diff --git a/apex/com.android.tethering-file_contexts b/apex/com.android.tethering-file_contexts
index 1b578ea..af366d8 100644
--- a/apex/com.android.tethering-file_contexts
+++ b/apex/com.android.tethering-file_contexts
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
 (/.*)?                  u:object_r:system_file:s0
 /bin/for-system/clatd   u:object_r:clatd_exec:s0
+/lib(64)?(/.*)          u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
diff --git a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
index 2c1c416..efb5947 100644
--- a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
+++ b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@
 		"devicestoragemonitor":                                            EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"diskstats":                                                       EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"display":                                                         EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
-		"dnsresolver":                                                     EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+		"dnsresolver":                                                     []string{"resolv_service_fuzzer"},
 		"domain_verification":                                             EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"color_display":                                                   EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
 		"netd_listener":                                                   EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
diff --git a/private/app.te b/private/app.te
index 49b8cde..b6b4714 100644
--- a/private/app.te
+++ b/private/app.te
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@
 get_prop(appdomain, device_config_runtime_native_prop)
 get_prop(appdomain, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
 
+# Allow the heap dump ART plugin to the count of sessions waiting for OOME
+get_prop(appdomain, traced_oome_heap_session_count_prop)
+
 # Allow to read ro.vendor.camera.extensions.enabled
 get_prop(appdomain, camera2_extensions_prop)
 
diff --git a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
index aeb6dd3..3b61f73 100644
--- a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@
     keystore_config_prop
     ntfs
     ondevicepersonalization_system_service
+    fuseblk
+    fuseblkd_untrusted
+    fuseblkd_untrusted_exec
+    fuseblkd
+    fuseblkd_exec
     permissive_mte_prop
     prng_seeder
     recovery_usb_config_prop
@@ -52,6 +57,7 @@
     stats_config_data_file
     system_net_netd_service
     timezone_metadata_prop
+    traced_oome_heap_session_count_prop
     tuner_config_prop
     tuner_server_ctl_prop
     ublk_block_device
diff --git a/private/crosvm.te b/private/crosvm.te
index aae8323..df97235 100644
--- a/private/crosvm.te
+++ b/private/crosvm.te
@@ -79,6 +79,12 @@
 # crosvm only needs write permission, so dontaudit read
 dontaudit crosvm virtualizationmanager:fifo_file read;
 
+# Required for crosvm to start gdb-server to enable debugging of guest kernel.
+allow crosvm self:tcp_socket { bind create read setopt write accept listen };
+allow crosvm port:tcp_socket name_bind;
+allow crosvm adbd:unix_stream_socket ioctl;
+allow crosvm node:tcp_socket node_bind;
+
 # Don't allow crosvm to open files that it doesn't own.
 # This is important because a malicious application could try to start a VM with a composite disk
 # image referring by name to files which it doesn't have permission to open, trying to get crosvm to
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index b858d4e..943b856 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
 can_profile_heap({
   dumpable_domain
   -app_zygote
-  -hal_configstore
+  -hal_configstore_server
   -logpersist
   -recovery
   -recovery_persist
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
 can_profile_perf({
   dumpable_domain
   -app_zygote
-  -hal_configstore
+  -hal_configstore_server
   -webview_zygote
   -zygote
 })
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index ca7e97a..2b98801 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -233,6 +233,8 @@
 /system/bin/fsck\.exfat	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
 /system/bin/fsck\.f2fs	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
 /system/bin/ntfsfix	--	u:object_r:fsck_exec:s0
+/system/bin/ntfs-3g	--	u:object_r:fuseblkd_untrusted_exec:s0
+/system/bin/ntfs-3g-compart	--	u:object_r:fuseblkd_exec:s0
 /system/bin/init		u:object_r:init_exec:s0
 # TODO(/123600489): merge mini-keyctl into toybox
 /system/bin/mini-keyctl	--	u:object_r:toolbox_exec:s0
diff --git a/private/fuseblkd.te b/private/fuseblkd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4423913
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/fuseblkd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# Compartmentalized domain specifically for mounting fuseblk filesystems.
+# We need this to not grant fuseblkd_untrusted sys_admin permissions.
+type fuseblkd_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type fuseblkd, domain;
+
+typeattribute fuseblkd coredomain;
+
+# Required for mount and unmounting. We can't minimize this permission,
+# even though we only allow mount/unmount.
+allow fuseblkd self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
+
+# Permissions for the fuseblk filesystem.
+allow fuseblkd fuse_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow fuseblkd fuseblk:filesystem { mount unmount };
+allow fuseblkd fuseblkd_untrusted:fd use;
+
+# Look through block devices to find the correct one.
+allow fuseblkd block_device:dir search;
+
+# Permissions to mount on the media_rw directory for USB drives.
+allow fuseblkd mnt_media_rw_file:dir search;
+allow fuseblkd mnt_media_rw_stub_file:dir mounton;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Only allow entry from fuseblkd_untrusted, and only through fuseblkd_exec binary.
+neverallow { domain -fuseblkd_untrusted } fuseblkd:process transition;
+neverallow * fuseblkd:process dyntransition;
+neverallow fuseblkd { file_type fs_type -fuseblkd_exec }:file entrypoint;
diff --git a/private/fuseblkd_untrusted.te b/private/fuseblkd_untrusted.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b99a49c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/fuseblkd_untrusted.te
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+# Fuseblk is a Filesystem in USErspace for block device. It should only be used
+# to mount untrusted blocks like USB drives.
+type fuseblkd_untrusted_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type fuseblkd_untrusted, domain;
+
+typeattribute fuseblkd_untrusted coredomain;
+
+domain_auto_trans(fuseblkd_untrusted, fuseblkd_exec, fuseblkd);
+
+# Allow stdin/out back to vold.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted vold:fd use;
+
+# Allows fuseblk to read block devices.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted block_device:dir search;
+
+# Permissions to read dynamic partitions blocks.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted super_block_device:blk_file getattr;
+
+# Permissions to access FUSE character devices.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted fuse_device:chr_file { getattr open read write };
+
+# Permissions to access /mnt/media_rw/.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted mnt_media_rw_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted mnt_media_rw_stub_file:dir getattr;
+
+# Permissions to read device mappers.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted sysfs_dm:dir search;
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted sysfs_dm:file { getattr open read };
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted dm_device:blk_file getattr;
+
+# Permissions to read links in tmpfs.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted tmpfs:lnk_file read;
+
+# Permissions to read loop device blocks.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted loop_device:blk_file getattr;
+
+# Permissions to access the /proc/filesystems file.
+allow fuseblkd_untrusted proc_filesystems:file { open read getattr };
+
+###
+### dontaudit rules
+###
+
+# ntfs-3g wants this permission to read a fork return code, for some reason.
+# It's unclear why, because it still reads the fork return code correctly,
+# and nothing breaks. If enforce is set to permissive, the audit goes away.
+dontaudit fuseblkd_untrusted self:capability sys_admin;
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# Fuseblk should never be run on block devices holding sensitive data.
+neverallow fuseblkd_untrusted {
+  boot_block_device
+  frp_block_device
+  metadata_block_device
+  recovery_block_device
+  root_block_device
+  swap_block_device
+  system_block_device
+  userdata_block_device
+  cache_block_device
+  dm_device
+}:blk_file no_rw_file_perms;
+
+# Only allow entry from vold, and only through fuseblkd_untrusted_exec binaries.
+neverallow { domain -vold } fuseblkd_untrusted:process transition;
+neverallow * fuseblkd_untrusted:process dyntransition;
+neverallow fuseblkd_untrusted { file_type fs_type -fuseblkd_untrusted_exec }:file entrypoint;
+
+# Under no circumstances should fuseblkd_untrusted or any other fuseblk filesystem be
+# given sys_admin access. They are fundementally untrusted, insecure filesystems.
+# The correct solution here is to compartmentalize permissions correctly so that
+# a smaller binary can get the required permissions. See fuseblkd.te.
+# Similar to above, we don't need setgid or setuid permissions.
+neverallow fuseblkd_untrusted self:capability { setgid setuid sys_admin };
+neverallow fuseblkd_untrusted self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid sys_admin };
+
+# Since we can't have sys_admin permissions, we definitely can't have mount/unmount
+# permissions, since we won't be able to use them. Same with relabel permissions.
+neverallow fuseblkd_untrusted fuseblk:filesystem { mount unmount relabelto relabelfrom};
diff --git a/private/genfs_contexts b/private/genfs_contexts
index 77e3954..08aa5a8 100644
--- a/private/genfs_contexts
+++ b/private/genfs_contexts
@@ -385,9 +385,9 @@
 genfscon vfat / u:object_r:vfat:s0
 genfscon binder / u:object_r:binderfs:s0
 genfscon exfat / u:object_r:exfat:s0
-genfscon ntfs / u:object_r:ntfs:s0
 genfscon debugfs / u:object_r:debugfs:s0
 genfscon fuse / u:object_r:fuse:s0
+genfscon fuseblk / u:object_r:fuseblk:s0
 genfscon configfs / u:object_r:configfs:s0
 genfscon sdcardfs / u:object_r:sdcardfs:s0
 genfscon esdfs / u:object_r:sdcardfs:s0
diff --git a/private/heapprofd.te b/private/heapprofd.te
index 1b41823..718ce81 100644
--- a/private/heapprofd.te
+++ b/private/heapprofd.te
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@
   app_zygote
   bpfloader
   diced
-  hal_configstore
+  hal_configstore_server
   init
   kernel
   keystore
diff --git a/private/mediaprovider_app.te b/private/mediaprovider_app.te
index dc6882b..7ad8feb 100644
--- a/private/mediaprovider_app.te
+++ b/private/mediaprovider_app.te
@@ -11,6 +11,10 @@
 # Allow MediaProvider to host a FUSE daemon for external storage
 allow mediaprovider_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
 
+# Allow MediaProvider to access fuseblk devices for external storage.
+allow mediaprovider_app fuseblk:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow mediaprovider_app fuseblk:file create_file_perms;
+
 # Allow MediaProvider to read/write media_rw_data_file files and dirs
 allow mediaprovider_app media_userdir_file:dir r_dir_perms;
 allow mediaprovider_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index c980696..3208377 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -221,6 +221,9 @@
 # heapprofd properties
 heapprofd.              u:object_r:heapprofd_prop:s0
 
+# traced properties
+traced.oome_heap_session.count u:object_r:traced_oome_heap_session_count_prop:s0 exact uint
+
 # servicemanager properties
 servicemanager.ready    u:object_r:servicemanager_prop:s0 exact bool
 
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index e9a6bba..b3c7528 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -839,6 +839,9 @@
 # Write tuner.server.enable
 set_prop(system_server, tuner_server_ctl_prop)
 
+# Allow the heap dump ART plugin to the count of sessions waiting for OOME
+get_prop(appdomain, traced_oome_heap_session_count_prop)
+
 # Create a socket for connections from debuggerd.
 allow system_server system_ndebug_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
 
diff --git a/private/traced.te b/private/traced.te
index 3029094..171e092 100644
--- a/private/traced.te
+++ b/private/traced.te
@@ -60,6 +60,11 @@
 set_prop(traced, system_trace_prop)
 # Allow to lazily start producers.
 set_prop(traced, traced_lazy_prop)
+# Allow tracking the count of sessions intercepting Java OutOfMemoryError
+# If there are such tracing sessions and an OutOfMemoryError is thrown by ART,
+# the hprof plugin intercepts the error, lazily registers a data source to
+# traced and collects a heap dump.
+set_prop(traced, traced_oome_heap_session_count_prop)
 
 # Allow traced to talk to statsd for logging metrics.
 unix_socket_send(traced, statsdw, statsd)
diff --git a/private/traced_perf.te b/private/traced_perf.te
index 080b6fe..31fa620 100644
--- a/private/traced_perf.te
+++ b/private/traced_perf.te
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
   app_zygote
   bpfloader
   diced
-  hal_configstore
+  hal_configstore_server
   init
   kernel
   keystore
diff --git a/private/vold.te b/private/vold.te
index 40c1a57..957e5d0 100644
--- a/private/vold.te
+++ b/private/vold.te
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 # Switch to more restrictive domains when executing common tools
 domain_auto_trans(vold, sgdisk_exec, sgdisk);
 domain_auto_trans(vold, sdcardd_exec, sdcardd);
+domain_auto_trans(vold, fuseblkd_untrusted_exec, fuseblkd_untrusted);
 
 # For a handful of probing tools, we choose an even more restrictive
 # domain when working with untrusted block devices
diff --git a/public/file.te b/public/file.te
index d508a7f..9ca6802 100644
--- a/public/file.te
+++ b/public/file.te
@@ -154,10 +154,10 @@
 type shm, fs_type;
 type mqueue, fs_type;
 type fuse, fusefs_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type fuseblk, sdcard_type, fusefs_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
 type sdcardfs, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
 type vfat, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
 type exfat, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
-type ntfs, sdcard_type, fs_type, mlstrustedobject;
 type debugfs, fs_type, debugfs_type;
 type debugfs_kprobes, fs_type, debugfs_type;
 type debugfs_mmc, fs_type, debugfs_type;
diff --git a/public/fsck_untrusted.te b/public/fsck_untrusted.te
index 8510c94..7e981bf 100644
--- a/public/fsck_untrusted.te
+++ b/public/fsck_untrusted.te
@@ -47,3 +47,21 @@
 neverallow { domain -vold } fsck_untrusted:process transition;
 neverallow * fsck_untrusted:process dyntransition;
 neverallow fsck_untrusted { file_type fs_type -fsck_exec }:file entrypoint;
+
+# fsck_untrusted should never have sys_admin permissions. If it requires sys_admin
+# permissions, that is a code mistake that needs to be fixed, not a permission that
+# should be granted. Same with setgid and setuid.
+neverallow fsck_untrusted self:global_capability_class_set { setgid setuid sys_admin };
+
+###
+### dontaudit rules
+###
+
+# Ignores attempts to access sysfs. fsck binaries seem to like trying to go
+# here, but nothing bad happens if they can't, and they shouldn't be allowed.
+dontaudit fsck_untrusted sysfs:file rw_file_perms;
+dontaudit fsck_untrusted sysfs_dm:file rw_file_perms;
+dontaudit fsck_untrusted sysfs_dm:dir rw_dir_perms;
+
+# Ignore attempts to access tmpfs. fsck don't need to do this.
+dontaudit fsck_untrusted tmpfs:lnk_file read;
diff --git a/public/hal_configstore.te b/public/hal_configstore.te
index 8867a8d..d26e1db 100644
--- a/public/hal_configstore.te
+++ b/public/hal_configstore.te
@@ -47,11 +47,11 @@
 # Should never need sdcard access
 neverallow hal_configstore_server {
     sdcard_type
-    fuse sdcardfs vfat exfat ntfs     # manual expansion for completeness
+    fuse sdcardfs vfat exfat fuseblk     # manual expansion for completeness
 }:dir ~getattr;
 neverallow hal_configstore_server {
     sdcard_type
-    fuse sdcardfs vfat exfat ntfs     # manual expansion for completeness
+    fuse sdcardfs vfat exfat fuseblk     # manual expansion for completeness
 }:file *;
 
 # Do not permit access to service_manager and vndservice_manager
diff --git a/public/ioctl_defines b/public/ioctl_defines
index e900173..62d45ab 100644
--- a/public/ioctl_defines
+++ b/public/ioctl_defines
@@ -170,6 +170,7 @@
 define(`BLKRESETZONE', `0x40101283')
 define(`BLKROGET', `0x0000125e')
 define(`BLKROSET', `0x0000125d')
+define(`BLKBSZSET', `0x00001271')
 define(`BLKROTATIONAL', `0x0000127e')
 define(`BLKRRPART', `0x0000125f')
 define(`BLKSECDISCARD', `0x0000127d')
diff --git a/public/property.te b/public/property.te
index e4470d6..74dd0f5 100644
--- a/public/property.te
+++ b/public/property.te
@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@
 system_restricted_prop(surfaceflinger_display_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(system_boot_reason_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(system_jvmti_agent_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(traced_oome_heap_session_count_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(ab_update_gki_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(usb_prop)
 system_restricted_prop(userspace_reboot_exported_prop)