Update language to comply with Android's inclusive language guidance
See https://source.android.com/setup/contribute/respectful-code for reference
Bug: 161896447
Change-Id: I0caf39b349c48e44123775d98c52a773b0b504ff
diff --git a/private/atrace.te b/private/atrace.te
index ad7d177..585c254 100644
--- a/private/atrace.te
+++ b/private/atrace.te
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
hal_client_domain(atrace, hal_vibrator)
')
-# Remove logspam from notification attempts to non-whitelisted services.
+# Remove logspam from notification attempts to non-allowlisted services.
dontaudit atrace hwservice_manager_type:hwservice_manager find;
dontaudit atrace service_manager_type:service_manager find;
dontaudit atrace domain:binder call;
diff --git a/private/coredomain.te b/private/coredomain.te
index edb2245..f14faf1 100644
--- a/private/coredomain.te
+++ b/private/coredomain.te
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@
')
# On TREBLE devices, a limited set of files in /vendor are accessible to
-# only a few whitelisted coredomains to keep system/vendor separation.
+# only a few allowlisted coredomains to keep system/vendor separation.
full_treble_only(`
# Limit access to /vendor/app
neverallow {
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index 8ba992b..6cee382 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@
allow domain boringssl_self_test_marker:dir search;
# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
-# with other UIDs to these whitelisted domains.
+# with other UIDs to these allowlisted domains.
neverallow {
domain
-vold
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@
#
# Assert that, to the extent possible, we're not loading executable content from
-# outside the rootfs or /system partition except for a few whitelisted domains.
+# outside the rootfs or /system partition except for a few allowlisted domains.
# Executable files loaded from /data is a persistence vector
# we want to avoid. See
# https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/detail?id=955 for example.
@@ -329,7 +329,7 @@
-zygote
} { fs_type -sdcard_type }:filesystem { mount remount relabelfrom relabelto };
-# Limit raw I/O to these whitelisted domains. Do not apply to debug builds.
+# Limit raw I/O to these allowlisted domains. Do not apply to debug builds.
neverallow {
domain
userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
diff --git a/private/heapprofd.te b/private/heapprofd.te
index ec3e4d0..7bd60a4 100644
--- a/private/heapprofd.te
+++ b/private/heapprofd.te
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
allow heapprofd self:capability kill;
# When scanning /proc/[pid]/cmdline to find matching processes for by-name
-# profiling, only whitelisted domains will be allowed by SELinux. Avoid
+# profiling, only allowlisted domains will be allowed by SELinux. Avoid
# spamming logs with denials for entries that we can not access.
dontaudit heapprofd domain:dir { search open };
diff --git a/private/incidentd.te b/private/incidentd.te
index 656f69f..f10173b 100644
--- a/private/incidentd.te
+++ b/private/incidentd.te
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@
r_dir_file(incidentd, misc_logd_file)
# Allow incidentd to find these standard groups of services.
-# Others can be whitelisted individually.
+# Others can be allowlisted individually.
allow incidentd {
system_server_service
app_api_service
diff --git a/private/isolated_app.te b/private/isolated_app.te
index 33b5219..e9411f5 100644
--- a/private/isolated_app.te
+++ b/private/isolated_app.te
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
neverallow isolated_app vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
# Isolated apps must not be permitted to perform actions on Binder and VndBinder service_manager
-# except the find actions for services whitelisted below.
+# except the find actions for services allowlisted below.
neverallow isolated_app *:service_manager ~find;
# b/17487348
diff --git a/private/perfetto.te b/private/perfetto.te
index 0161361..14707ac 100644
--- a/private/perfetto.te
+++ b/private/perfetto.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
# Perfetto command-line client. Can be used only from the domains that are
-# explicitly whitelisted with a domain_auto_trans(X, perfetto_exec, perfetto).
+# explicitly allowlisted with a domain_auto_trans(X, perfetto_exec, perfetto).
# This command line client accesses the privileged socket of the traced
# daemon.
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index fc4ba0d..0622908 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -66,14 +66,14 @@
# system server gets network and bluetooth permissions.
net_domain(system_server)
-# in addition to ioctls whitelisted for all domains, also allow system_server
+# in addition to ioctls allowlisted for all domains, also allow system_server
# to use privileged ioctls commands. Needed to set up VPNs.
allowxperm system_server self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
bluetooth_domain(system_server)
# Allow setup of tcp keepalive offload. This gives system_server the permission to
# call ioctl on app domains' tcp sockets. Additional ioctl commands still need to
-# be granted individually, except for a small set of safe values whitelisted in
+# be granted individually, except for a small set of safe values allowlisted in
# public/domain.te.
allow system_server appdomain:tcp_socket ioctl;
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@
# Use generic "sockets" where the address family is not known
# to the kernel. The ioctl permission is specifically omitted here, but may
# be added to device specific policy along with the ioctl commands to be
-# whitelisted.
+# allowlisted.
allow system_server self:socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
# Set and get routes directly via netlink.
diff --git a/private/traced_probes.te b/private/traced_probes.te
index dd6ece0..36f9c51 100644
--- a/private/traced_probes.te
+++ b/private/traced_probes.te
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
allow traced_probes debugfs_trace_marker:file getattr;
# TODO(primiano): temporarily I/O tracing categories are still
-# userdebug only until we nail down the blacklist/whitelist.
+# userdebug only until we nail down the denylist/allowlist.
userdebug_or_eng(`
allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing_debug:dir r_dir_perms;
allow traced_probes debugfs_tracing_debug:file rw_file_perms;