diff --git a/apex/com.android.conscrypt-file_contexts b/apex/com.android.conscrypt-file_contexts
index ffc3109..abf0085 100644
--- a/apex/com.android.conscrypt-file_contexts
+++ b/apex/com.android.conscrypt-file_contexts
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 #############################
 # System files
 #
-(/.*)?                   u:object_r:system_file:s0
-/lib(64)?(/.*)?          u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+(/.*)?                          u:object_r:system_file:s0
+/lib(64)?(/.*)?                 u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
+/bin/boringssl_self_test(32|64) u:object_r:boringssl_self_test_exec:s0
diff --git a/private/boringssl_self_test.te b/private/boringssl_self_test.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..869b924
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/boringssl_self_test.te
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+type boringssl_self_test, domain;
+type boringssl_self_test_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+type boringssl_self_test_marker, file_type;
+
+typeattribute boringssl_self_test coredomain;
+
+# switch to boringssl_self_test security domain when running boringssl_self_test_exec from init.
+init_daemon_domain(boringssl_self_test)
+
+# Allow boringssl_self_test binaries to create/check for the existence of boringssl_self_test_marker
+# files.
+allow boringssl_self_test boringssl_self_test_marker:file create_file_perms;
+allow boringssl_self_test boringssl_self_test_marker:dir ra_dir_perms;
+
+# No other process should be able to create these files because their existence causes the
+# boringssl self test to be skipped.
+neverallow {
+  domain
+  -boringssl_self_test
+  -init
+  -vendor_init
+} boringssl_self_test_marker:file no_rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
index 2079248..86f8a8d 100644
--- a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
@@ -1780,7 +1780,7 @@
 (typeattributeset system_block_device_29_0 (system_block_device))
 (typeattributeset system_boot_reason_prop_29_0 (system_boot_reason_prop))
 (typeattributeset system_bootstrap_lib_file_29_0 (system_bootstrap_lib_file))
-(typeattributeset system_data_file_29_0 (system_data_file system_data_root_file))
+(typeattributeset system_data_file_29_0 (system_data_file))
 (typeattributeset system_event_log_tags_file_29_0 (system_event_log_tags_file))
 (typeattributeset system_file_29_0 (system_file))
 (typeattributeset systemkeys_data_file_29_0 (systemkeys_data_file))
diff --git a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
index f91f22e..84eff89 100644
--- a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
 (typeattribute new_objects)
 (typeattributeset new_objects
   ( new_objects
+    boringssl_self_test
     charger_prop
     cold_boot_done_prop
     platform_compat_service
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index 31915bb..8d63fbe 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@
 allow domain linkerconfig_file:dir search;
 allow domain linkerconfig_file:file r_file_perms;
 
+# Allow all processes to check for the existence of the boringssl_self_test_marker files.
+allow domain boringssl_self_test_marker:dir search;
+
 # Limit ability to ptrace or read sensitive /proc/pid files of processes
 # with other UIDs to these whitelisted domains.
 neverallow {
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index bd91519..3740218 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@
 /dev/block/vold/.+	u:object_r:vold_device:s0
 /dev/block/ram[0-9]*	u:object_r:ram_device:s0
 /dev/block/zram[0-9]*	u:object_r:ram_device:s0
+/dev/boringssl/selftest(/.*)?	u:object_r:boringssl_self_test_marker:s0
 /dev/bus/usb(.*)?       u:object_r:usb_device:s0
 /dev/console		u:object_r:console_device:s0
 /dev/cpu_variant:.*     u:object_r:dev_cpu_variant:s0
@@ -188,6 +189,7 @@
 /system/bin/auditctl	u:object_r:auditctl_exec:s0
 /system/bin/bcc                 u:object_r:rs_exec:s0
 /system/bin/blank_screen	u:object_r:blank_screen_exec:s0
+/system/bin/boringssl_self_test(32|64) u:object_r:boringssl_self_test_exec:s0
 /system/bin/charger		u:object_r:charger_exec:s0
 /system/bin/e2fsdroid		u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
 /system/bin/mke2fs		u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
@@ -434,8 +436,7 @@
 # NOTE: When modifying existing label rules, changes may also need to
 # propagate to the "Expanded data files" section.
 #
-/data		u:object_r:system_data_root_file:s0
-/data/(.*)?		u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
+/data(/.*)?		u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
 /data/system/packages\.list u:object_r:packages_list_file:s0
 /data/unencrypted(/.*)?         u:object_r:unencrypted_data_file:s0
 /data/backup(/.*)?		u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
diff --git a/private/perfetto.te b/private/perfetto.te
index e95defa..419c4b9 100644
--- a/private/perfetto.te
+++ b/private/perfetto.te
@@ -69,7 +69,6 @@
 neverallow perfetto {
   data_file_type
   -system_data_file
-  -system_data_root_file
   # TODO(b/72998741) Remove exemption. Further restricted in a subsequent
   # neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
   -vendor_data_file
diff --git a/private/traced.te b/private/traced.te
index 42c6704..2d7d07f 100644
--- a/private/traced.te
+++ b/private/traced.te
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@
 neverallow traced {
   data_file_type
   -system_data_file
-  -system_data_root_file
   # TODO(b/72998741) Remove vendor_data_file exemption. Further restricted in a
   # subsequent neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
   -vendor_data_file
diff --git a/private/traced_probes.te b/private/traced_probes.te
index 97a7e6e..8746c34 100644
--- a/private/traced_probes.te
+++ b/private/traced_probes.te
@@ -101,7 +101,6 @@
   -apk_data_file
   -dalvikcache_data_file
   -system_data_file
-  -system_data_root_file
   -system_app_data_file
   -backup_data_file
   -bootstat_data_file
diff --git a/private/vendor_init.te b/private/vendor_init.te
index 6a68f1f..50efc22 100644
--- a/private/vendor_init.te
+++ b/private/vendor_init.te
@@ -2,6 +2,3 @@
 # Sometimes we have to write to non-existent files to avoid conditional
 # init behavior. See b/35303861 for an example.
 dontaudit vendor_init sysfs:dir write;
-
-# TODO(b/140259336) We want to remove vendor_init in the long term but allow for now
-allow vendor_init system_data_root_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index b4b5475..29e007d 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -222,9 +222,8 @@
   allow domain system_data_file:dir getattr;
 ')
 allow { coredomain appdomain } system_data_file:dir getattr;
-# /data has the label system_data_root_file. Vendor components need the search
-# permission on system_data_root_file for path traversal to /data/vendor.
-allow domain system_data_root_file:dir { search getattr } ;
+# /data has the label system_data_file. Vendor components need the search
+# permission on system_data_file for path traversal to /data/vendor.
 allow domain system_data_file:dir search;
 # TODO restrict this to non-coredomain
 allow domain vendor_data_file:dir { getattr search };
@@ -859,7 +858,6 @@
   } {
     core_data_file_type
     -system_data_file # default label for files on /data. Covered below...
-    -system_data_root_file
     -vendor_data_file
     -zoneinfo_data_file
     with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
@@ -871,7 +869,6 @@
     core_data_file_type
     -unencrypted_data_file
     -system_data_file
-    -system_data_root_file
     -vendor_data_file
     -zoneinfo_data_file
     with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
diff --git a/public/file.te b/public/file.te
index 45c2fbc..2758cad 100644
--- a/public/file.te
+++ b/public/file.te
@@ -228,8 +228,6 @@
 type cgroup_rc_file, file_type;
 # /cores for coredumps on userdebug / eng builds
 type coredump_file, file_type;
-# Type of /data itself
-type system_data_root_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # Default type for anything under /data.
 type system_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
 # Type for /data/system/packages.list.
diff --git a/public/init.te b/public/init.te
index 4f8e855..35fab33 100644
--- a/public/init.te
+++ b/public/init.te
@@ -80,18 +80,7 @@
 
 # Create and mount on directories in /.
 allow init rootfs:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow init {
-    rootfs
-    cache_file
-    cgroup
-    storage_file
-    mnt_user_file
-    system_data_file
-    system_data_root_file
-    system_file
-    vendor_file
-    postinstall_mnt_dir
-}:dir mounton;
+allow init { rootfs cache_file cgroup storage_file mnt_user_file system_data_file system_file vendor_file postinstall_mnt_dir }:dir mounton;
 allow init cgroup_bpf:dir { create mounton };
 
 # Mount bpf fs on sys/fs/bpf
@@ -602,7 +591,3 @@
 
 # No domain should be allowed to ptrace init.
 neverallow * init:process ptrace;
-
-# init owns the root of /data
-# TODO(b/140259336) We want to remove vendor_init in the long term but allow for now
-neverallow { domain -init -vendor_init -vold } system_data_root_file:dir { write add_name remove_name };
diff --git a/public/vold.te b/public/vold.te
index f4a6259..3a38ba5 100644
--- a/public/vold.te
+++ b/public/vold.te
@@ -135,10 +135,7 @@
 allow vold efs_file:file rw_file_perms;
 
 # Create and mount on /data/tmp_mnt and management of expansion mounts
-allow vold {
-    system_data_file
-    system_data_root_file
-}:dir { create rw_dir_perms mounton setattr rmdir };
+allow vold system_data_file:dir { create rw_dir_perms mounton setattr rmdir };
 allow vold system_data_file:lnk_file getattr;
 
 # Vold create users in /data/vendor_{ce,de}/[0-9]+