Merge "Add policies for permission APEX data directory."
diff --git a/private/access_vectors b/private/access_vectors
index cd1ad12..c143c0e 100644
--- a/private/access_vectors
+++ b/private/access_vectors
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@
common cap2
{
mac_override # unused by SELinux
- mac_admin # unused by SELinux
+ mac_admin
syslog
wake_alarm
block_suspend
diff --git a/private/app_zygote.te b/private/app_zygote.te
index c111ac8..5f20086 100644
--- a/private/app_zygote.te
+++ b/private/app_zygote.te
@@ -70,6 +70,9 @@
allow app_zygote system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow app_zygote system_data_file:file { getattr read map };
+# Send unsolicited message to system_server
+unix_socket_send(app_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
+
#####
##### Neverallow
#####
@@ -136,6 +139,7 @@
domain
-app_zygote
-logd
+ -system_server
userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
userdebug_or_eng(`-heapprofd')
}:unix_dgram_socket *;
diff --git a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
index c62edd5..60e6fb1 100644
--- a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.cil
@@ -1206,7 +1206,9 @@
(typeattributeset exported_bluetooth_prop_29_0 (exported_bluetooth_prop))
(typeattributeset exported_config_prop_29_0 (exported_config_prop))
(typeattributeset exported_dalvik_prop_29_0 (exported_dalvik_prop))
-(typeattributeset exported_default_prop_29_0 (exported_default_prop))
+(typeattributeset exported_default_prop_29_0
+ ( exported_default_prop
+ vndk_prop))
(typeattributeset exported_dumpstate_prop_29_0 (exported_dumpstate_prop))
(typeattributeset exported_ffs_prop_29_0 (exported_ffs_prop))
(typeattributeset exported_fingerprint_prop_29_0 (exported_fingerprint_prop))
diff --git a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
index 92cca46..3a5be19 100644
--- a/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
+++ b/private/compat/29.0/29.0.ignore.cil
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
gmscore_app
hal_can_bus_hwservice
hal_can_controller_hwservice
+ hal_identity_hwservice
+ hal_power_service
hal_rebootescrow_service
hal_tv_tuner_hwservice
hal_vibrator_service
@@ -57,11 +59,14 @@
ota_prop
art_apex_dir
service_manager_service
+ simpleperf
soundtrigger_middleware_service
sysfs_dm_verity
+ system_config_service
system_group_file
system_jvmti_agent_prop
system_passwd_file
+ system_unsolzygote_socket
tethering_service
timezonedetector_service
usb_serial_device
@@ -73,5 +78,4 @@
vendor_boringssl_self_test
vendor_install_recovery
vendor_install_recovery_exec
- vndk_prop
virtual_ab_prop))
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index f3b18df..c98909e 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -338,6 +338,7 @@
/system/bin/watchdogd u:object_r:watchdogd_exec:s0
/system/bin/apexd u:object_r:apexd_exec:s0
/system/bin/gsid u:object_r:gsid_exec:s0
+/system/bin/simpleperf u:object_r:simpleperf_exec:s0
/system/bin/simpleperf_app_runner u:object_r:simpleperf_app_runner_exec:s0
/system/bin/notify_traceur\.sh u:object_r:notify_traceur_exec:s0
/system/bin/migrate_legacy_obb_data\.sh u:object_r:migrate_legacy_obb_data_exec:s0
@@ -464,6 +465,7 @@
/data/backup(/.*)? u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
/data/secure/backup(/.*)? u:object_r:backup_data_file:s0
/data/system/ndebugsocket u:object_r:system_ndebug_socket:s0
+/data/system/unsolzygotesocket u:object_r:system_unsolzygote_socket:s0
/data/drm(/.*)? u:object_r:drm_data_file:s0
/data/resource-cache(/.*)? u:object_r:resourcecache_data_file:s0
/data/dalvik-cache(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
diff --git a/private/gsid.te b/private/gsid.te
index 4771311..daff5c6 100644
--- a/private/gsid.te
+++ b/private/gsid.te
@@ -126,6 +126,7 @@
gsi_data_file
ota_image_data_file
}:file create_file_perms;
+allow gsid gsi_metadata_file:dir create;
allowxperm gsid {
gsi_data_file
ota_image_data_file
diff --git a/private/hwservice_contexts b/private/hwservice_contexts
index d72231b..96b2760 100644
--- a/private/hwservice_contexts
+++ b/private/hwservice_contexts
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
android.hardware.camera.provider::ICameraProvider u:object_r:hal_camera_hwservice:s0
android.hardware.configstore::ISurfaceFlingerConfigs u:object_r:hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:s0
android.hardware.confirmationui::IConfirmationUI u:object_r:hal_confirmationui_hwservice:s0
+android.hardware.identity::IIdentityCredentialStore u:object_r:hal_identity_hwservice:s0
android.hardware.contexthub::IContexthub u:object_r:hal_contexthub_hwservice:s0
android.hardware.cas::IMediaCasService u:object_r:hal_cas_hwservice:s0
android.hardware.drm::ICryptoFactory u:object_r:hal_drm_hwservice:s0
diff --git a/private/llkd.te b/private/llkd.te
index 385f930..f218dec 100644
--- a/private/llkd.te
+++ b/private/llkd.te
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set kill;
userdebug_or_eng(`
- allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set sys_ptrace;
+ allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set { sys_ptrace sys_admin };
allow llkd self:global_capability_class_set { dac_override dac_read_search };
')
diff --git a/private/priv_app.te b/private/priv_app.te
index 161b245..6983840 100644
--- a/private/priv_app.te
+++ b/private/priv_app.te
@@ -56,15 +56,6 @@
# /cache is a symlink to /data/cache on some devices. Allow reading the link.
allow priv_app cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-# Write to /data/ota_package for OTA packages.
-allow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
- auditallow priv_app ota_package_file:dir rw_dir_perms;
- auditallow priv_app ota_package_file:file create_file_perms;
-')
-
# Access to /data/media.
allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow priv_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
@@ -81,13 +72,6 @@
allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:dir r_dir_perms;
allow priv_app { apk_tmp_file apk_private_tmp_file }:file r_file_perms;
-# b/18504118: Allow reads from /data/anr/traces.txt
-allow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-# b/142672293: No other priv-app should need this allow rule now that GMS core runs in its own domain.
-userdebug_or_eng(`
- auditallow priv_app anr_data_file:file r_file_perms;
-')
-
# For AppFuse.
allow priv_app vold:fd use;
allow priv_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write };
diff --git a/private/property_contexts b/private/property_contexts
index faa425b..625bf37 100644
--- a/private/property_contexts
+++ b/private/property_contexts
@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
security.perf_harden u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
service.adb.root u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
service.adb.tcp.port u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
+persist.adb.wifi. u:object_r:shell_prop:s0
persist.audio. u:object_r:audio_prop:s0
persist.bluetooth. u:object_r:bluetooth_prop:s0
diff --git a/private/runas_app.te b/private/runas_app.te
index e6fd953..c1b354a 100644
--- a/private/runas_app.te
+++ b/private/runas_app.te
@@ -16,3 +16,17 @@
# Allow lldb/ndk-gdb/simpleperf to ptrace attach to debuggable app processes.
allow runas_app untrusted_app_all:process { ptrace signal sigstop };
allow runas_app untrusted_app_all:unix_stream_socket connectto;
+
+# Allow executing system image simpleperf without a domain transition.
+allow runas_app simpleperf_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Suppress denial logspam when simpleperf is trying to find a matching process
+# by scanning /proc/<pid>/cmdline files. The /proc/<pid> directories are within
+# the same domain as their respective process, most of which this domain is not
+# allowed to see.
+dontaudit runas_app domain:dir search;
+
+# Allow runas_app to call perf_event_open for profiling debuggable app
+# processes, but not the whole system.
+allow runas_app self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
+neverallow runas_app self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
diff --git a/private/service_contexts b/private/service_contexts
index 26d9f5c..641798a 100644
--- a/private/service_contexts
+++ b/private/service_contexts
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
-android.hardware.rebootescrow.IRebootEscrow/default u:object_r:hal_rebootescrow_service:s0
-android.hardware.vibrator.IVibrator/default u:object_r:hal_vibrator_service:s0
+android.hardware.power.IPower/default u:object_r:hal_power_service:s0
+android.hardware.rebootescrow.IRebootEscrow/default u:object_r:hal_rebootescrow_service:s0
+android.hardware.vibrator.IVibrator/default u:object_r:hal_vibrator_service:s0
accessibility u:object_r:accessibility_service:s0
account u:object_r:account_service:s0
@@ -201,6 +202,7 @@
storagestats u:object_r:storagestats_service:s0
SurfaceFlinger u:object_r:surfaceflinger_service:s0
suspend_control u:object_r:system_suspend_control_service:s0
+system_config u:object_r:system_config_service:s0
system_update u:object_r:system_update_service:s0
task u:object_r:task_service:s0
telecom u:object_r:telecom_service:s0
diff --git a/private/shell.te b/private/shell.te
index 975fde4..8bd4e1d 100644
--- a/private/shell.te
+++ b/private/shell.te
@@ -83,3 +83,11 @@
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY
FS_IOC_GET_ENCRYPTION_POLICY_EX
};
+
+# Allow shell to execute simpleperf without a domain transition.
+allow shell simpleperf_exec:file rx_file_perms;
+
+# Allow shell to call perf_event_open for profiling other shell processes, but
+# not the whole system.
+allow shell self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
+neverallow shell self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
diff --git a/private/simpleperf.te b/private/simpleperf.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0639c11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/private/simpleperf.te
@@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
+# Domain used when running /system/bin/simpleperf to profile a specific app.
+# Entered either by the app itself exec-ing the binary, or through
+# simpleperf_app_runner (with shell as its origin). Certain other domains
+# (runas_app, shell) can also exec this binary without a domain transition.
+typeattribute simpleperf coredomain;
+type simpleperf_exec, system_file_type, exec_type, file_type;
+
+domain_auto_trans({ untrusted_app_all -runas_app }, simpleperf_exec, simpleperf)
+
+# When running in this domain, simpleperf is scoped to profiling an individual
+# app. The necessary MAC permissions for profiling are more maintainable and
+# consistent if simpleperf is marked as an app domain as well (as, for example,
+# it will then see the same set of system libraries as the app).
+app_domain(simpleperf)
+untrusted_app_domain(simpleperf)
+
+# Allow ptrace attach to the target app, for reading JIT debug info (using
+# process_vm_readv) during unwinding and symbolization.
+allow simpleperf untrusted_app_all:process ptrace;
+
+# Allow using perf_event_open syscall for profiling the target app.
+allow simpleperf self:perf_event { open read write kernel };
+
+# Allow /proc/<pid> access for the target app (for example, when trying to
+# discover it by cmdline).
+r_dir_file(simpleperf, untrusted_app_all)
+
+# Suppress denial logspam when simpleperf is trying to find a matching process
+# by scanning /proc/<pid>/cmdline files. The /proc/<pid> directories are within
+# the same domain as their respective processes, most of which this domain is
+# not allowed to see.
+dontaudit simpleperf domain:dir search;
+
+# Neverallows:
+
+# Profiling must be confined to the scope of an individual app.
+neverallow simpleperf self:perf_event ~{ open read write kernel };
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 4bcb104..5c50fa4 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@
# Create a socket for connections from crash_dump.
type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_ndebug_socket "ndebugsocket";
+# Create a socket for connections from zygotes.
+type_transition system_server system_data_file:sock_file system_unsolzygote_socket "unsolzygotesocket";
+
allow system_server zygote_tmpfs:file read;
allow system_server appdomain_tmpfs:file { getattr map read write };
@@ -657,6 +660,9 @@
# Create a socket for connections from debuggerd.
allow system_server system_ndebug_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
+# Create a socket for connections from zygotes.
+allow system_server system_unsolzygote_socket:sock_file create_file_perms;
+
# Manage cache files.
allow system_server cache_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow system_server { cache_file cache_recovery_file }:dir { relabelfrom create_dir_perms };
@@ -831,6 +837,9 @@
allow system_server adbd:fd use;
allow system_server adbd:unix_stream_socket { getattr getopt ioctl read write shutdown };
+# Read persist.adb.wifi. properties
+get_prop(system_server, shell_prop)
+
# Allow invoking tools like "timeout"
allow system_server toolbox_exec:file rx_file_perms;
@@ -861,6 +870,7 @@
r_dir_file(system_server, proc_net_type)
r_dir_file(system_server, proc_qtaguid_stat)
allow system_server {
+ proc_cmdline
proc_loadavg
proc_meminfo
proc_pagetypeinfo
@@ -971,6 +981,16 @@
# Only allow crash_dump to connect to system_ndebug_socket.
neverallow { domain -init -system_server -crash_dump } system_ndebug_socket:sock_file { open write };
+# Only allow zygotes to connect to system_unsolzygote_socket.
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -init
+ -system_server
+ -zygote
+ -app_zygote
+ -webview_zygote
+} system_unsolzygote_socket:sock_file { open write };
+
# Only allow init, system_server, flags_health_check to set properties for server configurable flags
neverallow {
domain
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app_all.te b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
index d8e0b14..769ddb0 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app_all.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app_all.te
@@ -168,3 +168,8 @@
allow untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file rw_file_perms;
allowxperm untrusted_app_all debugfs_kcov:file ioctl { KCOV_INIT_TRACE KCOV_ENABLE KCOV_DISABLE };
')
+
+# Allow signalling simpleperf domain, which is the domain that the simpleperf
+# profiler runs as when executed by the app. The signals are used to control
+# the profiler (which would be profiling the app that is sending the signal).
+allow untrusted_app_all simpleperf:process signal;
diff --git a/private/webview_zygote.te b/private/webview_zygote.te
index 8fe9733..c618253 100644
--- a/private/webview_zygote.te
+++ b/private/webview_zygote.te
@@ -77,6 +77,9 @@
allow webview_zygote system_data_file:lnk_file r_file_perms;
+# Send unsolicited message to system_server
+unix_socket_send(webview_zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
+
#####
##### Neverallow
#####
diff --git a/private/zygote.te b/private/zygote.te
index 6ad6db4..da06837 100644
--- a/private/zygote.te
+++ b/private/zygote.te
@@ -176,6 +176,9 @@
# Allow zygote to use ashmem fds from system_server.
allow zygote system_server:fd use;
+# Send unsolicited message to system_server
+unix_socket_send(zygote, system_unsolzygote, system_server)
+
###
### neverallow rules
###
diff --git a/public/attributes b/public/attributes
index 0fd2be2..dcbe9c0 100644
--- a/public/attributes
+++ b/public/attributes
@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@
hal_attribute(graphics_composer);
hal_attribute(health);
hal_attribute(health_storage);
+hal_attribute(identity);
hal_attribute(input_classifier);
hal_attribute(ir);
hal_attribute(keymaster);
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index 863c167..feb0435 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -1173,10 +1173,11 @@
-zygote
} shell:process { transition dyntransition };
-# Only domains spawned from zygote, runas and simpleperf_app_runner may have the appdomain
-# attribute.
+# Only domains spawned from zygote, runas and simpleperf_app_runner may have
+# the appdomain attribute. simpleperf is excluded as a domain transitioned to
+# when running an app-scoped profiling session.
neverallow { domain -simpleperf_app_runner -runas -app_zygote -webview_zygote -zygote } {
- appdomain -shell userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
+ appdomain -shell -simpleperf userdebug_or_eng(`-su')
}:process { transition dyntransition };
# Minimize read access to shell- or app-writable symlinks.
diff --git a/public/file.te b/public/file.te
index 7d1406f..ef30fc7 100644
--- a/public/file.te
+++ b/public/file.te
@@ -453,6 +453,7 @@
type statsdw_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
type system_wpa_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, coredomain_socket;
type system_ndebug_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
+type system_unsolzygote_socket, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
type tombstoned_crash_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject;
type tombstoned_java_trace_socket, file_type, mlstrustedobject;
type tombstoned_intercept_socket, file_type, coredomain_socket;
diff --git a/public/hal_identity.te b/public/hal_identity.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a8df186
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/hal_identity.te
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+# HwBinder IPC from client to server
+binder_call(hal_identity_client, hal_identity_server)
+
+hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_identity, hal_identity_hwservice)
diff --git a/public/hal_power.te b/public/hal_power.te
index 028011a..2c80a51 100644
--- a/public/hal_power.te
+++ b/public/hal_power.te
@@ -3,3 +3,7 @@
binder_call(hal_power_server, hal_power_client)
hal_attribute_hwservice(hal_power, hal_power_hwservice)
+
+add_service(hal_power_server, hal_power_service)
+binder_call(hal_power_server, servicemanager)
+allow hal_power_client hal_power_service:service_manager find;
diff --git a/public/hwservice.te b/public/hwservice.te
index 2cd582b..5085ea5 100644
--- a/public/hwservice.te
+++ b/public/hwservice.te
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
type hal_graphics_composer_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
type hal_health_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
type hal_health_storage_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
+type hal_identity_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
type hal_input_classifier_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
type hal_ir_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
type hal_keymaster_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, protected_hwservice;
diff --git a/public/property.te b/public/property.te
index 2cf043a..7a1e4dd 100644
--- a/public/property.te
+++ b/public/property.te
@@ -66,7 +66,6 @@
system_restricted_prop(system_boot_reason_prop)
system_restricted_prop(system_jvmti_agent_prop)
system_restricted_prop(userspace_reboot_exported_prop)
-system_restricted_prop(vndk_prop)
compatible_property_only(`
# DO NOT ADD ANY PROPERTIES HERE
@@ -146,6 +145,7 @@
system_public_prop(userspace_reboot_config_prop)
system_public_prop(vehicle_hal_prop)
system_public_prop(vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
+system_public_prop(vndk_prop)
system_public_prop(wifi_log_prop)
system_public_prop(wifi_prop)
diff --git a/public/property_contexts b/public/property_contexts
index 8414e87..0a000ec 100644
--- a/public/property_contexts
+++ b/public/property_contexts
@@ -392,8 +392,8 @@
ro.vendor.build.date.utc u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
ro.vendor.build.fingerprint u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
ro.vendor.build.version.incremental u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
-ro.vndk.lite u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
-ro.vndk.version u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
+ro.vndk.lite u:object_r:vndk_prop:s0 exact bool
+ro.vndk.version u:object_r:vndk_prop:s0 exact string
ro.vts.coverage u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact int
wifi.active.interface u:object_r:exported_wifi_prop:s0 exact string
wifi.concurrent.interface u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact string
@@ -441,4 +441,6 @@
ro.surface_flinger.refresh_rate_switching u:object_r:exported_default_prop:s0 exact bool
# Binder cache properties. These are world-readable
-binder.cache_key.has_system_feature u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.has_system_feature u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.is_interactive u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
+cache_key.is_power_save_mode u:object_r:binder_cache_system_server_prop:s0
diff --git a/public/service.te b/public/service.te
index 67128d2..d9bf83d 100644
--- a/public/service.te
+++ b/public/service.te
@@ -166,6 +166,7 @@
type slice_service, app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type statusbar_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type storagestats_service, app_api_service, ephemeral_app_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
+type system_config_service, system_api_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type system_update_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type soundtrigger_middleware_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
type task_service, system_server_service, service_manager_type;
@@ -204,6 +205,7 @@
### HAL Services
###
+type hal_power_service, vendor_service, service_manager_type;
type hal_rebootescrow_service, vendor_service, service_manager_type;
type hal_vibrator_service, vendor_service, service_manager_type;
diff --git a/public/simpleperf.te b/public/simpleperf.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..218fee7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/public/simpleperf.te
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+type simpleperf, domain;
diff --git a/public/su.te b/public/su.te
index fa32a4b..16ace6e 100644
--- a/public/su.te
+++ b/public/su.te
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
dontaudit su postinstall_file:filesystem *;
dontaudit su domain:bpf *;
dontaudit su unlabeled:vsock_socket *;
+ dontaudit su self:perf_event *;
# VTS tests run in the permissive su domain on debug builds, but the HALs
# being tested run in enforcing mode. Because hal_foo_server is enforcing
diff --git a/public/te_macros b/public/te_macros
index f065a21..b69c800 100644
--- a/public/te_macros
+++ b/public/te_macros
@@ -171,16 +171,17 @@
# Label tmpfs objects for all apps.
type_transition $1 tmpfs:file appdomain_tmpfs;
allow $1 appdomain_tmpfs:file { execute getattr map read write };
-neverallow { $1 -runas_app -shell } { domain -$1 }:file no_rw_file_perms;
-neverallow { appdomain -runas_app -shell -$1 } $1:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow { $1 -runas_app -shell -simpleperf } { domain -$1 }:file no_rw_file_perms;
+neverallow { appdomain -runas_app -shell -simpleperf -$1 } $1:file no_rw_file_perms;
# The Android security model guarantees the confidentiality and integrity
# of application data and execution state. Ptrace bypasses those
-# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components
-# to apps. Crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to
-# produce stack traces. llkd is excluded, as it needs to inspect
-# the kernel stack for live lock conditions. runas_app is excluded, as it can
-# only access debuggable apps.
-neverallow { domain -$1 -crash_dump userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd') -runas_app } $1:process ptrace;
+# confidentiality guarantees. Disallow ptrace access from system components to
+# apps. crash_dump is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to produce stack
+# traces. runas_app is excluded, as it operates only on debuggable apps.
+# simpleperf is excluded, as it operates only on debuggable or profileable
+# apps. llkd is excluded, as it needs ptrace access to inspect stack traces for
+# live lock conditions.
+neverallow { domain -$1 -crash_dump userdebug_or_eng(`-llkd') -runas_app -simpleperf } $1:process ptrace;
')
#####################################
diff --git a/public/vendor_init.te b/public/vendor_init.te
index eb93d13..6a20bf2 100644
--- a/public/vendor_init.te
+++ b/public/vendor_init.te
@@ -225,7 +225,6 @@
-module_sdkextensions_prop
-userspace_reboot_exported_prop
-userspace_reboot_prop
- -vndk_prop
})
')
@@ -262,6 +261,7 @@
set_prop(vendor_init, vehicle_hal_prop)
set_prop(vendor_init, vendor_default_prop)
set_prop(vendor_init, vendor_security_patch_level_prop)
+set_prop(vendor_init, vndk_prop)
set_prop(vendor_init, wifi_log_prop)
get_prop(vendor_init, exported2_radio_prop)
diff --git a/vendor/file_contexts b/vendor/file_contexts
index a3726ca..e0fcfcd 100644
--- a/vendor/file_contexts
+++ b/vendor/file_contexts
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.health@2\.0-service u:object_r:hal_health_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.health@2\.1-service u:object_r:hal_health_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.health\.storage@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_health_storage_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.identity@1\.0-service.example u:object_r:hal_identity_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.input\.classifier@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_input_classifier_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.ir@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_ir_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.keymaster@3\.0-service u:object_r:hal_keymaster_default_exec:s0
@@ -49,10 +50,12 @@
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.nfc@1\.2-service u:object_r:hal_nfc_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.media\.omx@1\.0-service u:object_r:mediacodec_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.power@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_power_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.power-service.example u:object_r:hal_power_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.power\.stats@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_power_stats_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.radio\.config@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_radio_config_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.radio@1\.2-radio-service u:object_r:hal_radio_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.radio@1\.2-sap-service u:object_r:hal_radio_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.rebootescrow-service\.default u:object_r:hal_rebootescrow_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.sensors@[0-9]\.[0-9]-service(\.multihal)? u:object_r:hal_sensors_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.secure_element@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_secure_element_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/rild u:object_r:rild_exec:s0
@@ -61,6 +64,7 @@
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.tv\.input@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_tv_input_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.tv\.tuner@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_tv_tuner_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.usb@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_usb_default_exec:s0
+/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.usb\.gadget@1\.1-service u:object_r:hal_usb_gadget_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.vibrator@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_vibrator_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.vibrator-service.example u:object_r:hal_vibrator_default_exec:s0
/(vendor|system/vendor)/bin/hw/android\.hardware\.vr@1\.0-service u:object_r:hal_vr_default_exec:s0
diff --git a/vendor/hal_identity_default.te b/vendor/hal_identity_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..7f84687
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_identity_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_identity_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_identity_default, hal_identity)
+
+type hal_identity_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_identity_default)
diff --git a/vendor/hal_usb_gadget_default.te b/vendor/hal_usb_gadget_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f1486b9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_usb_gadget_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_usb_gadget_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_usb_gadget_default, hal_usb_gadget)
+
+type hal_usb_gadget_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_usb_gadget_default)