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
 ')
 
diff --git a/private/logpersist.te b/private/logpersist.te
index 6f6ab50..ac324df 100644
--- a/private/logpersist.te
+++ b/private/logpersist.te
@@ -24,6 +24,6 @@
   userdebug_or_eng(`-misc_logd_file -coredump_file')
   with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
 }:file { create write append };
-neverallow { domain -init -dumpstate userdebug_or_eng(`-logpersist -logd') } misc_logd_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow { domain -init -dumpstate -incidentd userdebug_or_eng(`-logpersist -logd') } misc_logd_file:file no_rw_file_perms;
 neverallow { domain -init userdebug_or_eng(`-logpersist -logd') } misc_logd_file:file no_w_file_perms;
 neverallow { domain -init userdebug_or_eng(`-logpersist -logd') } misc_logd_file:dir { add_name link relabelfrom remove_name rename reparent rmdir write };
diff --git a/private/mediaprovider.te b/private/mediaprovider.te
index 5050e1a..249fee1 100644
--- a/private/mediaprovider.te
+++ b/private/mediaprovider.te
@@ -34,9 +34,6 @@
 # MtpServer uses /dev/mtp_usb
 allow mediaprovider mtp_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 
-# Fuse daemon
-allow mediaprovider fuse_device:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
-
 # MtpServer uses /dev/usb-ffs/mtp
 allow mediaprovider functionfs:dir search;
 allow mediaprovider functionfs:file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/mediaprovider_app.te b/private/mediaprovider_app.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a07fc2d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/mediaprovider_app.te
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+###
+### A domain for further sandboxing the MediaProvider mainline module.
+###
+type mediaprovider_app, domain, coredomain;
+
+app_domain(mediaprovider_app)
+
+# Access to /mnt/pass_through.
+allow mediaprovider_app mnt_pass_through_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow MediaProvider to host a FUSE daemon for external storage
+allow mediaprovider_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
+
+# Allow MediaProvider to read/write media_rw_data_file files and dirs
+allow mediaprovider_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allow mediaprovider_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+# Talk to the DRM service
+allow mediaprovider_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Talk to the MediaServer service
+allow mediaprovider_app mediaserver_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Talk to regular app services
+allow mediaprovider_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Talk to the GPU service
+binder_call(mediaprovider_app, gpuservice)
+
+# read pipe-max-size configuration
+allow mediaprovider_app proc_pipe_conf:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow MediaProvider to set extended attributes (such as quota project ID)
+# on media files.
+allowxperm mediaprovider_app media_rw_data_file:{ dir file } ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR
+  FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR
+  FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
+  FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
+};
diff --git a/private/permissioncontroller_app.te b/private/permissioncontroller_app.te
index 0fa2dea..8a6f6aa 100644
--- a/private/permissioncontroller_app.te
+++ b/private/permissioncontroller_app.te
@@ -3,14 +3,6 @@
 ###
 type permissioncontroller_app, domain, coredomain;
 
-# Allow everything.
-# TODO(b/142672293): remove when no selinux denials are triggered for this
-# domain
-# STOPSHIP(b/142672293): monitor http://go/sedenials for any denials around
-# `permissioncontroller_app` and remove this line once we are confident about
-# this having the right set of permissions.
-userdebug_or_eng(`permissive permissioncontroller_app;')
-
 app_domain(permissioncontroller_app)
 
 # Allow interaction with gpuservice
diff --git a/private/platform_app.te b/private/platform_app.te
index 9e26d7a..3beec38 100644
--- a/private/platform_app.te
+++ b/private/platform_app.te
@@ -68,9 +68,6 @@
 allow platform_app vr_manager_service:service_manager find;
 allow platform_app gpu_service:service_manager find;
 allow platform_app stats_service:service_manager find;
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  allow platform_app platform_compat_service:service_manager find;
-')
 
 # Allow platform apps to interact with gpuservice
 binder_call(platform_app, gpuservice)
diff --git a/private/priv_app.te b/private/priv_app.te
index e180b1d..74930ee 100644
--- a/private/priv_app.te
+++ b/private/priv_app.te
@@ -14,13 +14,6 @@
 # Used by: https://play.privileged.com/store/apps/details?id=jackpal.androidterm
 create_pty(priv_app)
 
-# webview crash handling depends on self ptrace (b/27697529, b/20150694, b/19277529#comment7)
-allow priv_app self:process ptrace;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow priv_app self:process ptrace;
-')
-
 # Allow loading executable code from writable priv-app home
 # directories. This is a W^X violation, however, it needs
 # to be supported for now for the following reasons.
@@ -63,15 +56,6 @@
 # /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link.
 allow priv_app cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
-# Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages.
-allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
-  auditallow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
-')
-
 # Access to /data/media.
 allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
@@ -80,11 +64,6 @@
 # running "adb install foo.apk".
 allow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow priv_app shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-  auditallow priv_app shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-')
 
 # Allow traceur to pass file descriptors through a content provider to betterbug
 allow priv_app trace_data_file:file { getattr read };
@@ -93,13 +72,6 @@
 allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
 
-# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
-allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-')
-
 # For AppFuse.
 allow priv_app vold:fd use;
 allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
@@ -117,47 +89,9 @@
 
 r_dir_file(priv_app, rootfs)
 
-# Allow GMS core to open kernel config for OTA matching through libvintf
-allow priv_app config_gz:file { open read getattr };
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow priv_app config_gz:file { open read getattr };
-')
-
 # access the mac address
 allowxperm priv_app self:udp_socket ioctl SIOCGIFHWADDR;
 
-# Allow GMS core to communicate with update_engine for A/B update.
-binder_call(priv_app, update_engine)
-allow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow priv_app update_engine:binder { call transfer };
-  auditallow update_engine priv_app:binder transfer;
-  auditallow priv_app update_engine:fd use;
-  auditallow priv_app update_engine_service:service_manager find;
-')
-
-# Allow GMS core to communicate with dumpsys storaged.
-binder_call(priv_app, storaged)
-allow priv_app storaged_service:service_manager find;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow priv_app storaged:binder { call transfer };
-  auditallow storaged priv_app:binder transfer;
-  auditallow priv_app storaged:fd use;
-  auditallow priv_app storaged_service:service_manager find;
-')
-
-
-# Allow GMS core to access system_update_service (e.g. to publish pending
-# system update info).
-allow priv_app system_update_service:service_manager find;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow priv_app system_update_service:service_manager find;
-')
-
 # Allow com.android.vending to communicate with statsd.
 binder_call(priv_app, statsd)
 
@@ -170,20 +104,6 @@
 allow priv_app preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow priv_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
-# Allow privileged apps (e.g. GMS core) to generate unique hardware IDs
-allow priv_app keystore:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow priv_app keystore:keystore_key gen_unique_id;
-')
-
-# Allow GMS core to access /sys/fs/selinux/policyvers for compatibility check
-allow priv_app selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow priv_app selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
-')
-
 read_runtime_log_tags(priv_app)
 
 # Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
@@ -196,9 +116,9 @@
 binder_call(priv_app, incidentd)
 allow priv_app incidentd:fifo_file { read write };
 
-# Allow heap profiling if the app opts in by being marked
-# profileable/debuggable.
+# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
 can_profile_heap(priv_app)
+can_profile_perf(priv_app)
 
 # Allow priv_apps to check whether Dynamic System Update is enabled
 get_prop(priv_app, dynamic_system_prop)
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index b2b6abc..1197de3 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
 hw.                     u:object_r:system_prop:s0
 ro.hw.                  u:object_r:system_prop:s0
 sys.                    u:object_r:system_prop:s0
-sys.init.userspace_reboot   u:object_r:userspace_reboot_prop:s0
+sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks u:object_r:init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop:s0
 sys.cppreopt            u:object_r:cppreopt_prop:s0
 sys.linker.             u:object_r:linker_prop:s0
 sys.lpdumpd             u:object_r:lpdumpd_prop:s0
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
 security.perf_harden    u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
 service.adb.root        u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
 service.adb.tcp.port    u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
+persist.adb.wifi.       u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
 
 persist.audio.          u:object_r:audio_prop:s0
 persist.bluetooth.      u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0
@@ -158,6 +159,7 @@
 ro.dalvik.              u:object_r:dalvik_prop:s0
 
 # Shared between system server and wificond
+wifi.                   u:object_r:wifi_prop:s0
 wlan.                   u:object_r:wifi_prop:s0
 
 # Lowpan properties
@@ -196,6 +198,7 @@
 persist.device_config.runtime_native_boot.   u:object_r:device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop:s0
 persist.device_config.media_native.          u:object_r:device_config_media_native_prop:s0
 persist.device_config.storage_native_boot.   u:object_r:device_config_storage_native_boot_prop:s0
+persist.device_config.window_manager_native_boot. u:object_r:device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop:s0
 
 # Properties that relate to legacy server configurable flags
 persist.device_config.global_settings.sys_traced u:object_r:device_config_sys_traced_prop:s0
@@ -226,5 +229,9 @@
 ota.warm_reset  u:object_r:ota_prop:s0
 
 # Module properties
-com.android.sdkext.                  u:object_r:module_sdkext_prop:s0
-persist.com.android.sdkext.          u:object_r:module_sdkext_prop:s0
+com.android.sdkext.                  u:object_r:module_sdkextensions_prop:s0
+persist.com.android.sdkext.          u:object_r:module_sdkextensions_prop:s0
+
+# Userspace reboot properties
+sys.userspace_reboot.log.         u:object_r:userspace_reboot_log_prop:s0
+persist.sys.userspace_reboot.log. u:object_r:userspace_reboot_log_prop:s0
diff --git a/private/runas_app.te b/private/runas_app.te
index e6fd953..c1b354a 100644
--- a/private/runas_app.te
+++ b/private/runas_app.te
@@ -16,3 +16,17 @@
 # Allow lldb/ndk-gdb/simpleperf to ptrace attach to debuggable app processes.
 allow runas_app untrusted_app_all:process { ptrace signal sigstop };
 allow runas_app untrusted_app_all:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
+# Allow executing system image simpleperf without a domain transition.
+allow runas_app simpleperf_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Suppress denial logspam when simpleperf is trying to find a matching process
+# by scanning /proc/<pid>/cmdline files. The /proc/<pid> directories are within
+# the same domain as their respective process, most of which this domain is not
+# allowed to see.
+dontaudit runas_app domain:dir search;
+
+# Allow runas_app to call perf_event_open for profiling debuggable app
+# processes, but not the whole system.
+allow runas_app self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
+neverallow runas_app self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
diff --git a/private/seapp_contexts b/private/seapp_contexts
index 3838578..6c3b607 100644
--- a/private/seapp_contexts
+++ b/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -158,12 +158,15 @@
 user=_app isEphemeralApp=true domain=ephemeral_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app isPrivApp=true domain=priv_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.permissioncontroller domain=permissioncontroller_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.android.providers.media.module domain=mediaprovider_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.providers.media.module domain=mediaprovider_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.android.permissioncontroller domain=permissioncontroller_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.android.vzwomatrigger domain=vzwomatrigger_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.gms domain=gmscore_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.gms.* domain=gmscore_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.gms:* domain=gmscore_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
-user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=29 domain=untrusted_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=30 domain=untrusted_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=29 domain=untrusted_app_29 type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=28 domain=untrusted_app_27 type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=26 domain=untrusted_app_27 type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app domain=untrusted_app_25 type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
diff --git a/private/security_classes b/private/security_classes
index 25b4cba..c0631e9 100644
--- a/private/security_classes
+++ b/private/security_classes
@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@
 
 class xdp_socket
 
+class perf_event
+
 # Property service
 class property_service          # userspace
 
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index 849717a..19d3b0d 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -1,11 +1,15 @@
-android.hardware.rebootescrow.IRebootEscrow/default u:object_r:hal_rebootescrow_service:s0
-android.hardware.vibrator.IVibrator/default u:object_r:hal_vibrator_service:s0
+android.hardware.light.ILights/default                               u:object_r:hal_light_service:s0
+android.hardware.power.IPower/default                                u:object_r:hal_power_service:s0
+android.hardware.rebootescrow.IRebootEscrow/default                  u:object_r:hal_rebootescrow_service:s0
+android.hardware.vibrator.IVibrator/default                          u:object_r:hal_vibrator_service:s0
 
 accessibility                             u:object_r:accessibility_service:s0
 account                                   u:object_r:account_service:s0
 activity                                  u:object_r:activity_service:s0
 activity_task                             u:object_r:activity_task_service:s0
 adb                                       u:object_r:adb_service:s0
+aidl_lazy_test_1                          u:object_r:aidl_lazy_test_service:s0
+aidl_lazy_test_2                          u:object_r:aidl_lazy_test_service:s0
 alarm                                     u:object_r:alarm_service:s0
 android.os.UpdateEngineService            u:object_r:update_engine_service:s0
 android.security.keystore                 u:object_r:keystore_service:s0
@@ -111,6 +115,7 @@
 isub                                      u:object_r:radio_service:s0
 jobscheduler                              u:object_r:jobscheduler_service:s0
 launcherapps                              u:object_r:launcherapps_service:s0
+lights                                    u:object_r:light_service:s0
 location                                  u:object_r:location_service:s0
 lock_settings                             u:object_r:lock_settings_service:s0
 looper_stats                              u:object_r:looper_stats_service:s0
@@ -199,6 +204,7 @@
 storagestats                              u:object_r:storagestats_service:s0
 SurfaceFlinger                            u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0
 suspend_control                           u:object_r:system_suspend_control_service:s0
+system_config                             u:object_r:system_config_service:s0
 system_update                             u:object_r:system_update_service:s0
 task                                      u:object_r:task_service:s0
 telecom                                   u:object_r:telecom_service:s0
diff --git a/private/shell.te b/private/shell.te
index 975fde4..8bd4e1d 100644
--- a/private/shell.te
+++ b/private/shell.te
@@ -83,3 +83,11 @@
   FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
   FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX
 };
+
+# Allow shell to execute simpleperf without a domain transition.
+allow shell simpleperf_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow shell to call perf_event_open for profiling other shell processes, but
+# not the whole system.
+allow shell self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
+neverallow shell self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
diff --git a/private/simpleperf.te b/private/simpleperf.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0639c11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/simpleperf.te
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# Domain used when running /system/bin/simpleperf to profile a specific app.
+# Entered either by the app itself exec-ing the binary, or through
+# simpleperf_app_runner (with shell as its origin). Certain other domains
+# (runas_app, shell) can also exec this binary without a domain transition.
+typeattribute simpleperf coredomain;
+type simpleperf_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+domain_auto_trans({ untrusted_app_all -runas_app }, simpleperf_exec, simpleperf)
+
+# When running in this domain, simpleperf is scoped to profiling an individual
+# app. The necessary MAC permissions for profiling are more maintainable and
+# consistent if simpleperf is marked as an app domain as well (as, for example,
+# it will then see the same set of system libraries as the app).
+app_domain(simpleperf)
+untrusted_app_domain(simpleperf)
+
+# Allow ptrace attach to the target app, for reading JIT debug info (using
+# process_vm_readv) during unwinding and symbolization.
+allow simpleperf untrusted_app_all:process ptrace;
+
+# Allow using perf_event_open syscall for profiling the target app.
+allow simpleperf self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
+
+# Allow /proc/<pid> access for the target app (for example, when trying to
+# discover it by cmdline).
+r_dir_file(simpleperf, untrusted_app_all)
+
+# Suppress denial logspam when simpleperf is trying to find a matching process
+# by scanning /proc/<pid>/cmdline files. The /proc/<pid> directories are within
+# the same domain as their respective processes, most of which this domain is
+# not allowed to see.
+dontaudit simpleperf domain:dir search;
+
+# Neverallows:
+
+# Profiling must be confined to the scope of an individual app.
+neverallow simpleperf self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
diff --git a/private/snapshotctl.te b/private/snapshotctl.te
index 0f0313c..f8399fe 100644
--- a/private/snapshotctl.te
+++ b/private/snapshotctl.te
@@ -34,3 +34,9 @@
 # Snapshotctl talk to boot control HAL to set merge status.
 hwbinder_use(snapshotctl)
 hal_client_domain(snapshotctl, hal_bootctl)
+
+# Logging
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  allow snapshotctl snapshotctl_log_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow snapshotctl snapshotctl_log_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/private/stats.te b/private/stats.te
index ea9530c..3e8a3d5 100644
--- a/private/stats.te
+++ b/private/stats.te
@@ -41,12 +41,14 @@
   domain
   -dumpstate
   -gmscore_app
+  -gpuservice
   -incidentd
   -platform_app
   -priv_app
   -shell
   -stats
   -statsd
+  -surfaceflinger
   -system_app
   -system_server
   -traceur_app
diff --git a/private/statsd.te b/private/statsd.te
index a55c42d..1483156 100644
--- a/private/statsd.te
+++ b/private/statsd.te
@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
 typeattribute statsd coredomain;
-typeattribute statsd stats_service_server;
 
 init_daemon_domain(statsd)
 
@@ -19,3 +18,6 @@
 
 # Allow StatsCompanionService to pipe data to statsd.
 allow statsd system_server:fifo_file { read getattr };
+
+# Allow statsd to retrieve SF statistics over binder
+binder_call(statsd, surfaceflinger);
diff --git a/private/surfaceflinger.te b/private/surfaceflinger.te
index e696fe5..78853bb 100644
--- a/private/surfaceflinger.te
+++ b/private/surfaceflinger.te
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 binder_call(surfaceflinger, binderservicedomain)
 binder_call(surfaceflinger, appdomain)
 binder_call(surfaceflinger, bootanim)
+binder_call(surfaceflinger, system_server);
 binder_service(surfaceflinger)
 
 # Binder IPC to bu, presently runs in adbd domain.
@@ -114,6 +115,12 @@
 pdx_client(surfaceflinger, bufferhub_client)
 pdx_client(surfaceflinger, performance_client)
 
+# Allow supplying timestats statistics to statsd
+allow surfaceflinger stats_service:service_manager find;
+allow surfaceflinger statsmanager_service:service_manager find;
+# TODO(146461633): remove this once native pullers talk to StatsManagerService
+binder_call(surfaceflinger, statsd);
+
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/private/system_app.te b/private/system_app.te
index ee18ab2..e5d7d18 100644
--- a/private/system_app.te
+++ b/private/system_app.te
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
   -virtual_touchpad_service
   -vold_service
   -vr_hwc_service
+  -default_android_service
 }:service_manager find;
 # suppress denials for services system_app should not be accessing.
 dontaudit system_app {
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index c1342d8..56d91d6 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
 typeattribute system_server mlstrustedsubject;
 typeattribute system_server scheduler_service_server;
 typeattribute system_server sensor_service_server;
+typeattribute system_server stats_service_server;
 
 # Define a type for tmpfs-backed ashmem regions.
 tmpfs_domain(system_server)
@@ -14,6 +15,9 @@
 # Create a socket for connections from crash_dump.
 type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_ndebug_socket "ndebugsocket";
 
+# Create a socket for connections from zygotes.
+type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_unsolzygote_socket "unsolzygotesocket";
+
 allow system_server zygote_tmpfs:file read;
 allow system_server appdomain_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
 
@@ -619,6 +623,7 @@
 set_prop(system_server, device_config_media_native_prop)
 set_prop(system_server, device_config_storage_native_boot_prop)
 set_prop(system_server, device_config_sys_traced_prop)
+set_prop(system_server, device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop)
 
 # BootReceiver to read ro.boot.bootreason
 get_prop(system_server, bootloader_boot_reason_prop)
@@ -654,9 +659,15 @@
 # Read the property as feature flag for protecting apks with fs-verity.
 get_prop(system_server, apk_verity_prop)
 
+# Read wifi.interface
+get_prop(system_server, wifi_prop)
+
 # Create a socket for connections from debuggerd.
 allow system_server system_ndebug_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
 
+# Create a socket for connections from zygotes.
+allow system_server system_unsolzygote_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
+
 # Manage cache files.
 allow system_server cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir { relabelfrom create_dir_perms };
@@ -831,6 +842,9 @@
 allow system_server adbd:fd use;
 allow system_server adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
 
+# Read persist.adb.wifi. properties
+get_prop(system_server, shell_prop)
+
 # Allow invoking tools like "timeout"
 allow system_server toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 
@@ -861,6 +875,7 @@
 r_dir_file(system_server, proc_net_type)
 r_dir_file(system_server, proc_qtaguid_stat)
 allow system_server {
+  proc_cmdline
   proc_loadavg
   proc_meminfo
   proc_pagetypeinfo
@@ -885,6 +900,9 @@
 allow system_server debugfs_wifi_tracing:dir search;
 allow system_server debugfs_wifi_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
 
+# Allow system_server to read tracepoint ids in order to attach BPF programs to them.
+allow system_server debugfs_tracing:file r_file_perms;
+
 # allow system_server to exec shell, asanwrapper & zygote(app_process) on ASAN builds. Needed to run
 # asanwrapper.
 with_asan(`
@@ -894,10 +912,11 @@
 ')
 
 # allow system_server to read the eBPF maps that stores the traffic stats information and update
-# the map after snapshot is recorded
+# the map after snapshot is recorded, and to read, update and run the maps and programs used for
+# time in state accounting
 allow system_server fs_bpf:dir search;
 allow system_server fs_bpf:file { read write };
-allow system_server bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write };
+allow system_server bpfloader:bpf { map_read map_write prog_run };
 
 # ART Profiles.
 # Allow system_server to open profile snapshots for read.
@@ -971,6 +990,16 @@
 # Only allow crash_dump to connect to system_ndebug_socket.
 neverallow { domain -init -system_server -crash_dump } system_ndebug_socket:sock_file { open write };
 
+# Only allow zygotes to connect to system_unsolzygote_socket.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+  -zygote
+  -app_zygote
+  -webview_zygote
+} system_unsolzygote_socket:sock_file { open write };
+
 # Only allow init, system_server, flags_health_check to set properties for server configurable flags
 neverallow {
   domain
@@ -986,6 +1015,7 @@
   device_config_media_native_prop
   device_config_storage_native_boot_prop
   device_config_sys_traced_prop
+  device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop
 }:property_service set;
 
 # system_server should never be executing dex2oat. This is either
@@ -1051,12 +1081,20 @@
 allow system_server vendor_apex_file:dir { getattr search };
 allow system_server vendor_apex_file:file r_file_perms;
 
+# Allow the system server to manage relevant apex module data files.
+allow system_server apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow system_server apex_permission_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server apex_permission_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
 # Allow PasswordSlotManager rw access to /metadata/password_slots, so GSIs and the host image can
 # communicate which slots are available for use.
 allow system_server metadata_file:dir search;
 allow system_server password_slot_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow system_server password_slot_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
 
+# Allow init to set sysprop used to compute stats about userspace reboot.
+set_prop(system_server, userspace_reboot_log_prop)
+
 # JVMTI agent settings are only readable from the system server.
 neverallow {
   domain
@@ -1090,3 +1128,13 @@
   -system_server
 } password_slot_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
 neverallow { domain -init -system_server } password_slot_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set *;
+
+# Allow systemserver to read/write the invalidation property
+set_prop(system_server, binder_cache_system_server_prop)
+neverallow { domain -system_server -init }
+    binder_cache_system_server_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Allow system server to attach BPF programs to tracepoints. Deny read permission so that
+# system_server cannot use this access to read perf event data like process stacks.
+allow system_server self:perf_event { open write cpu kernel };
+neverallow system_server self:perf_event ~{ open write cpu kernel };
diff --git a/private/traced_perf.te b/private/traced_perf.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7a78d79
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/traced_perf.te
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Performance profiler, backed by perf_event_open(2).
+# See go/perfetto-perf-android.
+typeattribute traced_perf coredomain;
+typeattribute traced_perf mlstrustedsubject;
+
+type traced_perf_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(traced_perf)
+perfetto_producer(traced_perf)
+
+# Allow traced_perf full use of perf_event_open(2). It will perform cpu-wide
+# profiling, but retain samples only for profileable processes.
+# Thread-specific profiling is still disallowed due to a PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH
+# check (which would require a process:attach SELinux allow-rule).
+allow traced_perf self:perf_event { open cpu kernel read write tracepoint };
+
+# Allow CAP_KILL for delivery of dedicated signal to obtain proc-fds from a
+# process. Allow CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH for stack unwinding and symbolization of
+# sampled stacks, which requires opening the backing libraries/executables (as
+# symbols are usually not mapped into the process space). Not all such files
+# are world-readable, e.g. odex files that included user profiles during
+# profile-guided optimization.
+allow traced_perf self:capability { kill dac_read_search };
+
+# Allow reading /system/data/packages.list.
+allow traced_perf packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
+
+# Allow reading files for stack unwinding and symbolization.
+r_dir_file(traced_perf, nativetest_data_file)
+r_dir_file(traced_perf, system_file_type)
+r_dir_file(traced_perf, apk_data_file)
+r_dir_file(traced_perf, dalvikcache_data_file)
+r_dir_file(traced_perf, vendor_file_type)
+
+# Do not audit the cases where traced_perf attempts to access /proc/[pid] for
+# domains that it cannot read.
+dontaudit traced_perf domain:dir { search getattr open };
+
+# Never allow access to app data files
+neverallow traced_perf { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file *;
+
+# Never allow profiling highly privileged processes.
+never_profile_heap(`{
+  bpfloader
+  init
+  kernel
+  keystore
+  llkd
+  logd
+  ueventd
+  vendor_init
+  vold
+}')
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app.te b/private/untrusted_app.te
index c15fa22..6e7a99c 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app.te
@@ -1,20 +1,11 @@
 ###
 ### Untrusted apps.
 ###
-### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps.
-### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
-### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
-### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
-### directory).  The untrusted_app domain is the default assignment in
-### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
-### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
-### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
-### domain is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
-### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
-### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
-### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
-### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
-### seapp_contexts.
+### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+### targetSdkVersion >= 30.
+###
+### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
+### placed in this selinux domain.
 ###
 
 typeattribute untrusted_app coredomain;
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_25.te b/private/untrusted_app_25.te
index 2091f2e..a1abc41 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_25.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_25.te
@@ -4,19 +4,8 @@
 ### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
 ### targetSdkVersion <= 25.
 ###
-### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
-### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
-### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
-### directory).  The untrusted_app domain is the default assignment in
-### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
-### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
-### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
-### domain is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
-### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
-### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
-### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
-### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
-### seapp_contexts.
+### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
+### placed in this selinux domain.
 ###
 
 typeattribute untrusted_app_25 coredomain;
@@ -59,3 +48,6 @@
 
 # Read /mnt/sdcard symlink.
 allow untrusted_app_25 mnt_sdcard_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# allow binding to netlink route sockets and sending RTM_GETLINK messages.
+allow untrusted_app_25 self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_27.te b/private/untrusted_app_27.te
index 03b3013..b7b6d72 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_27.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_27.te
@@ -4,20 +4,8 @@
 ### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
 ### 25 < targetSdkVersion <= 28.
 ###
-### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps.
-### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
-### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
-### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
-### directory).  The untrusted_app_27 domain is the default assignment in
-### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
-### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
-### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
-### domain is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
-### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
-### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
-### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
-### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
-### seapp_contexts.
+### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
+### placed in this selinux domain.
 ###
 
 typeattribute untrusted_app_27 coredomain;
@@ -48,3 +36,6 @@
 
 # Read /mnt/sdcard symlink.
 allow untrusted_app_27 mnt_sdcard_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# allow binding to netlink route sockets and sending RTM_GETLINK messages.
+allow untrusted_app_27 self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_29.te b/private/untrusted_app_29.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..344ae89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_29.te
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+###
+### Untrusted_29.
+###
+### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+### targetSdkVersion = 29.
+###
+### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
+### placed in this selinux domain.
+###
+
+typeattribute untrusted_app_29 coredomain;
+
+app_domain(untrusted_app_29)
+untrusted_app_domain(untrusted_app_29)
+net_domain(untrusted_app_29)
+bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app_29)
+
+# allow binding to netlink route sockets and sending RTM_GETLINK messages.
+allow untrusted_app_29 self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_all.te b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
index d8e0b14..d9fd5a1 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_all.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
@@ -137,9 +137,9 @@
 # connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
 perfetto_producer(untrusted_app_all)
 
-# Allow heap profiling if the app opts in by being marked
-# profileable/debuggable.
+# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
 can_profile_heap(untrusted_app_all)
+can_profile_perf(untrusted_app_all)
 
 # allow untrusted apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
 # modify them other than to connect
@@ -168,3 +168,8 @@
   allow untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file rw_file_perms;
   allowxperm untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file ioctl { KCOV_INIT_TRACE KCOV_ENABLE KCOV_DISABLE };
 ')
+
+# Allow signalling simpleperf domain, which is the domain that the simpleperf
+# profiler runs as when executed by the app. The signals are used to control
+# the profiler (which would be profiling the app that is sending the signal).
+allow untrusted_app_all simpleperf:process signal;
diff --git a/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te b/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
index b287bdc..157ee55 100644
--- a/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
+++ b/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 }:dir { open read write add_name remove_name rmdir relabelfrom };
 allow vold_prepare_subdirs {
     apex_module_data_file
+    apex_permission_data_file
     apex_rollback_data_file
     backup_data_file
     face_vendor_data_file
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@
 }:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
 allow vold_prepare_subdirs {
     apex_module_data_file
+    apex_permission_data_file
     apex_rollback_data_file
     backup_data_file
     face_vendor_data_file
diff --git a/private/webview_zygote.te b/private/webview_zygote.te
index 8fe9733..969ab9c 100644
--- a/private/webview_zygote.te
+++ b/private/webview_zygote.te
@@ -64,8 +64,8 @@
 # Directory listing in /system.
 allow webview_zygote system_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
-# Read system properties managed by zygote.
-allow webview_zygote zygote_tmpfs:file read;
+# Read and inspect temporary files (like system properties) managed by zygote.
+allow webview_zygote zygote_tmpfs:file { read getattr };
 # Child of zygote.
 allow webview_zygote zygote:fd use;
 allow webview_zygote zygote:process sigchld;
@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@
 
 allow webview_zygote system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
+# Send unsolicited message to system_server
+unix_socket_send(webview_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
+
 #####
 ##### Neverallow
 #####
diff --git a/private/zygote.te b/private/zygote.te
index e6c1db9..3963459 100644
--- a/private/zygote.te
+++ b/private/zygote.te
@@ -53,6 +53,16 @@
 # Bind mount on /data/data and mounted volumes
 allow zygote { system_data_file mnt_expand_file }:dir mounton;
 
+# Relabel /data/user /data/user_de and /data/data
+allow zygote tmpfs:{ dir lnk_file } relabelfrom;
+allow zygote system_data_file:{ dir lnk_file } relabelto;
+
+# Zygote opens /mnt/expand to mount CE DE storage on each vol
+allow zygote mnt_expand_file:dir { open read search relabelto };
+
+# Bind mount subdirectories on /data/misc/profiles/cur
+allow zygote { user_profile_data_file }:dir { mounton search };
+
 # Create and bind dirs on /data/data
 allow zygote tmpfs:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
 
@@ -61,7 +71,7 @@
 
 allow zygote mirror_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
-# Get and set data directories
+# Get inode of data directories
 allow zygote {
   system_data_file
   radio_data_file
@@ -119,6 +129,10 @@
 allow zygote mnt_user_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
 allow zygote mnt_user_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
 allow zygote mnt_user_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+# Allow mounting user-specific storage source if started before vold.
+allow zygote mnt_pass_through_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+
 # Allowed to mount user-specific storage into place
 allow zygote storage_file:dir { search mounton };
 
@@ -126,9 +140,6 @@
 allow zygote { sdcard_type }:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
 allow zygote { sdcard_type }:file { create_file_perms };
 
-# Allow zygote to expand app files while preloading libraries
-allow zygote mnt_expand_file:dir getattr;
-
 # Handle --invoke-with command when launching Zygote with a wrapper command.
 allow zygote zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 
@@ -163,12 +174,19 @@
 get_prop(zygote, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
 get_prop(zygote, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
 
+# Allow the zygote to access window manager native boot feature flags
+# to initialize WindowManager static properties.
+get_prop(zygote, device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop)
+
 # ingore spurious denials
 dontaudit zygote self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
 
 # Allow zygote to use ashmem fds from system_server.
 allow zygote system_server:fd use;
 
+# Send unsolicited message to system_server
+unix_socket_send(zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
@@ -201,7 +219,7 @@
   exported_bluetooth_prop
 }:file create_file_perms;
 
-# Do not allow zygote to access app data except getting attributes and relabeling to.
+# Zygote should not be able to access app private data.
 neverallow zygote {
   privapp_data_file
   app_data_file
diff --git a/public/aidl_lazy_test_server.te b/public/aidl_lazy_test_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..626d008
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/aidl_lazy_test_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+type aidl_lazy_test_server, domain;
+type aidl_lazy_test_server_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+  binder_use(aidl_lazy_test_server)
+  binder_call(aidl_lazy_test_server, binderservicedomain)
+
+  add_service(aidl_lazy_test_server, aidl_lazy_test_service)
+')
diff --git a/public/attributes b/public/attributes
index 0fd2be2..a3728cf 100644
--- a/public/attributes
+++ b/public/attributes
@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@
 hal_attribute(graphics_composer);
 hal_attribute(health);
 hal_attribute(health_storage);
+hal_attribute(identity);
 hal_attribute(input_classifier);
 hal_attribute(ir);
 hal_attribute(keymaster);
@@ -352,6 +353,7 @@
 # from one core domain to another, without having to update the vendor image
 # which contains clients of this service.
 
+attribute automotive_display_service_server;
 attribute camera_service_server;
 attribute display_service_server;
 attribute scheduler_service_server;
diff --git a/public/dnsmasq.te b/public/dnsmasq.te
index d189c89..86f1eb1 100644
--- a/public/dnsmasq.te
+++ b/public/dnsmasq.te
@@ -23,3 +23,6 @@
 allow dnsmasq netd:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
 allow dnsmasq netd:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
 allow dnsmasq netd:udp_socket { read write };
+
+# sometimes a network device vanishes and we try to load module netdev-{devicename}
+dontaudit dnsmasq kernel:system module_request;
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index 88093f9..f2af7b1 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -107,6 +107,10 @@
 get_prop(domain, logd_prop)
 get_prop(domain, vndk_prop)
 
+# Binder cache properties are world-readable
+get_prop(domain, binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop)
+get_prop(domain, binder_cache_system_server_prop)
+
 # Let everyone read log properties, so that liblog can avoid sending unloggable
 # messages to logd.
 get_prop(domain, log_property_type)
@@ -497,9 +501,9 @@
 # system_app_service rather than the generic type.
 # New service_types are defined in {,hw,vnd}service.te and new mappings
 # from service name to service_type are defined in {,hw,vnd}service_contexts.
-neverallow * default_android_service:service_manager add;
-neverallow * default_android_vndservice:service_manager { add find };
-neverallow * default_android_hwservice:hwservice_manager { add find };
+neverallow * default_android_service:service_manager *;
+neverallow * default_android_vndservice:service_manager *;
+neverallow * default_android_hwservice:hwservice_manager *;
 
 # Looking up the base class/interface of all HwBinder services is a bad idea.
 # hwservicemanager currently offer such lookups only to make it so that security
@@ -649,6 +653,7 @@
     -audioserver_service # TODO(b/36783122) remove exemptions below once app_api_service is fixed
     -cameraserver_service
     -drmserver_service
+    -hal_light_service # TODO(b/148154485) remove once all violators are gone
     -keystore_service
     -mediadrmserver_service
     -mediaextractor_service
@@ -724,7 +729,8 @@
     userdebug_or_eng(`-su') # communications with su are permitted only on userdebug or eng builds
     -init
     -tombstoned # linker to tombstoned
-    userdebug_or_eng('-heapprofd`)
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
+    userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
   });
 ')
 
@@ -983,6 +989,7 @@
     userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
     -shell
     -system_executes_vendor_violators
+    -traced_perf # library/binary access for symbolization
     -ueventd # reads /vendor/ueventd.rc
   } {
     vendor_file_type
@@ -997,6 +1004,7 @@
     -vendor_overlay_file
     -vendor_public_lib_file
     -vendor_task_profiles_file
+    -vendor_incremental_module
     -vndk_sp_file
   }:file *;
 ')
@@ -1170,10 +1178,11 @@
   -zygote
 } shell:process { transition dyntransition };
 
-# Only domains spawned from zygote, runas and simpleperf_app_runner may have the appdomain
-# attribute.
+# Only domains spawned from zygote, runas and simpleperf_app_runner may have
+# the appdomain attribute. simpleperf is excluded as a domain transitioned to
+# when running an app-scoped profiling session.
 neverallow { domain -simpleperf_app_runner -runas -app_zygote -webview_zygote -zygote } {
-  appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+  appdomain -shell -simpleperf userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
 }:process { transition dyntransition };
 
 # Minimize read access to shell- or app-writable symlinks.
@@ -1305,10 +1314,11 @@
     -appdomain
     -bootanim
     -crash_dump
+    -heapprofd
     -init
     -iorap_prefetcherd
     -kernel
-    -heapprofd
+    -traced_perf
     -ueventd
   } vendor_file:file { no_w_file_perms no_x_file_perms open };
 ')
diff --git a/public/dumpstate.te b/public/dumpstate.te
index 7342856..3f11b6a 100644
--- a/public/dumpstate.te
+++ b/public/dumpstate.te
@@ -230,6 +230,7 @@
   -virtual_touchpad_service
   -vold_service
   -vr_hwc_service
+  -default_android_service
 }:service_manager find;
 # suppress denials for services dumpstate should not be accessing.
 dontaudit dumpstate {
@@ -294,14 +295,20 @@
 # Allow dumpstate to run ss
 allow dumpstate { domain pdx_channel_socket_type pdx_endpoint_socket_type }:socket_class_set getattr;
 
+# Allow dumpstate to read linkerconfig directory
+allow dumpstate linkerconfig_file:dir { read open };
+
 # For when dumpstate runs df
 dontaudit dumpstate {
   mnt_vendor_file
   mirror_data_file
+  mnt_user_file
 }:dir search;
 dontaudit dumpstate {
   apex_mnt_dir
+  linkerconfig_file
   mirror_data_file
+  mnt_user_file
 }:dir getattr;
 
 # Allow dumpstate to talk to bufferhubd over binder
@@ -313,6 +320,10 @@
 # Allow dumpstate to kill vendor dumpstate service by init
 set_prop(dumpstate, ctl_dumpstate_prop)
 
+#Access /data/misc/snapshotctl_log
+allow dumpstate snapshotctl_log_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow dumpstate snapshotctl_log_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/public/fastbootd.te b/public/fastbootd.te
index f08885a..a0152d4 100644
--- a/public/fastbootd.te
+++ b/public/fastbootd.te
@@ -53,12 +53,13 @@
     userdata_block_device
   }:blk_file { w_file_perms getattr ioctl };
 
-  # For disabling/wiping GSI.
+  # For disabling/wiping GSI, and for modifying/deleting files created via
+  # libfiemap.
   allow fastbootd metadata_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
   allow fastbootd {rootfs tmpfs}:dir mounton;
-  allow fastbootd metadata_file:dir search;
-  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file:file rw_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd metadata_file:dir { search getattr };
+  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
 
   allowxperm fastbootd super_block_device_type:blk_file ioctl { BLKIOMIN BLKALIGNOFF };
 
@@ -113,6 +114,10 @@
   allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file:dir search;
   allow fastbootd ota_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
   allow fastbootd ota_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+  # Determine allocation scheme (whether B partitions needs to be
+  # at the second half of super.
+  get_prop(fastbootd, virtual_ab_prop)
 ')
 
 ###
diff --git a/public/file.te b/public/file.te
index 9573ad0..3c3d1bc 100644
--- a/public/file.te
+++ b/public/file.te
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
 type sysfs_bluetooth_writable, fs_type, sysfs_type, mlstrustedobject;
 type sysfs_devices_block, fs_type, sysfs_type;
 type sysfs_dm, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_dm_verity, fs_type, sysfs_type;
 type sysfs_dt_firmware_android, fs_type, sysfs_type;
 type sysfs_extcon, fs_type, sysfs_type;
 type sysfs_ion, fs_type, sysfs_type;
@@ -209,6 +210,8 @@
 # Type for all vendor public libraries. These libs should only be exposed to
 # apps. ABI stability of these libs is vendor's responsibility.
 type vendor_public_lib_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+# Default type for incremental file system driver
+type vendor_incremental_module, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 
 # Input configuration
 type vendor_keylayout_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
@@ -308,12 +311,11 @@
 type staging_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # /vendor/apex
 type vendor_apex_file, vendor_file_type, file_type;
-# /data/incremental
-type incremental_root_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 
 # Mount locations managed by vold
 type mnt_media_rw_file, file_type;
 type mnt_user_file, file_type;
+type mnt_pass_through_file, file_type;
 type mnt_expand_file, file_type;
 type mnt_sdcard_file, file_type;
 type storage_file, file_type;
@@ -344,6 +346,7 @@
 # /data/misc subdirectories
 type adb_keys_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type apex_module_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apex_permission_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type apex_rollback_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type audio_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type audioserver_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
@@ -365,6 +368,7 @@
 type radio_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 type recovery_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type shared_relro_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type snapshotctl_log_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type stats_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type systemkeys_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type textclassifier_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
@@ -451,11 +455,13 @@
 type statsdw_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
 type system_wpa_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, coredomain_socket;
 type system_ndebug_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type system_unsolzygote_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
 type tombstoned_crash_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
 type tombstoned_java_trace_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 type tombstoned_intercept_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
-type traced_producer_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
 type traced_consumer_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type traced_perf_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type traced_producer_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
 type uncrypt_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
 type wpa_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type zygote_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
diff --git a/public/flags_health_check.te b/public/flags_health_check.te
index af7d96a..cf33ce7 100644
--- a/public/flags_health_check.te
+++ b/public/flags_health_check.te
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
 set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_media_native_prop)
 set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_storage_native_boot_prop)
 set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_sys_traced_prop)
+set_prop(flags_health_check, device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop)
 
 allow flags_health_check server_configurable_flags_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
 allow flags_health_check server_configurable_flags_data_file:file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/hal_configstore.te b/public/hal_configstore.te
index 1a95b72..069da47 100644
--- a/public/hal_configstore.te
+++ b/public/hal_configstore.te
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
   userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
   -tombstoned
   userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
+  userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
 }:{ unix_dgram_socket unix_stream_socket } *;
 
 # Should never need access to anything on /data
diff --git a/public/hal_identity.te b/public/hal_identity.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8df186
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_identity.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_identity_client, hal_identity_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_identity, hal_identity_hwservice)
diff --git a/public/hal_light.te b/public/hal_light.te
index 333fcac..1e70b74 100644
--- a/public/hal_light.te
+++ b/public/hal_light.te
@@ -4,6 +4,13 @@
 
 hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_light, hal_light_hwservice)
 
+add_service(hal_light_server, hal_light_service)
+binder_call(hal_light_server, servicemanager)
+
+allow hal_light_client hal_light_service:service_manager find;
+
+allow hal_light_server dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
 allow hal_light sysfs_leds:lnk_file read;
 allow hal_light sysfs_leds:file rw_file_perms;
 allow hal_light sysfs_leds:dir r_dir_perms;
diff --git a/public/hal_power.te b/public/hal_power.te
index 028011a..2c80a51 100644
--- a/public/hal_power.te
+++ b/public/hal_power.te
@@ -3,3 +3,7 @@
 binder_call(hal_power_server, hal_power_client)
 
 hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_power, hal_power_hwservice)
+
+add_service(hal_power_server, hal_power_service)
+binder_call(hal_power_server, servicemanager)
+allow hal_power_client hal_power_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hwservice.te b/public/hwservice.te
index 2cd582b..3619a63 100644
--- a/public/hwservice.te
+++ b/public/hwservice.te
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 type fwk_scheduler_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
 type fwk_sensor_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
 type fwk_stats_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
+type fwk_automotive_display_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_atrace_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_audio_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_audiocontrol_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@
 type hal_graphics_composer_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_health_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_health_storage_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_identity_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_input_classifier_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_ir_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_keymaster_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
diff --git a/public/init.te b/public/init.te
index 56ed703..19c7e4b 100644
--- a/public/init.te
+++ b/public/init.te
@@ -381,6 +381,7 @@
 # init access to /sys files.
 allow init {
   sysfs_android_usb
+  sysfs_dm_verity
   sysfs_leds
   sysfs_power
   sysfs_fs_f2fs
@@ -545,7 +546,7 @@
 allow init unencrypted_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 
 # Set encryption policy on dirs in /data
-allowxperm init data_file_type:dir ioctl {
+allowxperm init { data_file_type unlabeled }:dir ioctl {
   FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
   FS_IOC_SET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
 };
diff --git a/public/installd.te b/public/installd.te
index 10277d2..a6307ef 100644
--- a/public/installd.te
+++ b/public/installd.te
@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@
 # optimizing application code.
 allow installd system_data_file:lnk_file { create getattr read setattr unlink };
 
+# Manage lower filesystem via pass_through mounts
+allow installd mnt_pass_through_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
 # Upgrade /data/media for multi-user if necessary.
 allow installd media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow installd media_rw_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
diff --git a/public/ioctl_defines b/public/ioctl_defines
index 15cf7d5..b2a6fbf 100644
--- a/public/ioctl_defines
+++ b/public/ioctl_defines
@@ -804,6 +804,8 @@
 define(`FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY', `0xc0506617')
 define(`FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY', `0x6685')
 define(`FS_IOC_FIEMAP', `0xc020660b')
+define(`FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR', `0x801c581f')
+define(`FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR', `0x401c5820')
 define(`FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY', `0x400c6615')
 define(`FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX', `0xc0096616')
 define(`FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT', `0x40106614')
diff --git a/public/iorapd.te b/public/iorapd.te
index abf7adb..4c08c72 100644
--- a/public/iorapd.te
+++ b/public/iorapd.te
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
 # tracing sessions and read trace data.
 unix_socket_connect(iorapd, traced_consumer, traced)
 
+# Allow iorapd to execute compilation (iorap.cmd.compiler) in idle time.
+allow iorapd system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/public/keystore.te b/public/keystore.te
index e869f32..27c4624 100644
--- a/public/keystore.te
+++ b/public/keystore.te
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 binder_use(keystore)
 binder_service(keystore)
 binder_call(keystore, system_server)
+binder_call(keystore, wificond)
 
 allow keystore keystore_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow keystore keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/net.te b/public/net.te
index bdef072..e90715e 100644
--- a/public/net.te
+++ b/public/net.te
@@ -18,10 +18,16 @@
 allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app} port_type:udp_socket name_bind;
 allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app} port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
 # See changes to the routing table.
-allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket { create read getattr write setattr lock append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg_read };
-# b/141455849 gate RTM_GETLINK with a new permission nlmsg_readpriv and initially grant
-# this permission to everything that previously had the nlmsg_read permission.
-allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_readpriv;
+allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket { create read getattr write setattr lock append connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg_read };
+# b/141455849 gate RTM_GETLINK with a new permission nlmsg_readpriv and block access from
+# untrusted_apps. Some untrusted apps (e.g. untrusted_app_25-29) are granted access elsewhere
+# to avoid app-compat breakage.
+allow {
+  netdomain
+  -ephemeral_app
+  -mediaprovider
+  -untrusted_app_all
+} self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
 
 # Talks to netd via dnsproxyd socket.
 unix_socket_connect(netdomain, dnsproxyd, netd)
diff --git a/public/netd.te b/public/netd.te
index c15a03b..92c2ed1 100644
--- a/public/netd.te
+++ b/public/netd.te
@@ -173,3 +173,13 @@
 
 neverallow netd sysfs_net:dir no_w_dir_perms;
 dontaudit netd sysfs_net:dir write;
+
+# Netd should not have SYS_ADMIN privs.
+neverallow netd self:capability sys_admin;
+dontaudit netd self:capability sys_admin;
+
+# Netd should not have SYS_MODULE privs, nor should it be requesting module loads
+# (things it requires should be built directly into the kernel)
+dontaudit netd self:capability sys_module;
+
+dontaudit netd kernel:system module_request;
diff --git a/public/property.te b/public/property.te
index 188178a..3de80ff 100644
--- a/public/property.te
+++ b/public/property.te
@@ -11,13 +11,15 @@
 system_internal_prop(device_config_runtime_native_prop)
 system_internal_prop(device_config_storage_native_boot_prop)
 system_internal_prop(device_config_sys_traced_prop)
+system_internal_prop(device_config_window_manager_native_boot_prop)
 system_internal_prop(firstboot_prop)
 system_internal_prop(gsid_prop)
+system_internal_prop(init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop)
 system_internal_prop(init_svc_debug_prop)
 system_internal_prop(last_boot_reason_prop)
 system_internal_prop(netd_stable_secret_prop)
 system_internal_prop(pm_prop)
-system_internal_prop(userspace_reboot_prop)
+system_internal_prop(userspace_reboot_log_prop)
 
 compatible_property_only(`
     # DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
@@ -55,18 +57,20 @@
     system_internal_prop(time_prop)
     system_internal_prop(traced_enabled_prop)
     system_internal_prop(traced_lazy_prop)
-    system_internal_prop(virtual_ab_prop)
 ')
 
 # Properties which can't be written outside system
+
+# Properties used by binder caches
+system_restricted_prop(binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(binder_cache_system_server_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(linker_prop)
-system_restricted_prop(module_sdkext_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(module_sdkextensions_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(nnapi_ext_deny_product_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(restorecon_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(system_boot_reason_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(system_jvmti_agent_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
-system_restricted_prop(vndk_prop)
 
 compatible_property_only(`
     # DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
@@ -98,13 +102,25 @@
     system_restricted_prop(vold_prop)
 ')
 
+# Properties which can be written only by vendor_init
+system_vendor_config_prop(apk_verity_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(cpu_variant_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(exported_audio_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(exported_camera_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(exported_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(exported_default_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(exported3_default_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(userspace_reboot_config_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(vehicle_hal_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(vndk_prop)
+system_vendor_config_prop(virtual_ab_prop)
+
 # Properties with no restrictions
 system_public_prop(audio_prop)
-system_public_prop(apk_verity_prop)
 system_public_prop(bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop)
 system_public_prop(bluetooth_audio_hal_prop)
 system_public_prop(bluetooth_prop)
-system_public_prop(cpu_variant_prop)
 system_public_prop(ctl_default_prop)
 system_public_prop(ctl_interface_start_prop)
 system_public_prop(ctl_start_prop)
@@ -116,13 +132,9 @@
 system_public_prop(exported2_radio_prop)
 system_public_prop(exported2_system_prop)
 system_public_prop(exported2_vold_prop)
-system_public_prop(exported3_default_prop)
 system_public_prop(exported3_radio_prop)
-system_public_prop(exported_audio_prop)
 system_public_prop(exported_bluetooth_prop)
-system_public_prop(exported_config_prop)
 system_public_prop(exported_dalvik_prop)
-system_public_prop(exported_default_prop)
 system_public_prop(exported_ffs_prop)
 system_public_prop(exported_overlay_prop)
 system_public_prop(exported_pm_prop)
@@ -142,11 +154,12 @@
 system_public_prop(radio_prop)
 system_public_prop(serialno_prop)
 system_public_prop(system_prop)
-system_public_prop(vehicle_hal_prop)
-system_public_prop(vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
 system_public_prop(wifi_log_prop)
 system_public_prop(wifi_prop)
 
+# Properties used in default HAL implementations
+vendor_internal_prop(rebootescrow_hal_prop)
+
 # Properties which are public for devices launching with Android O or earlier
 # This should not be used for any new properties.
 not_compatible_property(`
@@ -185,7 +198,6 @@
     system_public_prop(time_prop)
     system_public_prop(traced_enabled_prop)
     system_public_prop(traced_lazy_prop)
-    system_public_prop(virtual_ab_prop)
 
     system_public_prop(config_prop)
     system_public_prop(cppreopt_prop)
@@ -453,6 +465,16 @@
   neverallow {
     domain
     -coredomain
+    -hal_camera_server
+    -cameraserver
+    -vendor_init
+  } {
+    exported_camera_prop
+  }:property_service set;
+
+  neverallow {
+    domain
+    -coredomain
     -hal_wifi_server
     -wificond
   } {
@@ -538,128 +560,14 @@
     -system_writes_vendor_properties_violators
   } {
     property_type
-    -apexd_prop
-    -audio_prop
-    -bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop
-    -bluetooth_audio_hal_prop
-    -bluetooth_prop
-    -bootloader_boot_reason_prop
-    -boottime_prop
-    -bpf_progs_loaded_prop
-    -cold_boot_done_prop
-    -config_prop
-    -cppreopt_prop
-    -ctl_adbd_prop
-    -ctl_apexd_prop
-    -ctl_bootanim_prop
-    -ctl_bugreport_prop
-    -ctl_console_prop
-    -ctl_default_prop
-    -ctl_dumpstate_prop
-    -ctl_fuse_prop
-    -ctl_gsid_prop
-    -ctl_interface_restart_prop
-    -ctl_interface_start_prop
-    -ctl_interface_stop_prop
-    -ctl_mdnsd_prop
-    -ctl_restart_prop
-    -ctl_rildaemon_prop
-    -ctl_sigstop_prop
-    -ctl_start_prop
-    -ctl_stop_prop
-    -dalvik_prop
-    -debug_prop
-    -debuggerd_prop
-    -default_prop
-    -device_logging_prop
-    -dhcp_prop
-    -dumpstate_options_prop
-    -dumpstate_prop
-    -exported2_config_prop
-    -exported2_default_prop
-    -exported2_radio_prop
-    -exported2_system_prop
-    -exported2_vold_prop
-    -exported3_default_prop
-    -exported3_radio_prop
-    -exported3_system_prop
-    -exported_bluetooth_prop
-    -exported_config_prop
-    -exported_dalvik_prop
-    -exported_default_prop
-    -exported_dumpstate_prop
-    -exported_ffs_prop
-    -exported_fingerprint_prop
-    -exported_overlay_prop
-    -exported_pm_prop
-    -exported_radio_prop
-    -exported_secure_prop
-    -exported_system_prop
-    -exported_system_radio_prop
-    -exported_vold_prop
-    -exported_wifi_prop
+    -system_property_type
     -extended_core_property_type
-    -sota_prop
-    -ffs_prop
-    -fingerprint_prop
-    -firstboot_prop
-    -device_config_activity_manager_native_boot_prop
-    -device_config_reset_performed_prop
-    -device_config_boot_count_prop
-    -device_config_input_native_boot_prop
-    -device_config_netd_native_prop
-    -device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop
-    -device_config_runtime_native_prop
-    -device_config_media_native_prop
-    -device_config_storage_native_boot_prop
-    -device_config_sys_traced_prop
-    -dynamic_system_prop
-    -gsid_prop
-    -heapprofd_enabled_prop
-    -heapprofd_prop
-    -hwservicemanager_prop
-    -last_boot_reason_prop
-    -module_sdkext_prop
-    -system_lmk_prop
-    -linker_prop
-    -log_prop
-    -log_tag_prop
-    -logd_prop
-    -logpersistd_logging_prop
-    -lowpan_prop
-    -lpdumpd_prop
-    -mmc_prop
-    -mock_ota_prop
-    -net_dns_prop
-    -net_radio_prop
-    -netd_stable_secret_prop
-    -nfc_prop
-    -ota_prop
-    -overlay_prop
-    -pan_result_prop
-    -persist_debug_prop
-    -persistent_properties_ready_prop
-    -pm_prop
-    -powerctl_prop
-    -radio_prop
-    -restorecon_prop
-    -safemode_prop
-    -serialno_prop
-    -shell_prop
-    -system_boot_reason_prop
-    -system_prop
-    -system_radio_prop
-    -system_trace_prop
-    -test_boot_reason_prop
-    -test_harness_prop
-    -theme_prop
-    -time_prop
-    -traced_enabled_prop
-    -traced_lazy_prop
-    -vendor_default_prop
-    -vendor_security_patch_level_prop
-    -vold_prop
-    -wifi_log_prop
-    -wifi_prop
   }:property_service set;
 ')
+
+neverallow {
+  -init
+  -system_server
+} {
+  userspace_reboot_log_prop
+}:property_service set;
diff --git a/public/property_contexts b/public/property_contexts
index 7e49e9c..4ab4f59 100644
--- a/public/property_contexts
+++ b/public/property_contexts
@@ -150,6 +150,7 @@
 ro.oem_unlock_supported u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact int
 ro.opengles.version u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact int
 ro.radio.noril u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.rebootescrow.device u:object_r:rebootescrow_hal_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.retaildemo.video_path u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.statsd.enable u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.sf.disable_triple_buffer u:object_r:exported3_default_prop:s0 exact bool
@@ -201,6 +202,7 @@
 aac_drc_enc_target_level u:object_r:exported2_default_prop:s0 exact int
 aac_drc_heavy u:object_r:exported2_default_prop:s0 exact int
 aac_drc_reference_level u:object_r:exported2_default_prop:s0 exact int
+build.version.extensions. u:object_r:module_sdkextensions_prop:s0 prefix int
 ro.aac_drc_effect_type u:object_r:exported2_default_prop:s0 exact int
 drm.64bit.enabled u:object_r:exported2_default_prop:s0 exact bool
 dumpstate.dry_run u:object_r:exported_dumpstate_prop:s0 exact bool
@@ -256,7 +258,7 @@
 ro.build.version.incremental u:object_r:exported2_default_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.build.version.preview_sdk u:object_r:exported2_default_prop:s0 exact int
 ro.build.version.release u:object_r:exported2_default_prop:s0 exact string
-ro.build.version.extensions. u:object_r:module_sdkext_prop:s0 prefix int
+ro.build.version.release_or_codename u:object_r:exported2_default_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.build.version.sdk u:object_r:exported2_default_prop:s0 exact int
 ro.build.version.security_patch u:object_r:exported2_default_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.crypto.state u:object_r:exported_vold_prop:s0 exact string
@@ -298,6 +300,7 @@
 aaudio.mmap_exclusive_policy u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
 aaudio.mmap_policy u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
 aaudio.wakeup_delay_usec u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
+config.disable_cameraservice u:object_r:exported_camera_prop:s0 exact bool
 gsm.sim.operator.numeric u:object_r:exported_radio_prop:s0 exact string
 media.mediadrmservice.enable u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
 persist.rcs.supported u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
@@ -391,15 +394,15 @@
 ro.vendor.build.date.utc u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
 ro.vendor.build.fingerprint u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.vendor.build.version.incremental u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
-ro.vndk.lite u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
-ro.vndk.version u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vndk.lite u:object_r:vndk_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.vndk.version u:object_r:vndk_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.vts.coverage u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
 wifi.active.interface u:object_r:exported_wifi_prop:s0 exact string
 wifi.concurrent.interface u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
 wifi.direct.interface u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
 wifi.interface u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.apex.updatable u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
-ro.init.userspace_reboot.is_supported u:object_r:userspace_reboot_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.init.userspace_reboot.is_supported u:object_r:userspace_reboot_config_prop:s0 exact bool
 
 # public-readable
 ro.boot.revision u:object_r:exported2_default_prop:s0 exact string
@@ -436,5 +439,20 @@
 ro.surface_flinger.set_display_power_timer_ms u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
 ro.surface_flinger.support_kernel_idle_timer u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.surface_flinger.use_smart_90_for_video u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.surface_flinger.use_content_detection_for_refresh_rate u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
 ro.surface_flinger.color_space_agnostic_dataspace u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
 ro.surface_flinger.refresh_rate_switching u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
+
+# Binder cache properties.  These are world-readable
+cache_key.app_inactive                   u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.bluetooth.get_bond_state       u:object_r:binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.bluetooth.get_profile_connection_state     u:object_r:binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.bluetooth.get_state            u:object_r:binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.bluetooth.is_offloaded_filtering_supported u:object_r:binder_cache_bluetooth_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.get_packages_for_uid           u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.has_system_feature             u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.is_interactive                 u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.is_power_save_mode             u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.is_user_unlocked               u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.volume_list                    u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.display_info                   u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
diff --git a/public/recovery.te b/public/recovery.te
index 1193354..3bac03d 100644
--- a/public/recovery.te
+++ b/public/recovery.te
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
   allow recovery device:dir r_dir_perms;
   allow recovery block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
   allow recovery dev_type:blk_file rw_file_perms;
-  allowxperm recovery { userdata_block_device metadata_block_device }:blk_file ioctl BLKPBSZGET;
+  allowxperm recovery { userdata_block_device metadata_block_device cache_block_device }:blk_file ioctl BLKPBSZGET;
 
   # GUI
   allow recovery graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/service.te b/public/service.te
index 8d56fb9..79cce0e 100644
--- a/public/service.te
+++ b/public/service.te
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+type aidl_lazy_test_service,    service_manager_type;
 type apex_service,              service_manager_type;
 type audioserver_service,       service_manager_type;
 type batteryproperties_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -100,7 +101,7 @@
 type ethernet_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type biometric_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type bugreport_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
-type platform_compat_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type platform_compat_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type face_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type fingerprint_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type gfxinfo_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -116,6 +117,7 @@
 type iris_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type jobscheduler_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type launcherapps_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type light_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type location_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type lock_settings_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type looper_stats_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -165,6 +167,7 @@
 type slice_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type statusbar_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type storagestats_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type system_config_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type system_update_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type soundtrigger_middleware_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type task_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -203,6 +206,8 @@
 ### HAL Services
 ###
 
+type hal_light_service, vendor_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_power_service, vendor_service, service_manager_type;
 type hal_rebootescrow_service, vendor_service, service_manager_type;
 type hal_vibrator_service, vendor_service, service_manager_type;
 
diff --git a/public/shell.te b/public/shell.te
index 532d05f..0a97465 100644
--- a/public/shell.te
+++ b/public/shell.te
@@ -106,6 +106,9 @@
 get_prop(shell, last_boot_reason_prop)
 get_prop(shell, system_boot_reason_prop)
 
+# Allow reading the outcome of perf_event_open LSM support test for CTS.
+get_prop(shell, init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop)
+
 # allow shell access to services
 allow shell servicemanager:service_manager list;
 # don't allow shell to access GateKeeper service
@@ -124,6 +127,7 @@
   -virtual_touchpad_service
   -vold_service
   -vr_hwc_service
+  -default_android_service
 }:service_manager find;
 allow shell dumpstate:binder call;
 
diff --git a/public/simpleperf.te b/public/simpleperf.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..218fee7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/simpleperf.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type simpleperf, domain;
diff --git a/public/su.te b/public/su.te
index fa32a4b..16ace6e 100644
--- a/public/su.te
+++ b/public/su.te
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
   dontaudit su postinstall_file:filesystem *;
   dontaudit su domain:bpf *;
   dontaudit su unlabeled:vsock_socket *;
+  dontaudit su self:perf_event *;
 
   # VTS tests run in the permissive su domain on debug builds, but the HALs
   # being tested run in enforcing mode. Because hal_foo_server is enforcing
diff --git a/public/te_macros b/public/te_macros
index f065a21..430f172 100644
--- a/public/te_macros
+++ b/public/te_macros
@@ -171,16 +171,17 @@
 # Label tmpfs objects for all apps.
 type_transition $1 tmpfs:file appdomain_tmpfs;
 allow $1 appdomain_tmpfs:file { execute getattr map read write };
-neverallow { $1 -runas_app -shell } { domain -$1 }:file no_rw_file_perms;
-neverallow { appdomain -runas_app -shell -$1 } $1:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow { $1 -runas_app -shell -simpleperf } { domain -$1 }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow { appdomain -runas_app -shell -simpleperf -$1 } $1:file no_rw_file_perms;
 # The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
 # of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
-# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components
-# to apps. Crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
-# produce stack traces.  llkd is excluded, as it needs to inspect
-# the kernel stack for live lock conditions. runas_app is excluded, as it can
-# only access debuggable apps.
-neverallow { domain -$1 -crash_dump userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd') -runas_app } $1:process ptrace;
+# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components to
+# apps. crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to produce stack
+# traces. runas_app is excluded, as it operates only on debuggable apps.
+# simpleperf is excluded, as it operates only on debuggable or profileable
+# apps. llkd is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to inspect stack traces for
+# live lock conditions.
+neverallow { domain -$1 -crash_dump userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd') -runas_app -simpleperf } $1:process ptrace;
 ')
 
 #####################################
@@ -717,6 +718,34 @@
 ')
 
 ###################################
+# can_profile_perf(domain)
+# Allow processes within the domain to be profiled, and have their stacks
+# sampled, by traced_perf.
+define(`can_profile_perf', `
+  # Allow directory & file read to traced_perf, as it stat(2)s /proc/[pid], and
+  # reads /proc/[pid]/cmdline.
+  allow traced_perf $1:file r_file_perms;
+  allow traced_perf $1:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+  # Allow central daemon to send signal to request /proc/[pid]/maps and
+  # /proc/[pid]/mem fds from this process.
+  allow traced_perf $1:process signal;
+
+  # Allow connecting to the daemon.
+  unix_socket_connect($1, traced_perf, traced_perf)
+  # Allow daemon to use the passed fds.
+  allow traced_perf $1:fd use;
+')
+
+###################################
+# never_profile_perf(domain)
+# Opt out of profiling by traced_perf.
+define(`never_profile_perf', `
+  neverallow traced_perf $1:file read;
+  neverallow traced_perf $1:process signal;
+')
+
+###################################
 # perfetto_producer(domain)
 # Allow processes within the domain to write data to Perfetto.
 define(`perfetto_producer', `
@@ -798,6 +827,18 @@
 define(`system_public_prop', `define_prop($1, system, public)')
 
 ###########################################
+# system_vendor_config_prop(name)
+# Define a /system-owned property which can only be written by vendor_init
+# This is a macro for vendor-specific configuration properties which is meant
+# to be set once from vendor_init.
+#
+define(`system_vendor_config_prop', `
+  system_public_prop($1)
+  set_prop(vendor_init, $1)
+  neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init } $1:property_service set;
+')
+
+###########################################
 # product_internal_prop(name)
 # Define a /product-owned property used only in /product
 # For devices launching with Q or eariler, this restriction can be relaxed with
diff --git a/public/toolbox.te b/public/toolbox.te
index f4b164d..4c2cc3e 100644
--- a/public/toolbox.te
+++ b/public/toolbox.te
@@ -27,3 +27,12 @@
 allow toolbox system_data_root_file:dir { remove_name write };
 allow toolbox system_data_file:dir { rmdir rw_dir_perms };
 allow toolbox system_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
+
+# chattr +F and chattr +P /data/media in init
+allow toolbox media_rw_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms setattr };
+allowxperm toolbox media_rw_data_file:dir ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR
+  FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR
+  FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
+  FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
+};
diff --git a/public/traced_perf.te b/public/traced_perf.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f9a0324
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/traced_perf.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type traced_perf, domain;
diff --git a/public/traceur_app.te b/public/traceur_app.te
index 5333015..7e2cc84 100644
--- a/public/traceur_app.te
+++ b/public/traceur_app.te
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
   -virtual_touchpad_service
   -vold_service
   -vr_hwc_service
+  -default_android_service
 }:service_manager find;
 
 # Allow traceur_app to use atrace HAL
diff --git a/public/untrusted_app.te b/public/untrusted_app.te
index 5289bf9..43fe19a 100644
--- a/public/untrusted_app.te
+++ b/public/untrusted_app.te
@@ -16,6 +16,15 @@
 ### seapp_contexts.
 ###
 
+# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+# targetSdkVersion >= 30.
 type untrusted_app, domain;
+# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+# targetSdkVersion = 29.
+type untrusted_app_29, domain;
+# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+# 25 < targetSdkVersion <= 28.
 type untrusted_app_27, domain;
+# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+# targetSdkVersion <= 25.
 type untrusted_app_25, domain;
diff --git a/public/update_engine.te b/public/update_engine.te
index a6be3d3..078e494 100644
--- a/public/update_engine.te
+++ b/public/update_engine.te
@@ -75,3 +75,10 @@
 # gsi_metadata_file. We never apply OTAs when GSI is running, so just deny
 # the access.
 dontaudit update_engine gsi_metadata_file:dir search;
+
+# Allow to write to snapshotctl_log logs.
+# TODO(b/148818798) revert when parent bug is fixed.
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+allow update_engine snapshotctl_log_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow update_engine snapshotctl_log_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+')
diff --git a/public/vendor_init.te b/public/vendor_init.te
index 8230957..935c314 100644
--- a/public/vendor_init.te
+++ b/public/vendor_init.te
@@ -198,33 +198,8 @@
 not_compatible_property(`
     set_prop(vendor_init, {
       property_type
-      -device_config_activity_manager_native_boot_prop
-      -device_config_boot_count_prop
-      -device_config_reset_performed_prop
-      -device_config_input_native_boot_prop
-      -device_config_netd_native_prop
-      -device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop
-      -device_config_runtime_native_prop
-      -device_config_media_native_prop
-      -device_config_storage_native_boot_prop
-      -device_config_sys_traced_prop
-      -restorecon_prop
-      -netd_stable_secret_prop
-      -firstboot_prop
-      -pm_prop
-      -system_boot_reason_prop
-      -system_jvmti_agent_prop
-      -bootloader_boot_reason_prop
-      -last_boot_reason_prop
-      -apexd_prop
-      -gsid_prop
-      -nnapi_ext_deny_product_prop
-      -init_svc_debug_prop
-      -linker_prop
-      -module_sdkext_prop
-      -userspace_reboot_exported_prop
-      -userspace_reboot_prop
-      -vndk_prop
+      -system_internal_property_type
+      -system_restricted_property_type
     })
 ')
 
@@ -238,6 +213,7 @@
 set_prop(vendor_init, debug_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, exported_audio_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, exported_bluetooth_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, exported_camera_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, exported_config_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, exported_dalvik_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, exported_default_prop)
@@ -255,10 +231,14 @@
 set_prop(vendor_init, logd_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, log_tag_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, log_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, rebootescrow_hal_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, serialno_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, userspace_reboot_config_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, vehicle_hal_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, vendor_default_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, vndk_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, virtual_ab_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, wifi_log_prop)
 
 get_prop(vendor_init, exported2_radio_prop)
diff --git a/public/vold.te b/public/vold.te
index 9f4489d..58d1c48 100644
--- a/public/vold.te
+++ b/public/vold.te
@@ -52,6 +52,11 @@
   FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY
 };
 
+# Allow to load incremental file system driver
+allow vold self:capability sys_module;
+allow vold vendor_incremental_module:file r_file_perms;
+allow vold vendor_incremental_module:system module_load;
+
 # Only vold and init should ever set file-based encryption policies.
 neverallowxperm {
   domain
@@ -95,6 +100,15 @@
 # Allow mounting (lower filesystem) on parts of media for performance
 allow vold media_rw_data_file:dir mounton;
 
+# Allow setting extended attributes (for project quota IDs) on files and dirs
+# and to enable project ID inheritance through FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
+allowxperm vold media_rw_data_file:{ dir file } ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR
+  FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR
+  FS_IOC_GETFLAGS
+  FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
+};
+
 # Allow mounting of storage devices
 allow vold { mnt_media_rw_stub_file storage_stub_file }:dir { mounton create rmdir getattr setattr };
 
@@ -103,6 +117,10 @@
 allow vold mnt_user_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
 allow vold mnt_user_file:file create_file_perms;
 
+# Manage per-user pass_through primary symlinks
+allow vold mnt_pass_through_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+allow vold mnt_pass_through_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+
 # Allow to create and mount expanded storage
 allow vold mnt_expand_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
 allow vold apk_data_file:dir { create getattr setattr };
diff --git a/public/wificond.te b/public/wificond.te
index cfca60e..af29511 100644
--- a/public/wificond.te
+++ b/public/wificond.te
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 binder_use(wificond)
 binder_call(wificond, system_server)
+binder_call(wificond, keystore)
 
 add_service(wificond, wificond_service)
 
@@ -38,5 +39,4 @@
 
 # Allow keystore binder access to serve the HwBinder service.
 allow wificond keystore_service:service_manager find;
-allow wificond keystore:binder call;
 allow wificond keystore:keystore_key get;
diff --git a/tests/combine_maps.py b/tests/combine_maps.py
index d592b17..1a7dfaa 100644
--- a/tests/combine_maps.py
+++ b/tests/combine_maps.py
@@ -45,6 +45,11 @@
         # Typeattributes in V.v.cil have _V_v suffix, but not in V.v.ignore.cil
         bottom_type = m.group(1) if m else top_ta
 
+        # If type doesn't exist in bottom map, no need to maintain mappings to
+        # that type.
+        if bottom_type not in bottom.rTypeattributesets.keys():
+            continue
+
         for bottom_ta in bottom.rTypeattributesets[bottom_type]:
             bottom.typeattributesets[bottom_ta].update(top_type_set)
 
diff --git a/tools/sepolicy-analyze/Android.bp b/tools/sepolicy-analyze/Android.bp
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ff40c16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/sepolicy-analyze/Android.bp
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+cc_binary_host {
+    name: "sepolicy-analyze",
+    defaults: ["sepolicy_tools_defaults"],
+
+    srcs: [
+        "sepolicy-analyze.c",
+        "dups.c",
+        "neverallow.c",
+        "perm.c",
+        "typecmp.c",
+        "booleans.c",
+        "attribute.c",
+        "utils.c",
+    ],
+}
diff --git a/tools/sepolicy-analyze/Android.mk b/tools/sepolicy-analyze/Android.mk
deleted file mode 100644
index 56204a5..0000000
--- a/tools/sepolicy-analyze/Android.mk
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-LOCAL_PATH:= $(call my-dir)
-
-###################################
-include $(CLEAR_VARS)
-
-LOCAL_MODULE := sepolicy-analyze
-LOCAL_MODULE_TAGS := optional
-LOCAL_CFLAGS := -Wall -Werror
-LOCAL_SRC_FILES := sepolicy-analyze.c dups.c neverallow.c perm.c typecmp.c booleans.c attribute.c utils.c
-LOCAL_STATIC_LIBRARIES := libsepol
-LOCAL_CXX_STL := none
-
-LOCAL_COMPATIBILITY_SUITE := ats cts gts vts sts
-
-include $(BUILD_HOST_EXECUTABLE)
diff --git a/vendor/file_contexts b/vendor/file_contexts
index a3726ca..c5a9938 100644
--- a/vendor/file_contexts
+++ b/vendor/file_contexts
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.bluetooth@1\.[0-9]+-service      u:object_r:hal_bluetooth_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.bluetooth@1\.[0-9]+-service\.btlinux    u:object_r:hal_bluetooth_btlinux_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.biometrics\.fingerprint@2\.1-service u:object_r:hal_fingerprint_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.biometrics\.face@1\.1-service\.example u:object_r:hal_face_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.boot@1\.[0-9]+-service      u:object_r:hal_bootctl_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.broadcastradio@\d+\.\d+-service u:object_r:hal_broadcastradio_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.camera\.provider@2\.[0-9]+-service_64       u:object_r:hal_camera_default_exec:s0
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.health@2\.0-service         u:object_r:hal_health_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.health@2\.1-service         u:object_r:hal_health_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.health\.storage@1\.0-service       u:object_r:hal_health_storage_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.identity@1\.0-service.example u:object_r:hal_identity_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.input\.classifier@1\.0-service     u:object_r:hal_input_classifier_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.ir@1\.0-service             u:object_r:hal_ir_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.keymaster@3\.0-service      u:object_r:hal_keymaster_default_exec:s0
@@ -49,10 +51,12 @@
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.nfc@1\.2-service            u:object_r:hal_nfc_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.media\.omx@1\.0-service            u:object_r:mediacodec_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.power@1\.0-service          u:object_r:hal_power_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.power-service.example       u:object_r:hal_power_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.power\.stats@1\.0-service   u:object_r:hal_power_stats_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.radio\.config@1\.0-service  u:object_r:hal_radio_config_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.radio@1\.2-radio-service    u:object_r:hal_radio_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.radio@1\.2-sap-service    u:object_r:hal_radio_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.rebootescrow-service\.default    u:object_r:hal_rebootescrow_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.sensors@[0-9]\.[0-9]-service(\.multihal)?  u:object_r:hal_sensors_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.secure_element@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_secure_element_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/rild                                           u:object_r:rild_exec:s0
@@ -61,6 +65,7 @@
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.tv\.input@1\.0-service      u:object_r:hal_tv_input_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.tv\.tuner@1\.0-service        u:object_r:hal_tv_tuner_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.usb@1\.0-service            u:object_r:hal_usb_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.usb\.gadget@1\.1-service    u:object_r:hal_usb_gadget_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.vibrator@1\.0-service       u:object_r:hal_vibrator_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.vibrator-service.example    u:object_r:hal_vibrator_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.vr@1\.0-service             u:object_r:hal_vr_default_exec:s0
diff --git a/vendor/hal_bootctl_default.te b/vendor/hal_bootctl_default.te
index e61ba6b..ac30370 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_bootctl_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_bootctl_default.te
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 # Needed for ReadDefaultFstab.
 allow hal_bootctl_default proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
 allow hal_bootctl_default sysfs_dt_firmware_android:dir search;
+allow hal_bootctl_default sysfs_dt_firmware_android:file r_file_perms;
 
 # ReadDefaultFstab looks for /metadata/gsi/booted. We don't care about getting
 # a GSI-corrected fstab.
diff --git a/vendor/hal_identity_default.te b/vendor/hal_identity_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f84687
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_identity_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_identity_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_identity_default, hal_identity)
+
+type hal_identity_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_identity_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_rebootescrow_default.te b/vendor/hal_rebootescrow_default.te
index 99fadde..2625693 100644
--- a/vendor/hal_rebootescrow_default.te
+++ b/vendor/hal_rebootescrow_default.te
@@ -1,8 +1,10 @@
 type hal_rebootescrow_default, domain;
 hal_server_domain(hal_rebootescrow_default, hal_rebootescrow)
+get_prop(hal_rebootescrow_default, rebootescrow_hal_prop);
 
 type hal_rebootescrow_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(hal_rebootescrow_default)
 
 type rebootescrow_device, dev_type;
-allow hal_rebootescrow_default rebootescrow_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_rebootescrow_default rebootescrow_device:{ chr_file blk_file } rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_rebootescrow_default block_device:dir search;
diff --git a/vendor/hal_usb_gadget_default.te b/vendor/hal_usb_gadget_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1486b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_usb_gadget_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_usb_gadget_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_usb_gadget_default, hal_usb_gadget)
+
+type hal_usb_gadget_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_usb_gadget_default)