selinux - netd - tighten down bpf policy
bpf programs/maps are now loaded by the bpfloader, not netd
Test: built/installed on crosshatch which uses eBPF - no avc denials
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Change-Id: I1ebd82e6730d62d1966da3c4634ecd78ce703543
diff --git a/private/bpfloader.te b/private/bpfloader.te
index d9b29ce..00d4c79 100644
--- a/private/bpfloader.te
+++ b/private/bpfloader.te
@@ -17,8 +17,8 @@
###
### Neverallow rules
###
-neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf prog_load;
-neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper} *:bpf prog_run;
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader } *:bpf { map_create prog_load };
+neverallow { domain -bpfloader -netd -netutils_wrapper } *:bpf prog_run;
neverallow { domain -bpfloader -init } bpfloader_exec:file { execute execute_no_trans };
neverallow bpfloader domain:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
# only system_server, netd and bpfloader can read/write the bpf maps