Merge "Add sysprop for LeAudio inband ringtone support"
diff --git a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
index aba4363..8e11850 100644
--- a/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
+++ b/build/soong/service_fuzzer_bindings.go
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@
"android.hardware.wifi.hostapd.IHostapd/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.hardware.wifi.supplicant.ISupplicant/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.frameworks.cameraservice.service.ICameraService/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
+ "android.frameworks.location.altitude.IAltitudeService/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.frameworks.sensorservice.ISensorManager/default": []string{"libsensorserviceaidl_fuzzer"},
"android.frameworks.stats.IStats/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
"android.se.omapi.ISecureElementService/default": EXCEPTION_NO_FUZZER,
diff --git a/private/app.te b/private/app.te
index db32be0..49b8cde 100644
--- a/private/app.te
+++ b/private/app.te
@@ -58,8 +58,6 @@
# Allow to ro.camerax.extensions.enabled
get_prop(appdomain, camerax_extensions_prop)
-userdebug_or_eng(`perfetto_producer({ appdomain })')
-
# Prevent apps from causing presubmit failures.
# Apps can cause selinux denials by accessing CE storage
# and/or external storage. In either case, the selinux denial is
@@ -358,6 +356,12 @@
allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:dir w_dir_perms;
allow appdomain user_profile_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+# Allow writing performance tracing data into the perfetto traced daemon.
+# Needed for java heap graph ART plugin (perfetto_hprof).
+# The perfetto profiling daemon will check for the specific application's
+# opt-in/opt-out.
+perfetto_producer(appdomain)
+
# Send heap dumps to system_server via an already open file descriptor
# % adb shell am set-watch-heap com.android.systemui 1048576
# % adb shell dumpsys procstats --start-testing
diff --git a/private/app_zygote.te b/private/app_zygote.te
index 8aa288e..6552d63 100644
--- a/private/app_zygote.te
+++ b/private/app_zygote.te
@@ -142,18 +142,15 @@
alg_socket nfc_socket vsock_socket kcm_socket qipcrtr_socket smc_socket
} *;
-# Only allow app_zygote to talk to the logd socket, and
-# su/heapprofd/traced_perf on eng/userdebug. This is because
-# cap_setuid/cap_setgid allow to forge uid/gid in SCM_CREDENTIALS.
-# Think twice before changing.
+# Only allow app_zygote to talk to the logd socket, and su on eng/userdebug.
+# This is because cap_setuid/cap_setgid allow to forge uid/gid in
+# SCM_CREDENTIALS. Think twice before changing.
neverallow app_zygote {
domain
-app_zygote
-logd
-system_server
userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
- userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
- userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
}:unix_dgram_socket *;
neverallow app_zygote {
@@ -161,8 +158,6 @@
-app_zygote
-prng_seeder
userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
- userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
- userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
}:unix_stream_socket *;
# Never allow ptrace
diff --git a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
index 55d3840..30a7e35 100644
--- a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.ignore.cil
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
device_config_memory_safety_native_prop
device_config_vendor_system_native_prop
devicelock_service
+ fwk_altitude_service
fwk_camera_service
fwk_sensor_service
grammatical_inflection_service
diff --git a/private/crash_dump.te b/private/crash_dump.te
index 31f0128..bc6020e 100644
--- a/private/crash_dump.te
+++ b/private/crash_dump.te
@@ -30,13 +30,16 @@
}:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
')
+# Read ART APEX data directory
+allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:dir { getattr search };
+allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+
###
### neverallow assertions
###
-# ptrace neverallow assertions are spread throughout the other policy
-# files, so we avoid adding redundant assertions here
-
+# sigchld not explicitly forbidden since it's part of the
+# domain-transition-on-exec macros, and is by itself not sensitive
neverallow crash_dump {
apexd
userdebug_or_eng(`-apexd')
@@ -54,11 +57,7 @@
vendor_init
vold
userdebug_or_eng(`-vold')
-}:process { signal sigstop sigkill };
+}:process { ptrace signal sigstop sigkill };
neverallow crash_dump self:process ptrace;
neverallow crash_dump gpu_device:chr_file *;
-
-# Read ART APEX data directory
-allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:dir { getattr search };
-allow crash_dump apex_art_data_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index 00936b8..4ad7298 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -12,44 +12,49 @@
# heap profiling, as initialization will fail if it does not have the
# necessary SELinux permissions.
get_prop(domain, heapprofd_prop);
-# Allow heap profiling on debug builds.
-userdebug_or_eng(`can_profile_heap({
- domain
- -bpfloader
- -init
- -kernel
- -keystore
- -llkd
- -logd
- -logpersist
- -recovery
- -recovery_persist
- -recovery_refresh
- -ueventd
- -vendor_init
- -vold
-})')
-# As above, allow perf profiling most processes on debug builds.
-# zygote is excluded as system-wide profiling could end up with it
-# (unexpectedly) holding an open fd across a fork.
-userdebug_or_eng(`can_profile_perf({
+# See private/crash_dump.te
+define(`dumpable_domain',`{
domain
+ -apexd
-bpfloader
+ -crash_dump
+ -crosvm # TODO(b/236672526): Remove exception for crosvm
+ -diced
-init
-kernel
-keystore
-llkd
-logd
+ -ueventd
+ -vendor_init
+ -vold
+}')
+
+# Allow heap profiling by heapprofd.
+# Zygotes are excluded due to potential issues with holding open file
+# descriptors or other state across forks. Other exclusions conflict with
+# neverallows, and are not considered important to profile.
+can_profile_heap({
+ dumpable_domain
+ -app_zygote
+ -hal_configstore
-logpersist
-recovery
-recovery_persist
-recovery_refresh
- -ueventd
- -vendor_init
- -vold
+ -webview_zygote
-zygote
-})')
+})
+
+# Allow profiling using perf_event_open by traced_perf.
+can_profile_perf({
+ dumpable_domain
+ -app_zygote
+ -hal_configstore
+ -webview_zygote
+ -zygote
+})
# Everyone can access the IncFS list of features.
r_dir_file(domain, sysfs_fs_incfs_features);
@@ -556,9 +561,9 @@
userdebug_or_eng(`-su') # communications with su are permitted only on userdebug or eng builds
-init
-tombstoned # linker to tombstoned
- userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
- userdebug_or_eng(`-traced')
- userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
+ -heapprofd
+ -traced
+ -traced_perf
});
')
diff --git a/private/ephemeral_app.te b/private/ephemeral_app.te
index 3b916e2..9f2b1d5 100644
--- a/private/ephemeral_app.te
+++ b/private/ephemeral_app.te
@@ -45,14 +45,6 @@
allow ephemeral_app radio_service:service_manager find;
allow ephemeral_app ephemeral_app_api_service:service_manager find;
-# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
-# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
-perfetto_producer(ephemeral_app)
-
-# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
-can_profile_heap(ephemeral_app)
-can_profile_perf(ephemeral_app)
-
# allow ephemeral apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
# modify them other than to connect
allow ephemeral_app system_server:udp_socket {
diff --git a/private/file.te b/private/file.te
index 776c8e5..539e63e 100644
--- a/private/file.te
+++ b/private/file.te
@@ -130,3 +130,6 @@
# write permission on this to connect, and needs to be mlstrustedobject
# in to satisfy MLS constraints for trusted domains.
type prng_seeder_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+
+# /sys/firmware/devicetree/base/avf
+type sysfs_dt_avf, fs_type, sysfs_type;
diff --git a/private/genfs_contexts b/private/genfs_contexts
index 6fa98ea..77e3954 100644
--- a/private/genfs_contexts
+++ b/private/genfs_contexts
@@ -145,6 +145,7 @@
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/net u:object_r:sysfs_net:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/switch u:object_r:sysfs_switch:s0
genfscon sysfs /devices/virtual/wakeup u:object_r:sysfs_wakeup:s0
+genfscon sysfs /firmware/devicetree/base/avf u:object_r:sysfs_dt_avf:s0
genfscon sysfs /firmware/devicetree/base/firmware/android u:object_r:sysfs_dt_firmware_android:s0
genfscon sysfs /fs/ext4/features u:object_r:sysfs_fs_ext4_features:s0
genfscon sysfs /fs/f2fs u:object_r:sysfs_fs_f2fs:s0
diff --git a/private/heapprofd.te b/private/heapprofd.te
index 36d2938..1b41823 100644
--- a/private/heapprofd.te
+++ b/private/heapprofd.te
@@ -1,14 +1,4 @@
# Android heap profiling daemon. go/heapprofd.
-#
-# On user builds, this daemon is responsible for receiving the initial
-# profiling configuration, finding matching target processes (if profiling by
-# process name), and sending the activation signal to them (+ setting system
-# properties for new processes to start profiling from startup). When profiling
-# is triggered in a process, it spawns a private heapprofd subprocess (in its
-# own SELinux domain), which will exclusively handle profiling of its parent.
-#
-# On debug builds, this central daemon performs profiling for all target
-# processes (which talk directly to this daemon).
type heapprofd_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
type heapprofd_tmpfs, file_type;
@@ -56,23 +46,28 @@
# For checking profileability.
allow heapprofd packages_list_file:file r_file_perms;
-# This is going to happen on user but is benign because central heapprofd
-# does not actually need these permission.
-# If the dac_read_search capability check is rejected, the kernel then tries
-# to perform a dac_override capability check, so we need to dontaudit that
-# as well.
-dontaudit heapprofd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_read_search dac_override };
-
+# Never allow profiling privileged or otherwise incompatible domains.
+# Corresponding allow-rule is in private/domain.te.
never_profile_heap(`{
+ apexd
+ app_zygote
bpfloader
+ diced
+ hal_configstore
init
kernel
keystore
llkd
logd
+ logpersist
+ recovery
+ recovery_persist
+ recovery_refresh
ueventd
vendor_init
vold
+ webview_zygote
+ zygote
}')
full_treble_only(`
diff --git a/private/isolated_app.te b/private/isolated_app.te
index 7230844..9d0fd73 100644
--- a/private/isolated_app.te
+++ b/private/isolated_app.te
@@ -34,12 +34,3 @@
allow isolated_app webview_zygote:unix_dgram_socket write;
# Read system properties managed by webview_zygote.
allow isolated_app webview_zygote_tmpfs:file read;
-
-# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
-# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
-perfetto_producer(isolated_app)
-
-# Allow profiling if the main app has been marked as profileable or
-# debuggable.
-can_profile_heap(isolated_app)
-can_profile_perf(isolated_app)
diff --git a/private/isolated_compute_app.te b/private/isolated_compute_app.te
index 2c6d570..536261f 100644
--- a/private/isolated_compute_app.te
+++ b/private/isolated_compute_app.te
@@ -25,15 +25,6 @@
hal_client_domain(isolated_compute_app, hal_allocator)
hwbinder_use(isolated_compute_app)
-# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
-# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
-perfetto_producer(isolated_compute_app)
-
-# Allow profiling if the main app has been marked as profileable or
-# debuggable.
-can_profile_heap(isolated_compute_app)
-can_profile_perf(isolated_compute_app)
-
#####
##### Neverallow
#####
diff --git a/private/platform_app.te b/private/platform_app.te
index 46abb16..5d16d85 100644
--- a/private/platform_app.te
+++ b/private/platform_app.te
@@ -115,9 +115,6 @@
# suppress denials caused by debugfs_tracing
dontaudit platform_app debugfs_tracing:file rw_file_perms;
-# Allow platform apps to act as Perfetto producers.
-perfetto_producer(platform_app)
-
# Allow platform apps to create VMs
virtualizationservice_use(platform_app)
diff --git a/private/priv_app.te b/private/priv_app.te
index 8c965fc..cfd8721 100644
--- a/private/priv_app.te
+++ b/private/priv_app.te
@@ -126,20 +126,12 @@
read_runtime_log_tags(priv_app)
-# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
-# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
-perfetto_producer(priv_app)
-
# Allow priv_apps to request and collect incident reports.
# (Also requires DUMP and PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS permissions)
allow priv_app incident_service:service_manager find;
binder_call(priv_app, incidentd)
allow priv_app incidentd:fifo_file { read write };
-# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
-can_profile_heap(priv_app)
-can_profile_perf(priv_app)
-
# Allow priv_apps to check whether Dynamic System Update is enabled
get_prop(priv_app, dynamic_system_prop)
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index c969cee..902d51e 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -495,13 +495,18 @@
media.stagefright.thumbnail.prefer_hw_codecs u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact bool
persist.sys.media.avsync u:object_r:media_config_prop:s0 exact bool
-persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact string
-persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.disabled u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact bool
-persist.bluetooth.bluetooth_audio_hal.disabled u:object_r:bluetooth_audio_hal_prop:s0 exact bool
-persist.bluetooth.btsnoopenable u:object_r:exported_bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
-persist.bluetooth.btsnoopdefaultmode u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact enum empty disabled filtered full
-persist.bluetooth.btsnooplogmode u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact enum empty disabled filtered full
-persist.bluetooth.factoryreset u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.cap u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact string
+persist.bluetooth.a2dp_offload.disabled u:object_r:bluetooth_a2dp_offload_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.bluetooth_audio_hal.disabled u:object_r:bluetooth_audio_hal_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.btsnoopenable u:object_r:exported_bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.btsnoopdefaultmode u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact enum empty disabled filtered full
+persist.bluetooth.btsnooplogmode u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact enum empty disabled filtered full
+persist.bluetooth.snooplogfilter.headers.enabled u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.snooplogfilter.profiles.a2dp.enabled u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.snooplogfilter.profiles.map u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact enum empty disabled fullfilter header magic
+persist.bluetooth.snooplogfilter.profiles.pbap u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact enum empty disabled fullfilter header magic
+persist.bluetooth.snooplogfilter.profiles.rfcomm.enabled u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.bluetooth.factoryreset u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0 exact bool
bluetooth.hardware.power.operating_voltage_mv u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact int
bluetooth.hardware.power.idle_cur_ma u:object_r:bluetooth_config_prop:s0 exact int
diff --git a/private/sdk_sandbox.te b/private/sdk_sandbox.te
index 6ebfa0a..cfcf2a4 100644
--- a/private/sdk_sandbox.te
+++ b/private/sdk_sandbox.te
@@ -218,14 +218,6 @@
allow sdk_sandbox shell_data_file:file r_file_perms;
allow sdk_sandbox shell_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
-# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
-# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
-perfetto_producer(sdk_sandbox)
-
-# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
-can_profile_heap(sdk_sandbox)
-can_profile_perf(sdk_sandbox)
-
# allow sdk sandbox to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
# modify them other than to connect
allow sdk_sandbox system_server:udp_socket {
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index 288c9b5..6af5eab 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
android.frameworks.cameraservice.service.ICameraService/default u:object_r:fwk_camera_service:s0
+android.frameworks.location.altitude.IAltitudeService/default u:object_r:fwk_altitude_service:s0
android.frameworks.stats.IStats/default u:object_r:fwk_stats_service:s0
android.frameworks.sensorservice.ISensorManager/default u:object_r:fwk_sensor_service:s0
android.hardware.audio.core.IConfig/default u:object_r:hal_audio_service:s0
diff --git a/private/system_app.te b/private/system_app.te
index 9116058..e2bec30 100644
--- a/private/system_app.te
+++ b/private/system_app.te
@@ -180,9 +180,6 @@
# Settings app reads ro.usb.uvc.enabled
get_prop(system_app, usb_uvc_enabled_prop)
-# Allow system apps to act as Perfetto producers.
-perfetto_producer(system_app)
-
###
### Neverallow rules
###
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 62185fc..4e5b2e8 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -421,7 +421,9 @@
allow system_server mediadrmserver:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms;
allow system_server mediadrmserver:udp_socket rw_socket_perms;
-userdebug_or_eng(`perfetto_producer({ system_server })')
+# Write trace data to the Perfetto traced daemon. This requires connecting to
+# its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
+perfetto_producer(system_server)
# Get file context
allow system_server file_contexts_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/traced_perf.te b/private/traced_perf.te
index 811bf48..080b6fe 100644
--- a/private/traced_perf.te
+++ b/private/traced_perf.te
@@ -60,9 +60,14 @@
# Never allow access to app data files
neverallow traced_perf { app_data_file privapp_data_file system_app_data_file }:file *;
-# Never allow profiling highly privileged processes.
+# Never allow profiling privileged or otherwise incompatible domains.
+# Corresponding allow-rule is in private/domain.te.
never_profile_perf(`{
+ apexd
+ app_zygote
bpfloader
+ diced
+ hal_configstore
init
kernel
keystore
@@ -71,4 +76,6 @@
ueventd
vendor_init
vold
+ webview_zygote
+ zygote
}')
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_all.te b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
index 8c7fe7a..f666cc8 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_all.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
@@ -129,14 +129,6 @@
allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
allow untrusted_app_all vendor_app_file:lnk_file { open getattr read };
-# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
-# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
-perfetto_producer(untrusted_app_all)
-
-# Allow profiling if the app opts in by being marked profileable/debuggable.
-can_profile_heap(untrusted_app_all)
-can_profile_perf(untrusted_app_all)
-
# allow untrusted apps to use UDP sockets provided by the system server but not
# modify them other than to connect
allow untrusted_app_all system_server:udp_socket {
diff --git a/private/virtualizationmanager.te b/private/virtualizationmanager.te
index 4cd32b7..946c783 100644
--- a/private/virtualizationmanager.te
+++ b/private/virtualizationmanager.te
@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@
allow virtualizationmanager tombstone_data_file:file { append getattr };
allow virtualizationmanager tombstoned:fd use;
+# Allow virtualizationservice to read AVF debug policy
+allow virtualizationmanager sysfs_dt_avf:dir search;
+allow virtualizationmanager sysfs_dt_avf:file { open read };
+
# Allow reading files under /proc/[crosvm pid]/, for collecting CPU & memory usage inside VM.
r_dir_file(virtualizationmanager, crosvm);
diff --git a/public/hal_configstore.te b/public/hal_configstore.te
index 7d4d150..8867a8d 100644
--- a/public/hal_configstore.te
+++ b/public/hal_configstore.te
@@ -34,8 +34,6 @@
-prng_seeder
userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
-tombstoned
- userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
- userdebug_or_eng(`-traced_perf')
}:{ unix_dgram_socket unix_stream_socket } *;
# Should never need access to anything on /data
diff --git a/public/service.te b/public/service.te
index af799b3..3d3d98a 100644
--- a/public/service.te
+++ b/public/service.te
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@
type platform_compat_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type face_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type fingerprint_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type fwk_altitude_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type fwk_stats_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type fwk_sensor_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type game_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;