diff --git a/public/hal_omx.te b/public/hal_omx.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..cf03690
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_omx.te
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+# applies all permissions to hal_omx NOT hal_omx_server
+# since OMX must always be in its own process.
+
+add_hwservice(hal_omx_server, hal_codec2_hwservice)
+add_hwservice(hal_omx_server, hal_omx_hwservice)
+
+# can route /dev/binder traffic to /dev/vndbinder
+vndbinder_use(hal_omx_server)
+
+binder_call(hal_omx_server, binderservicedomain)
+binder_call(hal_omx_server, { appdomain -isolated_app })
+
+# Allow hal_omx_server access to composer sync fences
+allow hal_omx_server hal_graphics_composer:fd use;
+
+allow hal_omx_server gpu_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_omx_server video_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_omx_server video_device:dir search;
+allow hal_omx_server ion_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow hal_omx_server hal_camera:fd use;
+
+crash_dump_fallback(hal_omx_server)
+
+# Recieve gralloc buffer FDs from bufferhubd. Note that hal_omx_server never
+# directly connects to bufferhubd via PDX. Instead, a VR app acts as a bridge
+# between those two: it talks to hal_omx_server via Binder and talks to bufferhubd
+# via PDX. Thus, there is no need to use pdx_client macro.
+allow hal_omx_server bufferhubd:fd use;
+
+allow hal_omx_client hal_codec2_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow hal_omx_client hal_omx_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+allow hal_omx_client hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+binder_call(hal_omx_client, hal_omx_server)
+
+###
+### neverallow rules
+###
+
+# hal_omx_server should never execute any executable without a
+# domain transition
+neverallow hal_omx_server { file_type fs_type }:file execute_no_trans;
+
+# The goal of the mediaserver split is to place media processing code into
+# restrictive sandboxes with limited responsibilities and thus limited
+# permissions. Example: Audioserver is only responsible for controlling audio
+# hardware and processing audio content. Cameraserver does the same for camera
+# hardware/content. Etc.
+#
+# Media processing code is inherently risky and thus should have limited
+# permissions and be isolated from the rest of the system and network.
+# Lengthier explanation here:
+# https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2016/05/hardening-media-stack.html
+neverallow hal_omx_server domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;