Merge "Add sysprops for virtual Fingerprint/Face HAL"
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/compos.te b/microdroid/system/private/compos.te
index 49bc5b3..386f11e 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/compos.te
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/compos.te
@@ -25,6 +25,10 @@
# See b/35323867#comment3
dontaudit compos self:global_capability_class_set dac_override;
+# Allow settings system properties that ART expects.
+set_prop(compos, dalvik_config_prop)
+set_prop(compos, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
+
# Allow running odrefresh in its own domain
domain_auto_trans(compos, odrefresh_exec, odrefresh)
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/property.te b/microdroid/system/private/property.te
index abb193f..28fb8e1 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/property.te
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/property.te
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
# Declare ART properties for CompOS
system_public_prop(dalvik_config_prop)
system_restricted_prop(device_config_runtime_native_prop)
+system_restricted_prop(device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
# Don't audit legacy ctl. property handling. We only want the newer permission check to appear
# in the audit log
diff --git a/microdroid/system/private/property_contexts b/microdroid/system/private/property_contexts
index b2113e2..2b95520 100644
--- a/microdroid/system/private/property_contexts
+++ b/microdroid/system/private/property_contexts
@@ -154,7 +154,9 @@
heapprofd.enable u:object_r:heapprofd_prop:s0 exact bool
# ART properties for CompOS
-dalvik.vm. u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 prefix
-persist.device_config.runtime_native. u:object_r:device_config_runtime_native_prop:s0 prefix
+dalvik.vm. u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 prefix
+ro.dalvik.vm. u:object_r:dalvik_config_prop:s0 prefix
+persist.device_config.runtime_native. u:object_r:device_config_runtime_native_prop:s0 prefix
+persist.device_config.runtime_native_boot. u:object_r:device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop:s0 prefix
apexd.payload_metadata.path u:object_r:apexd_payload_metadata_prop:s0 exact string
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/file.te b/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/file.te
index 5a843f9..1afa50f 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/file.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/file.te
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
type apex_appsearch_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, apex_data_file_type;
type apex_permission_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, apex_data_file_type;
type apex_scheduling_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, apex_data_file_type;
+type apex_tethering_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, apex_data_file_type;
type apex_wifi_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, apex_data_file_type;
# /data/font/files
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/file_contexts b/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/file_contexts
index b4f42cf..af51799 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/file_contexts
+++ b/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/file_contexts
@@ -589,6 +589,7 @@
/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.compos(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_compos_data_file:s0
/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.permission(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.scheduling(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
+/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.tethering(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.uwb(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
/data/misc/apexdata/com\.android\.wifi(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_system_server_data_file:s0
/data/misc/apexrollback(/.*)? u:object_r:apex_rollback_data_file:s0
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/system_server.te b/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/system_server.te
index ec7bfe4..6d9d960 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/system_server.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/system_server.te
@@ -1362,12 +1362,14 @@
apex_appsearch_data_file
apex_permission_data_file
apex_scheduling_data_file
+ apex_tethering_data_file
apex_wifi_data_file
}:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server {
apex_appsearch_data_file
apex_permission_data_file
apex_scheduling_data_file
+ apex_tethering_data_file
apex_wifi_data_file
}:file create_file_perms;
diff --git a/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te b/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
index e1c8044..818660c 100644
--- a/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
+++ b/prebuilts/api/33.0/private/vold_prepare_subdirs.te
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
apex_appsearch_data_file
apex_permission_data_file
apex_scheduling_data_file
+ apex_tethering_data_file
apex_wifi_data_file
}:dir relabelfrom;
diff --git a/private/apexd.te b/private/apexd.te
index 0cafd3c..6db0fd9 100644
--- a/private/apexd.te
+++ b/private/apexd.te
@@ -33,9 +33,12 @@
allow apexd apex_rollback_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow apexd apex_rollback_data_file:file create_file_perms;
-# Allow apexd to read directories under /data/misc_de in order to snapshot and
-# restore apex data for all users.
-allow apexd system_data_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+# Allow apexd to read /data/misc_de and the directories under it, in order to
+# snapshot and restore apex data for all users.
+allow apexd {
+ system_userdir_file
+ system_data_file
+}:dir r_dir_perms;
# allow apexd to create loop devices with /dev/loop-control
allow apexd loop_control_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
diff --git a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.cil b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.cil
index 7a64f0a..4439277 100644
--- a/private/compat/33.0/33.0.cil
+++ b/private/compat/33.0/33.0.cil
@@ -1919,7 +1919,7 @@
(typeattributeset media_metrics_service_33_0 (media_metrics_service))
(typeattributeset media_projection_service_33_0 (media_projection_service))
(typeattributeset media_router_service_33_0 (media_router_service))
-(typeattributeset media_rw_data_file_33_0 (media_rw_data_file))
+(typeattributeset media_rw_data_file_33_0 (media_rw_data_file media_userdir_file))
(typeattributeset media_session_service_33_0 (media_session_service))
(typeattributeset media_variant_prop_33_0 (media_variant_prop))
(typeattributeset mediadrm_config_prop_33_0 (mediadrm_config_prop))
@@ -2362,7 +2362,7 @@
(typeattributeset system_boot_reason_prop_33_0 (system_boot_reason_prop))
(typeattributeset system_bootstrap_lib_file_33_0 (system_bootstrap_lib_file))
(typeattributeset system_config_service_33_0 (system_config_service))
-(typeattributeset system_data_file_33_0 (system_data_file))
+(typeattributeset system_data_file_33_0 (system_data_file system_userdir_file))
(typeattributeset system_data_root_file_33_0 (system_data_root_file))
(typeattributeset system_dlkm_file_33_0 (system_dlkm_file))
(typeattributeset system_event_log_tags_file_33_0 (system_event_log_tags_file))
@@ -2505,7 +2505,7 @@
(typeattributeset vendor_app_file_33_0 (vendor_app_file))
(typeattributeset vendor_cgroup_desc_file_33_0 (vendor_cgroup_desc_file))
(typeattributeset vendor_configs_file_33_0 (vendor_configs_file))
-(typeattributeset vendor_data_file_33_0 (vendor_data_file))
+(typeattributeset vendor_data_file_33_0 (vendor_data_file vendor_userdir_file))
(typeattributeset vendor_default_prop_33_0 (vendor_default_prop))
(typeattributeset vendor_file_33_0 (vendor_file))
(typeattributeset vendor_framework_file_33_0 (vendor_framework_file))
diff --git a/private/composd.te b/private/composd.te
index 5f99a92..d007d66 100644
--- a/private/composd.te
+++ b/private/composd.te
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
# Read ART's properties
get_prop(composd, dalvik_config_prop)
+get_prop(composd, device_config_runtime_native_boot_prop)
# We never create any artifact files directly
neverallow composd apex_art_data_file:file ~unlink;
diff --git a/private/file_contexts b/private/file_contexts
index af51799..0c45a88 100644
--- a/private/file_contexts
+++ b/private/file_contexts
@@ -563,7 +563,8 @@
/data/local/tmp(/.*)? u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0
/data/local/tmp/ltp(/.*)? u:object_r:nativetest_data_file:s0
/data/local/traces(/.*)? u:object_r:trace_data_file:s0
-/data/media(/.*)? u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0
+/data/media u:object_r:media_userdir_file:s0
+/data/media/.* u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0
/data/mediadrm(/.*)? u:object_r:media_data_file:s0
/data/nativetest(/.*)? u:object_r:nativetest_data_file:s0
/data/nativetest64(/.*)? u:object_r:nativetest_data_file:s0
@@ -580,6 +581,12 @@
/data/rollback/\d+/[^/]+/.*\.apk u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
/data/rollback/\d+/[^/]+/.*\.apex u:object_r:staging_data_file:s0
/data/fonts/files(/.*)? u:object_r:font_data_file:s0
+/data/misc_ce u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/data/misc_de u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/data/system_ce u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/data/system_de u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/data/user u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/data/user_de u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
# Misc data
/data/misc/adb(/.*)? u:object_r:adb_keys_file:s0
@@ -665,8 +672,10 @@
/data/misc/profiles/ref(/.*)? u:object_r:user_profile_data_file:s0
/data/misc/profman(/.*)? u:object_r:profman_dump_data_file:s0
/data/vendor(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
-/data/vendor_ce(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
-/data/vendor_de(/.*)? u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
+/data/vendor_ce u:object_r:vendor_userdir_file:s0
+/data/vendor_ce/.* u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
+/data/vendor_de u:object_r:vendor_userdir_file:s0
+/data/vendor_de/.* u:object_r:vendor_data_file:s0
# storaged proto files
/data/misc_de/[0-9]+/storaged(/.*)? u:object_r:storaged_data_file:s0
@@ -721,8 +730,17 @@
#############################
# Expanded data files
#
-/mnt/expand(/.*)? u:object_r:mnt_expand_file:s0
-/mnt/expand/[^/]+(/.*)? u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand u:object_r:mnt_expand_file:s0
+# CAREFUL: the two system_data_file patterns below can't be replaced with one
+# pattern "/mnt/expand/[^/]+(/.*)?", since SELinux would prioritize that over
+# "/mnt/expand/[^/]+/user". This is because when a path is matched by two
+# patterns that contain regex meta-characters, SELinux just chooses the longer
+# pattern (or the later pattern if the patterns are the same length), rather
+# than the pattern containing fewer regex meta-characters. Splitting the
+# pattern into "/mnt/expand/[^/]+" and "/mnt/expand/[^/]+/.*" works around this
+# problem, except for 1-character filenames which we aren't using.
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+ u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/.* u:object_r:system_data_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app(/.*)? u:object_r:apk_data_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/[^/]+/oat(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
# /mnt/expand/..../app/[randomStringA]/[packageName]-[randomStringB]/base.apk layout
@@ -730,8 +748,13 @@
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp(/.*)? u:object_r:apk_tmp_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/app/vmdl[^/]+\.tmp/oat(/.*)? u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/local/tmp(/.*)? u:object_r:shell_data_file:s0
-/mnt/expand/[^/]+/media(/.*)? u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/media u:object_r:media_userdir_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/media/.* u:object_r:media_rw_data_file:s0
/mnt/expand/[^/]+/misc/vold(/.*)? u:object_r:vold_data_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/misc_ce u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/misc_de u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/user u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
+/mnt/expand/[^/]+/user_de u:object_r:system_userdir_file:s0
# coredump directory for userdebug/eng devices
/cores(/.*)? u:object_r:coredump_file:s0
diff --git a/private/mediaprovider_app.te b/private/mediaprovider_app.te
index a9a52bb..dc6882b 100644
--- a/private/mediaprovider_app.te
+++ b/private/mediaprovider_app.te
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
allow mediaprovider_app fuse_device:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
# Allow MediaProvider to read/write media_rw_data_file files and dirs
+allow mediaprovider_app media_userdir_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow mediaprovider_app media_rw_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow mediaprovider_app media_rw_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
diff --git a/private/perfetto.te b/private/perfetto.te
index 5897aed..0904a67 100644
--- a/private/perfetto.te
+++ b/private/perfetto.te
@@ -110,6 +110,9 @@
data_file_type
-system_data_file
-system_data_root_file
+ -media_userdir_file
+ -system_userdir_file
+ -vendor_userdir_file
# TODO(b/72998741) Remove exemption. Further restricted in a subsequent
# neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
-vendor_data_file
diff --git a/private/system_server.te b/private/system_server.te
index 4d44736..e77ba5d 100644
--- a/private/system_server.te
+++ b/private/system_server.te
@@ -486,6 +486,10 @@
allow system_server keychain_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow system_server keychain_data_file:lnk_file create_file_perms;
+# Read the user parent directories like /data/user. Don't allow write access,
+# as vold is responsible for creating and deleting the subdirectories.
+allow system_server system_userdir_file:dir r_dir_perms;
+
# Manage /data/app.
allow system_server apk_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow system_server apk_data_file:{ file lnk_file } { create_file_perms link };
diff --git a/private/traced.te b/private/traced.te
index a6e200e..ec31a20 100644
--- a/private/traced.te
+++ b/private/traced.te
@@ -95,6 +95,9 @@
-perfetto_traces_bugreport_data_file
-system_data_file
-system_data_root_file
+ -media_userdir_file
+ -system_userdir_file
+ -vendor_userdir_file
# TODO(b/72998741) Remove vendor_data_file exemption. Further restricted in a
# subsequent neverallow. Currently only getattr and search are allowed.
-vendor_data_file
diff --git a/private/traced_probes.te b/private/traced_probes.te
index 66d5ac4..f2be14d 100644
--- a/private/traced_probes.te
+++ b/private/traced_probes.te
@@ -126,6 +126,9 @@
-dalvikcache_data_file
-system_data_file
-system_data_root_file
+ -media_userdir_file
+ -system_userdir_file
+ -vendor_userdir_file
-system_app_data_file
-backup_data_file
-bootstat_data_file
diff --git a/private/untrusted_app.te b/private/untrusted_app.te
index 62d458d..56e44db 100644
--- a/private/untrusted_app.te
+++ b/private/untrusted_app.te
@@ -14,3 +14,10 @@
untrusted_app_domain(untrusted_app)
net_domain(untrusted_app)
bluetooth_domain(untrusted_app)
+
+# Allow webview to access fd shared by sdksandbox for experiments data
+# TODO(b/229249719): Will not be supported in Android U
+allow untrusted_app sdk_sandbox_data_file:fd use;
+allow untrusted_app sdk_sandbox_data_file:file write;
+
+neverallow untrusted_app sdk_sandbox_data_file:file { open create };
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/private/vold.te b/private/vold.te
index cb7b1bc..40c1a57 100644
--- a/private/vold.te
+++ b/private/vold.te
@@ -66,3 +66,31 @@
-apexd
-gsid
} vold_service:service_manager find;
+
+# Allow vold to create and delete per-user directories like /data/user/$userId.
+allow vold {
+ media_userdir_file
+ system_userdir_file
+ vendor_userdir_file
+}:dir {
+ add_name
+ remove_name
+ write
+};
+
+# Only vold should create (and delete) per-user directories like
+# /data/user/$userId. This is very important, as these directories need to be
+# encrypted with per-user keys, which only vold can do. Encryption can only be
+# set up on empty directories, so creation and encryption must happen together.
+neverallow {
+ domain
+ -vold
+} {
+ media_userdir_file
+ system_userdir_file
+ vendor_userdir_file
+}:dir {
+ add_name
+ remove_name
+ write
+};
diff --git a/private/zygote.te b/private/zygote.te
index db39005..9368621 100644
--- a/private/zygote.te
+++ b/private/zygote.te
@@ -66,13 +66,15 @@
# them for app data isolation. Also traverse these directories (via
# /data_mirror) to find the allowlisted per-app directories to bind-mount in.
allow zygote {
- # /data/data, /data/user{,_de}, /mnt/expand/$volume/user{,_de}
+ # /data/user{,_de}, /mnt/expand/$volume/user{,_de}
+ system_userdir_file
+ # /data/data
system_data_file
# /data/misc/profiles/cur
user_profile_root_file
# /data/misc/profiles/ref
user_profile_data_file
- # /storage/emulated/$uid/Android/{data,obb}
+ # /storage/emulated/$userId/Android/{data,obb}
media_rw_data_file
}:dir { mounton search };
@@ -100,6 +102,7 @@
# standard labels. Note: it seems that not all dirs are actually relabeled yet,
# but it works anyway since all domains can search tmpfs:dir.
allow zygote tmpfs:{ dir lnk_file } relabelfrom;
+allow zygote system_userdir_file:dir relabelto;
allow zygote system_data_file:{ dir lnk_file } relabelto;
# Read if sdcardfs is supported
diff --git a/public/domain.te b/public/domain.te
index 6258c7a..bc3f373 100644
--- a/public/domain.te
+++ b/public/domain.te
@@ -242,16 +242,30 @@
allow domain sysfs_transparent_hugepage:dir search;
allow domain sysfs_transparent_hugepage:file r_file_perms;
-# files under /data.
+# Allow search access, and sometimes getattr access, to various directories
+# under /data. We are fairly lenient in allowing search access to top-level
+# dirs that commonly need to be traversed to get access to the "real" files, as
+# this greatly simplifies the policy and doesn't open up much attack surface.
not_full_treble(`
allow domain system_data_file:dir getattr;
')
allow { coredomain appdomain } system_data_file:dir getattr;
-# /data has the label system_data_root_file. Vendor components need the search
-# permission on system_data_root_file for path traversal to /data/vendor.
+# Anything that accesses anything in /data needs search access to /data itself.
+# This includes vendor components, as they need to access /data/vendor.
allow domain system_data_root_file:dir { search getattr } ;
+# system_data_file is the default type for directories in /data. Anything
+# accessing data files with a more specific type often has to traverse a
+# system_data_file directory such as /data/misc to get there.
allow domain system_data_file:dir search;
+# Anything that accesses files in /data/user (and /data/user_de, etc.) needs
+# search access to these directories themselves. getattr access is sometimes
+# needed too.
+allow { coredomain appdomain } system_userdir_file:dir { search getattr };
+# Anything that accesses files in /data/media needs search access to /data/media
+# itself.
+allow { coredomain appdomain } media_userdir_file:dir search;
# TODO restrict this to non-coredomain
+allow domain vendor_userdir_file:dir { getattr search };
allow domain vendor_data_file:dir { getattr search };
# required by the dynamic linker
@@ -853,6 +867,7 @@
core_data_file_type
-system_data_file # default label for files on /data. Covered below...
-system_data_root_file
+ -vendor_userdir_file
-vendor_data_file
-zoneinfo_data_file
with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
@@ -865,6 +880,7 @@
-unencrypted_data_file
-system_data_file
-system_data_root_file
+ -vendor_userdir_file
-vendor_data_file
-zoneinfo_data_file
with_native_coverage(`-method_trace_data_file')
diff --git a/public/file.te b/public/file.te
index 9d333f5..009e86d 100644
--- a/public/file.te
+++ b/public/file.te
@@ -299,13 +299,20 @@
type system_data_root_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
# Default type for anything under /data.
type system_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
+# Default type for directories containing per-user encrypted directories, such
+# as /data/user and /data/user_de.
+type system_userdir_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
# Type for /data/system/packages.list.
# TODO(b/129332765): Narrow down permissions to this.
# Find out users of system_data_file that should be granted only this.
type packages_list_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
type game_mode_intervention_list_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
-# Default type for anything under /data/vendor{_ce,_de}.
+# Default type for anything inside /data/vendor_{ce,de}.
type vendor_data_file, file_type, data_file_type;
+# Type for /data/vendor_{ce,de} themselves. This has core_data_file_type
+# because these directories themselves are platform-managed; only the files
+# *inside* them are vendor data. (Somewhat similar to system_data_root_file.)
+type vendor_userdir_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
# Unencrypted data
type unencrypted_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
# installd-create files in /data/misc/installd such as layout_version
@@ -427,6 +434,7 @@
type keystore_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
type media_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
type media_rw_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type, mlstrustedobject;
+type media_userdir_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
type misc_user_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
type net_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
type network_watchlist_data_file, file_type, data_file_type, core_data_file_type;
diff --git a/public/init.te b/public/init.te
index ce0d130..cc28098 100644
--- a/public/init.te
+++ b/public/init.te
@@ -212,10 +212,11 @@
allow init {
file_type
-app_data_file
+ -credstore_data_file
-exec_type
-iorapd_data_file
- -credstore_data_file
-keystore_data_file
+ -media_userdir_file
-misc_logd_file
-nativetest_data_file
-privapp_data_file
@@ -223,7 +224,9 @@
-system_app_data_file
-system_dlkm_file_type
-system_file_type
+ -system_userdir_file
-vendor_file_type
+ -vendor_userdir_file
-vold_data_file
}:dir { write add_name remove_name rmdir relabelfrom };
@@ -251,6 +254,10 @@
allow init tracefs_type:file { create_file_perms relabelfrom };
+# Allow init to read /apex/apex-info-list.xml for preinstalled paths of APEXes to determine
+# subcontext for action/service defined in APEXes.
+allow init apex_info_file:file r_file_perms;
+
allow init {
file_type
-app_data_file
diff --git a/public/installd.te b/public/installd.te
index 46796af..216704d 100644
--- a/public/installd.te
+++ b/public/installd.te
@@ -42,13 +42,12 @@
allow installd asec_image_file:dir search;
allow installd asec_image_file:file getattr;
-# Create /data/user and /data/user/0 if necessary.
-# Also required to initially create /data/data subdirectories
+# Required to initially create subdirectories of /data/user/$userId
# and lib symlinks before the setfilecon call. May want to
# move symlink creation after setfilecon in installd.
allow installd system_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
-# Also, allow read for lnk_file so that we can process /data/user/0 links when
-# optimizing application code.
+# Also, allow read for lnk_file so that we can process symlinks within
+# /data/user/$userId when optimizing application code.
allow installd system_data_file:lnk_file { create getattr read setattr unlink };
# Manage lower filesystem via pass_through mounts
@@ -62,6 +61,7 @@
allow installd media_rw_data_file:dir relabelto;
# Delete /data/media files through sdcardfs, instead of going behind its back
+allow installd media_userdir_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow installd tmpfs:dir r_dir_perms;
allow installd storage_file:dir search;
allow installd { sdcard_type fuse }:dir { search open read write remove_name getattr rmdir };
@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@
allow installd mirror_data_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
# Upgrade /data/misc/keychain for multi-user if necessary.
+allow installd system_userdir_file:dir r_dir_perms;
allow installd misc_user_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
allow installd misc_user_data_file:file create_file_perms;
allow installd keychain_data_file:dir create_dir_perms;
diff --git a/public/ioctl_defines b/public/ioctl_defines
index 51cce4e..11f7f3e 100644
--- a/public/ioctl_defines
+++ b/public/ioctl_defines
@@ -132,6 +132,7 @@
define(`BC_REPLY', `0x40406301')
define(`BC_REQUEST_DEATH_NOTIFICATION', `0x400c630e')
define(`BC_TRANSACTION', `0x40406300')
+define(`BINDER_GET_EXTENDED_ERROR', `0xc0486211')
define(`BINDER_ENABLE_ONEWAY_SPAM_DETECTION', `0x40046210')
define(`BINDER_FREEZE', `0x400c620e')
define(`BINDER_GET_FROZEN_INFO', `0xc00c620f')
diff --git a/public/ioctl_macros b/public/ioctl_macros
index 47a5157..64ee1b0 100644
--- a/public/ioctl_macros
+++ b/public/ioctl_macros
@@ -73,4 +73,5 @@
BINDER_SET_IDLE_PRIORITY BINDER_SET_CONTEXT_MGR BINDER_THREAD_EXIT
BINDER_VERSION BINDER_GET_NODE_DEBUG_INFO BINDER_GET_NODE_INFO_FOR_REF
BINDER_SET_CONTEXT_MGR_EXT BINDER_ENABLE_ONEWAY_SPAM_DETECTION
+BINDER_GET_EXTENDED_ERROR
}')
diff --git a/public/toolbox.te b/public/toolbox.te
index 93adbc4..3705a92 100644
--- a/public/toolbox.te
+++ b/public/toolbox.te
@@ -22,11 +22,11 @@
neverallow * toolbox:process dyntransition;
neverallow toolbox { file_type fs_type -toolbox_exec}:file entrypoint;
-# rm -rf directories in /data
+# rm -rf /data/per_boot
allow toolbox system_data_root_file:dir { remove_name write };
allow toolbox system_data_file:dir { rmdir rw_dir_perms };
allow toolbox system_data_file:file { getattr unlink };
# chattr +F /data/media in init
-allow toolbox media_rw_data_file:dir { r_dir_perms setattr };
-allowxperm toolbox media_rw_data_file:dir ioctl { FS_IOC_SETFLAGS FS_IOC_GETFLAGS };
+allow toolbox media_userdir_file:dir { r_dir_perms setattr };
+allowxperm toolbox media_userdir_file:dir ioctl { FS_IOC_SETFLAGS FS_IOC_GETFLAGS };
diff --git a/public/vold.te b/public/vold.te
index b0fb6d0..07f0fd3 100644
--- a/public/vold.te
+++ b/public/vold.te
@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@
# Allow mounting (lower filesystem) on parts of media for performance
allow vold media_rw_data_file:dir mounton;
-# Allow setting extended attributes (for project quota IDs) on files and dirs
-# and to enable project ID inheritance through FS_IOC_SETFLAGS
+# Allow setting project quota IDs and enabling project ID inheritance on
+# /data/media/$userId/* and /mnt/expand/$volume/media/$userId/*
allowxperm vold media_rw_data_file:{ dir file } ioctl {
FS_IOC_FSGETXATTR
FS_IOC_FSSETXATTR
@@ -124,6 +124,10 @@
allow vold mnt_expand_file:dir { create_dir_perms mounton };
allow vold apk_data_file:dir { create getattr setattr };
allow vold shell_data_file:dir { create getattr setattr };
+allow vold system_userdir_file:dir { create getattr setattr };
+allow vold media_userdir_file:dir { create getattr setattr open read ioctl };
+# Needed to set the casefold flag on /mnt/expand/$volume/media
+allowxperm vold media_userdir_file:dir ioctl { FS_IOC_GETFLAGS FS_IOC_SETFLAGS };
# Allow to mount incremental file system on /data/incremental and create files
allow vold apk_data_file:dir { mounton rw_dir_perms };