diff --git a/private/app.te b/private/app.te
index f127b98..508b60c 100644
--- a/private/app.te
+++ b/private/app.te
@@ -69,9 +69,6 @@
 # Communicate with surfaceflinger.
 allow appdomain surfaceflinger:unix_stream_socket { read write setopt getattr getopt shutdown };
 
-# Query whether a Surface supports wide color
-allow { appdomain -isolated_app } hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:hwservice_manager find;
-
 # App sandbox file accesses.
 allow { appdomain -isolated_app } app_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
 allow { appdomain -isolated_app } app_data_file:notdevfile_class_set create_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/app_neverallows.te b/private/app_neverallows.te
index b050e52..ecca70a 100644
--- a/private/app_neverallows.te
+++ b/private/app_neverallows.te
@@ -140,20 +140,63 @@
 #    incidence rate of security issues than system/core components and have
 #    access to lower layes of the stack (all the way down to hardware) thus
 #    increasing opportunities for bypassing the Android security model.
+#
+# Safe services include:
+# - same process services: because they by definition run in the process
+#   of the client and thus have the same access as the client domain in which
+#   the process runs
+# - coredomain_hwservice: are considered safe because they do not pose risks
+#   associated with reason #2 above.
+# - hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:  becuase it has specifically been
+#   designed for use by any domain.
+# - hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice: because these operations are also offered
+#   by surfaceflinger Binder service, which apps are permitted to access
+# - hal_omx_hwservice: because this is a HwBinder version of the mediacodec
+#   Binder service which apps were permitted to access.
 neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
   hwservice_manager_type
-  # Same process services are safe because they by definition run in the process
-  # of the client and thus have the same access as the client domain in which
-  # the process runs
   -same_process_hwservice
-  -coredomain_hwservice # neverallows for coredomain HwBinder services are below
-  -hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs # Designed for use by any domain
-  # These operations are also offered by surfaceflinger Binder service which
-  # apps are permitted to access
+  -coredomain_hwservice
+  -hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs
   -hal_graphics_allocator_hwservice
-  # HwBinder version of mediacodec Binder service which apps were permitted to
-  # access
   -hal_omx_hwservice
+  -untrusted_app_visible_hwservice
+}:hwservice_manager find;
+neverallow untrusted_app_visible_hwservice unlabeled:service_manager list; #TODO: b/62658302
+# Make sure that the following services are never accessible by untrusted_apps
+neverallow all_untrusted_apps {
+  default_android_hwservice
+  hal_audio_hwservice
+  hal_bluetooth_hwservice
+  hal_bootctl_hwservice
+  hal_camera_hwservice
+  hal_contexthub_hwservice
+  hal_drm_hwservice
+  hal_dumpstate_hwservice
+  hal_fingerprint_hwservice
+  hal_gatekeeper_hwservice
+  hal_gnss_hwservice
+  hal_graphics_composer_hwservice
+  hal_health_hwservice
+  hal_ir_hwservice
+  hal_keymaster_hwservice
+  hal_light_hwservice
+  hal_memtrack_hwservice
+  hal_nfc_hwservice
+  hal_oemlock_hwservice
+  hal_power_hwservice
+  hal_sensors_hwservice
+  hal_telephony_hwservice
+  hal_thermal_hwservice
+  hal_tv_cec_hwservice
+  hal_tv_input_hwservice
+  hal_usb_hwservice
+  hal_vibrator_hwservice
+  hal_vr_hwservice
+  hal_weaver_hwservice
+  hal_wifi_hwservice
+  hal_wifi_supplicant_hwservice
+  hidl_base_hwservice
 }:hwservice_manager find;
 # HwBinder services offered by core components (as opposed to vendor components)
 # are considered somewhat safer due to point #2 above.
diff --git a/private/dexoptanalyzer.te b/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
index db81d0d..1c23f57 100644
--- a/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
+++ b/private/dexoptanalyzer.te
@@ -21,6 +21,10 @@
 # package manager.
 allow dexoptanalyzer app_data_file:dir { getattr search };
 allow dexoptanalyzer app_data_file:file r_file_perms;
+# dexoptanalyzer calls access(2) with W_OK flag on app data. We can use the
+# "dontaudit...audit_access" policy line to suppress the audit access without
+# suppressing denial on actual access.
+dontaudit dexoptanalyzer app_data_file:dir audit_access;
 
 # Allow testing /data/user/0 which symlinks to /data/data
 allow dexoptanalyzer system_data_file:lnk_file { getattr };
diff --git a/private/surfaceflinger.te b/private/surfaceflinger.te
index 3595ee4..b33035e 100644
--- a/private/surfaceflinger.te
+++ b/private/surfaceflinger.te
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
 hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_graphics_allocator)
 hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_graphics_composer)
 hal_client_domain(surfaceflinger, hal_configstore)
-allow surfaceflinger hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:hwservice_manager find;
 allow surfaceflinger hidl_token_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
 
 # Perform Binder IPC.
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 5e7da2f..4afdf95 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -79,6 +79,9 @@
 # Allow alarmtimers to be set
 allow system_server self:capability2 wake_alarm;
 
+# Create and share netlink_netfilter_sockets for tetheroffload.
+allow system_server self:netlink_netfilter_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
+
 # Use netlink uevent sockets.
 allow system_server self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms_no_ioctl;
 
@@ -177,6 +180,7 @@
 
 # Use HALs
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_allocator)
+hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_configstore)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_contexthub)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_fingerprint)
 hal_client_domain(system_server, hal_gnss)
diff --git a/public/attributes b/public/attributes
index 2b28cf0..1fe3826 100644
--- a/public/attributes
+++ b/public/attributes
@@ -144,6 +144,15 @@
 # TODO(b/36463595)
 attribute vendor_executes_system_violators;
 
+# hwservices that are accessible from untrusted applications
+# WARNING: Use of this attribute should be avoided unless
+# absolutely necessary.  It is a temporary allowance to aid the
+# transition to treble and will be removed in a future platform
+# version, requiring all hwservices that are labeled with this
+# attribute to be submitted to AOSP in order to maintain their
+# app-visibility.
+attribute untrusted_app_visible_hwservice;
+
 # PDX services
 attribute pdx_endpoint_dir_type;
 attribute pdx_endpoint_socket_type;
diff --git a/public/hal_configstore.te b/public/hal_configstore.te
index 4bf6cfd..66a168e 100644
--- a/public/hal_configstore.te
+++ b/public/hal_configstore.te
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 # HwBinder IPC from client to server
 binder_call(hal_configstore_client, hal_configstore_server)
 
+allow hal_configstore_client hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs:hwservice_manager find;
+
 add_hwservice(hal_configstore_server, hal_configstore_ISurfaceFlingerConfigs)
 # As opposed to the rules of most other HALs, the different services exposed by
 # this HAL should be restricted to different clients. Thus, the allow rules for
diff --git a/public/hal_neverallows.te b/public/hal_neverallows.te
index feadcda..fc2b5f6 100644
--- a/public/hal_neverallows.te
+++ b/public/hal_neverallows.te
@@ -8,14 +8,16 @@
   -rild
 } self:capability { net_admin net_raw };
 
-# Unless a HAL's job is to manage network hardware, it should not be
-# using network sockets.
+# Unless a HAL's job is to communicate over the network, or control network
+# hardware, it should not be using network sockets.
 neverallow {
   halserverdomain
+  -hal_tetheroffload_server
   -hal_wifi_server
   -hal_wifi_supplicant_server
   -rild
 } domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
+neverallow hal_tetheroffload_server unlabeled:service_manager list; #TODO: b/62658302
 
 ###
 # HALs are defined as an attribute and so a given domain could hypothetically
diff --git a/public/hal_tetheroffload.te b/public/hal_tetheroffload.te
index a4c21fcd..48d67a2 100644
--- a/public/hal_tetheroffload.te
+++ b/public/hal_tetheroffload.te
@@ -1,3 +1,8 @@
 ## HwBinder IPC from client to server, and callbacks
 binder_call(hal_tetheroffload_client, hal_tetheroffload_server)
 binder_call(hal_tetheroffload_server, hal_tetheroffload_client)
+
+allow hal_tetheroffload_client hal_tetheroffload_hwservice:hwservice_manager find;
+
+# allow the client to pass the server already open netlink sockets
+allow hal_tetheroffload_server hal_tetheroffload_client:netlink_netfilter_socket { getattr read setopt write };
diff --git a/public/hwservice.te b/public/hwservice.te
index c3f3077..bb2c668 100644
--- a/public/hwservice.te
+++ b/public/hwservice.te
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 type hal_renderscript_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type, same_process_hwservice;
 type hal_sensors_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
 type hal_telephony_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
+type hal_tetheroffload_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
 type hal_thermal_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
 type hal_tv_cec_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
 type hal_tv_input_hwservice, hwservice_manager_type;
diff --git a/public/te_macros b/public/te_macros
index d65eb88..2d1ec03 100644
--- a/public/te_macros
+++ b/public/te_macros
@@ -101,6 +101,10 @@
 typeattribute $2 pdx_$1_endpoint_dir_type;
 type pdx_$1_endpoint_socket, pdx_$1_endpoint_socket_type, pdx_endpoint_socket_type, file_type, coredomain_socket, mlstrustedobject, mlstrustedsubject;
 type pdx_$1_channel_socket, pdx_$1_channel_socket_type, pdx_channel_socket_type, coredomain_socket;
+userdebug_or_eng(`
+dontaudit su pdx_$1_endpoint_socket:unix_stream_socket *;
+dontaudit su pdx_$1_channel_socket:unix_stream_socket *;
+')
 ')
 
 #####################################
diff --git a/vendor/hal_tetheroffload_default.te b/vendor/hal_tetheroffload_default.te
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..03c542b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/hal_tetheroffload_default.te
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+type hal_tetheroffload_default, domain;
+hal_server_domain(hal_tetheroffload_default, hal_tetheroffload)
+
+type hal_tetheroffload_default_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
+init_daemon_domain(hal_tetheroffload_default)
diff --git a/vendor/rild.te b/vendor/rild.te
index ea9109b..510a776 100644
--- a/vendor/rild.te
+++ b/vendor/rild.te
@@ -2,7 +2,3 @@
 # public, but conceptually should go with this
 type rild_exec, exec_type, vendor_file_type, file_type;
 init_daemon_domain(rild)
-
-# TODO(b/36613472), TODO(b/36718031): Remove this once rild no longer
-# communicates with non-vendor components over sockets.
-typeattribute rild socket_between_core_and_vendor_violators;