diff --git a/Android.mk b/Android.mk
index e3b4143..6c25fc1 100644
--- a/Android.mk
+++ b/Android.mk
@@ -202,6 +202,9 @@
 ifeq ($(NATIVE_COVERAGE),true)
   with_native_coverage := true
 endif
+ifeq ($(CLANG_COVERAGE),true)
+  with_native_coverage := true
+endif
 
 treble_sysprop_neverallow := true
 ifeq ($(BUILD_BROKEN_TREBLE_SYSPROP_NEVERALLOW),true)
diff --git a/apex/com.android.extservices-file_contexts b/apex/com.android.extservices-file_contexts
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f3a65d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/apex/com.android.extservices-file_contexts
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+(/.*)?                u:object_r:system_file:s0
diff --git a/private/access_vectors b/private/access_vectors
index 66c1b79..aa0109c 100644
--- a/private/access_vectors
+++ b/private/access_vectors
@@ -27,6 +27,14 @@
 	execute
 	quotaon
 	mounton
+	audit_access
+	open
+	execmod
+	watch
+	watch_mount
+	watch_sb
+	watch_with_perm
+	watch_reads
 }
 
 
@@ -125,7 +133,7 @@
 common cap2
 {
 	mac_override	# unused by SELinux
-	mac_admin	# unused by SELinux
+	mac_admin
 	syslog
 	wake_alarm
 	block_suspend
@@ -164,14 +172,6 @@
 	reparent
 	search
 	rmdir
-	open
-	audit_access
-	execmod
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
 }
 
 class file
@@ -179,82 +179,26 @@
 {
 	execute_no_trans
 	entrypoint
-	execmod
-	open
-	audit_access
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
 }
 
 class lnk_file
 inherits file
-{
-	open
-	audit_access
-	execmod
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
-}
 
 class chr_file
 inherits file
 {
 	execute_no_trans
 	entrypoint
-	execmod
-	open
-	audit_access
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
 }
 
 class blk_file
 inherits file
-{
-	open
-	audit_access
-	execmod
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
-}
 
 class sock_file
 inherits file
-{
-	open
-	audit_access
-	execmod
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
-}
 
 class fifo_file
 inherits file
-{
-	open
-	audit_access
-	execmod
-	watch
-	watch_mount
-	watch_sb
-	watch_with_perm
-	watch_reads
-}
 
 class fd
 {
@@ -505,8 +449,6 @@
 	send
 	recv
 	relabelto
-	flow_in		# deprecated
-	flow_out	# deprecated
 	forward_in
 	forward_out
 }
@@ -781,3 +723,13 @@
 
 class xdp_socket
 inherits socket
+
+class perf_event
+{
+	open
+	cpu
+	kernel
+	tracepoint
+	read
+	write
+}
diff --git a/private/apexd.te b/private/apexd.te
index 1e1ccc5..62a3eff 100644
--- a/private/apexd.te
+++ b/private/apexd.te
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 allow apexd apex_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
 
 # Allow apexd to create directories for snapshots of apex data
+allow apexd apex_permission_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow apexd apex_permission_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 allow apexd apex_rollback_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow apexd apex_rollback_data_file:file create_file_perms;
 
diff --git a/private/app_neverallows.te b/private/app_neverallows.te
index 6248cab..5c8ad88 100644
--- a/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
   untrusted_app
   untrusted_app_25
   untrusted_app_27
+  untrusted_app_29
   untrusted_app_all
 }')
 # Receive or send uevent messages.
@@ -111,6 +112,14 @@
   alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket xdp_socket
 } *;
 
+# Disallow sending RTM_GETLINK messages on netlink sockets.
+neverallow {
+  all_untrusted_apps
+  -untrusted_app_25
+  -untrusted_app_27
+  -untrusted_app_29
+} domain:netlink_route_socket { nlmsg_readpriv };
+
 # Do not allow untrusted apps access to /cache
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir ~{ r_dir_perms };
 neverallow { all_untrusted_apps -mediaprovider } { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:file ~{ read getattr };
diff --git a/private/app_zygote.te b/private/app_zygote.te
index c111ac8..5f20086 100644
--- a/private/app_zygote.te
+++ b/private/app_zygote.te
@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@
 allow app_zygote system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 allow app_zygote system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
 
+# Send unsolicited message to system_server
+unix_socket_send(app_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
+
 #####
 ##### Neverallow
 #####
@@ -136,6 +139,7 @@
   domain
   -app_zygote
   -logd
+  -system_server
   userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
   userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
 }:unix_dgram_socket *;
diff --git a/private/atrace.te b/private/atrace.te
index 2545c8b..ad7d177 100644
--- a/private/atrace.te
+++ b/private/atrace.te
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
   -installd_service
   -vold_service
   -lpdump_service
+  -default_android_service
 }:service_manager { find };
 allow atrace servicemanager:service_manager list;
 
diff --git a/private/automotive_display_service.te b/private/automotive_display_service.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e397d10
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/automotive_display_service.te
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+# Display service for Automotive
+type automotive_display, domain, coredomain;
+type automotive_display_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(automotive_display)
+
+# Allow to use Binder IPC for SurfaceFlinger.
+binder_use(automotive_display)
+
+# Allow to use HwBinder IPC for HAL implementations.
+hwbinder_use(automotive_display)
+
+# Allow to read the target property.
+get_prop(automotive_display, hwservicemanager_prop)
+
+# Allow to find SurfaceFlinger.
+allow automotive_display surfaceflinger_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow client domain to do binder IPC to serverdomain.
+binder_call(automotive_display, surfaceflinger)
diff --git a/private/automotive_display_service_server.te b/private/automotive_display_service_server.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a916de8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/automotive_display_service_server.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+add_hwservice(automotive_display, fwk_automotive_display_hwservice)
diff --git a/private/blank_screen.te b/private/blank_screen.te
index 51310d1..69dd7e6 100644
--- a/private/blank_screen.te
+++ b/private/blank_screen.te
@@ -4,3 +4,5 @@
 init_daemon_domain(blank_screen)
 
 hal_client_domain(blank_screen, hal_light)
+
+allow blank_screen hal_light_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
index c62edd5..60e6fb1 100644
--- a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
@@ -1206,7 +1206,9 @@
 (typeattributeset exported_bluetooth_prop_29_0 (exported_bluetooth_prop))
 (typeattributeset exported_config_prop_29_0 (exported_config_prop))
 (typeattributeset exported_dalvik_prop_29_0 (exported_dalvik_prop))
-(typeattributeset exported_default_prop_29_0 (exported_default_prop))
+(typeattributeset exported_default_prop_29_0
+  ( exported_default_prop
+    vndk_prop))
 (typeattributeset exported_dumpstate_prop_29_0 (exported_dumpstate_prop))
 (typeattributeset exported_ffs_prop_29_0 (exported_ffs_prop))
 (typeattributeset exported_fingerprint_prop_29_0 (exported_fingerprint_prop))
diff --git a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
index 96eb1dd..38d980e 100644
--- a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
@@ -9,10 +9,13 @@
     aidl_lazy_test_server_exec
     aidl_lazy_test_service
     apex_module_data_file
+    apex_permission_data_file
     apex_rollback_data_file
     app_integrity_service
     app_search_service
     auth_service
+    automotive_display
+    automotive_display_exec
     ashmem_libcutils_device
     blob_store_service
     binder_cache_system_server_prop
@@ -29,15 +32,20 @@
     device_config_sys_traced_prop
     exported_camera_prop
     file_integrity_service
+    fwk_automotive_display_hwservice
     gmscore_app
     hal_can_bus_hwservice
     hal_can_controller_hwservice
+    hal_identity_hwservice
+    hal_light_service
+    hal_power_service
     hal_rebootescrow_service
     hal_tv_tuner_hwservice
     hal_vibrator_service
     incfs
     incremental_service
     incremental_root_file
+    init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop
     init_svc_debug_prop
     iorap_prefetcherd
     iorap_prefetcherd_data_file
@@ -48,6 +56,7 @@
     mediatranscoding_exec
     mediatranscoding_tmpfs
     mirror_data_file
+    light_service
     linker_prop
     linkerconfig_file
     mock_ota_prop
@@ -56,12 +65,17 @@
     ota_prop
     art_apex_dir
     service_manager_service
+    simpleperf
     soundtrigger_middleware_service
+    sysfs_dm_verity
+    system_config_service
     system_group_file
     system_jvmti_agent_prop
     system_passwd_file
+    system_unsolzygote_socket
     tethering_service
     timezonedetector_service
+    untrusted_app_29
     usb_serial_device
     userspace_reboot_prop
     userspace_reboot_config_prop
@@ -71,5 +85,4 @@
     vendor_boringssl_self_test
     vendor_install_recovery
     vendor_install_recovery_exec
-    vndk_prop
     virtual_ab_prop))
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index 907d1b8..08d963c 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
     get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_radio_prop)
     get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported3_system_prop)
     get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, exported_camera_prop)
+    get_prop({coredomain appdomain shell}, userspace_reboot_config_prop)
     get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
     get_prop({coredomain shell}, userspace_reboot_prop)
     get_prop({domain -coredomain -appdomain}, vendor_default_prop)
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index 2ab86fd..c7729d8 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -338,10 +338,12 @@
 /system/bin/watchdogd            u:object_r:watchdogd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/apexd                u:object_r:apexd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/gsid                 u:object_r:gsid_exec:s0
+/system/bin/simpleperf           u:object_r:simpleperf_exec:s0
 /system/bin/simpleperf_app_runner    u:object_r:simpleperf_app_runner_exec:s0
 /system/bin/notify_traceur\.sh       u:object_r:notify_traceur_exec:s0
 /system/bin/migrate_legacy_obb_data\.sh u:object_r:migrate_legacy_obb_data_exec:s0
 /system/bin/aidl_lazy_test_server    u:object_r:aidl_lazy_test_server_exec:s0
+/system/bin/android\.frameworks\.automotive\.display@1\.0-service u:object_r:automotive_display_exec:s0
 
 #############################
 # Vendor files
@@ -464,6 +466,7 @@
 /data/backup(/.*)?		u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
 /data/secure/backup(/.*)?	u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
 /data/system/ndebugsocket	u:object_r:system_ndebug_socket:s0
+/data/system/unsolzygotesocket  u:object_r:system_unsolzygote_socket:s0
 /data/drm(/.*)?		u:object_r:drm_data_file:s0
 /data/resource-cache(/.*)? u:object_r:resourcecache_data_file:s0
 /data/dalvik-cache(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
@@ -504,6 +507,7 @@
 # Misc data
 /data/misc/adb(/.*)?            u:object_r:adb_keys_file:s0
 /data/misc/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com.android.permission(/.*)?    u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/apexrollback(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/apns(/.*)?           u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
 /data/misc/audio(/.*)?          u:object_r:audio_data_file:s0
@@ -591,6 +595,8 @@
 # Apex data directories
 /data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
 /data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata(/.*)?       u:object_r:apex_module_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexdata/com.android.permission(/.*)?  u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce/[0-9]+/apexdata/com.android.permission(/.*)?  u:object_r:apex_permission_data_file:s0
 
 # Apex rollback directories
 /data/misc_de/[0-9]+/apexrollback(/.*)?   u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
diff --git a/private/genfs_contexts b/private/genfs_contexts
index 07c44ca..92ef6a8 100644
--- a/private/genfs_contexts
+++ b/private/genfs_contexts
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@
 genfscon sysfs /kernel/notes u:object_r:sysfs_kernel_notes:s0
 genfscon sysfs /kernel/uevent_helper u:object_r:sysfs_usermodehelper:s0
 genfscon sysfs /kernel/wakeup_reasons u:object_r:sysfs_wakeup_reasons:s0
+genfscon sysfs /module/dm_verity/parameters/prefetch_cluster u:object_r:sysfs_dm_verity:s0
 genfscon sysfs /module/lowmemorykiller u:object_r:sysfs_lowmemorykiller:s0
 genfscon sysfs /module/tcp_cubic/parameters u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0
 genfscon sysfs /module/wlan/parameters/fwpath u:object_r:sysfs_wlan_fwpath:s0
diff --git a/private/gsid.te b/private/gsid.te
index 4771311..5d7b043 100644
--- a/private/gsid.te
+++ b/private/gsid.te
@@ -111,8 +111,12 @@
 allow gsid metadata_file:dir { search getattr };
 allow gsid {
     gsi_metadata_file
+}:dir create_dir_perms;
+
+allow gsid {
     ota_metadata_file
 }:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
 allow gsid {
     gsi_metadata_file
     ota_metadata_file
diff --git a/private/hwservice_contexts b/private/hwservice_contexts
index d72231b..238fd53 100644
--- a/private/hwservice_contexts
+++ b/private/hwservice_contexts
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 android.frameworks.schedulerservice::ISchedulingPolicyService   u:object_r:fwk_scheduler_hwservice:s0
 android.frameworks.sensorservice::ISensorManager                u:object_r:fwk_sensor_hwservice:s0
 android.frameworks.stats::IStats                                u:object_r:fwk_stats_hwservice:s0
+android.frameworks.automotive.display::ICarWindowService        u:object_r:fwk_automotive_display_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.atrace::IAtraceDevice                          u:object_r:hal_atrace_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.audio.effect::IEffectsFactory                  u:object_r:hal_audio_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.audio::IDevicesFactory                         u:object_r:hal_audio_hwservice:s0
@@ -24,6 +25,7 @@
 android.hardware.camera.provider::ICameraProvider               u:object_r:hal_camera_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.configstore::ISurfaceFlingerConfigs            u:object_r:hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:s0
 android.hardware.confirmationui::IConfirmationUI                u:object_r:hal_confirmationui_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.identity::IIdentityCredentialStore             u:object_r:hal_identity_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.contexthub::IContexthub                        u:object_r:hal_contexthub_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.cas::IMediaCasService                          u:object_r:hal_cas_hwservice:s0
 android.hardware.drm::ICryptoFactory                            u:object_r:hal_drm_hwservice:s0
diff --git a/private/init.te b/private/init.te
index 116eff4..42ec0f3 100644
--- a/private/init.te
+++ b/private/init.te
@@ -45,3 +45,18 @@
 set_prop(init, userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
 neverallow { domain -init } userspace_reboot_prop:property_service set;
 neverallow { domain -init } userspace_reboot_exported_prop:property_service set;
+
+# Second-stage init performs a test for whether the kernel has SELinux hooks
+# for the perf_event_open() syscall. This is done by testing for the syscall
+# outcomes corresponding to this policy.
+# TODO(b/137092007): this can be removed once the platform stops supporting
+# kernels that precede the perf_event_open hooks (Android common kernels 4.4
+# and 4.9).
+allow init self:perf_event { open cpu };
+neverallow init self:perf_event { kernel tracepoint read write };
+dontaudit init self:perf_event { kernel tracepoint read write };
+
+# Only init is allowed to set the sysprop indicating whether perf_event_open()
+# SELinux hooks were detected.
+set_prop(init, init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop)
+neverallow { domain -init } init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop:property_service set;
diff --git a/private/isolated_app.te b/private/isolated_app.te
index 15c0f3f..49e9065 100644
--- a/private/isolated_app.te
+++ b/private/isolated_app.te
@@ -13,6 +13,10 @@
 # Access already open app data files received over Binder or local socket IPC.
 allow isolated_app { app_data_file privapp_data_file }:file { append read write getattr lock map };
 
+# Allow access to network sockets received over IPC. New socket creation is not
+# permitted.
+allow isolated_app { ephemeral_app priv_app untrusted_app_all }:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } { rw_socket_perms_no_ioctl };
+
 allow isolated_app activity_service:service_manager find;
 allow isolated_app display_service:service_manager find;
 allow isolated_app webviewupdate_service:service_manager find;
@@ -130,7 +134,7 @@
 # excluding unix_stream_socket and unix_dgram_socket.
 # Many of these are socket families which have never and will never
 # be compiled into the Android kernel.
-neverallow isolated_app self:{
+neverallow isolated_app { self ephemeral_app priv_app untrusted_app_all }:{
   socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket
   key_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket
   netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket
diff --git a/private/linkerconfig.te b/private/linkerconfig.te
index f82e05d..414b39f 100644
--- a/private/linkerconfig.te
+++ b/private/linkerconfig.te
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
 init_daemon_domain(linkerconfig)
 
 ## Read and write linkerconfig subdirectory.
-allow linkerconfig linkerconfig_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow linkerconfig linkerconfig_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow linkerconfig linkerconfig_file:file create_file_perms;
 
 # Allow linkerconfig to log to the kernel.
@@ -13,4 +13,7 @@
 # Allow linkerconfig to be invoked with logwrapper from init.
 allow linkerconfig devpts:chr_file { read write };
 
+# Allow linkerconfig to scan for apex modules
+allow linkerconfig apex_mnt_dir:dir r_dir_perms;
+
 neverallow { domain -init -linkerconfig } linkerconfig_exec:file no_x_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/llkd.te b/private/llkd.te
index 385f930..f218dec 100644
--- a/private/llkd.te
+++ b/private/llkd.te
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
 
 allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set kill;
 userdebug_or_eng(`
-  allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
+  allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace sys_admin };
   allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
 ')
 
diff --git a/private/priv_app.te b/private/priv_app.te
index 161b245..c879c33 100644
--- a/private/priv_app.te
+++ b/private/priv_app.te
@@ -56,15 +56,6 @@
 # /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link.
 allow priv_app cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
-# Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages.
-allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
-  auditallow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
-')
-
 # Access to /data/media.
 allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
@@ -81,13 +72,6 @@
 allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
 
-# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
-allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-')
-
 # For AppFuse.
 allow priv_app vold:fd use;
 allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
@@ -127,13 +111,6 @@
 allow priv_app preloads_media_file:file r_file_perms;
 allow priv_app preloads_media_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 
-# Allow GMS core to access /sys/fs/selinux/policyvers for compatibility check
-allow priv_app selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  auditallow priv_app selinuxfs:file r_file_perms;
-')
-
 read_runtime_log_tags(priv_app)
 
 # Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index faa425b..2db46a0 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 ro.hw.                  u:object_r:system_prop:s0
 sys.                    u:object_r:system_prop:s0
 sys.init.userspace_reboot   u:object_r:userspace_reboot_prop:s0
+sys.init.perf_lsm_hooks u:object_r:init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop:s0
 sys.cppreopt            u:object_r:cppreopt_prop:s0
 sys.linker.             u:object_r:linker_prop:s0
 sys.lpdumpd             u:object_r:lpdumpd_prop:s0
@@ -48,6 +49,7 @@
 security.perf_harden    u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
 service.adb.root        u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
 service.adb.tcp.port    u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
+persist.adb.wifi.       u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
 
 persist.audio.          u:object_r:audio_prop:s0
 persist.bluetooth.      u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0
diff --git a/private/runas_app.te b/private/runas_app.te
index e6fd953..c1b354a 100644
--- a/private/runas_app.te
+++ b/private/runas_app.te
@@ -16,3 +16,17 @@
 # Allow lldb/ndk-gdb/simpleperf to ptrace attach to debuggable app processes.
 allow runas_app untrusted_app_all:process { ptrace signal sigstop };
 allow runas_app untrusted_app_all:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
+# Allow executing system image simpleperf without a domain transition.
+allow runas_app simpleperf_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Suppress denial logspam when simpleperf is trying to find a matching process
+# by scanning /proc/<pid>/cmdline files. The /proc/<pid> directories are within
+# the same domain as their respective process, most of which this domain is not
+# allowed to see.
+dontaudit runas_app domain:dir search;
+
+# Allow runas_app to call perf_event_open for profiling debuggable app
+# processes, but not the whole system.
+allow runas_app self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
+neverallow runas_app self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
diff --git a/private/seapp_contexts b/private/seapp_contexts
index 3838578..fed4325 100644
--- a/private/seapp_contexts
+++ b/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -163,7 +163,8 @@
 user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.gms domain=gmscore_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.gms.* domain=gmscore_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app isPrivApp=true name=com.google.android.gms:* domain=gmscore_app type=privapp_data_file levelFrom=user
-user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=29 domain=untrusted_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=30 domain=untrusted_app type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
+user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=29 domain=untrusted_app_29 type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=28 domain=untrusted_app_27 type=app_data_file levelFrom=all
 user=_app minTargetSdkVersion=26 domain=untrusted_app_27 type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
 user=_app domain=untrusted_app_25 type=app_data_file levelFrom=user
diff --git a/private/security_classes b/private/security_classes
index 25b4cba..c0631e9 100644
--- a/private/security_classes
+++ b/private/security_classes
@@ -139,6 +139,8 @@
 
 class xdp_socket
 
+class perf_event
+
 # Property service
 class property_service          # userspace
 
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index 26d9f5c..19d3b0d 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
-android.hardware.rebootescrow.IRebootEscrow/default u:object_r:hal_rebootescrow_service:s0
-android.hardware.vibrator.IVibrator/default u:object_r:hal_vibrator_service:s0
+android.hardware.light.ILights/default                               u:object_r:hal_light_service:s0
+android.hardware.power.IPower/default                                u:object_r:hal_power_service:s0
+android.hardware.rebootescrow.IRebootEscrow/default                  u:object_r:hal_rebootescrow_service:s0
+android.hardware.vibrator.IVibrator/default                          u:object_r:hal_vibrator_service:s0
 
 accessibility                             u:object_r:accessibility_service:s0
 account                                   u:object_r:account_service:s0
@@ -113,6 +115,7 @@
 isub                                      u:object_r:radio_service:s0
 jobscheduler                              u:object_r:jobscheduler_service:s0
 launcherapps                              u:object_r:launcherapps_service:s0
+lights                                    u:object_r:light_service:s0
 location                                  u:object_r:location_service:s0
 lock_settings                             u:object_r:lock_settings_service:s0
 looper_stats                              u:object_r:looper_stats_service:s0
@@ -201,6 +204,7 @@
 storagestats                              u:object_r:storagestats_service:s0
 SurfaceFlinger                            u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0
 suspend_control                           u:object_r:system_suspend_control_service:s0
+system_config                             u:object_r:system_config_service:s0
 system_update                             u:object_r:system_update_service:s0
 task                                      u:object_r:task_service:s0
 telecom                                   u:object_r:telecom_service:s0
diff --git a/private/shell.te b/private/shell.te
index 975fde4..8bd4e1d 100644
--- a/private/shell.te
+++ b/private/shell.te
@@ -83,3 +83,11 @@
   FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
   FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX
 };
+
+# Allow shell to execute simpleperf without a domain transition.
+allow shell simpleperf_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow shell to call perf_event_open for profiling other shell processes, but
+# not the whole system.
+allow shell self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
+neverallow shell self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
diff --git a/private/simpleperf.te b/private/simpleperf.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0639c11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/simpleperf.te
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# Domain used when running /system/bin/simpleperf to profile a specific app.
+# Entered either by the app itself exec-ing the binary, or through
+# simpleperf_app_runner (with shell as its origin). Certain other domains
+# (runas_app, shell) can also exec this binary without a domain transition.
+typeattribute simpleperf coredomain;
+type simpleperf_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+domain_auto_trans({ untrusted_app_all -runas_app }, simpleperf_exec, simpleperf)
+
+# When running in this domain, simpleperf is scoped to profiling an individual
+# app. The necessary MAC permissions for profiling are more maintainable and
+# consistent if simpleperf is marked as an app domain as well (as, for example,
+# it will then see the same set of system libraries as the app).
+app_domain(simpleperf)
+untrusted_app_domain(simpleperf)
+
+# Allow ptrace attach to the target app, for reading JIT debug info (using
+# process_vm_readv) during unwinding and symbolization.
+allow simpleperf untrusted_app_all:process ptrace;
+
+# Allow using perf_event_open syscall for profiling the target app.
+allow simpleperf self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
+
+# Allow /proc/<pid> access for the target app (for example, when trying to
+# discover it by cmdline).
+r_dir_file(simpleperf, untrusted_app_all)
+
+# Suppress denial logspam when simpleperf is trying to find a matching process
+# by scanning /proc/<pid>/cmdline files. The /proc/<pid> directories are within
+# the same domain as their respective processes, most of which this domain is
+# not allowed to see.
+dontaudit simpleperf domain:dir search;
+
+# Neverallows:
+
+# Profiling must be confined to the scope of an individual app.
+neverallow simpleperf self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
diff --git a/private/stats.te b/private/stats.te
index ea9530c..26508f1 100644
--- a/private/stats.te
+++ b/private/stats.te
@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
   -shell
   -stats
   -statsd
+  -surfaceflinger
   -system_app
   -system_server
   -traceur_app
diff --git a/private/statsd.te b/private/statsd.te
index a55c42d..1e56b67 100644
--- a/private/statsd.te
+++ b/private/statsd.te
@@ -19,3 +19,6 @@
 
 # Allow StatsCompanionService to pipe data to statsd.
 allow statsd system_server:fifo_file { read getattr };
+
+# Allow statsd to retrieve SF statistics over binder
+binder_call(statsd, surfaceflinger);
diff --git a/private/surfaceflinger.te b/private/surfaceflinger.te
index e696fe5..5d78a18 100644
--- a/private/surfaceflinger.te
+++ b/private/surfaceflinger.te
@@ -114,6 +114,10 @@
 pdx_client(surfaceflinger, bufferhub_client)
 pdx_client(surfaceflinger, performance_client)
 
+# Allow supplying timestats statistics to statsd
+allow surfaceflinger stats_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(surfaceflinger, statsd);
+
 ###
 ### Neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/private/system_app.te b/private/system_app.te
index ee18ab2..e5d7d18 100644
--- a/private/system_app.te
+++ b/private/system_app.te
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
   -virtual_touchpad_service
   -vold_service
   -vr_hwc_service
+  -default_android_service
 }:service_manager find;
 # suppress denials for services system_app should not be accessing.
 dontaudit system_app {
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index ec79319..5c50fa4 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
 # Create a socket for connections from crash_dump.
 type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_ndebug_socket "ndebugsocket";
 
+# Create a socket for connections from zygotes.
+type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_unsolzygote_socket "unsolzygotesocket";
+
 allow system_server zygote_tmpfs:file read;
 allow system_server appdomain_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
 
@@ -657,6 +660,9 @@
 # Create a socket for connections from debuggerd.
 allow system_server system_ndebug_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
 
+# Create a socket for connections from zygotes.
+allow system_server system_unsolzygote_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
+
 # Manage cache files.
 allow system_server cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir { relabelfrom create_dir_perms };
@@ -831,6 +837,9 @@
 allow system_server adbd:fd use;
 allow system_server adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
 
+# Read persist.adb.wifi. properties
+get_prop(system_server, shell_prop)
+
 # Allow invoking tools like "timeout"
 allow system_server toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
 
@@ -861,6 +870,7 @@
 r_dir_file(system_server, proc_net_type)
 r_dir_file(system_server, proc_qtaguid_stat)
 allow system_server {
+  proc_cmdline
   proc_loadavg
   proc_meminfo
   proc_pagetypeinfo
@@ -971,6 +981,16 @@
 # Only allow crash_dump to connect to system_ndebug_socket.
 neverallow { domain -init -system_server -crash_dump } system_ndebug_socket:sock_file { open write };
 
+# Only allow zygotes to connect to system_unsolzygote_socket.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -init
+  -system_server
+  -zygote
+  -app_zygote
+  -webview_zygote
+} system_unsolzygote_socket:sock_file { open write };
+
 # Only allow init, system_server, flags_health_check to set properties for server configurable flags
 neverallow {
   domain
@@ -1051,6 +1071,11 @@
 allow system_server vendor_apex_file:dir { getattr search };
 allow system_server vendor_apex_file:file r_file_perms;
 
+# Allow the system server to manage relevant apex module data files.
+allow system_server apex_module_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow system_server apex_permission_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow system_server apex_permission_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+
 # Allow PasswordSlotManager rw access to /metadata/password_slots, so GSIs and the host image can
 # communicate which slots are available for use.
 allow system_server metadata_file:dir search;
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app.te b/private/untrusted_app.te
index c15fa22..6e7a99c 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app.te
@@ -1,20 +1,11 @@
 ###
 ### Untrusted apps.
 ###
-### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps.
-### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
-### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
-### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
-### directory).  The untrusted_app domain is the default assignment in
-### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
-### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
-### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
-### domain is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
-### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
-### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
-### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
-### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
-### seapp_contexts.
+### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+### targetSdkVersion >= 30.
+###
+### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
+### placed in this selinux domain.
 ###
 
 typeattribute untrusted_app coredomain;
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_25.te b/private/untrusted_app_25.te
index 2091f2e..a1abc41 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_25.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_25.te
@@ -4,19 +4,8 @@
 ### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
 ### targetSdkVersion <= 25.
 ###
-### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
-### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
-### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
-### directory).  The untrusted_app domain is the default assignment in
-### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
-### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
-### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
-### domain is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
-### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
-### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
-### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
-### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
-### seapp_contexts.
+### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
+### placed in this selinux domain.
 ###
 
 typeattribute untrusted_app_25 coredomain;
@@ -59,3 +48,6 @@
 
 # Read /mnt/sdcard symlink.
 allow untrusted_app_25 mnt_sdcard_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# allow binding to netlink route sockets and sending RTM_GETLINK messages.
+allow untrusted_app_25 self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_27.te b/private/untrusted_app_27.te
index 03b3013..b7b6d72 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_27.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_27.te
@@ -4,20 +4,8 @@
 ### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
 ### 25 < targetSdkVersion <= 28.
 ###
-### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps.
-### Apps are labeled based on mac_permissions.xml (maps signer and
-### optionally package name to seinfo value) and seapp_contexts (maps UID
-### and optionally seinfo value to domain for process and type for data
-### directory).  The untrusted_app_27 domain is the default assignment in
-### seapp_contexts for any app with UID between APP_AID (10000)
-### and AID_ISOLATED_START (99000) if the app has no specific seinfo
-### value as determined from mac_permissions.xml.  In current AOSP, this
-### domain is assigned to all non-system apps as well as to any system apps
-### that are not signed by the platform key.  To move
-### a system app into a specific domain, add a signer entry for it to
-### mac_permissions.xml and assign it one of the pre-existing seinfo values
-### or define and use a new seinfo value in both mac_permissions.xml and
-### seapp_contexts.
+### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
+### placed in this selinux domain.
 ###
 
 typeattribute untrusted_app_27 coredomain;
@@ -48,3 +36,6 @@
 
 # Read /mnt/sdcard symlink.
 allow untrusted_app_27 mnt_sdcard_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# allow binding to netlink route sockets and sending RTM_GETLINK messages.
+allow untrusted_app_27 self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_29.te b/private/untrusted_app_29.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..344ae89
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_29.te
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+###
+### Untrusted_29.
+###
+### This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+### targetSdkVersion = 29.
+###
+### See public/untrusted_app.te for more information about which apps are
+### placed in this selinux domain.
+###
+
+typeattribute untrusted_app_29 coredomain;
+
+app_domain(untrusted_app_29)
+untrusted_app_domain(untrusted_app_29)
+net_domain(untrusted_app_29)
+bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app_29)
+
+# allow binding to netlink route sockets and sending RTM_GETLINK messages.
+allow untrusted_app_29 self:netlink_route_socket { bind nlmsg_readpriv };
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_all.te b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
index d8e0b14..769ddb0 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_all.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
@@ -168,3 +168,8 @@
   allow untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file rw_file_perms;
   allowxperm untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file ioctl { KCOV_INIT_TRACE KCOV_ENABLE KCOV_DISABLE };
 ')
+
+# Allow signalling simpleperf domain, which is the domain that the simpleperf
+# profiler runs as when executed by the app. The signals are used to control
+# the profiler (which would be profiling the app that is sending the signal).
+allow untrusted_app_all simpleperf:process signal;
diff --git a/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te b/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
index b287bdc..157ee55 100644
--- a/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
+++ b/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 }:dir { open read write add_name remove_name rmdir relabelfrom };
 allow vold_prepare_subdirs {
     apex_module_data_file
+    apex_permission_data_file
     apex_rollback_data_file
     backup_data_file
     face_vendor_data_file
@@ -26,6 +27,7 @@
 }:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto };
 allow vold_prepare_subdirs {
     apex_module_data_file
+    apex_permission_data_file
     apex_rollback_data_file
     backup_data_file
     face_vendor_data_file
diff --git a/private/webview_zygote.te b/private/webview_zygote.te
index 8fe9733..c618253 100644
--- a/private/webview_zygote.te
+++ b/private/webview_zygote.te
@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@
 
 allow webview_zygote system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
 
+# Send unsolicited message to system_server
+unix_socket_send(webview_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
+
 #####
 ##### Neverallow
 #####
diff --git a/private/zygote.te b/private/zygote.te
index f1ccce6..da06837 100644
--- a/private/zygote.te
+++ b/private/zygote.te
@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@
 # Zygote opens /mnt/expand to mount CE DE storage on each vol
 allow zygote mnt_expand_file:dir { open read search relabelto };
 
+# Bind mount subdirectories on /data/misc/profiles/cur
+allow zygote { user_profile_data_file }:dir { mounton search };
+
 # Create and bind dirs on /data/data
 allow zygote tmpfs:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
 
@@ -173,6 +176,9 @@
 # Allow zygote to use ashmem fds from system_server.
 allow zygote system_server:fd use;
 
+# Send unsolicited message to system_server
+unix_socket_send(zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
+
 ###
 ### neverallow rules
 ###
diff --git a/public/attributes b/public/attributes
index 0fd2be2..a3728cf 100644
--- a/public/attributes
+++ b/public/attributes
@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@
 hal_attribute(graphics_composer);
 hal_attribute(health);
 hal_attribute(health_storage);
+hal_attribute(identity);
 hal_attribute(input_classifier);
 hal_attribute(ir);
 hal_attribute(keymaster);
@@ -352,6 +353,7 @@
 # from one core domain to another, without having to update the vendor image
 # which contains clients of this service.
 
+attribute automotive_display_service_server;
 attribute camera_service_server;
 attribute display_service_server;
 attribute scheduler_service_server;
diff --git a/public/dnsmasq.te b/public/dnsmasq.te
index d189c89..86f1eb1 100644
--- a/public/dnsmasq.te
+++ b/public/dnsmasq.te
@@ -23,3 +23,6 @@
 allow dnsmasq netd:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write };
 allow dnsmasq netd:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
 allow dnsmasq netd:udp_socket { read write };
+
+# sometimes a network device vanishes and we try to load module netdev-{devicename}
+dontaudit dnsmasq kernel:system module_request;
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index 863c167..604df89 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -500,9 +500,9 @@
 # system_app_service rather than the generic type.
 # New service_types are defined in {,hw,vnd}service.te and new mappings
 # from service name to service_type are defined in {,hw,vnd}service_contexts.
-neverallow * default_android_service:service_manager add;
-neverallow * default_android_vndservice:service_manager { add find };
-neverallow * default_android_hwservice:hwservice_manager { add find };
+neverallow * default_android_service:service_manager *;
+neverallow * default_android_vndservice:service_manager *;
+neverallow * default_android_hwservice:hwservice_manager *;
 
 # Looking up the base class/interface of all HwBinder services is a bad idea.
 # hwservicemanager currently offer such lookups only to make it so that security
@@ -652,6 +652,7 @@
     -audioserver_service # TODO(b/36783122) remove exemptions below once app_api_service is fixed
     -cameraserver_service
     -drmserver_service
+    -hal_light_service # TODO(b/148154485) remove once all violators are gone
     -keystore_service
     -mediadrmserver_service
     -mediaextractor_service
@@ -1173,10 +1174,11 @@
   -zygote
 } shell:process { transition dyntransition };
 
-# Only domains spawned from zygote, runas and simpleperf_app_runner may have the appdomain
-# attribute.
+# Only domains spawned from zygote, runas and simpleperf_app_runner may have
+# the appdomain attribute. simpleperf is excluded as a domain transitioned to
+# when running an app-scoped profiling session.
 neverallow { domain -simpleperf_app_runner -runas -app_zygote -webview_zygote -zygote } {
-  appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+  appdomain -shell -simpleperf userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
 }:process { transition dyntransition };
 
 # Minimize read access to shell- or app-writable symlinks.
diff --git a/public/dumpstate.te b/public/dumpstate.te
index 7342856..824be5d 100644
--- a/public/dumpstate.te
+++ b/public/dumpstate.te
@@ -230,6 +230,7 @@
   -virtual_touchpad_service
   -vold_service
   -vr_hwc_service
+  -default_android_service
 }:service_manager find;
 # suppress denials for services dumpstate should not be accessing.
 dontaudit dumpstate {
diff --git a/public/fastbootd.te b/public/fastbootd.te
index f08885a..3ab489b 100644
--- a/public/fastbootd.te
+++ b/public/fastbootd.te
@@ -53,12 +53,13 @@
     userdata_block_device
   }:blk_file { w_file_perms getattr ioctl };
 
-  # For disabling/wiping GSI.
+  # For disabling/wiping GSI, and for modifying/deleting files created via
+  # libfiemap.
   allow fastbootd metadata_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
   allow fastbootd {rootfs tmpfs}:dir mounton;
-  allow fastbootd metadata_file:dir search;
-  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file:file rw_file_perms;
+  allow fastbootd metadata_file:dir { search getattr };
+  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+  allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
 
   allowxperm fastbootd super_block_device_type:blk_file ioctl { BLKIOMIN BLKALIGNOFF };
 
diff --git a/public/file.te b/public/file.te
index 9573ad0..ef30fc7 100644
--- a/public/file.te
+++ b/public/file.te
@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
 type sysfs_bluetooth_writable, fs_type, sysfs_type, mlstrustedobject;
 type sysfs_devices_block, fs_type, sysfs_type;
 type sysfs_dm, fs_type, sysfs_type;
+type sysfs_dm_verity, fs_type, sysfs_type;
 type sysfs_dt_firmware_android, fs_type, sysfs_type;
 type sysfs_extcon, fs_type, sysfs_type;
 type sysfs_ion, fs_type, sysfs_type;
@@ -344,6 +345,7 @@
 # /data/misc subdirectories
 type adb_keys_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type apex_module_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+type apex_permission_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type apex_rollback_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type audio_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 type audioserver_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
@@ -451,6 +453,7 @@
 type statsdw_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
 type system_wpa_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, coredomain_socket;
 type system_ndebug_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type system_unsolzygote_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
 type tombstoned_crash_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
 type tombstoned_java_trace_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
 type tombstoned_intercept_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
diff --git a/public/hal_identity.te b/public/hal_identity.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8df186
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_identity.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_identity_client, hal_identity_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_identity, hal_identity_hwservice)
diff --git a/public/hal_light.te b/public/hal_light.te
index 333fcac..1e70b74 100644
--- a/public/hal_light.te
+++ b/public/hal_light.te
@@ -4,6 +4,13 @@
 
 hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_light, hal_light_hwservice)
 
+add_service(hal_light_server, hal_light_service)
+binder_call(hal_light_server, servicemanager)
+
+allow hal_light_client hal_light_service:service_manager find;
+
+allow hal_light_server dumpstate:fifo_file write;
+
 allow hal_light sysfs_leds:lnk_file read;
 allow hal_light sysfs_leds:file rw_file_perms;
 allow hal_light sysfs_leds:dir r_dir_perms;
diff --git a/public/hal_power.te b/public/hal_power.te
index 028011a..2c80a51 100644
--- a/public/hal_power.te
+++ b/public/hal_power.te
@@ -3,3 +3,7 @@
 binder_call(hal_power_server, hal_power_client)
 
 hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_power, hal_power_hwservice)
+
+add_service(hal_power_server, hal_power_service)
+binder_call(hal_power_server, servicemanager)
+allow hal_power_client hal_power_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hwservice.te b/public/hwservice.te
index 2cd582b..3619a63 100644
--- a/public/hwservice.te
+++ b/public/hwservice.te
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 type fwk_scheduler_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
 type fwk_sensor_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
 type fwk_stats_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
+type fwk_automotive_display_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, coredomain_hwservice, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_atrace_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_audio_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_audiocontrol_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@
 type hal_graphics_composer_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_health_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_health_storage_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_identity_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_input_classifier_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_ir_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
 type hal_keymaster_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
diff --git a/public/init.te b/public/init.te
index 56ed703..cc60b5a 100644
--- a/public/init.te
+++ b/public/init.te
@@ -381,6 +381,7 @@
 # init access to /sys files.
 allow init {
   sysfs_android_usb
+  sysfs_dm_verity
   sysfs_leds
   sysfs_power
   sysfs_fs_f2fs
diff --git a/public/ioctl_defines b/public/ioctl_defines
index 15cf7d5..b2a6fbf 100644
--- a/public/ioctl_defines
+++ b/public/ioctl_defines
@@ -804,6 +804,8 @@
 define(`FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY', `0xc0506617')
 define(`FS_IOC_ENABLE_VERITY', `0x6685')
 define(`FS_IOC_FIEMAP', `0xc020660b')
+define(`FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR', `0x801c581f')
+define(`FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR', `0x401c5820')
 define(`FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY', `0x400c6615')
 define(`FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX', `0xc0096616')
 define(`FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_PWSALT', `0x40106614')
diff --git a/public/keystore.te b/public/keystore.te
index e869f32..27c4624 100644
--- a/public/keystore.te
+++ b/public/keystore.te
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
 binder_use(keystore)
 binder_service(keystore)
 binder_call(keystore, system_server)
+binder_call(keystore, wificond)
 
 allow keystore keystore_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow keystore keystore_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/net.te b/public/net.te
index bdef072..100363a 100644
--- a/public/net.te
+++ b/public/net.te
@@ -19,9 +19,15 @@
 allow {netdomain -ephemeral_app} port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
 # See changes to the routing table.
 allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket { create read getattr write setattr lock append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg_read };
-# b/141455849 gate RTM_GETLINK with a new permission nlmsg_readpriv and initially grant
-# this permission to everything that previously had the nlmsg_read permission.
-allow netdomain self:netlink_route_socket nlmsg_readpriv;
+# b/141455849 gate RTM_GETLINK with a new permission nlmsg_readpriv and block access from
+# untrusted_apps. Some untrusted apps (e.g. untrusted_app_25-29) are granted access elsewhere
+# to avoid app-compat breakage.
+allow {
+  netdomain
+  -ephemeral_app
+  -mediaprovider
+  -untrusted_app_all
+} self:netlink_route_socket { nlmsg_readpriv };
 
 # Talks to netd via dnsproxyd socket.
 unix_socket_connect(netdomain, dnsproxyd, netd)
diff --git a/public/property.te b/public/property.te
index 2cf043a..8142aa2 100644
--- a/public/property.te
+++ b/public/property.te
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 system_internal_prop(device_config_sys_traced_prop)
 system_internal_prop(firstboot_prop)
 system_internal_prop(gsid_prop)
+system_internal_prop(init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop)
 system_internal_prop(init_svc_debug_prop)
 system_internal_prop(last_boot_reason_prop)
 system_internal_prop(netd_stable_secret_prop)
@@ -66,7 +67,6 @@
 system_restricted_prop(system_boot_reason_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(system_jvmti_agent_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
-system_restricted_prop(vndk_prop)
 
 compatible_property_only(`
     # DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
@@ -146,6 +146,7 @@
 system_public_prop(userspace_reboot_config_prop)
 system_public_prop(vehicle_hal_prop)
 system_public_prop(vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
+system_public_prop(vndk_prop)
 system_public_prop(wifi_log_prop)
 system_public_prop(wifi_prop)
 
diff --git a/public/property_contexts b/public/property_contexts
index 8414e87..0a000ec 100644
--- a/public/property_contexts
+++ b/public/property_contexts
@@ -392,8 +392,8 @@
 ro.vendor.build.date.utc u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
 ro.vendor.build.fingerprint u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.vendor.build.version.incremental u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
-ro.vndk.lite u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
-ro.vndk.version u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vndk.lite u:object_r:vndk_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.vndk.version u:object_r:vndk_prop:s0 exact string
 ro.vts.coverage u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
 wifi.active.interface u:object_r:exported_wifi_prop:s0 exact string
 wifi.concurrent.interface u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
@@ -441,4 +441,6 @@
 ro.surface_flinger.refresh_rate_switching u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
 
 # Binder cache properties.  These are world-readable
-binder.cache_key.has_system_feature      u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.has_system_feature             u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.is_interactive                 u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.is_power_save_mode             u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
diff --git a/public/recovery.te b/public/recovery.te
index 1193354..3bac03d 100644
--- a/public/recovery.te
+++ b/public/recovery.te
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@
   allow recovery device:dir r_dir_perms;
   allow recovery block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
   allow recovery dev_type:blk_file rw_file_perms;
-  allowxperm recovery { userdata_block_device metadata_block_device }:blk_file ioctl BLKPBSZGET;
+  allowxperm recovery { userdata_block_device metadata_block_device cache_block_device }:blk_file ioctl BLKPBSZGET;
 
   # GUI
   allow recovery graphics_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/service.te b/public/service.te
index 67128d2..76e642d 100644
--- a/public/service.te
+++ b/public/service.te
@@ -117,6 +117,7 @@
 type iris_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type jobscheduler_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type launcherapps_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type light_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type location_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type lock_settings_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type looper_stats_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -166,6 +167,7 @@
 type slice_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type statusbar_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type storagestats_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type system_config_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type system_update_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type soundtrigger_middleware_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
 type task_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -204,6 +206,8 @@
 ### HAL Services
 ###
 
+type hal_light_service, vendor_service, service_manager_type;
+type hal_power_service, vendor_service, service_manager_type;
 type hal_rebootescrow_service, vendor_service, service_manager_type;
 type hal_vibrator_service, vendor_service, service_manager_type;
 
diff --git a/public/shell.te b/public/shell.te
index 532d05f..0a97465 100644
--- a/public/shell.te
+++ b/public/shell.te
@@ -106,6 +106,9 @@
 get_prop(shell, last_boot_reason_prop)
 get_prop(shell, system_boot_reason_prop)
 
+# Allow reading the outcome of perf_event_open LSM support test for CTS.
+get_prop(shell, init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop)
+
 # allow shell access to services
 allow shell servicemanager:service_manager list;
 # don't allow shell to access GateKeeper service
@@ -124,6 +127,7 @@
   -virtual_touchpad_service
   -vold_service
   -vr_hwc_service
+  -default_android_service
 }:service_manager find;
 allow shell dumpstate:binder call;
 
diff --git a/public/simpleperf.te b/public/simpleperf.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..218fee7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/simpleperf.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type simpleperf, domain;
diff --git a/public/su.te b/public/su.te
index fa32a4b..16ace6e 100644
--- a/public/su.te
+++ b/public/su.te
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
   dontaudit su postinstall_file:filesystem *;
   dontaudit su domain:bpf *;
   dontaudit su unlabeled:vsock_socket *;
+  dontaudit su self:perf_event *;
 
   # VTS tests run in the permissive su domain on debug builds, but the HALs
   # being tested run in enforcing mode. Because hal_foo_server is enforcing
diff --git a/public/te_macros b/public/te_macros
index f065a21..b69c800 100644
--- a/public/te_macros
+++ b/public/te_macros
@@ -171,16 +171,17 @@
 # Label tmpfs objects for all apps.
 type_transition $1 tmpfs:file appdomain_tmpfs;
 allow $1 appdomain_tmpfs:file { execute getattr map read write };
-neverallow { $1 -runas_app -shell } { domain -$1 }:file no_rw_file_perms;
-neverallow { appdomain -runas_app -shell -$1 } $1:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow { $1 -runas_app -shell -simpleperf } { domain -$1 }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow { appdomain -runas_app -shell -simpleperf -$1 } $1:file no_rw_file_perms;
 # The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
 # of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
-# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components
-# to apps. Crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
-# produce stack traces.  llkd is excluded, as it needs to inspect
-# the kernel stack for live lock conditions. runas_app is excluded, as it can
-# only access debuggable apps.
-neverallow { domain -$1 -crash_dump userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd') -runas_app } $1:process ptrace;
+# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components to
+# apps. crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to produce stack
+# traces. runas_app is excluded, as it operates only on debuggable apps.
+# simpleperf is excluded, as it operates only on debuggable or profileable
+# apps. llkd is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to inspect stack traces for
+# live lock conditions.
+neverallow { domain -$1 -crash_dump userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd') -runas_app -simpleperf } $1:process ptrace;
 ')
 
 #####################################
diff --git a/public/traceur_app.te b/public/traceur_app.te
index 5333015..7e2cc84 100644
--- a/public/traceur_app.te
+++ b/public/traceur_app.te
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
   -virtual_touchpad_service
   -vold_service
   -vr_hwc_service
+  -default_android_service
 }:service_manager find;
 
 # Allow traceur_app to use atrace HAL
diff --git a/public/untrusted_app.te b/public/untrusted_app.te
index 5289bf9..43fe19a 100644
--- a/public/untrusted_app.te
+++ b/public/untrusted_app.te
@@ -16,6 +16,15 @@
 ### seapp_contexts.
 ###
 
+# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+# targetSdkVersion >= 30.
 type untrusted_app, domain;
+# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+# targetSdkVersion = 29.
+type untrusted_app_29, domain;
+# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+# 25 < targetSdkVersion <= 28.
 type untrusted_app_27, domain;
+# This file defines the rules for untrusted apps running with
+# targetSdkVersion <= 25.
 type untrusted_app_25, domain;
diff --git a/public/vendor_init.te b/public/vendor_init.te
index eb93d13..609821f 100644
--- a/public/vendor_init.te
+++ b/public/vendor_init.te
@@ -220,12 +220,12 @@
       -apexd_prop
       -gsid_prop
       -nnapi_ext_deny_product_prop
+      -init_perf_lsm_hooks_prop
       -init_svc_debug_prop
       -linker_prop
       -module_sdkextensions_prop
       -userspace_reboot_exported_prop
       -userspace_reboot_prop
-      -vndk_prop
     })
 ')
 
@@ -262,6 +262,7 @@
 set_prop(vendor_init, vehicle_hal_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, vendor_default_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, vndk_prop)
 set_prop(vendor_init, wifi_log_prop)
 
 get_prop(vendor_init, exported2_radio_prop)
diff --git a/public/vold.te b/public/vold.te
index 9f4489d..c1509f1 100644
--- a/public/vold.te
+++ b/public/vold.te
@@ -95,6 +95,12 @@
 # Allow mounting (lower filesystem) on parts of media for performance
 allow vold media_rw_data_file:dir mounton;
 
+# Allow setting extended attributes (for project quota IDs) on files and dirs
+allowxperm vold media_rw_data_file:{ dir file } ioctl {
+  FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR
+  FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR
+};
+
 # Allow mounting of storage devices
 allow vold { mnt_media_rw_stub_file storage_stub_file }:dir { mounton create rmdir getattr setattr };
 
diff --git a/public/wificond.te b/public/wificond.te
index cfca60e..af29511 100644
--- a/public/wificond.te
+++ b/public/wificond.te
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 binder_use(wificond)
 binder_call(wificond, system_server)
+binder_call(wificond, keystore)
 
 add_service(wificond, wificond_service)
 
@@ -38,5 +39,4 @@
 
 # Allow keystore binder access to serve the HwBinder service.
 allow wificond keystore_service:service_manager find;
-allow wificond keystore:binder call;
 allow wificond keystore:keystore_key get;
diff --git a/vendor/file_contexts b/vendor/file_contexts
index a3726ca..e0fcfcd 100644
--- a/vendor/file_contexts
+++ b/vendor/file_contexts
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.health@2\.0-service         u:object_r:hal_health_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.health@2\.1-service         u:object_r:hal_health_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.health\.storage@1\.0-service       u:object_r:hal_health_storage_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.identity@1\.0-service.example u:object_r:hal_identity_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.input\.classifier@1\.0-service     u:object_r:hal_input_classifier_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.ir@1\.0-service             u:object_r:hal_ir_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.keymaster@3\.0-service      u:object_r:hal_keymaster_default_exec:s0
@@ -49,10 +50,12 @@
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.nfc@1\.2-service            u:object_r:hal_nfc_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.media\.omx@1\.0-service            u:object_r:mediacodec_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.power@1\.0-service          u:object_r:hal_power_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.power-service.example       u:object_r:hal_power_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.power\.stats@1\.0-service   u:object_r:hal_power_stats_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.radio\.config@1\.0-service  u:object_r:hal_radio_config_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.radio@1\.2-radio-service    u:object_r:hal_radio_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.radio@1\.2-sap-service    u:object_r:hal_radio_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.rebootescrow-service\.default    u:object_r:hal_rebootescrow_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.sensors@[0-9]\.[0-9]-service(\.multihal)?  u:object_r:hal_sensors_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.secure_element@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_secure_element_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/rild                                           u:object_r:rild_exec:s0
@@ -61,6 +64,7 @@
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.tv\.input@1\.0-service      u:object_r:hal_tv_input_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.tv\.tuner@1\.0-service        u:object_r:hal_tv_tuner_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.usb@1\.0-service            u:object_r:hal_usb_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.usb\.gadget@1\.1-service    u:object_r:hal_usb_gadget_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.vibrator@1\.0-service       u:object_r:hal_vibrator_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.vibrator-service.example    u:object_r:hal_vibrator_default_exec:s0
 /(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.vr@1\.0-service             u:object_r:hal_vr_default_exec:s0
diff --git a/vendor/hal_identity_default.te b/vendor/hal_identity_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f84687
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_identity_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_identity_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_identity_default, hal_identity)
+
+type hal_identity_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_identity_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_usb_gadget_default.te b/vendor/hal_usb_gadget_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1486b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_usb_gadget_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_usb_gadget_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_usb_gadget_default, hal_usb_gadget)
+
+type hal_usb_gadget_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_usb_gadget_default)