Update language to comply with Android's inclusive language guidance
See https://source.android.com/setup/contribute/respectful-code for reference
Bug: 161896447
Change-Id: I0caf39b349c48e44123775d98c52a773b0b504ff
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/app.te b/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/app.te
index 9251ed9..c53fa36 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/app.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/app.te
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@
tmpfs
}:lnk_file no_w_file_perms;
-# Blacklist app domains not allowed to execute from /data
+# Denylist app domains not allowed to execute from /data
neverallow {
bluetooth
isolated_app
@@ -533,7 +533,7 @@
-shell # bugreport
} input_device:chr_file ~getattr;
-# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties except for a few whitelisted domains.
+# Do not allow access to Bluetooth-related system properties except for a few allowlisted domains.
# neverallow rules for access to Bluetooth-related data files are above.
neverallow {
appdomain
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/domain.te b/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/domain.te
index d37a0bd..999c16a 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/domain.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/domain.te
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
allow domain crash_dump:process sigchld;
# Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
-# with other UIDs to these whitelisted domains.
+# with other UIDs to these allowlisted domains.
neverallow {
domain
-vold
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/incidentd.te b/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/incidentd.te
index efd23bd..64e174f 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/incidentd.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/incidentd.te
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@
# TODO control_logd(incidentd)
# Allow incidentd to find these standard groups of services.
-# Others can be whitelisted individually.
+# Others can be allowlisted individually.
allow incidentd {
system_server_service
app_api_service
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/isolated_app.te b/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/isolated_app.te
index 37935c3..fbfb8a5 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/isolated_app.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/isolated_app.te
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@
neverallow isolated_app vndbinder_device:chr_file *;
# Isolated apps must not be permitted to perform actions on Binder and VndBinder service_manager
-# except the find actions for services whitelisted below.
+# except the find actions for services allowlisted below.
neverallow isolated_app *:service_manager ~find;
# b/17487348
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/system_server.te b/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/system_server.te
index 40c5382..3a5b53b 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/system_server.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/27.0/private/system_server.te
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
# system server gets network and bluetooth permissions.
net_domain(system_server)
-# in addition to ioctls whitelisted for all domains, also allow system_server
+# in addition to ioctls allowlisted for all domains, also allow system_server
# to use privileged ioctls commands. Needed to set up VPNs.
allowxperm system_server self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
bluetooth_domain(system_server)
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@
# Use generic "sockets" where the address family is not known
# to the kernel. The ioctl permission is specifically omitted here, but may
# be added to device specific policy along with the ioctl commands to be
-# whitelisted.
+# allowlisted.
allow system_server self:socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
# Set and get routes directly via netlink.
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/domain.te b/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/domain.te
index f5c72cc..e9ae56c 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/domain.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/domain.te
@@ -195,19 +195,19 @@
allow domain fs_type:filesystem getattr;
allow domain fs_type:dir getattr;
-# Restrict all domains to a whitelist for common socket types. Additional
+# Restrict all domains to a allowlist for common socket types. Additional
# ioctl commands may be added to individual domains, but this sets safe
-# defaults for all processes. Note that granting this whitelist to domain does
+# defaults for all processes. Note that granting this allowlist to domain does
# not grant the ioctl permission on these socket types. That must be granted
# separately.
allowxperm domain domain:{ rawip_socket tcp_socket udp_socket }
ioctl { unpriv_sock_ioctls unpriv_tty_ioctls };
-# default whitelist for unix sockets.
+# default allowlist for unix sockets.
allowxperm domain domain:{ unix_dgram_socket unix_stream_socket }
ioctl unpriv_unix_sock_ioctls;
-# Restrict PTYs to only whitelisted ioctls.
-# Note that granting this whitelist to domain does
+# Restrict PTYs to only allowlisted ioctls.
+# Note that granting this allowlist to domain does
# not grant the wider ioctl permission. That must be granted
# separately.
allowxperm domain devpts:chr_file ioctl unpriv_tty_ioctls;
@@ -226,7 +226,7 @@
### neverallow rules
###
-# All socket ioctls must be restricted to a whitelist.
+# All socket ioctls must be restricted to a allowlist.
neverallowxperm domain domain:socket_class_set ioctl { 0 };
# TIOCSTI is only ever used for exploits. Block it.
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@
# Do not allow any domain other than init or recovery to create unlabeled files.
neverallow { domain -init -recovery } unlabeled:dir_file_class_set create;
-# Limit device node creation to these whitelisted domains.
+# Limit device node creation to these allowlisted domains.
neverallow {
domain
-kernel
@@ -246,7 +246,7 @@
-vold
} self:capability mknod;
-# Limit raw I/O to these whitelisted domains. Do not apply to debug builds.
+# Limit raw I/O to these allowlisted domains. Do not apply to debug builds.
neverallow {
domain
userdebug_or_eng(`-domain')
@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@
#
# Assert that, to the extent possible, we're not loading executable content from
-# outside the rootfs or /system partition except for a few whitelisted domains.
+# outside the rootfs or /system partition except for a few allowlisted domains.
#
neverallow {
domain
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@
neverallow { domain -init } mmc_prop:property_service set;
# Do not allow reading device's serial number from system properties except form
-# a few whitelisted domains.
+# a few allowlisted domains.
neverallow {
domain
-adbd
@@ -664,7 +664,7 @@
')
# On TREBLE devices, a limited set of files in /vendor are accessible to
-# only a few whitelisted coredomains to keep system/vendor separation.
+# only a few allowlisted coredomains to keep system/vendor separation.
full_treble_only(`
# Limit access to /vendor/app
neverallow {
@@ -718,7 +718,7 @@
} vendor_shell_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
# Do not allow vendor components to execute files from system
- # except for the ones whitelist here.
+ # except for the ones allowlist here.
neverallow {
domain
-coredomain
@@ -916,7 +916,7 @@
# In addition to the symlink reading restrictions above, restrict
# write access to shell owned directories. The /data/local/tmp
-# directory is untrustworthy, and non-whitelisted domains should
+# directory is untrustworthy, and non-allowlisted domains should
# not be trusting any content in those directories.
neverallow {
domain
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te b/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
index 0f2540e..028440c 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/hal_wifi_supplicant.te
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
add_hwservice(hal_wifi_supplicant_server, hal_wifi_supplicant_hwservice)
allow hal_wifi_supplicant_client hal_wifi_supplicant_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
-# in addition to ioctls whitelisted for all domains, grant hal_wifi_supplicant priv_sock_ioctls.
+# in addition to ioctls allowlisted for all domains, grant hal_wifi_supplicant priv_sock_ioctls.
allowxperm hal_wifi_supplicant self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
r_dir_file(hal_wifi_supplicant, sysfs_type)
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/netd.te b/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/netd.te
index aa99da2..7f7872e 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/netd.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/netd.te
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
type netd_exec, exec_type, file_type;
net_domain(netd)
-# in addition to ioctls whitelisted for all domains, grant netd priv_sock_ioctls.
+# in addition to ioctls allowlisted for all domains, grant netd priv_sock_ioctls.
allowxperm netd self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
r_dir_file(netd, cgroup)
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/vendor_toolbox.te b/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/vendor_toolbox.te
index eb292ca..63f938d 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/vendor_toolbox.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/27.0/public/vendor_toolbox.te
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
# or read, execute the vendor_toolbox file.
full_treble_only(`
# Do not allow non-vendor domains to transition
- # to vendor toolbox except for the whitelisted domains.
+ # to vendor toolbox except for the allowlisted domains.
neverallow {
coredomain
-init