diff --git a/private/crosvm.te b/private/crosvm.te
index 3f39201..2d9a688 100644
--- a/private/crosvm.te
+++ b/private/crosvm.te
@@ -84,7 +84,7 @@
 # crosvm tries to read serial device, including the write-only pipe from virtualizationmanager (to
 # forward console/log to the host logcat).
 # crosvm only needs write permission, so dontaudit read
-dontaudit crosvm virtualizationmanager:fifo_file read;
+dontaudit crosvm virtualizationmanager:fifo_file { read getattr };
 
 # Required for crosvm to start gdb-server to enable debugging of guest kernel.
 allow crosvm self:tcp_socket { bind create read setopt write accept listen };
@@ -96,9 +96,9 @@
 allow crosvm vfio_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
 allow crosvm vfio_device:dir r_dir_perms;
 
-# Allow crosvm to access VM DTBO via a pipe created by vfio handler.
-allow crosvm vfio_handler:fd use;
-allow crosvm vfio_handler:fifo_file r_file_perms;
+# Allow crosvm to access VM DTBO via a file created by virtualizationmanager.
+allow crosvm virtualizationmanager:fd use;
+allow crosvm virtualizationservice_data_file:file read;
 
 # Don't allow crosvm to open files that it doesn't own.
 # This is important because a malicious application could try to start a VM with a composite disk
diff --git a/private/vfio_handler.te b/private/vfio_handler.te
index 706a6ca..2a0bd37 100644
--- a/private/vfio_handler.te
+++ b/private/vfio_handler.te
@@ -20,5 +20,12 @@
 allow vfio_handler sysfs:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow vfio_handler sysfs:file rw_file_perms;
 
+# Allow vfio_handler to write to VM DTBO via a file created by virtualizationmanager.
+allow vfio_handler virtualizationmanager:fd use;
+allow vfio_handler virtualizationservice_data_file:file write;
+
+# vfio_handler can only use fd from virtualizationmanager, and can't open files itself
+neverallow vfio_handler virtualizationservice_data_file:file { open create };
+
 # Only vfio_handler can add vfio_handler_service
 neverallow { domain -vfio_handler } vfio_handler_service:service_manager add;
diff --git a/private/virtualizationmanager.te b/private/virtualizationmanager.te
index a8fb202..b6bcd98 100644
--- a/private/virtualizationmanager.te
+++ b/private/virtualizationmanager.te
@@ -89,7 +89,3 @@
 # For debug purposes we try to get the canonical path from /proc/self/fd/N. That triggers
 # a harmless denial for CompOS log files, so ignore that.
 dontaudit virtualizationmanager apex_module_data_file:dir search;
-
-# Allow virtualizationmanager to access VM DTBO via a pipe created by vfio handler.
-allow virtualizationmanager vfio_handler:fd use;
-allow virtualizationmanager vfio_handler:fifo_file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/virtualizationservice.te b/private/virtualizationservice.te
index a4588dc..14662fa 100644
--- a/private/virtualizationservice.te
+++ b/private/virtualizationservice.te
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
 # directories, it needs the permission to unlink the files created by virtualizationmanager.
 allow virtualizationservice virtualizationservice_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow virtualizationservice virtualizationservice_data_file:{ file sock_file } unlink;
+allow virtualizationservice virtualizationservice_data_file:file write;
 
 # Allow to use fd (e.g. /dev/pts/0) inherited from adbd so that we can redirect output from
 # crosvm to the console
@@ -62,9 +63,8 @@
 allow virtualizationservice vfio_device:chr_file getattr;
 allow virtualizationservice vfio_device:dir r_dir_perms;
 
-# Allow virtualizationservice to access VM DTBO via a pipe created by vfio handler.
-allow virtualizationservice vfio_handler:fd use;
-allow virtualizationservice vfio_handler:fifo_file r_file_perms;
+# Allow virtualizationservice to access VM DTBO via a file created by virtualizationmanager.
+allow virtualizationservice virtualizationmanager:fd use;
 
 neverallow {
   domain