Merge "Track SELinux denial."
diff --git a/Android.mk b/Android.mk
index 5f59e19..bb6cb53 100644
--- a/Android.mk
+++ b/Android.mk
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@
precompiled_sepolicy \
precompiled_sepolicy.plat_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256 \
precompiled_sepolicy.product_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256 \
+ product_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256 \
endif # ($(PRODUCT_PRECOMPILED_SEPOLICY),false)
@@ -303,7 +304,6 @@
product_service_contexts \
product_mac_permissions.xml \
product_mapping_file \
- product_sepolicy_and_mapping.sha256 \
endif
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/28.0/public/lmkd.te b/prebuilts/api/28.0/public/lmkd.te
index 472946e..5b4a235 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/28.0/public/lmkd.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/28.0/public/lmkd.te
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@
r_dir_file(lmkd, sysfs_lowmemorykiller)
allow lmkd sysfs_lowmemorykiller:file w_file_perms;
-# Send kill signals
-allow lmkd appdomain:process sigkill;
+# setsched and send kill signals
+allow lmkd appdomain:process { setsched sigkill };
# Clean up old cgroups
allow lmkd cgroup:dir { remove_name rmdir };
diff --git a/private/apexd.te b/private/apexd.te
index 2290878..ef20478 100644
--- a/private/apexd.te
+++ b/private/apexd.te
@@ -40,6 +40,10 @@
allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:dir mounton;
# allow apexd to create symlinks in /apex
allow apexd apex_mnt_dir:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+# allow apexd to unlink apex files in /data/apex/active
+# note that apexd won't be able to unlink files in /data/staging/session_XXXX,
+# because it doesn't have write permission for staging_data_file object.
+allow apexd staging_data_file:file unlink;
# allow apexd to relabel apk_tmp_file to apex_data_file.
# TODO(b/112669193) remove this when APEXes are staged via file descriptor
@@ -77,6 +81,10 @@
# Allow self-execute for the fork mount helper.
allow apexd apexd_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+# Unshare and make / private so that hooks cannot influence the
+# running system.
+allow apexd rootfs:dir mounton;
+
# Allow to execute shell for pre- and postinstall scripts. A transition
# rule is required, thus restricted to execute and not execute_no_trans.
allow apexd shell_exec:file { r_file_perms execute };
diff --git a/private/app_neverallows.te b/private/app_neverallows.te
index 4ecb355..e46c4ef 100644
--- a/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -334,3 +334,13 @@
# Untrusted apps are not allowed to use cgroups.
neverallow all_untrusted_apps cgroup:file *;
+
+# TODO(b/113362644): remove open permission from these domains.
+# Untrusted apps targetting >= Q are not allowed to open /dev/ashmem directly.
+#neverallow {
+# all_untrusted_apps
+# TODO(b/113362644): route mediaprovider to ashmemd
+# -mediaprovider
+# -untrusted_app_25
+# -untrusted_app_27
+#} ashmem_device:chr_file open;
diff --git a/private/app_zygote.te b/private/app_zygote.te
index aa5be4c..e221666 100644
--- a/private/app_zygote.te
+++ b/private/app_zygote.te
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@
neverallow app_zygote {
service_manager_type
-activity_service
+ -ashmem_device_service
-webviewupdate_service
}:service_manager find;
diff --git a/private/ashmemd.te b/private/ashmemd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..08df515
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/ashmemd.te
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+typeattribute ashmemd coredomain;
+type ashmemd_exec, exec_type, file_type, system_file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(ashmemd)
+
+binder_use(ashmemd)
+add_service(ashmemd, ashmem_device_service)
+
+allow ashmemd ashmem_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/compat/26.0/26.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/26.0/26.0.ignore.cil
index c9c127f..91901d3 100644
--- a/private/compat/26.0/26.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/26.0/26.0.ignore.cil
@@ -175,7 +175,6 @@
time_prop
timedetector_service
timezone_service
- timezonedetector_service
tombstoned_java_trace_socket
tombstone_wifi_data_file
trace_data_file
diff --git a/private/compat/27.0/27.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/27.0/27.0.ignore.cil
index ddd4e06..58e6d91 100644
--- a/private/compat/27.0/27.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/27.0/27.0.ignore.cil
@@ -154,7 +154,6 @@
test_boot_reason_prop
time_prop
timedetector_service
- timezonedetector_service
tombstone_wifi_data_file
trace_data_file
traced
diff --git a/private/compat/28.0/28.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/28.0/28.0.ignore.cil
index 6154e3c..6962052 100644
--- a/private/compat/28.0/28.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/28.0/28.0.ignore.cil
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
app_prediction_service
app_zygote
app_zygote_tmpfs
+ ashmemd
+ ashmem_device_service
biometric_service
bpf_progs_loaded_prop
bugreport_service
@@ -46,6 +48,9 @@
flags_health_check_exec
fwk_bufferhub_hwservice
fwk_stats_hwservice
+ gpuservice
+ gsi_data_file
+ gsi_metadata_file
gsi_service
gsid
gsid_exec
@@ -108,6 +113,7 @@
system_lmk_prop
system_suspend_hwservice
system_suspend_control_service
+ system_trace_prop
staging_data_file
task_profiles_file
testharness_service
@@ -116,6 +122,7 @@
timedetector_service
timezonedetector_service
uri_grants_service
+ use_memfd_prop
vendor_idc_file
vendor_keychars_file
vendor_keylayout_file
diff --git a/private/coredomain.te b/private/coredomain.te
index 9899d02..ebad8e7 100644
--- a/private/coredomain.te
+++ b/private/coredomain.te
@@ -188,3 +188,18 @@
full_treble_only(`
neverallow coredomain tee_device:chr_file { open read append write ioctl };
')
+
+# Allow access to ashmemd to request /dev/ashmem fds.
+allow {
+ coredomain
+ -init
+ -iorapd
+ -perfprofd
+} ashmem_device_service:service_manager find;
+
+binder_call({
+ coredomain
+ -init
+ -iorapd
+ -perfprofd
+}, ashmemd)
diff --git a/private/crash_dump.te b/private/crash_dump.te
index fe25bad..bb13bff 100644
--- a/private/crash_dump.te
+++ b/private/crash_dump.te
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
-vold
}:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
userdebug_or_eng(`
- allow crash_dump { llkd logd }:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
+ allow crash_dump { llkd logd vold }:process { ptrace signal sigchld sigstop sigkill };
')
###
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@
ueventd
vendor_init
vold
+ userdebug_or_eng(`-vold')
}:process { signal sigstop sigkill };
neverallow crash_dump self:process ptrace;
diff --git a/private/domain.te b/private/domain.te
index 39b7c75..9db19f1 100644
--- a/private/domain.te
+++ b/private/domain.te
@@ -33,6 +33,10 @@
allow domain cgroup_rc_file:file r_file_perms;
allow domain task_profiles_file:file r_file_perms;
+# Allow all domains to read sys.use_memfd to determine
+# if memfd support can be used if device supports it
+get_prop(domain, use_memfd_prop);
+
# For now, everyone can access core property files
# Device specific properties are not granted by default
not_compatible_property(`
@@ -153,9 +157,10 @@
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -apexd } staging_data_file:dir *;
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -apexd -kernel } staging_data_file:file *;
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } staging_data_file:dir no_w_dir_perms;
-# apexd needs the link permission, so list every `no_w_file_perms` except for `link`.
+# apexd needs the link and unlink permissions, so list every `no_w_file_perms`
+# except for `link` and `unlink`.
neverallow { domain -init -system_server } staging_data_file:file
- { append create unlink relabelfrom rename setattr write no_x_file_perms };
+ { append create relabelfrom rename setattr write no_x_file_perms };
neverallow {
domain
diff --git a/private/ephemeral_app.te b/private/ephemeral_app.te
index 3d3433e..05f41db 100644
--- a/private/ephemeral_app.te
+++ b/private/ephemeral_app.te
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@
allow ephemeral_app drmserver_service:service_manager find;
allow ephemeral_app radio_service:service_manager find;
allow ephemeral_app ephemeral_app_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow ephemeral_app gpu_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow ephemeral apps to interact with gpuservice
+binder_call(ephemeral_app, gpuservice)
# Write app-specific trace data to the Perfetto traced damon. This requires
# connecting to its producer socket and obtaining a (per-process) tmpfs fd.
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index b793e82..97352a5 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -186,6 +186,7 @@
/system(/.*)? u:object_r:system_file:s0
/system/lib(64)?(/.*)? u:object_r:system_lib_file:s0
/system/bin/atrace u:object_r:atrace_exec:s0
+/system/bin/ashmemd u:object_r:ashmemd_exec:s0
/system/bin/bcc u:object_r:rs_exec:s0
/system/bin/blank_screen u:object_r:blank_screen_exec:s0
/system/bin/e2fsdroid u:object_r:e2fs_exec:s0
@@ -325,6 +326,7 @@
/system/bin/apexd u:object_r:apexd_exec:s0
/system/bin/gsid u:object_r:gsid_exec:s0
/system/bin/simpleperf_app_runner u:object_r:simpleperf_app_runner_exec:s0
+/system/bin/notify_traceur\.sh u:object_r:notify_traceur_exec:s0
#############################
# Vendor files
@@ -436,6 +438,7 @@
/data/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp/oat(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
/data/app-private(/.*)? u:object_r:apk_private_data_file:s0
/data/app-private/vmdl.*\.tmp(/.*)? u:object_r:apk_private_tmp_file:s0
+/data/gsi(/.*)? u:object_r:gsi_data_file:s0
/data/tombstones(/.*)? u:object_r:tombstone_data_file:s0
/data/vendor/tombstones/wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:tombstone_wifi_data_file:s0
/data/local/tmp(/.*)? u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0
@@ -481,10 +484,12 @@
/data/misc/recovery(/.*)? u:object_r:recovery_data_file:s0
/data/misc/shared_relro(/.*)? u:object_r:shared_relro_file:s0
/data/misc/sms(/.*)? u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/stats-active-metric(/.*)? u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
/data/misc/stats-data(/.*)? u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
/data/misc/stats-service(/.*)? u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
/data/misc/systemkeys(/.*)? u:object_r:systemkeys_data_file:s0
/data/misc/textclassifier(/.*)? u:object_r:textclassifier_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/train-info(/.*)? u:object_r:stats_data_file:s0
/data/misc/user(/.*)? u:object_r:misc_user_data_file:s0
/data/misc/vpn(/.*)? u:object_r:vpn_data_file:s0
/data/misc/wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:wifi_data_file:s0
@@ -609,6 +614,7 @@
#
/metadata(/.*)? u:object_r:metadata_file:s0
/metadata/vold(/.*)? u:object_r:vold_metadata_file:s0
+/metadata/gsi(/.*)? u:object_r:gsi_metadata_file:s0
#############################
# asec containers
diff --git a/private/genfs_contexts b/private/genfs_contexts
index 2a74484..6189adb 100644
--- a/private/genfs_contexts
+++ b/private/genfs_contexts
@@ -224,6 +224,7 @@
genfscon tracefs /events/oom/oom_score_adj_update/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/task/task_rename/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon tracefs /events/task/task_newtask/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon tracefs /events/ftrace/print/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/trace_clock u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /tracing/buffer_size_kb u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
@@ -263,6 +264,7 @@
genfscon debugfs /events/oom/oom_score_adj_update/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /events/task/task_rename/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /events/task/task_newtask/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
+genfscon debugfs /tracing/events/ftrace/print/ u:object_r:debugfs_tracing:s0
genfscon debugfs /kcov u:object_r:debugfs_kcov:s0
diff --git a/private/gpuservice.te b/private/gpuservice.te
index c8f3def..ebfff76 100644
--- a/private/gpuservice.te
+++ b/private/gpuservice.te
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
-# gpu service
-type gpuservice, domain, coredomain;
+# gpuservice - server for gpu stats and other gpu related services
+typeattribute gpuservice coredomain;
type gpuservice_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(gpuservice)
diff --git a/private/gsid.te b/private/gsid.te
index 5ac1c25..0c2e50c 100644
--- a/private/gsid.te
+++ b/private/gsid.te
@@ -7,4 +7,101 @@
init_daemon_domain(gsid)
binder_use(gsid)
+binder_service(gsid)
add_service(gsid, gsi_service)
+
+# Needed to create/delete device-mapper nodes, and read/write to them.
+allow gsid dm_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow gsid dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
+allow gsid self:global_capability_class_set sys_admin;
+dontaudit gsid self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
+
+# libfiemap_writer uses sysfs to derive the bottom of a device-mapper stacking.
+# This requires traversing /sys/block/dm-N/slaves/* and reading the list of
+# file names.
+allow gsid sysfs_dm:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Needed to stat /data/gsi/* and realpath on /dev/block/by-name/*
+allow gsid block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# liblp queries these block alignment properties.
+allowxperm gsid userdata_block_device:blk_file ioctl {
+ BLKIOMIN
+ BLKALIGNOFF
+};
+
+# gsi_tool passes the system image over the adb connection, via stdin.
+allow gsid adbd:fd use;
+
+# gsid needs to store images on /data, but cannot use file I/O. If it did, the
+# underlying blocks would be encrypted, and we couldn't mount the GSI image in
+# first-stage init. So instead of directly writing to /data, we:
+#
+# 1. fallocate a file large enough to hold the signed GSI
+# 2. extract its block layout with FIEMAP
+# 3. create a dm-linear device using the FIEMAP, targeting /dev/block/by-name/userdata
+# 4. write system_gsi into that dm device
+#
+# To make this process work, we need to unwrap the device-mapper stacking for
+# userdata to reach the underlying block device. To verify the result we use
+# stat(), which requires read access.
+allow gsid userdata_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+
+# gsid uses /metadata/gsi to communicate GSI boot information to first-stage
+# init. It cannot use userdata since data cannot be decrypted during this
+# stage.
+#
+# gsid uses /metadata/gsi to store three files:
+# install_status - A short string indicating whether a GSI image is bootable.
+# lp_metadata - LpMetadata blob describing the block ranges on userdata
+# where system_gsi resides.
+# booted - An empty file that, if exists, indicates that a GSI is
+# currently running.
+#
+allow gsid metadata_file:dir search;
+allow gsid gsi_metadata_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow gsid gsi_metadata_file:file create_file_perms;
+
+allow gsid gsi_data_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
+allow gsid gsi_data_file:file create_file_perms;
+allowxperm gsid gsi_data_file:file ioctl FS_IOC_FIEMAP;
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -gsid
+ -fastbootd
+ -vold
+} gsi_metadata_file:dir *;
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -gsid
+ -fastbootd
+ -vold
+} gsi_metadata_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -gsid
+ -fastbootd
+ -vold
+} { gsi_data_file gsi_metadata_file }:notdevfile_class_set *;
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -gsid
+} gsi_data_file:dir ~{ open create read getattr setattr search relabelto ioctl };
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -gsid
+} gsi_data_file:dir *;
+
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -gsid
+} gsi_data_file:notdevfile_class_set ~{ relabelto getattr };
diff --git a/private/hal_allocator_default.te b/private/hal_allocator_default.te
index 7aa28aa..9dbe923 100644
--- a/private/hal_allocator_default.te
+++ b/private/hal_allocator_default.te
@@ -3,3 +3,6 @@
type hal_allocator_default_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
init_daemon_domain(hal_allocator_default)
+
+# To talk to ashmemd
+binder_use(hal_allocator_default)
diff --git a/private/isolated_app.te b/private/isolated_app.te
index 017f46b..8a0f96b 100644
--- a/private/isolated_app.te
+++ b/private/isolated_app.te
@@ -90,10 +90,12 @@
# b/17487348
# Isolated apps can only access three services,
-# activity_service, display_service and webviewupdate_service.
+# activity_service, display_service, webviewupdate_service, and
+# ashmem_device_service.
neverallow isolated_app {
service_manager_type
-activity_service
+ -ashmem_device_service
-display_service
-webviewupdate_service
}:service_manager find;
diff --git a/private/notify_traceur.te b/private/notify_traceur.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef1fd4f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/notify_traceur.te
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+type notify_traceur, domain, coredomain;
+type notify_traceur_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+init_daemon_domain(notify_traceur);
+binder_use(notify_traceur);
+
+# This is to execute am
+allow notify_traceur activity_service:service_manager find;
+allow notify_traceur shell_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+allow notify_traceur system_file:file rx_file_perms;
+
+binder_call(notify_traceur, system_server);
diff --git a/private/platform_app.te b/private/platform_app.te
index 7e190c9..bbba1d9 100644
--- a/private/platform_app.te
+++ b/private/platform_app.te
@@ -67,6 +67,14 @@
allow platform_app app_api_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
allow platform_app vr_manager_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app gpu_service:service_manager find;
+allow platform_app stats_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow platform apps to interact with gpuservice
+binder_call(platform_app, gpuservice)
+
+# Allow platform apps to log via statsd.
+allow platform_app statsd:binder call;
# Access to /data/preloads
allow platform_app preloads_data_file:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/priv_app.te b/private/priv_app.te
index 71e787f..ad39eb1 100644
--- a/private/priv_app.te
+++ b/private/priv_app.te
@@ -47,6 +47,10 @@
allow priv_app recovery_service:service_manager find;
allow priv_app stats_service:service_manager find;
allow priv_app system_api_service:service_manager find;
+allow priv_app gpu_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow privileged apps to interact with gpuservice
+binder_call(priv_app, gpuservice)
# Write to /cache.
allow priv_app { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir create_dir_perms;
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index 4eb10dd..8024954 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@
pm. u:object_r:pm_prop:s0
test.sys.boot.reason u:object_r:test_boot_reason_prop:s0
sys.lmk. u:object_r:system_lmk_prop:s0
+sys.trace. u:object_r:system_trace_prop:s0
# Boolean property set by system server upon boot indicating
# if device owner is provisioned.
diff --git a/private/runas_app.te b/private/runas_app.te
index 525aea1..e6fd953 100644
--- a/private/runas_app.te
+++ b/private/runas_app.te
@@ -15,3 +15,4 @@
# Allow lldb/ndk-gdb/simpleperf to ptrace attach to debuggable app processes.
allow runas_app untrusted_app_all:process { ptrace signal sigstop };
+allow runas_app untrusted_app_all:unix_stream_socket connectto;
diff --git a/private/seapp_contexts b/private/seapp_contexts
index ae07a96..964f47d 100644
--- a/private/seapp_contexts
+++ b/private/seapp_contexts
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+# The entries in this file define how security contexts for apps are determined.
+# Each entry lists input selectors, used to match the app, and outputs which are
+# used to determine the security contexts for matching apps.
+#
# Input selectors:
# isSystemServer (boolean)
# isEphemeralApp (boolean)
@@ -10,57 +14,93 @@
# isPrivApp (boolean)
# minTargetSdkVersion (unsigned integer)
# fromRunAs (boolean)
-# isSystemServer=true can only be used once.
+#
+# All specified input selectors in an entry must match (i.e. logical AND).
+# An unspecified string or boolean selector with no default will match any
+# value.
+# A user, name, or path string selector that ends in * will perform a prefix
+# match.
+# String matching is case-insensitive.
+# See external/selinux/libselinux/src/android/android_platform.c,
+# seapp_context_lookup().
+#
+# isSystemServer=true only matches the system server.
# An unspecified isSystemServer defaults to false.
# isEphemeralApp=true will match apps marked by PackageManager as Ephemeral
# isV2App=true will match apps in the v2 app sandbox.
# isOwner=true will only match for the owner/primary user.
-# isOwner=false will only match for secondary users.
-# If unspecified, the entry can match either case.
-# An unspecified string selector will match any value.
-# A user string selector that ends in * will perform a prefix match.
-# user=_app will match any regular app UID.
-# user=_isolated will match any isolated service UID.
+# user=_app will match any regular app process.
+# user=_isolated will match any isolated service process.
+# Other values of user are matched against the name associated with the process
+# UID.
+# seinfo= matches aginst the seinfo tag for the app, determined from
+# mac_permissions.xml files.
+# The ':' character is reserved and may not be used in seinfo.
+# name= matches against the package name of the app.
+# path= matches against the directory path when labeling app directories.
# isPrivApp=true will only match for applications preinstalled in
# /system/priv-app.
# minTargetSdkVersion will match applications with a targetSdkVersion
# greater than or equal to the specified value. If unspecified,
# it has a default value of 0.
-# fromRunAs=true means the setcontext request is from run-as. Default is false.
-# All specified input selectors in an entry must match (i.e. logical AND).
-# Matching is case-insensitive.
+# fromRunAs=true means the process being labeled is started by run-as. Default
+# is false.
#
-# Precedence rules (see external/selinux/libselinux/src/android/android.c seapp_context_cmp()):
+# Precedence: entries are compared using the following rules, in the order shown
+# (see external/selinux/libselinux/src/android/android_platform.c,
+# seapp_context_cmp()).
# (1) isSystemServer=true before isSystemServer=false.
-# (2) Specified isEphemeralApp= before unspecified isEphemeralApp= boolean.
+# (2) Specified isEphemeralApp= before unspecified isEphemeralApp=
+# boolean.
# (3) Specified isV2App= before unspecified isV2App= boolean.
# (4) Specified isOwner= before unspecified isOwner= boolean.
-# (5) Specified user= string before unspecified user= string.
-# (6) Fixed user= string before user= prefix (i.e. ending in *).
-# (7) Longer user= prefix before shorter user= prefix.
-# (8) Specified seinfo= string before unspecified seinfo= string.
-# ':' character is reserved and may not be used.
-# (9) Specified name= string before unspecified name= string.
-# (10) Specified path= string before unspecified path= string.
-# (11) Specified isPrivApp= before unspecified isPrivApp= boolean.
-# (12) Higher value of minTargetSdkVersion= before lower value of minTargetSdkVersion=
-# integer. Note that minTargetSdkVersion= defaults to 0 if unspecified.
-# (13) fromRunAs=true before fromRunAs=false.
+# (5) Specified user= string before unspecified user= string;
+# more specific user= string before less specific user= string.
+# (6) Specified seinfo= string before unspecified seinfo= string.
+# (7) Specified name= string before unspecified name= string;
+# more specific name= string before less specific name= string.
+# (8) Specified path= string before unspecified path= string.
+# more specific name= string before less specific name= string.
+# (9) Specified isPrivApp= before unspecified isPrivApp= boolean.
+# (10) Higher value of minTargetSdkVersion= before lower value of
+# minTargetSdkVersion= integer. Note that minTargetSdkVersion=
+# defaults to 0 if unspecified.
+# (11) fromRunAs=true before fromRunAs=false.
+# (A fixed selector is more specific than a prefix, i.e. ending in *, and a
+# longer prefix is more specific than a shorter prefix.)
+# Apps are checked against entries in precedence order until the first match,
+# regardless of their order in this file.
+#
+# Duplicate entries, i.e. with identical input selectors, are not allowed.
#
# Outputs:
# domain (string)
# type (string)
# levelFrom (string; one of none, all, app, or user)
# level (string)
-# Only entries that specify domain= will be used for app process labeling.
-# Only entries that specify type= will be used for app directory labeling.
+#
+# domain= determines the label to be used for the app process; entries
+# without domain= are ignored for this purpose.
+# type= specifies the label to be used for the app data directory; entries
+# without type= are ignored for this purpose.
+# levelFrom and level are used to determine the level (sensitivity + categories)
+# for MLS/MCS.
+# levelFrom=none omits the level.
+# levelFrom=app determines the level from the process UID.
+# levelFrom=user determines the level from the user ID.
+# levelFrom=all determines the level from both UID and user ID.
+#
# levelFrom=user is only supported for _app or _isolated UIDs.
# levelFrom=app or levelFrom=all is only supported for _app UIDs.
# level may be used to specify a fixed level for any UID.
#
+# For backwards compatibility levelFromUid=true is equivalent to levelFrom=app
+# and levelFromUid=false is equivalent to levelFrom=none.
+#
#
# Neverallow Assertions
-# Additional compile time assertion checks can be added as well. The assertion
+# Additional compile time assertion checks for the rules in this file can be
+# added as well. The assertion
# rules are lines beginning with the keyword neverallow. Full support for PCRE
# regular expressions exists on all input and output selectors. Neverallow
# rules are never output to the built seapp_contexts file. Like all keywords,
diff --git a/private/service.te b/private/service.te
index 89664e4..1bec3ce 100644
--- a/private/service.te
+++ b/private/service.te
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+type ashmem_device_service, app_api_service, service_manager_type;
type dynamic_android_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type gsi_service, service_manager_type;
type incidentcompanion_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index 650b62e..5295d7f 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
app_binding u:object_r:app_binding_service:s0
app_prediction u:object_r:app_prediction_service:s0
apexservice u:object_r:apex_service:s0
+ashmem_device_service u:object_r:ashmem_device_service:s0
gsiservice u:object_r:gsi_service:s0
appops u:object_r:appops_service:s0
appwidget u:object_r:appwidget_service:s0
@@ -192,7 +193,6 @@
textservices u:object_r:textservices_service:s0
time_detector u:object_r:timedetector_service:s0
timezone u:object_r:timezone_service:s0
-time_zone_detector u:object_r:timezonedetector_service:s0
thermalservice u:object_r:thermal_service:s0
trust u:object_r:trust_service:s0
tv_input u:object_r:tv_input_service:s0
diff --git a/private/stats.te b/private/stats.te
index 2c7199d..81ec1cf 100644
--- a/private/stats.te
+++ b/private/stats.te
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@
domain
-dumpstate
-incidentd
+ -platform_app
-priv_app
-shell
-stats
diff --git a/private/system_app.te b/private/system_app.te
index 39af1e6..3f0d335 100644
--- a/private/system_app.te
+++ b/private/system_app.te
@@ -66,6 +66,9 @@
# Allow system apps to interact with incidentd
binder_call(system_app, incidentd)
+# Allow system apps to interact with gpuservice
+binder_call(system_app, gpuservice)
+
allow system_app servicemanager:service_manager list;
# TODO: scope this down? Too broad?
allow system_app {
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 98ae7f8..4a48983 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -53,6 +53,12 @@
allowxperm system_server self:udp_socket ioctl priv_sock_ioctls;
bluetooth_domain(system_server)
+# Allow setup of tcp keepalive offload. This gives system_server the permission to
+# call ioctl on app domains' tcp sockets. Additional ioctl commands still need to
+# be granted individually, except for a small set of safe values whitelisted in
+# public/domain.te.
+allow system_server appdomain:tcp_socket ioctl;
+
# These are the capabilities assigned by the zygote to the
# system server.
allow system_server self:global_capability_class_set {
@@ -189,6 +195,7 @@
binder_call(system_server, incidentd)
binder_call(system_server, iorapd)
binder_call(system_server, netd)
+binder_call(system_server, notify_traceur)
binder_call(system_server, statsd)
binder_call(system_server, storaged)
binder_call(system_server, update_engine)
@@ -270,6 +277,7 @@
sdcardd
statsd
surfaceflinger
+ vold
# This list comes from HAL_INTERFACES_OF_INTEREST in
# frameworks/base/services/core/java/com/android/server/Watchdog.java.
diff --git a/private/traced.te b/private/traced.te
index a3c5d8b..0aeb11b 100644
--- a/private/traced.te
+++ b/private/traced.te
@@ -36,6 +36,10 @@
allow traced iorapd:fd use;
allow traced iorapd_tmpfs:file { read write };
+# Allow traced to notify Traceur when a trace ends by setting the
+# sys.trace.trace_end_signal property.
+set_prop(traced, system_trace_prop)
+
###
### Neverallow rules
###
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_25.te b/private/untrusted_app_25.te
index 7cccbac..5e669c7 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_25.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_25.te
@@ -56,3 +56,7 @@
# allowed for targetApi<=28 for compat reasons.
allow untrusted_app_25 dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
userdebug_or_eng(`auditallow untrusted_app_25 dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;')
+
+# The ability to talk to /dev/ashmem directly. targetApi>=29 must use
+# ASharedMemory instead.
+allow untrusted_app_25 ashmem_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_27.te b/private/untrusted_app_27.te
index 0c9c684..7427b68 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_27.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_27.te
@@ -36,3 +36,7 @@
# allowed for targetApi<=28 for compat reasons.
allow untrusted_app_27 dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;
userdebug_or_eng(`auditallow untrusted_app_27 dex2oat_exec:file rx_file_perms;')
+
+# The ability to talk to /dev/ashmem directly. targetApi>=29 must use
+# ASharedMemory instead.
+allow untrusted_app_27 ashmem_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_all.te b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
index 2c44627..c1cd6c7 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_all.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@
allow untrusted_app_all privapp_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
allow untrusted_app_all app_data_file:file { r_file_perms execute };
+# Chrome Crashpad uses the the dynamic linker to load native executables
+# from an APK (b/112050209, crbug.com/928422)
+allow untrusted_app_all system_linker_exec:file execute_no_trans;
+
# Follow priv-app symlinks. This is used for dynamite functionality.
allow untrusted_app_all privapp_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
@@ -94,6 +98,10 @@
allow untrusted_app_all radio_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all app_api_service:service_manager find;
allow untrusted_app_all vr_manager_service:service_manager find;
+allow untrusted_app_all gpu_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow untrusted apps to interact with gpuservice
+binder_call(untrusted_app_all, gpuservice)
# Allow GMS core to access perfprofd output, which is stored
# in /data/misc/perfprofd/. GMS core will need to list all
@@ -176,3 +184,9 @@
allow untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file rw_file_perms;
allowxperm untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file ioctl { KCOV_INIT_TRACE KCOV_ENABLE KCOV_DISABLE };
')
+
+# Allow access to ashmemd to request /dev/ashmem fds.
+binder_call(untrusted_app_all, ashmemd)
+
+# TODO(b/113362644): audit apps directly using /dev/ashmem and emit error
+# message with info on how to fix that.
diff --git a/private/webview_zygote.te b/private/webview_zygote.te
index f9deff0..95affef 100644
--- a/private/webview_zygote.te
+++ b/private/webview_zygote.te
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@
neverallow webview_zygote {
service_manager_type
-activity_service
+ -ashmem_device_service
-webviewupdate_service
}:service_manager find;
diff --git a/private/zygote.te b/private/zygote.te
index ccb18fe..9fc0998 100644
--- a/private/zygote.te
+++ b/private/zygote.te
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@
allow zygote sdcardfs:filesystem { unmount };
# Allow creating user-specific storage source if started before vold.
-allow zygote mnt_user_file:dir create_dir_perms;
+allow zygote mnt_user_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
allow zygote mnt_user_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
allow zygote mnt_user_file:file create_file_perms;
# Allowed to mount user-specific storage into place
@@ -100,7 +100,8 @@
# TODO: reduce this back to only sdcardfs once b/123533205 is root-caused
# (Technically "sdcardfs" and "media_rw_data_file" are equivalent, since
# sdcardfs simply wraps files stored under /data/media.)
-allow zygote { sdcardfs media_rw_data_file vfat }:dir { search mounton };
+allow zygote { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
+allow zygote { sdcard_type media_rw_data_file }:file { create_file_perms };
# Handle --invoke-with command when launching Zygote with a wrapper command.
allow zygote zygote_exec:file rx_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/app.te b/public/app.te
index 75f521e..ee9b8cf 100644
--- a/public/app.te
+++ b/public/app.te
@@ -357,6 +357,8 @@
allow appdomain system_server_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
allow appdomain zygote_tmpfs:file { map read };
+# Allow vendor apps access to ashmemd to request /dev/ashmem fds.
+binder_call({ appdomain -coredomain }, ashmemd)
###
### Neverallow rules
diff --git a/public/ashmemd.te b/public/ashmemd.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..542f093
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/ashmemd.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type ashmemd, domain;
diff --git a/public/crash_dump.te b/public/crash_dump.te
index ec33df3..5188d19 100644
--- a/public/crash_dump.te
+++ b/public/crash_dump.te
@@ -50,13 +50,14 @@
# which is super useful in some cases.
unix_socket_connect(crash_dump, logdr, logd)
-# Crash dump is not intended to access the following data types. Since these
+# Crash dump is not intended to access the following files. Since these
# are WAI, suppress the denials to clean up the logs.
dontaudit crash_dump {
core_data_file_type
vendor_file_type
}:dir search;
dontaudit crash_dump system_data_file:file read;
+dontaudit crash_dump property_type:file read;
###
### neverallow assertions
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index bc50d60..d3fac70 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -64,7 +64,19 @@
allow domain owntty_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow domain null_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
allow domain zero_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow domain ashmem_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+allow {
+ domain
+ # TODO(b/113362644): route coredomain to ashmemd
+ #-coredomain
+ # TODO(b/113362644): remove open permission from apps.
+ #-ephemeral_app
+ #-isolated_app
+ #-untrusted_app_all
+} ashmem_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
+
+# Allow using fds to /dev/ashmem.
+allow domain ashmemd:fd use;
+
# /dev/binder can be accessed by non-vendor domains and by apps
allow {
coredomain
@@ -343,6 +355,7 @@
-healthd
-uncrypt
-tee
+ -hal_bootctl
} self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;
# No process can map low memory (< CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR).
diff --git a/public/e2fs.te b/public/e2fs.te
index 1a2024e..dd5bd69 100644
--- a/public/e2fs.te
+++ b/public/e2fs.te
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
allow e2fs userdata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow e2fs metadata_block_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
allow e2fs dm_device:blk_file rw_file_perms;
-allowxperm e2fs { userdata_block_device metadata_block_device }:blk_file ioctl {
+allowxperm e2fs { userdata_block_device metadata_block_device dm_device }:blk_file ioctl {
BLKSECDISCARD BLKDISCARD BLKPBSZGET BLKDISCARDZEROES BLKROGET
};
diff --git a/public/fastbootd.te b/public/fastbootd.te
index 1d77fd1..5827c50 100644
--- a/public/fastbootd.te
+++ b/public/fastbootd.te
@@ -47,6 +47,13 @@
userdata_block_device
}:blk_file { w_file_perms getattr ioctl };
+ # For disabling/wiping GSI.
+ allow fastbootd metadata_block_device:blk_file r_file_perms;
+ allow fastbootd {rootfs tmpfs}:dir mounton;
+ allow fastbootd metadata_file:dir search;
+ allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+ allow fastbootd gsi_metadata_file:file rw_file_perms;
+
allowxperm fastbootd {
system_block_device
super_block_device
diff --git a/public/file.te b/public/file.te
index a8f113b..073be04 100644
--- a/public/file.te
+++ b/public/file.te
@@ -190,6 +190,8 @@
type metadata_file, file_type;
# Vold files within /metadata
type vold_metadata_file, file_type;
+# GSI files within /metadata
+type gsi_metadata_file, file_type;
# Type for /dev/cpu_variant:.*.
type dev_cpu_variant, file_type;
@@ -328,6 +330,7 @@
type update_engine_log_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
# /data/misc/trace for method traces on userdebug / eng builds
type method_trace_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type gsi_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
# /data/data subdirectories - app sandboxes
type app_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
diff --git a/public/gpuservice.te b/public/gpuservice.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c862d0b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/gpuservice.te
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+# gpuservice - server for gpu stats and other gpu related services
+type gpuservice, domain;
diff --git a/public/hal_bootctl.te b/public/hal_bootctl.te
index 2491734..be9975f 100644
--- a/public/hal_bootctl.te
+++ b/public/hal_bootctl.te
@@ -3,5 +3,3 @@
binder_call(hal_bootctl_server, hal_bootctl_client)
hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_bootctl, hal_bootctl_hwservice)
-
-dontaudit hal_bootctl self:global_capability_class_set sys_rawio;
diff --git a/public/healthd.te b/public/healthd.te
index a383dcf..5fe4add 100644
--- a/public/healthd.te
+++ b/public/healthd.te
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
allow healthd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_tty_config };
allow healthd self:global_capability_class_set sys_boot;
+dontaudit healthd self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
allow healthd self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
diff --git a/public/init.te b/public/init.te
index 54125ac..02302b2 100644
--- a/public/init.te
+++ b/public/init.te
@@ -173,6 +173,7 @@
file_type
-app_data_file
-exec_type
+ -gsi_data_file
-iorapd_data_file
-keystore_data_file
-misc_logd_file
@@ -189,6 +190,7 @@
file_type
-app_data_file
-exec_type
+ -gsi_data_file
-iorapd_data_file
-keystore_data_file
-misc_logd_file
@@ -206,6 +208,7 @@
file_type
-app_data_file
-exec_type
+ -gsi_data_file
-iorapd_data_file
-keystore_data_file
-misc_logd_file
@@ -223,6 +226,7 @@
-apex_mnt_dir
-app_data_file
-exec_type
+ -gsi_data_file
-iorapd_data_file
-keystore_data_file
-misc_logd_file
@@ -308,6 +312,7 @@
# init access to /proc.
r_dir_file(init, proc_net_type)
+allow init proc_filesystems:file r_file_perms;
userdebug_or_eng(`
# Overlayfs workdir write access check during mount to permit remount,rw
diff --git a/public/installd.te b/public/installd.te
index ccf28ec..e767b25 100644
--- a/public/installd.te
+++ b/public/installd.te
@@ -166,4 +166,10 @@
# only system_server, installd and dumpstate may interact with installd over binder
neverallow { domain -system_server -dumpstate -installd } installd_service:service_manager find;
neverallow { domain -system_server -dumpstate } installd:binder call;
-neverallow installd { domain -system_server -servicemanager userdebug_or_eng(`-su') }:binder call;
+neverallow installd {
+ domain
+ -ashmemd
+ -system_server
+ -servicemanager
+ userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+}:binder call;
diff --git a/public/property.te b/public/property.te
index 6cc67ed..8883ff8 100644
--- a/public/property.te
+++ b/public/property.te
@@ -74,10 +74,12 @@
type system_boot_reason_prop, property_type;
type system_prop, property_type, core_property_type;
type system_radio_prop, property_type, core_property_type;
+type system_trace_prop, property_type;
type test_boot_reason_prop, property_type;
type test_harness_prop, property_type;
type time_prop, property_type;
type traced_enabled_prop, property_type;
+type use_memfd_prop, property_type;
type vold_prop, property_type, core_property_type;
type wifi_log_prop, property_type, log_property_type;
type wifi_prop, property_type;
@@ -440,6 +442,7 @@
-system_boot_reason_prop
-system_prop
-system_radio_prop
+ -system_trace_prop
-test_boot_reason_prop
-test_harness_prop
-time_prop
diff --git a/public/property_contexts b/public/property_contexts
index e7cddee..836b2a4 100644
--- a/public/property_contexts
+++ b/public/property_contexts
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
persist.sys.dalvik.vm.lib.2 u:object_r:exported2_system_prop:s0 exact string
persist.sys.media.avsync u:object_r:exported2_system_prop:s0 exact bool
persist.sys.hdmi.keep_awake u:object_r:exported2_system_prop:s0 exact bool
+persist.sys.sf.color_mode u:object_r:exported2_system_prop:s0 exact int
persist.sys.sf.color_saturation u:object_r:exported2_system_prop:s0 exact string
persist.sys.sf.native_mode u:object_r:exported2_system_prop:s0 exact int
pm.dexopt.ab-ota u:object_r:exported_pm_prop:s0 exact string
@@ -245,6 +246,7 @@
ro.secure u:object_r:exported_secure_prop:s0 exact int
service.bootanim.exit u:object_r:exported_system_prop:s0 exact int
sys.boot_from_charger_mode u:object_r:exported_system_prop:s0 exact int
+sys.use_memfd u:object_r:use_memfd_prop:s0 exact bool
vold.decrypt u:object_r:exported_vold_prop:s0 exact string
# vendor-init-settable|public-readable
diff --git a/public/radio.te b/public/radio.te
index 8a8bef3..4527707 100644
--- a/public/radio.te
+++ b/public/radio.te
@@ -35,8 +35,10 @@
allow radio app_api_service:service_manager find;
allow radio system_api_service:service_manager find;
allow radio timedetector_service:service_manager find;
-allow radio timezonedetector_service:service_manager find;
# Perform HwBinder IPC.
hwbinder_use(radio)
hal_client_domain(radio, hal_telephony)
+
+# Used by TelephonyManager
+allow radio proc_cmdline:file r_file_perms;
diff --git a/public/service.te b/public/service.te
index 3d5b41c..e3721b7 100644
--- a/public/service.te
+++ b/public/service.te
@@ -165,7 +165,6 @@
type telecom_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type timedetector_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type timezone_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
-type timezonedetector_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type trust_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type tv_input_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type uimode_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
diff --git a/public/update_engine_common.te b/public/update_engine_common.te
index 078a41b..b55f4bc 100644
--- a/public/update_engine_common.te
+++ b/public/update_engine_common.te
@@ -73,3 +73,6 @@
# get physical block device to map logical partitions on device mapper
allow update_engine_common block_device:dir r_dir_perms;
+
+# Allow update_engine_common to write to statsd socket.
+unix_socket_send(update_engine_common, statsdw, statsd)
diff --git a/public/update_verifier.te b/public/update_verifier.te
index da2eaf8..0a9090c 100644
--- a/public/update_verifier.te
+++ b/public/update_verifier.te
@@ -29,3 +29,8 @@
# Use Boot Control HAL
hal_client_domain(update_verifier, hal_bootctl)
+
+# Access Checkpoint commands over binder
+allow update_verifier vold_service:service_manager find;
+binder_call(update_verifier, servicemanager)
+binder_call(update_verifier, vold)
diff --git a/public/vendor_init.te b/public/vendor_init.te
index b7c60c6..ba0941e 100644
--- a/public/vendor_init.te
+++ b/public/vendor_init.te
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
-unlabeled
-vendor_file_type
-vold_metadata_file
+ -gsi_metadata_file
}:dir { create search getattr open read setattr ioctl write add_name remove_name rmdir relabelfrom };
allow vendor_init unlabeled:{ dir notdevfile_class_set } { getattr relabelfrom };
@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@
-unlabeled
-vendor_file_type
-vold_metadata_file
+ -gsi_metadata_file
}:file { create getattr open read write setattr relabelfrom unlink map };
allow vendor_init {
@@ -76,6 +78,7 @@
-unlabeled
-vendor_file_type
-vold_metadata_file
+ -gsi_metadata_file
}:{ sock_file fifo_file } { create getattr open read setattr relabelfrom unlink };
allow vendor_init {
@@ -87,6 +90,7 @@
-unlabeled
-vendor_file_type
-vold_metadata_file
+ -gsi_metadata_file
}:lnk_file { create getattr setattr relabelfrom unlink };
allow vendor_init {
@@ -97,6 +101,7 @@
-system_file_type
-vendor_file_type
-vold_metadata_file
+ -gsi_metadata_file
}:dir_file_class_set relabelto;
allow vendor_init dev_type:dir create_dir_perms;
diff --git a/public/vold.te b/public/vold.te
index 14286c4..d201257 100644
--- a/public/vold.te
+++ b/public/vold.te
@@ -238,11 +238,17 @@
# vold might need to search or mount /mnt/vendor/*
allow vold mnt_vendor_file:dir search;
+dontaudit vold self:global_capability_class_set sys_resource;
+
+# vold needs to know whether we're running a GSI.
+allow vold gsi_metadata_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+allow vold gsi_metadata_file:file r_file_perms;
+
neverallow {
domain
-vold
-vold_prepare_subdirs
-} vold_data_file:dir ~{ open create read getattr setattr search relabelto ioctl };
+} vold_data_file:dir ~{ open create read getattr setattr search relabelfrom relabelto ioctl };
neverallow {
domain
@@ -282,9 +288,10 @@
neverallow { domain -vold -init } restorecon_prop:property_service set;
# Only system_server and vdc can interact with vold over binder
-neverallow { domain -system_server -vdc -vold } vold_service:service_manager find;
+neverallow { domain -system_server -vdc -vold -update_verifier } vold_service:service_manager find;
neverallow vold {
domain
+ -ashmemd
-hal_health_storage_server
-hal_keymaster_server
-hal_system_suspend_server
diff --git a/vendor/file_contexts b/vendor/file_contexts
index 303f001..8890ca0 100644
--- a/vendor/file_contexts
+++ b/vendor/file_contexts
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@
/(vendor|sustem/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.confirmationui@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_confirmationui_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.contexthub@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_contexthub_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.drm@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_drm_default_exec:s0
-/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.cas@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_cas_default_exec:s0
-/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.cas@1\.0-service-lazy u:object_r:hal_cas_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.cas@1\.[01]-service u:object_r:hal_cas_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.cas@1\.[01]-service-lazy u:object_r:hal_cas_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.dumpstate@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_dumpstate_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.gatekeeper@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_gatekeeper_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.gnss@[0-9]\.[0-9]-service u:object_r:hal_gnss_default_exec:s0